Isaac - The Faces of Power

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Jeffrey

C.

Isaac

7

behaves

in

various

circumstances,

and

especially,

whether

there

are

any

regularities in its behavior. 6

Like

Hume,

Popper

associates

any attempt

to

provide

real

definitions

and

analyze

causal necessities with medieval

scholasticism

and

unscien-

tific

metaphysics.

Also like

Hume,

he construes

causality

as

constant

conjunction. Popper

writes:

To

give

a causal

explanation

of

an

event

means

to deduce a

state-

ment which

describes

it,

using

as

premises

of

the deduction one

or

more universal

laws,

together

with

certain

singular

statements,

the

initial

conditions. .

. .

The

initial

conditions describe

what

is

usually

called the cause

of

the

event

in

question.7

Thus,

because

any

talk of natural

necessity

is

derisively

branded

meta-

physics

and

because the

only meaning

that can thus be

given

to

causality

is as

empirical regularity,

the

task

of

scientific

explanation

becomes

deductive-nomological-the

formulation

of

generalizations

about

empir-

ical

regularities

which enable us

to

predict

that Whenever

A,

then

B. '

This

ideal

of scientific

explanation,

once dominant

within

philosophy

of

science,

has

been

subjected

to much criticism in

philosophy.

But,

just

as

it took

political

scientists some time before

they

were

willing

to

adopt

this

ideal,

there has

also been a

lag

between its abandonment

by

philosophers

and its

rejection

by

political

scientists. One

consequence

of this

is its con-

tinuing

influence on

the debate

about

power.

II. The

First Face

of

Power

This

understanding

of

scientific

explanation

shaped

a new

and

rigorous

effort to

formalize the

concept

of

power.

A

number of

articles

were

published,

all

variations on the

same

theme-power

is a

causal

relation

between the

behaviors

of two

agents,

causality

being

understood as con-

stant

conjunction.9

6.

Karl

R.

Popper,

The

Open

Society

and its

Enemies,

Vol. I

(Princeton,

NJ:

Princeton

University

Press,

1966),

p.

32.

7. Karl

R.

Popper,

The

Logic

of

Scientific

Discovery

(London:

Hutchinson,

1959,

and

New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1968),

pp.

59-60.

8.

See,

in

addition

to

Popper,

Carl

Hempel's

Aspects

of

Scientific

Explanation

(New

York:

Free

Press,

1965),

especially

pp.

364-67.

As

Holt

and

Turner

write:

Typically,

the

[scientific]

hypothesis

involves a

predicted

relationship

between

at

least

two

variables and

takes

the

general

form

of

'If

A,

then

B.'

Holt

and

Turner,

Methodology, p.

6.

9.

See,

for

example,

Herbert

A.

Simon,

Notes

on

the

Observation

and

Measurement

of

Political

Power,

Journal

of

Politics

15

(1953);

and

James G.

March,

An

Introduction

to

the

Theory

and

Measurement

of

Influence,

American

Political

Science

Review

49

(1955).



8

Beyond

he

ThreeFaces

of Power

This

approach

was

taken

up by

Robert

Dahl,

one of the most

impor-

tant figures n the three facesof powerdebate.Dahl, in a seriesof arti-

cles,

argued

the

need for a

definition

of

power

amenable

o

the

kind of

empirical

research nvisioned

by

behavioralism.

Thus he

wrote:

power

terms

n

modernsocial science refer to

subsetsof

relations

among

social

units

such

that the

behaviorof one or more units

(the response

units,

R),

depend

in

some circumstances n

the behavior

of other units

(the

con-

trolling

units,

C).'1

Power, then,

is

an

empiricalregularity

whereby

he

behavior

of

one

agent

causes the behavior of another.

Dahl is

explicit

about

this,

noting

that:

For

the assertion

C has

power

over

R'

we can substitute he asser-

tion 'C's behavior

causes R's

behavior'

.

.

. the

language

of

cause,

like the

language

of

power,

is

used

to

interpret

ituations

n

which

there

is a

possibility

that some event

will

intervene

o

change

the

order of other

events.

