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Cold War Revision Notes FOUR CRISES

Quotations

Crisis Period (Late 1940s to 1960s)1. Pressure for coexistence came from increased risk of war.

(a) Most dangerous feeling that World War III was going to happen.(b) After death of Stalin (March 1953), there were efforts to manage confrontational

US-Soviet relations(c) Advent of hydrogen bomb (year) and ICBM tech ramped up mutual threat

1. 1950-53 Korea

(a) Significance1. Key moment in globalization of the Cold War2. Revolutionary Chinese now clearly leaning to Soviets rather than neutral or pro-Western

(a) Now clear US didn’t ‘lose’ China(b) China led on ideology(c) Also realist grounds – sided with weaker superpower. When US weakened in

1970s, China switched sides3. Truman considered using atomic weapons once Chinese became involved in Korea.

(a) Joint chiefs advised use of atomic weapons against China(b) Nuclear bombs sent across the pacific for possible use (c) When bombs reached Guam, Truman had them stopped instead of moving them

to Okinawa to become operational

(b) Causes of Crisis1. Kim il Sung planned to reunite Korea2. Stalin had repeatedly said no but, convinced things had changed

(a) USSR now had nuclear weapons (b) Soviets now had a new ally in the region, China(c) US had indicated it thought the security perimeter was off-shore, which Stalin

took to mean Korean unification would be ok

(c) The Facts

(i) Background1. Korea had been under Japanese colonial rule for 35 years. In August 1945 Japan

surrenders.2. Allies decided unilaterally at the Potsdam and Moscow Conferences (1945) that

Korea would be temporarily divided at the 38th Parallel and ruled by a joint 5-year US-USSR trusteeship, after which elections would be held for a united Korea

3. At the end of the Second World War(a) The Japanese in the South of the country surrendered to the Americans(b) Japanese in the North surrendered to the Soviets(d) In the mean time, separate govts were set up – both dictatorships(e) The country was divided at the 38th Parallel as a temporary measure(f) Soviets + Chinese supported Communist Kim il Sung(g) Americans and West supported Capitalist Syngman Rhee

4. Kim il Sung had aspired to united the two Koreas under communist rule:(a) In March 1949 Kim went to Moscow to seek Stalin’s permission to invade the

South


(b) Stalin, preoccupied with Berlin, rejected the request(c) By the end of 1949, the international situation was transformed:

(i) The Soviets had the atom bomb(ii) Mao had proclaimed the People’s Republic of China and concluded a

Treaty of Friendship with Stalin(iii) Stalin was now confident that the US lacked the will to respond to

events in South East Asia(d) In April 1950 Stalin approved Kim Il Sung’s plans to invade the South. Stalin

did a deal: (i) He wanted lead for his nuclear programme(ii) He would OK Korean reunification provided China agreed military help if

confrontation resulted with the US5. Communist North Korea launches a surprise assault in June 1950 to ‘liberate’ the

south and unify Korea(a) Syngman Rhee’s South Korean army retreated or fled and the North

Koreans captured Seoul in 3 days(b) Domino theory first expounded in US(c) US decides this is not a matter for the US alone, but the UN should be

involved6. In the UN, the USA called for condemnation of the North Korean invasion

(a) Russia had withdrawn from UNSC (in 1950) to protest UN refusal to admit Communist China, and so was unable to use its veto to when UN troops were ordered into South Korea to drive back the Communists.

(b) Security Council voted to create a military force of troops from 16 nations(c) UN troops were expected to be able to drive the North Koreans back north

within six weeks(d) General Douglas McArthur was appointed to lead the United Nations forces

7. Within days, and without anti-tank weaponry, American troops were in disarray(a) UN Forces were driven back to a tiny enclave at Pusan, on the south-west

coast(b) McArthur decided to gamble on a vast seaborne invasion 150 miles behind

enemy lines at Inchon in an attempt to sever and then roll back the North Korean advance

(c) 15 Sept 1950 Inchon landings(d) Two weeks later, battle for Seoul(e) McArthur reinstated Syngman Rhee – his association with Rhee’s

increasingly vicious regime caused concern in Washington8. South Korean army crosses into North Korea, the UN troops also advanced into

North Korea.(a) Both thought the war was already won. (b) The Chinese feared that if North Korea was defeated, nothing would stop

the Americans crossing the Yalu river at the border between China and North Korea and invading the Chinese mainland

(c) Devastated North Korea asked China to intervene(d) Stalin secretly pressed Mao to enter the war to save North Korea(e) Wanting to show China’s power in Asia, Mao agreed

9. Meanwhile, UN forces continued the race north(a) 19th Oct – Pyongyang fell(b) McArthur assured Truman there was no possibility of China entering the war


(c) At the same time, Mao ordered half a million troops to cross the Yalu and wait for US forces to approach the border

(d) UN forces across North Korea were pushed back southwards abandoning vehicles and equipment and adopting a scorched earth policy

(e) The Communists advanced rapidly southwards, recapturing Pyongyang and then Seoul in early 1951

10. Truman was pressed to use the atom bomb(a) At a Washington press conference journalists pressed Truman on the

possible use of the atom bomb in Nov 1950(b) Press stories about the possible use of the bomb alarmed Clement Attlee,

who flew to Washington to receive Truman’s assurance that there were no plans to use atomic weapons

(c) The Americans understood that if they used atomic weapons, the Russians would reply

(d) There was tacit agreement by both sides not to escalate too much(e) US tried to use nuclear diplomacy (Truman and Eisenhower) but in a limited

way11. Americans had enjoyed air supremacy since the start of the war

(a) Russia sent pilots in MiG-15s to train the Communists but ended up secretly taking part in combat

(b) The US slowly won back air supremacy(c) McArthur called for the bombing of Chinese cities and for the pursuit of the

war in mainland China(d) While the US was holding armistice negotiations, McArthur summoned his

opposite numbers to discuss their surrender(e) Truman determined (Apr 1951) to limit the war to Korea to prevent a

possible third world war and sacked McArthur12. By the Summer of 1951, both sides had fought into a stalemate, roughly where

the fighting had begun a year earlier (a) UN was suffering 2,500 casualties a month(b) Armistice talks began in July 1951 but got nowhere – talks stalled over the

issue of POWs – almost half the 130,000 Northern POWs declined to be returned home

(c) Meanwhile, US bombers dropped almost as much explosives on North Korea as they had on Germany in WW2 – estimates suggest 2 million civilians were killed in the north – Pyongyang was razed

(d) North and South Koreans committed massacres against civilians (e) Talks continued – hundreds of meetings over two years (in Geneva?)

