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Iraq: The exception to the ruleJudith S. Yaphe aa Senior research professor for the Middle East at theInstitute for National Strategic Studies, National DefenseUniversity, Washington, D.C.Published online: 07 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Judith S. Yaphe (2001) Iraq: The exception to the rule, TheWashington Quarterly, 24:1, 125-137

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Judith S. Yaphe

Iraq: The Exceptionto the Rule

Has the time come, ten years after the invasion of Kuwait andthe imposition of sanctions, to lift the military and trade embargoes imposedby the United Nations (UN) on Iraq to force compliance with UN SecurityCouncil resolutions (UNSCR)? The answer, if one believes the rhetoric ofthe 2000 presidential campaign, would seem to be a resounding "no": no toending sanctions, no to flouting UN—and U.S.—resolve to change obstruc-tionist behavior, and no to Saddam Hussein remaining in power. If one lis-tens to Congress and much of the country, the consensus also seems to beno—not yet. We may have sanctions fatigue, but we are not ready to con-cede the battle to Saddam.

What is the impact of sanctions on Iraq and the success or failure of con-tainment as a means to modify or punish Iraqi behavior? What are the policyoptions for the United States as a new administration takes over? Will it bepossible to maintain sanctions on a recalcitrant Iraq, even if they are unilat-eral rather than universal? What policy should Washington pursue if Saddamremains in power? What policy should Washington consider if there is regimechange in Baghdad? What will it take for Washington to de-rogue Baghdad?What should Iraq anticipate from a new administration in Washington?

Dealing with Saddam

As policy choices, the options for dealing with Saddam are few and simple:sanction him, ignore him, accept him as the ultimate survivor, or eliminate

Judith S. Yaphe is senior research professor for the Middle East at the Institute forNational Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Theopinions expressed here are her own and do not represent policies of the university, theU.S. Department of Defense, or any other government agency.

Copyright © 2000 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and theMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyThe Washington Quarterly • 24:1 pp. 125-137.

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him or pray someone else will. Imposing sanctions and seeking to eliminatehim as the ruler of Iraq are options the United States is willing to pursue. Ig-noring or accepting him, although preferable to some governments, remainunacceptable choices for Washington. Whatever the option, Saddam andthe country he rules cannot be ignored, accepted, or eliminated withoutgreat risks.

Wayward Sanctions

Sanctions initially were seen as a way to influence, shape, or modify the be-havior of a wayward state much the same way parents deal with a waywardchild—you will not develop and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD),you will not frighten or invade your neighbor, you will not terrorize or oppressyour people or any other people. Two kinds of sanctions were applied toBaghdad in 1991: economic sanctions, which could be lifted when Iraq wasfound by the UN Security Council to be in compliance with the resolutionscalling for elimination of its biological, chemical, nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; and sanctions prohibiting acquisition of military hard-ware, which must be removed by a separate UN Security Council vote.

In 1993, the Clinton administration enshrined sanctions in its policy ofdual containment. Dual containment was meant to force Iran and Iraq tomodify their behavior and abide by international norms and UNSCR. ForIraq, it meant forcing Saddam to comply with UNSCR dictating Iraq surren-der all WMD programs, stockpiles, and sites for destruction; return all prison-ers of war and stolen property to Kuwait; and pay reparations to those harmedby his military occupation and near destruction of Kuwait. Saddam was alsorequired to end persecution of Iraq's so-called minorities—so-called becausethe "minority" Shi'a Arabs comprise nearly 60 percent of the population ofIraq and the minority Kurds comprise approximately 20 percent.

To enforce sanctions on Iraq, the United States refined its containmentstrategy. It soon became containment plus military operations, plus WMDinspections by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), plus efforts tooverthrow Saddam. Earlier this year, Clinton administration officials re-stated the U.S. policy to contain Iraq. Assistant Secretary of State for NearEastern Affairs Edward Walker asserted in March that Saddam remained athreat to regional peace and would not relinquish his WMD arsenal or livein peace with his neighbors. Iraq under Saddam, he insisted, "cannot be re-habilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of na-tions." Walker and other administration officials insisted that U.S. policyremained committed to containing the regime, alleviating the suffering ofthe people of Iraq, and supporting Iraqis who seek a new government.1 New

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Iraq: The Exception to the Rule |

No president canafford to advocatea major change inIraq policy.

red lines for U.S. military operations were also defined: the United Stateswould use force if Saddam deployed WMD or if he attacked the Kurds.

