ISSN 2502-0722Issue 15 / September 2015

Project Supervisors

Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director, The Habibie CenterHadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center

Managing Editor

Ray Hervandi

Thinking ASEAN Team

A. Ibrahim AlmuttaqiAskabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifRahma SimamoraWirya Adiwena

A Note From the Editor

Articles

ASEAN and The Rise of Terrorism Threats

A Madrasah in Rural Malaysia: A Missive from the Field

The ACSC/APF 2016 in Timor-Leste:An Alternative for CSO Engagement

Infographic:Realizing a People-Centered ASEAN: The ACSC/APF Roadmap

ASEAN Round-Up

One of the World’s Biggest Fisheries Ison the Verge of Collapse

Why China’s Shadow Finance EchoesPre-Crisis U.S.

ASEAN Countries Stifle Free Labor Market

Contents

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ISSN 2502-0722

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A note from the editorDear readers:

Welcome to the September issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!

As we commemorate the terror attacks in the United States on September 11, we focus this month’s issue on two update articles on the latest developments in countering terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia. In the years since 9/11, both countries have been at the epicenter of the struggle against terror threats coming from within and without the region.

While other issues have taken over the attention of many policymakers in Southeast Asia, terrorism is a regional concern that is unlikely to disappear soon. Our colleagues from the Kuala Lumpur-based outfit IMAN Research sent us a missive from their research based in Islamic boarding schools in the northern Malaysian state of Kedah.

An article on how ASEAN responds to terror threats by Dr. Badrus Soleh, head of the international relations department at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, follows. In it, Badrus sketches out the latest thinking on and responses to persisting terror threats.

Habibie Center’s researcher Askabea Fadhilla reports on the recent ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum (ACSC/APF) in Timor-Leste, the first time such an event takes place outside an ASEAN member state.

Our infographic looks back at previous iterations of ACSC/APF since its first in Malaysia in 2005. Meanwhile, our ASEAN Round-Up articles highlight the collapsing fishing area in the Philippines, rumblings from Chinese shadow finance system, and the region’s stillborn free labor market after the ASEAN Economic Community in effect.

Please do not hesitate to drop us a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, suggestions or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta,

Ray Hervandi

Managing Editor

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

2Issue 15 / September 2016

ASEAN and The Rise of Terrorism ThreatsBadrus Sholeh, PhD is Head of the Department of International Relations and Executive Director of the Centre for the Middle East and Global Peace Studies, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta. He is also also Senior Researcher at the Habibie Center, Jakarta.

People demonstrated with placards saying #WeAreNotAfraid after a failed terror attempt in Central Jakarta in mid-January 2016.

Source: www.thejakartapost.com

The ASEAN Summits in September 2016 in Vientiane, Laos confirmed the importance for global unity against the rise of terrorism. At the Summits, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned of three challenges for ASEAN: “self-radicalization, terrorist groups in the region linking up with the Islamic State, and the increased frequency of attacks” (Ong 2016). Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull argued that Australia and Southeast Asian countries should anticipate the threat after the suffered losses of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, especially lone-wolf operations. In particular, Turnbull noted, “As it is rolled back, as its territory is being taken back – it will resort to terrorist activities outside of the Middle East … we do have to be very alert to the actions of these lone actors-individuals who for a variety of reasons, may be radicalized” (BBC, 7 September 2016). President Joko Widodo warned against the threats of radicalism and terrorism in South East Asia and stressed the need to come up with an inclusive ASEAN mechanism to overcoming terrorist and radical threats. President Jokowi said, ” We need a firm and comprehensive regional architecture, which put ASEAN upfront and contributes more effectively to regional security and stability (Jakarta Globe, 7 September). PM Lee, PM Turnbull, and President Jokowi talked before the Summits and reflected on terrorist operations in the region, and how terrorist groups and individuals transformed new methods of attacks. They agreed on urgency of partnership to strengthen cooperation to overcome terrorism, build an inclusive community, and manage peaceful and stable region.

This essay examines current trends of terrorist operations in Southeast Asia and how they have affected security and socio-economic stability in the region. It evaluates the policies managed by government and presents several recommendations. It argues solid partnership and unity among states and civil society are urgently needed to prevent further threats and to reduce the rise of terrorism and radicalism.

