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Iran and Central Asia: paradigm andpolicyMOHIADDIN MESBAHI

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To cite this article: MOHIADDIN MESBAHI (2004): Iran and Central Asia: paradigm and policy,Central Asian Survey, 23:2, 109-139

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Iran and Central Asia: paradigmand policyMOHIADDIN MESBAHI

Introduction

A discussion of the foreign policy of young revolutionary states such as Iran posesthe particularly complex challenge of reaching a conceptual balance between theimportance of new ideological predilections on the one hand, and the expectedpragmatic behavior of a presumed rational actor responding to a more ®xedhistorical geopolitical context, on the other. What makes this conceptual balanceeven more taxing is the occurrence of signi®cant historical events that have notonly regional, but major global, signi®cance.

Twice in the last two decades of the 20th century, events of historical proportionhave dramatically affected the shape and direction of Iranian foreign policy. TheFebruary 1979 revolution was the most signi®cant development affecting theprism through which foreign policy values, motivations, ideals, priorities andcommitments were de®ned. The perception of Iran as a revolutionary state placedan unprecedented burden on Iran's foreign policy. The dif®culty of theinternational system in accepting/recognizing the Iranian revolution had asmuch to do with the shape and scope of Iran's international options and choices, aswith the aspirations and objectives of the new custodians of Iranian foreign policy.The construction of Iranian foreign policy identity thus took place not only in thehands of the revolutionaries or the new elite, but, and more so, in the hands ofinternational actors responding to the revolution, regionally and globally.

The December 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, a superpower bordering theNorthern frontier of Iran, was the second seminal event that fundamentally alteredthe scope and dimension of Iran's foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Unionnot only changed Iran's policy towards Russia and the remnants of a oncepowerful empire, but also reactivated a totally new set of dynamics, affectingIran's domestic national security on ethno-territorial lines.

Five major regional wars since 1979, including one between Iran and Iraq,which directly or indirectly were the result of the Iranian revolution and thecollapse of the Soviet Union, established a completely new geopolitical andgeoideological structure for the new Iranian republic. The historical instability ofthe West (Iraq), East (Afghanistan), and South (the Persian Gulf), wascomplimented by the North. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence

Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi is at the Department of International Relations, Miami Florida InternationalUniversity (email: mesbahim@®u.edu).

ISSN 0263-4937 print/ISSN 1465-3354 online/04/02/0109-31 ã 2004 Central Asian SurveyDOI: 10.1080/02634930410001310508

Central Asian Survey (June, 2004) 23(2), 109±139

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of new independent states, forced Iran, largely unprepared, to engage in unknownprospects or regional competitions, pressures and opportunities in the newNorthern frontier. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US geopolitical responses,the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq by theUnited States and the `coalition of the willing', were the ®nal signi®cant chaptersthat completed the revolution in Iran's international structure; the encirclement ofIran's regional security framework was now complete.

This study explores the crucial elements of the conceptual framework withinwhich the Iranian vision and foreign policy thinking towards Central Asia and theCaucasus are shaped.1 The paper is not designed to detail bilateral ties, but rather,to provide key generalizations regarding Iran's policy in the region.

Iranian foreign policy: paradigm and conceptual framework

Iran's view of its new Northern frontier, that is, its place in the Iranian foreignpolicy framework and objectives, is generally affected by the interactive dynamicsof four issues: ®rst, the role of Russian±Iranian relations or Russian-centric aspectsof Iranian foreign policy in Central Asia; second, the Islamic factor or thegeopolitics and geocultural role of Islam; third, the global factor, namely the ever-presence of the United States in shaping Iranian regional policy, and ®nally avision of Iran's centrality in shaping Central Asian and Caucasian developments.Iran's bilateral ties and multilateral policies and initiatives, while issue/country-speci®c at the micro level, will nevertheless be in¯uenced, at the macro level, bythe uneven symbiosis of these four dynamics. These factors are all embedded intwo permanent characteristics of Iranian foreign policy since 1979. First is thestrategic loneliness of Iran in the international system and regional sub-system,and second, the securitization of Iran's identity; the impact of ideology and theperception of others which made the assessment of Iran's intentions, capability,threat, to be largely driven not by Iran's material capability and power projection,but by its intentions, message, identity and idea's. This has been largely anessentialist approach, which thus made a rational/realist assessment of Iran animpossibility. Therefore, Iran's security and foreign policy dilemma remainedopen-ended.

Geopolitics and balance of power: relations with Russia

Iran embraced the collapse of the Soviet Union with `mixed emotion'. Thecollapse of the Soviet Union relieved Iran in one stroke from the threats of both themilitary presence of a superpower and the ideological challenge of Marxism as ahistorical universalist rival claimant in the Muslim world. For more than a century,Iran's geopolitical calculation had been informed by the threat of Russian/Sovietimperialism pressing its considerable weight against its long Iranian border. Iran'shistorical gravitation toward alliance with distant powers, like the British Empireup to 1945 and the United States in the postwar years, was a result of this historicalvulnerability and the perception of Russian expansionism. Iran became the buffer

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state between the presumed Russian southward thrust and the Western powers'historical geopolitical and economic interests (i.e. British India and Persian Gulfoil). Iran's territorial integrity was to a large extent dependent on the great powers'implicit understanding of its position as the buffer state.

The Iranian revolution of 1979, and the subsequent hostility between Iran andthe United States, signaled the beginning of change in the historical ®xation of the`buffer' concept and the balancing context of Iranian geopolitics.

Somewhat unique in its foreign policy consequences, the anti-Westernorientation of the Iranian revolution did not translate into a pro-Soviet stance.In fact, Iran, especially in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan andMoscow's support for Iraq, remained distant from and critical of the Soviet Unionthrough most of the 1980s. Following a superpower policy that could be termed`radical negative equilibrium'Ðan activist distance from and balance against thesuperpowersÐIran's radically independent position vis-aÁ-vis both superpowers,beyond its ideological motives, was calculated to emphasize a message ofnonalignment and thus recast Iran, not as a buffer, but rather as an active/activistneutral zone.

Viewed from this perspective, Iran has had a stake in the maintenance of acertain balance in the regional and international structure and distribution ofpower. Given the increasing hostility between Iran and the United States in the1980s, and the gradual and decisive consolidation of US power in the Persian Gulf,the presence of the less aggressive, yet functioning, `Gorbachevian' Sovietsuperpower would seem to have served Iran's overall geopolitical interests. Thefear of a US-led unipolar world system was thus the underlying reason behindIran's cautious and subdued attitude toward the unfolding process of the Sovietcollapse in the 1990-91 period. A major editorial in the Tehran Times, the semi-of®cial mouthpiece of Iran's Foreign Ministry, assured the Soviet leadership thatIran, in contrast to other countries in the region, had a stake in the territorial andpolitical integrity of the Soviet Union and would not utilize Soviet vulnerability.2

This consideration of Iran's vulnerability in a US-dominated regional/international order was the key underlying factor in the development of Iran'sRusso-centric policy toward the new independent states of Central Asia and theCaucasus in the post-Soviet period. To have a correct, if not warm, relationshipwith Russia remains critical to Iran's regional foreign policy.3 This Russian-centric policy was designed to respond to three sets of Iranian concerns andobjectives, namely: the importance of bilateral Russian±Iranian relations; theimpact of Russia on Iranian±Central Asian relations; and the impact of theemergence of new states for Iran's domestic, i.e. territorial, integrity.

First, bilaterally, Russia has been and will continue to be a source for purchasingarms and technology and for economic, trade and political cooperation.4 TheRussian-centric policy, however, is not based on single issues or purely bilateralconsiderations, but also re¯ects Iran's concern over multilateral and bilateralrelations with Central Asian states.

Second, this Russian-centrism re¯ects Iran's recognition of Moscow's geopol-itical in¯uence in the former republics and its impact on Iranian±Central Asian

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relations. An anti-Russian policy in Central Asia on the part of Tehran will notserve Iran's immediate and long-term interests. Such a policy would createimpediments to regional receptivity and further pave the way for more intensiveregional coalitions against Iran.

Third, Iran's vulnerability against regional con¯icts in Central Asia and theTranscaucasus, and its needs for regional stability, demand a closer cooperationwith or understanding of Moscow. This is particularly important in view of theprominence that Iran has attached to its own role as a peacemaker and mediator.

This regional perspective does not exclude con¯icts of interest and competitivepolicies, as has been the case in issues such as the con¯ict in Tajikistan, NagornoKarabakh and the tension over the ®nal status of the Caspian legal regime, butillustrates the continuous attempt by Tehran to accommodate the Russian factor, tominimize Moscow's obstructionism, and to solicit its acquiescence or cooperation.Furthermore, the multiplicity of issues concerning the Russian±Iranian±CentralAsian triangle does not lend itself to a uniformity of interests in all situations.Con¯icts of interest between Iran and Russia in Tajikistan, for example, aresimultaneously accompanied by the ¯uctuating convergence and con¯ict ofinterests of the two countries on the issues concerning the geopolitics of theCaspian Sea, Iran's `second Persian Gulf', the sovereignty over Caspian Seaenergy and food resources and, especially, the long-term and very serious impactof the Caspian environmental crisis on Iran's northern provinces.5

The nature and impact of Russian-centrism in Iran's regional policy has and willbe decided at the nexus of the bilateral and multilateral dimensions of Russian±Iranian relations, and the nature of relations with the other key emerging actor,namely the United States. This latter factor has a particularly enormousimplication for Russian±Iranian relations.6 Russia has decidedly elevated theIranian factor in its regional policy, giving a high pro®le to this relationship in thedomestic politics of foreign policy, and demonstrating its willingness to seriouslytest its relations with the United States, especially in view of Washington's seriousconcerns over transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran.7

Russian±Iranian nuclear cooperation has been the most important testingground of Russian±Iranian relations and a focal point of US±Russian negotiationssince 1995 when Russia and Iran signed a protocol for the completion of theBushehr nuclear power plant.8 The Israeli stake in the Iranian nuclear project hasfurther pushed the Russian nuclear deal with Iran to the top of the US policyagenda toward Russia and Tel Aviv's bilateral relations with Moscow. The nuclearissue has been subjected to the ebb and ¯ow of Iran's economic limitations,Russia's hesitation, and above all, the impact of the US carrot,9 and stick10 policyto limit Russian±Iranian nuclear and military ties.11

The Russians have not been completely consistent in their promises of nuclearcooperation with Iran. They have been responsive to US pressure, ¯uctuating fromsolid promises of not only publicly rejecting US accusations and pressures, andeven promises of expansion of nuclear cooperation, to `delay tactics', and evencooperation with the United States, re¯ected most signi®cantly in Moscow'sacquiescence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report in

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September of 2003, in which the IAEA, in a strongly worded document, raisedconcern about Iranian nuclear activities and demanded Iran's acceptance of theadditional `93 + 2' Protocols. The Russian guarded support12 for the IAEA cameafter intense US lobbying and perhaps more importantly, the European decisions,especially by France and Germany and the EU to support the IAEA report. The EU`cover' was essential for Moscow's support, re¯ecting Russia's willingness todistance itself from Iran when the international consensus is solid, or on the otherhand, playing a supportive or neutral role towards Iran when the opposition isfragmented and mostly includes the United States alone. The Russians alsocontinued to play the ®ne line on the nuclear issue by insisting that the jointnuclear project by Iran in Bushehr, in spite of the IAEA report had no connectionwith the newly raised concerns over Iran's independent nuclear energy program,13

and thus its continuation as a central Russian commitment towards Iran.14

Nevertheless, the nuclear and military cooperation with Iran will continue, notonly because of economic incentives, but also because of the political symbolismattached to these ties. For Russia, they are symbols of an assertive and independentforeign policy, and for Iran, they are a critical barometer of Russia's intentions,and Moscow's desire to maintain Iran as a potential strategic partner in the face ofNATO and US expansion, especially in the Caucasus.15

The controversy over Iran's nuclear and missile capability, like many otherissues related to Iran, has acquired a life of its own. Independent from Russian±Iranian relations, it now serves the interest of a complex web of military industrialand special interest groups who wish to reinvigorate the American strategicdefense projects, previously known as SDI, to safeguard the United States againstnuclear missiles from `rogue' states such as North Korea and Iran. The debate overIran's nuclear and missile capabilities, among other `rogue states', provided anopportunity to revisit and eventually to abandon the sacred strategic cow in US andRussian relations, namely the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Therethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in the US nuclear posture and the new`targeting' announced in 2002, further guaranteed the signi®cance and thelongevity of the nuclear and missile problematic in Russian±Iranian relations,especially in the post-9/11 era.16

Russian military ties with Iran are not signi®cant in terms of the overall volumeof the Russian global arms trade, almost 75 per cent of which is accounted for byChina and India.17 Yet the nuclear component of these ties remains signi®cant.The ongoing Iranian nuclear project, peaceful or not, may not enhance Iran'ssecurity, as perceptions, real or imagined, matter most. In the absence of acomprehensive nuclear and missile non-proliferation regime in the Middle Eastand Southwest Asia, which could include, Iran, but also Israel, India and Pakistan,or a drastic Iranian abandonment of its nuclear program, Russian-built nuclearfacilities in Iran, in addition to other `native' facilities, would probably remain arealistic target of preemptive military strikes by the United States and especiallyIsrael. Russia's interests and prestige will be tied to Iran's physical vulnerability.