13. Truman decided not to run again and Eisenhower won the 1952 election by a landslide

(a) March 1953, Stalin died – (i) Stalin had wanted to keep the war going – he wanted the Chinese and

Americans to fight to the death(ii) his successors (Malenkov, Bulganin & Khruschev) wanted to end it as

they thought it impossible to win(b) Ceasefire finally agreed July 1953 – backed by China, North Koreans and UN

– Syngman Rhee refused to sign(c) 75,000 Communist prisoners were handed over and 12,000 UN prisoners

were set free(d) 54,000 Americans and 3,000 UN troops were killed; an estimated 500,000

Chinese soldiers were killed


(e) North and South, 3 million Koreans were killed, wounded or missing; another 5 million were homeless

(f) Communism had been contained

2. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

(a) Significance (see also outcomes)1. How close to war?

(a) NK believed this time they ‘really were on the verge of war’(b) JFK estimated the odds of war as somewhere between one in three and even.(c) Dean Rusk called it ‘the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen’(D) French Air force General Pierre Gallois, instrumental in construction of French

nuclear arsenal, said the CMC was neither threatening nor worth writing about2. IMPORTANT - The nature of the Cold War changed profoundly after the missile crisis:

(a) In SP relations, there was a trend towards greater understanding, confidence-building, contact and even cooperation (Sewell)

(b) But continued arms race, threat of MAD, economic and diplomatic rivalry.

(b) Causes of Crisis1. Cuban revolution in 1959

(a) brought a left-leaning (but not yet explicitly Communist) Castro to power on US doorstep

(b) Young revolutionaries threatened to export revolution throughout Latin America(c) Raul Castro and Che Guevara sought Communist involvement and support (d) Cubans sought economic relations with Russia (to buy the 50% of Cuban sugar,

their principal crop, that the US was no longer buying, to sell equipment)(e) US had huge financial interests in Cuba – US companies employed one-tenth of

the Cuban workforce, owned most of the island’s utilities, oil refineries and sugar plantations.

(f) Agrarian reform law drastically limited property holdings ‘nationalising’ millions of acres.

2. Stalin had left Latin America to the US, taking a sphere-of-influence approach. Khrushchev felt differently and looked for opportunities to outdo Stalin in terms of penetration into the Third World. [2]

(a) In Autumn 1959, over the opposition of foreign policy advisors, NK approved Warsaw Pact weapons sales (Czech) to Cuba

(c) Background

Brinkmanship1. John Foster Dulles had espoused ‘brinkmanship’ – the doctrine to display, when

challenged, unflinching nerve to risk nuclear war. This was probably inevitable given Eisenhower’s nuclear or nothing defense policy

The Nuclear scorecardUSA had 27,300 nuclear warheads, of which at least 7,000+ were strategic USSR had 3,300 nuclear warheads, of which around 500 were strategic

La Coubre1. In March 1960 a shipment of Belgian arms to Cuba exploded in Havana harbour,

killing more than one hundred people. 2. Castro was convinced this was an act of US sabotage.


3. Castro vowed to accept any gesture of friendship from the Soviets. 4. Castro decided to nationalize all US property, including sugar concerns. 5. Castro stepped up internal security measures to root out counter-revolutionaries.

Cuban War Scares1. In 1960 Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric expressed a desire to see Castro out of

power2. Castro’s intelligence showed there was US paramilitary training going on in

Central America3. In October 1960 Castro was convinced a US force was preparing to invade from

Guatemala4. Castro expected Eisenhower would make a move before the end of October to

help Nixon’s election chances5. Both Cuba and Russia denounced US interventionism at the UN on 25 October –

suggesting the US would stage an attack on Guantanamo as a pretext to invade. 6. Although the CIA planned to launch an attack, it was actually nowhere near ready7. The Soviets and the Cubans believed an invasion was imminent

The Question of Missiles on Cuba1. In mid-1960, KGB analysts had concluded it would unlikely the US would intervene

in Cuba unless provoked by either:(a) a Cuban attack on Guantanamo, or(b) the establishment of Soviet missiles on Cuba

To reiterate, the KGB felt that Soviet missiles on Cuba would provoke a US attack on Cuba

2. The War Scare of 1960 affected Cuban-Soviet relations(a) it completed Castro’s journey towards communism for Cuba - in Nov 1960

Castro gave a speech to the PSP admitting he was a communist in which he referred to Moscow as “our brain and our great leader”

(b) by Jan 1961 Khrushchev was identifying his leadership of the communist world and the prestige of the Soviet Union with the health of Cuba – any US attempt to undermine it would challenge NK’s personal authority

Soviet Defence Commitment Soviets declared that Cuba security constituted a vital interest of the USSR, to be

defended by all means.Castro considered that this had a deterrent effect on Washington during the war

scare

(d) The Facts – Chronology

1958 (Nov) – US-USSR-UK moratorium on nuclear testing

1959 Cuban Revolution

1960March – Eisenhower admin begins covert action against CastroMay – La Coubre is sabotaged in Havana harbourMay – Soviets shoot down Gary Powers’ U-2 spy planeMid-1960 – the Soviets think a US attack on Cuba unlikelyAutumn – JFK ramps up anti-Castro rhetoric on election campaign trailOct – War scare - Cubans convince Soviets a US attack is imminent


Nov – Castro admits in a ‘secret speech’ that he is a communistDec – Second war scare

1961Jan – Khrushchev pins his colours to Castro and CubaJan – a few days before the inauguration, US breaks relations with Cuba

The Bay of PigsRichard Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) was the chief advocate of the paramilitary

option – the Kennedys had preferred to continue Eisenhower’s policy of using covert means to remove Castro

Kennedy asked for the ‘Trinidad Plan’ to be altered so as to keep the US hand in it invisible – imposing constraints which ultimately reduced the operation’s chance of success

April – KGB reported that the CIA had started final prep for a Cuban invasion but Moscow not convinced

12 April – Kennedy assures the world that the US will not invade12 April – Yuri Gagarin becomes the first man into space15 April – US (unmarked?) B-26s begin strafing Cuban airfields15 April – Adlai Stevenson (UN ambassador) forced to lie about US involvementJFK allegedly cancelled (in writing?) further airstrikes although only 60% of Cuban airforce

(36 combat aircraft strong) had been eliminated – this doomed the operation. Mac Bundy issued the cancellation order.