Trends in Terrorist Threats

Databases of terrorism trends in 2016 stated that wars in Syria and Iraq have a direct impact on the rise of terrorist operations outside the Middle East. The Islamic State (IS) effectively attracted thousands of jihadist volunteers from all over the world. This figure included about a thousand jihadists from Southeast Asia, mostly Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. IS has recruited students, individuals, and families. Many of them did not come from a radical family background. IS progressively took advantage of social media like Facebook, Telegram, WhatsApp, Blackberry Messengers (BBM), and blogging to deliver IS propaganda from the wars of Syria and Iraq. Social media groups managed by IS volunteers successfully trapped new recruits. Some of the terrorist operators worked individually after getting inspired from the social media. The lone-wolf attack on a church in Medan, North Sumatra, Indonesia on August 28, 2016 was not part of any radical group. The perpetrator was radicalized off jihadist media. Furthermore, these lone wolves are radicalized when they rub shoulders with experienced ideological jihadis in Indonesian prisons. For example, the Jakarta attack operator in January 2016 started on his radical path after meeting IS ideologue Aman Abdurrahman in prison in 2014. Aman Abdurrahman kept numerous books and articles on jihad while he was in prison in Jakarta and Nusakambangan.

In addition, terrorist global networks grow stronger from wider support of national and local radical organization and influential jihadist community leaders. In Southeast Asia, groups like Abu Sayyaf, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters of the Philippines, Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid, Jama’ah Ansharul Khilafah, Tauhid wal Jihad of Indonesia are among radical groups growing stronger in mutual support of transnational networks. Some organizations even claimed no ties to Al-Qaida (AQ), IS or other terrorist organizations but maintain jihadist operations. Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) for example declared to split from AQ. JN took advantage to get more financial support and sympathy from private and individual donors. It is easier for JN to raise funds after being split from AQ. In Southeast Asia, some radical organizations, foundations and schools receive money from local and international sources, including those unrelated to IS or AQ. The prevailing ideology and curricula at these institutions unsurprisingly foment hatred against infidels, Christians and groups jihadists target like the Ahmadiyyah and the Shia.

Attack Operations and Economic Development

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the most vulnerable countries in Southeast Asia and have become targets for terrorist organizations and lone-wolf operations. Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, and other country members of ASEAN are under threats of the attacks. AQ and IS networks are the dominant operators in this context. However, splinter groups that have split from the more established terrorism outfits remain a gap in terrorism research. A 2016 study from Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) claims, “Most data are nationwide, regional, or global. The impact of key regional, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and other internal conflicts may or may not be reported as terrorism and are not addressed

by source, cause, or reasons for choosing given targets” (Cordesman 2016: 5).

The attacks affected economic development and foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia. According to the A.T Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index in 2004, 2005, and 2007, leading executives of international companies stated that terrorist attacks are “one of their major concerns while making overseas investment decisions. If Southeast Asia is considered as a region plagued with frequent terrorist activities, foreign companies will avoid doing business here” (Lee 2016). The bombings in Bali 2002, 2005 and numerous bombings in Southern Thailand in August 2016 have played on the fears of tourists in undermining the local tourism.

Southeast Asian countries have been a target for AQ and its networks since 2000. The Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, and other operations by AQ-affiliated organizations in the region impacted security and socio-economic stability. After the declaration of the Islamic State (IS), some local organizations and prominent clerics in Southeast Asia claimed to support the IS. In 2016, IS-related attacks targeted business and government buildings and state apparatus.

In the Southeast Asian region, IS strengthened regional cells and networks by recruiting young fighters, including students. One of the Dhaka, Bangladesh, gunmen who brutally killed 20 hostages on July 2, 2016, was a student at Monash University in Malaysia. In Indonesia, IS recruited young fighters and aggressively posted on IS social media. The latest IS attack in Southeast Asia was the Abu Sayyaf Group attack in Davao City, Southern Philippines, killing 14 people and injuring 68 on September 2, 2016. Foreign Ministers of ASEAN condemned the attacks. They said: “ASEAN reiterates its commitment to working with the international community to combat violent extremism and terrorism in all their forms and manifestations, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whom so ever it is committed.”

