Italo Balbo and the Colonization of Libya by Claudio G. Segre

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talo albo nd theolonization o Libya

Claudio G. Segre

Who does not remember he thousandsof colonist familiesthatBalbo led there [to Libya]? the nationalisthistorian,GioacchinoVolpe, asked rhetorically.1 ndeed, the intensive settlement ofLibya under the governorshipof Italo Balbo ranksas one of thefascist regime smost memorable eats of demographic oloniza-tion . In I940, following two grand mass migrations, nearly 40 percent of the 110,000 Italians in Libya were agricultural olonists,most of them former landless peasants and agricultural daylabourers.Libyaunder Balboprovideda splendidconfirmation fthe regime sclaim that the Italianempirein Africa was not con-quered for the privileged ew but to give proletariantaly at lastanoutlet for its exuberant ife .2With his immensepersonalcharm,his organizingabilities,andhis flair for publicity,Balbo did much to enhancethe image offascist Italy as a nation dedicatedto demographic olonization .The mass sailing of 20,000 peasants in 1938, an expedition whichBalbo led personally,gainedinternationalpublicity. Perhapsthegrandfleet of sixteen ships bearingthe colonists and the festive,emotionalwelcomeforthe 8oofamilies n Tripoliwereoverdone.Yet even the most scepticalforeignvisitorsand newsmen had toadmirethe efficiencyand smoothnesswith which the emigrationwashandled.Yet the view that demographiccolonizationwas largely thebrainchild of Balbo - as Volpe and others imply - can be mis-leading.3No manis wholly original n his ideas andBalbowas no

1 G. Volpe, L Italia degli emigranti , L Italia chefu, Milan 1961, I23-24.2 See the basic policy speech by A. Lessona, Minister of Italian Africa, AttiParlamentari, Legislatura XXIX, la Sessione, Tornata del I9 maggio I937; re-printed in Luigi Preti, Imperofascista, africani ed ebrei, Milan 1968, 219.3 John Wright, Libya, New York 1969, I71.14I

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYexception. The type of state-directed peasant colonization that heorganized on a mass scale had been discussed and rejected since thedays of the Liberal regimes. Even Count Giuseppe Volpi, the firstgovernor of Libya under a fascist government, had opposedsuch projects because of their expense. Nor was Balbo originalin creating the administrative institutions for operating hisprojects. These institutions - colonization companies createdfor the purpose of settling landless peasants - were largely anextension of the work of Balbo s predecessors, De Bono andBadoglio.Balbo s real contribution was his ability as a leader and an or-ganizer. In energy, charm, and organizing talents, he had few peersamong the other fascist gerarchi. Yet his reputation and energyalone would not have been enough to expand the colonization tothe scale that he ultimately reached. Balbo s real fortune was thatby the time of his governorship, the regime was less interested inthe costs of colonization than in the prestige which the projectsmight reflect. The colonization could - and did - bring lustre to theregime in several ways. First, a modern, intensively colonizedLibya provided a strong card in the fascist bid for Mediterraneanhegemony and African empire. Second, on a less belligerent note,the Libyan example of large-scale public works and resettlementprojects suggested some new answers to a world troubled by un-employment and depression. Finally, the colonization struck aspecial chord in the hearts of many patriotic Italians. The regimewas finally realizing an old dream - cherished for years especiallyby Italy s minority of colonial enthusiasts - of creating populationoutlets under the Italian flag in Africa.What Balbo offered, then, was not new ideas. In many ways hiswork was an extension of the foundations laid by his predecessors.With the fascist drive for prestige behind him, however, he couldindulge his abilities as organizer and leader to their fullest extent.He could enlarge the colonization on a scale that had never beenopen to his predecessors. But the reverse was also true: when thefascist bid for empire failed, Balbo s colonization, too, founderedand disappeared.How did Balbo follow in the tracks of his predecessors ? In whatways did he realize the aspirations of an earlier generation ofcolonial enthusiasts ? To answer these questions it is necessary toreview Italian plans for the colony during the Giolittian era.