17 April – Cuban brigade is trapped on the beaches and the invasion is over19 April – RFK warns JFK “If we don’t want Russia to set up missile bases in Cuba, we had

better decide now what we are willing to do to stop it.”OUTCOMES of Bay of Pigs:16 April - US attack prompts Castro to declare his plan for a socialist CubaBoP accelerates the building of a surveillance state that Castro had once considered

avoidableOver the next month, 20,000 Cubans were arrested for counterrevolutionary activityKennedy no longer trusted the conclusions of his own advisers (he replaced Dulles with

McCone and Bissell with Helms?)

Vienna Summit (4 June 1961)1. Khrushchev planned no new initiatives or compromises – he was optimistic he could

achieve movement (on Berlin?) by bullying the new US President2. Mikoyan spoke out in favour of a more careful, diplomatic approach but NK would have

none of it3. Kennedy planned to probe the Soviet position on fundamental issues4. JFK offered a new deal towards a nuclear test ban treaty but NK was in no mood to

compromise – he was primarily interested in Berlin5. JFK complained on the second day of the summit that this was not what he had

expected or asked for6. NK threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany in Dec, leaving them to decide

the issue of access to West Berlin7. The only thing agreed on was Laotian neutrality8. The Kennedys thought Vienna showed the USSR was not interested in taking any steps

towards a new détente

1961May – RFK first meets with Georgi Bolshakov and the back channel begins


July – Khrushchev announces intention to resume nuclear testing in the autumn because the international situation had deteriorated and because the USSR lagged behind the US in testing

July – Walter Ulbricht warns the Soviets that continued open borders would lead to East Germany’s collapse

Summer – RFK said the US-Soviet relations were entering a tougher, harder, meaner period than had gone before

13 August – Khrushchev orders the construction of Berlin wall(October? – with the US-USSR tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie), Ros Gilpatric says in a

speech that despite fears of a missile gap, the US could launch a crushing retaliatory blow against a Soviet first strike

Khrushchev takes Gilpatric’s speech as a personal affront and orders the atmospheric test of Tsar Bomba, the largest hydrogen device ever constructed above the Soviet Arctic (its 50 megaton yield, was half the original yield to reduce fallout)

4 Sept - Castro reiterates his request of early 1961 for increased Soviet military assistance (cautiously, NK decided to take his time)

1 Dec – Castro publicly declares himself to be a communist and Cuba to be a socialist country - the US pressures 13 govts in Latin America to break ties with Cuba

1962Feb – Khrushchev’s son-in-law Adzhubei visited Kennedy in Washington and Dulles was not

capable of liquidating a conflict like the Soviets did in Hungary in three days – NK believed this meant JFK was considering a second, bigger invasion of Cuba, this time involving US troops, so on 8 Feb he approved a $133million military assistance package to ramp up Cuban security

March – Soviet military intelligence told NK that the Pentagon was preparing for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union

March - Kennedy announced his intention to resume nuclear testing on 15 April unless a test ban was signed in the interim.

Spring – Robert Kennedy asks the Special Group to consider what they should do if the Soviets build a military base on Cuba – few in the group took the question seriously – CIA analysts even doubted that the Soviets would come to Cuba’s aid if attacked by the USA

March – Castro suggests to Soviets the time is right to organize a Soviet intelligence centre in Cuba to support revolutionaries throughout Latin America – Castro wants to keep the USA busy to stave off another invasion attempt

Key soviet allies in the Cuban leadership are in trouble

Khrushchev’s Decision to Send Missiles to Cuba1. NK faced multiple challenges to his leadership of the socialist world:

(a) US were not prepared to deal with him with respect(b) JFK’s offer to negotiate a (partial? Atmostpheric only) test ban had been

humiliating (c) Negotiations with Washington over the future status of Berlin were proving

fruitless(d)Kennedy could oust Castro any time he decided to use US troops(e) Castro’s revolutionary zeal could lead him to ally with Beijing or go his own way,

as Tito had done in 1948(f) in April Castro decides to press ahead without Soviet support in launching an

active campaign of revolution in Latin America, beginning by training guerrillas – Moscow considers Castro’s timing was terrible – it would help JFK make his case that Castro needed to go


(g) Mikoyan opposed placing missiles and troops on Cuba

To Restrain US from Invading Cuba(a) To defend Havana from US aggression – strategic missiles to strain US from

military action and tactical weapons to fight if deterrence failed(b) May – Khrushchev starts obsessing about losing Cuba and decides to send

nuclear missiles to Cuba – this would answer the American threat to Cuba but would also avoid war

(c) Soviet missiles in Cuba would “not in any case” be used – nuclear war would be impossible to win – the missiles would have one purpose only, to scare and restrain the Americans, and give them a taste of their own medicine

(d) A battery (how many is that?) of medium- and intermediate-range missiles could deter Kennedy

(e) NK wanted to demonstrate to Castro personally that the Soviet Union would defend his revolution

(f) Anadyr was supposed to be a ‘containment plan’, designed to scare the Pentagon into leaving Castro alone

Strategic Reasons(a) NK cites Balance of Power rationale in a meeting with the Defence Council – “In

addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of power’”

(b) Perhaps to compensate for Soviet strategic inferiority by doubling at a stroke the number of Soviet missiles that could reach the US.