The Philippine and Indonesian governments cannot fight the movements by themselves. Overcoming transnational terrorist networks also requires a stronger effort by a solid, strategic and tactical partnership of state and society at the regional and global levels. Furthermore, poverty reduction and developing education are among the most urgent steps needed to reduce the influence of radicalism. This includes strengthening the moderate religious community and progressive youth who have been involved in peace building initiatives and socio-economic development. Foreign Ministers agreed at the 23rd ASEAN Regional Forum at Vientiane, Lao PDR, 26 July 2016 in calling for “a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism, respect for diversity, peace and moderation as a counter narrative to violent extremism, including through the promotion of religious tolerance and the Global Movements of moderates.” However, some policies against extremism and countering terrorism are still dominated by state and security apparatus. Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), a state body for countering violent extremism and terrorism, manages its own programs. Instead, it should be a coordinating body and facilitate civil society organizations devoted to countering terrorism. At the regional level, Abu Sayyaf that has taken hostages

from Indonesia, Malaysia, Canada, the Philippines and other countries in Southern Philippines cannot be defeated by the military approach only. It needs a coordination and partnership of ASEAN countries and civil society groups. Civil society organizations need more access and supports to work with government towards more effective approach to countering terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Reference

Cordesman, Anthony H. The Uncertain Trends and Metrics of Terrorism in 2016, Working draft July 27, 2016 Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Lee, Chia-yi. “Resurgent Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Impact On the Economy,” RSIS Commentary No 012, 21 January 2016.

Ong, Justin. “Unity, economic growth and terrorism: 3 challenges facing ASEAN, says PM Lee,” channelnewsasia, 07 September 2016.

“Peace, Stability Key for Asean, Jokowi Says at Summit,” Jakarta Globe, 07 September 2016, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/peace-stability-key-asean-jokowi-says-summit/, retrieved on 09 September 2016.

4Issue 15 / September 2016

A Madrasah in Rural Malaysia: A Missive from the FieldDina Zaman is the founding Executive Director of IMAN Research, a research outfit based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Badrul Hisham Ismail, Programme Manager, and Muhammad Nazreen, Research Officer, led the field trip.

Students studying the Qur’an at the Nurul Iman madrasah outside Malaysia’s capital Kuala Lumpur, September 11, 2015.

Source: REUTERS/Olivia Harris

Background

Madrasahs, despite their rather unfortunate reputation for promoting militant activities, religious fundamentalism and conservatism at odds with the progressive, secular world, have an important role to play in countering violent and non-violent extremism.

Religious leaders of such institutions play a pivotal role, too, in countering extremism. Their influence surpasses their immediate communities, especially youths who upon a certain age leave their homes to work or study elsewhere.

Islamic education was informal in the beginning years. They consisted of Qur’an-reading classes and were conducted in mosques. The earliest known madrasahs—Islamic religious schools—were founded by the Seljuk Turks from Central Asia around the tenth century. “Theirs was not a centralized empire,” religious studies scholar Karen Armstrong wrote in her book Fields of Blood. The Seljuk established these in order to raise the standards of formal Islamic education.

Modern-day madrasahs in Malaysia

In Malaysia, madrasahs are known as sekolah pondok, literally “hut schools” and also known as sekolah agama rakyat (SAR)—“people’s schools of religion”. These schools are usually situated in rural areas around Malaysia. These schools teach Islamic subjects and have been around long before the arrival of British colonial power. The primary objective is to equip students with the values needed to become a good Muslim. These schools receive guidelines from the Malaysian Ministry of Education, but are not regulated and monitored. Many of the students who attend SARs are from lower-income backgrounds.

SARs serve as a focal point for the community surrounding them. While school activities segregate students by gender and are aligned with Islamic values and principles, they also are the village’s meeting point where the community meets for religious events and holidays, weddings, and community events. They integrate the community, and most times the adults in the village also turn to the teachers of SARs for religious direction.

The other religious schools are national religious schools that are mostly secondary schools; state religious schools that can be divided into both primary and secondary, and private religious schools. In a nutshell, these schools differ in terms of management, sources of funding and, to a certain extent, curriculum. National religious schools fall directly under the jurisdiction of the federal Ministry of Education while state religious schools fall under the purview of state agencies—Malaysia is a federation of states. SAR and private Islamic schools are independent. The former receives partial funding from the government along with private donations, while the latter is predominantly funded through student fees1.

