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Irregular Warfare
One Nature, Many Characters
Colin S. Gray
Te conditions o small wars are so diversied, the enemys mode oghting is oten so peculiar, and the theatres o operations presentsuch singular eatures, that irregular warare must generally be car-ried out on a method totally diferent rom the stereotyped system[or regular war]. Te art o war, as generally understood, mustbe modied to suit the circumstances o each particular case. Teconduct o small wars is in certain respects an art by itsel, divergingwidely rom what is adapted to the conditions o regular warare,but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which
permit comparison to be established.
CharlesE.Callwell,1906 Small Wars: A actical extbook or Imperial Soldiers
Opening Shots
Itisnotpossibletodaytotalkaboutirregularwarareandcounter-insurgency(COIN)withoutdiscussingIraq.However,Iamdeterminednottoallowthisarticletosinkintothegreatbogoendlessopinionpiecesonthestateoplayinthatunhappycountry.MysolutionistosayaslittleasIcanaboutIraquntilIreachmyconcludingthoughts,whenIwillreleasemypersonalconvictionsbriefyanddirectly.Tisshouldenable
youtoappreciatetheargumentbutdiscountmyconclusions,shouldyousochoose.TecommentsonIraq,inthemainbodyothepaperatleast,areintendedtobescholarlyandpragmatic,notpolitical.Obviously,Iraqmustdominateourviewothesubject.StevenMetziscorrecttoassertthatwhentheUnitedStatesremovedSaddamHusseinrompowerin
Dr.ColinS.GrayisproessorointernationalpoliticsandstrategicstudiesattheUniversityoRead-ing,UK.Teauthoro22books,hismostrecent(publishedin2007)areFighting alk: Forty Maxims onWar, Peace, and Strategy; and War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History.
TisarticlewasoriginallyapaperpresentedattheAirForceSymposiumonCounterinsurgency,AirWarCollege,MaxwellAFB,AL,2426April2007.
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thespringo2003,AmericanpolicymakersandmilitaryleadersdidnotexpecttobecomeinvolvedinaprotractedcounterinsurgencycampaigninIraq.Butithasnowbecometheseminalconictothecurrenteraand
willserveasaparadigmoruturestrategicdecisions.1TomasR.MockaitistellsusthatIraqistheinsurgencyromhell.2I
suggestthatorallregularsoldiersallinsurgenciesarehell-born,thoughadmittedlysomearemorehellishthanothers.Andtoopenoneomythemesjustacrack,WilliamecumsehSherman,agreatAmericangeneral,oncesaidthatwarishell(actually,thoseexactwordswerecrediblyattributedtohim).Withoursophisticationandscholarship,andnowourdoctrinemongering,itisnecessarytorememberthatwearetalkingabout
war,includingaairamountowarare.Insurgency,orirregularwar,andwarareareglobalphenomena,andtheyalwayshavebeen.IamprovidinganAnglo-AmericanperspectivebecausethatiswhatIamandknowbest.TiscanappeartobiasananalysisbecauseitcannotavoidimplyingthatCOINandcounterterrorism(C),andespeciallysomepathologiesintryingtodealwiththem,areuniquetous.Teyarenot.
WhenRalphPetersurgesabloody,attritionalapproachononeohismorecoloruldays,heistalkingthelanguageoRomangeneralshipunderVespasianandhissonitusintheirbrutalsuppressionotheJewishRevoltinPalestineinAD6677.3Irregularwarareisanold,oldstory,andsoarethemethodsappliedtowageit,onbothsides.odaysmotivesorirregularwararesupposedlysomodern,evenpostmodernleadsomecommentatorstospeculateaboutnewwarsascontrastedwitholdwars. 4Iyouarestronglyothatpersuasion,thebestIcandoistosuggestthatyouponderlongandhardonTucydidesandhisamousandoverquotedtriptychoear,honor,andinterestascomprisingtheprimarymotives
or political behavior, including war.5 Irregular warare, o necessity incommonwithitsTucydideanmotives,isaboutpoliticalpower:whogetsit,andasarathersecondarymatter,whattodowithit.Tatmayseemabanalpoint,butreallyitisnot.COINisaboutthecontrolopeopleandterritory, not the remaking o civilizations, or even cultures. Crusadersmakebadpolicymakers;theytendtobedisinterestedinstrategy.
Also,speakingasastrategist,Ihaveaproessionaldislikeorimpossiblemissions.EveniIdothewrongthing,IliketothinkthatIcansucceed.
Westrategistsarepragmaticpeople,andwedontlikeacceptinglong,adverseoddsinpursuitobenetsohighlydubiousworth.
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Fromtimetotime,byandlargedeliberately,Iwilldelveintothedarkwoodsoscholarlyquibbling,butIampainullyawarethatscholarsandocials,civilianandmilitary,areapttobemesmerizedbytheirowncon
ceptualgenius.Particularlyaretheyperhapsarewe(meaculpaalso)devotedtotheprocessoanalysisbyevernerdissection.Weloveourcategoriesandoursubcategories.Teirinventiongivesusanillusionointellectualcontrol.6Wethinkwecanimproveourunderstandingoasubjectasdifuseandrichlyvariedasirregularwarareandinsurgencybyhuntingorthemostprecisedenitionandsubdenitions.Teresultsalltoootenareocialdenitionsthattendtotheencyclopaedicandareutterlyindigestible.Orwediscover ahostosimilarterms, eachwithits
subtlydistinctivemeaningandprobablyitsuniquehistoricalandculturalbaggage.So,arewetalkingaboutirregularwarare,insurgency,low-intensityconict,guerrillawarare,terrorism,andsoorth?Teanswerisyes,andmorethanthose.Dothedistinctionsmatter?Well,theycan,becausesome
wordscarryaheavyloadoimplicitandexplicitimplieddiagnosis,wisdom,andadvice.Butalwaysrememberthatconceptualsophisticationcanbeoverdone.IntheCOINregard,itisaclassicexampleothesoundeconomicprincipleosecuringdiminishingreturnstoefort.Ocourse,thereismuchmoretowarthanwarare,butwarareiswarare,andthemostcorecompetencyosoldiersisskillininictingpain,killingpeople,andbreakingthings.Also,justasweneedtoseeirregularwarareinthecontextoCOIN,orviceversaormypreerence,soinadditionwecannotpermitourselvestoorgetthatinsurgencyiswarare.Sporadic,episodic,protractedwarareerodesthemodernWestern,andthereoretheinternational,legaldistinctionbetweenwarandpeace.Canwetellacontexto
warromoneopeace?Doweknowwhoareinnocentsandwhoarebelligerents?SometimesIeelcompelledtoreturntobasicswithstudentsto
cutthroughalototheoverelaboratetheorizingandremindthemthatwearediscussingwarandwarare.
