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IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM?

The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of aMeaning. By S. Rufus Davis. (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1978). Pp. xi, 237. $14.50.

THE most comprehensive bibliography of federalism, in theoryand practice, was published in 1967 and runs to 231 pages.' It is

not unreasonable to assume that, updated to the present, it wouldcover in excess of 300 pages. But anyone undertaking that taskwould at once be confronted by the problem of definition. K.C.Wheare entitled his classic study of the subject FederalGovernment, 2 avoiding the problem by the (relatively simple)technique of deducing a definition from an examination of the best-known examples of the species. Rufus Davis has chosen the term"Federal Principle" for his scrutiny of the concept.

Davis' purpose is "to take stock of an idea that has lived a longlife,...was once an ornament of political science,...[but] has begunto show distinct marks of wear and tear" (ix). The evidence of hardtimes for the concept of federalism, says Davis, is everywhere: "inthe many and different approaches to the subject; in the varying at-tempts to rectify its name; in the contradictory programs urged in itsname; in the alternating arrangements brought within its fold; inthe minimal returns of comparative studies; and in the growingdisinclination of many scholars to work with the concept" (ibid.).

Examples come, of course, readily to mind. When lawyers discussfederalism in the United States it is inevitably in the context of theprovisions of the Constitution. Justice Black provided a rare excep-tion when he undertook, in 1971, to define "Our Federalism" as "asystem in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of bothState and National Governments, and in which the NationalGovernment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protectfederal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so inways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of

1. Albert Liboiron, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in Australia,Canada, the United States and Other Countries (Kingston, Ontario: Institute of In-tergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1967).

2. (4th edition; New York: New York University Press, 1964).

288 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

the State."3 The problem with that definition is, of course, in therepeated use of the word "legitimate." What activities are"legitimately" in the province of the member units rather than of thenation? The Constitution of the United States offers few answers tothat question, leaving it even unsaid who, within the politicalsystem, is to resolve the issue. More modern constitutions, often con-ceived with a clear recognition of the tensions between states andnation in the United States, have attempted to be more specific. In-dia's elaborate schedules of powers that are exclusively the nation's,exclusively the states', and not exclusive to either sphere go to the ex-treme-but have not allowed that country to escape conflict be-tween states and nation.

Political scientists are not as uniform in their approach as lawyersare, and for good reasons. The diversity of perspectives in politicalscience is such that one can hardly expect anything else. Davis-whohas a fine way with words-entitles the chapter in which hediscusses modern political science approaches "The Twentieth Cen-tury Doctors," with the subtitle "as many men, so many theories"(155). The best he is able to do with the wide-ranging views is tocategorize them. Wheare and those who have followed his lead aresaid to see federalism as a matter of degree; Carl Friedrich is iden-tified as principal representative of the view that federalism shouldbe seen as a process; and Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar aregiven prominence as exponents of "federalism as sharing" (158, 173,182). But in summarizing his overview of the "twentieth centurydoctors" Davis reaches the conclusion that the "deep ambivalence"he perceives in their views is really unavoidable: given the natureand experience of the American polity, how is one to reconcile thereality of the national government's power with the persistent factsof diversity?

It is worth recalling that Harold Laski predicted in 1939 thatfederalism in the United States would become obsolete because itwould prove unable to "cope with...outstanding problems,...tosatisfy living demands,...to keep pace with the tempo of the lifegiant capitalism has evolved." 4 But, as Davis observes (206), this

3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).4. Harold J. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism," The New Republic, 98:367

(1939). This article was widely reprinted in standard collections of readings for begin-ning American government courses in the 1940s and 1950s.

Laski restated his position nearly ten years later: "Federalism, which began by seek-

IS THERE A THEORY OF FEDERALISM 289

deprecatory view of federalism in 1939 is not too different from thatof A.V. Dicey who, in 1885, asserted that "a federation...willalways be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states ofequal resources."5

II

Federations have indeed failed in recent history but not for eitherDicey's or Laski 's reasons. The West Indies Federation, a product ofBritish initiative, reached an end in 1962, shortly after Jamaica andTrinidad-Tobago, its most populous units, decided to withdraw.°Malaysia and Singapore reached a parting of the ways in 1965, afteronly two years of federation experience.' The Federation ofRhodesia and Nyasaland fell apart, after ten years existence; shortlyafterwards Nyasaland became the nation of Malawi and NorthernRhodesia attained independence under the name of Zambia whileSouthern Rhodesia declared itself independent of Great Britain andwould resist the end of white rule for another fifteen years.'

But Malaysia (less Singapore) continues as an effective federation,India and Nigeria have joined the ranks of federally organizedpolities, and Austria and Germany, (though only a part of the latter)returned to the practice of federalism which had been obliterated byHitler's dictatorship. Debate over federalism has become increasing-ly lively-and occasionally critical-in the established federations.Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States are all, tovarying degrees, engaged in renewed search for the appropriate

ing to maintain variety in unity, has ended [sic] by succumbing to the influence ofgiant capitalism." The American Democracy (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 50.See also Karl Loewenstein, "The Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age,"in: Arnold Zurcher, ed., Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II(New York: New York University Press, 1951), pp. 211-212.

5. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed.,London: Macmillan, 1964), P. 172.

6. G.H. Flanz, "West Indian Federation," in: Thomas M. Franck, ed., WhyFederations Fail (New York: New York University, 1968), pp. 91-123; Ursula K.Hicks, Federalism: Failure and Success (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),pp. 55-68.

7. Frank N. Trager, "The Federation of Malaysia," in: Franck, ed., op. cit., pp.125-166; Hicks, op. cit., pp. 87-75.

8. Herbert J. Spiro, "The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland," in: Franck, ed.,op. cit., pp. 37-89; Hicks, op. cit., pp. 76-84.

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balance between the powers of the nation and the powers of thestates.