To underscore its commitments, the Clinton administration releasedmoney to support the INDICT campaign, an international effort to bringcharges against Saddam and a dozen senior regime officials for war crimesand crimes against humanity, and began providing nonmilitary training andequipment to factions of the Iraqi opposition (primarily the Iraqi NationalCongress, led by Ahmad Chalabi in exile in London). Sanctions were easedto allow Iraq to import chemicals and equipment for water purification aswell as spare parts to repair oil industry equipment. Dual-use items—thosehaving military as well as civilian application—are still banned. The Clintonadministration also supported a British resolution in the UN Security Coun-cil—UNSCR 1284—which would suspend eco-nomic sanctions temporarily if Baghdad agreedto allow a new UN arms inspection team led byHans Blix to resume full and unregulated in-spections of Iraq's weapons programs as re-quired by previous UN resolutions.

Sanctions have worked by denying Saddamcomplete sovereignty over all of Iraq and unfet-tered use of Iraq's oil revenues, weakening hismilitary, and impeding the ability to acquirecomponents necessary to rebuild his weapons systems or reconstitute whole-sale WMD programs. Saddam has not been able to threaten his neighbors,although there have been military feints and rhetorical warnings against Ku-wait and other governments allowing the United States access to military fa-cilities. Unable to sustain his loyal military and security services, Saddamwas forced in 1996 to accept the first oil-for-food resolution. UNSCR 986allowed Iraq to sell $1.8 billion in oil every six months to purchase food andhumanitarian aid. By 1999, the amount of oil Iraq could sell had risen to$5.2 billion every six months and then to virtually whatever it could sell.

The additional income should have allowed Saddam to provide much-needed goods for Iraqis suffering under sanctions. It did not. The result of10 years of sanctions and mostly desultory air strikes has been the impover-ishment of Iraq's traditional middle class of bureaucrats, technocrats, intel-lectuals, professionals, and civil servants. Sanctions have also led to highermortality rates for the old, the weak, the children, and those otherwise un-dervalued or dispossessed by the regime (Shi'a areas of southern Iraq whichhad engaged in the 1991 rebellion, for example). Although Iraq provides theonly statistics available, which therefore are not independently verifiable,the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that infant mortality

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has doubled since sanctions were imposed in 1990. Conditions are worse incentral and southern Iraq where the death rate for children under five rosefrom 56 per 1,000 live births in the period 1984-1989 to 131 per 1,000 in1994-1999. In the predominantly Kurdish north, however, where Iraqis arenot in charge of food and humanitarian aid distribution, deaths of childrenunder five have dropped from 80 per 1,000 live births in 1984-1989 to 72per 1,000 between 1994-1999. UNICEF reports chronic malnourishmentand diarrhea as the major killers of the young.2

Lifting the Ban

Many Americans and some Europeans believe that sanctions, at some point,have to work. Either Saddam will be forced to comply in order to alleviatethe impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, or Iraqis will be so frustrated byhardship and political, economic, and diplomatic isolation that they willoverthrow the government. Sanctions, however, have not modifiedSaddam's behavior or changed his aggressive nature, the brutality of his re-gime, or his willingness to forego possession of WMD. Their singular successcame because of the consensus of the international community that theUN-imposed sanctions were the proper tactic.

Sanctions today face two problems: Saddam has changed tactics and in-ternational consensus is fading. Saddam has diverted international attentionaway from his punishment of potential opponents, withholding of access tofood and medicine, and hoarding of imported goods for his supporters. In-stead, he blames the West—and specifically the United States and theUnited Kingdom (UK)—for the deaths of Iraqi children, the increased inci-dence of malnutrition and disease, and the impoverishment of the Iraqimiddle class. Iraq's neighbors, members of the UN Security Council, andmany other governments have come to similar conclusions regarding the in-efficacy of sanctions.