That this

notion

of

power

rests

on a

Newtonian

analogy

seems obvious.

We are all

naturally

at rest or at constant

velocity,

until our

movement

s

altered

by

an

external

force. Power

is

that force

whereby

social

agents

alterthe behaviorof otheragentsor, as Dahlputsit, getthemto do what

they

would

not otherwise

do.'2 True

to

his

empiricism,

Dahl

insists that

there are

no

necessary

relationships

between

the behaviors

of

agents,

writing

that

the

only meaning

that

is

strictly

causal

in

the notion

of

power

is one

of

regular

sequence:

hat

is,

a

regular

sequence

such

that

when

A does

something,

what

follows,

or

what

probably

follows,

is

an

action

by

B. '3

These

remarks

may

sound

unexceptionable,

but their

force must

be

emphasized.

Dahl

is

insisting

here thathis notion

of

power

smacksof

no

metaphysics,

hat its assertioninvolves

nothing

that is not empirically

evident.

This

view of

power

s

the basis

of theentire

hreefaces

of

power

debate.

All

of the

contestants

agree

hat

power

s an

empirical

elation

of

cause

and

effect,

and none

of

them conceives

of

power

as

involving

any

necessary

connections,

or

what

I will latercall structural

elationships.

This is

not to

say

that

the reason

for

this is because

subsequent

con-

10.

Robert

A.

Dahl,

Power,

International

Encyclopedia

of

the Social

Sciences,

vol.

12

(New

York,

1968), p.

407.

11.

Ibid.,

p.

418.

12. Robert

A.

Dahl,

The

Concept

of

Power,

Behavioral

Science

2,

no.

3

(July

1957):

203-4.

13. Robert

A.

Dahl,

Cause

and

Effect

in the

Study

of

Politics,

in Cause

and

Effect,

ed.

Daniel

Lerner

(New

York:

Free

Press,

1965), p.

94.



Jeffrey

C.

Isaac

9

testants

consciously

wished

to endorse

the Humean

view.

It

is,

rather,

that they simply failed to challenge it, most likely because they failed to

recognize

it-an

interesting

example

of

the

power

of

a view which

is

neither

asserted

nor

recognized

as

such.

The

controversy

about

power

does

not revolve

around

this

major

premise.

It

revolves,

instead,

around the

following question:

How

do

we

identify

those instances

in

which

A

gets

B to do

that which

B

would

not

otherwise

have

done? As Steven

Lukes

points

out,

this

question

hinges

on the

question

of a

counterfactual:

What would

B

have otherwise

done?

Dahl's

answer to this is that B's revealed

preferences

indicate

this.14

Thus, A has power over B means that A's behavior regularly causes B

to do

something

which B does

not want to

do. This

has been

called

the

first face

of

power

insofar as it involves manifest

instances

of

conflict

and

compliance.

It

has also

been called the decisionist view

insofar

as

it is

limited to

instances of actual

decisionmaking

or choice in

action.

It is on

the

basis of this

interpretation

of the

counterfactual

that

Dahl,

and

his

student Nelson

Polsby,

insisted that

any

scientific

claims

about

power

must

focus

on instances

of

manifest

conflict.

In

this

insistence,

they

employed

their

understanding

of

scientific

method in

order

to

delegitimate radical critics of American society who wrote about power

without

referring

to

regular

sequences

of

the

above-mentioned

sort. Thus

Polsby,

in

his

Community

Power

and Political

Theory,

chastised what he

called

categorialism,

categorical

claims such

as

A

has

power

over

B

which

refuse

to

specify

the

empirical

conditions,

the

causal

behaviors,

under which B

can

be

predicted

to act

(note

the

similarity

of this

criticism

to

Popper's

invidious

distinction

between

methodological

nominalism

and

essentialism).