Academic interest in federalism reflects this intensified publicconcern. In the decade following the end of World War II signifi-cant work was stimulated by the possibility of a federated Europe. 9

Canadian and Australian scholars, in more recent years, haveresponded to sharply increased tensions in their respective federalsystems. 10 The International Political Science Association conducteda roundtable on federalism at Oxford in 1963 and made "new trendsin the theory and practice of federalism" a major topic of its sixthworld congress in Geneva in 1964.

In the United States Morton Grodzins initiated a significant studygroup on federalism at the University of Chicago. His student,Daniel Elazar, continued and enlarged this effort, establishing theCenter for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, and aquarterly journal, appropriately named Publius, dedicated solely tothe subject of federalism. A roster of American scholars alone whohave addressed themselves to various aspects of federalism wouldeasily fill several pages.

This cursory survey-which makes no claim to com-pleteness-suggests that John Fischer may have been right when heobserved in 1954 that "the idea of federalism is more alive todaythan at any time in the last 150 years."" But what do we mean whenwe speak of federalism?

As Daniel Elazar observed in his article for the International En-cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "no single definition of federalism

9. E.g., R.R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich, eds., Studies in Federalism, (Boston:Little, Brown, 1954); Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the AtlanticArea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting ofEurope: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford Univer-sity Press, 1968); Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., Federalism, Mature and Emergent(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), esp. Part Four.

10. E.g., R.B. Byers and Robert W. Reford, eds., Canada Challenged: TheViability of Confederation (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,1979); P.A. Crepeau and C.B. McPherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); R.L. Mathews, Intergovernmental Rela-tions in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974).

11. John Fischer, "Prerequisites of Balance," in: Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, p. 58.


has proved satisfactory to all students." 12 Davis wonders (204)

whether the subject has not been "slowly poisoned by increasingdoses of qualifications and rechristenings," and then presents no lessthan 44 types of federalism which has has uncovered in the currentliterature. (At that, he does not include the ultimate oxymoron, theGerman writer Hesse's "unitarian federalism.")

19

Davis presents his list of adjectives in random order without eitheridentifying the source or characterizing the qualification each adjec-tive imposes upon the noun. But, roughly speaking, the array of con-cepts can be divided into two groups: one which owes its origins toacademic• efforts to produce a taxonomic description, the otherwhich serves normative or programatic ends. Phrases like"creative," "cooperative," "new" federalism are all images original-ly conjured up by politicians. Academics then attempt to delineatewhat these phrases mean.

But these efforts are rarely successful. Take the term "cooperativefederalism." Elazar defines it as patterned sharing or negotiatedcoordination s ' but, following Grodzins, he also maintains that thissharing (or coordination) had been a characteristic of the American.system of government since its inception in 1789. But, one may ask,is not joint effort a presupposition of any federal system? Unlessthere is agreement on basic goals of the political system, can there bea division of the system's powers? At best, the addition of the adjec-tive connotes a special intensity of the pattern of sharing; at worst, it.is no more than a pleonasm.

One could perform similar or comparable analyses with other ad-jectival phrases intended to give the word "federalism" a specialmeaning. Davis concludes that the plethora of modifiers merelyreflects the absence of an ascertainable (and reliable) content of thenoun itself (chapter 7). Those who have sought to construct a theoryof federalism have failed: "the informational, explanatory anddescriptive value of the federal symbol is very much less than it was

12. Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," in: Davis L. Sills, ed., International En-cyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 5,p. 335. Elazar is also the author of the entry "Federalism" in the fifteenth edition of theEncyclopedia Britannica (Warren E. Preece, ed.: Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica,.1978), Macropaedia, vol. 7, p. 202.

13. Konrad Hesse, Der uniterasche Bunessstaat (1962), cited by Carl J. Friedrich,Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 115.

14. Op. cit., n. 13.


once thought to be;...the language of traditional analysis offers uslittle security;... the structure of a federal system is simply thedesignation of the visible, never the invisible" (298).

III

Davis thus confirms what C.T. Hughes wrote in 1964:

The Received Theory seems...to assume that there is a discoverable thing called"federalism." It [the theory] proceeds from a provisional definition, whichstands at the beginning of the book, through an examination and description ofthe empirical data in the light of that definition, to a more refined definition atthe end of the book. This is justifiable on certain assumptions, though there is atendency for the assumptions to shift as the examination proceeds. The initialassumption is of a sort of nominalism-"federalism is what I say it is"-but thefinal assumption is a sort of realism-"there is a real thing called federalism,and it looks like this."...I think there are such real things as "state" and"justice"...but I think federalism itself is a term which does not have this thing-status. le

This is not the place to discuss the problem of definition in thesocial sciences. Federalism is not the only term that seems to defydefinition. It is not surprising that some writers have concluded thatfederalism as a concept is absurd,'° that others have flatly ques-tioned whther federalism even exists,

"and that one recent writer

proclaims that "the logic of federalism has ceased to informAmerican political practice. " 18

Yet in the name of federalism elections are contested and lawsuitsare argued. Four days before Ronald Reagan was inaugurated asPresident of the United States the National Conference of StateLegislatures and the National Governors' Association issued a state-ment calling for reform (not resurrection or revival) of the American

15. Christopher J. Hughes, "The Theory of Confederacies," (working paper for theSixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Geneva,1964), p. 3.

16. Martin Shapiro, "Federalism," in Ronald K.L. Collins, ed., ConstitutionalGovernment in America (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980)., p. 359. It shouldbe noted that Shapiro's reference is to federalism as a legal concept.

17. William H. Riker, "Six Books in Search of a Subject-or Does Federalism Existand Does It Matter?" Comparative Politics, vol. 2, p. 135 (1965).

18. James O. Robertson, American Myth, American Reality, (New York: Hill andWang, 1980), p. 309.


federal system. 10 In 1969 Professor Riker had conceded that somelawyers, at least, acted as if federalism were real; he, however,could only consider it a legal fiction of no significance to the realitiesof governmental life. In 1981, federalism in America is, withoutquestion, a live issue.