Thus, international support for a containment strategy on Iraq is provingincreasingly difficult to maintain. The differences are especially sharpamong the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—theUnited States, UK, France, Russia, and China—and within the Arab world.In the latter, Islamist critics sympathize with the Iraqi people, causing Arabgovernments to support the public consensus without openly forgivingSaddam. Coalition partners continue to share the U.S. view that Iraq hasnot complied with UN Security Council resolutions on its WMD and thatBaghdad must not threaten its neighbors again. Russia, France, and China,however, argue against sanctions without end and without incentive. In aninterview in early August with the Saudi-owned paper al-Hayat, for ex-

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ample, French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine noted that economic sanc-tions had been the necessary result of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait but werenow "having a very dangerous effect on Iraqi society and the Iraqi people."

France feels that the sanctions ... are oppressive, ineffectual, and danger-ous: oppressive because they punish only the Iraqi people and the weakestamong them, ineffectual because they have no effect on the regime and donot encourage it to cooperate, and dangerous because they instill in thesanctions generation feelings of revenge, a generation that knows only wardeprivation. Sanctions are intensifying the disintegration of Iraqi societyand the implications of that are dangerous for the country's social unity... for its stability and for the region.3

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UK are exceptions to the waning interest insanctions, but sympathy for Iraq's people is growing even in Riyadh, bringingwith it the risk of regime criticism for maintaining the embargo at the ex-pense of Saudi and Arab self-interest.

Two issues dominate the discussion: what is the endgame of sanctionsand how do we get there from here? Opinions vary on what Iraq must do tocomply with UNSCR. To which resolutions must Iraq comply? All the reso-lutions, as the United States, the UK, and Ku-wait insist? Or is the only operative clause theparagraph in UNSCR 687—which says thatwhen Iraq has satisfied UNSCOM and the In-ternational Atomic Energy Agency that it nolonger possesses biological, chemical, andnuclear weapons, or the ballistic missiles todeliver them—then economic sanctions canbe removed?

If the endgame is to rid Iraq of its WMD,then Saddam's rule is not at issue—except inWashington. U.S. policymakers believe Iraq's

The United States

will almost certainly

remain committed

to keeping sanctions

in place.

objectives and behavior are unlikely to change while he is in power. Theylink Saddam's fate to that of the sanctions, saying that only his removal willoffer some prospect for change. In contrast, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow haveconcluded that regime change is unlikely and, if it were to occur, would pro-duce no shift in policy. These governments argue instead that policy changecould occur under Saddam, and they are willing to deal with him, albeitwith considerable reserve. Except for Kuwait, Iraq's Persian Gulf neighborsappear to believe that the war and sanctions have eroded Iraq's military ca-pabilities to the point that they perceive little immediate threat.

The second issue of how to get to the endgame involves tactics. Whatwill get Saddam to comply with the UNSCR requirements? Will isolationor engagement, punishment or incentives, work? European, Russian, and

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most Arab leaders argue that engagement, not isolation or punishment bymilitary attack, is the key to defusing crises with Baghdad. The most re-cent oil-for-food resolution, UNSCR 1284, is deliberately ambiguous in of-fering Baghdad temporary relief from economic sanctions if it complieswith weapons inspections. The resolution, in theory, combines a newly de-signed UN weapons inspection team—called UNMOVIC, or the UNMonitoring, Verification, and Inspection Mission—with the freedom of ac-tion (full, unfettered access to sites) accorded UNSCOM and a grace pe-riod for a compliant Iraq. France and Russia want to lower the thresholdeven more by creating "UNSCOM Lite" inspection teams—ones whichwould operate under the tighter restrictions long demanded by Baghdad—and would include a timetable for ending economic sanctions. Others ad-vocate a controlled opening—gradual sanctions relief, modest diplomaticengagement, opening cultural centers, and unfreezing assets. They recom-mend incentives—such as closing the files on Iraqi nuclear and ballisticmissile programs—to encourage Iraqi good behavior. No one believesBaghdad is close to complying on biological or chemical weapons pro-grams, and all agree on the need to monitor Iraq for signs of new programson all four files. No one—except possibly for China—appears to envision adramatic or sudden removal of sanctions or shows willingness to agree toany new sanctions.