In spite of the military ties, Russian±Iranian relations are subject to unpredict-able and unforeseen challenges and pressures. Iran, for example, will continue to

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be concerned with Russia's manipulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, itsambiguous, if not hostile policy toward the Iranian vision of the Caspian legalregime,18 its continuous domination of Tajikistan and its abrupt maneuvering ofdifferent aspects of the nuclear trade. The policy differences, in fact, have gonebeyond the Caucasus and Central Asia and unexpectedly included regionaldifferences in the Balkans.

Iran and Russia differed on the Bosnian crisis, where Iran played a relativelyimportant role in helping the Bosnians resist Serbian domination. Iran's militaryaid to the Bosnian Muslims, in the midst of international sanctions against thewarring factions, was not welcomed by Moscow. As in Bosnia, the Kosovo crisisalso highlighted Iran's paradoxical relations with Moscow. The mutual condem-nation of NATO's intervention could not overshadow Iran's disagreement withMoscow concerning the Serbian atrocities against Kosovar Albanian Muslims. Asthe self-proclaimed custodian of the Muslim ummah on the one hand, and the avidcritic of Western intervention on the other, Iran found itself in an awkwardposition. Handicapped by its fear of the precedent-setting NATO intervention,19

and the psychological and ideological inability to support the US-engineeredpolicy in Kosovo,20 Iran's Islamic credentials were threatened, both domesticallyand internationally, as the general Muslim public sympathy lied with NATO'sactions against the `Muslim-killing Serbs'. The perceptions of Iran as siding withPan-Slavic Russia against Muslims, could have been potentially very damaging, asthe Muslims of the North Caucasus in Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan and to alesser extent, Central Asia, saw in the Russian pro-Serbian policy, an expression ofthe well-entrenched historical animosity of the Slavs against the Muslims.21

Identi®cation of Iran with an `anti-Islamic Russia' could severely complicateIran's self-image in the region. This is particularly important as the type of activistIslam increasingly emerging especially in Central Asia, is characterized by a newbreed of `Talibanism' that both, theologically and politically, has opposed IranianIslam, and Shi'ism.22 Historically, Soviet Islam, while belonging predominantly tothe Sunni tradition, was not particularly hostile to Iran, due partially to thesigni®cance of su® tariqahs in the North Caucasus and to a lesser degree in CentralAsia, and their spiritual connections with Iranian and Shi'i saints and Imams.Iran's relative silence towards the Russian intervention in Chechnya, had alreadybegun to question the Islamic image of Iran as universal champion of `Islamiccause'; like so many regional and international actors Iran made a strategic choicein dealing with Chechnya as a `domestic' Russian affair, and thus accepting auniversal self-imposing paradigm for limited critique of Moscow's brutalcampaign in the North Caucasus.

Moscow's attitudes toward Kosovo, its clear ethno-religious ¯avor and itsreluctance to condemn Serbian atrocities against Kosovo Albanian Muslims23

tested the limitations of the civilizational/religious dialogue that the Iranian clergyand seminaries had initiated with the Russian Orthodox Church in the late 1990s.24

Russia's increasing concern over its own Islamic problem in the North Caucasusand the objections of the Muslim world in general,25 voiced increasingly by Iranianof®cials,26 might have helped to modify Moscow's policy in the Balkans.27 In view

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of Western problems with the Muslim world and Iran, Moscow, in spite of the`anti-Islamic' international permissiveness, which emerged in the post-9/11 era,and which has given Moscow a free hand in the North Caucasus, has remainedconcerned over further loss of prestige in the Muslim world and the potentialIslamic backlash at home and abroad. Iran's Bosnian policy had unintentionally,but tellingly, coincided with the US position. Kosovo again underlined anotherarea of Russian±Iranian tension and not by accident, an unacknowledged area ofpolitical convergence of US±Iranian interests.

Iran now occupies an important place in Russian foreign policy, not only inCentral Asia and the Caucasus, but also in the Middle East, particularly, in view ofthe alarming implications of NATO expansion, possible militarization of theCaspian basin and especially direct US military presence in the region, and tieswith regional states, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, which evolved after 9/11.

The evolution of Russian policy toward the legal status of the Caspian regime,from an early discursive convergence with the Iranian position in the early 1990sto a triangulation with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that strongly favoredundermining Iranian interests by pushing for a territorial division, underscoredthe very ¯uid nature of Russian±Iranian relations. The Russian military maneuverin the Caspian,28 which followed an intense period of disagreement with Iran,signi®ed Moscow's willingness to exploit the Iranian isolation and projectMoscow's determination to display occasional coercive diplomacy vis-aÁ-visTehran. The common concern over the possible US militarization of the region viathe traditional venue of `vital national interests', i.e. the pipelines, while asigni®cant factor in the convergence of Russian and Iranian strategic threatassessment, did not preclude the attempt at unilateral coercive diplomacy byMoscow. Nevertheless, Russia will carefully watch the extent and the scope of thepossible thaw in US±Iranian relations, a possibility that has gone throughsigni®cant ebb and ¯ow especially since the election of reformist PresidentKhatami.29

Perhaps equally signi®cant, Moscow's policy towards Iran in its systemicdimension will be framed by the nature of Europe's relations with Iran. A closerrelationship between the EU and Iran will provide the incentive and the ability, inaccordance with the claimed `European identity' of Russian foreign policy and inview of pragmatic balance of power, to more comfortably handle the USdispleasure and maintain closer relations with Iran. Conversely, a deterioration ofEU relations with Iran, as indicated in the nuclear issue, will provide both theincentive and the cover for a `collective distance' of the international communityfrom Iran and thus Moscow's reluctant, though legitimate, compliance. Thenuance of the Russian±US±EU triangulation for Moscow is to minimize thebilateral damage of an inconsistent and opportunistic `big' partner in the eyes ofthe Iranians, and thus to fully exploit the `strategic loneliness' of Iran on a varietyof critical regional issues such as the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. While thelogic of security dilemma and strategic balance dictates Iran's `partnership' withRussia, Iran's acquired post-revolutionary identity, as a uniquely and `radicallyindependent' country, along with historical mistrust of Russia, and perhaps the

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lingering shadow of an eventual `grand deal' with the United States, will continueto make Iran, at best, a `reluctant balancer'.

Islamic geopolitics: the `ideational' and securitization of identity

The second factor in Iranian±Central Asian relations is the impact of Iran'sparticular characteristics as an Islamic state, speci®cally one with a revolutionary/revisionist ideology perceived by a host of regional and international actors asdestabilizing and threatening. This particular image of Iran has been the centraland de®ning element in shaping its opportunities and constraints, and affectsIranian foreign policy behavior. It is this uniformity in the Iranian image in theeyes of both friends and enemies that has created an inescapable context forIranian foreign policy in its bilateral or multilateral dimension.

Iran's foreign policy, pragmatic or revolutionary, has and will be measuredwithin the con®nes of the level of sensitivity of other actors toward the geopoliticsof the Islamic factor. Central to this geopolitics of the `ideational' factor is, ofcourse, the attitude of the great powers, above all the United States and Russia. USattitudes toward the `Islamic threat' and its containment in the Persian Gulf, theMiddle East and North Africa, now also includes Central Asia and the Caucasus; aprocess that preceded 9/11, but that was certainly signi®cantly intensi®ed by it.

Russia has and will continue to consider the Islamic factor as one of thecornerstones of its policy formulations, options and strategies, historicallyvacillating between the traditional fear of Islamic encirclement and thustemptation for containment and domination, on the one hand, or the inclinationfor coexistence/cooptation, and thus tactical alliances and manipulation on theother. Given the Islamic character of Central Asia and its linkage with the MiddleEast and Iran's geographical location and its self proclaimed political Islamiccharacter, the Islamic factor and its impact on shaping Iran's international`identity' has been and will continue to be an important consideration in shapingIran's position in Central Asia as well.

A discussion of the role of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus is beyond thescope of this paper; what is important here, however, is the role of the `threat' ofIslam in shaping the attitudes of multitudes of actors with divergent interests whousually converge on the issue of `containment' of the Islamic and by association,the Iranian threat. Whether Islam is a real `threat' in Central Asia, or whether it isconveniently or mistakenly imagined as such, remains largely irrelevant, asregional and international actors act upon the `Islamic factor' as one of the keythreats to their domestic and external security in the post-Soviet period.

While the general culture and religious characteristics of Central Asia may pointto areas of opportunity and in¯uence for Iran, the same factors are nurturingresistance and obstaclesÐa dichotomy that has characterized Iran's policy in theMiddle East and the Islamic world in general. This dichotomy originates from thedivergent impact of Iran's bilateral relations with other states on the one hand andIran's real or perceived impact or in¯uence on social movements (i.e. Islamicactivists/groups, etc.) on the other. In Central Asia (in Tajikistan in particular) and

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as is the case in Iran's relations with Islamic states elsewhere, the inherent tensionbetween state-to-state relations and state-to-social movement relations will be acontinuous source of challenge and opportunity for Iran. This is notwithstandingIran's repeated assertion of non-involvement in revolutionary Islamic movementsor lack of interest in exporting the revolution.

Iran's policy toward the role of Islam or Islamic movements in Central Asia isfundamentally pragmatic. Its pragmatism re¯ects Tehran's appreciation of the`underdeveloped' nature of both political and orthodox Islam in Central Asia, thedistinctly non-Iranian, non-Shi'i, sources of the Islamic revival and militancy inCentral Asia, the strength of the Soviet secular legacy, and above all, the strengthof the local and regional coalition that fear of Islam generates. This coalition notonly targets Islam as a domestic challenge, but more importantly targets Iran andattempts its isolation. Iran's pragmatism is challenged by a combination ofinterdependent and mutually reinforcing dynamics, including: (a) the inertia of aself-proclaimed `Islamic metropolis' in Iran (the Umm al-Qora), (b) domesticideological pressure, and above all, (c) an absence of international and regionalmechanisms willing to acknowledge and reward Iran's pragmatism. The absenceof any `reward structure' erodes support and legitimacy at home while resulting inthe loss of credibility with potential friends abroad.30

Cognizant of its own limitation in exporting its `revolutionary' model and awareof the super-sensitivity of all regional actors, Iran has emphasized the cultural andcivilizational, rather than the political aspect of its Islamic credentials. A survey ofthe content of Iranian±Central Asian relations indicates a marked emphasis oncultural ties and activities, which are devoid of a direct political dimension.31 It ishoped that the emphasis on `cultural Islam', will reduce the anxiety of CentralAsian states, while reinforcing Iran's uniqueness as an Islamic state.32

In the short run, this shift may not solve the Iranian dilemma; a dilemma that iscompounded by the ambiguity of the reward structure of pursuing a pragmaticmoderate foreign policy. Pragmatic or revolutionary, Iran continues to havedif®culty in reaping the bene®ts of the former, while it still feels the overwhelmingweight and the baggage of the latter. A pragmatic Iran will still be perceived andtreated as revolutionary. The Iranian/Islamic threat is an instrumental force forbuilding consensus, overcoming differences, and making strange bedfellows apolitical normalcy. Yet, a persistent policy of pragmatism and insistence onculture and dialogue as a serious instrument of foreign policy, especially underKhatami was designed to overcome the ideological baggage of the 1979revolution. The reformist movement in Iran, and the attempt to synchronizeIslam and democracy has to some degree modi®ed the ®xation on Iran's externalpost-1979 revolutionary image. The combination of Khatami's normative`revolution' in Iranian domestic polity initiated by the concept of `Islamic civilsociety' internally, and the `deep deÂtente' and concept of `dialogue ofcivilizations' externally, undermined to a signi®cant degree the simplistic, thoughuseful image of Iran as a revisionist/revolutionary state. The inconsistencies of thisnormative revolution, on the one hand, and the inability or unwillingness of theinternational system to accommodate and nurture this dynamic on the other hand

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have, however, made the recourse to and invocation of the traditional image ofIran by other actors, including the Central Asian states, at times of diplomatic andpolitical need, relatively easy. The global and regional promises of a `reformistIslamic' Iran as a successful model of general emulation remains a distant, if notan unrealistic hope.

The global factor: relations with the United States

The US±Iranian hostility, itself a function of the complexity of the Islamic factor,has played a major role in shaping the international relations of Central Asia. Infact, the tension in US±Iranian relations that has engulfed the politics of thePersian Gulf/Middle East since the 1979 Islamic Revolution has been extended toCentral Asia and the Caucasus. Concern over the Islamic/Iranian threat becamethe conceptual and the policy bridge linking security discussions of Central Asiaand the Caucasus with those of the Persian Gulf/Middle East. In a nutshell,through US `agency', Iranian foreign policy has been globalized since therevolution.

The post-9/11 `revolution' in US policy towards and relations with Central Asiaand the Caucasus added a new and long dreaded strategic component to the virtualtriangulation of Iran±the United States±the Northern Tier. The Russian acquies-cence to the US presence and subsequent unilateral US political and militaryinitiatives is promising to make the United States, Iran's northern neighbor,duplicating, even in more negative fashion, the Iranian condition in the PersianGulf.