Why, then, this frustration of the academics? Is the search for oneunifying "federal principle" not to be fulfilled? Is it even worth pur-suing?

It is well to bear in mind that thinking (and writing) aboutfederalism was for perhaps too long a time encumbered by twosignificant limitations: the apparent success of the American modeland-possibly related-an almost total concentration on legal struc-tures. Davis designates the product of the Philadelphia Conventionas "Federalism Mk. I" (Chapter 4); Friedrich does not include theUnited States among the case studies that form the second half of hisTrends of Federalism in Theory and Practice because "most readerswill be familiar with the ongoing discussion and development in ourcountry. "20

More important is the extent to which other nations have been in-fluenced by the American model. 21 Toqueville had acclaimed thecreation of the federal state in North America as a novel contribu-tion to statecraft and indeed there had never before been an ar-rangement that so effectively blended national purposes with localautonomy. Relatively little was known in the nineteenth centuryabout earlier historic precedents. There were two "confederations"in existence, the Swiss-until 1848 little more than a loose pattern ofalliance and occasional collaboration 22-and the even looser Ger-man Confederation that had emerged from the Congress of Viennain 1815. There were, also, the historic examples of the Hanseatic

19.State Legislatures, February 1981, is gven over to the topic of reform of thefederal system. The NCSL-NGA statement appears on page 7. See also the monographseries being released by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relationsunder the general title The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics ofGrowth (1980-81).

20. Carl J. Friedrich, Op. cit., n. 13, p. 174.21. The following discussion leans heavily on Chapter III, "Federalism," of Carl J.

Friedrich, The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad (Boston: Boston Univer-sity Press, 1967).

22. The Swiss complicated the issue by retaining the term "confederation" for thesystem they adopted in 1848.


League and the United Netherlands. Obviously these were notdesirable models for the nation-builders of the nineteenth century.The United States, by contrast, was a success story. Here monarchicgovernment had been shaken off; since "the first new nation" hadbased its government on federalism, other new nations undertook tofollow that example.

In Latin America, the reaction to the highly centralized ad-ministration of the Spanish crown (through the four vice-royalties ofMexico, Nueva Granada, Peru and La Plata) was heavily over-shadowed by the example of the United States. But, as Harry Kantorhas pointed out, the presuppositions for successful federal ar-rangements were wanting z3

In no Latin American country which adopted federalism were lines delimitingthe subdivisions drawn with any real understanding of the requisites forcreating viable units.... In the United Stated federalism worked because thecentral government began with limited powers and grew through the years. InLatin America it did not work because the central government in all the federalstates simply never relinquished enough power to the states or provinces toallow them to become truly self-governing units....[In addition,] the traditionof Spanish authoritarianism was strong, bred by centuries of colonial rule.Uniformity was stimulated by the system of Roman law and by the unifying in-fluence of the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant religious institution. 24

Few traces of federalism remain today in Latin America. Fourcountries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) are, if onereads their constitutions only, federal states. But the politicalrealities say otherwise. In the three countries first named the centralgovernment has the constitutional power to intervene in the affairsof the constituent states. "Intervencion" is commonly justified byallegations of corruption or threats to the national interest. In fact,the practice has been (and is) used to remove political opponents andassure control by the dominant regime. In Venezuela, the centralgovernment appoints the governors of the states and normally treatsthem more as its agents than as officials of a distinct and separatepolitical entity. In all four countries there is great disparity, both inpopulation and wealth, among the constituent parts. In Argentina

23. Harry Kantor, "Latin American Federalism, Aspiration and Futility," in:Valerie Earle, ed., Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca, Il-linois: F.E. Peacock, 1968), pp. 186-187.

24. Ibid., pp. 205-208.


the Federal Capital (Buenos Aires) and the province of Buenos Airestogether comprise virtually half of the nation's population. In Brazilthe two largest states, Sao Paolo and Minas Gerais (18 percent and14 percent of the population) have traditionally predominated. Oneof every five Mexicans lives in the Federal District (Mexico City) andthe same is true in Venezuela.

Kantor, writing in 1967, 25 was, pessimistic about the future offederalism in Latin America and (except possibly for Venezuelawhich has seen prosperity and increased political life in the interven-ing years) there is little to make a different prognosis today. ButKantor also noted "a great desire to continue federalism" in thesefour nations as well as a trend toward closer ties among the fiverepublics of Central America. He foresaw, perhaps somewhatwishfully, the possibility of "a type of federalism peculiar to LatinAmerica." It is, in any case, demonstrable that liberal elements inLatin America have traditionally assumed that the desirable alter-native to despotism and oligarchic regimes should be modeled afterthe government of the United States, including its federal character.

Historically, the year 1848 marks the first major impact ofAmerican federalism on European events. In that year Switzerlandadopted a federal constitution. In Germany the National Assemblyof Frankfurt produced a federal constitution but its labors proved invain. In both cases, the American model figured preeminently in thediscussions of the constitution-writers. Perhaps understandably, theSwiss assembly heard repeated assertion that the American ex-perience was not appropriate to Swiss conditions. In the end, thenew constitution incorporated the American solution ofbicameralism but even then it was insisted that the Swiss were notimitating the United States. "Similar causes rather engendered thesame effects in Philadelphia in 1787 and at Berne in 1848. "26

The same year 1848 also saw that first, albeit abortive, attempt towrite a constitution for a united Germany. The attempt failed buttwo aspects of the effort are worthy of note: (1) the members of theFrankfurt assembly were virtually of one mind in the determinationto seek a federal solution, and (2) they were equally certain themodel for this solution was to be found in the United States.

27

25.William E. Rappard, La Constitution de la Confederation Suisse, 1848-1948(1948), p. 269, quoted by Friedrich, op. cit., n. 13, p. 52.

26. Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, p. 52.27. Ibid., pp. 52-55.