UNSCR 1284 was kept deliberately vague in order to woo support fromFrance and Russia. The Iraqi government rejects any compliance with theresolution, and Iraq remains uninspected since October 1998. Unwilling totrust Baghdad and provoked by Saddam's refusal to accept UNSCR 1284,the Clinton administration warns that Iraq risks military retaliation if itsforces cross the thirty-sixth parallel and threaten the Kurds, or if it rebuildsand deploys long-range missiles (those with a range of more than 150 kilo-meters) or biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.

If You Ignore or Forgive Saddam, What Then?

A key question must be answered by those who would ease or eliminatesanctions while Saddam remains in power and unrepentant. Can Iraq beheld accountable for compliance with UNSCR, including those on monitor-ing its WMD programs, without sanctions in place? The simple answer is no.Without sanctions, Iraq has no reason to abide by UN resolutions. Saddameffectively ended the UNSCOM monitoring and inspection regime by deny-ing inspectors access to sites. He probably will do the same with UNMOVICwhen or if it attempts to enter Iraq. Perceived disarray in the UN SecurityCouncil and higher oil revenues give Saddam additional incentives to

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stonewall the UN as an institution while Baghdad courts energy-deprivedEurope and Asia.

Without sanctions, what is at risk? Verification of WMD programs—in-cluding monitoring, identification, and elimination of WMD programs withno new development as required under UNSCR 687—would be impossible.Independent monitoring of equitable food and humanitarian aid distributionby the UN or nongovernmental organizations would not be permitted. Ef-forts to get Iraq to acknowledge and return Kuwaiti prisoners of war, orproperty, or to pay reparations would be over. Baghdad is likely to challengethe Kuwait-Iraq boundary settlement andthe peacekeeping activities of the UN Iraq-Kuwait border commission (UNIKOM).

Saddam warned Iraqis in a speech in Au-gust not to "pay those to whom you are un-der no obligation more than their due."4

Although this may be only a subtle hint as tohis unwillingness to continue to pay repara-tions, it comes at a time when Kuwaiti oilcompanies have presented their bill for dam-

What is the endgame

of sanctions and how

do we get there from

here?

ages due to Iraq's occupation and destruction of the oil fields.5 Paymentinto the compensation fund would become debt repayment to "friends."Money would be spent on domestic recovery, but few believe Saddam woulddelay military reconstruction for civilian redevelopment. While claimingIraqis are starving, Baghdad has been caught trying to export food and medi-cine and uses revenue from illegal oil sales "to buy 10,000 bottles of whiskeyand 50 million cigarettes a month," according to UK minister of state at theforeign office Peter Hain.6 Meanwhile, oil sales are approaching prewar fig-ures of $18 billion a year.

It is possible to read Saddam's intentions in his more recent speeches. Forexample, on eliminating weapons systems, he told officials of the MilitaryIndustrial Organization in June that he was willing to limit weapons withthe condition that Israel did so first.

If the world tells us to abandon our weapons and keep only swords, we willdo that. We will destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons.But if they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right to possessonly a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become ameans to defend our country ... then we will try our best to acquire therifle.7

Could Iraq be a good neighbor in the region? In a speech commemoratingthe end of the Iraq-Iran war—and in tones oddly echoing the Sermon onthe Mount—Saddam accused Turkey and the Gulf Arabs of "treachery anddisgrace" for harboring the planes that kill the men, women, and children of

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Iraq. He criticized "those rulers and kings who have sold out their souls andappointed [the occupying foreigner] to rule over everything that is dear andprecious in the values and wealth of their people."

Would he seek revenge? Saddam told Iraqis "not to provoke a snake be-fore you make up your mind and muster up the ability to cut its head," andhe warned them, "Do not give your enemy any chance to get the upper hand

of you. ... Do not exaggerate a promise youcannot fulfill or a threat your ability cannotsupport. ... Keep your eyes on your enemy. Beahead of him but do not let him be far behindyour back."8

Finally, what has Baghdad been doing inthe two years it has gone uninspected? Inearly July, the U.S. government announcedthat Iraq had test-fired a short-range, liquid-

fueled ballistic missile—the Al-Samoud ("Resistance" in Arabic)—thatcould carry conventional explosives or the chemical or biological weaponsthat Iraq is still suspected of hiding. U.S. officials said the tests are evidencethat Iraq is working to perfect its ballistic missile technology, which could beeasily adapted to missiles with a longer range.