Thus

Polsby

writes about

the

claim

that

there

is

a

dominant

class:

For

this

latter

statement to

mean

anything

in

a

scientific

sense,

we

must,

according

to the

formal

requirements

postulated

above,

make

reference

to

specific

decisions in

which

particular

outcomes

are

affected

by

members

of

the classes into

which

we

divide

the

population,

and

secondly,

we

must

state

the

conditions

under

which we

can

take it

as

demonstrated

that

the

upper

class

does

not

have

more

power

than

the

lower

class.'5

Ascriptions

of

power,

then,

are

falsifiable

predictions

about

the

stimuli

14.

Dahl,

The

Concept

of

Power.

15.

Nelson

Polsby,

Community

Power

and Political

Theory (New

Haven,

CT:

Yale Uni-

versity

Press,

1980), pp.

5-6.



10

Beyond

the

Three

Facesof Power

of the

powerful

and the

responses

of the

powerless.

Similarly

Dahl,

in

his

now-classic

Critiqueof

the

RulingElite Model, criticizedC. Wright

Mills

by asserting

hat

I

do not

see how

anyone

can

suppose

hat he has

established he dominanceof a

specific

group

in

a

community

or

nation

without

basing

his

analysis

on the carefulexaminationof a

seriesof

con-

crete

decisions. '6

It is

important

o see what these criticisms

accomplished,

or

doing

so

will

clarifyexactly

what this article s

criticizing.

On the

one

hand,

some

very

sensibleand

plausiblepoints

are

made

regarding

he

importance

of

empirical

evidence

and the

possibility

of

theoreticalcriticism. On the

other hand, the whip hand of scienceis deployedto questionthe very

meaning

and

reference

of

claims about

power

that do not

conform to

Dahl's decisionist

perspective.

t

is not Dahl's

emphasis

on the

empirical,

but his

reliance

on

empiricism,

on the

Hume/Popper

view

of

causality

and

scientific

explanation,

hat is the

problem

with his

view

of

power.

III.

The

Second

Face

of

Power

The

Dahl-Polsby

view

of

power

was

challenged

by

Peter

Bachrach

and

Morton

Baratz,

who

introduced

the

notion

of a second

face

of

power.

Their

criticismrestson two

points.

The firstis thatDahl and

Polsby

sometimes

write

in

a

naively

positivist

vein,

as

though

the

loca-

tion

of

power

were

unproblematic

nd

simply

a

question

of

observation.

Bachrach

and

Baratz

nsist

that

this

is

mistaken,

hatall science

nvolves

the

making

of

judgements

of

significance

which

are derived

rom

a

theo-

retical

perspective.

Their

second

objection

is that

Dahl's

formulation

misses

a

crucial

eature

of

power-the

suppression

f conflict.

In

criticiz-

ing

Dahl's

decisionist

focus

on

actual

conflict,

Bachrach

and

Baratz

develop

the

concept

of

a

nondecision,

which

they

define

as a

decision

that

results

n

suppression

r

thwarting

of

a

latent

or manifest

challenge

to

the

values

or

interests

of the

decision-maker. 8

The

point

of

this

argument

s that

power

entails

not

simply

nteraction,

but

limitations

on

interaction.

Yet,

their

formulation

s also

ambiguous

and

open

to

the

charge

hat

it is little different

from

Dahl's.

On the

one

hand,

Bachrach

andBaratz

suggest

a

structural

ormulation,

conceiving

16.

Robert

A.

Dahl,

A

Critique

of

the

Ruling

Elite

Model,

American Political

Science

Review

58

(1958):

463-4.

17. Cf.

Peter

Bachrach

and

Morton

Baratz,

The

Two

Faces of

Power,

American

Political

Science

Review

56

(1962):

942-52,

and

Decisions

and Nondecisions:

An

Analytic

Framework,

American

Political

Science

Review

57

(1963):

632-42.

These

essays

are

reprinted

in the authors'

Power

and

Poverty (New

York:

Oxford

University

Press, 1970).

18.

Bachrach

and

Baratz,

Power

and

Poverty,

pp.

43-44.



Jeffrey

C.

Isaac

11

power

as

implicated

n

institutionalized

ractices.

