Islamic opposition and the politics of exclusion.

Should governments in Muslim-majority countries exclude Islam

from politics in order to promote stability?

In Muslim-majority countries the appropriate relationship between Islam and the state is highly disputed. On one side of the spectrum, Turkey prides itself on its secular state. Here the idea of secularism is fiercely defended by the people, the military and the government. However, even in Turkey the rise of the Refah Party and later the Justice and Development Party (AKP) highlight the contentious issue of Islam’s involvement in state politics. At the other end of the spectrum countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have the complete integration of religion and politics, with top officials also being religious figures, as is the case of the Ayatollah in Iran, and religious law (Sharia Law) also being the laws of the state which the government enforce. In the predominantly Muslim states in North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia there has been much political instability due to a myriad of reasons. In Muslim-majority countries that try to keep a broad separation of religion and state, political Islam is often a leading cause of instability and perceived as a threat by many. In response, governments, whether democratic or autocratic, have tried to silence and reduce the influence of the Islamic opposition in order to retain control. This paper argues that governments (both democratic and autocratic) in Muslim-majority countries should not exclude Islamic opposition from the political arena in order to retain stability.

The literature surrounding Islam and its role in politics is extensive. Much of the literature has focused on whether Islam is compatible with democracy (Esposito and Voll, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Merniss, 1992; Salame, 1994). One of the most debated areas within the field of whether Islam and democracy are compatible is over the issue of secularism within a Muslim-majority country (Roy, 2007; Ruedy, 1994; Wing and Varol, 2007). Furthermore, studies of Islamic opposition, the government’s response and the further response of Islamic opposition, whether it is violent extremism or non-violent public resistance, has also been a point of academic study. These studies usually take the form of case studies in nations or regions, ranging from totalitarian regimes in Uzbekistan (Naumkin, 2003) to democratic states such as Turkey (Tank, 2005) or studying whole regions such as Central Asia (Seifert, 2013) or North Africa (Ruedy, 1994). These studies demonstrate that one of the methods used to protect or promote stability is to try and exclude Islamic opposition. They demonstrate the reaction of both moderate and extremist Islamic opposition to the aforementioned exclusion. The case studies are specific in the details of the Islamic opposition and the state’s response however they frequently contain little analysis and are mostly descriptive. The current literature succeeds in analysing whether secularism is compatible with an Islamic culture and offers specific cases of the state’s actions and outcomes when trying to combat Islamic opposition in a nation which does not want the integration of religion and state. A combination of analysing Islam, secularism, and state enforcement is needed to be able to assess the correct method of protecting stability by way of moderating Islamic. The aim of this paper is therefore to contribute to the available literature by assessing the consequences of protecting and/or promoting stability via the frequently used method of state implemented exclusion of Islamic opposition from the political sphere.

To be able to assess and answer the question of whether states should exclude Islamic opposition in order to maintain stability, the first task is to focus the background research on Muslim-majority countries that have attempted to exclude Islamic opposition from the political discourse. After some initial research it becomes clear that most Muslim-majority countries have at some point tried to reduce the voice of some form of Islamic discontent. The main cause for this exclusion has been due to opposing sects governing other sects and trying to reduce their influence. As a consequence of this exclusion of some form of Islamic opposition, this paper will focus on states that reduce the political influence of all Islamic opposition, regardless of sect. The purpose of this narrowing down is that this paper’s focus is on the perceived threat of Islam to the fundamental governmental system of the state, not on the perceived threat of oppositional Muslim sects to the ruling Muslim sect. Furthermore, this paper will primarily focus on the consequences of excluding moderate Muslim opposition. For the purpose of this paper, ‘moderate’ Muslims are a broad group that encompasses any Muslim who does not commit violent attacks in order to impose Islam upon politics or the political system ‘Radical’ or ‘extremist’ Muslims are those who aim to impose Islam and influence the state via violent measures. To be able to adequately address the effect on moderates, this paper will not directly focus on the effects upon radicals, however as the consequences are very interlinked some discussion surrounding the effects upon radicals will be discussed but not to the same extent as the discussion surrounding moderates. Once the parameters of the area to study had been established, related papers, books, case studies and news articles could be read and analysed in order to create the thesis that total exclusion of Islamic opposition within a Muslim-majority country decreases stability. This paper will first examine the most significant consequence of exclusion, marginalisation, followed by an analysis of what is known as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and it’s applicability to democratic Muslim-majority nations. Next, this paper will examine the paradox of exclusion in a democracy. Lastly, this paper will conduct an analysis of exclusion in an authoritarian state.