Next,becausepoliticians,ocials,andatleastsomestrategistsnotusuallythemoreacademiconesareproessionalproblemsolvers,theyarealways inthemarket or answers.Terevolutioninmilitaryafairs(RMA)projecthassuferedromprovidingveryexpensiveanswerstoanunknownquestion,atleasttoaquestionthatwashugelyunderexamined.Butnow,withCOINandtheirregularchallenge,thedeensecommunity
againhasachallengeitbelievesitcangetitsteethinto.Teproblemisthatsomechallengesaremuchmoretaxingthanothers.oexcelatCOIN,or
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Americans,isinnitelymoredicultthantoexcelatregularconventionalwarare.However,theAmericanisanoptimisticpublicculture,anditsmilitarycultureshaveahostoallbutgeneticallyprogrammedcan-do
agents,soCOINistheavorothedecade.Imightaddtheancientreminderthattothepersonwhodoesnthavetodoit,nothingisimpossible.COINisanactivitytowardwhichtheAmericanpublic,strategic,andmilitarycultureshavebeen,andIsuspectremain,deeplyhostile.ButitisnottheAmericanwaytodothingsbyhalves.InBritain,wetendtouse quarter measures when hal measures are called or. In the UnitedStates,theerrorliesintheoppositedirection.InthetroublingwordsothatdistinguishedAmericanpoliticalscientist,SamuelP.Huntingtono
Harvard,writingintheWeinberger-Powelleraothemid-1980s:TeUnitedStatesisabigcountry,andweshouldghtwarsinabigway.Oneoourgreatadvantagesisourmass;weshouldnothesitatetouseit....Bigness,notbrains,isouradvantage,andweshouldexploitit.Iwehavetointervene,weshouldintervenewithoverwhelmingorce.7
TisjustgoestoshowthatachairatHarvardcarriesnoguaranteeowisdom,ordoesit?Huntingtonreectedtheethosothemid-1980s,butalsothereasonIquotehimhedoessuggestareasonwhytheUnitedStateshashadahardtimewithCOIN.WhenpolicydemandsefectivenessinCOIN,thegovernmentthemilitaryinparticular,naturallyblowsdustofitsancientmanualsiitcanndthem;unearthsclassic
writingsbyCharlesE.Callwell,theUSMarineCorps,DavidGalula,Robertaber,Maose-tung,Robertrinquier,FrankKitson,and.E.Lawrence;andrediscoverswhatpreviousgenerationsknew,evenitheydidntalwayspracticeitwell. 8Ocourse,thecontextshavechanged,andeveryworkotheory,oundedontheexperienceothelieandtimesoits author,isstufed ulloinappropriateaswellasmuchgoodadvice.
Nomatter,whenCOINorwhateveristhechallengeothehourisking,whateveristohandisrushedtotheronttoserve.Everypieceoashionablejargon,everyexecrableacronym,everydodgyideaishijackedorthebandwagon.TebandwagonnowisCOIN.ocitebutaewothelightweightnotionsthatarepretendingtobeheavymetal:so-calledourth-generationwarare,network-centricwarare,efects-basedoperations,culture,andatotallyintegratedapproach.Tedeensecommunityhas made the remarkable discovery that what in Britain we call grand
strategyintheUnitedStates,nationalsecuritystrategyisagoodidea.Italwayswas.Inpointoact,Ithoughtthatthewholeaimohavinga
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NationalSecurityCouncilstructurewastoenableagrandstrategy,butperhapsthedistributionopowerinWashingtonistooexquisitelydifusetopermitthat.DareIcallitanothermissionimpossible?
WhatIamsuggesting,admittedlyratherungenerously,isthatwhenweconrontatrulydicultchallenge,onethatAmericanculturalprogrammingisnotwellpreparedtomeet,welookorthesilverbullet,thebigcomprehensivesolution.Sotodaywelearn,again,howtodoCOIN;wediscoverthevirtuesoculturalunderstanding;werediscoverthatwarand
warareisaboutpolitics;andwegraspthenecessityoranintegratedapproach,otherwiselongknownasgrandstrategy.Itwouldseemthatindesperationweareliabletobelievemanyextravagantpromises.Why?Be
causewewanttobelievethattherearesolutionsor,betterstill,thatthereisasingle,dominantsolution.Iapologizeoropeninginsocensoriousamanner.Tatwasnotreallymy
intention.Butsometimesthearmchairstrategisthastogowherehisbraincommands,orgoodorill.oclosethisinitialbroadsideonaslightlyupbeatnote,Iwillsaythatwhatmattersmost,indeedwhatshouldbeadoptedasaprinciple,istogetthebigthingsrightenoughbecausethesmallerrorseventuallycanbexed.Rephrased,pursuethepathominimumregrets.Mayourmistakesbemodestandcorrectible.
Whatotheplanoattackhere?Tebodyothediscussionyes,wewillgettoit,inactwenearlyhaveisorganizedtoposeandanswerourcentralquestions:
1. Whatisthenatureoirregularwarare,andhowdoesitdiferromregularwarare?
2. Whydoregularorceshavegreatdicultywagingirregularwarareefectively?
3. IsCOINwinnablebyregulars?
4. Whataretheleadingashionableerrorsaboutirregularwarare?
Tisagendashouldsucetostirtheneedulopinion,expertise,andprejudice.
What Is the Nature o Irregular Warare, and How Does It Dier rom Regular Warare?
Irregular warare does not have a distinctive nature. Warare is warare,andwariswar,period.Butitdoeshaveanotensharplydistinctive
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character.Inact,irregularwararecantakeawidevarietyoormsandbepracticedindiferentmodes,evenwithinthesameconict.WeareinthechallengingrealmowhattheChinesecallunrestrictedwarare:in
principle,anythinggoes,anythingthatmightwork.9Aterall,thatistheveryessenceostrategy.Inthetimelessandwell-quotedwordsoBernardBrodie,Strategicthinking, or theory i onepreers, isnothing inotpragmatic.Strategy isa howtodoit study,aguidetoaccomplishingsomethinganddoingiteciently.Asinmanyotherbranchesopolitics,thequestionthatmattersinstrategyis:Willtheideawork?10
Tereisnoneedorustodevoteattentiontothenatureowar;thatvitaltaskhasbeenperormedmorethanadequatelybyCarlvonClausewitz.
Andsinceallwarhasthesamenature,itmattersnotwhetheritisregularorirregular.Youwillndscholarsandotherswhotrytopersuadeyouthatwarischangingitsnatureasitsmanycontextsalter,andespeciallythatirregularwarhasanaturequiteuniquetoitsel.Itisnonsense.Terearenoregularorirregularwars.Tereareonlywars.Insearchoadvantageor,asoten,toavoiddisadvantage,wararemaybewagedbymethodsthatcontemporarynormsregardasirregular.Tatreallyisamatterodetail,albeitimportantdetail.Iamhighlightingadistinctionthatisnotalways
wellunderstoodbetweenwarandwarare.Asotenasnot,thetermsareemployedsynonymously,usuallyinignoranceotheircrucialdiferenceinmeaning.AsecuritycommunitywillembarkuponawarorthepurposestatedbyClausewitzontherstpageohismasterwork, On War:War is thus an act o orce to compel our enemy to do our will (emphasisinoriginal).11Tatisit.Onedoesnotsetouttowagearegularoranirregularwar.Rather,themode,ormorelikelythemixomodes,isdictatedbystrategiccircumstances.