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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAIN 1912, EXCEPT FOR THE COASTAL OASES near Tripoli and theplateausof Cyrenaica, he Italiansfound themselvesmastersoflittlemore thanlargetractsof bleak,barrendesert.The Turkshadmadelittle effort to transformLibya. The colonyoffered ittle inthe way of naturalresourcesor tradingpossibilities.A few dates,animalhides, esparto grass, sponges and fish were Libya schiefproducts.The one inexhaustibleresourcethat Libya offeredwasland- andplentyof it.4If nothingelse, then, at leastLibyamightbecome a peasant sparadise. n the newcolonythousandsof land-less peasantswho otherwiseemigrated o foreign ands might re-claimtheirown farms.The feasibilityof a mass peasantcolonizationwas widely de-batedeven before the LibyanWar.Politiciansand diplomats ikeDi San Giuliano and Sonnino, favouredpopulationcolonies inLibyaasa meansto bolsterItaly sdiplomaticaims in the Mediter-ranean and as a safety valve for the nation ssocial discontent.5Socialists ike AntonioLabriolawerehopeful that Tripoli wouldbecomea greatoutlet forthe Italianproletariat nd thusputanendto emigration.Without a colony like Libya, Labriola argued,Italian emigrantsdispersedto the five corners of the earth, tocountries uch asArgentinawheretheycouldneverhopeto gatherin such numbersas to createa newpatria. With Libyaunder theItalianflag,on the otherhand, emigrants.. wouldno longerbeemigrants ince they wouldbe going to populatea newpatria .6The imageof Libyaas a potentialpeasant sparadisereallybe-came fixed in the public mind during the furious newspaperpolemics at the time of the Libyan War. Corradini and thenationalist press - but also some of the Giolittian papers - pre-sented Libya as a future emigrant sparadise.7Only two thingswereneeded to makethe dreama reality: iberation rom thebar-barousTurkishyoke and a little hardwork. As proofof Libya spotential,colonialenthusiastscited classical iteraturewhich de-scribedarich andfertile andatthetimeof theRomans.If classical4Modern Libya encompasses680,000 squaremiles and ranksas the fourthlargestcountryin Africa.5 F. Cataluccio, Antonino di San Giuliano e la politica estera italiana dal I9ooal 1914, Florence I935, I3; M. L. Salvadori, II mito del buongoverno,Turin 1963,62-II5.6 Antonio Labriola, Scritti vari difilosofia e politica, Bari 1906, 439.7 E. Corradini, L ora di Tripoli, Milan I9ii; M. Pincherle, La preparazionedell opinione pubblica all impresa di Libia , Rassegna storica del Risorgimento,July-Sept. 1969.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYliterature wasn t proof enough, the analogy with neighbouringTunisia was often cited. There, under similar circumstances, it wasargued, Italian emigrants - mostly Sicilians - had created flourish-ing farms and olive groves.Just who should organize and finance the Libyan colonizationwas not always made clear. Part of the radical Left claimed that itis the duty of the government to present to parliament an organicplan for the occupation and utilization of the conquered territoriesby the working classes, without any privileges for private capital .8The mavericksocialist, Gaetano Salvemini, on the other hand, dis-puted the nationalist portrayal of Libya as a terrestrialparadise ;Libya s natural conditions were not those of Tunisia and he wasopposed to any mass colonization with landless peasants.Grandiose public works projects and more or less forced statecolonization were senseless.9 They could lead only to an artificialagglomeration of immigrants to whom the government would beforced to give work even when there wasn t any.A governmental commission which visited the colony in 1913showed no enthusiasm for extensive state involvement. It recom-mended that colonization should be financed primarily by privatecapital and should employ Libyan labour. Too often in the publicmind, the commission report complained, colonization was con-sidered simply as a surrogate for emigration - a surrogate that wasto be organized and financed by the government.10Even Baron Franchetti, the chief architect of the government-sponsored colonization of Eritrea during the Crispi era, expresseddoubts about the feasibility of mass colonization. In Libya the en-vironmental conditions were much more difficult than in Eritrea shighlands. Certainly state aid would be justified in Libya since thecolonization would be in the national interest, but the Libyan prob-lem would be far more complex and expensive than what he hadattempted in Eritrea.11For the first two decades of Italian rule, however, the question ofland colonization was subordinate to the military and politicalproblems of pacifying the colony. The first attempts at settlement