(c) NK felt he needed a bold move to remind Washington of Soviet power(d) The Soviet military saw the Cuban operation (Operation Anadyr) as an

opportunity to project power into the Western hemisphere and a rescue mission for Castro

(e) The Soviet navy intended to use Cuba as a base for Soviet as well as for Cuban defence

(f) To double the USSR’s lagging ICBM capacity to hit US targets(g) NK emulated Eisenhower’s ‘new look’ – nuclear or nothing defence policy,

seeking ‘more bang for the buck’ – defending Cuba through increased reliance on nuclear weapons rather than costly conventional forces

To stay ahead of the Chinese in world communism(a) Perhaps an attempt to guarantee the status quo in Cuba and prevent any

attempt by the Chinese to undermine his leadership of international communism(b) To boost USSR claims to lead international communism, and to avoid losing

ground to Beijing

To reinforce the alliance with Cuba(a) To reinforce the alliance with Cuba (ideologically, leading Cubans were closer to

Beijing in its support for armed uprisings throughout Latin America) and to fence China out

NK did not think it would cause war(a) NK believed it important that the scheme not be disclosed before US

congressional elections on 6 November, after that he would visit Kennedy and inform him himself and JFK would have no alternative but to accept missiles on Cuba


(b) NK says JFK is intelligent and would not set off a nuclear war over Soviet missiles in Cuba, just as they had put their missiles in Turkey, NK thought JFK would swallow the missiles as the Soviets had accepted missiles in Turkey

(c) But if the Americans had shown themselves unwilling to tolerate a communist country off American shores, why did NK think they (d) would accept a communist country with nukes?

(d) NK had wanted to keep the missiles secret as long as possible so as not to add to the pressures on JFK to act before the missiles became operational

US had set the precedent in Europe(a) The USA had set a precedent by using missiles to defend allies who were

geographically vulnerable – by deploying 17 intermediate-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey in the late 1950s – [NO, Halliday, the Middle East in IR, p.124 cites JL Gaddis in We Now Know 1997, pp.264-5) as saying ‘But the USA did deploy intermediate range Jupiter nuclear missiles, capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union, in Turkey in 1961’.

(b) In Soviet eyes, the Jupiters legitimated the Soviet missiles in Cuba

Operation Anadyr – the Missiles (a) Moscow’s so-called ‘joint defence plan’ for Cuba envisioned shippig twenty-four

R-12 MRBMs (1100 mile range)(b) Sixteen R-14 IRBMs (2200 mile range), eighty FKR nuclear cruise missiles (short

range)(c) Nine Frog/Luna battlefield missiles, (d) Six warheads for short range IL-28 bombers (600 mile range), (e) tanks, surface-to-air missiles, MiG-21 jet fighters and 50,000 soldiers and

technicians.

R-16s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)1. The Soviets had R-16s (known to NATO as SS-7s) were intercontinental ballistic

missiles that could hit the USA with a one-megaton warhead launched from Soviet Central Asia. The USA had four times as many of these as the USSR and NK argued it would take 10 years for the USSR to build enough of these to match US strategic power – he suggested Cuba might make a useful base for Soviet intermediate range missiles, of which Moscow had many.

R-14 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs)1.Soviet military recommended sending two kinds of ballistic missiles to Cuba – 24

medium-range R-12s with a 1MT warhead and a range of 1050 miles and 16 intermediate-range R-14s with a 1MT warhead and a range of 2100 miles – once installed, these forty missiles would double the number of Soviet nuclear missiles that could reach the US mainland

2.The R-14 (SS-5) had a range nearly twice that of the R-12 and carried the same punch. Whereas the thirty-six R-12s in Cuba were clearly terror weapons directed as US population centres, the R-14s had the range to hit US ICBM bases in the Midwest. In the language of nuclear strategy, the Soviets had equipped Cuba with a ‘counterforce’ capability – the ability to knock out the US strategic arsenal in a first strike.

R-12 Medium-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)1.‘The R-12s – or SS-4s, as they were designated by NATO countries – had a range of

approximately 1,100 nautical miles and carried a one-megaton warhead. Some 74 feet long, including a 7-foot nose cone, these missiles were mobile in that they were moved to their launch sites by 67-foot trailers. To put the power of the R-12 into perspective, one can note that Hiroshima was flattened by a blast equivalent to 14,000 tons of TNT.


A single R-12 represented 1 million tons of TNT, which could be dropped on any point from Dallas, Texas, to Washington, D.C..

2.All thirty-six R12s were on Cuba, and eight of them operational, by the time the US discovered the missiles on Cuba

The

Tactical Missiles1. In general, tactical missiles were designed to fight wars, not to deter aggression2.The program also included two tactical cruise missile regiments, that is 80 bulky FKRs,

each with a yield of 6-12 kilotons and a range of about 100 miles3.18 tactical warheads for Lunas would be sent with 45 strategic warheads for the

medium-range missiles and 36 warheads for the FKR cruise by ship (the Indigirka) leaving the USSR on 15 Sept

Light Bombers and Nuclear BombsThe Defence Ministry also recommended that one squadron of IL-28 light bombers with six

10-kiloton nuclear bombs be shipped in crates. These bombers would be sent with the tactical missiles in the first half of October.

SubmarinesIn order not to upset the Americans NK authorised only four Foxtrot submarines to be sent

into the North Atlantic, each carrying a payload of 22 torpedoes, one of which on each submarine would be nuclear tipped, scheduled to leave on 1st October and reach Cuba a month later

The Plan in Operation1.The plan envisaged sending 50,874 military personnel to Cuba2.The medium-range R-12s would be operational by mid-October and the intermediate-

range R-14s not before the end of November at the earliest so NK wanted a stopgap measure – small enough to be rushed to Cuba in a matter of days but powerful enough to stop a US amphibious landing – tactical or ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons – short-range Luna missiles could go by plane

3.Khrushchev took pains to maintain direct control of even the battlefield nuclear weapons – he did not want to lose control of the decision to use them

4.By early Sept 114 shipments had been dispatched to Cuba (since June), 94 of which had already arrived. Only 35 to go, all scheduled to be loaded by 20 Oct and to reach Cuba before 5 November, the deadline established by the US congressional election.

5.Ships with specially configured holds delivered all thirty-six of the R-12s, with an additional six false R-12s to deceive US attack planes, by the end of September.

