Iran-US Relations Brief9

8/2/2019 Iran-US Relations Brief9

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9 insti t ut o de estudos est rat gicos e int ernacionais

janeiro 2009

Iran-US Relations: window of opportunity?

Ghoncheh Tazmini PhD in international relations, University of Kentat Canterbury

Introduction

One of the most interesting cases to watch in the days of American powertransition is Iran. A week after Barak Obamas presidential inauguration on 20January 2009 the Iranian revolution will mark its thirtieth anniversary and forthree decades, American policy toward Iran has largely concentrated on

punitive measures aimed at destabilising the Iranian regime and limiting itsregional influence. However, despite efforts to shape Tehrans policies andbehaviour by isolating the country politically and economically, Irans regionalinfluence is greater today than ever. Indeed, to date, US approach toward theIslamic Republic has been one based solely on sticks a long campaign ofisolation, pressure and threats without carrots. This strategy has proven tobe counter-productive and self-defeating for the Americans. Irans location inthe heart of the Persian Gulf and at the crossroads of the Middle East, CentralAsia and South Asia its vast proven hydrocarbon resources, its soft powerinstruments in various crisis areas where the US is bogged down, haveheightened the countrys strategic importance. Clearly, the sticks have failedto curb Irans rapidly growing influence as a political actor and a major energysupplier, both regionally and globally.

Nevertheless, these two countries are not necessarily fated to be enemiesforever. Washington and Tehran share many strategic goals and in someareas may even be seen as potential allies. Both desperately want to stabiliseIraq and Afghanistan, both detest radical Sunni movements like al-Qaeda andthe Taliban. Both, for different reasons, seek to assure a steady supply ofpetroleum to Western markets. It is in the national security interest of theUnited States and in the interest of Americas regional allies to work withIran rather than against it. However, the only way to win Iran over is to enterinto comprehensive talks without preconditions, with the aim of resolvingbilateral differences, normalising bilateral relations, and negotiating mutuallybeneficial relationships based on equal rights for all, rather than the primacy ofAmerican or Israeli interests in the Middle East. The essence of this approachis a sincere, sustained effort to dismantle the wall of mistrust between the two

countries and to build confidence.During his election campaign, Obama vowed to talk to Iran withoutpreconditions, something that the administration of George W. Bush refused toconsider. As a result, analysts predict that Obamas victory may be a chanceto bridge the divide between the United States and Iran. This analysis exploresthe prospects for change in US-Iran relations under Obamas leadership. Bycontextualising bilateral relations within an historical framework, this analysiswill reveal the historical points of contention between the two countries as wellas their existing policy concerns. The examination will then centre on thecurrent standoff by prescribing a new approach to dealing with Iran, not thepuzzle of Iran or the paradox of Iran, but the Iran that is emerging as a majorplayer on the international stage. This account will also reflect on the Iranianreaction to Obamas victory. Taking the current political calculus into

consideration, this analysis will make the case that it is high time for a newapproach in dealing with Iran.

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Blowback HistoryFew episodes of twentieth century historymore perfectly epitomise the concept ofblowback. In 1953, the US violently

pushed Iran off the path to democracy bycovertly deposing a formally-elected civilgovernment. Operation Ajax, as the CIAplot was code-named, resulted in awhirlpool of instability in Iran, andcontributed to the rise of anti-Americansentiment. From 1952 to 1953, PrimeMinister Mohammad Mossadeq who wasappointed as Prime Minister by MohammadReza Shah Pahlavi began a period of rapidpower consolidation, centred onnationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian OilCompany (AIOC). Established by the British

in the early 20th century, the Anglo-IranianOil Company shared profits (85% British-15% Iran), but the company withheld theirfinancial records from the Iraniangovernment. By 1951 Iranian support fornationalisation of the AIOC was intense andthe Iranian parliament unanimously agreedto nationalise its holding of, what was at thetime, the British Empires largest company.The United States and Britain, through anow-admitted covert operation of the CIA,conducted from the US Embassy in Tehran,helped organise a coup to overthrowMossadeq. The operation failed and theShah fled to Italy. After organising protestsagainst Mosaddeq, a second operation wassuccessful and the Shah returned from hisbrief exile. The Shah rode back to poweressentially on the tip of American bayonets.In essence, the United States had engagedin a massive covert operation designed toremove a world-famous democratically-elected leader from power and reinstall anauthoritarian monarch (a move whichmakes a mockery of Americas currentlystated desire to spread democracy in theMiddle East). US interventionism in Iranhad disastrous ramifications. It generatedmassive resentment toward the USgovernment not only because Iransdemocratically-elected prime minister hadbeen ousted but also because the US wenton to ardently support a brutal dictator forthe next 25 years. It is speculated that thereason that the Iranian students tookcontrol of the US embassy after theoverthrow of the Shah in 1979 was theirgenuine fear that the US government would