8 E. Lemonon, La Libye et l opinion publique italienne , Questions diplo-matiques et coloniales, July-December I9I3, 597.9 G. Salvemini, A mosca cieca , L Unita, 6 December I912.10Commissione per lo studio Agrologico della Tripolitania, La Tripolitaniasettentrionale, Rome 1913, I, 363.11L. Franchetti, Mezzogiorno e colonie, Florence I950, 425.144



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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAcamein Tripolitaniawhere the Italians inallyemergedvictoriousby I925. Cyrenaica, ontaining ome of the best landsfor coloniza-tion, was not peaceful until I932.In Tripolitania,the first governorunder the fascist regime,Count GiuseppeVolpi, a Venetianbankerand diplomat,madeitclearthat he wantedno partof masspeasantcolonization.12He re-cognized the political importanceof creatinga large and stableItalianpopulation n the colony,but thoughtthat for the statetobearthe entire burdenof financingthe colonizationwas absurd.His own plan- once he had resolved he thornyproblemof creat-ing a publicdomain was to offer and to privateItalian nvestors.He hopedto attract hem by offeringcheapland,tax advantages,andgovernmentassistance n the form of creditandtechnicalad-vice. To preventanyconcessionaireromsimplyholdingraw landas speculation,Volpi slegislationstipulated hatvarious mprove-ments had to be madeon the land or the concessionwouldbe re-voked.Gradually, s in Tunisia,he argued, he largeestateswouldbe brokendown. ImmigrantItalian abourerswouldsave enoughto buytheir ownplots.Meanwhile, he colony seconomywouldbetransformedas private and governmentinvestment createdthenecessary nfrastructure.Such a prudent policy, based on economic considerations,eventually clashed with fascism s ambitious colonial goals. AsLuigi Federzoni, the minister of colonies, wrote in a privatememorandumo the Duce in I927, the questionof Libyancoloni-zationwas not an end in itself. The problemof populatingLibyawas reallya problemof foreignpolicy, a problemof making partof Africa sMediterraneanhores Italian n fact aswell as in law .13Yet, despitethe government snducements,Volpi sapproachwasnot attractingmuch capital investment in Tripolitania sagri-culture.14Worse still, Volpi s plan meant the creationof largeestates whose owners were inclined to hire cheap Libyan labour

12 La rinascita della Tripolitania: memorie e studi sui quattro anni di governo delConte Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata, Milan I926, I87-238.13 US National Archives, Official Records of Italian Government Agencies(I922-44), T-586 (II34) 070574.14 Italian capital, lazy and sluggish, still shuffling about in its householdslippers, has understood nothing of our colonial future, and what is worse,doesn t want to understand anything , complained a correspondent of thecolonialist periodical, L Oltremare. C. Gulinelli, L Oltremare, November I928,418.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYrather than to import Italian colonists and their families. Thus thecolony was making little headway in developing a dense metro-politan population.Mussolini had made his first visit to Libya in I926 an occasionto raise the Italian colonial problem before the world. Now, aspolitical goals came to override purely economic considerations,state intervention in colonization policy became more pronounced.In I928, under De Bono s governorship, new legislation was passedto increase subsidies to private concessionaires and to require themto settle colonist families on their lands.15 Thanks to this newlegislation, the number of immigrant families in Tripolitania morethan trebled between 1929 and I933. In 1929 some 455 families,totalling 1778 members, were settled in Tripolitania. Four yearslater, the number had increased to I500 families with about7000 members.16In a few selected areasthe state went beyond encouraging privatecapital to settle colonist families. Colonization companies, financedin part by the state and in part by private capital, experimentedwith direct settlement of landless peasants. These companiesdiffered widely in size and financial structure, but were similar intheir methods and goals.17Their aim was primarily the creation ofsmall, independent landowners from the peasant colonist familieswho emigrated from Italy. Their method was similar: they pro-vided the colonist family with all the necessities for reclaiming theirnew farms from the steppe. Tools, seed, houses, livestock, credit,technical advice were all furnished by the company; the colonistand his family contributed only their labour. The colonist s rela-tionship with the company was regulated by a variety of contractswhich provided that the colonist would pay off the company s in-vestment in stages as the farm became productive. At the end of 20to 30 years, thanks to the company s financial support and direc-tion, the colonist would be ready for independence - and he wouldhave earned his own farm.