6.‘The first shipment of nuclear warheads, on the Soviet freighter Indigirka, reached Mariel on October 4. On board were forty-five one-megaton warheads for the R-12s, twelve 2-kiloton warheads for the Luna tactical weapons, six 12-kiloton bombs for the IL-28 bombers and thirty-six 12-kiloton warheads for the cruise (FKR) missiles. In sum, the ship carried the equivalent of roughly 45,500 kilotons of TNT [i.e. 45.5 MT or 45.5 million tons TNT equivalent).

7.All thirty-six R-12s were already in Cuba, and eight of them operational, by the time the US discovered the missiles on Cuba.

Problems with Project Anadyr1.The missiles (presumably the R-12s and R-14s, not the tactical nukes) were 70 feet long

and therefore difficult to keep under wraps2.Soviet intelligence knew since at least early 1962 about regular U-2 reconnaissance

flights over Cuba so Khrushchev must also have known


3.NK complained about US reconnaissance flights over international waters as ‘harrassment’ and sent a request via Bolshakov that these be stopped for the sake of better relations, JFK agreed as he didn’t want any trouble from NK ahead of the Congressional elections and elicited a promise from NK to put the Berlin issue ‘on ice’ until after the elections

Escalation and Discovery of Project Anadyr 1.August ’62, dozens of Soviet freighters were speeding towards Cuba carrying Soviet

military equipment2.10 Aug – John McCone suggests the possibility that the unusual level of Soviet shipping

heading for the Caribbean might mean the Soviets were in the process of deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba (RFK had warned as early as May 1961 that the Soviets might one day put missiles on the island)

3.4 Sept - JFK releases a presidential statement defining which kinds of Soviet assistance would be unacceptable and would be interpreted as threats to vital US interests:

(a) organized Soviet combat troops in Cuba(b) Soviet military bases on the island(c) violation of US control over Guantanamo(d) presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles(e) any other ‘significant offensive capability’

4.JFK had no idea the Soviets would soon be in violation of three of these conditions5.7 Sept – JFK requested the call-up of 150,000 men in the Reserves to active duty for 12

months6.This caused NK to accelerate preparations for a war with the US7.11 Sept – NK issues a statement reiterating Moscow’s ironclad commitment to Castro

and, to reinforce his statement, orders that Soviet armed forces be placed on ‘limited alert’

8.5 Oct – Bolshakov conveyed a pledge from Khrushchev that the Soviet Union was sending only defensive weapons to Cuba … Bolshakov lived to see the end of the Cold War; but he never got over his bitterness at having been used to deceive the Kennedys. He was in the dark about the Anadyr operation.

8.10 Oct – Kenneth Keating alleged on the floor of the Senate that he had evidence that six launch sites for intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs) were under construction in Cuba … Neither the White House nor the CIA, however, had any conclusive evidence of IRBM or MRBM launch sites. The results of all the U-2 flights up to that point had proven negative.

Missiles Found1.‘Mc George Bundy, Kennedy’s national security adviser, received the results of Heyser’s

U-2 mission. There appeared to be two 70-foot-long MRBMs at San Cristobal … Besides Bundy and the leadership of the U.S. intelligence community, Dean Rusk and his team at State, as well as McNamara and the deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, received word of the U-2’s discovery before going to bed on October 15.

ExComm1. Blight & Nye spoke of three factions within ExComm (with fluid membership): “Hawks

were invaders and doves were traders; owls were persuaders”:(a) Hawks supported early military action – airstrikes against missiles, full invasion,

or both(i) Group included Max Taylor, Joint Chiefs, Dean Acheson, Douglas Dillon, John

McCone and Paul Nitze(ii) Saw little risk of retaliation


(iii) Saw little risk of inadvertent or irrational action – Max Taylor, when interviewed, was clearly wedded to ‘rational actor’ model of decision-making – he counted on all participants to act rationally

(b) Doves wished to avoid any use of force, even quarantine, and preferred to resolve the crisis by trading missiles

(i) Doves included Adlai Stevenson and Llewellyn Thompson(ii) Privately, and known only to Dean Rusk at the time, JFK dictated a

statement to be given to U Thant, UN Sec Gen, to make if NK didn’t respond favourably to the RFK proposal to Dobrynin (non-invasion pledge + secret Jupiters trade-off) – the statement proposed public trade-off of Turkish for Cuban missiles and JFK was willing to run the domestic political risk of a trade to avoid war

(c) Owls preferred quarantine – a mild use of force that allowed flexible movement, if conditions required it, towards hawkish or dovish options –

(i) Owls included McNamara, Bundy and Ball(ii) this group took a more expansive view of the risks involved - worried about

irrational action or inadvertent escalation (like Doves) and danger of inaction, leaving missiles on Cuba (like Hawks)

First Ex Comm Meeting, October 16, 19621.Kennedy asked Charles Bohlen, the ‘old Kremlin hand’ to join the discussions.2.JFK and Bohlen were concerned that Khrushchev was probably trying to use Cuba to

force American concessions in Europe. 3.Besides Bohlen, from the State Dept came Dean Rusk, Undersecretary of State George

Ball, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Edwin Martin and Ambassador at large Llewellyn Thompson. Robert McNamara and his deputies Roswell Gilpatric and Paul Nitze represented the Defense Department. John McCone, way on an urgent family matter, was replaced by his deputy Marshall “Pat” Carter, and the CIA was also represented by the head of the NPIC, Arthur Lundahl, whose analysts had found the missile sites on the U-2 photographs. General Maxwell Taylor came as chairman of the JCS. Rounding out the group were McGeorge Bundy and the Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen from the White House, Treasury Secretary C Douglas Dillon, and Robert Kennedy. Of these men, only Robert Kennedy and the president knew that this meeting was being taped.

4.Kennedy himself identified four possible military scenarios to end the crisis: (1) air strike against all the known missile sites; (2) general air strike the at included sorties against the Soviet MiG-21 fighter jets and all of the SA-2 sites; (3) an invasion of Cuba (which would need 8 days’ preparation); (4) a blockade of the island to prevent, it was hoped, the nuclear warheads and more missiles from reaching Cuba. Kennedy’s preference was a surgical air strike.