A Village in Kedah, Malaysia

Present-day madrasahs in Baling2 and Sik in the northwestern state of Kedah are rustic, and there is little interference from the state and religious authorities. They are left to their own devices and are funded by donations from the wealthier villagers and receive some support from state agencies. Yet, they are influential among the villagers, and some of the more veneered role models are Tok Guru Salleh Sik, Ustaz Awang Lanai, and Syeikh Muslim.

In recent times, madrasahs in Kedah have produced militants like Ustaz Mat Lotfi Ariffin, who were influential in shaping the religious mindset at the well-established pondoks, such as Madrasah Al-Hidayah in Kuala Ketil, Kedah. Lotfi, who is now deceased, is internationally renowned for his militant exploits. However, although Lotfi was regarded as a Muslim hero among the militants and their sympathizers, the current religious heads mentioned above are against any form of violent extremism. This sentiment is a glimmer of hope in the fight against militant movements and extremism.

From our fieldwork observation, findings show that most Malay-Muslim youths were radicalized due to their inability to resist militant propaganda. Most of the radicalized youths did not receive formal/informal education from religious institutions. The space they inhabit—the madrasah—can serve as an alternative platform for discourse.

Role models like Tok Guru Salleh Sik should be encouraged to teach and encourage young Muslims to view Islam from another viewpoint, one that challenges them and yet show them that (this) Islam is progressive, global and adheres to the sharia.

The fieldwork materialized a desire articulated by the villagers and the religious leaders: IMAN has been invited to conduct an English class for their young in the very schools that had given birth to personalities like Lotfi.

Perhaps, as Todd Schmidt wrote, madrasahs around the world—

and Malaysia is no different—are severely underfunded and situated in remote locations in rural areas. We need to assess if the current syllabus is on par with the national one. A universal curriculum3 that teaches simple and basic language skills and hygiene would be in high demand.

“A common sense yet comprehensive menu of options is available. Policy initiatives and measures that empower madrasahs to provide a wide array of subjects, modern learning tools, and teacher expertise have great potential. They can help induce voluntary participation or, at the least, impede extremist madrasahs that refuse to adopt programs that benefit their students and society.”

“Programs aimed at reform should fund literacy programs at all grade levels. To prepare students for the global economy, English proficiency should be one objective, as should vocational programs to produce a skilled workforce and further hone student skills. Graduates from madrasahs participating in these programs who meet prescribed levels of aptitude and basic skill proficiency should receive preference in employment programs. Issuing nationally recognized graduation diplomas that guarantee employment is another option to consider.”

Schmidt continued, “International exchange programs could target underprivileged Muslim students in middle and high school, equivalent cohorts, and college students. We must provide the incentive for young Muslims with demonstrated potential to receive the best education available…”

The conversation between these madrasahs and IMAN is still on-going.

In light of the current political and economic climate in Malaysia, youth and graduate unemployment is becoming a source of social concern, triggered by increasing participation rate of the young and educated workforce in an environment where there is increasing fragility and sluggishness in business and economic prospects (MIER, January 2016). To date, there are about 161,000 unemployed graduates in Malaysia. At the same time, the recent increase in religiosity among Muslims has radicalized many who have found that affirmative action and economic policies have failed them. The role of religious leaders and the schools that educate their students is increasingly urgent in these times of conflict.

Endnotes

1. The Potential of Independent Religious Schools: A Case Study of Al-Amin, IDEAS Brief No.4, June 2016

2. Baling, a tiny hamlet of a village which IMAN conducted field work in, has a tense political past. In the 1980s, it was the site of a bloody stand-off between the Malaysian Government and purported militant, Ibrahim Libya, and his followers.

3. Reforming the Madrasah: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism, by Schmidt, Todd | Military Review, May-June 2008

6Issue 15 / September 2016

The ACSC/APF 2016 in Timor-Leste:An Alternative for CSO EngagementAskabea Fadhilla is Researcher at the Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies program.