15R.D.L. 7 June 1928, no. 1695. The De Bono laws were a kind of intensi-fied Volpi plan in which demographic goals were made explicit. For text of thelegislation see: Governo della Libia, Direzione di affari economici e colonizza-zione. Norme relative alla colonizzazione in Libia, Tripoli I939.16Istituto Agricolo Coloniale (IAC), La colonizzazione della Tripolitania,Rome 1947, 6r, I38.17 G. Palloni, I contratti agrari degli Enti di Colonizzazione in Libia, Florence1945, 34-40.

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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAThus, when Balbobecamegovernorn 1934,the commitmentostatecolonizationhad been madeandthe colonization ompanies

the administrative nd technical velhicles or mass colonizationwerealready unctioning.Balbo,who until I933hadbeenoccupiedwith buildingthe Italian air force and leadingspectacular rans-oceanicflights,hadnothingto do with thesedecisions.WHERE DID THE INITIATIVE and the models for the Libyancolonizationcome from? As the colonizationn Libya developed,it becamemore and morean extensionof the regime s nternalre-clamationandunemploymentprojects.Likethe PontineMarshes,thecolonization n Libyawaspartof the Duce sattempts o createmore livingspace to resolveItaly smountingsocialandeconomiccrises.To foreignvisitorswhomarvelled ttheaccomplishmentsnthe PontineMarshes, he Duce was fond of pointingout how theNew Italywas colonizing he sand in Libya.18The parallelwith thePontineMarsheswas not purelyrhetorical.Boththe colonization ompaniesn Libyaand the PontineMarsheswereunder hegeneral upervision f thesamegovernment gency,the Commission or InternalMigrationand Colonization.19 hisbody had been created n 1930with the specifictaskof resettlingsmall farmersand day labourersof the Po Valley. Gradually, tspowerswereextendedbeyondItaly smetropolitanboundaries.Inadministrative tructure,financing,agrarian ontracts and direc-tion, the Libyan colonizationcompaniesshowed many parallelswith the state s nternalreclamation chemes.The chief lobbyists for the extension of internalcolonizationprogrammeso LibyawereLuigi Razza,the firstpresidentof theCommission for Internal Migration and Colonization, andAlessandroLessona, ormanyyearsunder-secretaryn the colonialministry.Razza,one of the regime sexpertson agriculturalabourproblems,becameMinisterof PublicWorksshortlybeforehe diedin a 1935 plane crash. Lessona - ironically one of Balbo s chiefenemies in the in-fightingamongthe gerarchi argued ong andhardfor the creationof colonization ompanies.20He wasa strong

18 C. Eylan, Choses vues en Italie et en Libye , Revue des deux mondes,I March 1936, 132.19 Migratorie, correnti , Enciclopedia italiana, Milan 1934, XXIII, 258;L. Razza, Le migrazioni interne e la colonizzazione . Nuova Antologia, I6 Feb-ruary I932, 532-39.20 Among the cliques and rivalries that formed in fascist colonial circles,147