5.McNamara agreed with the Chiefs’ desire to slow the president down. 6.McNamara portrayed blockade initiative as something in between a military and a

political course of action, and the best of a bad lot of options.7.McNamara not too worried about missiles themselves – there weren’t enough of them to

tilt the balance against US nuclear superiority. 8.JKF thought the missiles posed more of a strategic threat because of the diplomatic

leverage they gave Khrushchev.9.At this point, RFK was the strongest advocate of invasion.10. By the end of the first day, JFK was being persuaded by Max Taylor and the JCS that

even a massive air strike might not be enough to remove the threat – only a full invasion would be practical - the day slated for a wider attack was Saturday 20th. At this point, Mac Bundy still preferred a surgical air strike.


11. Llewellyn Thompson suggested instead a blockade, a public demand that the missiles be dismantled and a threat of force for non-compliance.

12. JKF and RFK considered the blockade option insufficient as it could do nothing to remove missiles already deployed on Cuba.

13. JFK still thought force would be effective and doubted the Soviets would respond by launching the nuclear missiles on Cuba

14. An invasion of Cuba would require in all 250,000 men, 90,000 of whom would be ground troops

15. RSM expressed concerns that any use of force risked inadvertent nuclear war (that’s my guy!) – JFK thought the danger of nuclear accident was low and Berlin was the main problem in his mind.

The Thirteen Days1.During the course of the crisis US intelligence kept turning up new missile sites.2.By Friday 19th the ExComm polarised – RFK joined the air strike team, which included

Dillon, McCone and Acheson. Favouring a blockade were McNamara, Rusk, Thompson and Ball. Both groups prepared position papers making the case for their preference.

3.Over the next couple of days, RFK moved towards the blockade option as a first step – he didn’t like the idea of attacking without warning - and brought the two groups together. By Sat 20th RFK was firmly in the blockade camp.

4.CIA estimated that the Soviets probably had effective missiles in Cuba so any military action would entail the risk of a nuclear launch.

5.After five days of discussion, the blockade option carried the vote (which now included Adlai Stevenson back from the ).

6.JFK told his friend David Ormsby-Gore he thought the existence of nuclear arms made a secure and rational world impossible … not just politically impossible but too dangerous

7.RFK’s Justice Dept guys took the view that the Jupiters in Turkey would have to be given up in the end as the price of settlement

8.Sunday 21st – the Soviets were still in the dark about the coming crisis, although they had detected increased US air and naval activity in the Caribbean.

Khrushchev reacts1.Khrushchev thought things might have worked out differently if he had gone along with

Castro’s request to disclose the Soviet-Cuban defence agreement back in August2.As of Mon 22nd, thirty ships were still en route to Cuba, carrying nuclear warheads and

missiles and the Foxtrot submarines were closing to Cuba3.The Kremlin wanted the four ships carrying R-14s to maintain course and the rest could

return to the USSR – but the Soviets didn’t tell Castro about curtailing shipments4.The Presidium (Politburo) considered the probability of war very high and raised the

armed forces alert level (and those of the other Warsaw pact armies)

The Risks1.The Soviet Commander in Cuba, General Pliyev was authorised to use the tactical

nuclear weapons in the event of a US landing, but could not fire the 1100-mile R-12s (IRBMs) without a direct order from Moscow.

2.The nuclear torpedoes carried by the four Foxtrot attack submarines could each knock out an aircraft carrier

3.Each Luna (tactical battlefield nuke) had a range of 31 miles and a two-kiloton nuclear payload. It was estimated that the plane over Hiroshima had a 14-KT payload.

NOTE: Nuclear firepower increases exponentially, not arithmetically


4.The Cruise (FKR) missiles carried roughly 12-KT – enough to blow a US aircraft carrier group apart. Of the eighty missiles with nuclear warheads originally ordered to be shipped, the Kremlin had already sent 36 to Cuba.

5.At the moment Kennedy signed the quarantine proclamation, all of the MRBMs, complete with warheads, were on the island and nearly operational

The Climax1.Daily News correspondent Frank Holeman called Bolshakov to suggest a meeting. RFK

wanted to use Bolshakov to sound out the Kremlin on a diplomatic solution – possibly involving a trade-off with the (intermediate range) Jupiters in Turkey

2.JFK made his televised speech on Monday 22nd3.Charles Bartlett also passed word to Bolshakov that the White House was considering a

trade with the Jupiters4.On the night of Tuesday 23rd, RFK went to see Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet

Ambassador’s office5.RFK asked what instructions were given to the Soviet ships headed for Cuba in the light

of JFK’s ‘quarantine’ speech. Dobrynin did not know.6.On Wednesday 24th, US Strategic Air Command was placed on nuclear alert – the

changes were transmitted en clair and the radio signals were picked up by the GRU office in the Soviet Embassy

7. On Thursday 25th – Khrushchev told the Presidium that he wanted to order the missile transports on the high seas to turn around and to present the Americans with a plan to defuse the crisis – he was convinced that the Soviets could not keep missiles on Cuba without war – he suggested a non-invasion pledge in return for removing the missiles and allowing the UN to inspect and verify the sites.

Why did Khrushchev back down?1.A sense of the military inferiority of the Soviet Union2.JFK’s actions showed he was not deterred by the missiles which had already arrived on

Cuba3.On Friday 26th the Kremlin thought the US was growing impatient and preparing to strike

very soon – the Pentagon had put US forces on DEFCON 2 and the GRU knew of an order to US hospitals to prepare to receive casualties

4.Khrushchev did not believe John Kennedy was going to use force against the Soviet missiles

5.On Saturday 27th Castro believed an intervention was almost inevitable and would occur within 24-72 hours.

The Settlement1.Friday 26th – Khruschev’s ‘knot of war’ telegram2.Feklisov was the KGB Chief in Washington, he decided to engage in private diplomacy of

his own. He contacted John Scali, an ABC News journalist for a meeting. In Scali’s version, Feklisov offered that (a) the missiles would be dismantles and the sites open to US inspection, (b) Castro would promise never to receive offensive weapons, (c) the US would pledge not to invade Cuba.