The degree to which US preferences and displeasure can decide or in¯uenceregional choices, i.e. advocating distance from Iran, will depend on parallel threatperceptions as well as the level of expectations and realities of rewards forfollowing the US lead. Promises of US direct or indirect economic, political, oreven military support can play a major role. As the dynamics of the Azerbaijan oildeal and the drama of the `pipeline schemes', including the Baku±Ceyhoun,indicate, Washington will not hesitate to go beyond generating atmosphericpressure to overtly intervene politically to undermine or contain Iranian interestsand in¯uence. The post-9/11 era in US policy towards Azerbaijan indicates anelevated level of security cooperation between the two countries under the rubricof the `war on terror' and the protection of US `vital interest' in the region and theincreasing language of security in US discourse about the region and the role ofAzerbaijan.33 US±Iranian hostility would also affect relations between Iran andAzerbaijan, and will be an important element in affecting Iranian policy in theCaucasus as a whole. If Azerbaijan is perceived as directly pursuing aWashington-inspired policy vis-aÁ-vis Iran, Iranian±Azeri relations could becomethe most complex, if not explosive, in the region. The critical nature of thisrelationship and the mutual cautiousness of Tehran and Baku is the `corrective'that has so far acted as the modifying factor and the energy preventing a strategicbreakout.

As the most outspoken critic of Iran in Central Asia, Uzbekistan perceives its

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ambiguous, if not hostile, attitude towards Iran as both an instrument of domesticcontrol against the oppositionÐwhich has been branded `religious extremist'Ðand as a useful vehicle for rapprochement with the United States. US±Uzbekrelations, which had been frozen because of Washington's dissatisfaction overslow economic reforms and political repression, showed marked improvementsince the mid 1990s and received a signi®cant boost after 9/11 and theintensi®cation of military ties with the United States on the `war on terror'. Thetension in Uzbek±Iranian relations, which followed the reports of PresidentKarimov's support for the US trade embargo against Iran in the 1990s,34 was justanother indication of the continuous dif®culty between Tashkent and Tehran, andthe enduring impact of US±Iranian relations on Iranian foreign policy in CentralAsia.35

It is interesting to note that the Uzbek construction of the threat perception onthe usual band-wagoning with global or US discourse, shifted to include the terms`Taliban', `Wahabism' and `Al-Qaeda' to re¯ect the change in prognostication ofideological and political threat in the post 9/11 eraÐthus leading to expectationsof a shift away from mixing the ideational argument from Shi'i Iran. Tashkent,nevertheless like other capitals in the region, remains ready to tap into prevailing,though ¯uctuating, discursive variations on the Iranian threat. This conceptualopportunism and rhetorical permissiveness in threat assessment has managed tomaintain room for a diplomatic political correctness that characterizes the nuancedpolicy towards Iran since the emergence of the reformists in the Iranian politicalscene and Khatami's presidency; a nuance which has now become characteristicof relations between the new independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasusand Iran.

The signi®cance of the US factor in shaping regional attitudes towards Iran alsounderscores the impact of any serious ¯uctuation, either positive or negative, onIran's relations with the United States. The guarded optimism of the early years ofKhatami's presidency in an opening with the US and eventual `normalization' hasbeen overtaken by the failed expectation of the short, though promising,rapprochement at the removal of the Taliban in the immediate post-9/11 era andthe continuous intensi®cation of con¯ict with Iran over other critical issues such asthe Israeli±Palestinian crisis, terrorism, post-Saddam Iraq and not least of all thelooming nuclear issue.

An intense US±Iran con¯ict will worsen Iran's relations with the region. Some,like Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, might be tempted to engage in deeper strategicrelations with the United States against Iran, while others such as Tajikistan,Turkmenistan and Armenia will make varying attempts at mutual accommodation.Conversely, a normalization of US±Iran relations will have a far reaching anddialectical impact. It will remove both the tempting `reward structure' of anti-Iranian policy (or distance from Iran), thus de-leveraging the region vis-aÁ-visWashington and Tehran, and removing the unnatural and counterproductiveweight of a policy based on `avoiding' Iran, which has affected a host of regionaland international issues, including among others the question of access to energy.

The discussion of the nature of US±Iranian relations and the problems of its

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normalization is beyond the scope of this paper. Suf®ce it to say that such`normalization' demands a new political discourse, which does not equate`normalization' with friendship, let alone with `alliance'; a normalization thatre¯ects convergence of national interests at least on selective but important issues,if not on long-term structural dynamics. A key element of almost a quarter centuryof US±Iran hostility has been the ideological nature of the con¯ict; not just amongthe Iranians, but the seldom-discussed role of the `ideational' in deciding USpolicy towards Iran, especially in the post-Soviet world. The US self-image as atriumphant neoliberal entity bent upon seeing and reinventing the world in its ownimage, especially under the Clinton team, and then in its post-9/11 neoconserva-tive reformulation under Bush, has played a critical role in shaping US foreignpolicy towards particularly vulnerable countries with `revisionist/rogue' ideolo-gies who either have lost the battle of ideas and are struggling with transition, i.e.Russia, or those like Iran who still harbor the `illusion' of hanging on to`antiquated' non-western ideas.

The United States has shown remarkable propensity toward believing andacting on the assumption that normalization with former and current ideologicalenemies cannot take place on the basis of a pragmatic national interestÐof realistargument varietiesÐbut rather, is predicated on sustained and veri®able signs ofthe `transition' of the identity of the enemies (i.e. regime change), approximating amirror image of the US self. `Transition is a notion rooted in the U.S. ego', notedStephen Cohen commenting on US policy towards Russia.36 Morganthau's`autonomous' state has acquired an identity, which does not easily lend itself to arational ahistorical de®nition of national interest. At the altar of this ideationalapproach, pragmatic US political and economic interestsÐand with that, the long-term interests of the region are being undermined; the similarity, especially withthe earlier Iranian foreign policy attitudes, has been remarkable.

No other case is more illustrative of this than the US policy in the Caspian,where preoccupation with the ideational rather than the pragmatic, transitionologyrather than accommodation, political calculations rather than economic rationale,drives Washington's policy; the critics of a Marxian analysis of US foreign policycould take heart in US Caspian policy. While domestic US constituencies such asoil companies, multinationals and their political and `academic' lobbies havepushed for the most pragmatic and economically feasible policies, i.e. to includeIran in the networks of pipelines,37 the US administrations since the Sovietcollapse have opted for exclusion of Iran at all costs. In addition to frustrating theUS oil companies,38 the policy has not only generated economically questionablealternative pipeline scenarios, but has more seriously set in motion a geopoliticaldynamic that perhaps unintentionally could lead to a new East±West fault line andthe re-emergence of a new `great game' in the former Soviet South.

Increasingly, political and military patterns of US±NATO interests, such asexpansion of military ties with the region through the Partnership for PeaceProgram, joint military exercises and naval visits, have been complimentedwith the clear gravitation of Azerbaijan and Georgia toward closer politico-military ties with the United States and NATO. This emerging line-up has

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been gradually supplemented by symbolic, or at times more serious Israeli±Turkish and Israeli±Azerbaijan ¯irtation with `mini informal alliances', thusconnecting the Middle Eastern geopolitical and ideological dynamics with equallycomplicated security systems in the Caucasus.39 In Central Asia, the seeds ofcloser politico-military ties between the United States/NATO and Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been planted ®rst through peace-keeping varieties and schemes, and more frontally with post-9/11 US militarybases and access.

The symbiosis of pipeline geopolitics and geoeconomics with ideology hasprovided the context for the emergence of a new, ¯uid and ambiguous `greatgame'. This context reveals the paradox of of®cial US-stated policy towards theCaspian BasinÐa policy that conceptually and originally was designed to preventthe new great game, but is ironically, operationally constructing one. Commentingon the new great game, Strobe Talbot, the former US Assistant Secretary of Statein the Clinton Administration, echoed the prevailing public sentiment of theprevious and subsequent administration when he chastised the idea of the `greatgame' and argued, that `Our goal is to avoid and actively to discourage thatatavistic outcome. In pondering and practicing the geopolitics of oil, let's makesure that we are thinking in terms appropriate to the 21st century, and not the 19th.Let's leave Rudyard Kipling and George McDonald Fraser, where they belongÐon the shelves of historical ®ction. The Great Game, which starred Kipling's Kimand Fraser's Flashman, was very much of the zero-sum variety. What we want tohelp bring about is just the opposite. We want to see all responsible players in theCaucasus and Central Asia be winners.'40

In the post-Soviet world, and in the 21st century, Iran has yet to qualify formembership in the US-de®ned `club of responsible players' and as such, andnotwithstanding the `mixed signals' in the last several years,41 is subjected to themodern variations of Kipling's `19th century ®ction'. The short lived US±Irancollaboration in Afghanistan against the Taliban after 9/11, both strategically viathe Northern alliance and diplomatically, via the Bonn process could have had,especially given the proximity and the signi®cance of Afghanistan in generatinginstability in Central Asia, a lasting impact on facilitating the normalization ofUS±Iran relations; that opening however did not survive the domestic andinternational complexity of the mutual hostility.

The added political and ideological energy in the maintenance of this hostility isthe impact of the Israeli±Palestinian con¯ict and the resultant Iran±Israeli hostility,and the role of this factor in both public space and at the interstate level in shapingthe mutual attitudes between Iran and the United States. It would not be anexaggeration to argue that US±Iran bilateral hostility has increasingly beentriangulated with Israel's concerns and preferences, affecting a wide range ofissues and dynamics, including not only nuclear proliferation, but even regionalissues such as energy, and Iran's relations with Russia and with the states of theCaucasus and Central Asia. Iran's position as a linkage state between the MiddleEast and Central Asia has thus been further con®rmed.

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Iran's centrality: the role of self-image

The fourth factor shaping Iran's policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus is Iran'sself-image as a central player in the region's international dynamics.42 This self-image is rooted in Iran's perception of its assets and liabilities. Iran's unique assetsinclude its geographical contiguity with the former Soviet Union (Iran has landborders with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkmenistan and sea borders with Russiaand Kazakhstan); its natural role as the key transit link between Central Asia andthe Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the open sea; and its political importance asa major actor in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Iran thus sees itself as anexus and center of regional economic and political activities. This centrality, inaddition to Iran's other assets, also re¯ects appreciation of its resultantvulnerabilities.

Concern over territorial integrity, a traditional preoccupation, has now beenstrongly reinforced by the emergence of surrounding states with active andsigni®cant ethno-territorial problemsÐproblems magni®ed by the multi-ethnicnature of Iran itself. A prime regional refugee hub, Iran hosted more than 4 millionrefugees, 14 per cent of its population in the 1980s and early 1990s, as a result ofcon¯icts on its western border (Iraq) and on its eastern border (Afghanistan).(More recently, Iran has received refugees from the North, including Azerbaijanand to a lesser extent from Tajikistan.) Regional con¯icts are a major challenge toIranian security and a direct consequence of its central location. This centrality hasgenerated certain perspectives and attitudes in Iranian foreign policy towardCentral Asia, which are not very different from those adopted toward the PersianGulf. These attitudes and perspectives include an anti-containment strategy (adesire to undermine any attempt at Iran's isolation) and a proactive diplomacy toenhance Iran's political, security, and economic strength and leverage. Iran's selfvision of centrality is best re¯ected in its determination to expand bilateral tieswith the new independent states as well as constructing and participating inmultilateral regional initiatives.

Bilateral ties

The dynamics of Iran's bilateral ties with the new states of the Transcaucasus andCentral Asia are characterized by variations in propensity, interests andaccomplishments indicating differentiations in priorities, opportunities andconstraints.

The geographical contiguity, and ongoing and seemingly intractable ethniccon¯ict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the cross-border ethnic makeup of Azerbaijan andIran, Azerbaijan's increasing tendency for closer relations with states unfriendly toIran and the issue of energy (i.e. Caspian oil), make Iran's relations with Armeniaand especially with Azerbaijan, potentially the most explosive. The ethnic andreligious af®nity between Azerbaijan and Iran has not been enough to prevent theincreasing dif®culties in bilateral relations and a warmer relationship between Iranand Armenia. Mutual suspicions and accusations regarding interference into each

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other's internal affairs43, Iran's security anxiety over Azerbaijan's interests indeveloping close ties with the United States and especially Israel,44 the exclusionof Iran from the Caspian oil deal and ethnic ambitions towards Iranian Azerbaijanon the one hand, and the Azeri accusations of Iran's support for an Islamicmovement and Armenia's military effort, on the other, have overshadowedoccasional though serious attempts at improving the relationship, such as summits,visits by heads of states, the signing of friendship treaties and securitycooperation.45

Relations with Armenia remain in much better shape, especially in view ofAzeri±Iranian tension, Russian±Iranian partnership and Iran's historical ties withthe Armenian community. Iran remains concerned over the territorial integrity ofAzerbaijan and therefore has opposed the full self-determination for Armenians inNagorno-Karabakh. (In the conference of Organization of Islamic States inTehran, 1998, Iran pushed for a resolution that emphasized Azerbaijan's territorialintegrity.) An Armenian hardline position pushing for full independence ofNagorno-Karabakh, may complicate Iranian±Armenian relations.46 Iran's oppos-ition to the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is predicated on Iran's concernover precedent-setting territorial changes on the Iranian frontier along ethnic lines.The positions of the United States and Iran on a realistic solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem are similar, although they may differ on the monitoringmechanism. Iran would prefer a regionally organized, or UN peacekeeping force,to NATO's peacekeeping forces modeled along the Dayton option in Bosnia. Thepresence of a small, but historically popular Armenian minority in Iran, Armenia'scarefully implemented doctrine of positive neutrality, re¯ected in good relationswith Iran and avoidance of band-wagoning with anti-Islamic, anti-Iranian regionaland global discourse (in spite of the US pressure), along with accommodatingRussian±Iranian relations, have helped to construct a complex context withinwhich Iranian±Armenian relations have developed and survived the obviouspressure for closer ties with Azerbaijan, especially in view of the Nagorno-Karabakh con¯ict47 and its damaging impact on Iran±Azeri relations.