Timor-Leste children playing soccer under an ASEAN People’s Forum billboard.Source: aseanpeople.org

The 2016 ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum (ACSC/APF), which took place in August in Dili, Timor-Leste, served as an important milestone for civil society organizations (CSO) and the relations between ASEAN and neighboring country Timor-Leste. The forum concluded with a strong message of solidarity for Timor-Leste’s campaign to join ASEAN.

This year’s ACSC/APF is significant for three reasons. Firstly, for the first time since the first ACSC/APF conference in 2005, a non-ASEAN member state hosted the gathering against common practice. Secondly, eleven years after the first formal engagement with CSOs, this year’s forum is the first after the ASEAN Community came into being. Thirdly, for Timor-Leste, the forum highlights the country’s effort to join ASEAN. This article will explore and further elaborate the significance of this year’s ACSC/APF to ASEAN and its CSO engagement.

The ACSC/APF initially served as a platform for CSOs in Southeast Asia to discuss broad issues and concerns from different sectors affecting the countries in the region in order to collaborate on possible resolutions. When it was first initiated in 2005 during Malaysia’s chairmanship, the ACSC was officially recognized to be a part of the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit—although in practice, it was not always officially welcomed. As the conference was held in parallel to the official ASEAN Summit, the serving ASEAN Chair is usually expected to host the ACSC/APF.

The forum also provides an open space for dialogue with ASEAN leaders in the form of face-to-face meetings followed by the submission of joint statements and recommendations to the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN government representatives. Independence and inclusivity are the major features that distinguish ACSC/APF from regular ASEAN-organized forums. The annual characteristic of ACSC/APF also opens up the possibility for CSOs to meet at least once a year. This helps with creating a sense of a region-wide community of CSOs and in turn with raising their influence with ASEAN governments.1

However, this practice remains a great challenge as the conduct of ACSC/APF depends on the attitude of the host government toward civil-society activities, especially in regard to providing them with political and social freedom.

In the history of ACSC/APF, there has been a growing states intrusion on the ACSC/APF process. It has been taking place in the form of states limitation towards the issues discussed in the forum, CSO participation, or the reluctance of government officials to attend the forum.2 For example, during the 2010 ACSC/APF in Vietnam, the event was held almost a full month prior to the leaders’ meeting, which ensured that an interface meeting between CSOs and officials were not feasible. Meanwhile, in ACSC/APF 2012 in Cambodia, another government-run ASEAN People’s Forum were held simultaneously with the original one, attended by the government officials, so that the CSOs were divided and forced to choose.3

Learning from this past experience, the holding of ACSC/APF 2016 should be considered as a crucial point. Since ASEAN Chair Lao PDR was not hosting this year’s forum, ACSC/APF 2016 was expected to provide more freedom and flexibility for CSOs. However, there are also a number of issues to consider in order to claim the forum as successful. First, how Timor-Leste as a non-ASEAN member state would have such influence in an ASEAN-related forum, and second, how ASEAN as well as its civil society responded to this whole new mechanism, given that the outcomes of the ACSC/APF will be difficult to convey directly to ASEAN Leaders because there were no interface meeting, except with the parliamentarians one. Furthermore, whether this year’s ACSC/APF will be able to resonate a significant impact for the CSOs engagement with ASEAN is something that needs to be identified further.

The fact that civil society community decided to bring the ACSC/APF to Timor-Leste is a straightforward message to the ASEAN policymakers that there is something wrong with ASEAN right now. The ACSC/APF2015 Conference Outcome Statement rearticulates this sentiment. Through this document, CSOs came to an agreement that the 2016 ACSC/APF would not be held in Lao PDR due to “the lack of readiness of the civil society organizations in the country and the absence of assurance of a safe space for open and constructive discussions of all issues of concerns in the region.”4 Lao PDR has also been dealing with a huge wave of protests from the ASEAN civil society community due to the enforced disappearance of Lao human rights activist Sombath Somphone.

The CSOs have expected ASEAN to take a relevant measure to take up this issue. There has been a series of attempt to meet with ASEAN human rights representative to urge and seek clarifications from them. However ASEAN as a whole hasn’t done anything—not even an official statement on the disappearance of this Lao PDR’s human rights activist. The Lao PDR’s human rights representative even mentioned that the issue should not be raised because of the non-interference principle of ASEAN.5 It is, therefore, safe to say that the decision from the civil society to have the ACSC/APF in Timor-Leste is part of their ‘boycott’ towards ASEAN given their continuous inconsistency and lack of commitment in addressing the human rights violation.