3.It was thought for a generation that the Scali-Feklisov meetings played a role in the negotiations ending the crisis – they didn’t

4.By this time, the Excomm was split into two groups; one favouring a military option, the other a diplomatic one - only Stevenson, McClore (the arms control czar) and the JFK were still considering a negotiated settlement involving a trade of the Jupiter missiles. RSM was in favour of a limited air strike, Dillon wanted a broader air strike, Taylor wanted a massive airstrike on missile sites and airfields, McCone wanted a full invasion.


5.Although the Jupiters hadn’t been a determinative issue at all for Khrushchev presented the Soviets with a means of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat

6.Walter Lippman wrote a column advocating a swap with the Jupiters to end the crisis.7.Why didn’t Khrushchev announce the missiles were ready and threaten to use them if

the US invaded or launched an air strike – why didn’t he use them politically? In the heat of the crisis he backed away from threatening nuclear war.

8.Saturday 27th – JFK didn’t think he could avoid trading away the Jupiter missiles – he sent Robert to Dobrynin to seek a political solution to the fast-deteriorating crisis – offering an end to the blockade, a non-invasion pledge – and a delayed removal of the Jupiters without any public linkage

9.Khrushchev pushed the Presidium to accept the US offer – he urged a retreat from the prospect of nuclear war and the destruction of the human race.

10. Moscow cut the deal without consulting Havana – Castro knew nothing about the Jupiter part of the deal. He was furious.

Aftermath1.Kennedy’s ground-breaking American University speech, and his initiative to restart

arms control discussions, were welcomed by Khrushchev – a new modus Vivendi was emerging between the superpowers that brought the tension down a notch or two

2.Khrushchev agreed to a limited test ban (on atmospheric testing, which would not require any inspections).

3.In the summer of 1963, the two countries established a 24-hour comms link – the ‘hot line’

4. Bilaterally, beside the test ban, the superpowers had come to an agreement on the sale of wheat, announced reciprocal defence cuts, promised not to station nuclear weapons in space and agreed in a vague way to cooperate in space.

5.The legacy of the missile crisis was that Khrushchev and Kennedy were now willing to take risks for better relations

6.By Dec 1963, after the assassination, KGB analysts had concluded that an anti-Soviet coup d’état had occurred.

(e) Outcomes

JFK and USA1. JFK grew in stature and confience – he appeared tough at home (the Jupiter trade-off

remained secret)

Khrushchev and the USSR1. NK’s standing within the Krelin was impaired – his foreign policy looked erratic – the

CMC hastened his ouster in October 19642. NK’s claim to have ‘saved’ Cuba now appears valid3. Moscow resolved to catch up in nuclear competition ASAP so as to become invulnerable

to future US pressure.(a) Furious at having to back down and humiliated by having to submit to low-flight

inspections of departing missiles(b) US leaders rationalised this as a stabilising component of what RSM dubbed MAD(c) Nixon/Brezhnev enshrined it in a state of nuclear parity by 1972.

Castro and Cuba1. Castro was furious and Soviet-Cuban ties were strained2. Castro probably owed his regime’s long-term survival in part to JFK’s non-invasion

pledge (although didn’t Operation Mongoose continue?)


International Relations1. The crisis heralded an era of relative stability in superpower relations

(a) JFK’s American University speech emphasised the two nations’ common humanity and interest in avoiding nuclear ruin

(b) Washington and Moscow established an emergency hotline as a direct result of the CMC

(c) The relaxation of tensions fostered speculation that, had JFK and NK lasted in power longer, they might have ended the Cold War altogether.

2. Nuclear relations:(a) Superpowers agreed to a limited nuclear test ban treaty (August 1963)(which

pointed the way to a 1968 Non-proliferation pact)(b) French Air force General Pierre Gallois (instrumental in construction of French

nuclear arsenal) said the evolution and outcome of the CMC showed that nuclear weapons created a shared rationality, even with enemies

3. NK lost his appetite for the Berlin showdown he had been threatening.

The Not-so-goods1. Success in Cuba may have facilitated disaster in Vietnam

(a) Johnson’s national security team during Vietnam consisted of missile crisis veterans

(b) RSM admitted his experience of the quarantine directly influenced his thinking on the bombing of North Vietnam

(c) CMC inculcated confidence that calibrated force could compel communist capitulation – but this was a misreading – NK may have blinked but Castro certainly didn’t (he urged NK to use the nukes in the event of invasion) and Ho Chi Minh wouldn’t

3. Vietnam

(a) Significance3 million diedLongest US war

(b) Cause of Crisis1. US commitment expanded incrementally

(a) America went to war not from a single decision but from a series of small decisions over a period of 15 years:

(i) Feb 1950 – US decides to commit economic and military aid to France to suppress Vietminh revolution (led by Communists)

(ii) 1954 – after Geneva Conference, US commits to support South Vietnam(iii) 1965 - LBJ commits combat troops

2. The intersection of the dissolution of colonial empires and the start of the Cold War:(a) Among all the nationalist movements for independence from colonialism, the

Vietnamese movement was the only one directed by Communists(b) This had enormous consequences; it meant an anticolonialist movement

assumed global dimensions 3. The US perceived the war in Vietnam in terms of its own conflict with the Soviet Union

(a) From the outset the US viewed Ho Chi Minh as an instrument of a Soviet drive for world domination – this view was not challenged until the US was neck-deep in war

(b) Yet Ho’s revolution was initiated without external support (until 1949)


4. NSC-68, drafted in 1950 in response to the fall of China to Mao Zedong’s Communists and the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb

(a) Fundamental premise of NSC-68 is that the Soviet Union was seeking to impose its absolute authority on the rest of the world

(b) NSC-68 saw the world divided into two blocs, with a fragile balance of power between them and (misguidedly) assumed a zero sum game in which a gain by the Soviets was a loss by the USA

(c) Thus countries of previously only marginal importance suddenly took on great significance – hence the 1950 US commitment to help France suppress the Vietminh

5. Domino theory(a) The fall of Vietnam would cause the loss of all Indochina (Laos & Cambodia)

followed by all Southeast Asia (b) Loss of Southeast Asia would deny the US access to important raw materials and strategic waterways

(b) China seemed more aggressive than USSR – more committed to world revolution – and it was supporting North Vietnam (after ’49)