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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAinstance,ashe records n his diary,he organizedapeacefularmyof63,000 (by his count) peasantsandunemployed n Ferrara o de-monstrate or additionalgovernmentpublic worksprojects.25 nthis episode,Balboshowed the same concern or carefulorganiza-tion that he laterdisplayedwith the Ventimila.Balbo s second asset - as the demonstration n Ferraramightindicate was his familiaritywith theproblemsandpoliticsof landcolonizationand reclamation.Perhapshe did not knowthe Libyansituationspecificallywhen he first becamegovernor;andperhapshe was not astheoreticallywell-versedas his technical taff;never-theless,as areadingof his Diaryfor 1922 ndicates,he knewsome-thing aboutthe problemsof agricultural abourfrom first-handexperience.After all, as a squadrista, e had made a careerofexploitingagrarianunrest.A third factor hatstimulatedhis interest n colonizationwashisown personalambition.He was as eageras ever to remain n thepubliceye, to maintainhis politicalstatus and his contacts.Afterhis triumphsas soldierandaviator,he nowplanned o adda careerasempirebuilderin Africa.He fanciedhimself as a sortof ItalianLyautey. No one admireshim morethan I do , Balbosaid of thegreat French colonialadministrator.26With peace established nLibyafor the firsttime in more thantwentyyearsof Italianrule,Balbo could turn to constructiveprogrammes as well as thesumptuous living in the governor spalace- that suggestedtheimage of his French idol. Like Lyautey, he devoted himself tobuildingandmodernizinghis capitalof Tripoli.He expanded heroadnetworkand the colonization.Towardsthe Libyans- nowthat all organizedresistancewasbroken he offeredvarious con-ciliatorygesturesandpolicies.27The goalof intensive andcolonizationwasstill remote. Finan-cial inducementsand legal stipulationsto force privateconces-sionaires o settle colonistfamilieson their landswere notyieldingsatisfactory esults. As late as the 1937 agricultural ensus,onlyabout7 per cent of the I24,000 hectaresunderprivateconcession

25 I. Balbo, Diario 1922, Milan I932, 50-5I.26 C. Eylan, loc. cit., 137.27 In I936 a period of severe drought threatened to decimate the livestock inTripolitania. Balbo organized a fleet of 50 ships to ferry some 300,000 head oflivestock to Cyrenaica. During the return march to Tripolitania in the autumn,Balbo organized watering stations all along the route. Cf. Martin Moore, FourthShore: Italy s Mass Colonization of Libya, London I940, I74.149



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYwere distributed n smallfarms of 50 hectares.Colonistfamilies,boththosewho workedonthe latifundia ndthose who ownedtheirownfarms, otalled1299.Volpi shopethat the largeestateswouldgraduallybe subdividedwasbeingrealizedveryslowly,if atall. AsBalboput it, he foundhimself heir to a situation hat was expen-sive for the state, unsuitableto the needs of the concessionaires,and sterile n regard o thebasicgoalsof the fascistregime. And heconcluded: there was nothingfor me to do but to changecoursedecisively .The latifundiawere to givewayto a colonizationbasedprimarily n socialgoals ,a systemthatwould directthe govern-ment s financial acrifices to the trueworkersof the land .28The experiments of the Enteper la ColonizzazionedellaCirenaicacaughthis eye. To be sure,therewereproblems o be ironedout:he wanteda better selectionof colonists;he plannedto locate thecompany sheadquartersn the colonyrather han n Rome;he sawthat there wereconflicts o be settled betweenthe governmentandthe company,the colonistsand the Libyans,the techniciansandthe administrators.But basically, n Balbo sview, the systemre-presentedby the companywas sound. With minormodifications,he extendedthe company sauthority o Tripolitaniaand changedits nameto Ente per la ColonizzazionedellaLibia in I935. Thatsameyear,a secondcompany,a branchof the Istituto NazionaleFascistaper la PrevidenzaSociale,a social securityand welfareorganization,began colonizationactivity in Tripolitania.In themeantime,despiteofficialgovernment ssuranceshat the coloniza-tion companieswere not intendedto competewithprivateconces-sions,opportunitiesorprivate nvestmentbecamemoreand morerestricted.Landin thepublicdomainwasincreasingly eserved orthe companies.29The increasedauthorityof the colonizationcompaniesset the

28 I. Balbo, La colonizzazione in Libia , L Agricoltura coloniale, August I939,463-64. At the time of the mid-1937 agricultural census, private concessionswere distributed as follows: 8025 hectares divided into 539 small farms of50 hectares or less; 12,500 hectares divided into 130 farms of 50-200 hectares;finally I3I concessions that covered I03,288 hectares of which the seven largestalone encompassed 24,535 hectares.29 The I937 census indicated that only 3000 hectares were available to privatecolonization for further expansion in Tripolitania and about I0,000 hectares inCyrenaica. The colonization companies in the meantime tripled and quadrupledtheir holdings to a total of about 225,000 hectares in I940 compared to aboutI35,000 hectares in private concessions. IAC, La colonizzazione agricola dellaTripolitania, II3, I50; La colonizzazione in Cirenaica, I6, I8.