It

is in this

regard

hat

they refer to Schattschneider'sonceptof the mobilizationof bias,

writing

hat:

Political

systems

and

sub-systems

develop

a

mobilization

of

bias,

a set of

predominant

values,

beliefs,

rituals,

and

institu-

tional

procedures

rules

of

the

game )

that

operatesystematically

and

consistently

o

the benefit

of

certain

groups

and

persons

at

the

expense

of

others.Those who benefit

are

placed

n

a

preferred

osi-

tion to

defendand

promote

their

vested

interests.19

This formulation, however, comes dangerouslyclose to postulating

underlying

structural relations

as

determining

behavior,

risking

the

essentialism

o

scorned

by

properly

trained scientific

theorists.

Polsby

makes

the

point:

The

central

problem

s this:

Even

if

we can

show

that a

given

status

quo

benefits

some

people

disproportionately

as

I

think

we

can for

any

real

world

status

quo),

such

a

demonstration

alls short

of

showing

that

the

beneficiaries

created

the

status

quo,

act

in

any

meaningfulway to maintain t, or could, in the future,act effec-

tively

to deter

changes

n it.20

Once

again,

the

mark of

science

is the

examinationof

behavior,

but a

given

status

quo,

in

and of

itself,

holds

no

interest for

the

theorist

of

power.

In

the

end,

Bachrachand

Baratzsacrifice

heir

interest

n

structure o

the

interest of

science.

They

say

explicitly

that

power

involves

actual

compliance

and

go

so far

as to

assert hat

it

cannot

be

possessed,

only

exercised.2'Conceding

to

behavioralism,they hold that although

absence

of conflict

may

be a

non-event,

a

decision

which

results

n

pre-

vention of conflict

is

very

much

an

event-and an

observable

one,

to

boot. 22

By

admitting

his,

Bachrachand

Baratz

expose

themselves o a

criticism

made

by

Geoffrey

Debnam-that

implicit

n

their

formulation

19.

Ibid.

20.

Polsby,

Community

Power,

p.

208,

emphasis

added.

See

also

Raymond

Wolfinger,

Nondecisions

and

the

Study

of Local

Politics, American Political Science Review 65

(1971),

for

a

similar

criticism.

For an

interesting critique

of the

positivism

which

Polsby/

Wolfinger

fall

into,

and

a

defense

of the

possibility

of

discovering

covert

decisions of Bach-

rach

and

Baratz's

sort,

see

Frederick

Frey's

Nondecisions

and

the

Study

of

Local

Politics:

A

Comment,

American

Political

Science

Review 65

(1971).

21.

Bachrach

and

Baratz,

Power &

Poverty, p.

19.

22.

Ibid.,

p.

46.



Jeffrey

C. Isaac 13

to instances of

behavioral

compliance

as the

one- and

two-dimensional

views do. He asks, Is not the supreme exercise of power to avert con-

flict and

grievance

by influencing, shaping,

and

determining

the

percep-

tions

and

preferences

of

others? 26

Lukes submits that

his

view

of

power, along

with

those of Dahl

and

Bachrach and

Baratz,

all can be seen as alternative

interpretations

and

applications

of

one and the same

underlying concept

of

power,

accord-

ing

to which A exercises

power

over

B

when

A

affects B in a manner

con-

trary

to B's interests. 27

It is Lukes

who makes

the

concept

of

interest

central to

the

debate,

yet

it

is

important

to see how much

his

similarities

with his predecessors outweigh his differences. Lukes agrees that power

is a

causal

concept denoting

behavioral

regularities.

He

agrees

too

that

A

has

power

over

B

means that A's

behavior

causes

B

to do

some-

thing

that

B

would not

otherwise do. As Lukes

puts

it,

any

attribution

of

the

exercise of

power

. . .

always implies

a

relevant

counterfactual. 28

In

the

cases of the

first two

faces

of

power,

the

counterfactual

is

pro-

vided

by

the

existence

of

empirical

conflict

between the

revealed

prefer-

ences of A

and B.

Lukes

differs

from

these views in

insisting

that

preferences

can

themselves

be

the effect of the

exercise

of

power.

