Israel-United States Relations: Special Relations, and what is next?

8/6/2019 Israel-United States Relations: Special Relations, and what is next?

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Israel- United States Relations: Special Relations, and What Is Next?

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-TovDepartment of International RelationsThe Hebrew University & The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Prepared for the President's Conference

Introduction

The special relations between the United States and Israel are the most important

political & security assets that Israel holds in the international sphere. These relations,

which were formed after the Six-Day War, assisted Israel in promoting its political

and security goals in both the Middle Eastern and the International systems. Israel has

a major interest in not only preserving these relations, but also in promoting them as

much as possible. The essentiality of the special relations is substantial particularly at

this era in which Israel is kept in international exclusion. The continuity of the

previous USA support for Israel at the same level and scope is needed in order to face

the de-legitimacy processes of the Israeli policy and even of the State of Israel in

different circles of the international system.

USA support of Israel and the promotion of the special relations are not

necessarily automatic and are also dependent on the Israeli peace policy mainly in the

context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the chairmanship of Barak Obama

and the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, in the past two years the

special relations between Israel and the USA fell into a crisis over the promotion of

the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Although the specials relations grew in the

strategic-security field during this period, the peace process field of the special

relations was harmed due to lack of agreement between the two states over the


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solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the dispute over the settlements issue

was the most prominent.

This crisis has taken place after 16 years of continuous growth in the special

relations during the presidency period of Bill Clinton and George Bush (Jr.), and

Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and

Ehud Olmert. The Israeli policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also at the center

of the Israeli relations with the Jewish community in the United States, and the

tendency to doubt the Israeli policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is growing in the

liberal circles of the said Jewish community, so that it is no longer willing to

automatically support the Israeli policy.

This paper aims to characterize the relations between the USA and Israel as special

relations and to explain its sources, as well as to focus on the characteristics of these

relations in the context of the peace process, and to point out the importance of

amendment of the special relations in a peace process.

Defining the USA-Israeli relations as special relations

The definition of relations between two states as special is meant to

individualize and separate them from ordinary relations between states. The

appearance of this term is rare and uncommon in the field of foreign relations,

especially when it comes to relations between a superpower and a small state.

Defining the special relations between the USA and Israel determines that USA and

Israel have a unique partnership, which entirely differs from the other relations of the


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two states with other world countries. The two parties share political, ideological,

strategic and security interests which can be called a commonwealth of shared

interests, alongside with values, principles and common norms which can be called

a commonwealth of shared values. The special relations between the USA as a

powerful country and Israel as a small state have no match in the international sphere.

This is indeed a rare case in international modern history. Both sides give enormous

significance to the relations and work for their nurturing, empowerment and

continuity. These relations include a high leveled friendship, sympathy, trust and a

close, intensive political and security cooperation. Each side has a unique position in

the domestic and foreign policy of the other. The special relations are not limited to

leaders and policy makers alone, but include both friend-states fully, and insure their

continuity and survival ability even at times of crisis between the two states. The

relations are based on mutuality which is beneficial to both states. USA provides

Israel political, military and economic assistance in large and continuant scales.

Israel sees the USA interests in shaping its foreign policy as highly important, and

it shows the USA great loyalty as it tends to answer its requests and works for

promoting USA interests as well as its own. Between the years 1948 and 2010 Israel

received directly over 110 billion dollars from the USA, military and economic

assistance. Since 1985 all assistance was given as grant. Israel is the top assistance

recipient of the USA. Despite this fact, the special relations were never given a formal

status of a military and political treaty.

The sources of the special relations

Two main sources or foundations to these special relations can be pointed out.

One is soft and the other is hard. The soft sources of the relations are the common


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values, principles and norms, including democratic and liberal regimes, initiative,

religious valued commonness: Judo-Christian and immigrant societies. In addition,

the existence of a large effective Jewish community which sees the USA support of

Israel as a main and central factor in the special relations. Although the soft sources

are initial and vital to the existence of the special relations, they were not enough for

defining the relations as special. Only once the strategic-security factors became a

part of the relations, they were defined as special. The definition of the relations as

special was determined by the USA and not by Israel only when the USA was

convinced that the shared strategic-security interests with Israel enhances its own

global and regional interests.