Does U.S. policy

change if Saddam is

gone?

U.S. Policy Options in 2001

The new administration will review policy toward Iraq, so can Saddam hopefor better terms or more of the same from Washington? No president can af-ford to advocate a major change in Iraq policy. The mood in the UnitedStates is not to end economic sanctions or allow Saddam free use of Iraq'soil revenues. Saddam's intentions, all will argue, are clear from the missiletests, the threats to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the rejection of UN resolu-tions and inspection efforts, and the opening of the Baghdad airport thissummer. Moreover, Iraq's neighbors may also have been reminded ofSaddam's intentions throughout the summer as Saddam, his son Qusay, andsenior officials joined the Iraqi press in calling once again for the armedoverthrow of the Gulf regimes.

The United States will almost certainly remain committed to keepingsanctions in place, returning weapons inspectors to Iraq, and protecting theKurds. Washington will not care how much oil Iraq pumps or how muchmoney it earns from oil sales. It will care that Saddam be denied access tothose revenues, that food and medicine be distributed equitably throughoutIraq, and that Baghdad not be allowed to rebuild forbidden weapons pro-grams. It will need to review what the Iraqi "opposition" is, or needs to be if

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it is to confront Saddam effectively. And, finally, it may need to considerhow long a policy of containment—especially if it becomes a unilateralpolicy—can be pursued before "Saddam fatigue" sets in.

The new administration will have several key issues to resolve. What ac-tions by Iraq will trigger a U.S. military response? Saddam is certain to testthe new administration. He may try a feint into Kurdish territory or towardKuwait and Saudi borders. He always challenges the no-fly zones to temptU.S. aircraft into an act of reckless endangerment. His goal is to shootsomething down or, short of that, trick the U.S. or UK pilots into doing ma-jor damage to civilians. He will continue to refuse the UN—be it inspec-tions by UNMOVIC or surveys of needs by humanitarian groups—access toIraq. He already senses dissension within the UN Security Council and willtry to exploit this by encouraging the international community to ignore theembargo, fly to Baghdad, implement contractsand understandings, and open full diplomaticrelations.

What will our response be? Will we punishhim for crossing into the no-fly zones or feint-ing toward Kuwait or Saudi territory? To ignorethese infractions is to encourage him, unless weintend to alter our red lines. The coalition thatopposed Saddam for much of the 1990s is nomore. If the remaining governments supportingU.S. operations—the UK, Kuwait, and occa-sionally Saudi Arabia—withdraw their support,then do we go it alone? We may already be considering a unilateral ap-proach. Today, only the United States and UK fly the missions over the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. National Security Council SpecialAdviser for the Middle East Bruce Riedel may have prepared the way foreventual unilateralism in policy and military operations when defendingsanctions at a speech in Houston in May. He said, "Denial of access to theAmerican economy in a meaningful way relegates economies to a lesser sta-tus in the world." Although multilateral sanctions were preferable, hewarned that Americans "should not abjure ourselves of the use of more uni-lateral methods when diplomacy cannot bring about the result we want."9

In its dealings with Iraq's opponents, the new U.S. administration willhave to decide how much, if any, military assistance is to be given to anIraqi Liberation Army that does not yet exist. It will also have to decidewhether it will extend in the south to the Shi'a the same protections guar-anteed the Kurds in northern Iraq. Unlike the territory above the thirty-sixth parallel, southern Iraq below the thirty-third parallel is not a no-drive

Washington needs

to have policies

now for the time

when change

comes to Iraq.