Of all Central Asian states, Iran's relations with Turkmenistan have been,comparatively, the most expansive and successful, as the two states have adopted apolicy of accommodation and security neutrality.48 Iran takes comfort inTurkmenistan's `neutral' security policy and its hesitant attitudes towards theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in spite of long-term ties withRussia. Economic ties, especially in the areas of energy, pipelines and strategictransportation links49 have underscored these relations. The fact that Khatamichose Turkmenistan as the ®rst country to visit, only underscores the signi®canceof Ashgabat±Tehran ties. Iran, nevertheless, will remain sensitive towards anysigni®cant changes in the Turkmen neutrality doctrine, especially in view of theUS pressure in Ashgabat to look for alternatives other than Iran for its pipelineprojects. In this context, Turkmenistan's connection with Afghanistan andPakistan will potentially be of great signi®cance.50

Tajikistan, for reasons of both ideology and culture, has occupied a unique placein Iran's Central Asian policy and as such will continue to remain a permanent

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®xture.51 Iran not only sees Tajikistan as the only Persian/Iranian enclave in theCentral Asian Turkic milieu, and thus worthy of attention, but it has been arelatively successful showcase for Iranian mediation strategy and attempts atcentrality. Iran's success, however, is tamed by the continuous Russian attempt atmonopolizing domination,52 the ambiguity of the attitudes of the current regimetowards Tehran and Iran's own hesitation about a deeper emotive, culturalcommitment to its civilizational brothers. While cultural cooperation, especially inthe area of language has been expanding, the economic and security assistance hasbeen limited. The `defense agreement' between the two countries remainsprobably more symbolic than substantive.53 A more substantive politico-securitylink between the two countries may have to wait for a modi®ed Russian presenceand a more uni®ed Tajik leadership which may look into Iran as an importantsource of security support against its powerful neighbor, Uzbekistan. Thisscenario, in addition to the Russian factor, has to await the short and long termimpact of the post 9/11 era on the region and US security ties with Tajikistan.

Early Tajik expectations for an idyllically close relationship, ethno-culturallyand politically, with Iran, and the hope to be treated `as Israel is by the UnitedStates' have not materialized.54 The Tajik civil war, immediately after independ-ence, deprived Iran from an opportunity to deal with its civilizational brothers in a`normal' setting. Iran had to take sides in the civil war, supporting the oppositionagainst the Dushanbe regime since 1992.55 In view of Iran's increasing emphasison its own culture, which of course normatively attempts to accommodate areformist Islam, as a prevailing content of its domestic and foreign policy identity,Tajikistan could have a much more signi®cant place in future Iranian regionalpolicy. The prerequisite for such a prominent role for Tajikistan requires a moreserious intra-civilizational discourse, closer role of Iran in political support forTajikistan in view of its regional challenges, and especially more serious materialsupport by Iran which, given expectations has not been signi®cant.56

Iran's relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are underlined by a gradualand patient improvement since 1992, overcoming the earlier ideological politicalbarriers of `the Islamic threat' (especially during the intense period of the Tajikcivil war). The gradual acceptance of Iran as an important player, particularly inview of its efforts in mediation in Tajikistan and its role in containing the threatfrom Afghanistan, especially during the Taliban era and its subsequent actions infacilitating the downfall of the Taliban,57 has been complimented by gradualimprovement in trade relations with Iran. Iran has become a source of affordableconsumer products for both republics, and above all an important outlet to theopen sea, especially for oil producing Kazakhstan, which in recent years hasshown interest in an oil swap with Iran. This is a strategy to circumvent theexclusion of Iran from the pipeline and energy transit routes, and has resulted inTehran's unilateral investment in building oil terminals and pipelines.58 It isinteresting to note that Kazakhstan's Caspian oil was among the ®rst to ®nd itsway, though with inconsistency, to external markets, namely Iran itself!59

Iran's relations with Uzbekistan are among the most complicated, if notdif®cult. Uzbekistan's regional ambitions (viewed in Tehran as `instinctively

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imperialist'), its increasingly close relations with the United States (viewed in theearly 1990s by Washington as `the island of stability'), and its `championing' ofthe containment policy have overshadowed occasional improvements in diplo-matic ties with Iran. Closer ties between Uzbekistan and the United States haveinadvertently contributed to an improvement of relations between Russia and Iranin Central Asia and more speci®cally in Tajikistan. Uzbek regional ambitions inCentral Asia, its not at times so visible but deeply serious and multi-dimensionalproblem with Iran's friend, Tajikistan, that involves not only geopolitics, butdeeply felt existential ethno-cultural issuesÐwill remain potentially seriousproblems.

Multilateral response

Two themes in Iran's anti-containment and proactive diplomatic posture areessential to its foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely, regionalmultilateralism and diplomacy of con¯ict resolution and mediation. Iran'smultilateral policy is re¯ected in its promotion or creation of regionalorganizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)60 and theCaspian Sea Littoral States Organization, and multilateral economic projectsfocusing on transit and energy.61 Building transit linkages with Central Asiathrough an expanding shipping line in the Caspian Sea and more signi®cantlythrough the railroad with Turkmenistan (Sarakhs±Tezhen), will be a signi®cantcomponent of Iran's multilateral and regionalist approach toward Central Asia.This policy is also re¯ected in regional cooperation in the areas of energy and thetransport of oil and gas to Europe via multilateral pipeline projects such as the oneinvolving Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey.62

This multilateralism has also been expressed in Iran's initiative and participa-tion in several regional attempts at `triangulations', such as Iran±Turkmenistan±Armenia, Iran±Greece±Armenia, Iran±Turkmenistan±India, Iran±Georgia±Armenia, Iran±Ukraine±Turkmenistan, etc. These multilateral relations aredesigned to: (a) provide a regional cross-current network that will hopefullyprovide Iran with economic bene®ts, (b) solidify Iran's role as an integral part ofthe regional community, (c) confront attempts to isolate Iran, thus complicatingthe establishment of anti-Iranian security alliances, and making containmentunlikely or unworkable. Iran's interest in multilateralism and triangulationmechanisms is designed also to serve Iran's geopolitical calculation in balancingpotential regional challenges. For example, closer ties with Greece and India arehoped to leverage Iran's position vis-aÁ-vis Turkey and Pakistan.

Iran's regional rivalry with Turkey is usually viewed as a signi®cant factorshaping Iranian foreign policy and Central Asia's international relations. What isnot clear, however, is the operational or real signi®cance and substance of thiscompetition. While both Ankara and Tehran have jockeyed for a position in theregion, given their limitations and the enormous needs of Central Asia and theCaucasus, the region has so far accommodated both, and avoided the stark choiceof choosing between the two. At times the competition seems more ethereal than

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detrimental and more the re¯ection of the anxiety of two regional newcomers,which the new states and the big powers willingly manipulate.

Geopolitically, the exaggerated sense of self-importance of both countries hasbeen modi®ed or tamed by the reality of their practical limitations and the moresalient roles of Russia, and increasingly the United States in the region.Ideologically, while the issues of `competitive' Turkish and Iranian models dohave certain relevance, the impact of the ideological competition remains limited.The Central Asian states are not eager to embrace a new `Big Brother' model. Nordo either of these two countries successfully exemplify what they preach;secularism and Islam are not the exclusive domain of either Turkey or Iran. Thisrivalry has also diminished Turkey's and Iran's leverage vis-aÁ-vis the UnitedStates and Russia respectively. Fearing this, and in spite of pressure from theirgreat power partners, Ankara and Tehran have engaged in lowering the substanceand symbolism of their rivalries, and have increasingly focused on the mutualdesire to improve bilateral political and especially economic ties.63

Turkish±Iranian competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus, was symbolizedmostly by rhetorical claims about competitive `Islamic models', and morespeci®cally by divergent views over the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and relationstowards Azerbaijan and Armenia. This regional competition is neverthelessembedded in the larger bilateral security problems such as the Kurdish question,and ambiguous, but potentially signi®cant, `strategic' ties between Ankara and TelAviv, and its corollary with Washington's strategic goals in the Caucasus; allsituated in the emerging role of Azerbaijan and the Caspian as strategic vitalnational interests of the United States. What makes the Turkish±Iranianrelationship and its regional signi®cance even more complex is the domesticdynamics of ideological and socio-political change in both countries, especially onthe role of Islam and its peaceful `ascendancy' in Turkey and its `reform-secularization' in Iran; a somewhat reverse role that belies the earlier and moreconventional regional expectation.

Iran's regional rivalry with Pakistan, though more subtle, has thus far had amore signi®cant regional implication. Pakistan's attempt to present itself and itspolitical allies in Afghanistan as a primary source of Western access to energy inthe region led to intensi®cation of its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan (apolicy tacitly approved by Saudi Arabia and the United States) and even to lobbyfor closer US±Taliban relations in years not too distant from 9/11. While thispolicy jeopardized Iran's border security in the East and weakened its in¯uence inAfghanistan, it ironically bene®ted Iran in Central Asia. The crisis in Taliban-dominated Afghanistan helped shift, to some degree, the nature of the ideologicalthreat from Iran to the Taliban's `extremist Islam' (i.e. `Saudi-type', `Wahabbi'). Itcontributed to Russian±Iranian rapprochement in Tajikistan and weakened thehand of the Uzbeks in their anti-Iranian posture. Iran's ¯uctuating relations withTurkey and Pakistan has prompted Tehran to opt for closer relations with Greeceand India (crossing the Huntingtonian civilizational divides!), and in the processinvolving several regional states, such as Turkmenistan and Armenia, in tri-partitefashion.

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Multilateralism also re¯ects Iran's beliefs in its own geographical centrality forextra-regional actors interested in access to Central Asia and the Caucasus.Finally, it re¯ects Iran's insistence in projecting a non-ideological foreign policy,as indicated by emphasis on closer ties with countries of different civilizations andcultures, i.e. Greece, India, Armenia, Georgia, etc. The latter point will be furtherreinforced in the future as Iran looks into cross-cultural civilizational dialogue andties as a serious instrument of its foreign policy.

The Iranian strategy of con¯ict resolution and mediation diplomacy in CentralAsia and the Caucasus is designed to: (a) safeguard against regional con¯ictsaffecting Iranian security and their propensity to invite great-power intervention,(b) enhance Iran's prestige and its regional leverage, thereby contributing to Iran'scentrality in regional affairs and (c) develop a positive image that neutralizes thecomplex or negative impact of the `Islamic factor'. Iran's mediation in the twomajor regional con¯icts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, i.e. Nagorno-Karabakhand especially Tajikistan, is underscored by the signi®cance of mediation as amethod in promoting Iran's security and political relevance to important regionaldynamics. It is interesting to note that Iran's `functionalist/neo-functionalist'approach to overcoming the constraining political and ideological environment ofCentral Asia has been driven to some extent by the infusion, in recent years, offresh policy analysis in Iranian of®cial circles inspired by Western functionalistliterature.64

Conclusion

What frames and directs Iran's foreign policy toward its new northern frontiersince the collapse of the Soviet Union? Iran's new identity, its ®xed and yet ¯uidgeopolitical state, combined with the consistent preoccupation of regional andglobal players with their own interests and with Iran's `real intentions', has helpedto establish an internally dynamic and reinforcing paradigm within which both theIranian foreign policy and the policy towards Iran are decided.

1. Regional stability and border continuity

The key normative preoccupation of Iran is the security and the sustenance of thenew republic and thus its stake in regional stability. The self-image of being alinkage state, not just geopolitically, but normatively, underscores and derives thispreoccupation. The implications of `ethno-territoriality' and regional con¯icts,and the inviolability of existing regional borders, including those of the new states,have been the critical consideration in Iranian foreign policy thinking. The desirefor stability is accompanied by a determination to avoid deliberate or imposedisolation, and to remain involved in regional politics affecting the key dynamics ofthe region's inter-state relations which have a direct impact on Iranian interests;Iran's centrality is emphasized.

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2. Strategic loneliness and self-suf®ciency

Iran by design and by default both regionally and globally is strategically lonely,though not isolated. There is a signi®cant difference between loneliness andisolation. Loneliness is a complex by-product of Iran's particular normativeidentity and what this identity has generated in terms of policy choices by Iran andthe attitudes of others. Iran is not isolated, as neither its geopolitical reality, nor itseconomic and normative impact allows its isolation. Major regional issues, mustout of necessity pass through the `Iranian factor'.

The Russian centric dimension of Iran's regional policy is the by-product ofits systemic loneliness. The concern over US domination and pressure, alongwith contiguous geo-political realities, will thus continue to make Russia asigni®cant player in Iran's foreign policy towards the new frontier. The attemptat strategic partnership with Russia, however, will continue to be tested bydeep-seated historical mistrust and the largely tactical nature of the friend-ship between Moscow and Tehran in spite of strategic claims. US regional policywill be a major factor affecting Iran's policy and position, especially in theCaspian Basin. The degree of success and dif®culties in Iranian foreign policy willbe to a signi®cant measure a function of the overall atmospherics of US±Iranianrelations.