The turning point was Israels military victory in the Six-Day War which

enhanced Israels strategic importance, in its ability not only to defend itself, but also

to assist in protecting USA interests in the area. Israels military victory established a

new territorial, political and strategic reality in the Middle East, which enabled the

USA to strengthen its regional status over the Soviet Union as an only mediator which

works to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Special Relations in a Peace Process

The special relations in the peace process mainly developed after Yom Kippur

War in 1973, since all the parties involved: The USA, Israel and Arab countries saw

the special relations between the USA and Israel as the main stimulus which will

enable the promotion of a political process in the area. Each side saw the relations

differently and tried to manipulate them in favor of its own interests. As a result, some

tense appeared in the relations between the USA and Israel. After Yom-Kippur War,

USA believed that there was an opportunity of transforming the Arab-Israeli conflict


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and establishing American peace in the area. Transforming the conflict required

adopting the formula of Security Council Resolution 242 Land for Peace. The

Israeli occupation of the lands was the key to the transformation. USA alone could

convince Israel to accept the formula of land for peace. The great advantage USA had

at this point was the special relations with Israel. USA was the only powerful country

Israel was willing to accept as a mediator in the conflict. Without the special relations

with Israel, USA had only little effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The importance of

Israel as strategic asset was now defined in terms of willingness to accept the

American peace strategy. In making peace, Israel is a concrete strategic asset. Thus

Egypt, Syria as well as Jordan and the Palestinians realized that the path to Jerusalem

goes through Washington and that only the USA has an influence over Israel. Israel

was rightfully afraid that it will have to pay for promoting regional American interests

and that will damage the exclusiveness of its relations with the USA.

However, the possibility of American mediation created a concrete opportunity to

minimize the regional instability and the danger of war. Henry Kissinger, the

American Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, developed a new

concept of the special relations with Israel in a peace process. The new concept was

based on the following assumptions: (1) USA cannot promote a peace process without

Israel (2) The special relations are mainly an asset and not a burden for the USA (3)

Arab countries see the special relations as an asset and not as a burden since only

USA can change Israels policy (4) USA accepts Israels position that it is risking

itself by making peace with Arab countries which are not democratic and that have a

tradition of breaking agreements (5) USA does not wish to weaken Israel or put it in

danger (6) Israel trusts the USA and can take risks for making peace (7) USA will

work in order to significantly minimize these risks by taking the following actions: (a)


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USA is willing to negotiate with Israel over a mutual concept of coordination in a

peace process. (b) USA will not surprise Israel by taking unilateral initiatives, (c)

USA will promise to preserve Israels existence and safety by giving in a generous

security and economic assistance (d) USA will give Israel security and political grants

for establishing and maintaining the agreements with the Arab countries (e ) USA will

give Israel a green light for independent activity in case USA shall be unable to

prevent the dangers of breaking security agreements with the Arab countries (f) USA

shall not agree with an Israeli veto over peace processes and it will make a wise use of

its diplomatic means if needed to convince Israel to accept the American peace

initiatives. The process of minimizing the Arab-Israeli conflict in the years 1974-1975

which brought to the establishment of two separation agreements between Israel and

Egypt and between Israel and Syria, created the foundations for special relations

between the USA and Israel in a peace process.

USA recognized the importance of the Israeli occupation of the land as a stimulus

for a peace process and confirmed that Israel was compensated through security,

economic and diplomatic means for its willingness to give up land. Israel recognized

the importance of the peace process and helped the USA to operate the American

peace in the area. Defining Israel as a strategic asset was now not only related to its

security-strategic status, but also to its willingness to make peace. The special

relations in a peace process also fell into crisis from time to time, due to

disagreements around the promotion of the peace process and the concessions Israel

was requested to make. The most eminent examples are: the crisis of March 1975,

which brought the USA to reevaluate the special relations with Israel, crises in the

Israeli-Egyptian peace process in the years 1977-1979, and crises in the years 1988-


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1992 over the issue of the settlements and the participation of Israel in peace

conference in Madrid.

The special relations during a peace process climaxed in the Oslo process years

1993-2000, during the peace process with Jordan in 1994, and during the peace

process with Syria in the years 1993-2000, during the chairmanship of president Bill

Clinton and the prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. Alongside with the

special relations, a very close relationship was developed between the president of the

USA and the prime ministers of Israel. Rabin defined the peace making as the main

contribution of Israel to the special relations with the USA. A peace making Israel is a

strategic asset for the USA. For the first time Israel was managing two negotiation

courses at the same time with the Palestinians and the Syrians. Rabin was willing to

take calculated risks for establishing peace, and Clinton promised that the USA will

assist Israel to minimize these risks through tightening the strategic and political

relations.