repeat what it had done in 1953.While Iranians certainly have not forgottenAmericas role in orchestrating Mossadeqs

overthrow, the more recent memory of USsupport for the Saddam in the Iraqi-imposedwar against Iran (1980-1988) lingers just aspowerfully. A covert American program during

the Reagan administration provided Iraq withcritical battle planning assistance at a timewhen American intelligence agencies knewthat Iraqi commanders would employchemical weapons in waging the decisivebattles of the Iran-Iraq war. The covertprogram was carried out at a time whenPresident Ronald Reagans top aides andnational security advisors were publiclycondemning Iraq for its use of poison gas,especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabjain March 1988.During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States

decided it was imperative that Iran bethwarted, so it could not overrun the importantoil-producing states in the Persian Gulf. It haslong been known that the US providedintelligence assistance to Iraq in the form ofsatellite photography to help the Iraqisunderstand how Iranian forces were deployedagainst them. Though senior officials of theReagan administration publicly condemnedIraqs employment of mustard gas, sarin, VXand other poisonous agents, the Americanmilitary officers said President Reagan, VicePresident George Bush and senior nationalsecurity aides never withdrew their support forthe highly classified program in which morethan 60 officers of the Defence IntelligenceAgency were secretly providing detailedinformation on Iranian deployments, tacticalplanning for battles, plans for airstrikes andbomb-damage assessments for Iraq. The factis that American intelligence officers neverencouraged or condoned Iraqs use ofchemical weapons, but neither did theyoppose it. In fact, the Reagan administrationpublicly condemned Iraqs use of gas whileprivately acquiescing in its employment on thebattlefield. Here we see two examples of theRealpolitik of American interests that havehad a blowback effect: Irans deeplyentrenched suspicion of US intentions is firmlygrounded in an historical past replete withtragic American blunders.The Americans also cite past grievances as asource of mistrust, particularly the Americanhostage crisis in Tehran. On November 4,1979 in the heady days of the Iranianrevolution, a group of Iranian studentsstormed the American Embassy in Tehran

and took 63 American Embassy personnelhostage. The specific grievance of thestudents (the hostage takers) focused on the

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Shah and his relationship with the US. InOctober 1979, US officials learned theShah was diagnosed with cancer. TheShah requested entry to the US for medical

treatment; President Jimmy Carter rejectedhis request. After a vigorous campaign ledby influential US Shah supporters the Shahwas admitted into the United States. Thearrival of the Shah to the US instigatedIranian unrest, which led to the invasion ofthe US Embassy. It evoked memories ofthe 1953 coup and aroused fear that the USwas planning another coup to restore theShah to power. In short, for the studentswho took over the Embassy, for the Iranianrevolutionary officials who supported them,and for much of Iran, the taking of the

Embassy was a response to the 1953 coupagainst Mossadeq. The US responded tothe situation through economic anddiplomatic pressures. President Carterstopped US oil imports from Iran, froze allIranian assets in US banks, and, with theexception of humanitarian goods, theUS ceased all trade with Iran. However, theeconomic sanctions and diplomaticpressures did not compel a hostagerelease. The US then responded with afailed military action, resulting in the deathsof eight Americans. The hostage crisisserved as the defining moment of the US-Iran relationship for Americans.Within a day of Reagan taking the oath ofpresidency, the hostages were releasedand returned stateside. However, duringPresident Reagans administration, therewas little improvement in US-Iran relations.In 1983, the US accused Iran of supportinga series of anti-American terrorist attackscarried out by Hezbollah, and in 2003, theUS Supreme Court decided that Iransupported the terrorist organisation. TheIran-Contra scandal followed the Hezbollahattacks. During the Iran-Contra scandal, theUS illegally sold weapons to Iran and usedthe profits to support the Contras inNicaragua. Despite the series of eventswith Iran in the 1980s, it was the accidentalshooting down of a commercial airline bythe US that increased the hostilitiesbetween the countries. In 1988, the USSVincennes shot down an Iraniancommercial flight in Iranian air space overthe Strait of Hormuz 290 Iranians died.Although the US paid a compensation of

$61.8 million to Iran, the US never paid forthe lost aircraft nor did they offer an officialapology to Iran.