The most important bene®ciary of US±Iran hostility has been Russia, a greatinternational and regional power, who has milked this hostility without traditionalCold War rhetoric, and while maintaining improved relations with the UnitedStates, has diminished Iran's regional maneuverability on a host of issuesincluding the Caspian legal regime. Russian policy towards Iran and the UnitedStates is informed by a maximizing strategy characterized by tactical ¯exibility,small concessions, the use of rhetoric and bold language,65 and endless diplomacyas a substitute for critical or radical decisions.66 Russia, while not opposed to areduction in US±Iranian tension, will remain a potential loser in the event of asigni®cant positive transformation in US±Iran relations.

Russian±Iranian relations are also, more than ever before, situated in the contextof EU relations with Iran and Russian±European regional and global consider-ations. A paradoxical framework has emerged in which a closer EU±Iranianrelationship, especially in view of NATO's enlargement, while diminishingRussian leverage vis-aÁ-vis Iran, and raising concern in Moscow,67 will neverthe-less help the Russians avoid accommodation of US anti-Iranian pressure. The EU±Iran rapprochement will constitute a major systemic crack in the containment ofIran, thus the reduction of the price, both normative and material, in ignoring orcircumventing US pressure.

The impact of US±Iran relations on the region has and will continue to beequally, if not more consequential. A serious con¯ict between the two countriesinvolving coercive politico-military initiativesÐespecially those involving USmilitary ties in the regionÐwill force tough choices for most and especially forneighboring Azerbaijan. Conversely, a signi®cant reorientation of US±Iranrelations will have a systemic region-wide impact: It would (a) diminish

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Russia's historical dominance and (b) increase US leverage vis-aÁ-vis the regionalstates, especially in areas of political reform and democracyÐwhich have so farremained hostage to security considerations, and thus reverse the leverage of theregional states vis-aÁ-vis the United States.

The signi®cance of US±Iran relations has been magni®ed since the 9/11 tragedyand the subsequent US response. Most signi®cant has been the intermingling oftwo interrelated but unexpected developments affecting US±Iran relations after 9/11. First, two major regional challenges to Iran's national security, challengespartially of the US making, namely Saddam Hussein's Iraq and TalibanAfghanistan, have both been removed by a swift US military surgery. Second,and as a consequence, in terms of an abstract regional balance of power andposition, Iran has emerged in its best shape since the 1979 revolution and theSoviet collapse. Yet, practically, Iran and for that matter, the Persian Gulf andCentral Asia, have a permanent new neighbor called the United States, a neighborthat has transformed its over-the horizon, proxy-based presence into a directpolitical and physical presence not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in CentralAsia and the Caucasus. The US proximity to Iran, in spite of Iran's new powerposition, confronts Iran with its most challenging foreign policy environmentsince the inception of the new republic. The US and Iran have gradually exhaustedthe space for proxy wars between them, and now stand on the threshold of eitherfurther and more serious confrontation or reconciliation. The eventual direction ofthis relationship, given Iran's geopolitical centrality, will be of a global andregional signi®cance, a region that will include not only the Middle East, but alsoCentral Asia and the Caucasus.

3. The paradoxical region

As it stands, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new regionin Iran's northern frontier, especially the Caspian, has been at best a mixedblessing for Iran. Iran's hope to make the Caspian a demilitarized `sea of peace andfriendship'68 has gradually given way to increasing US presence and Russia'sdetermination to remain the sole guarantor of security in the region.69 Thepotential for gainÐthough signi®cantÐhas been balanced by multiple challenges:no signi®cant economic bene®ts, potential environmental disaster of colossalproportion exacerbated by the oil rush,70 gradual securitization (and militariza-tion) of its Northern border and unnecessary commitment of national energy toprevent or play in a new `great game' of little positive consequence. In thiscontext, the growing pessimism regarding the economic feasibility of the Caspianenergy projects, along with the modi®ed projections of its available resources andthus the diminishing economic signi®cance of the Caspian, might ironically beIran's saving grace.71 Yet, in the post 9/11 world where so far `the political' hasde®ned `the economics', this relatively modest role of Caspian energy in globalenergy calculation might eventually pail in its geopolitical and ideationalsigni®cance.

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4. Foreign policy identity

Iran's Islamic identity will continue to have a major place in shaping itsopportunities and constraints. The effort to deideologize its Islam and`culturalize'/'civilizationize' its foreign policy will continue to inform theideational dimension of Iran's foreign policy. As the new independent states diginto their past to construct a history for their present, the Iranians hope that genuinearcheology will lead to discovery of a signi®cant Iranian cultural heritage andcontribution and thus embracement, not containment of Iran.72 Furthermore, thesigni®cant domestic changes in Iran, the overall deÂtente in Iran's regional policies,and the pragmatic orientation of Iran's policy in the region from the beginningÐwhich stands in contrast with its more ideological policy in the Middle EastÐareall hoped to reshape the ideological image and the role of the ideational thusleading to the eventual de-securitization of Iran's foreign policy identity.

5. The interregional linkage state and three regional meta dynamics

Although the Persian Gulf has traditionally preoccupied Iranian foreign policymakers, Central Asia and the Caucasus have gradually gained real signi®cance forIranian leaders. While in the South, smaller weak states, oil, great power presenceand ideology have made Iran a signi®cant actor in the Persian Gulf/Middle East,the emerging weak nation-states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the new goldrush for Caspian oil, the inevitable great power competition, and again, ideology,have also made Iran a signi®cant player in the North. Iran's foreign policy in thenext century, like that of so many other actors in this region, will be decided at thecrossroads of three intermingling meta dynamics and structures: the internationalpolitical economy of access to energy, the geopolitical balance of power and thegeocultural interaction of Islam, Western modernity and post-Soviet legacy. Theenormity of the challenge facing Iran cannot be exaggerated. Squeezed betweenthe two signi®cant sub-regions of the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, Iran will be thelinkage interregional state; as all key dynamics of the region, energy, politics andideology, will in one way or the other, by design or default, go through Iran.

6. Foreign policy and legitimacy

These interactive external dynamics and structures, however, are embedded in thecomplex web of domestic polity and above all the question of regime legitimacy.This is particularly crucial in the context of the two paradoxical but livingorganisms of the Iranian paradigmatic predicament mentioned above, namely thesymbiosis of strategic loneliness and regional centrality; a unique medium powerstate with no strategic partner and at the crossroads and center of all majordynamics of the most volatile region in the world. This demanding contextrequires self-suf®ciency in foreign policy, and thus an internally generatedresource base. The core value to this self reliance will be the degree of domesticlegitimacy with its ever increasing ties to a notion of democracy and progress. This

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is even more so as the social discourse of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras ininternational relations, whether genuine or not, has been dominated by thelanguage, if not the ideology of democracy, liberalism and reform, especially bythe Western world and especially by the United States, and claims and counterclaims of compatibility of Islam with democracy. Iran's complex and dif®cult,though at times promising experimentation with a symbiosis of Islam anddemocracy especially since 1997, notwithstanding the signi®cance of externalstructures, remains one of the most critical factors in shaping Iran's internationaland regional opportunities and constraints. Iran's material/physical assets andvulnerabilities, in the end, remain at the mercy of the nature and the scope of itsnormative and soft power, not just externally, but primarily and intrinsicallyinternally. Lonely and thus self-reliant, domestic legitimacy remains key to Iran'sexercise of power, and protection and achievement of her national interests andobjectives. Whether Iran's post revolutionary elite in the middle of the ®rst decadeof the new century is cognizant of this core value, and not just rhetorically,remains to be seen.

Notes and references

1. The term Central Asia will be used throughout the paper to refer not only to the states in Central Asia, but alsoto Iran's neighbors in the Caucasus and the Caspian basin.

2. Tehran Times, 8 January 1990, p 2. The Iranian press was replete with warnings to Gorbachev about thetrappings of too close a relationship with the USA and the danger of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.For an academic overview of the Soviet collapse from an Iranian perspective, see Elahe Koolaee, Ettehaad-eShoravi: Az Takveen taa Froopaashi (The Soviet Union: From Formation to Disintegration) Tehran: DaftarMotale'aat Beinolmelal, 1376 (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies, 1997), especially, pp246±277.

3. The `strategic partnership' has been a repeated theme used with varieties of intensity and ambiguities sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union and especially from the mid-1990s. In the words of the then Iranian UNAmbassador and current Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, `Our relations with Russia are excellent and are ofa strategic nature', cited in `Iran's Caspian Policy', statement of Ambassador and Permanent Representativeof Iran to the United Nations at the First International Conference on `Caspian Oil, Gas, and Pipeline: SeizingOpportunities: The Second Persian Gulf', New York, 29 May 1997.

4. In this context, the issue of Russia's arms sales to Iran and the transfer of so-called `dual use' technology,especially in the area of nuclear technology, given the US sensitivity, will remain a complex one; it is an issueshaped by the interaction of multiple factors and dynamics such as its impact on US±Russian relations, its®nancial and political utility for Russia, and perhaps above all the level of Iran's sensitivity. Iran's reaction toPresident Yeltsin's announcement of no more sales of arms to Iran during his trip to Washington in October1994 was remarkably low-key; a response that among others re¯ected Iranian uncertainty about Russia'sultimate commitment and also the complexity of accommodating Russia's ¯uctuating rhetoric and techniqueto neutralize US criticism. Moscow's subsequent attitudes, including the `withdrawal' from the Gore±Chernomyrdin understanding, non-consequential summitries both during the Clinton and to some extentduring the Bush presidency only reinforced the complexity and ¯uidity of Russian diplomatic commitmentsand posture. The latest display of this trait emerged out of the Bush±Putin summit and talk in Camp David inSeptember of 2003, where Putin while giving the indication of unanimity with the USA on the nuclear issue,maintained a subtle but substantive distance from the USA on both language and key US demands. For Putinand Bush joint press conference see New York Times, 27 September 2003, p 1.

5. Iran's coastal regions will be among the most affected by the current environmental problem in the Caspianand a potentially disastrous zone in the event of an oil-related environmental crisis. See Rory Cox and DougNorlen, `The great ecological game: will Caspian Sea oil development lead to environmental disaster?',Paci®c Environment and Resource Center, January 1997, in Turkistan Newsletter, Vol 3, 5 March 1999; andespecially on the link between the legal regime and the sustainability of environmental vitality of the Caspianfrom an Iranian perspective, see Reza Dasht Ara, `Regim-e Hooghoghi Daryaay-e Khazar va Hefz-e Moheet-

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e Zeest-e Daryaee' (The Caspian legal regime and protection of the marine environment', Iran, 31 July 2001,p 11.

6. See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, `Iran's emerging partnership with Russia', Middle East Insight, Summer 1995.7. While media reports, especially since the mid 1990s have on occasion indicated that the USA and Russia

have reached serious agreements to block Russian technology transfer to Iran, Russia's commitment touphold all of the promises has usually remained uncertain, subject to interpretation and revisitation. Comparefor example the report on US±Russian negotiations regarding Iran in 1998, New York Times, 23 January1998, p A6, with the report on the Bush±Putin summit and press conference in the New York Times, 27September 2003, p 1. While in the latter the summit showed indications of a closer US±Russian position,especially in view of the critical report by the IAEA in September of 2003, Russia continued to leave roomfor separating its own nuclear project in Bushehr from both the letter and the spirit of the IAEA report andespecially the US attitude on the project. The US Congress resolution in May 2004 calling for toughermeasures against Iran by the world and especially by Russia was designed to make a `clean bill of health' forIran by IAEA more dif®cult. Moscow's eventual decision as to the degree of its cooperation will continue tobe subjected to IAEA report, its tone and scope. A report that the EU can live with, but the USA will object to,will probably provide Russia with adequate coverage to expand cooperation with Iran in completion ofexisting nuclear projects, in spite of Washington displeasure.

8. For reports on the Bushehr plant, see, `Russia±Iran protocol provides evidence of discussions, but no ®rmagreement on sale of centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment', National Resources Defense Council, NewsRelease, 10 May 1995; Izvestya, 13 January 1995, p 3; `Iran, Russia agree on $800 million nuclear plantdeal', The Washington Post, 9 January 1995, p 18; `In Russia', in Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense MonitorNo 2, 16 January 1995, p 12.