Special Relations in fighting terrorism

The special relations between the USA and Israel continued to tighten during the

chairmanship of President George Bush (Jr.) and prime ministers Ariel Sharon and

Ehud Olmert. These relations were characterized by an enhancement of the security-

strategic cooperation in fighting terrorism, following the terror attack over the USA

on September 2001, the violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in 2001-2005, the

second Lebanon War in 2006, and the Gaza Operation at the end of 2008 and the

beginning of 2009. The close support of Israel by the USA in the violent

confrontations with the Palestinians and Hezbollah enabled Israel to handle these

confrontations without burdening external constraints. USA also supported Israels

disengagement plan from Lebanon in 2000 and from the Gaza Strip in 2005.


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However, alongside with the fight against terrorism the USA continued to work for

establishing regional peace and the Annapolis Process it initiated brought to the

renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Special Relations in crisis in the Obama -Netanyahu Era

Even before the chairmanship of Barak Obama, different officials in the USA

administration, who participated in the peace process between Israel and the

Palestinians and between Israel and Syria such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Aaron

Miller, Dan Kurtzer (in the memoirs published on the peace process in the era of

Clinton and Bush) made claims that the special relations between the USA and Israel

in the Clinton and Bush era were at times a concrete burden to the peace process and

even damaged the effectiveness of American mediation. These personalities called to

the new coming administration to reevaluate the special relations between Israel and

the USA in a peace process. The question is, therefore, how to use the special

relations so that it will benefit the peace process. Although these personalities

recognize the importance of the special relations as a stimulus to the peace process,

they call for proportionality of these relations during a peace process. These

personalities recommended that: special relations- yes, exclusiveness of the special

relations- no. Israel may be given military and economic assistance so that it may

defend itself, but its positions must not harm the peace process, especially on the issue

of the settlements. The settlements, including the Jewish neighborhoods in Eastern

Jerusalem were never accepted as legal by the USA. These personalities

recommended that with every renewal of the peace process, the issue of settlement

expansion must be dealt with properly. These advisors recommended that the USA

will insist that during the negotiation over the Final Settlement all construction in the

settlements shall cease, including construction in settlement blocs, and will be


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renewed only on agreement of the Palestinians. It seems that the Obama regime

embraced these recommendations and is acting accordingly.

Although the Obama regime has tightened the special relations with Israel in the

security-strategic area in the past two years, it has cooled them off during a peace

process. Obama does not see the special relations in the peace process with Israel as

an asset, but mainly as a burden since he holds Israel responsible of the stagnation of

the peace process in the past two years, mainly for its refusal to cease the settlements.

The settlements are conceived as a disturbance to the peace process. Obama has

shown and is showing great sympathy to the Palestinian issue and Palestinian

suffering and is determined to found a Palestinian State in the borders of 1967, which

will live peacefully alongside with Israel. However, the Obama regime believes that a

Palestinian state could only be founded through an agreement with Israel following a

peace process, and not through a U.N. decision. Although Israel agreed to freeze the

construction in the settlements for a 10 month period, the approach talks in the

mediation of the presidential emissary, George Mitchell, have brought no real

progress to the peace process and in fact they brought to a significant deterioration

compared to the Annapolis process. It seems that the USA failed to make use of the

settlement freeze in order to move the process forward. The Palestinians refusal to

renew to direct negotiation with Israel Palestinian state can be established without an

agreement with Israel following a peace process create a real challenge to the future

of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Special relations reconstruction during a peace process

In the past two years the special relations in peace process are at a consistent

withdrawal and have reached a worrying low which might affect the whole set of

special relations, including the strategic-political field. On both sides lies the


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responsibility to amend the special relations and to reevaluate its importance during a

peace process. This can be done by renewing the trust between both sides. The old

premises of special relations in peace process are fitting nowadays as well: promoting

peace is an American interest, but it is also an Israel one. There can be no promotion

of a political process without American mediation. There can be no promotion of a

political process without Israeli consent. A peace making Israel is an American

strategic asset. Israel will announce its willingness to take calculated risks for

establishing peace. USA will assist Israel in minimizing the risks of peace making

through giving guarantees and security, economic and political assistance.

Reconstruction the special relations with the USA in such a harsh era of de-

legitimation for the Israeli policy and the state of Israel itself is a vital Israeli interest.

The special relations with the USA are a true asset which Israel must not endanger,

but these relations are also the only stimulus the USA has for promoting a peace

process in the Middle East. Both sides are called to rebuild the trust in the relations

and to reevaluate alone and together the essentiality of the special relations to both

sides. Special relations are not necessarily a total agreement on every matter in peace

process, and both sides have different interests. However, special relations require

mutual efforts to a clarification of the disagreements and finding compromises which

will serve the interests on both sides.

Israel-United States Relations: Special Relations, and what is next?

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