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zone. Iraqi forces are not warned against operations in the south as they areagainst the north. This disparity is an important one to Iraqi Shi'a militantswho see discrimination and a lack of U.S. resolve in this. As we move for-ward on the INDICT campaign, Saddam is planning retaliation against Iraqiexiles, both dissidents and economic refugees. A dissident has been mur-dered in Germany, rumors are circulating that Baghdad will cancel pass-ports, and the Iraqi press for the first time in September published lists ofthose who had "defected" or left Iraq since 1979, defining how Baghdad in-terpreted their leaving. Iraq's dissident communities in Europe were re-minded of Baghdad's long reach when a former military officer received atape recording of a female relative being raped by security forces. The oppo-sition also claims Baghdad has stepped up its intelligence activities abroad,made easier as more embassies are reopened.10

When Is Iraq No Longer a Concern?

Those decisions are merely tactical ones. They assume sanctions stay inplace and Saddam continues to be an international pariah. A new U.S. ad-ministration will have to consider its basic strategy, however. Will it be suf-ficient to deny Iraq legitimacy and keep it contained, even if we are the onlyones doing the containing? Is there anything to be gained by not dealingwith Saddam? Conversely, is there anything to be gained by dealing withhim? The answer to this is relatively easy: there is little to be gained by deal-ing with Saddam. If sanctions are removed and the United States ceasesmonitoring Iraq, Saddam will gain legitimacy, be able to declare victory, al-beit a hollow and meaningless one, and resume his quest for power and sta-tus in diplomacy and weapons systems.

Iraqis will benefit little from the lifting of sanctions. It would not meanovernight recovery for the country or its long-suffering people. Under thebest of circumstances and highest of oil prices, it will take a long time to re-build Iraq. Iraq will desperately need development assistance—for water pu-rification plants, sewage treatment facilities, and health care centers thatare adequately staffed, supplied, and not controlled by the regime. Thequestion is how can this be turned to Washington's advantage. If recogniz-ing Saddam means more outside experts and observers get into Iraq to workon project aid and more Iraqis can leave Iraq, then it may be worth it.

Does U.S. policy change if Saddam is gone? The decision could be deter-mined by the way he goes. If Saddam dies because of illness—rumors that hehas cancer have been circulating for months—or old age, then he will havehad time to arrange a succession of his choice. Oldest son Uday cannot betransformed from a figure of fear and loathing into one of sympathy, educa-

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tion, and strength. Second son Qusay, who has traditionally been the lessvisible but just as lethal as his brother, lately has surfaced not just as head ofSaddam's special security forces, but has begun speaking out publicly on po-litical matters." If there is time to plan the transition, then Qusay will beable to place loyalists in positions of power and authority and eliminate anyimmediate challengers, including his brother. This might ensure a relativelystable succession process.

If Qusay is the successor, the United Stateswill have to decide whether it can deal with a

o not linkDending sanctions

to regime change.

son of the regime it has vilified. Qusay appears tobe very much like his father—a cunning and sus-picious figure who trusts no one and places sur-vival of the regime above Iraq's security and wellbeing. He may be willing to offer vague conceptsof reform, broaden the base of government, andaccept some limits on Iraqi actions, but he willnot compromise Iraq's independence, territorial sovereignty, or national in-terest, however he may define it.

A coup by military or political factions to remove Saddam might be moretolerable for U.S. policymakers. It would certainly be welcomed by Iraq'sneighbors and by European and Asian governments longing to deal withBaghdad again. Their zeal could diminish the impact of a U.S. decision to rec-ognize, not recognize, or delay recognition of Baghdad's new government. IfSaddam is overthrown by a revolt, it is likely that revenge against the familywould eliminate Uday, Qusay, and others. Iraq's neighbors would hope that,by quick recognition of the successor government, they would shore up a suf-ficiently strong successor who could hold the country together. They wouldhave little interest in the form of government to be reconstructed in Iraq, solong as it were led by a Sunni Arab military figure with little interest in shar-ing power with the Shi'as or extending autonomy to the Kurds.

Consequences of an Iraq-Driven Foreign Policy

Pursuit of a foreign policy dominated by Iraq could have serious conse-quences for other U.S. policies and interests. What price is Washington will-ing to pay to ensure international solidarity on maintaining sanctions andcontaining Iraq? Is Russia to be offered concessions on enlargement by theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, missile defense, or loans? Is Taiwanconceded to get Beijing to back the UN resolutions? Perhaps sanctions onother states such as Iran are eased in return for European support for U.S.Iraq policy. In the short-term, the United States will probably continue to

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have support from the UK and France to uphold UNSCR. But Paris andMoscow will also push to ease restrictions, allow trade, and open the coun-try to development and investment.