9. During the meeting between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin on 10March 1998, the USA proposed an increase in Russia's quotas for commercial launches using Russianmissiles, booster rockets for foreign satellites with US components in exchange for Russia `axing the Bushehrpower plant' and the Russian guarantee of terminating missile technology transfer to Iran. The Russian PrimeMinister reportedly had argued, `that Russia has cooperated and will continue to cooperate with Iran ¼. areclean in this respect. We never overstep any limits with regards to missile technology and nuclear matters ¼.Everything we do in the spirit of cooperation with Iran, we do within the framework of what is permissible.'For this and a discussion of the Russian view on the US attempt, during the Clinton era, to offer incentives toMoscow for abandoning nuclear cooperation with Iran, see the article by Valeriya Sycheva, `A bird in thehand, is worth two in outer space', Segodnya, 11 March 1998, p 6. For a sample of the US efforts by the BushAdministration, including a visit by Spencer Abraham, US Secretary of Energy, in changing Russia'sposition and repeated Russian reassurances and reservation see, `Russian Nuclear Minister to discuss Iran,proposes sweeping cooperation deal with US during visit,' Associated Press, 6 May 2002, in <wyg://39/htt://story.news.yahoo.com/¼p_p_wo_en_ge/Russia_us_nuclear_30&printer=1> `Russia to build a secondnuclear reactor for Iran,' Agence France-Press, 26 July 2002, in <http://www.nyt.com/2002/07/26/international/26AFP-Russ.html?> Andrew Jack, `US attacks Russia over Iran `arms' program', FinancialTimes, August 2002; `Political factors to de®ne Iranian nuclear ties to Moscow', in <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/020802/aafp/020802154636top.html>, 2 August 2002; Peter Baker, `Russians assureU.S. on Iran: nuclear reactor plan is called theoretical,' Washington Post, 3 August 2002, p A13; An Iranianreaction could be found in, `Neshast-e bi Natijey-e Keremlin' (The failed meeting in Kremlin), Iran, 2August 2002, p 1; and `Taharrok-e Naakaam-e Amreeka'ihaa Baray-e Man'e Hamkaari Roossyeh baa Iran'(Failed US activity in preventing cooperation between Russia and Iran', Iran, 2 August 2002; and Hayt-e No,3 August 2002; p 7.

10. The US pressure on Russia which has been intensifying through a sustained lobby, especially on thecongressional level by the Israelis has included repeated threats of US congressional disapproval of aid toRussia and the Administration's economic and ®nancial sanctions against Russian research andmanufacturing companies with militarily related ties to Iran. See `Clinton penalizing 7 Russian enterprises',New York Times, 29 June 1998, p A14. For a joint expression of US±Israeli concern underscored by USof®cials during the meeting of US±Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee, see `State Department of®cialwarns of Iran threat', Associated Press, 17 September 2003, in <http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmp1=stor-y2&cid=540&u=/ap/20030917/ap_on_re_mi_ea/us_iran_1>

11. Russian research and technical institutes such as Scienti®c Research and Design Institute for PowerTechnology (known as Nikiet) and Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology have been the focus ofUS pressure and Russian concessions, Yevgeny Adamov, Russian Minister for Atomic Energy and formerdirector of Nikiet, announced that the Institute had abandoned the plan to sell Iran the research reactor andMendeleyev's contact had been limited to delivery of unclassi®ed information regarding heavy watertechnology. This, the Russian Minister hoped, would clear the way for lifting of US sanctions against Russianresearch institutes; though not sure the deal would bypass `some narrow-minded' and `angry people in the

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Department of State'. See Michael Gordon, `Russia to offer U.S. deal to end Iran nuclear aid', New YorkTimes, 17 March 1999, p A12. The post-9/11 era and the subsequent `axis of evil' speech by President Bush,brought enormous and unprecedented pressure on Moscow by Washington to break its nuclear cooperationwith Iran especially during the 2003±2004 period; Moscow continued to ¯uctuate between `war of words'with Washington and delaying its cooperation with Iran at the same time.

12. Russian diplomacy during the controversial debate on the IAEA report in September of 2003 was shrouded insome ambiguity, while some reports indicate eager Russian acquiescence to the US and Europeanperspective, other reports, including comments by Iranian of®cials, indicate Moscow's at least somewhatlukewarm attempt to prevent the critical direction of the IAEA September 2003 report. See for example, theimportant interview by Mohsen Aminzadeh, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia and Oceania, whoreferred to Russia's and some members of the non-aligned movement, or `good efforts, though with verylimited maneuver' during the IAEA debate. See Yas-e No, 23 September 2003, p 2. For a more negativeperspective on Russia's role, see Aftab Yazd, 23 September 2003, p 11.

13. Reportedly, the Russians, after the IAEA report in September 2003, somewhat quali®ed this distinction andindicated that the completion of the Bushehr nuclear facilities could only be stopped by a UN decision, i.e. aUN resolution which, according to some Russian of®cials could only come after the UN would providesuf®cient indications as to the violations of international regulations in this project. This Russian`quali®cation' was a compliment to an earlier decision to postpone the completion of ®nal negotiations withIran on the last stages of the construction to the `near future'. For an Iranian re¯ection on this, see `Russia:stopping the construction of the Bushehr power plant will be a UN decision', Aftab Yazd, 21 September 2003,p 2.

14. The Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, after the September 2003 IAEA reportindicated that there are no reasons for stopping nuclear cooperation with Iran added that `the construction ofthe nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be continued ¼. Under the IAEA chapter, nuclear powers [are]obliged to help other states develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ¼. The nuclear power plant inBushehr is constructed under the IAEA auspices. During the inspections, specialists have not revealed anyviolations'; although he reiterated the need for adding certain amendments on additional protocols on thereturn of the spent nuclear fuel to Russia. Itar-Tass/ACSNNA/IRNA, Vienna, 16 September 2003, cited in<http:/www.payvand.com/ news/03/sep/1100.html>.

15. `Even without NATO's expansion, it is probably unlikely that Moscow and Washington would be working inlock step, to thwart Iran's nuclear ambition.' Michael Gordon, `Russia remains uneasy over NATO'sexpansion', New York Times, 14 March 1999, p 10.

16. A bipartisan commission headed by then former US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, concluded in 1998that `rogue' states such as Iran and North Korea are much closer to developing a ballistic missile threat, thanthe CIA had predicted. The house and the senate, over the objections of the Clinton administration, and itsthreat of veto, overwhelmingly approved a bill supporting an anti-missile system project. Eric Schmidt,`House joins Senate in voting for system to defend against missiles', New York Times, 19 March 1999, p A14.`The Nuclear Posture Review' a Pentagon report which was leaked to the press in March 2002 reintroducedthe nuclear weapons along with `new targets', including seven states comprising a typical list of the roguestates and `plausibly' Russia in the US post 9/11 era doctrine. Michael Gordon, `U.S. nuclear plan see newweapons and new targets', New York Times, 10 March 2002, p A1. For an of®cial Russian reaction, seeMichael Wines, `Russia assails U.S. stance on arms reduction', New York Times, 12 March 2002, p A1.

17. For an overview of the Russian arms trade, see Igor Khripunov, `Russia's weapons trade: domesticcompetition and foreign markets', Problems of Post-Communism, Vol 46, No 2, March±April 1999, p 42. Foran overview of Russian military ties especially in the area of ballistic missile technology to Iran see the IAEAreport on Iran's nuclear program, reproduced in www.baztab.com, 2 April 2004.

18. While Russia and Iran displayed a common approach towards the legal regime of the Caspian Sea in earlyyears after the Soviet collapse and most of the 1990's, nevertheless, Iranians could not be certain about thelevel of the Russian commitment to the principle of `equal sharing' of the resources of the Caspian and thusfear midcourse abandonment and manipulation of the legal regime for tactical advantages by the Russians.This natural uncertainty, however, was buried under constant need for the posture of strategic partnership, alinguistic and diplomatic comfort zone, that blinded Tehran to the depth of Russia's evolving position and itsgradual but eventual shift in early years of the current decade. For a report on attempts by both sides tosolidify cooperation in the Caspian in the face of the increasing isolation of both in late the 1990s, see `Iranand Russia Unite over Caspian hydrocarbon export', Izvestiya, 22 April 1999, p 6, and a report by DemetryZhdannikov, `Russia, Iran, in new energy initiative', Reuters, 23 April 1999. For a sample of Iranian,especially the reformist parliaments, growing frustration and anger with Russia see, `Changing Russia'sposition in the Caspian is the alarm bell for Iran', Aftab, 28 May 2003, p 5; `Bilateral treaties haveundermined Iran's legitimate interest in the Caspian', Aftab, 23 July 2003, p 5; and `The Russians have fooledthe Iranians', editorial in a web cite close to the moderate conservative establishment, Baztab, 27 July 2003 in

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<http://216.55.151.46/index.asp?ID=5210&Subject=News>. Iran's parliamentarian criticism leveled bothagainst the Iranian foreign Ministry for mishandling the negotiations with the Russian and excessive trust onMoscow's friendship, and against Russia's double-crossing policy. In an extraordinary attempt at improvingRussia's image, Victor Kaluzhny, Russia's Special Envoy on the Caspian addressed the Iranian Majlis (theparliament). See iran.ru.com, 2 Feburary 2003 in the <http://iran.mtu.ru/index.shtml?&view=story&i-d=13839&lang=fa&ch=1//>. For a more hopeful Russian view on Iran's position see Nezavismaya Gazeta,23 March 2004.

19. For an Iranian expression of concern over the global meaning of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, see Englishlanguage daily, Keyhan International, 16 April 1999, pp 1±3.

20. Iran's condemnation of NATO's intervention was not uniform. While the Foreign Ministry was careful toquestion the intervention's legal base as being outside of the UN framework, others, such as AyatollahKhamenei, were much more directly critical. `Iranian criticizes NATO', New York Times, 6 April 1999, pA11.

21. For an account of Muslim reaction in the North Caucasus towards Russian policy towards Kosovo, see`Kazan's Tatars oppose union of Slavs', The Irish Times, 24 April 1999, p 6.

22. While one has to be very skeptical about the pejorative label of Wahabism used by of®cial circles in theCaucasus and Central Asia, to oppress the Islamic and secular opposition, it is clear that the traditionalIslamic tendencies, both of®cial and underground have increasingly been complimented or challenged by theemergence of `Taliban-type' Islamic groups in Central Asia (and to a much lesser degree the NorthCaucasus). For an earlier report on this trend see Sanobar Shermatova, `Said Amirov will shave off his beard:will Daghestan stay in Russia or follow Chechnya's example', Moskovskiye Novosti, No 9, 8±15 May 1998,pp 6±7 and Nabi Abdulliev, `Daghestan's true believers', Transitions, March 1999.

23. The Russian Ambassador in Iran, Konstantin Shubalov, irritated Iranians when he attributed reports ofSerbian atrocities largely to NATO's propaganda. For this interview, see the English language Daily Iran, 7April 1999, pp 1±2.

24. Nevertheless, this interfaith dialogue between Islam and Orthodox Christianity has continued. The fourth ofsuch meetings took place, for example, in April 2004, in which the Islamic and Christian participantsaddressed, among other issues, culture, globalization and ethics. See Shargh, 28 April 2004, p 2.

25. For a re¯ection of Russia's concerns over a Muslim backlash at home and abroad over Moscow's Balkanspolicy and rise of pan-Slavism, see Michael Winer, `Russia's House betrothes Belarus and Yugoslavia', NewYork Times, 18 April 1999, p 10.

26. Iran's frustration and concern was highlighted by the fact that it also had to carry the burden of being thePresident of the Organization of Islamic Countries, and thus had to be more openly vocal in demandingMoscow's diplomatic intervention. Celestine Bohlen, `Russia seeks to mediate Kosovo crisis', New YorkTimes, 21 April 1999, p A14.

27. Ibid. For Iran's view on the necessity of the Russian role in solving the Balkan crisis, see `Iran's ForeignMinister's interview with BBC', in Hamshahri, 22 April 1999, p 1.

28. Russian President Putin announced Moscow's decision for war games in April 2002 immediately after thefailure of the ®ve Caspian states summit in Turkmenistan in resolving the legal status of the Caspian Sea.Reportedly more than 60 warships and 10,000 men took part in the exercises from Russia and some warshipsand ®ghter planes from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. `Russia holds biggest post-Soviet military exercises inthe Caspian', Agence France Press (AFP), Moscow, 1 August 2002, cited in Hindustan Times, 8 August2002. According to the state news agency, RIA Novosty, Iran had requested to take part in the exercise, butRussia had refused, citing a 1924 Treaty between Iran and the USSR, barring all ships, other than Soviet,from the Caspian. Iran and Turkmenistan were invited as observers. A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman,Alexandre Yakovenko, dismissed the charge that the Russian military exercise was aimed at any othercountry.

29. For a discussion of the general outlines of Khatami's foreign policy elaborated after his unexpected electionto the presidency, see Ziba Farzin-nia, `The seventh Iranian presidential election and its probable impacts onthe Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy', The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol IX, No 2,Summer 1997. Khatami's foreign policy vision later acquired more speci®c tenets, including `deep deÂtente'(tanesh zedaee), `dialogue of civilizations' (goftegooy-e tammaddunhaa), and the `coalition for peace'(e'telaaf-e sulh), the last two respectively in response to the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations theory thathad acquired major followings in the US and the latter after 9/11 and the months leading to US intervention inIraq in 2003. For Khatami's views, see for example Mohammad Khatami, Az Donyaay-e `Shahr' taa Shahr-e`Donyaay': Seyri dar Andishe-ye Syyasi Gharb (From World of `City' to the City of the `World': Re¯ectionon Political Thought in the West), Tehran: Nashr-e Nay 1376 (Tehran: 1997), and Mohammad Khatami,Goftegooy-e Tammaddunhaa (The Dialogue of Civilizations), Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1380 (Tehran: 2001).

30. For a discussion of Iran's policy towards the Islamic factor in Central Asia, see Mohiaddin Mesbahi,`Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of Islam', Central Asian Survey, Fall 1997.