When Germany attained unity for the first time in her history in1871, it was in federal form but less for ideological or theoreticalreasons than in consideration of dynastic traditions. The new nationincluded twenty-two monarchies (in addition to the three free citiesof Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, and Alsace-Lorraine, newly ac-quired from France). But 65 percent of the land area and 62 percentof the population were included in the state of Prussia. The popula-tion ratio between Schaumburg-Lippe and Prussia was 1:770. In ad-dition, some states, (e.g. Brunswick) consisted of scattered, non-contiguous administrative units. 28

The Weimar Republic succeeded in eliminating a few of thesmallest member states by absorbing them into larger ones but re-tained both the form and the pattern of the federal arrangement in1871. The Nazi regime, while committed to centralization in prac-tice, had no more impact on the territorial arrangement of the Reichthan did the Weimar Republic. Hitler was content to exert powerthrough the party organization, the district (Gaue) of which were,at least in some instances, more in accord with regional economicand social patterns than was the formal structure of the state. Theparty's predominance effectively nullified the constitutional divisionof powers though in theory it remained in force. 29

The Federal Republic of Germany presents both a return to tradi-tional patterns and a new departure. There is abundant evidencethat the people of West Germany desired a federal arrangement incontrast to the party centralism of the Hitler area. Although theWestern allies were initially not agreed on the kind of a federalstructure they wanted for the new Germany, it was clear that theydid not desire to see a centralized state.

3°

The Basic Law now divides West Germany into ten units(Lander), some of them clearly traditional (e.g. Bavaria and thecity-states of Bremen and Hamburg), others reflecting thepragmatic necessities imposed by military occupation as well as theurge to overcome the particularism of the past. But in the face ofmuch doubt that a federal structure could develop harmoniously

28. Peter Schaller, "The Federal System of the Federal Republic of Germany," in:George W. Hoffman, ed., Federalism and Regional Development: Case Studies on theExperience in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (Austin: Univer-sity of Texas Press, 1981), p. 72.

29.Ibid., pp. 72-74.30. Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, pp. 66-68.


unless it was grounded on perceived diversities, the Basic Law pro-vided for a reorganization of the system so as take account of "inner-ethnic ties, the historical and cultural context, economic feasibility,practicability, and the social structure." 31 But, although twicespecial commisions made recommendations for change, none havetaken place that were not made necessary by external conditions(specifically, the addition of the Saarland in 1959. 32 What this sug-gests is (1) that, among peoples that have been long settled, localismstill is a powerful force, and (2) that, even where federal relationsare not sustained by long-standing traditions, there is a reluctance todisturb them.

The pulling force of local traditions is abundantly evident amongthe Swiss and the Austrians. Determined to eradicate memories ofthe past, Hitler not only decreed the elimination of the word"Austria" (thus the Land Upper Austria became Upper Danube andthe Land Lower Austria, Lower Danube) but also directed internalshifts of territory. Yet as soon as Austria was free of German rule,these realignments (which made good sense economically andgeographically) were countermanded. 33 If one recalls that, prior to1918, there had been no political entity called "Austria," 34 the sur-vival of local traditions is, of course, not surprising. The Habsburgemperor ruled in Tyrol not because he was emperor but because hewas Count of Tyrol-and proper Tyrolians were ever conscious of it.

Geographic considerations serve to reinforce tradition. The alpinevalleys of Switzerland and Austria were mostly separated from eachother by mountainous ranges that inhibited intercourse until the ageof the railroad and, more significantly, the automobile. There wereobvious limits to what a central government could expect to ac-

31. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 29.32. SchOller op. cit., n.28, pp. 80-93. Page 93 contains a map showing 1972 pro-

posals for a revised alignment of states. See also Karl H. Cerny, "Federalism in theWest Germany Republic," in: Valerie Earle, op. cit., n. 23, pp. 152-156.

33. Ludwig Jedlicka, "Verfassungs-und Verwaltungsprobleme 1938-1955," in: In-stitut fair Oesterreichkunde, Die Entwicklung der Verfassung Oesterreichs coin Mit-telalter bis zur Gegenwart (Graz: Stiasny Verlag, 1963), pp. 129-132.

34. While the country was known as "Austria" before 1867 and as "Austria-Hungary" from 1867 to 1918, there was no Austrian nation. Thus, after 1867, the non-Hungarian part of the dual monarchy was legally described as "the kingdoms andlands represented in the Reichsrat." Hans Lentze, "Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn und dieDezembergesetze von 1887," in: ibid., p. 105.


complish under such conditions-and there were compelling reasonswhy local issues should be settled locally.

It is important to keep the distance factor in mind, not so much interms of miles (or kilometers) but in terms of the time it takes totravel between points. This is as true of the United States as it is ofthe countries of Europe. Thus, at the beginning of national govern-ment in the United States a trip from New York to Boston took fivedays, a journey from Boston to Savannah 22 1

/2 days, and to reachthe distant points in the interior was a four to five weeks' trip fromalmost any point on the east coast." s The dispersion of population inAustralia and Canada-even though federation in these two coun-tries came much later than in the U.S.-is functionally theequivalent of the separation of the centers of population in the for-mative years of the American union."

But, if this proposition-that physical separation is important to afederal system-is correct, why did the West Indian Federation fail(or East Africa, or Central Africa, etc.)? Davis (216) concludes thatthere has been too much of an "urge to tidy the matter," too much ofa desire to discover a "logic of federalism" (212, quoting Mac-mahon"). too much of a flight toward theory.

IV

To say that a country has "a federal system of government" does,in fact, tell us next to nothing about that system. It does not tell uswhether the country is as ethnically homogeneous as Australia or asdiverse as Switzerland. It does not reveal whether, within that coun-try, there is one legal system or a plurality (if the latter were con-sidered a criterion of a federal state, does the existence of a Scottishlegal system make the United Kingdom a federation?). Does the ex-istence of a federal structure tell us anything about the nation'seconomic system? Or its cultural policies? Or its strength or

35. Seymour Dunbar; A History of Travel in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1925), vol. I, pp. 177 and 329; Charles O. Paullin and John K. Wright, Atlasof the Historical Geography of the United States ( Washington: Carnegie Institution,1932), Plate 138A, "Rates of Travel, 1800."