When President Bush puts the words Iranand World War III in the same sentence, orwhen the Senate votes to designate a largepart of Irans military a terrorist organisation,

what is the anticipated Iranian reaction giventhis grievous historical backdrop? Instead ofissuing threats and denigrating the IslamicRepublic, the American government needs toponder the question of what moralresponsibility they have to Iran in the wake ofthis painful history. The fact is that the US isfixated with the idea of getting rid of theIranian regime. Over the past years, the UShas pursued the policy of secretly funnelingUS government money to Iranians in order toexploit cracks within the ruling elite andbetween Irans rulers and its people. What is

curious is that the US is desperately tryingcoerce Iran into renouncing its uraniumenrichment and plutonium productionprograms (which Iran insists is intended forcivilian use), but at the same time, it is tryingto destabilise the country and overthrow theregime. A foreign policy strategy based onsuch flawed logic is doomed and only proneto fuelling animosity to dangerous heights.Few Americans recall how the Iranians werehelpful to the US in Afghanistan after the USinvasion in 2001 in actively supporting theBonn conference agenda to help rebuild thenew Afghanistan state, and in supporting theAfghan parliaments endorsement of HamidKarzai as its president. In 2003, Iran offered aproposal trying to ease strained relationsbetween the two rivals. Iran put severaldifferent issues on the table including an offer,within the framework of the negotiations, tosupport the idea of turning Hezbollah into amere political organisation. Secondly, theoffer included Iranian opposition for Islamic jihad and support for Hamas, and provisionsthat Iran would encourage the Palestinians togo a political route, rather than military route,in their dealings with Israel. The Bushadministration rejected the offer andcontinued to depict Iran as a threat to not onlythe United States, but also to the internationalcommunity. The history between the US andIran is a continuous source of conflict with thepotential to explode into a more severeconflict with global consequences. Now, if weconsider Obamas victory as a window ofopportunity in the history of Iran-US relations,then the Obama administration must firstclarify a fundamental question: Is Iranian

foreign policy rooted in an immutableideological opposition to the United States, oris Iranian behaviour a function of US policies?

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Could a different US approach result in amore conciliatory Iranian response? Theonly way to test these hypotheses is viadirect dialogue. This entails opening the

door to direct, unconditional andcomprehensive negotiations at the seniordiplomatic level where personal contactscan be developed, intentions tested, andpossibilities explored on both sides.Sustained engagement is far more likely tostrengthen US national security at thisstage than either escalation to war orcontinued efforts to threaten, intimidate orcoerce Iran. However, before we considerthe prescription for a revised strategytowards Tehran under Obama, let us firstreflect on Irans response to Obamas

presidential victory.

Iranian Reaction to Obamas VictoryThe presidential victory of Barack Obamahas been something of a bombshell forIranians of every persuasion. Overall,officials and observers have expressedcautious optimism on the possibility ofdetente. On the one hand, Obamas lifestory as the son of an immigrant Muslimfather resonates deeply amongst Iranians.On the other hand, his clearly statedpositions on Irans nuclear program rattleand unnerve the political classes. Iransmyriad political factions and groupings aretrying hard to make out the President-elects political worldview and priorities.Two days after the 4 November election,the world learned that President MahmoudAhmadinejad had sent a surprisingly warmmessage to Obama, congratulating him onhis victory and expressing the hope that hecould start a new era. However, the Iranianpresidents hard-line supportersencompassing various clerical, non-clericaland paramilitary power centres have beendivided over President Ahmadinejads letterand the prospects for peace with Obama.Some groups, involving both clerics andnon-clerics, have taken to defendingAhmadinejads line, while others have takento criticising it. Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi, thehard-line Friday prayer leader of the city ofShiraz, defended Ahmadinejads letter bysaying that it reflected our president'selevated self-confidence. He added: He[Obama] is that countrys first blackpresident. He has taken over the

presidency in conditions where thereexisted mass discrimination against blackAmericans until very recently. Another

prominent hard-line ayatollah, also of pro-Ahmadinejad, Elmul Hoda, took a decisivelydifferent take. He said in his Friday prayersermons in the city of Mashad: It is foolhardy

to think US policy changes with personnelchanges ... whether white or black doesntmatter.Anti-Ahmadinejad hardliners, mostly clerics,criticised the Presidents letter. Their mainnewspaper, Jomhouri Eslami, ran severaleditorials lambasting the notion that positivechanges could come out of Obamas victory.In its 10 November editorial, the paperreminded Ahmadinejad that if the purpose ofhis letter-writing was to probe possibleopenings with the US, it was only theSupreme Leader that could have legally