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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAstagefor the finalphaseof fascistcolonizationpolicy- thephaseofintensive demographiccolonization.In the spring of I937, theDuce madea secondvisit to Libya.As in I926, his visit signalledashiftin policy. Unlikehis earliervisit,however, herewereno bel-ligerentspeeches.This time Mussoliniwaseagerto depicthimselfas the peaceful Protectorof Islam and the leaderof an imperialpowerconcernedonlywith the developmentof its colonies.The planfor the Ventimila,which Balborevealed n May 1938,formedapartof thisprogrammeordevelopment.30t was to settle20,000 colonists eachyearfor five yearsin succession.The long-range goalwas a populationof 500,000Italians n Libyaby mid-century.Balbo made clear how the intensivephaseof colonizationfitted in with fascism spoliticalandsocialgoals.First of all, Libyawas to become legally a Fourth Shore by integratingthe fournorthern provinces into the Italian kingdom.31The intensivecolonizationwouldmakethis integrationa realityand not a sterilepiece of legislation.Secondly, intensive colonizationmeant thetransferof extensivemanpowero the colonyandwouldstrengthenItaly s military-strategicposition in the Mediterranean.Thecolonizationalso fittedinto fascistplans for autarkyand for thecolony sown self-sufficiency.Finally,intensive colonizationhar-monized with the goals of the CorporateState and the FascistCharterof Labour.Throughthe processof intensivecolonization,landless peasants would be transformed nto prosperoussmalllandowners,representing he values of familysolidarity,dignity,andpoliticalorder.The colonizationwould realizethe old sloganof landto the peasants la terraai contadini) .

Whatwould happento the Libyansdisplacedby the incomingcolonists?Balbohadhis answers.The governmentplanneda pro-grammeof agriculturaldevelopment hat was virtuallyidenticalwith the opportunitiesofferedto the Italians.The samefinancialand technicalaids would be available, he sametypes of govern-ment villageswould be built for them in special areas.Further-more, Italians were to be settled farmers.They would not beallowed o raise argeherdsof livestock thisactivitywas to be leftas a monopolyfor the Libyans.Finally, Libyanswouldbenefitas30 The basic legislation is contained in RDL. 17 May I938, no. 70I.31 I. Balbo, La colonizzazione in Libia , 466. The measure was reminiscent ofthe French administration of Algeria. Like Algeria, Libya was to be divided intofour metropolitan provinces (Tripoli, Misurata, Benghazi, Derna) under fourprefects. The Fezzan remained a military territory.I51



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYlabourers n the construction obs createdby the buildingof thenew agricultural ettlements.

Onpapertheseplansseemed attractive. n practice hey proveddifficultto implement.Even if the war had not intervened,theLibyans showed little interest in the new agriculturalpatternswhich the Italianstried to introduce.In Cyrenaica he bedouinsshowed their resentmentat the occupationof their best grazinglandsbysporadic aidsonthe Italiansettlements.Even in Tripoli-tania,wherestableagriculturewasatradition, he attractions f thecitiesprovedto be greater hanthose of rural ife.32In the meantime, he feverishpreparationsor the firstphaseofintensivedemographic olonizationprovidedworkfor ItaliansandLibyans alike. The constructionof new farms and villages andirrigationworksemployed5000 Italianswhoemigrated romItalyand 4650 who were hired in Libya. However, the bulk of the33,000man labour orce wasLibyan.33 n Italy,a committee romthe Commissionor InternalMigrationandColonization,ravelledfor threemonthsselectingthe 800o families,of whomtwo-thirdscamefrom NorthernItaly, especially he Venetoand Emilia.THE VENTIMILAWERE BALBO S last great public triumph. He waswidely applaudedboth in the fascist and the internationalpress.Eventhe most scepticalanti-fascistobserversadmired he discip-line anddynamismwhich the ventimilademonstrated.Those withlongandnostalgicmemories, ikeGioacchinoVolpe,saw in Balbo sfleet in miniatureanentirepeopleon the move,justas at the timeof the mass emigrations at the end of the nineteenthcentury.34Yet, as Volperemarked,howthingshad changed rom those de-pressingdayswhen the governmentconsideredemigrantsas littlemore thana sourceof remittancesromabroad.Mussolini s ronictribute was perhapsthe best measureof Balbo s success. Cianonotedin his diary hat sincethe Duce was annoyedat thepublicitythat Balbohasacquired hroughhis initiative , utureimmigration