36. William S. Livingston, "Canada, Australia and the United States: Variationson a Theme," in: Valerie Earle, ed., op. cit., n. 23, pp. 95-96.

37. Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Problem of Federalism: A Survey," in: Arthur W.Macmahon, ed., op. cit., n. 9, p. 4.


weakness in foreign affairs? To ask the questions is to answer them.As the experience of Latin American federal states demonstrates,

even similarities in the formal statement of the federal relationshipdo not assure that the practical results will bear much resemblance.As Kantor has indicated, 38 although early constitution-makers southof the Rio Grande deliberately followed the prototype of the UnitedStates, even under the most favorable conditions federalism in LatinAmerica has not come close to its model.

Even as between societies of decidedly democratic castdissimilarities quickly appear. When the Australians wrote theirconstitution (in 1897-98), they sought to avoid some of the problemsthat Canada had experienced under the British North America Act.Specifically, the Australians wanted to be able to amend their con-stitution without the need to involve the Parliament at London (asCanada had to do). Section 128 of the constitution therefore set upan amending procedure. Amendments are proposed by the nationallegislature and then submitted to popular referendum. To become apart of the constitution, the proposal must be approved by a majori-ty of those voting, and also by a majority of those voting in a majori-ty of the states. This arrangement was modeled after the Swiss con-stitution. But over a fifty-year period (1901-51), Australian votersapproved only four out of twenty-four submitted proposals, whilethe Swiss record was twenty-six adopted out of thirty-one submit-ted. 39 There is, of course, one major difference between Australiaand Switzerland: The Swiss constitution explicitly excludes theFederal Court from judicial review of national legislation (but can-tonal legislation can be and is reviewed) while Australia, no lessdeliberately, not only followed the practice of the United States butembodies it in its constitution.

4o

38. See supra, at notes 23 and 34.39. Constitution of Australia (1901), chapter 8, § 128; Constitution of Switzerland

(1974 as amended in 1891), articles 118-123. See William S. Livingston, Federalismand Constitutional Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 118 and185-187. The figures in the text for Switzerland do not include proposals submitted bypopular initiative (an alternative not adopted by the Australians). If one includes theseproposals, the Swiss amended their constitution thirty-nine times in fifty years-or,roughly ten times as often as the Australians.

40. Constitution of Switzerland, article 109; Constitution of Australia, Chapter 3,§§ 75-76; Fred L. Morrison, "The Swiss Federal Court: Judicial Decision Making andRecruitmFht," in: Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiers of Judicial


The example could be multiplied and the exercise would onlyserve to confirm that federalism presents indeed, in Valerie Earle'sphrase, "infinite variety in theory and practice. " Federalismworks well in Switzerland in spite of four district linguistic andcultural groups while in Canada Quebec threatens secession andmany observers see the fate of the entire federal union in danger.Can one theory sustain both situations?

V

Davis further demonstrates the difficulty by a table (217,219)which shows how much variety there is among the writers when itcomes to deciding how many (and which) states are to be classifiedas "federal." The range runs from four (Albert Bushnell Hart in 1891and K.C. Wheare in 1951) to Duchacek 's twenty-one. To this mightbe added Elazar whose count comes to seventeen "federal systems,"plus eighteen "political systems utilizing federal principles." 42 Theevident discrepancies are, of course, functions of the definitionemployed by each of the several writers.

Livingston, in his influential article A Note on the Nature ofFederalism, 43 argued against preoccupation with legal (or legally-based) taxonomies. "The essence of federalism," he wrote in anotherplace, "lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but inthe society itself. Federal government is a device by which thefederal qualities of the society are articulated and protected."44 Hegives due credit to political, economic, social, and culturalforces-these determine the particular solution a society seeks (andsometimes finds) for the problem of political organization. What

Research (New York: Wiley, 1988), pp. 133-138; J.D. Miller, Australian Governmentand Politics: An Introductory Survey, second edition (London: Duckworth, 1959), pp.141-147.

41. Subtitle of the book of essays edited by Professor Earle, cited supra, n. 23.42. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Principles and Practices of Federalism: A Comparative

Historical Approach" (Philadelphia: Center for the Study of Federalism, WorkingPaper No. 8, [n.d.]), Tables I and II.

43. In: Aaron Wildavsky, ed., American Federalism in Perspective (Boston: Little,Brown, 1967). This article originally appeared in the Political Science Quarterly, vol.57 (1952), pp. 81-95.

44. Ibid., p. 37.


solution a particular polity produces is a "response to a definite set ofstimuli."

But Livingston does not tell us what kinds of stimuli will producewhat kind of federalism; all he says is that the social diversities thatproduce federalism may be of many kinds.

Davis (168-172) acknowledges that "to those wearied of theelaborate classificatory sophistries of the `constitutionalists,' Liv-ingston's essay first came as a breath of fresh air." Livingston, heconcedes, is "most certainly not a dogmatist nor an arithmetician."But what he has produced is "a theory without a tool-kit." By plac-ing the major emphasis on non-constitutional, non-structuralcriteria what has emerged is a definition that fits any political entitythat contains-and somehow accommodates-diversity. To be sure,Livingston stipulates that the diversity must be "significant" beforethe "society is likely to provide " accommodation. But may one notalso reverse that statement: if the society provides accommodation,then the difference is to be called significant? What, then, is thecause and what the effect?

Occasionally in the literature of federalism one may find an il-lustration that hypothesizes that the minimal form of federalism isone in which the member states have only the power "to change theshape of postmen's helmets," that this is the low point of the a con-tinuum which, at the other end, extends to the powers of war andpeace. The source of this image is a 1951 article by the Britishpolitical scientists W.J.M. McKenzie and Brian Chapman45 which,while focusing on the Italian constitution of 1948, raises the questionof when arrangements that recognize regional differences rise to thelevel of "federalism."