He

thus

insists that what B would do otherwise cannot be gauged properly by B's

preferences,

but

rather

by

B's

interests.

Lukes,

then,

defines

power

as

follows:

A

exercises

power

over

B

when A

affects B

contrary

to B's

interest. 29 The

concept

of

power

can

thus refer to

relations

between A

and B

even in

the

absence of

empirical

conflict.

Lukes

contends

that

this

view

captures

the

essence of

power

as an

empirical

relation

between

A

and B

and

that the

sole

difference

between

this view

and

those

articulated

by

his

antagonists

is

that

those

holding

the three

different

views

of

power

I

have

set out

offer different

inter-

pretations of what are to count as interests and how they may be adverse-

ly

affected. 30

Lukes's view

is

that the

concept

of

interest,

or

what has

been

called

objective interest,

refers to

what

an

agent

would

do

under

ideal

democratic

circumstances. It

thus

follows

that if

it can

be

plausibly

argued

that A

affects B in

a

manner

which

limits

B

from

doing

what

B

26. Steven Lukes, Power and Authority, in A History of Sociological Anslysis, ed.

Tom

Bottomore and

Robert

Nisbet

(New

York:

Basic

Books,

1978),

p.

669.

27.

Lukes,

Power: A

Radical

View,

p.

27.

28.

Ibid.,

p.

41.

29.

Ibid.,

pp.

22-25.

30.

Ibid.,

p.

27.



14

Beyond

the

Three Faces

of Power

would do under ideal

conditions,

then it can

be

properly

said that A exer-

cises

power

over

B.31

This notion of

objective

interest has been

subjected

to

a

great

deal of

criticism,

some of which

will be

discussed below.

But

regardless

of the

merit of Lukes's

understanding

of

interests,

the

importance

of the con-

cept

for

him

is

grounded

in

his

commitment to

viewing power

as an

empirical

regularity.

Despite

his criticisms of his

antagonists,

he is

explicit

that

he

is

merely interpreting

a

shared

concept.

Insofar

as

this is

true,

Lukes's

formulation,

like that of Bachrach

and

Baratz,

is

ambigu-

ous

regarding

the

socially

structured and

culturally patterned

dimen-

sion of power.

In

a

later

essay,

Power and

Structure,

Lukes seeks to

clarify

this,

arguing

that

structural and

empirical approaches

must be

synthesized

and

suggesting

that there

is a dialectic of

power

and structure. 32

Social

structure limits

action,

and

power,

being

an

event-like

phenomenon,

is

discernible

empirically.

Power,

he

says,

is an

agency concept,

not

a

structural

one,

yet

he

writes that it

is held

and

exercised

by agents

(individual

or

collective)

within

systems

and

structural

determinants. 33

This clarifies

somewhat

the relation

between

power

and structure-social

structure provides the limits within which power is exercised. But it also

leaves

unanswered

the

problem

posed

by

Lukes's

earlier

discussion of

power

in

structural

terms.

In other

words,

what is

the

nature of

these

structural

determinants

of

power?

How

determining

are

they?

If

power

is

an

agency

concept

rather

than

a structural

one,

and

if it denotes

behavioral

regularities,

then

what

precisely

is the

difference

between

Lukes's

third

face of

power

and

the

view

of Bachrach

and

Baratz?

Is

it

31.

Ibid.,

pp.

34-35. This view of interests, as Lukes acknowledges, has been developed

by

William

E.

Connolly,

On

'Interests'

in

Politics,

Politics

and

Society,

2,

no. 4

(Sum-

mer

1972).

This

conception

owes

much to

the

work of

Jiirgen

Habermas,

particularly

his

Knowledge

and

Human

Interests

(Boston:

Beacon

Press,

1968).

Lukes

explicitly

links

himself

to

the

idiom

of critical

theory

in a later

paper,

On

the

Relativity

of

Power,

in

Philosophical

Disputes

in the

Social

Sciences,

ed. S.

C.

Brown

(Sussex

and

New

Jersey:

Harvester

and

Humanities,

1979),

p.