Tere is no need to explore the nature o irregular war because it is
identicaltothegeneralnatureowar.AtruegloryothethreepreeminentclassicsostrategicthoughtClausewitzsOn War,SunzusArt o War,andTucydidesPeloponnesian Waristhattheytellusallthatweneedto know about wars unchanging nature.12 Read properly, they explainthenatureoallwarinallperiods,amongallbelligerents,employingall
weapons,anddeployinganendlessarrayodeclaredmotives.Tismaysoundpedantic;Ihopeitjustsoundsobvious.IemphasizetheauthorityoClausewitz,andparticularlyhisinsistencethatallwarsarethingso
thesamenature,inordertohelpdemystiythisratheramorphousbeast,irregularwar.13
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Notonlyisitanerrortoreiyirregularwar,whichaterall isonlyamethod,asadistinctivephenomenon,itcanalsobeaseriousmistaketodividetherealmowarareneatlyintotheregularandtheirregular.Many
warsareneitherpurely regularnorpurely irregular. In act,ionesideadheresstrictlytotheirregularcode,itisallbutcertaintobedeeated.Irregularorcesdonotwinunlesstheycantranslatetheirirregulargainsintothekindoadvantagethatyieldsthemmilitary,strategic,andultimatelypoliticalefectagainsttheirregularenemy.Unlessthestatelosesitsnerveandcollapsespolitically,theinitiallyirregularbelligerentcanonly
winiitisabletogenerateregularmilitarystrength.Letuspausetosummarizeaewimportantpoints.
1. Wariswar,andwarareiswarare.Clausewitziantheoryisrichbutaustere.Hegivesushisremarkabletrinityoprimordialviolence,hatred, and enmity; chance and probability; and reason; hisidentication o wars climatedanger, exertion, uncertainty,andchance;theinsistencethatwarmustbeapoliticalinstrument;andhisreminderotheubiquitousroleoriction. 14
2. Terearenoirregularwarsobedienttosomedistinctivenatureo
theirown.3. Many,perhapsmost,warsarecharacterizedbybelligerentsresorting
toarangeocombatmodesontheregular-irregularspectrum.
4. Becausegenerallytheyarethelegalinstrumentsolegalentities(i.e.,states),regulararmedorcestypicallythinkintermsoaneatlybinarycontextopeaceorwar.Tiscanbeunhelpul.Belligerentsinirregularmodearewonttohover,tomovebackandorthperhaps,betweenpeaceandwar.Indeed,recallingthelateandunlamentedSovietUnion,thereareideologieswhoseagentsmustalwaysbeat
warwithprescribedenemies,thoughthewarwillrarelyinvolveactiveviolence.
5. Finally,whetherornottheyrecognizetheact,allbelligerentsunctiongrandstrategically.Weshouldnotbeoverimpressedbytherecentrediscoveryothestrategicwheelinthisregard.Teactthatthereismoretowarthanwarare,orghting,wasaswellknownto
AlexandertheGreatasitshouldbetous.15
Teapparentrecentstrategicepiphanythathasrevealedtousthetruebreadthobehaviors
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relevanttotheconductoirregularwarareis,rankly,recognitionotheblindinglyobvious.
Sincethereisnocaseorasserting,orearing,thatirregularwararecomprisesanythingotherthanthestandardsetoingredientspresentinallwarare,albeitdistinctivelymixed,justwhatisitthatweareanalyzing?
Terearetworoughbutreadywaystodistinguishregularromirregularwarare.Terstisbythecharacterothecombatants.Writingacenturyago,ColonelCallwellotheBritisharmyemployedthecontemporarytermoart,smallwar.Hedeneditthus:Practicallyitmaybesaidtoincludeallcampaignsotherthanthosewhereboththeopposing sidesconsistoregulartroops.16Inotherwords,asmallwariswagedbetweenstateand
nonstateadversaries.Telegalandpoliticalstatusothebelligerentsdenestheirregularity.Tesecondapproach,incontrast,ocusesuponmodesooperation. Irregularwarare iswagedbysuch irregularmethods asguerrillawararepreponderantly,probablywithprecursorandthenadjunctterrorism.Scholarsostrategicarcanaliketodebatetheirconceptualchoices.Sometimesthesematter.Isoursubjectinsurgency,orisitirregularwarare?17Telatterrisksdivertingusundulyintoamilitaryboxcanyonattheexpenseoshortchangingtheimplicationsotheeternaltruththatthereis
moretowarthanwarare.Indeed,insomepartsothisworldevenreerringtowarandwararecanmisleadbysuggestingthepossibilityotheiropposites,peaceandstabilization.Aterritorymaybelockedinaconditionopermanentwarandpeace.Tatisconceptuallyaswellaspolitically,legally,andsociallyconusingtotidy-mindedacademicsanddratersodoctrinemanuals.
Itisundeniablethatinsomeimportantwaysinsurgencyisamoresatisactoryconceptthanisirregularwarare.Itreerstoapurpose,typicallytotakepowerbymeansoatolerably,certainlyvariably,popularcampaign
o violence to destabilize and ultimately deeat the established government.However,Iamreluctanttosurrendertheirregularlabelcompletelytosodeniteapoliticalmission.Forme,atleast,theattractionsothebroadchurchoirregularwarareincludeitsabilitytowelcomeregularsbehavingirregularly.Imustconesstosomeunhappinesswithdenitionsthat err on the side o exclusivity. Probably it is sensible to decline tochoose.Instead,weshouldnotwasteefortonthemeritsanddemeritsoinsurgencyandirregularity.Teormerisobviouslypoliticallysuperior,
butthelatterallbutcompelsustothinkinnovativelyand,dareIsayitagain,inanunrestrictedway.
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Letuscuttothechase.Iwillidentiythosecharacteristicsoirregularwarare that wemay elect to regard as theeternalnatureo thegenre.PleaserecallthatIamappearingtoviolatemyearlierClausewitzianargu
menttotheefectthatallwarhasthesamenature.Itishelpul,actuallyitisessentialorourlimitedpurposehere,tolocatethoseeaturesmostcharacteristicowhatwemeanbyirregularwarare.Onlybyproceedingthuscanweentertheliststodointellectualandpracticalcombatwiththebeliesandpracticesotheseriouslymisinormed.