Regionalism, the two authors point out, is a fact of life in all butthe tiniest political units. Italy, they maintain, is but a case in point.Even before the peace treaties of 1919 placed ethnic and linguisticminorities within the boundaries of the Italian state there were glar-ing contrasts, often open conflicts, between North and South, "be-tween the Italy as advanced as any state in Western Europe and oneas backward as some countries of the Middle East. "40 The uniquecircumstances under which Italy achieved its unification between

45. "Federalism and Regionalism," Modern Law Review, vol. 14 (1951), pp.182-194.

46. Ibid., p. 184.


1860 and 1870-the predominance in the effort of the Piedmontese,the perceived need to follow the example of France, the bloody crisiswhich at the time threatened the survival of the prime example of aworking federalism-all combined to produce the constitutionalframework of a unitary state. What resulted was "centralism intheory and diversity in practice."

The post-World War II constitution, sought to recognize thedilemma implicit in this formulation. Drawing on theoreticaldiscussions by Gaspare Ambrosini,

47Title V, "Regions, Provinces

and Communes," 48 established regional government as a constitu-tional principle. The nation was divided into twenty regions whichwere to exercise considerable powers over their internal affairs. Fiveregions-Sicily, Sardinia, Alto Adige (the South Tyrol), Friulia-Venezia Giulia, and Val d'Aosta-each an area of unique problemsof economic and ethnic nature, were designated "special regions."As such they were granted "particular forms and conditions ofautonomy, in accordance with special statutes. " In response tostrong pressures from these regions they were granted "limited ex-clusive legislative power,"; i.e., the right to legislate, withinspecified areas, to the exclusion of national law.

The other fifteen regions had to wait until 1970 before Parliamentimplemented the constitutional provisions. The machinery ofregional autonomy is thus in place but its scope is rather narrowlycircumscribed. Regions may adopt laws to implement nationallegislation when it is cast as a national "framework law" (leggi cor-nici) and they may adapt national legislation to specific needs andconditions of the region. But all of this is limited to a list of subject-matter fields enumerated by Parliament (and, of course, subject tochange by that body). More significantly, a government commis-sioner and a control commission, both appointed by the centralgovernment, must approve all acts of the regional government. 4B

McKenzie and Chapman, writing in 1951, could not foresee howslowly regionalization would reach reality in Italy. They recognizedthat, both politically and financially, the central government might

47. Autonomia Regionale e Federalismo (Rome, 1944), cited ibid., p. 185.48. Constitution of the Republic of Italy (1948), Title V. articles 114-133. Original-

ly there were only nineteen regions but Molise was later separated from Abruzzi.49. P.A. Allum, Italy-Republic Without Government? (New York: Norton,

1973), pp. 225-238.


be able to frustrate the projected development of a regional struc-ture. But they did not (and perhaps could not) anticipate that adominant Christian Democratic party would adamantly defer adecentralization that might-as indeed it now has-placed thegovernment of some regions in the hands of the Communists.

What McKenzie and Chapman did see was that the Italian ap-proach (at least as it stood on paper) could have wider application,especially in the United Kingdom. There, they maintained,regionalism already existed. It had been incorporated into the Act ofUnion with Scotland of 1707, was to be found in a variety of specialarrangements for Wales and had been reiterated in the Ireland Actof 1949. 50 Even beyond these statutory bases, there were, theyasserted, "things which Parliament could legally do, but which itdoes not do because a majority of its members think them wrong." 51

In other words, the regional character of the government of theUnited Kingdom is founded on the political morality that is theessence of British constitutionalism.

VI

It is at this point that the issues of the shape of the postmen'shelmets enters into the discussion. McKenzie and Chapman use this(slightly bizarre) example to point out that what may suit a politicalscientist may not be nearly so welcome to the lawyer. Ambrosinihad, in effect, proposed a way-station between federalism andunitary government, and the Italian constitution appeared to givereality to this theoretical construct. This, say McKenzie and Chap-man, is the kind of gradualism that political scientists can live with.For "when [political scientists] want to know whether a state is cen-

50. Textbook treatments of the government of the United Kingdom usually give on-ly cursory mention of the differences that characterize governmental arrangements inScotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (to say nothing of the Channel Islands and theIsle of Man). Recent events have produced greater attention to the matters thoughusually still from a centrist or English perspective. See, e.g., the chapter subtitled "TheDiversity of the United Kingdom, "in Max Beloff and Gillian Peele, The Governmentof the United Kingdom: Political Authority in a Changing Society (New York: Norton,1980). There is apparently only one book dealing with government in Scotland, J.G.Kellar, The Scottish Political System (second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1975).

51. Op. cit., n. 45, p. 183.


tralized or decentralized [they] ask in real life not about the federalprinciple but about the point where the division of central and localpowers fall on [the] scale. It is an empty form to say that a state is afederation if the units (or, on the other hand, the central govern-ment) have no power except to regulate postmen's helmets."

52

But suppose the design of postmen's helmets became a matter ofreal (or imagined) significance? What, for instance, ask the twoauthors, if one of the German Lander decided to dress its mailmenin the uniform of the S.S.? Only six years after World War II, onecan imagine that this would be widely interpreted as evidence of (orat least advocacy of) a revival of Nazism. At once the lawyers wouldbe faced with the need to draw a line-or at least to know how tobalance the conflicting interests. The convenient continuum cannotpossibly be designed with the kind of specificity that answers allquestions, especially questions not likely to have been anticipated. 53

In the United States, for instance, we do not doubt that theFounding Fathers aimed for a system in which "every farmer andevery craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certaintythat he will have free access to every market in the Nation" 54 butthat vision did not embrace rapid mass transportation, electronicdata transmission, and industrial pollution.