The second message that the ACSC/APF is trying to convey is related towards Timor-Leste’s position vis-à-vis ASEAN.

Having engaged the ASEAN CSOs forum for the past 12 years,

Timor-Leste is no stranger to the CSO community in Southeast Asia. In 2011, the country made a formal application for ASEAN membership, and in the meantime, all requirements needed for Timor-Leste’s application is completed, leaving the final decision of their membership in the hands of ASEAN leaders.6 The CSOs who participated in the ACSC/APF saw the delay in Timor-Leste’s ASEAN membership as an unjustified act. Timor-Leste has shared similar experience and challenge with other ASEAN member states, and therefore they are considered capable to contribute in the region’s solidarity and cohesiveness.7 This “show of solidarity” is a strong signal towards ASEAN that CSOs themselves have taken their own position to support the inclusion of Timor-Leste as a full ASEAN member-state.

Despite its relatively successful execution—comprising various plenary sessions and workshops with more than 800 participants—the holding of ACSC/APF2016 has not been without any hurdles. Technical and financial assistance was quite a problem as a non-ASEAN member state is hosting the event. Furthermore, an expected interface meeting this year could only be bringing in the parliamentarians, without any presence of ASEAN officials. Even now a month after the event, ASEAN doesn’t seem to officially recognize the outcome of the forum.

The mediocrity of ASEAN’s commitment to recognize the process within the ACSC/APF is also reflected in the Joint Communique of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 24 July 2016. A week prior the biggest ASEAN People’s gathering, the meeting had only mentioned the phrase “civil society organizations” once, in its relation with AICHR.8 Moreover, while the ASEAN Vision 2025 signifies the ASEAN’s commitment towards a people-centered community, there remains skepticism, especially with the lack of ASEAN commitment to address the people’s aspiration. These, in fact, are such a huge stagnancy—if not a step back—considering how far the CSOs have gone since the very first time they were welcomed in the 11th ASEAN Summit in 2005.

The ACSC/APF2016 no doubt marks a significant milestone in the eleven-year history of CSOs’ engagement with ASEAN. It was more than just a people’s gathering—it was a statement. Despite the ASEAN’s inability to fully recognize the ongoing reform performed by the CSOs, the ACSC/APF2016 has shown that ASEAN people have power to express their powerful messages towards ASEAN. This year’s ACSC/APF may not be conducted in the usual manner. It may not also provide a common ground for engagement with ASEAN officials. Furthermore, the ACSC/APF2016 has taken the shot to explore an alternative—to explore the new approach and new experience in engaging with ASEAN. Nonetheless, given the independency that it owns, the ACSC/APF is still one of the best platforms for CSOs to maintain their influence in the region, despite its limited liberty.

Endnotes

1. Kelly Gerard, “From the ASEAN People’s Assembly to the ASEAN Civil society organizations Conference: the boundaries of civil society organizations advocacy,” Contemporary Politics, 19, 4 (2013), 420-424.

8Issue 15 / September 2016

2. Ibid., 422, 423

3. Askabea Fadhilla, “ASEAN’s Structured Engagement of Civil Society Organizations,” Thinking ASEAN, Issue 4 (2015), 5-7.

4. ACSC/APF2015, “ACSC/APF2015 Outcome Statement,” retrieved from http://aseanpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/ACSC-APF-2015-Conference-Outcome-Statement.pdf

5. John Quinley III, “Interview: Remembering the Disappearance of Sombath Somphone,” The Diplomat, 2015, retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/interview-remembering-the-disappearance-of-sombath-somphone/

6. ACSC/APF 2016, “First Regional Consultation Meeting APF 2016,” retrieved from http://aseanpeople.org/1st-rc-meetings-bangkok-minutes/

7. ACSC/APF 2016, “ Expanding Peoples’ Solidarity for a Just and Inclusive ASEAN Community-CSO Statement,” retrieved from http://aseanpeople.org/expanding-peoples-solidariy/

8. ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Communique of The 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” retrieved from http://asean.org/storage/2016/07/Joint-Communique-of-the-49th-AMM-ADOPTED.pdf

thcasean.org/publication

ASEAN ROUND-UPOne of the World’s Biggest Fisheries Is on the Verge of Collapsenews.nationalgeographic.com, August 31st 2016