Irregularwararecanhavenoxedcharacter;itsirregularityisdeter minedbyspecichistoricalandculturalcircumstances.IncommonwiththeChinesechiandcheng,unorthodoxandorthodox,LiddellHartsin
directasopposedtodirectapproach,18
andsymmetricalcontrastedwithasymmetricalwarare,irregularityisdenedbyitsopposite.Tisisnotterriblyhelpul.Ittellsusthatirregularwarareisnotregularwarare.But
whatisregularwarare?Andtowhom?oastrategicculturethatavorsraiding,presumablyastrategyoopenwararewouldbeirregular.Teoristscanpassmanyahappyhourtryingtodenetheindenable.Tetruthisthatirregular,indirect,andasymmetricalareallinherentlyemptyconcepts,denableonlywithreerencetotheiropposites.Andthoseop
posites,similarly,areberetodenitemeaning.Butletusnotdespair.Whenacedwithatheoreticalconundrumsuchasthis,oneisobligedtoresorttothatoldreliable,commonsense.Itsohappensthatwedohaveagoodenoughworkingunderstandingoirregularwarare,one whichgrants the distinctiveness o each case. I we itemize irregular wararesprincipaleatures,leavingsubtletiesasideorthemoment,weshouldbecloseenoughtondingtheanswertothisrstquestion.Whatisdistinctiveaboutirregularwarare?
1. Irregularwarareiswararewagedinastyle,orstyles,thatarenonstandardortheregularorcesatissue.Teenemyisunlikelytobeintheserviceoastate.
2. Irregular warare is waged in order to secure the acquiescence, inotthesupport,othelocalpeople.Militarydeeatotheirregularenemyis desirable, butnot essential. It is hispolitical deeat,hisdelegitimation,thatiscrucial.
3. Tedecisivecombatoccursinandaboutthemindsocivilians,notonthebattleeld.Protectionothepeoplemustbejobone.
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4. Intelligencerules!Butactionable,whichistosayreal-time,intelligenceisattainableonlyromdeectorsorasympatheticpublic.Andorsuchinormationtobeavailable,itsagentsmustbelievethatyou
arethewinningside.Prudencedictatessuchcaution.5. Irregularwarare,ascontrastedwithcommonbanditry,crime,orrec
reationalbrigandryandhooliganism,needsanideology.Atleast,itneedssomeacsimileoabigideaortwo.Ideasandcultureusuallydomatterinwarare.Butoraninsurgencytomobilizeandgrow,ithastohaveasourceospiritualand/orpoliticalinspiration.Whencombatinganirregularenemy,onecannothelpbeingincompetitionwiththatbigidea.Tereisanunhelpulasymmetryinthestructureothe
context.Teinsurgentisbiddingwithpromises;youarecounter-bidding with what must be a somewhat awed perormance. Andbearinmindthattheirregularoewillbestrivingwithimaginationandperhapssomecompetencetomakeyourclaimsorbettergovernancelooklikelies.
6. Ocourse,allwarareisaboutpolitics.Itisonlythepoliticaldimensionthatgivesmeaningtothebloodyactivity.But,inregularwarare,atleastorthesoldiers,politicstypicallytakesabackseatuntilthemilitaryissue
issettled.Notsoinirregularwarare.Inthelattercasetherewillprobablybenorecognizablemilitarydecision.Militarybehaviormustbeconductedoritspoliticalefectsbecausethoseefects,inthemindsothepublic,comprisethetrueeldodecision.
7. Culturemattersgreatly.Tisisyetanotherclaimthatisnotuniqueto irregularwarare,but itisogreater signicancein thatmodeoconict.Sinceirregularwarareisaboveallelseacontestortheacquiescenceandallegianceocivilian locals, theirbelies, values,
expectations,andpreerredbehaviorsareauthoritative.Iwedonotknowmuchaboutthosebeliesandvalues,weareunlikelytoregistermuchprogressinpersuasion,exceptbyaccident.Indeed,bybehavinglikestrangersinastrangelandtruealiensourregularsoldiers and ocials are as likely to do more harm than good totheirmission.Alwaysbealerttothemalignworkingsothelawounintendedconsequences.Youmightwishtomarrythatlawtothemaximthatnogooddeedshallgounpunished.
8. Finally,regularwararetheAmericanwayhasthehighlydesirablecharacteristicsoofensiveness,aggressiveness,seizingandkeeping
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theinitiative,andmaintainingahightempoooperations.Teobjectis todeeat, indeedannihilate,theenemyinshortorderbyacombination o maneuver and repower. Te idea that time is a
weapon is somewhat aliencertainly it is unwelcome. But in irregularwarare,anenemywhoisgreatlydisadvantagedmateriallyisobligedtousetimeagainstyou.Heexpectstowinbynotlosingbecause he believes that he can outlast you. Te war will not bewonorlostinthelocalbarriosandswamps,butinAmericassittingrooms.Teirregularisnotattemptingtoinictanimpossiblemilitarydeeatuponyou.SteveMetzpointstothemeaningostrategicefectivenessinirregularwararewhenhewritesthatinsurgency,
aterall,isarmedtheater.19
Allcompetentstrategistsoirregularwararerecognizethisact.Teirregularopponents,timeatertime,haveresistedsuchcomprehension.MichaelCollinsorchestratedhisIrishRepublicanArmycampaignagainstBritainin191921inobediencetothisprinciple,asdidVoNguyenGiap.Needlesstosay,perhaps,ianirregularorceenjoysmilitarysuccess,itsleadersarealwaysvulnerabletothetemptationtochangetherules.Teymayseektoacceleratethepaceohistorybygoingdirectlyorpolitical
goldbymeansoaswitmilitaryvictory.Asotenasnot,suchhubrisbringsthemclosetomilitaryandpoliticalnemesis.
Itisnecessarytohighlightthediferencesbetweenregularandirregularwarare.ButImustconesstoconsiderableuneasewithsuchaneatandconvenientbinarydistinction.TereisanOrientalstrategictheoristlurkingsomewherewithinme,andthatelusivepersonavorsaboth/andapproachratherthananeither/orone.WhentheAmericandeensecommunitymakesagreatdiscovery,inthiscasethephenomenonoirregularwarare,ittends
tooverdiscovery.Byandlarge,thelong-belatedrediscoveryowhathasreallyalwaysbeenknownaboutirregularwarareandinsurgencyisverywelcome.However,tociteyetanotherlaw,diminishingreturnstoefortrapidlysetin.IwouldbelesstroubledwereIseeingamoreholisticapproachtostrategyandwararethanInoticetoday.IsuspectboththattheCOINenthusiasm
willnotlongendure,butthatwhileitdoeswewilloverreachandoverreact.TisisonereasonwhyIhavetriedtoarguethatoursubjectiswarandwarareandthattheyhaveapermanentnature.AsIshallexplain,Ibelievethat
thecurrentcommendabledriveorgreaterefectivenessinCOINisgoingtopromotenewstrategicerrors.
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Why Do Regular Forces Have Great Difculty WagingIrregular Warare Eectively?