VII

In this country we often talk as if the merging of the legal andpolitical were unique to the United States. We often quoteToqueville's observation that "scarcely any political question arisesin the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into ajudicial question"55

-with the implication that the opposite is trueelsewhere. But Toqueville did not say that and authors like Cap-pelletti and McWhinney have reminded us that the United Statesdoes not have a monopoly on the practice of judicial review. 56 Con-

52. Ibid., p. 185.53. Ibid., pp. 185-186.54. Justice Jackson in Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).55. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Reeve translation, edited by

Phillips Bradley; New York: Knopf, 1945), vol. 1, p. 280.56. Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-SpeakingWorld (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956); Friedrich, op. cit., n. 21, chap.IV.


flicts that arise from political issues will in many countries emerge aslaw suits and their resolution sought by the techniques of the law.The contrast between legal analysis and political analysis, betweenlawyers' thinking and political scientists' thinking is not confined tothe American scene.

The literature on federalism does not make too much of a point ofthe extent to which law thinking tends to influence lay thinking.Paul A. Freund alludes to it briefly at the end of his essay "Umpiringthe Federal System." 57 McKenzie and Chapman sharply criticizeDicey's view of federalism as being based on Austinianjurisprudence and note, passingly, that Austin 's (and Dicey' s) ap-proach had broadly colored British perceptions of that country'spolitical institutions. 58 Michael D. Reagan urges that, becausefederalism as a term is so overladen with legal thinking, the relation-ship of different levels of government, the "New Federalism,""should be labeled "Intergovernmental Relations"-as indeed hascome to happen, both on the official level and among scholars. 5B

Certainly the older literature on federalism, whether written bylawyers or by political scientists, reflects a primarily legal view ofthe subject. More recent criticism often takes this legalistic approachfor its target, as Davis shows by grouping these writers together inone chapter (chap. 5, 121-154). Conversely, legal writers can befound who consider federalism in primarily political terms. B ° Onecan sympathize with those who would prefer to keep the two groupsseparate, at least when they are talking about federalism.

57. In: Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, p. 173, with a pertinent quotation from ArthurT. Goodhart, fn. 50, p. 178.

58.Op. cit., n. 45, p. 184.59. Michael D. Reagan and John G. Sanzone, The New Federalism (second edi-

tion,New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 4-6. President Eisenhower ap-pointed a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; out of one of its recommenda-tions came the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. For examples ofthe use of the term in the scholarly literature, see: William Anderson, Intergovernmen-tal Relations in Review (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960); W. BrookeGraves, American Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Scribner, 1964); DellWright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (North Sciutate, Mass.: DuxburyPress, 1978).

60. E.g., Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism," in: Prin-ciples, Politics and Fundamental Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961),also in a slightly different form in Macmahon, op. cit., n. 9, pp. 97-114.


The confusion is likely to be confounded if one takes cognizance ofhow federalism as a term is used by practicing politicians. ThusPresident Reagan's assistant for intergovernmental relations advisesthat the President is committed to a "revitalized federalism" whichis defined as "a return of authority and revenue to state and localgovernment." The same article reports that, in his speech at NotreDame University in May 1981, the President "noted thatWashington has...usurped powers that belong to state and localgovernments." The article is preceded by this quotation from thePresident's inaugural address: "It is my intention to curb the size andinfluence of the federal establishment and to demand recognition ofthe distinction between the powers granted to the federal govern-ment and those reserved to the states or to the people. All of us needto be reminded that the federal government did not create the states;the states created the federal government." B1

The question may be asked whether this is "Our Federalism" asJustice Black had defined it in Younger v. Harris. 82 Black, it will berecalled, defined federalism as sensitive balancing of the legitimateinterests of nation and states; President Reagan speaks of two (ap-parently easily identifiable) groups of powers. Black wouldrecognize that there is a need to weigh interests; Reagan appears tobelieve that there is a clear line that only needs to be enforced. Canthe two views be reconciled? Are they even on the same level?

Harry N. Scheiber, in several articles but most extensively in anessay in the spring 1980 Law and Society Review, 83 hasdemonstrated how the appeal to federalism has historically beenused in this country. To this end he compares and contrasts the useof federalist rhetoric and the actual exercise of governmentalpowers. He concludes that "the performance record of governmen-tal quality within the [American] federal system is at best mixed."Especially, he notes, if performance is evaluated in terms of in-dividual liberty-"which, after all, is at the core of the valuesclaimed for American federalism"-the record is, at best, in-conclusive.

s4

61. Richard S. Williamson, "The Shape of 'Reagan Federalism'," StateLegislatures, vol. 7, no. 7 (July/August 1981), pp. 37-39.

62. Supra, at n. 3.63. "Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the

American System," Law and Society Review, vol. 14 (1980), pp. 663-722.64. Ibid., p. 705-707.


Nor does history demonstrate that the cause of federalism hasbeen the consistent monopoly of any one group or party. "Politicalactors," Scheiber observes, "[often] found themselves with strangebedfellows or in unfamiliar clothing. "85 Federalism, it appears, hasmore often been the means rather than the end. Black, I believe,recognized this when he spoke of federalism in terms of "sensitivity"and "endeavors." These are terms that describe a state of mind, nota taxonomy.

But, as Scheiber also notes, it is in the nature of society that struc-tures once established take on an existence and a dynamic of theirown.88 The dynamics of the American federal system are mostsignificantly determined by our decentralized, state-based politicalparties. Riker contends that the party system is what really main-tains federalism in this country. 87 Yet it is well to bear in mind thatthe decentralization of the American party system is the product of astructural mandate of the Constitution, i.e. the residence require-ment for members of Congress. 88 It is this structural element thatsupplies the underpinning for the rhetoric of American federalism.

Is the Tenth Amendment" a similar structural support? Thelanguage of the amendment suggests that, under the Constitution,powers are either delegated to the national government or they arenot; and if they are not, then they belong to the states (unless theConstitution contains a special prohibition). Presumably when it isasserted-as President Reagan's statement appears to do-that thedivision of powers is unambiguous, it is this kind of reading of thetext that serves as the basis.