267.

It is

therefore

curious

that

in a more recent

paper

he

rejects

Habermas's

(and

his own

earlier)

transcendental

conception

of

objective

interest,

opting

instead

for

a

Weberian

subjectivism

in

many ways

akin

to

Polsby.

See Steven

Lukes,

Of

Gods

and

Demons:

Habermas

and

Practical

Reason,

in Habermas:

CriticalDebates,

ed. John

B.

Thompson

and

David

Held

(Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

Press,

1982).

This is

an

issue

on

which

Lukes

shows

some

confusion.

For a

critique,

see

Michael

Bloch,

Brian

Heading,

and

Phillip

Lawrence,

Power

in

Social

Theory:

A

Non-Relative

View,

in

Brown,

Philosophical

Disputes,

pp.

243-60.

32.

See

Steven

Lukes,

Power

and

Structure,

in

Essays

in

Social

Theory,

ed.

Steven

Lukes

(London:

Macmillan,

1977).

33.

See

Lukes,

Power

&

Authority, p.

635;

Relativity

of

Power,

pp.

263-4.



Jeffrey

C. Isaac 15

simply

a focus

on

a

different class of

events,

those which involve

the

transgression of objective interest rather than simply compliance? If

Lukes's

view is

different,

his bifurcation

of

power

and structure

does

not

go

far

in

showing

us how.

In

short,

Lukes

seems unable

to

articulate

the

structural nature

of

social

power

which,

he

rightly

notes,

is so

important.

In

the

end,

Lukes

leans

toward a

view of

power

differing

little

from

that of

his

predecessors.

Like

them,

he views

power

in

terms of

behav-

ioral

regularities

rather

than

their

structural determinants.

And like

them

he

conflates the

possession

of

power

with

its

exercise,

insisting

that

power

is an

agency

concept

rather

than

a

structural

one. Lukes

explicitly

rejects the locution power to, and instead accepts an exclusive

emphasis

on

power

over.

For

him,

power

is exhausted in

interaction,

in

the

regularity

with which

A

can

get

B to

do

something,

thus

having

power

over

B. His

formulation

leaves

no room for

consideration

of

the

enduring powers

to

act

which

are

possessed by

A

and

B,

and which

are

brought

to bear

in

interaction.

He

justifies

inattention

to

the

locution

power

to

by

arguing

that

it is

out

of line

with

the

central

meaning

of

power

as

traditionally

understood

and with

the

concerns that have

always

preoccupied

students of

power. 34

But it is

precisely

this tradi-

tional idiom that I wish to question. An adequate formulation of the

concept

of

power

must

recognize

that the

power

one

agent

exercises over

another

agent

in

interaction

is

parasitic upon

the

powers

to

act

which the

agents

possess.

The

purpose

of

the

above

discussion

has

been to

demonstrate some

root

similarities

among

the

contestants

of the

three faces of

power

con-

troversy,

and

to

point

out

that

the

debate

about

power

has been con-

ducted

within

rather narrow

parameters. Nonetheless,

within

these

parameters,

some

serious

problems

are left

unresolved.

And

while

the

irresolution of conflict is not always a signal of something awry, in this

case it

may

indicate

the need

to

broaden the

parameters

of

debate,

and

in

fact

to

free the

discussion from

its

behavioralist

legacy.

The

major

unresolved

difficulty

of the

debate

concerns

the

problem

of

the

limits

within

which

interaction

occurs,

or

what

I

have

called the struc-

tural

nature

of

power.

This

problem

has

proven

inarticulable

within

the

confines

of the

debate,

in

virtue

of

the

shared

premise,

established

by

the

behavioral

revolution,

that

power

is the

empirical

causation of one

actor's behavior

by

that of

another actor.

Bachrach

and

Baratz,

as

well

as Lukes, have failed to develop the structural dimension of power to

which

they

rightly point.

This is

not a

problem

for

Dahl,

who

never raises

34.

Lukes,

Power: A

Radical

View,

p.

31.

Isaac - The Faces of Power

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