Many Muslim-majority countries, whether they are autocratic or democratic, have attempted to create stability by excluding Islam and Islamic opposition from politics. For example the banning of organizations in Turkey such as the National Order Party or the removal of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In a democratic state the aim of exclusion is to prevent an ideology which is perceived as a threat to democracy from gaining power and influence and thus decreasing the level of democracy which the country wishes to retain or achieve. In an autocratic state Islamic opposition is excluded from the political arena to prevent any dissidence from being popular and thus decreasing the centralised power of the government, as an autocratic state would do with any vocal opposition. The exclusion of Islam and Islamic opposition from government therefore has different justifications depending on the type of government however the end result of both attempting to restrict Islam is the same and can have the same consequence of destabilisation irrespective of the type of government, it is for this reason that governments must allow Islamic opposition which abides by the same rules as any other political opposition to exist.

Marginalisation

Arguably the most significant consequence of excluding Islam is that exclusion results in all Islamic-based opposition being excluded, not just the type of Islam which is a threat to

stability. Moderate Islamic opposition then has no opportunity to operate in the public sphere and is thus pushed to the fringes of society, marginalising a group that would not have been a threat. The marginalisation of a group then results in those who still wish to influence politics with their Islamic agenda being forced to operate underground, in the same sphere as radical Islamists. As the moderate Islamists can no longer use the public channels to influence government their options are severely reduced. This persecution of a group who were previously willing to participate in politics can become sympathetic to the extremists cause and methodology or worse, become radicalised themselves (Hafez 2003). As Della Porta (1992: 16) explains, dissenters joining a radical organisation is frequently a result of non-violence activism leading to persecution. The result of marginalisation due to the states repression is used to the advantage of extremists, as the document ‘Lessons of Jihad’ an influential document for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan informs its readers: “The state will impose a curfew. It will begin to strongly torment the people. This is to your advantage.” (Nanajanov, 2002). Additionally, mass repression can also create sympathisers amongst those on the left who do not believe in the integration of religion and state. When discussing the contributing factors leading to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Mirsepassi-Ashtiani assesses that the secular intellectuals disapproval of the Shah’s oppression of opposition led them to contributing “much to the rationalizing, popularizing, and even legitimizing of Shiism and the Shici clergy” (1994). Excluding Islamic opposition therefore results in at best, creating sympathisers for the extremist cause or, at worst, fuelling the growth and determination of extremists. Baylouny (2004: 2) writes “In democracies that resist the pull of indiscriminate or collective repression, terrorism does not threaten the existence of the system itself; violence will continually spiral toward its demise, losing allies and support as democratic institutions expand to include new social actors”. Avoiding indiscriminate repression of political Islam and thus creating opportunities for legal Islamic opposition is therefore needed in order to reduce Islamic extremism and create stability. When Islamic extremists do attack the response of the government, whether autocratic or democratic, is to further tighten controls on any Islamic opposition or attempts of integrating religion and the state. As explained before, these controls, which mostly affect moderate Muslims, as the percentage of Muslims who conduct these attacks is so small, alienate and create further grievances with the moderate Muslims and augments retaliation by the extremists. The retaliation by the extremists creates more instability as it involves further and more severe attacks. Hafez (2003) argues that Islamic militancy is created primarily from state exclusion and repression. Retaliation and resentment from exclusion is also supported by the work of Rasler (1996). For example, in retaliation to the Uzbek governments imposed curfew in the Ferghana Valley, which was implemented to control Islamic extremists, Islamic organisations responded with the capture and murder of several police officers (Naumkin, 2003). The tightening of the controls and further exclusion of Islam therefore fails to achieve its aim of reducing Islamic extremism and creating stability.

The Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis

The ‘Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis’(Schwedler: 2011), is built upon the idea that institutions and political opportunities provide incentives for once excluded groups to enter the political sphere, abandon radical methods and play by the rules of democracy. This theory has its roots in many works whose focus was on the system-moderating behaviour of political parties. Particularly of note is the work by Robert Michels on the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Michels, 1911). An early version of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

is in Samuel P. Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Society (1973) where he discusses the “participation/moderation tradeoff”. Here he describes what he calls the “democratic bargain” wherein political opposition can have success in the democratic channels once they have “moderated their demands and modified their tactics”. This moderation and modifying of tactics includes, but is not exclusive to, stopping violence, abandoning revolutionary ideas, accepting the political institutions and using the established methods of elections and institutional procedures in order to achieve their goals. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis has been built around these founding ideas and shares much of the fundamental grounding. Participating in democratic systems causes religious parties to, according to Tepe (2005), undertake ‘internal secularization’ where the party will reinterpret and redefine religious ideas to be compatible within a secular state. As the party participates in the democratic system, the objective of the party changes and its goals become constrained by the democratic system and the process of democratic bargaining (Mufti, 1999: 144). Nasr (1995: 283) writes that even Islamist parties who once sought to replace the democratic system now act entirely within it, such as Jama’at-I Islami of Pakistan. Many studies have been conducted surrounding the inclusion-moderation hypothesis with a particular focus on Islam. For example, Wickham’s (2004) analysis of the Wasat Party, a break-away group from the Muslim Brotherhood, has moderated itself despite tensions between the Islamist commitment and democratic participation aspects of the party. Wickham (2004: 219) argues that the Wasat Party’s change of stance from opposing the torture of Islamic militants for instrumental reasons to being against the torture of any individual despite their identity as a matter of principal demonstrates how inclusion can moderate once extremist opposition. Furthermore, regarding Tunisia after the 2011 Arab Spring, the Islamic party Ennahda had to moderate its goals, Salem (2015: 5) writes, “Realizing that the Islamist agenda was the party’s and not a point of national consensus, Ennahda dropped its insistence on Islamist clauses in the new constitution. The draft that was unanimously approved is remarkably secular, civic, and democratic.” The inclusion-moderation hypothesis therefore demonstrates the positive consequences of including Islamic opposition in politics.

There are however many lines of criticisms of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. These criticisms include a lack of normative commitment to operating within a democracy amongst Islamic organisations (Baran, 2008; Tibi, 2008); a lack of empirical evidence (Schwedler, 2006); and lastly, that there is no agreement of what moderation includes and whether an organisation has truly become moderate or is in the process of moderation.

Firstly, regarding the critique of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis that Islamic organisations do not hold a commitment to behaving within the rules and institutions available to them via democracy, it can be argued that there is nothing to be gained from opening the political process to Islamic opposition as these groups have no interest in acting democratically. Even if the political process was available, it would not be used for democratic goals. One can look to Turkey for empirical evidence. Turkey has a unique combination within the Islamic world of being the first Muslim-majority democracy coupled with a capitalist, free-market, industrial economy. This established democracy combined with its economic structure results in other influencers of Islamic extremism such as economic hardship (Kreisler, 2001) and foreign intervention (Savun and Phillips, 2009) being reduced thus helping to isolate the variable of Islamic extremism due to inclusion/exclusion. For an example of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis failing it is helpful to examine the

Refah Party once they gained power and influence on a national level. The Refah (Welfare) Party was a Turkish political party founded in 1983. The Refah Party grew in power and influence and by 1996 were the largest party in the Turkish parliament. However although the party became more popular they were banned in 1998 by the Constitutional Court of Turkey for violating the separation of religion and state as mandated by the constitution. Evidence of the Refah party’s threat to stable democracy had been around for many years before it was disbanded. An example of this threat comes from a speech given in parliament by the then Refah Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan assured his parties representatives that they would achieve a “just order” however when describing how this will be achieved he asked “will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on that point.” (Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 2003). As the leader of a democratic country, Erbakan cannot be ambiguous when it comes to matters regarding whether violence will be used by their party to achieve their political goals. The seniority of Erbakan and the mass success of his party within democratic institutions would suggest that they would have become non-violent political actors however, Erbakan does not unambiguously declare that his party must not use violent methods to achieve their goals. The “just order” Erbakan is speaking of is the unification of Islam and state therefore via his ambiguity one could argue that himself and his party, due to their religious ambitions, demonstrate successfully that if Islam is included within a democracy this will not stop those included from using non-democratic methods to achieve their aims. Furthermore, other Refah representatives had spoken about the need for unification of religion and the state by any means, a segment of a speech by Refah representative Ibrahim Halil Celik demonstrates this threat:

“If you attempt to close down the ‘İmam-Hatip’ theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow [..] I too would like blood to flow. That’s how democracy

will be installed. [..] The army has not been able to deal with 3,500 members of the PKK. How would it see off six million Islamists? If they piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.”- (Case of

Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 2003).