32 IAC, La colonizzazione della Cirenaica; La colonizzazione agricola dellaTripolitania. Reports of the bedouin raids in Cyrenaica can be found in USNational Archive, Official Records of Italian Government Agencies , T-586(409) 003636.33 Governo della Tripolitania, Notizie e cifre sul nuova piano di colonizza-zione della Libia , Tripoli I939, I5.34 G. Volpe, Storia del movimentofascista, 230.

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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATIONOF LIBYAto Libya was to take place quietly.35Balbo sgrandmanneralsomanaged o irritatemanyof the agriculturalechnicianswhofacedthe task of training and guiding the mass of colonists in thedecadesahead.The hurried preparations,he massive influx offamilies meant that - as one of them phrased it - Too often actionhad to precedethought. 36The paradeand carnivalaspects of the mass emigrationalsocame under criticism.Balbo s festive way of doing things couldhaveimportantpsychologicalbenefits, echnicalexpertsconceded.The colonists were constantlyremindedthat their new homes inLibyawere anextensionof Italy,not aforeignandunknown hore,andthatthe Duce andhisregimewouldalways ookafter hem. Onthe otherhand,argued he agriculturalechnicians, o muchcodd-lingand anfaremightalsomislead he colonists ntothinking hataneasyfutureof enjoying hegovernment swelfarebenefits ayahead.Ona different evel,the massemigrationwasscarcelyreassuringto theLibyansand to theArabworldasawhole. Cianorecordednhis diary hattheventimila adprovokedviolentdemonstrationsnBaghdad.37 renchofficials n TunisiaandAlgeriausedthe venti-mila as an occasion o stirup anti-Italian eelingamongtheir localArabpopulations.Finally,there was the questionof how long thecomplex,cumbersome, ndexpensivecolonization tructurewouldlast. Balbo led a second emigrationof about Io,ooo colonists inI939 - this time with very little fanfare. By I940, the Italian popu-lation numbered Io,ooo persons of whom about 39,000 - or nearly40 per cent - were agricultural olonists. Of these, nearlythree-quartershadarrivedduring he massemigrations f 1938andI939.In relation o the Libyan populationas a whole,the Italiansmadeup aboutI5 per cent andhad established hemselvesas the largestnon-Libyanminority.38If the warhadnot intervened, hefuturepotential orsettlementin Libya looked bright.39Balbo s plan for settling a total of

35 Ciano s Diary, ed. M. Muggeridge, London 1947, 4-5.36 G. Palloni, I contratti agrari degli Enti di Colonizzazione, II9.37 Ciano s Diary, I939-43, PP. 4-5.38 IAC, La colonizzazione della Cirenaica, 20; La colonizzazione agricola dellaTripolitania, II3-I7; C.L. Pan, The Population of Libya , Population Studies,June I949.39 For the following, see IAC, La colonizzazione agricola della Tripolitania,124-25. Balbofrequentlyreturnedfrom overflightsof the territorywith greatplansfor extendingthe colonization. His agriculturaladvisers,however, wereoften scepticaland dividedabout the possibilitiesfor futuregrowth.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYIO10,00 colonists by 1943 could probably have been fulfilled. Thecolonization companies had a cushion of 30-40 per cent of theirlands still undeveloped. Depending on the intensity of cultivationand the methods used, optimistic agricultural experts predictedthat the number of colonists in Tripolitania alone could be in-creased five-fold to a total of I20,000. Libya s future, however, wasdependent on an enormous and continuous investment that Italycould scarcely afford.40With the conquest of Ethiopia completed,the regime turned to the task of developing the new empire. Thecolonial budget for I937-38 totalled I614 million lire, aboutI2-5 per cent of the total state budget and nearly four times theamount for the previous year. The budget for 1938-39 showedanother I per cent increase.How did the Italians meet the enormous jump in their colonialexpenses ? The colonies contributed only a small fraction, usuallyabout one-third. The rest had to be made up through special taxeslevied at home and through a steadily declining standard of livingfor the majorityof Italians. In Libya, the outpouring of investmentwas reflected in the fact that nearly half (960 million lire) of thestate s estimated total investment in the colony (I-8 billion lire)during the 30-year Italian occupation was invested during theyears I937-42.41 The priority for agriculture and colonization isalso reflected in the investment figures. The colonization projectsand the development of agriculture absorbed about two-thirds(654 million lire) of the expenditure during this period of intensiveinvestment.Balbo must have been well aware of the enormous expenditurein Libya because his technical advisers were always concerned withexplaining the spiralling costs of the projects. As they frankly ad-mitted in one report, Such high costs may raise doubts about theadvisability of carrying out the programmes .42However, the re-port argued, the costs had to be seen in perspective; in part they