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31. Opening book fairs, art exhibitions, artistic displays, etc. are characteristic. Obviously these efforts are`Islamic' in nature, yet they are carefully scanned for their non-politicized content and emphasis on Islamiccultural and scholarly dimensions. For an early manifestation of these efforts see the details of cultural tiesestablished between Iran and Central Asian states including Kyrgyzstan covered in FBIS-SOV, 21 October1993, pp 70±72, FBIS-SOV, 25 October 1993, pp 65±66. It is worth noting that on purely Islamic aspects,Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan have and continued to be much more active and consequential thanIran.

32. For example, see comments by Iranian diplomats at the gathering of Muslim dignitaries of theCommonwealth of Independent States in 21 February 1998, on the need for the spiritual message of Islamamong the Muslims of the newly independent states and the need for unity of all `divine religions in theregion' neutralizing `the propaganda of opposing cultural and political currents', FBIS-NES-98-052 DailyReport, 21 February 1998, p 20.

33. The trip by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Baku in December of 2003 underscored theevolution of US±Azeri relations to transcend energy and economics and politics to security and militaryrelations. The USA has provided Azerbaijan ®ve naval vessels, including an 82 foot point class patrol, whichwas part of the US aid package. See the report by the US Foreign Aid Watch Organization atwww.foreignaidwatch.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&®le=article&sid=531&m, 4 December2003. Rumsfeld indicated that the United States would work with Azerbaijan to improve its ability to secureits territorial waters. See Thom Shanker, `Seeking to block terrorist route, Rumsfeld asks help in Azerbaijan',New York Times, 4 December 2003, p 3.

34. Although Uzbek of®cials denied the reports of Karimov's comments, Iran's decision to cancel the scheduledtrip of Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kmalov, to Tehran, indicated Iran's dissatisfaction with Uzbekof®cial explanation. See, for reports on Uzbekistan's of®cial denial of support for US embargo, Ettela'at, 8May 1995, p 8. On cancellation of visit, see Ettela'at, 15 May 1995. The two countries, however, haveengaged in damage limitations and have tried since 1996 to lessen the tension of diplomatic overtures andeconomic agreements. The visit of Iran's Foreign Minister to Uzbekistan in February of 1996 should beconsidered in this context. See for the coverage of the visit and the meetings with Karimov, Ettela'at, 1March 1996, p 10. While the domestic sources of `Islamic radicalism' and its particularly non-Shi'i`wahhabi' orientation has taken away the usual line of accusation against Iran, yet the post-9/11 closemilitary cooperation between the US and Uzbekistan makes a closer relations between Tashkent and Tehrancomplicated and restrained.

35. The visit of US Defense Secretary, William Perry, on 9 April 1995, to Tashkent marked a considerable steptowards improvement in US±Uzbek relations. US occasional criticism of President Karimov's regime hasbeen muted and quali®ed; the US security consideration throughout the late 1990s and especially after 9/11has been the overriding paradigm shaping the relationshipÐKarimov's visit to the US and his warmreception by President Bush underscored the supremacy of immediate security needs of the US militaryaccess to Central Asia over human rights and domestic political and economic reform. For a discussion ofhuman rights problems in Uzbekistan especially after the US intervention in Afghanistan and the neardestruction of the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (IMU) by the United States during the Afghan operation,see Peter Baker, `Government crackdown threatens to radicalize previously non-violent groups', TheWashington Post, 27 September 2003, p A19. For a report on growing forces of Islamic extremism inUzbekistan and Karimov's tough policy, see Bruce Pannier, `Central Asia: is Uzbekistan the source ofregional extremism?', RFE/RL, 27 April 2004.

36. New York Times, 27 March 1999, p A17.37. The views of the American oil companies were best illustrated by Mobil Corporation's prominently placed

essay advertisements in the New York Times editorial pages throughout 1998±1999, which stronglyadvocated the Iranian alternative for the Caspian. For a sample, see `Iran: food for thought', New York Times,16 April 1999, p A 27. The editorial argued, `U.S.±Iran rapprochement would go a long way to bolsterregional harmony ¼. When U.S. policyÐlike unilateral sanctionsÐprohibits us from doing business in acountry, we will abide. But that doesn't prevent us from speaking out against the use of unilateral sanctions.'Sanctions `cost American companies sales and jobs ¼. Maintaining sanctions on Iran, while foreigncompanies can invest there with no restrictions, not only puts U.S. companies on the sidelines, but moreimportantly weakens America's foreign policy in the region.'

38. `In their hearts, many American oil executives believe the best export route for Caspian oil is through Iran.'For this and a discussion of the contradiction between the US Caspian policy and the American oilcompanies, see Stephen Kinzer, `Caspian competitors embrace foreign powers on sea of oil', New YorkTimes, 24 January 1999, p A18.

39. For early reports on US±NATO politico-military activities and interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, seeKinzer, ibid; James Kit®eld, `Stars and stripes on the silk route', National Journal, 13 March 1999; andDavid Stern, `East±West fault-lines deepen in Caucasus as NATO meets', Agence France Press, cited in

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Turkistan's Newsletter, Vol 3, No 93, 16 April 1999, pp 9±11. The early and mostly low key US militaryinvolvement with the new states, conducted via peace keeping possibilities, joint exercises, civil±militaryissues, laid the foundation for a smoother transition to direct US military presence in Central Asia and accessto military basis which was granted in 2002 to the US after 9/11 with the acquiescence of Russia and theregional states including Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. Whether these bases will become permanent militaryand strategic ®xtures remains to be seen. The war on terror, the US interest in the Caspian, and proximity toChina may provide all the necessary strategic rationale for a long-term presence. For Russian of®cial viewsconcerning the US long-term presence in the Caucasus and the Caspian, especially after occupation of Iraq,see Nezavismaya Gazeta, 23 March 2004, p 5, interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Kalyuzhny;and Nezavismaya Gazeta, 12 May 2004, pp 1 and 5, interview with Vyachelav Trubnikov Senior RussianForeign Minister.

40. `A farewell to Flashman: American policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia', Deputy Secretary Talbot'sAddress at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Baltimore, Maryland, 21 July1997. Available in <http://www.state.gov/regions/nis/970721talbot.html>.

41. The relative thaw in US±Iranian relations since Khatami, has consistently been accompanied by tough USmeasures, thus, a group of mixed signals: Khatami's remarkable acknowledgement of the values of Westerncivilization, Clinton's and Secretary Albright important acknowledgement of Western and US guilt in Iran,the lifting of agricultural sanctions, replacing `dual-containment' with `engagement and containment', allpositive signals, have been quali®ed, by simultaneous reinforcements of the sanctions opposing the Mobil bidfor the oil swap in Iran, and even an Israeli-inspired congressional measure to punish the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for working with Iran! For this ¯uctuation during the Clinton era, see GarySick's discussions of the `Mixed Signals' in gulf2000-list@colombia.edu, on 1 May 1999, 18:42:32±0400(EDT). The most promising atmosphere for mutual improvement of relations appeared immediately after the9/11 tragedy and close collaboration between US and Iran before and during the US campaign in Afghanistanin 2002. This early important opportunity was buried under the complexity of Iranian and US domesticpolitics and the unexpected `Axis of Evil' speech by President Bush in January of 2003 and the `regimechange' posture; a `sea change' from the atmosphere of the late 1990s in US±Iran relations. For Russianre¯ections on US view of the Iranian threat see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 May 2004, p 5, interview withVyacheslav Trubnikov, Senior Deputy Russian Foreign Minister where he rejects the US alarmist view onIranian nuclear threat and blames it on Israelis' misinformation campaign; `this is likely to be the `̀ tracing''of what my friends from Mosad are feeding the EU and Americans'.

42. In the words of Kamal Kharazi, Iran's Foreign Minister, `Iran is naturally a part of or partner in any politicaldevelopment in regions such as Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Caucasus, East of the Arab World, Persian Gulf,and Southwest Asia'. See Kharazi's Statement on `Iran's Caspian Policy', op cit, Ref 3.

43. The Azeri's usual line of complaint has been the accusation of Iran's attempt to promote radical Islam inAzerbaijan, while the Iranians have raised many concerns with regards to Baku's attempt in promotingseparatist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan. For the former see, for example, Zerkalo, 17 April 2004, pp 4 and9, which outlines the dif®culties with Iran on several levels, including Iran's support for Armenia. For arecent Iranian view, see the centrist and close-to-government report, `Baku, the center of anti-Iranianseparatist activity', www.baztab.com/index.asp? ID=15953&Subject-News, 29 April 2004.

44. For an interesting and blunt call and justi®cation for closer relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, in spite ofIranian objections, see Zerkalo, op cit, Ref 43, pp 4 and 9. The paper interviews several members of theparliament from the peoples front party, Azerbaijan, the Compatriot Party and United People's Front Partywho advocated stronger ties with Israel and disregard for Iran's possible objections or complaints, and thebene®ts of Israeli support for Azerbaijan in the United States.

45. For an Azeri discussion of these issues, see Zerkalo, 15 March 1997, which warns that the two countries arelosing historical opportunities for cooperation in view of the continuous tensions in the relationship. Themost signi®cant move to improve bilateral relations took place during the visit of President Aliev to Tehran inMay 2002, where both sides signed a new agreement on the principles of cooperation and friendly relations.See Iran, 21 May 2002, p 3, Entekhab, 20 May 2002, p 2. For a report on Iran±Azerbaijan securityagreements, especially on ®ghting terrorism, which took place during a visit between Iran's Minister ofIntelligence, Ali Yunesi and his Azerbaijani counterpart and President Aliev, see `The era of cold relationsbetween Tehran and Baku is over', Hayat-e No, 27 July 2002, p 8. For a more negative Azeri view on theoverall nature of the relations see Zerkalo, op cit, Ref 43, especially p 9.

46. For the implications of the radicalization of the Armenian position after Ter-Petrossian's downfall, see NewYork Times, 9 February 1998, p A8.

47. For an assessment of the origin and dynamics of the con¯ict and Iranian diplomatic involvement in earlystages of the con¯ict see, Kaveh Bayaat, Bohraan-e Gharabaagh (Karabakh Crisis), Tehran: EnteshaaraatParvin, 1372) (Tehran: Parvin, 1993). For a report on the discussion of the con¯ict among other issues thattook place during President Aliev's visit to Tehran in May 2002, see reports on Khatami±Aliev joint press

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conference in Iran, 21 May 2002, p 3, where Khatami reiterated the condemnation of `aggression andoccupation in whatever form' and underscored Iran's intense interest in regional security and negotiation asthe only venue for con¯ict resolution. During the visit both sides signed the `Agreement on the Principles ofCooperation and Friendly Relations', and discussed possible agreements on the legal regime for the Caspian.See ibid, p 2; Entekhab, 20 May 2002, p 2, especially the interview with Bagher Emaami, the head of `Iran±Azerbaijan Parliamentarian Friendship Society', in which for the ®rst time the possibility of a bilateralrapprochement on the Caspian issue was raised; a point which was interestingly reiterated by a source closeto the Iranian establishment, see `Emkan Tavaafoq Panhany Iran va Azerbaijan Bar Sar-e Khazar' (Thepossibility of a secret Iranian±Azeri agreement on the Caspian) in www. baztab.com/index.asp, 21 July 2003.For a more general of®cial re¯ection, which underscored the signi®cance of Tehran's Summit on thepossibility of opening a bilateral venue for legal regime of the Caspian, see Iran, 11 June 2002, p 2.; for aRussian view see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 2004, p 5, interview with Deputy Foreign Minister VictorKalyuzhny on the Caspian Sea.

48. For an academic, yet of®cial Iranian assessment of Turkmenistan, see Galil Roshandel and Ra®k GholiPoor,Syasat va Hookoomat dar Torkamanestaan (Politics and government in Turkmenistan), Tehran: Markaz-eChaap va Enteshaaraat Vezarat-e Omoor-e Khaarejeh, 1378) (Tehran: Center of Publications of Ministry ofForeign Affairs, 1999), especially pp 161±188.

49. The eventual linkage of Iran's railroad system to Turkmenistan is considered by Iran as a signi®cant chapterin Iran's relations with the entire Central Asia. See Khatami's interview with the Saudi paper Al-Watan, citedin www.baztab.com, 17 July 2003.

50. Iran, for example, opposed Turkmenistan's attempts to construct a pipeline through the Caspian Sea, thusbypassing Iran; a project heavily lobbied and supported by the United States. For a report on Iran's oppositionexpressed in the gathering of several hundred oil executives in Ashgabat in early March 1999, see TurkistanEconomic Bulletin, Vol 99, No 25, 12 March 1999, pp 1±3, 5.

51. For a comprehensive review of Tajikistan's post con¯ict condition from an Iranian point of view, see thespecial issue on Tajikistan of Envoy: West and Central Asian Business Magazine, October 1997, especially,S. Farrokhyar, `Conservatism and moderation: will peace and tranquility return to Tajikistan', M. Aliev, `Gasand oil industries in Tajikistan', S. Farrokhyar, `We seek democracy to propagate Islam: an interview withAbdullah Nouri, leader of the Tajikistan Islamic Movement', N. Bruker and I. Guseinova, `Prostitution: theprofession of poverty and War', O. Pan®lov, `To whom will the child of the uranium industry belong?'