Iitisanyconsolation,youshouldbeawarethatveryewarmieshavebeenequallycompetentintheconductoregularandirregularwarare.Teprincipalreasonisglaringlyobvious.Armiesgenerallyareorganized,equipped,andtrainedtoghtotherarmieswithcharacteristicssimilartotheirs.Inregularwarareoneseeksvictorythoughthedecisivedeeatotheenemiesorcesonthebattleeld.Althoughtheenterpriseisthoroughlypoliticalinmotivationandmeaning,theproximatebehavioris,andhastobe,military.Anarmycommandermaycontributetoadialogonstrategywithhispoliticalmasters,butcorporals,sergeants,captains,
colonels,andevenone-andtwo-stargeneralswillnot.20Teywillbeullyoccupiedghtingthewar.Teproblemisthatinirregularwararethereisanarmedenemyinthetheater,buthismilitarydeeatorhumiliationisnottheprimeobjectiveotheCOINefort.Tisisnottosaythatsuchdeeatisunimportant,avitalmattertowhichIshallreturn.
TeprimaryCOINchallengeisstrategic.TisisperhapsunortunatebecausetrulyitcanbesaidthattheUnitedStatesdoesnotreallydostrategy.Rather,ittendstojumpstraightrompolicytooperationsandtactics.21Te
dominantapproachtostrategythatonendsinAmericanstrategiccultureismorethancasuallyreminiscentotheviewothemostadmiredsoldierothesecondhalothenineteenthcenturyRobertE.Leealwaysexcepted,ocourseFieldMarshalHelmuthGravonMoltke.Teeldmarshaldeclaredin1871thatstrategyappropriatesthesuccessoeveryengagementandbuildsuponit.Tedemandsostrategygrowsilentintheaceoatacticalvictoryandadaptthemselvestothenewlycreatedsituation.Strategyisasystemoexpedients.22Weknowhowthatapproacharedunderre.olosetwoworldwarsin27yearswasquiteastrategicachievement.
Inregularwarare,thesoldiersknowhowtowin,andthegeneralsunderstandthetaskthattheymustsetthetroopsto.COINisdiferent.Teamiliarconnectionbetweentactical,evenoperational,militaryexcellenceandstrategicsuccessiseitherabsentortenuous.Youwinamilitaryengagement by standard metrics, but so what? Can insurgents be beatenmilitarily?Itheycannot,justhowcantheybedeeated?ICOINisallaboutpoliticalefect,whatkindomilitaryandotherbehavioursgenerate,orundermine,thatpoliticalefect?Tesearenotexactlynewques
tions.ItisnoteventruetoclaimthatCOINtodayconrontsnewormsoinsurgency.Strategichistoryhasbeenherebeore.Contextscertainly
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change.AsEdwardN.Luttwakremindsus,theoptionoout-terrorizingterroristsandencouragingsocialdisciplinethroughthegenerationoseriousearisnotopentousasitwastoGeneralVespasianwhenheelected
toteachtherevoltingJewsinAD67whyitwasnotagoodideatorevoltagainstRome.23Changingnormsaglobalizedtechnologyonewsandopinionreportinghavealteredcruciallythecontextsowarare,especiallyCOINwarare.Regularorcesarestilltryingtocometogripswiththemediadimensiontotheirbehavior.
Techiedicultyorregularsistodecideuponastrategythatmightwork.Militaryoperationsandtacticsarearromirrelevant,buttheyarenotthekeystosuccess.Itisworthnoting,however,thattheycanprove
tobethekeystopoliticalailure.RecallDienBienPhuand,potentially,KheSanh.Teregularhas tochangehismind-setandadoptaviewomilitaryactivitythathasitintegraltoaholisticapproachtoaproblemthatislargely,thoughnotentirely,political.Sincesoldiershaveghtingastheirmostdistinctive corecompetency,andgiventhat theyarebestpreparedtowrestlewithotherregularsoldiers,themilitaryculturalchallengeisproound.Rephrased,typicallywhenaregularorceiscommittedtoCOIN,althoughithassomeinherentadvantages,itisbeingaskedtoperorminways,andorpurposes,orwhichitisrelativelyillprepared.Iprooothisclaimisrequired,justconsiderIraq.Otenitissaidthatitismorediculttoexpelanoldideathantointroduceanewone.Becauseweonlyhaveonearmy,wecannotafordtodeprogramourregulars,evenweresuchmentalsurgerypossible.Aterall,wemaywellneedthemtoperorminaregularway,eveninpursuitoCOINsuccess.ImightmentionthatIhavealwaysbelievedthattherstrequirementorspecialoperationsorces(SOF),torpurposeasthesayinggoestoday,isanunconventionalmind-set.24UnlessSOFareemployedbypeoplewhocan
thinkunconventionally,andunlesstheythemselveshaveunconventionalminds,theymustperormarshortotheirpotential.Asalways,theproblemisstrategic.Whatefectisitnecessarytogenerate,andhowisthattobedone?Itisalwaysessentialtobeabletoanswerthemostcriticalquestionposedbystrategy,sowhatwhatdiferencedoesitmake?
Not all military institutions haveequal dicultywith COIN. Public,strategic, and military cultures difer amongcountries. For example, the
wagingowarareagainstirregularsoallpersuasionsandinmostkindso
terrainhaslongbeenacore,inotthecore,competencyotheBritisharmy.Veryoccasionally,thoughrelativelybriey,thatarmywouldchangeitsgame
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dramaticallywhencontinentaldemandshadtobemet.ButtheBritisharmywasorganizedasanimperialpoliceorce.Itwastransportedbythenavyonexpeditionsoconquest.Tenitpolicedtheempire,providingaidtothe
civilpower.Andnallyitconductedalengthy,andnotwhollyunsuccessul,imperialretreat,servingastherearguardorthelongprocessodevolutionater1945.OnecouldarguethattheBritisharmywasstillengagedinimperialpolicinginNorthernIrelanduntiltheGoodFridayAgreemento1998.Weneedtobewareocasualgeneralization.TequestionIposeis,Ibelieve,validandimportant:whydoregularorceshavegreatdicultywagingir regularwarareefectively?Tescaleothedicultyvarieswiththesubject.TeBritisharmyhasalongtraditionoperormanceinirregularwarare.
IthasnotalwayscovereditselwithgloryinCOINcampaigns.However,Britishmilitaryculturehasnobasicdicultywithsuchwarare.Itiswhatthearmyexpectstobeaskedtodo.Andhistorically,irregularwararehasbeenthepreponderantBritishmilitaryexperience.
TeUnitedStatesanditsArmyisanothercasealtogether.Despite300years o irregular warare in North America against Native Americans,
Americanmilitarycultureneverdesignatedirregularwarare,orCOIN,asarequiredcorecompetency,atleastnotuntiltoday,ratherbelatedly.Tisisnottheoccasiontoexplainwhythishasbeenso.Isimplyrecorditasahistoricalact.TeUnitedStateshasapreerredwayinwarareolongstandingthatis,onbalance,highlydysunctionalorCOIN.MoreandmoreAmericananalystshavecometorecognizethis,butrecognitionandefectiveresponseareratherdiferent.EvenastheUSArmyandAirForceappreciatethediferencesbetweenregularandirregularwarareinsoarastheybearupontheirbehaviors,itremainsanopenquestionwhetherornotAmericancultureandinstitutionsareabletomaketheadjustmentsnecessaryormuchgreaterefectivenessinCOIN.