PUERTO PRINCESA, PHILIPPINES. Years ago, Christopher Tubo caught a 660-pound blue marlin in the South China Sea. The fishing was good there, he says. Tuna fishermen would come home from a trip with dozens of the high-value fish as well as a good haul of other species. “Here there’s none of that,” he says, looking toward the Sulu Sea, the Philippine sea where he’s been fishing for the past four years. His two boats, traditional Filipino outriggers called bancas, float in the shallow water nearby, new coats of white paint drying in the sun.

Tubo’s decision not to fish in the South China Sea speaks to the rising tensions in the region, which are causing fierce competition for natural resources. Encompassing 1.4 million square miles (3.7 million square kilometers), the South China Sea is of critical economic, military, and environmental importance: $5.3 trillion in international trade plies its waters annually; in terms of biodiversity, it is thought of as the marine equivalent of the Amazon rain forest; and its fish provide food and jobs for millions in the 10 countries and territories that surround it.

Read more: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-south-china-sea-overfishing-threatens-collapse/

Why China’s Shadow Finance Echoes Pre-Crisis U.S.Bloomberg News, August 24 2016

The shadow financing that is fueling China’s economic growth is unsustainable and “eerily similar” to developments in the U.S. before the global financial crisis, says Logan Wright at research firm Rhodium Group. The nation has at most about 18 months before this funding -- derived largely from wealth-management products offering higher returns on riskier underlying investments -- hits a wall, says Wright, director of China markets strategy for New York-based Rhodium. Banks will then be unable to generate new credit needed to maintain

the current pace of economic growth, which is likely to slow to a range of 5 to 5.5 percent for about two years, he says.

Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-24/china-s-shadow-finance-is-reminiscent-of-pre-crisis-u-s-q-a

ASEAN Countries Stifle Free Labor MarketVnexpress.net, August 25 2016

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a framework for the region’s economic integration, focuses on a free labor market that allows skilled professionals to work anywhere they like across the region, which has a population of 620 million people. The free labor market, which began to take shape in 2015, has freed up eight professions, including medicine, dentistry, nursing, engineering, architecture, natural resources and geographical exploration, accounting and tourism, allowing professionals in these areas to move between countries in the region to work.

Read more: http://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/asean-countries-stifle-free-labor-market-3458386.html

Why it matters: The South China Sea is not just a trade route that carries $5.3 trillion worth of international trade, it is also the workplace of three million plus fishermen whose catch feeds countless more in many countries. The legal and political limbo which the South China Sea is currently in has resulted in a situation where those fishermen take advantage of the free-for-all situation by catching their fish in ways that are environmentally unsustainable. This classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ case risks making the marine equivalent of the Amazon into a watery wasteland.

Why it matters: It should come as no surprise to hear that China is in financial trouble. Yet, rather than fixing the deep structural problems in their macroeconomic system, the ac-tions pursued by the government so far can only prolong the inevitable. As the ASEAN region is an increasingly important destination for Chinese investment and one of its main trading partners, China’s insistence on relying on monetary relaxation to fix much larger problems should worry ASEAN members. If and when China’s economy bursts, the resulting shockwaves will further hurt the already ill global economy.

Why it matters: The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is taking its time in achieving a free flow of labor between its member states. Thus far, only eight categories of profession-als are allowed to move freely between countries, but even then there are differing regulations and tax (dis)incentives each country imposes on these migrants. Taking things slow has al-ways been a feature of ASEAN policies, but a lack of regulatory harmony and certainty may dissuade potential migrants from fully taking advantage of the AEC.

The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental,

non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality

and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes,

respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of

human resources and the spread of technology.

ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAMThe Habibie Center

Jl. Kemang Selatan No.98, Jakarta Selatan 12560(P.) 62 21 781 7211(F.) 62 21 781 7212

www.habibiecenter.or.idwww.thcasean.org

facebook.com/habibiecenter @habibiecenter

The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by

2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN

that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government

circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help

spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within

our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

Trekking Travel’s Asia Cruise in Halong bayPhoto Credit: Arianos/Wikipedia.