As well as events in Turkey, there is evidence of Islamic parties failing to participate in a democracy or developing democracy within the rules of a democratic system in other nations. In regards to the elections in Tunisia and Egypt after the 2011 Arab Spring, Salem writes “Majorities that voted Islamist parties to power in Egypt and Tunisia turned into majorities that protested their monopolization of power and attempts to Islamize the state and society.” (Salem, 2003: 2). This further supports the argument that if Islamic parties are allowed to participate in a democracy then the consequences will be that if they fail to succeed democratically they will still encourage “bloodshed” to gain power or if they do succeed will attempt to monopolise power and Islamise the state and society. From this evidence it can be concluded that if a state wishes to remain a stable democracy, the exclusion of Islamists who at first appear to be willing participants in a democratic system is necessary as the inclusion of them will be used to erode democracy and with this erosion instability will follow.

It is important to note however that in neither the Turkish nor Tunisian and Egyptian example, neither country became an Islamic state nor suffered significant instability as a direct result of the rhetoric or actions of the governing Islamic party. Schwedler noted the

same lack of regime change despite the perceived threat. Writing about the National Islamic Front in 1989 Sudan and the Islamic Salvation Front in 1990s Algeria, Schwedler (1998: 2) writes “What stands out about these oft-cited examples of the Islamic "threat" is that not one illustrates the paradox of democracy, i.e., an authoritarian regime coming to power through elections.” The fear of what is often phrased as “one man, one vote, one time” (Langohr 2001: 591), meaning that once Islamists gain power democratically they will remove the right to vote and remove the democratic institutions and system, has never come to fruition.

A lack of empirical evidence and clear mechanisms for behavioural modification (Schwedler, 2006) is another criticism levied against the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. The lack of empirical evidence surrounding the inclusion-moderation hypothesis within Islam stems from the lack of Muslim-majority countries that have a democratic system. Only Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey and Lebanon can be reasonably argued to be democracies, ranked 49th, 70th and joint 98th respectively in the Economist Inteligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2015: 6). Due to this lack of Muslim-majority countries being democracies the available empirical evidence available and instances of successes and failures of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in Muslim-majority countries is greatly reduced. Out of these four democracies only Indonisia (Buehler, 2013), Turkey (Gurses, 2014) and Tunisia (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013) have been examined using the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Having a lack of cases and empirical evidence to support a theory results in the theorist being less able to make assumptions. As John (2010: 269) writes ‘Statistical theory shows that the larger the number of cases […] the surer the data analysts can be that what they observe is not a random occurrence’. The inverse of this, that the smaller the number of cases the less sure analysts can be that what they observe is not a random occurrence, can thus be said to be true and applied to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.

A third critique of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is that it is unclear what exactly moderation entails and how clear it is that an organization has become moderated due to inclusion. Just as terms such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘nation’ are surrounded by ambiguity, inconsistency, impreciseness and occasionally completely erroneous use, ‘moderation’ faces the same issues. As Karl Deutsch writes “ In science, including social science, a word is only a kind of noise unless we sooner or later use it to lead a procedure that will tell us whether or not a certain event or fact belongs under the word”. (1969: 138). Some distinguish the process of moderation of moving from a single, unalterable ideology to a more inclusive and adaptable one, others are more specific and create a definition between ideological and behavioural moderation (Schwedler, 2006, 2011). For Teczür ideological moderation is ‘a process through which political actors espouse ideas that do not contradict the principles of popular sovereignty, political pluralism, and limits on arbitrary state authority’ (2010: 10). Behavioural moderation however is the ‘the adaptation of electoral, conciliatory, and nonconfrontational strategies that seek compromise and peaceful settlement of disputes at the expense of nonelectoral, provocative, and confrontational strategies that are not necessarily violent but may entail contentious action’ (Tezcür 2010: 10). Wickham (2004) has attempted to distinguish the actions and attitude changes which constitute evidence that an organisation is moderating. Wickham (2004: 207) writes that moderation is notable when there is a change in leaders’ core principles which determine the strategic direction of the organisation so that compromise and cooperation with secular organisations makes it possible for all organisations to achieve shared goals. The challenge of defining moderation

results in difficulties when testing the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Trying to measure a change in moderation cannot be reliably repeated as different parameters of what should be considered moderation means that different results can be produced depending on the researcher’s epistemology. This lack of reliability inherent in the inclusion-moderation hypothesis coupled with the issue that moderation should be understood as a continuum from radical to moderate, not as a category which one can quantify (Schwedler, 2011: 352) further weakens its effectiveness as a theory. Furthermore, when an organisation is moderating or has become moderated, whether it is ideological moderation or behavioural moderation, it is hard to define and decipher whether the change in attitudes and/or actions is due to inclusion. Teczür (2010: 15) doubts the effect of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis’ and argues that political moderation may not be due to inclusion but rather a consequence of country-specific features within a diverse and distinct political scenario.