40 J. L. Miege, L Imperalisme colonial italien de 1870 a nos jours, Paris I968,252.41 For the following, see Memorandum sulla situazione economicae finanziariadei territori italiani in Africa, Rome 1946, 4. The investment in Libya s agri-culture during this period 1937-42 dwarfs the sums invested for the same pur-poses in East Africa (33-8 million). Yet these sums appear relatively modestcompared to the I billion lire lavished on the Pontine Marshes during thedecade I926-36.42 Istituto Agronomico per l Oltremare, Osservatorio Rurale, Archive no.2178, Relazione a S.E. Balbo .

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ITALO BALBO AND THE COLONIZATION OF LIBYAwere high becausethe Italianswerestartingwith nothing. Libyaofferedneither nfrastructure oragriculturalraditions.The costsshouldalsobe seen in termsof futurebenefits. The initialsettle-ments creatednuclei that would soon attract furthersettlementandexpansion,perhaps nto areas hatat the time did not seematall feasible.Ultimately,the techniciansconcluded,the expenseswereworthwhilebecauserapid,intensive colonization is the onlyway to preparea futureprosperity or Libya,a way that resolvespoliticaland socialproblemsaswell as economicones .Balbo sblueprintfor Libya sfutureprosperity aded with thewar.The NorthAfricancampaign ee-sawedbackandforthacrossCyrenaicaand the colonists were eventuallyevacuated n 1942.Duringthe post-waruncertainties,withoutthe vastgovernmentalsubsidies,withoutthe assurance hat LibyawouldremainItalian,the remaining olonization chemes n Tripolitania lsofaltered.A1956 agreementbetween Italy and the Libyan governmentpro-videdforthe completionof certainof the villages,but the remain-ing colonists,facingincreasinglyhostileandrestrictive egislation,chose to sell theirfarms o Libyansandreturn o Italy. By the endof 1961,nearly70 per cent of the Italianfarms n the projectshadbeen sold; by I964 only about I20 families were left. The end camewith the Libyan government sexpropriationand expulsion de-creesof 2I July I970. Italiansreceivedno indemnity or theirpro-pertyandwerevirtuallyexpelledsincetheywere to be deprivedofall opportunities or employment n the country.Balbowasfortunate n thathe neversawthe ultimate ate of hiscolonization chemes.He died in amysteriousplanecrash,28 JuneI940, two and a half weeksafterItaly enteredthe war.His ideasfor demographic olonization n Libyarested argelyon the workof his predecessors,but his extensionof theseplanswas nonethe-less impressive.Whathe failedto resolvewasthe paradox hatlaybehindthe colonizationprogramme.The volatileforces that hadcombinedto createthe projects- the fascist drive for prestige,autarky,Mediterraneanhegemony, empire in Africa- also de-stroyedthem. Despite Balbo simplacableopposition,the Duce sambitions ed to the Germanallianceand to war.With the collapseof theregime,Balbo scolonization,oo,foundered nddisappeared.

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Italo Balbo and the Colonization of Libya by Claudio G. Segre

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Transcript of Italo Balbo and the Colonization of Libya by Claudio G. Segre