James Madison certainly did not anticipate this interpretation. Inhis speech of June 8, 1789, in which he introduced the severalamendments that would become the Bill of Rights he commented,almost casually:

65. Ibid., p. 710.86. Ibid., p. 708, where Livingston, (op. cit., n. 43) is quoted to the same effect.87. William H. Riker, op. cit., n. 17, pp. 135-136 and 145-156.68. Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 2, ch. 2 and sec. 3, cl. 3: "No per-

son shall be a Representative...[and] no Person shall be a Senator...who shall not,when elected, be an Inhabitant of that state in which...[or] for which he shall bechosen."

89. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, no pro-hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."


I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State conventions,that several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the constitu-tion, that the powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the severalStates. Perhaps words which may define this more precisely than the whole ofthe instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they maybe deemed unnecessary: but there can be no harm in making such a declaration,if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so,and do therefore propose it. 70

Again, during the debate over Hamilton's proposal to establish a na-tional bank, less than two years later, Madison said: "Interferencewith the powers of the States was no constitutional criterion of thepowers of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress would notexercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should in-terfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States. "71 Theevidence supports Justice Roberts ' summation in 1931: "The TenthAmendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the peo-ple at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers notgranted to the United States were reserved to the States or to thepeople. It added nothing to the instrument as originallyratified.... "72 Or, as Justice Stone put it ten years later in UnitedStates v. Darby, "the Tenth Amendment...states but a truism thatall is retained which has not been surrendered."

73

But the record of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the TenthAmendment is not without ambiguity. For much of the nineteenthand in the first four decades of the twentieth century the Court,sometimes explicitly, sometimes by inference only, treated the TenthAmendment as an identifiable limit to Congressional Action. Thusin 1871 Justice Nelson wrote that "the States, within the limits oftheir powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth Amend-ment, `reserved,' are as independent of the general government asthat government within its sphere is independent of the States," andthus a national tax on personal income could not apply to thesalaries of state officials. 74 And in 1918, the Court's nullification of

70. Annals of Congress, vol. 1, cols. 458-459.71. Ibid., vol. II, col. 1897 (1791).72. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).73. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).74. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124 (1871), overruled in Graves v. O'Keefe,

306 U.S. 468 (1939).


the national child labor law was similarly grounded on the TenthAmendment. 75 Black's apostrophe of "Our Federalism," while it cer-tainly shares none of the absolution of Justice Nelson's language inCollector v. Day, was thus not so much an innovation as a refine-ment of a position that has considerable grounding in the past.

VIII

Empirical evidence thus supports that conclusion which Davisreaches on the basis of his examination of the many varieties offederalism in the writings of the theorists. The term, standing alone,does not adequately inform; modified-by any of the 44 adjectiveslisted by Davis or others that might yet be added to the list-it losesthe unifying character that would serve definitional value.

But the phenomenon of federalism persists. Its manifestations areso numerous and so varied that the sheer effort to identify a commonminimum content is a challenge of unique dimension. In this essay alimited number of examples and illustrations from countries otherthan the United States has been brought into the discussion in orderto provide a broader perspective of the subject. Yet, whatever onemay consider to be the number of federal states today, 76 there areother examples that could-and perhaps should-have been in-troduced. Each would have been distinguishable from the others,for reasons that might be historical, cultural, economic orgeographic. To cover all of them by one definition would require aphrase so broad and so imprecise that it would do little to infusemeaning. This is, of course, the main point of Davis ' argument: "Nosingle perception of the subject will provide us with an accuratemeans of decoding and translating the transactions of any singlefederal culture; nor will any combination of the known ways oflooking at the matter enable us to decode and translate the transac-tions of all the heterogeneous phenomena that move about in the`federal' galaxy. (216). But "federalism does matter." 77 It matters,however, not because it provides a finite prescription of structuralrelationships but because its connotations are deeply imbedded inrealities of political behavior.

75. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).76. See text, supra, at fn. 42.77. Scheiber, op. cit., n. 63, p. 713.


This becomes evident if one correlates concern with (or invocationof) federalism as a concept with the rise of critical political tensionsin federally organized states. The issue of the role and size of the na-tional government in the United States precipitates discussion overthe scope of federalism when the political forces in the nation dividemost sharply over the policies pursued by the national government.In part, this is so because those who use the federalism argument arewell aware of the fact that it continues to have strong political ap-peal.78

Similar observations have been made about federalism as a tool ofpolitical rhetoric in other countries. Perhaps the most telling exam-ple is the case of Austria where the federal relationship underwentconsiderable change in the years before 1966 but, because the twomajor political parties shared the government and thus the respon-sibility for the changes, federalism (and its manifestations) neverbecame an issue for public debate. It became a matter for both thepublic and academic discussion almost as soon as the coalition wasreplaced by a single-party government in 1966. 79 To put it different-ly, federalism regained vitality as an issue when the political consen-sus on national policy ceased to incorporate the overwhelming ma-jority of the electorate.

"Federalism," Livingston observed, "...is a response to the valuesof society."80 Like Livingston, Riker and others, Davis confirms thatfederalism is not an ideology nor is it a concept that, of its own force,triggers policy outcomes or influences political action. Its impor-tance rests in, its adaptability as a verbal symbol, its capacity toreflect, in terms that do not compel orthodoxy, the never-ceasingtensions between broadly national needs and the desire of local (orregional) interest to make their own decisions in their own interests.Like many key words in the world of politics, federalism partakesmore of the pragmatic than the absolute, more of empiricism than oftheory.

University of Kansas FRANCIS H. HELLER

78. Livingston, op. cit., n. 38, p. 119.79. Manfried Welan, "Die Geschichte der osterreichischen Bundesverfassung als

Spiegelbild der osterreichischen Demokratie," in: Anton Pelinka and Manfried Welan,Demokratie and Verfassung in Oesterreich (Vienna: Europa Verlag,1971), pp. 50-52.

80.Loc. cit., n. 78.

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