The inclusion-moderation hypothesis has much evidence that inclusion will reduce the amount of radical Islamists, however, it is hard to imagine that a group such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda would cease its terrorist activities and its members would become moderate and peaceful if their organisations are made legal and allowed to participate through the democratic channels. This is another aspect where the inclusion-moderation hypothesis appears to falter. This paper however argues that the aim of allowing Islamic opposition should not be to eradicate an organisation that is already radical; instead, allowing Islamic opposition should aim to prevent moderate Muslims from sympathising with the extremists as the moderates can now voice their beliefs through mainstream, moderate political opposition and thus preventing moderate Muslims from becoming marginalised and radicalised. If an extremist organisation becomes more moderate as a result of the opening of democratic channels, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad becoming the Islamic Party, and terrorist activities by the once extremist group cease then this is an additional benefit of allowing Islamic opposition. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis should not be applied to cases where the aim of inclusion is to deradicalise those who are already radicalised but instead should be used to prevent marginalisation and radicalisation of moderates.

Despite the criticisms of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the theory should not be discarded. As each case study is conducted, within the valid parameters explained by the researcher, the hypothesis’ application will prove to be a useful theory regarding the relationship between government, Islamic opposition and their role in democratic politics.

The Democratic Paradox of Exclusion

The separation of religion and state is perceived to be a core component of a modern democracy, as Stepan (2000: 39-40) writes “Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments”. “As secularism is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for viable democracy” (Nasr, 1995: 3) it is important for democracies to retain secularism once it has been instituted. It can be argued that Islamic parties, if they gained power within a democratic system would try and create an integration of religion and state. The previously mentioned example of the Refah party in Turkey wanting to achieve their “just order” of integrating religion and state is a clear example of this threat that democracies wish to prevent. To counter this threat and preserve democracy, the government attempts to prevent Islamic opposition from being in a position where this could be possible. Furthermore, in a Muslim-majority country, if an Islamic party gains power then the

common fear that repressive policies might be imposed against minorities and other citizens, for example the removal of suffrage for women, the implementation of unfair sharia law or the persecution of Kurds, Christians and Jews. This would be anti-democratic, as Stepan (2000: 39) writes, a democracy must have “considerable protections for minority rights.” However, the system of representative democracy is not a perfect system of government, therefore in order to preserve democracy and stability it is argued that rights and freedoms of a few have to be restricted so that the rights and freedoms of the many are not restricted. As Schwedler (1998: 1) asks “Might the exclusion of certain groups, though undesirable in principle, be necessary to ensure that democratic stirrings are not immediately crushed?”

With this reasoning, democracies justify the exclusion of Islamic opposition from partaking in a democracy. However, if a democracy is persecuting a minority for the end goal of preventing the persecution of minorities there is a clear paradox.

The exclusion of a group via the restriction of free speech, banning the right to assemble and constraining the individual’s right to freedom of religion is inherently undemocratic. The purpose of the exclusion of Islamist groups is to defend and develop stable a democracy however if the exclusion of the aforementioned groups is itself undemocratic then the exclusion creates a paradox where in order to further democracy (by excluding Islamist opposition) the state acts undemocratically (restricting induvial rights and freedoms). Keyman (2007) writes “The more secularism is used by the state elite as a political project to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing its society”. Additionally, weakening democracy can lead to further radicalisation. It has been shown that terrorist movements in democracies tend to be short-lived (Gurr, 2003). Therefore to promote stability and prevent extremism it is necessary to make sure the level of democracy is not reduced.