If Saddam remains in power for the indefinite future—he is only 63—thenthe United States needs to follow a consistent and coherent policy towardIraq. If the United States declares red lines and then ignores violations byBaghdad, it encourages Saddam to act more aggressively toward Iraqis and hisneighbors. Several suggestions for the new administration seem appropriate.

• Do not declare red lines unless you mean to defend them.• Do not declare as your objective those goals impossible to accomplish

(such as claiming military operations are intended to eliminate all WMDstocks and facilities).

• Do not arm or support an opposition that is not a credible threat toSaddam.

• Do not link ending sanctions to regime change; this could pull Iraqis to-ward Saddam rather than turn them away from him.

• Decide now what kind of successor is acceptable and be prepared to fol-low through as events unfold. This assumes that policymakers must de-cide how important it is to U.S. interests and regional stability to keepIraq stable rather than see it slip into chaos or civil war.

• Be prepared to maintain commitments to regional security and to theGulf Cooperation Council states in order to encourage rapprochementwith Iran while calibrating Iraq's eventual reentry into the internationalcommunity at the appropriate time.

The United States may in the longer term have to "go it alone." With orwithout the support of other governments, it will be much more difficult tomaintain sanctions if and when Saddam is gone. Washington needs to havepolicies now for the time when change comes to Iraq, for it will come unan-nounced and undeterred by outside events. The U.S. government will haveto decide whether it can deal with any successor and whether it is preparedto offer an end to economic sanctions in return for a promise of stability, re-duced tensions with neighbors, and an end to the persecution of Iraq'speople. The United States will need to remind the Kurds of their commit-ment to remain within Iraq and that they do not have support for a Kurdishentity independent of Baghdad. It will also need to remind Iraq's neigh-bors—Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—of their commitments to re-spect the integrity of Iraq and warn them not to interfere as Iraq's ethnic,sectarian, tribal, and institutional factions determine the make up of a post-Saddam Iraq.

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Notes

1. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Walkerbefore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 22, 2000; testimony ofDeputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian AffairsAlina Romanowski before the House Committee on International Relations, March23, 2000.

2. UNICEF, "A Report on Iraq Under a Decade of Sanctions," March 3, 2000,<www.ArabicNews.com>.

3. Randah Taqiyy al-Din, al-Hayat, August 1, 2000.

4. Text of Iraqi President's Speech on Anniversary Marking End of Iraq-Iran War,Baghdad Iraq News Agency, August 8, 2000. One-third of Iraq's oil income goes topay reparations.

5. In August, the Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) submitted a claim for repara-tions of $21.6 billion for lost oil and gas sales resulting from Iraq's invasion of Ku-wait in 1990. Russia and France had objected to an earlier claim by KPC and, forthe first time since 1991, no award was made at the time. Barbara Crossette, "Dis-pute Arises on Iraqi Debt for Oil Losses by Kuwaitis," New York Times, August 23,2000, p. A6. In September, the United States agreed to a cut in the amount Iraqmust put into the reparations fund in exchange for payment of the KPC claim.

6. Commentary by Minister of State at the Foreign Office Peter Hain, Independent,August 7, 2000.

7. Speech to the Military Industrial Organization carried on Republic of Iraq Televi-sion, June 12, 2000, and translated by FBIS, GMP20000612000293.

8. Text of Iraqi President's Speech on Anniversary Marking End of Iraq-Iran War, Au-gust 8, 2000.

9. "Clinton Aide Defends Sanctions as Policy Tool," Reuters, May 19, 2000.

10. "Saddam Reportedly Gives Secretary Power to Withdraw Iraqi Expatriates' Pass-ports," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 8, 2000.

11. "Iraqi Sources See Qusay's Letter to Saddam as Announcement of 'Political Role,'"Al-Hayat, August 5, 2000, p. 2.

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