Atsomeriskooverstatement,IwillhazardthepropositionthatalmosteverythingthatisregardednearuniversallyasbestpracticeinCOINcontradictstheAmericanwayinwarare.25oexcelinCOINanarmyneedsto:
1. Understandthatallmilitaryactionispoliticaltheater.Irregularwararedoesnot,cannot,haveamilitaryoutcome.
2. Appreciatethattheconictisortheacquiescenceorsupportothe
people.Deadinsurgentsareabonus;theyarenotareliablemarkosuccess.
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3. Bepreparedtotearupitsdoctrinemanualsorregularwarare.Itsrstjobistoprotectthepeople.
4. Adoptdiferentprioritiesamongitsskills.Beinghighlyagileinmaneuverandlethalinrepowerarenotespeciallyhelpul.Canitbethatourmilitarytransormationwas,oris,headinginadirectionirrelevant,oractuallyharmul,orefectivenessinCOIN?
5. AcceptthatCOINrequiresalong-termcommitment,typically10years.Also,itrequiressecurityorcesinlargenumbers.Historicalanalysisseemstoshowthatoneneedsroughly20membersothesecurityorcesorevery1,000peopleinthegeneralpopulation.26acticalskillandtechnologyarenotveryrelevant.Teyarenicetohave,butthebasisosuccessisnumbersintherightratio.
Iyourarmedorcesareshapedbyandweddedtoamilitarycultureorapidmaneuverordecisivevictory,itheyseektoexploitrepowerasthelongestoriendlylongsuits,anditheydrawasharpdistinctionbetweenthepoliticalandthemilitaryrealms,COINwillbethesourceoendlessrustration.Notonlyisanarmyexcellentintheconductoregularwar areunlikelytoshineatCOIN,thatexcellencewillalsoproveahindrancetounderstandingandrespondingtothediferentchallengesposedbyacontextoirregularhostilities.Tepicturelooksgrim,perhapsundulyso.
AretheregroundstohopeorsuccessinCOIN?
Is COIN Winnable by Regulars?
Teanswertothisquestionisaresoundingyes.Isaythisnotjustasanarmationoaithbutalsoonthebasisohistoricalevidence.Insurgencieshaveadistinctlyunevenrecordostrategicandpoliticalsuccess.Wetheo
riststendtobeoverimpressedwithstructuralactors.WehappilylistreasonsorandagainsttheprospectsorCOINadvantage.Butwearenotoriously
weakatdealingwiththehumandimensionoCOIN.Similarly,wearenotaseloquentasweshouldbeonthesubjectsoClausewitzsclimateowarandriction.Peoplemattermost,notleastinrelativelylow-technologyhostilities.Leaderscount.Politicalcharismaandstrategicinspirationarepricelessassets.Inwarareoallkinds,regularandirregular,moraleisbyarthemostimportantgeneratoroefectiveness.Inaprotractedirregularconict,
themoraleotherivalarmedorcescanbeliterallydecisive.Teskillulleaderworkstodepressthemoraleotheenemysspearcarriers.
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Ontheobversesideoinspiredleadership,itisimportanttoallowanalyticalspaceorhumanerror.Itisalwaysamistaketodiscountolly,incompetence,andsheerbadluck.Manycampaignsthatshouldhavebeen
won were, in act, lost because the troops were poorly led. Every war,regularandirregular,isaduel,asClausewitzmaintains.Itisalsoastrugglebetweentwoormorelearninginstitutions.27Everyonemakesmistakesinwar.Notallmistakesareatal,butthecourseoeventsisshaped,evendetermined,bywhichsidelearnstheastestandadaptsmorequickly.
WhileanarmymustdiscardmostoitsdoctrineorregularwarareinordertobeefectiveinCOIN,itmustnottrytodiscardtheessentialactsoitsregularity.Itisthearmyotheestablishedorder.Itprovides
aidtothecivilpower.Ithasallthematerialadvantagesoocialsanctionandresources.Ithaslegitimacy;atleastitshouldhavelegitimacy.WhileaCOINcampaignrequiresaregulararmytoreorganize,retrain,andreequip,itdoesnotrequire,itcannotrequire,theregularstoapetheirregulars. Te regular army and its adjuncts are the ace o order andstability.Itneedstolookandbehaveasithatisso.Whatdoweknowromhistoricalexperience,romlogic,andromcommonsenseabouttheprospectsorsuccessbyregularorcesinCOIN?
First,althougheveryinsurgencyisunique,eachhassomeeaturescommonto themall.TisconvenientactmeansthataCOINdoctrineisbotheasibleandnecessary.28WeknowwhatconstitutesbestpracticeinCOIN,ionlybecausewehaveaccesstoanabundanceoevidenceotheconsequences o poor practice. Te beginning o COIN wisdom is tograsptheimplicationsoClausewitzsamousrule.Heinsistedthattherst,thesupreme,themostar-reachingactojudgmentthatthestatesmanandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablishbythattest[otwithpolicy]thekindowaronwhichtheyareembarking;neithermistakingit
or,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature.Tisistherstoallstrategicquestionsandthemostcomprehensive.29WeknowthatCOINisacontestorthemindsothepeople.othatend,weknowthatthemilitaryinstrumenthastobesubordinatetocivilianauthorityandinthebackgroundbehindthepolice.Also,weknowthattheuseoorceshouldbeminimal.TeentireCOINefortrequirescoordinatedcentralciviliandirection.Tereisnoneedtodwellontheseamiliardetails.Tepointisthatthereisnothingwhatsoevermysteriousaboutbestprac
ticeinCOIN,atleastinprinciple.Wehaveaglitteringarrayovariablyoutstandingclassictextsandanevenmoreglitteringarrayohistorical
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episodesobothailureandsuccessinCOIN.TechargetodayisnottocomprehendtheCOINchallenge.Tatiseasy.Rather,it istopersuadeourinstitutionstochangetheirpreerredbehaviorswhilebeingalertto
thepossibilitythatinstitutional,strategic,andpublicculturesmaynotpermitthenecessaryadjustments.
Second,COINcananddoessucceedithecontextsotheconictarepermissive.Forexample,COINwasalwaysmuchmorelikelytobesuccessulinthePhilippines,Malaya,andElSalvadorthaninVietnam,Aghanistan,andIraq.Notalltasksaredoable,eventoagitedstrategist.Iraqtodaybearsallthehallmarksomissionimprobable.Followingourinitialerrors,thesecuritysituationhasdeteriorated,probablybeyondrescue.Teconict
isnowsocomplexitevenmakesWorldWarIIYugoslavialooksimplebycomparison,andthatisquiteanachievement.Testrategistshouldbeapragmatist.Whethertheprospectiveconictisregular,irregular,oramessy,untidycombinationothetwo,itmaynotbewinnableatbearablecost.Strategyisaboutmakinghardchoicesbaseduponcost-benetguesswork.Evenasound,well-testedCOINdoctrine,tobeimplementedbyasuitablycoordinatedcivil-militaryefort,maystandnoreasonablechanceosuc ceeding.Situationalawarenessiskey.DonotassumethatCOINisalwaysdoable.Ahostoshowstopperscanrainontheparade.