Exclusion in Autocratic and Illiberal Regimes

The consequences of the exclusion of Islamic opposition within autocratic regimes shares similarities with exclusion in democratic states. There are however some consequences where the effect is either unique or greatly increased when exclusion occurs in an authoritarian regime. The majority of Muslim-majority nations are autocratic or clearly illiberal democracies. Inherent in these systems of government is repression of political opposition. For the elite to retain complete political control, opposition is silenced quickly with a heavy-handed approach. It is common for the government to respond to non-violent opposition with violence, utilizing the monopoly of violence that the state possesses to prevent any opposition from developing into a serious threat. The authoritarian leaders justify these methods and complete control by using much of the same rhetoric as those in democracies who oppose Islamic intervention in politics. The idea that it is better for the people if this small amount of opposition is treated unfairly and it is better to have the current elite in power than any other is often used by the ruling elite. In a US-Egypt meeting with the then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, when questioned if he would ease on his repression of political dissidents and freedom of speech, Mubarak responded “If I do what you ask, the "fundamentalists" will take over the government in Egypt. Do you want that?” (Zakaria, 2004: 187). Similarly, when Clinton asked the same of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, he responded “If I do what you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow” (Zakaria,

2004: 187). The justification that it is better for the ruling elite to restrict freedoms than the alternative of allowing extremists to gain influence and power can then be used to justify the harsh methods elites employ to achieve stability. The consequences of a crackdown on Islamist extremism in an autocracy however can have the effect of polarising political opponents. As authoritarian regimes do not allow any oppositional activism or change of any sort (Tarrow, 1998: 85), any opponent becomes a criminal. The result of this is that it changes the internal politics of the state from a multi-sided to a two-sided game. As those who would have previously wanted reform rather than revolution are criminalised the situation becomes one of ‘for or against’ where support is gathered for whichever challenger can withstand the repression, irrelevant of the organisations agenda (Baylouny, 2004: 4). As religion is difficult to repress completely, as evident in the failure of the Soviet Union to eradicate the Orthodox Church, it is religious opposition that therefore becomes the main opposition in autocratic regimes. Furthermore, religion crosses social class and economic interests, reducing areas of potential conflict amongst disparate social groups. The already established structure of Islam (historical and shared texts, established places of worship and deeply rooted cultural integration) provides a strong and unifying centre for opposition to develop from. Hence, excluding all opposition (therefore encompassing Islamic opposition) in an autocracy can have the adverse of the desired effect and increase Islamic opposition thus fuelling threats to the governing elite. Additionally, as Anderson states, opposition’s methods mirror those of the regime (Anderson: 1987: 228). When an organized and hierarchical state acts violently against political opposition, the opposition will react violently and become well-structured and hierarchical. This effect is known as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As the opposition reacts with violence, the state will attempt to repress this with more violence which in turn creates fiercer opposition. This spiral of violence causes instability. The consequences of this heavy-handed approach are evident in the results of the protests which kick-started the Arab Spring in 2011. Peaceful demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahir Square, the city of Daraa in Syria and outside the police headquarters in Benghazi, Libya all culminated in violent clashes with the government and eventual revolution or civil war. In comparison, when Moroccan King Mohammed VI faced mass protest across the country, including popular chants of ‘Down with autocracy’ (Champion, 2011), the authorities reacted with less force; during the protests 6 people were killed (Miller, 2011) by security forces compared with an estimated 846 in Egypt (Khazbak, 2012). Reforms were proposed and implemented swiftly to appease the opposition and prevent revolution. Although vocal opposition remains in Morocco, constitutional changes have greatly reduced the destabilising factor of these protests. As Seidman (2000) explains, the rational choice of the opposition to use violent or non-violent methods is directly related to the oppressor’s own actions. The unity, structure and resilience of Islam therefore means that in order to retain stability, autocratic regimes should not exclude and oppress all Islamic opposition. Nasr (1995: 273) summarises this succinctly “an open political process […] is far more likely to control religiopolitical activism than authoritarian regimes that exclude [Islamic activists] from the political process”.

Conclusion The exclusion of Islam from politics in a Muslim-majority country does have its benefits. Creating controls in order to foster stability is an important aspect of government and the removal of threats that may cause instability is necessary. However, as exclusion has been

proven to lead to marginalisation, radicalisation, illerbality in a democratic state and unified and stronger opposition in an autocracy, the negatives greatly outweigh the benefits. As has been demonstrated and supported by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the inclusion of Islamic opposition can result in the moderation of their behaviour and ideology, thus Islam and the state can co-exist successfully. It has been shown that the indiscriminate exclusion of Islamic opposition from the democratic process aids the radicals cause, thus leading to a more severe threat to stability. Preventing individuals from radicalisation or harbouring radical sympathies is an essential aspect of preventing destabilising groups from gaining followers, members, influence and power. Therefore, in order to retain or increase stability, political process should be opened to allow moderate Islamic opposition to voice their discontent, ideology and aims peacefully.

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