52. In an attempt to further consolidate its hold on Tajikistan in view of developments in Afghanistan and thecoming to power of the Taliban, and an implied response to Uzbek distance from the CIS, and gravitationtowards the United States, Russia reached an agreement with Dushanbe to establish a permanent militarybase in Tajikistan, a measure severely criticized by Uzbekistan. Iran's response was, again because ofstrategic consideration and logic, muted. Bruce Pannier, `Tajikistan: Uzbek President criticizes proposedRussian base', Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Report, 9 April 1999, printed in Turkistan Newsletter, Vol3, No 79, 13 April 1999, pp 9±11 also Nezavismaya Gazeta, 28 May 1999, p 10. Iran, however, was surprisedabout the degree of Russian cooperation with the United States in acquiescing to access to military bases inCentral Asia in 2002. While Russia and Iran cooperated with the US in the military campaign in Afghanistanvia their mutual allies in the Northern Alliance, Tehran was alarmed at the ease that Russia had apparentlyabandoned the strategic logic so prevalent in Moscow's doctrinal rhetoric so repeatedly stated in the mutualdiplomatic engagements with Iran throughout the 1990's and beyond. For a re¯ective and alarming Russianof®cial view as to `permanency' of the US presence that resonates with those shared in Iran see NezavisimayaGazeta, 12 May 2004, pp 1 and 5.

53. See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, `Tajikistan and Iran', in Rubinstein and Smolensky, eds, Regional Rivalry in theNew States of Eurasia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

54. A disappointed leading Tajik intellectual and public ®gure once told the author that the Tajik expectation wasthat Iran's attitudes towards Tajikistan would be similar to that of the United States towards Israel, indicatinga much deeper emotional, cultural, security and economic ties than have so far materialized.

55. For a discussion of Tajik±Iranian relations, see Mesbahi, op cit, Ref 30, and `Iran and Tajikistan', inRubinstein and Smolensky, op cit, Ref 53. While the Russian dominant position in Tajikistan is af®rmed andaccepted by Dushanbeh, the role of Iran in the peace process and especially its durability remains a constanttheme in Tajik of®cial assessment. See remarks by Tajik Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdolnabi Sattarzadeh inwww.iran.ru, May 28, 2002 in www.iran.ru/index.shtml?ch=7&lang=en&view=story&id=1312.Interestingly and echoing former Russian Prime Minister Evgeni Primakov, Sattarzadeh underscored how`Iran and Russia's equal status in establishment of a stable peace in Tajikistan curbed the in¯uence of US andits allies such as Turkey and Pakistan'.

56. Iran's limited economic capabilities, especially in investment capacity, has been a major factor. The mostrecent and important Iranian economic engagement in Tajikistan is the construction of a 670 MW power

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plant in Sangtudeh, located 140 km southeast of Dushanbe; a US $360 million project that Iran will ®nance.Iran's participation in the project is under the build±operate±transfer (BOT) method. IRNA, 16 March 2004.

57. The improved relationship with Kyrgyzstan was underscored by the fact that the seizure of Iranian weaponsdestined for pro-Iranian factions in the Afghan civil war by the Kyrgyz authorities at Osh did not create anycontroversy. The weapons were part of a larger package of humanitarian aid, and were returned to Iran, whilethe humanitarian aid was allowed to pass. See, Turkistan Newsletter, Vol 98, No 2, 18 November 1998, p 1.For re¯ection on the prospects of improvement of relations with Kyrgyzstan see Khatami's interview in Al-Watan, op cit, Ref 49.

58. For a report on Iran's continuous effort to attract Kazakhstan and others including Russia, by unilaterallybuilding infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, such as the terminal in Neka, which allows Caspian producers toswap an equivalent volume of Iranian light crude oil in the Persian Gulf, which could reach up to half amillion barrels per day, see `Iran keen on cooperation with Caspian states on oil shipment', IRNA, 29 April2004, `Khatami: Iran provides safest cheapest route for transfer of Caspian oil', BBC Monitoring MiddleEast, 29 April 2004. `Iranian oil companies to take part in Kazakh tenders', Energy News, 29 April 2004,Cited in Eurasia: The Of®cial Newsletter of the International Institute for Caspian Studies, 29 April 2004,and `Iran seeking to grow Caspian crude swap volume', Reuters News, 12 May 2004.

59. The Kazakh±Iranian oil swapping project has been ¯uctuating, not only for economic and technical reasons,but for political considerations, namely US pressure, which lead, for example, to its discontinuation in 1997.IRNA, 11 April 1999, and Iran-TASS, 12 April 1999, reprinted in Turkistan Economic Bulletin, Vol 99, No40, 21 April 1999, p 2. For a new sense of optimism in expanding relations between Kazakhstan and otherrepublics, see Khatami's interview with the Saudi paper, Al-Watan, op cit, Ref 49.

60. For a good overview of Iran's perspective on multilateralism, regional; organizations and especially ECO,see Elahe Kolaee, Eko va Hamgeraee Mantaghe'ie (ECO and Regional Multilateralism), (Tehran: MarkazePajhooheshhaay-e Elmi va Motaale'at-e Esteraategic-e Khavar-emianeh, 1379), (Tehran: Center forScienti®c Research and Strategic Studies of the Middle East, 1999), especially pp 157±205 and 227±257,which are devoted to the role of the great powers and the interrelations between member states.

61. For an early of®cial elaboration of Iran's views on Central Asia and on the issue of regionalism see AbbasMaleki, `Cooperation: Iran's new foreign policy objectives', Majal'leh Motale'ate Asia-ye Markazi vaQafqaz (The Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Review) (Tehran), Vol 1, No 2, Fall 1992, pp. 336±37.

62. For an early report on the pipeline project, see `Central Asia turning South', The Economist, 29 October 1994,p 40.

63. This rivalry has diminished Turkey's and Iran's leverage vis-aÁ-vis the USA and Russia respectively. Fearingthis, and in spite of pressure from their great power clients, Ankara and Tehran have engaged in somesigni®cant economic cooperation, including the very ambitious US $20 billion gas treaty signed in 1996. Fordetails on this and related projects between Turkey and Iran, see `Iran±Turkey natural gas export', IRNA, 2April 1999, cited in Turkistan Economy Bulletin, Vol 99, No 35, 5 April 1999, p 4.

64. Some of these functionalist views are expressed in the newly established journal, Envoy. See for example, theEnvoy, September 1997 issue devoted to the Caspian Sea. Also see The Iranian Journal of InternationalAffairs, Amu Darya, Majal'leh Motale'ate Asia-ye Markazi va Qafqaz, and Journal of Central Asia and theCaucasus, especially, issues published from September 1995 to the present. For a blend of regionalism andfunctionalism, see Kolaee, op cit, Ref 60, pp 2±114.

65. The typical and repeated term characterizing Iran's relations with Russia, both by the Iranians and theRussians, has been `strategic partner', which was coined following then President Rafsanjani's trip in the®nal years of the Soviet Union in 1989, a term that survived the Soviet collapse and has been repeated tounderscore Russia's relations with Iran. The most recent language is by President Putin, following his visitwith Iran's Foreign Minister Kharrazi, referring to Iran as Russia's `historical partner'. See Aftab Yazd, 18May 2004, p 11.

66. Two cases illustrate Russia's attempt at leaving all the options open in its maximizing strategy. The ®rst dealswith the Caspian Legal Regime, where the Russians started with paralleling the Iranian position regarding thesigni®cance of the 1921 agreement as the basis of the legal regime, and in more recent years havecircumvented Iran by holding their own direct bilateral talks with other littoral states, while keeping Iranengaged in constant and numerous Caspian Sea meetings and summits. For an interesting example of this¯exibility and language see the interview by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, `The Russian Caspianman', Victor Kalyuzhny, with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 2004, p 5. Russia's position towards the legalregime has been to keep the Americans out of the negotiations (which Azerbaijan is interested in) whilecoaching Iran in bits and pieces to get close to the Russian position. The second case is Russia's engagementin building the nuclear power plant in Bushehr and the general question of Iran's nuclear proliferation.Russian statements, positions and postures have included various statements, ¯uctuating between outrightrejections of accusations against Iran to almost paraphrasing the US concerns, from promising the completionof the Bushehr power plant, the delivery of fuel, to constant delay for `political', `commercial', or `technical'

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reasons. For a sample of the Russian perspective, see comments by Russia's Atomic Energy Minister,Alexandre Rumyantsev, in rejecting the USA accusation against Iran, in `Bolton needs to be convincing',Kommersant, 26 August 2003, p 3; `Pyongyang±Tehran relations are exaggerated', in Nezavismaya Gazeta, 7August 2003; `Russia±Iran to sign Nuc fuel deal in September', Reuters, 26 August 2003; `Russia to delaysigning key nuclear agreement with Iran', Agence France Press, 29 August 2003 (the unexpected statementfrom Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, appeared to be a direct concession to frequently expressed US andIsraeli concern); Alexandre Yakovenko, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, indicating Moscow'sdetermination to cooperate with Iran, in spite of US pressure, Itar-TASS, 25 February 2004, cited in FBIS-SOV-2004-0225. Vladimir Frolov, `Iran's nuclear surprise', Moscow Vremya MN, 12 March 2003 (the articleviews Iran's nuclear program as a threat to Russian security); `Russia looks to extend nuclear cooperationwith Iran', Itar-TASS, 26 April 2004, cited in BBC-Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 26 April 2004. HereAlexandre Rumyantsev indicated Russia's interest in building new units in Bushehr; and ®nally, the Iraniancomplaints about the Russian approach in construction of the Bushehr power plant, `We are facing a lot ofdif®culties', an Iranian of®cial visiting Moscow said, WWW.Baztab.com, 11 May 2004. For a Russian `¯ip-¯op' response to this complaint, see Aftab Yazd, 16 May 2004, p 1, where a Russian of®cial rejected the ideaof Russia's delay as a result of US pressure and pointed to other commercial and technical problems.

67. `E.U. enlargement will broaden EU±Iran cooperation', IRNA, 20 April 2004, citing Iran's ambassador toBrussels. According to Gennadi Gudkov, Deputy of the State Duma Security committee, the RussianSecurity Council should come up with a new plan of action, Pravda, 25 March 2004, p 2. Also see VladimirSkosyrev, `There is a limit to Moscow's concessions', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 May 2004, pp 1 and 5, inwhich senior deputy foreign minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, discusses in length a range of questions,including the US±NATO expansion of in¯uence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

68. President Khatami's inaugural speech at the opening of the Neka terminal, IRNA, 29 April 2004.69. Victor Kalyuzhny, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, and President Putin's special representative on Caspian

Sea negotiations, in an international forum in Kazakhstan, opposed both the idea of a non-Caspian statemilitary presence, i.e. the United States, and the concept of demilitarization. See `Caspian Sea should not bedemilitarized', in The America's Intelligence Wire, 28 April 2004, cited in Eurasia: The Of®cial Newsletterof the International Institute for Caspian Studies, 29 April 2004.

70. Given the population concentration and signi®cant agricultural and food resources, Iran would be the mostaffected country in the region, and thus has advocated a region-wide attempt in addressing the issue of how toprotect the environment against the exploitation of its resources, including its oil and ®sh, which hasremained the subject of intense debate among the littoral states. Suggestions regarding the creation of auni®ed environmental regime for the Caspian Basin, while agreed to in principle, have been plagued bycon¯icting interests and the undecided legal regime of the Caspian.

71. The early enthusiasm over the `Gold Rush' in the Caspian Sea has gradually been replaced by more realisticand modest assessment of its potentials, especially in view of the decline of oil prices. Judith Matloff,`Letting Caspian `̀ Black Gold Lie''', Christian Science Monitor, March 1999, pp 10±11, and M. Culler, `Therise and fall of the Caspian Sea', National Geographic Magazine, May 1999.

72. An early attempt at the culturalization of the Iranian view of the region was best re¯ected in a lecturedelivered by Atao'llah Mohajerani, then Iran's Minister of Culture and Guidance, in the gathering ofstudents, faculty, and of®cials of Makhtoumqoli University in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. `Every human beinghas the obligation to know his own history, and today, the Persian language is the key to knowing the historyof this region.' Referring to Makhtoumqoli, Hafez and Rumi, he said, that `The Persian language belongs toall the nations of the region, for we all have lived in different periods in one common civilizational andcultural milieu. The great personalities of literature and thought belong to everybody in this region and weshould not separate them based on new geographical boundaries.' Cited in Iranian, No 48, April 1999, p 2.This culturalization is also re¯ected in Iranian historiography of the region's socio-political history and itstraditional linkages with Iran. See for example, Araaz Mohammad Sarli, Tareekh-e Torkamenestaan (TheHistory of Turkmenistan), (Tehran: Daftere Motale'at-e Syasi va Beinulmelali, 1375) (Tehran: Institute forPolitical and International Studies, 1995); and Iran Kalbassi, Farsi Iran va Tajeekestan: Yek BrrasiMoghaabele'I (Iran±Tajikistan Farsi: A Contrastive Survey) (Tehran: Moa'ssesey-e Chaap va Entesharaat-eVezarat-e Omoor-e Khaarejeh: (Tehran: Center for Publications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995). Iran'sglobal initiative in suggesting `civilizational dialogue' as the antidote to the `clash of civilizations' thesisreceived both international and regional attention leading to the UN Year of Global Dialogue in 2001. Theearly optimism over the regional impact was soon to be overshadowed by the securitization of the region inthe post-911 period.

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