Tirdand lastly, or COIN to succeed abroad it has towork politicallyorusathome.ItheAmerican(andBritish)publiclosespatienceorcondence intheendeavor,theexercise isdoomed.Tispointis soobviousastovergeonthebanal.WhenIraiseditinaspeechayearago,Iwasnotpopular.IpredictedasurgeobumperstickerssayingNomoreIraqs.Teaudiencewasnotimpressedatthattime.ItheUnitedStatesbelievesthatitacesagenerationandmoreoirregularchallenges,itisgoingtohavetoaddressthispotentiallyatalweaknessinitsstayingpower.
Irregularwarareisprotractedandapparentlyindecisive.Itisdiculttounderstandindetail,itscourseishardtodescribe,evidenceoprogressiselusive,anditsutureisalmostimpossibletopredict.IAmericanscannotacceptthesestructuralacts,thecountrycannotsucceedatCOIN.
What Are the Leading Fashionable ErrorsBelieved about Irregular Warare?
Iyoulikemaxims,trythisone:Foreverycomplexproblemthereisasimplesolution,anditisalwayswrong.Itisnoticeablethatthecurrent
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understandableurryotheoryandadviceonirregularwararehasencouragedthepromotionoanumberojustsuchsimplesolutions.Imustpreacemynegativecommentsbysayingthatthe ideasIwillciteareall
excellentinthemselves.WhatIshallcriticizeistheviewthatanyothemistheanswerorwhichwehavebeensearching.Imustriskexaggerationinordertohighlighttheargumentthataninherentlygoodidearapidlybecomesamuchlessgoodideawhenitslimitationsarenotappreciated.Teoursimpleideasthatcurrentlyarebeinginvestedwithmiraculouspropertiesorthesuccessulprosecutionoirregularwarareareculture,COINdoctrine,theuseoSOF,andthedominanceopoliticalovermilitarybehavior.
First,theUSdeensecommunityhasdiscoveredculture.Withallthe
enthusiasmotheconvert,ourmilitaryisbeingencouragedtobelievethatunderstandinglocalcultureisthekeytovictory.30Wemustcomprehendthepeopleandthesocietythatweaspiretorescueromchaosandcapturebydangerouscreeds.Tisisanexcellentidea,asitalwayshasbeen.Temainproblemisthatitisnotachievable.Someculturalempathycertainlyisattainable.Buttoacquireanythingmorethanasupercialgraspolocalmoresandsocialstructuredemandsyears,inotalietime,oexposureandstudy.Ourpracticeotoursodutywithrapidrotationisincompatible
withtheacquisitionoculturalexpertise.Still,thereiseverythingtobesaidinavoroourdoingwhatwecantounderstandthepeoplewhosemindscomprisethebattlespaceinirregularwarare.31IshouldaddthateveniahanduloAmericananthropologistsandhistoriansdosecureagoodmeasureoculturalexpertise,whatdowedowithit?Recallthestrategistsquestion,sowhat?So,nowtheUSdeenseestablishmentknowsthatcultureisimportant.Good.Butwhatcanitdowiththatgeneralknowledgethatwouldbereallyuseul?
Second,asproblemsolversourocialsandsoldiersarealwaysinthe
marketorsolutionstothequestionotheday.AndrewF.Krepinevichspoketothismarketandtoldmanypeoplewhattheyweredesperatetohearwhen,in2005,heofereddrinktothethirstyandoodtothehungrywithhistimelyarticle,HowtoWininIraq. 32WhatKrepinevichprovidedwasarst-ratesummary,andapplicationtoIraq,ostandardCOINtheory.HeexplainedbestpracticeinCOINasrevealedbyhistoricalexperience.Obviously,thisunexceptionalessaycameasarevelationtomanyAmericanswhosomehowhadmissedtheCOINlecturesintheir
proessionaleducation.ItwouldnotbeairtocompareKrepinevichwithGen Robert Nivelle, the French general who promised desperate and
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despairingpoliticiansvictoryatastrokeonthewesternrontin1917.Amongotherdiferences,Krepinevichwasrecommendingasounddoctrine.ButKrepinevich,Nivelle,andmorerecently,theadvocatesoamili
tarysurgeinBaghdaddoshareoneimportantcommoneature.Teyareallpeoplewhoclaimtohavetheanswertotheproblemothehour.HowtoWininIraqandsimilar,ilesscompetentoferings,arequintessentiallyJominian.Iyourecall,AntoineHenrideJomini,theSwisstheorist,promisedvictorytothosewhoappliedthecorrectdoctrine.33TeideahastakenrootthatthesolutiontoourirregularwararenightmaresisadoptionotherightCOINdoctrine.Tisisahal-truthatbest.Inhistoricalpractice,eachcaseissouniquethatalthoughtherearesomevalid
principleswhichshouldgovernirregularwarare,therecanbenoreliabletemplateorallcontexts.
Tird,atlonglastSOFhavebecomeashionableand,dareIsay,popular.Inandoitsel,anewappreciationorSOFisentirelywelcome.ButwhatdoweexpectoourSOF?Whataretheirrolesinirregularwarare?AretheykeytosuccessinCOIN?Teanswerisnotreally,exceptinthecontextothetotalprotractedcivil-militaryefortthatCOINrequires.SOFcanonlybeasefectiveascircumstancesallowandasthechaino
commandpermits.Inparticular,inCOINtheyeitherplaywiththeteamortheiruniquetalentsarelargelywasted.Ithewrongstrategyispursued,SOFwillnotrescuetheenterprise.Tereisalwaysthedangerthataregular military establishment deeply encultured in conventional maneuver
warare,andweddedindissolublytorepowersolutions,willuseitsSOFassetstodobetterwhatitalreadydoeswell.Specically,SOFwillbeemployedastargetspottersorstand-ofweaponry.Recallthatin20012anallegedlynewAmericanwayowar,vitallyenabledbySOFtargetspot
ting,wasproclaimedandcelebratedastheexperienceinAghanistan.34
SolittlecareulthoughthasbeendevotedtothestrategicefectivenessoSOFindiferentrolesthatitiseasytoseewhyexaggeratedestimatesotheirpotentialarenothardtocomeby.WelackpersuasivetheoryonSOF.Inact,thegenuinelystrategicliteratureonSOFandspecialoperationsisalmostentirelyabsent.IcommendJamesKirassexcellentrecentbooktoyou.35Itisalonelyitemonanotherwiseemptyshel.Somemayalsondvalue, inspirationat least, inDerekLeebaerts recentwork.36 Although
mostothosewhohavelatchedontoSOFastheprincipalanswertoourCOINtroublesarenotwhollyinerror,theyreallydonotknowwhatthey
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aretalkingabout.Tereis,andcanbe,noSOFsolution.SOFareavitalpartothesolution,whereasolutionispossible,thatis.