written such a letter or ordered one. It furtheradded a cautionary note by calling attention toObamas accusations against Iran. Over thelast 30 years, both the Democrats and theRepublicans have proven to be equally atodds with the Iranian people. Obamas victoryshould be seen in this context, the editorialnoted.The Centrist groups reacted in a pragmaticbut cautious manner. Typical of these weretwo articles in the influential news weeklyOmid-e Javan, printed in its 15 Novemberissue. In one article, the author called the USpresidential election the triumph ofdemocracy. However, the author warned itsreaders that it was demeaning for a countrywith a history spanning several thousandyears to beg for respect from other countries.In addition, said the author, the Republicansusually win their battles with guns and bullets,while the Democrats do so through moresubtle means. The article ended by warningthe countrys politicians not to make hastymoves or statements. The second author hada more optimistic tone: By calling forunconditional talks with Iran, Obama isthrowing the ball right into our [Irans] courtsince we would have to talk under theSecurity Council umbrella, which is ill-disposed to us. Ahmadinejads letter, theauthor claimed, was misguided. He felt that itwas rather presumptuous to assume thatObama would pursue a more conciliatoryposture toward Iran.The reformist groups on the other handapplauded President Ahmadinejad for writingthe letter. However, they mostly questionedwhether the new US administration could

build confidence with Ahmadinejad at thehelm of the Iranian government. For instance,in a seminar on foreign policy at the

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prestigious Department of Law and PoliticalScience at Tehran University, MohsenAminzadeh, a former undersecretary ofstate under the reformist president Khatami,

asserted that only a reformist governmentcould save the day. According toAminzadeh, The Obama-Khatami duo hastruly the potential to get us out of this crisison the condition that the totality of thesystem lends a hand. If the presentadventurist foreign policy is allowed tocontinue, there can be little chance of animprovement in US-Iran relations.Aminzadeh cautioned that if the trend ofradicalism continues [in Iran], he [Obama]would behave even more harshly toward usthan Bush.

Causality and a prescription for changeWe have observed a series of reactionsalong the Iranian political spectrum. What isevident is that there is a lot of emotionimbued in the various postures adopted bythe diverse groupings and factions. Thefeeling toward the US is certainly not one ofindifference. There is no unified voice,nevertheless, the overall feeling is thatObamas election heralds a new chapter,an opportunity that the Americanestablishment could exploit in order tonormalise relations with Iran. As discussedabove, the source of contention betweenthe US and Iran is the product of a series ofhistorical events. Over time past grievanceshave fostered a deep-seated atmosphere ofmistrust between the two countries. Thus,in determining the causality of the prevailinghostility between Iran and the US, we canidentify a temporal precedence. Rhetoricalclashes and disputes between the twopowers are the effect rather than the causeof the Iranian-American standoff. The causeof the long-standing tension betweenWashington and Tehran can be traced backto a series of fateful historical episodes thatleft an indelible imprint on the nature ofIran-US relations. Simply put, it is suspicionand lack of confidence between the twocountries that is the basis of everydayclashes. In establishing this pattern ofcausality, we can identify a prescription: themistrust that has accumulated over the pastthirty years needs to be reversed. Thus,American policy needs to centre onconfidence-building as opposed to the war

mongering. President Ahmadinejads letterwas a step in the right direction; it can beinterpreted as an icebreaker or an overture,

which ought to be reciprocated with a writtenexchange in order to pave the ground for adirect dialogue, followed by direct andunconditional negotiation.

In terms of policy, this approach translatesinto recognition of Irans national and securityinterests. The US needs stop the habit ofthinking about the Middle East as if it wereAmericas backyard, denying the interests ofother states, including Iran, in their ownneighbourhood. This is one reason thatTehran befriended the whole range of IraqiShiite parties, adding potential complicationsto US military withdrawal in the Middle East.Iran has also built its influence in Syria,Lebanon and Gaza. Its patronage of theLebanese Hezbollah helped develop a militia

force that held its own against the Israelimilitary in 2006 and has faced down theLebanese government since then. Its similarrelationship with Hamas has brought aboutfurther complications in the Arab-Israeliconflict. Indeed, Iran is in a position to raisethe temperature between Israel and itsneighbours. Conversely, it is also in a positionto help calm tension and open the way forsolutions to be found.As such, one of Obamas chief foreign policyconcerns should be reorientation of AmericasIran policy. As discussed above, restoration ofties might be possible through a sustainedeffort to build confidence. The US needs toredefine Irans role in its own backyard andto engage Iran productively; only then can theUS realistically think about extricating itselffrom the Middle East. It is no secret that thepolitical developments in post-Saddams Iraqand Afghanistan have expanded Iranspolitical-security role. The US needs to factorin this reality into its strategic calculus.However, the prevailing mentality is that Iransincreased regional role contradicts USstrategic goals, the interests of Arab allies,and the security of Israel. The US needs tounderstand that Irans geostrategic positionand proximity to regional crises along with itsdynamic Shiite ideology and its culturalaffinities with its neighbours are importantsoft power tools that it does not possess.Another consideration is that power andpolitics in the region are interdependent: forexample, the political-security issues in theLevant are linked with power-sharing conflictsin the Persian Gulf. Iran plays a key role inboth regions, and thus, it cannot be sidelined.

The United States must recognise that if Iranis properly engaged, it can be a valuable

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