Fourthandnally,thedeenseestablishmentappearstobeintheprocess
ooverreachingwiththedazzlinginsightthatthemilitarydimensionissubordinatetothepoliticalinirregularwarare.Yetagain,thisisapowerulandcorrectinsight.Butwhentakentooar,whenreducedtoanarticleoaith,itbecomesadangerouserror.Ocourse,insurgentsoallnoxiousbreedscannotwinmilitarily,atleastnotunlesstheCOINorcescommittrulyappallingstrategicmistakes.However,COINinallitsnonmilitarydimensionscanonlyourishinacontextophysicalsecurityorthepublic.TetraditionalAmericanwayinwarareishighlydysunctionalorCOIN,asIhavesuggestedalreadyandasisgenerallyrecognizedtoday.However,weneedtobecareullestweoverbalanceawayromaccordingthemilitarydimensionitsproperdue.ItisimportantactuallyitisessentialorthepublictoseetheCOINregularssucceedinbattle.Teyhavetobelievethattheinsurgentsarebeing,andwillcontinuetobe,deeated.Naturally,onemustnotpursuenarrowlymilitaryobjectivesregardlessothepoliticalcostsosodoing.ButIdetectsignstodayoanunduewillingnesstodemoteanddiscountthemilitaryelement.Withoutphysicalsecurityorthepeople,aCOINcampaignisgoingnowhereuse
ul,nomatterhowsophisticateditsdoctrineorwellcoordinateditscentrallycivilian-directedeforts.
Tosummarizetheargumentjustadvanced:bewareofthegreatover-simplifications.Lookoutforthefalselypromisedsilverbullets.Caveatemptor.Ihavesuggestedthatculture,COINdoctrine,SOF,andtheparamountcyofthepoliticalhaveallbeenadoptedasiconicsolutionstothehideouslycomplexchallengesofCOIN.Whileeachisvaluable,noneistheanswer.
Concluding Thoughts
Iclosewithhaladozenthoughtsthatareasspareanddirectasmuchotheprecedingdiscussionhasbeenratherindirectandsometimeshedged
withtypicalacademicqualiers.Teseconcludingpointsareamixtureotheobviousandthecontroversial.
1. Irregularwarareishighlyvariableinormandisalwayscomplex.
2. Irregularwararecallsorcultural,political,andmilitaryqualitiesthatarenotamongthetraditionalstrengthsoAmericans.Americaexcels
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intheconductolarge-scaleregularwarare.Moreover,airpoweristheessenceotheAmericanwayinwarare.
3. Weneedtobewareodrawingtoosharpadistinctionbetweenregular and irregular warare. Most wars have elements o both. Andwarareiswarare,whetheritisregularorirregular.
4. Fewarmiesexcelatbothregularandirregularwarare.Americasirregularwararedecitishistoricallycommonamongstates.Itisnotatallextraordinary.
5. Irregularwararematters,butitmattersagreatdeallessthanwould,orwill,thereturnogreat-powerrivalryandantagonism.Wehaveto
becareullestweoverreacttothemenaceothedecadeirregularwarareonlytodiscoverthattheCOINchallengewasadistractionrommoreserioussecurityinternationalbusiness.
6. Itollowsromtheseconcludingthoughts,andromtheargumentinmuchothispaper,thattheUnitedStatesshouldundertakelittleirregular warare. It would be a political and strategic mistake toidentiyirregularwarare,COINespecially,asAmericasdominantstrategicuture.IthecountryshouldmakethemistakeocommittingitseltoextensiveCOINprojects,itwillrequireamuchlargerarmy.echnologywillnotsubstituteanywherenearadequatelyornumbersoAmericansontheground.
Notes1. StevenMetz,Learning rom Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy(CarlisleBar
racks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,January2007),v.
2. TomasR.Mockaitis,Te Iraq War: Learning rom the Past, Adapting to the Present, andPlanning or the Future(CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,
February2007),1.
3. RalphPeters,InPraiseoAttrition,Parameters34,no.2(Summer2004):2432.For
COINRomanstyle,seeJosephus,Te Jewish War, trans.G.A.Williamson,rev.E.MarySmall
wood(London:PenguinBooks,1981).
4. MaryKaldor,New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge:Polity
Press,1999);andHerriedMnkler,Te New Wars(Cambridge:PolityPress,2005).
5. RobertB.StrasslerandRichardCrawley,eds.Te Landmark Tucydides: A Comprehensive
Guide to the Peloponnesian War(NewYork:TeFreePress,1996),43.
6. IamindebtedtoLtGenPaulvanRiperwhohasorceullybroughttomyattentiontheexcessiveprolierationotermsorirregularwarareandinsurgency.
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7. Samuel P. Huntington,American Military Strategy, Policy Papers in International Aairs,no.28(Berkeley,CA:InstituteoInternationalStudies,UniversityoCaliornia,Berkeley,1986),16.
8. Charles E. Callwell,Small Wars: A actical extbook or Imperial Soldiers (1906; repr.,
Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1990);USMarineCorps,Small Wars Manual, United States MarineCorps, 1940 (1940;repr.,Manhattan,KS:SunowerUniversityPress,2004);DavidGalula,Counterinsurgency Warare: Teory and Practice(1964;repr.,Westport,C:PraegerSecurityInternational,2006);Robertaber, War o the Flea: Te Classic Study o Guerrilla Warare(1965;repr.,Washington,DC:PotomacBooks,2002);Mao setung on Guerrilla Warare,trans.SamuelB.Grith(NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1961);Rogerrinquier, Modern Warare: AFrench View o Counterinsurgency(1961;repr.,FortLeavenworth,KS:USArmyCommandandGeneral Staf College, 1985); Frank Kitson,Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency,Peacekeeping(London:FaberandFaber,1971);and.E.Lawrence,GuerrillaWarare, Ency-clopaedia Britannica,14thed.(1929;repr.,London:EncyclopaediaBritannica,1959),vol.10,
95051.9. QiaoLiangandWangXiangsui,Unrestricted Warare: Assumptions on War and actics inthe Age o Globalization,trans.ForeignBroadcastInormationService(Beijing:PeoplesLiberationArmyLiteratureandArtsPublishingHouse,February1999).
10. BernardBrodie,War and Politics(NewYork:Macmillan,1973),452.11. CarlvonClausewitz,On War,ed.andtrans.MichaelHowardandPeterParet(1832;
repr.,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976),75.12. SeeClausewitz,On War;Sunzu,Te Art o War,trans.RalphD.Sawyer(Boulder,CO:
WestviewPress,1994);andStrasslerandCrawley, Landmark Tucydides.13. Clausewitz,On War,606.14. Ibid.,89,104,11921,60510.
15. DavidJ.Lonsdale,Alexander, Killer o Men: Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Arto War(London:Constable,2004),56,219.
16. Callwell,Small Wars, 21.17. Metz,Learning rom Iraq,6263.18. B.H.LiddellHart,Strategy: Te Indirect Approach(London:FaberandFaber,1967).19. Metz,Learning rom Iraq,44.20. EliotA.Cohen,Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime(New
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