6. Kennedy-Johnson saw Vietnam in terms of a test case of US credibility (JFK sensitive to charges of appeasement but, unlike LBJ, unwilling to go to war over Vietnam)

7. All Presidents from Truman to Johnson assumed that the fall of Vietnam to Communism would have disastrous domestic political consequences, following the rancour over the ‘loss’ of China in 1949, which the Republicans exploited at the 1952 polls, it was thought no Democratic Admin could survive the loss of Vietnam

(c) Theories to explain US involvement1. Quagmire theory – (favoured by Schlesinger) - successive presidents took successive

steps to solve the problem, but embroiled the US deeper in the quagmire.2. Stalemate theory accuses presidents of knowing they couldn’t win yet continuing the

war simply to avoid being seen to be defeated – not wanting to be ‘the first president to lose a war’

3. The commitment trap – the commitment made to Vietnam by each president made it harder for their successors to exit without the US (and the president) losing face

4. Shared responsibility – unfair to blame presidents alone – responsibility shared by presidential advisers: State department, Defense, Joint Chiefs, CIA and ambassadors to Vietnam.

(d) Background1. Vietnam (within Indochina) was a French Colony.

(a) Japan conquered French Indochina during WW2 and was then defeated.(b) FDR oscillated as to the fate of French Indochina after the war, considered

establishing an international trusteeship (US-USSR-China) but offered it to France if they promised to steer it towards independence.

(c) US revulsion at colonialism was overtaken by US revulsion at communism so America decided to assist the French

(d) Ho Chi Minh led a nationalist-inspired but Communist directed anticolonial revolution, beginning in 1946 (check)

2. The US decided Vietnam was crucial and couldn’t be allowed to fall to Communism(a) In 1950 US committed to support France to suppress the Viet Minh revolution(b) In 1954 France, a colonial power, was defeated at Dien Bien Phu (despite US

backing) by a poor feudal nation(c) US undertook to support a non-communist govt in South Vietnam as a bulwark

against further soviet gains in the region.(d) Eisenhower motivated by Domino theory;


(e) Kennedy-LBJ:(i) US credibility in terms of determination to defend its vital interests against

aggression – to deter adversaries in other areas – idea of credibility rooted in Munich analogy

(ii) Also commitment to South Vietnam’s freedom and democracy3. Ho Chi Minh leader of North Vietnam – Washington saw him as an instrument of the

Communist block(a) Land reforms were instituted in the North – ‘rich peasants’ were persecuted and

imprisoned – this helped aggravate a refugee crisis – close to 1million fled south, encouraged by the US.

(b) 1950 The Communists created the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong), encouraged by Russia

(c) The Viet Cong assassinated Southern village leaders who supported Diem, in their thousands

4. Diem, leader of South Vietnam, was Catholic, anti-Communist, autocratic and intolerant of other religions.

(a) To isolate peasants from Viet Cong control, Diem had villages burned and villagers relocated to fortified ‘strategic hamlets’, built under US supervision – a policy so unpopular it won new recruits for the Viet Cong

(b) Diem’s regime and policies provoked much discontent (i) Buddhist monks burned themselves to death in protest at religious

intolerance(ii) There were waves of demonstrations in Saigon

(e) The Facts 1. 1954 France calls it a day and Vietnam is divided

(a) July 1954 - International peace conference, Geneva Accords, temporarily divided Vietnam and agreed that nationwide elections would be held in 1956.

(b) America opposed elections because (i) it feared that elections would not be free in the North, but also (ii) that even if elections were free, the Communists would gain control of a

unified Vietnam(c) 1955 – Diem renounces the Geneva Accords and declares the Republic of South

Vietnam. The elections never took place.(d) 1st Nov 1963, Diem overthrown by a group of South Vietnamese generals

3. JFK decides to pull all 16,000 advisers out of Vietnam by end 1963 (NSAM-263), on the basis of the McNamara-Taylor fact-finding mission and report

(a) 22nd Nov – President Kennedy assassinated(b) LBJ pledges to stay in Vietnam as long as it would take, and to do whatever

would be necessary to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency(c) Westmoreland takes charge of US war effort

4. 2nd and 4th August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incidents (second one didn’t happen)(a) 7th August Gulf of Tonkin resolution gave LBJ authority to increase US

involvement in the war5. Viet Cong were stepping up operations in South Vietnam – 170,000 operating in the

field – (a) Launched repeated attacks in central Saigon(b) South Vietnamese regimes came and went

6. Nov 1964 - LBJ won election by a landslide.7. Feb 1965 - Viet Cong attack on airbase at Pleiku, killing 8 Americans


(a) LBJ launched air campaign (Operation Rolling Thunder) against the North, aimed at boosting the morale of the south and forcing Ho Chi Minh to negotiate – it didn’t work

(b) Mar 1965 – first US troops landed at Da Nang (c) 3 weeks later, Vietcong bombed US embassy in Saigong(d) LBJ thought communist China was behind such attacks – but Russia was

supplying more aid to the North Vietnamese than China – N.VN pilots were being trained in Russia

(e) McNamara returned to Vietnam to assess the situation - (f) Aug LBJ extended airstrikes to within 10 miles of Chinese border

8. Jan 1968 Tet Offensive - massive attacks across South Vietnam during new year celebration

(a) US public was shocked to see US embassy overrun by Vietcong and fighting in streets of Saigon

(b) Fierce battle for US to recapture ancient city of Hue(c) Public opinion and voices of dissent (including RFK) grew louder(d) McNamara, disillusioned, was leaving office for the World Bank(e) LBJ declines to stand for another term

9. Mar 1968 peace negotiations began in Paris – deadlocked(a) US election campaign underway(b) Candidate Nixon’s emissaries made secret contact with South Vietnamese govt

and urged them to stand firm in peace negotiations as they would be assured a better deal under a Republican govt.

(c) Peace negotiations stalled and the US war in Vietnam lasted another 4 years – Americans were so cross when they realised how and slippery and self-interested republicans could be that they never voted for them again and the world became a far better place

10. Nixon takes office Jan 1969(a) March 1969 – May 1970 secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos(b) Vociferous public pressure to end the war of Vietnam – but support for Nixon at

75% (c) May 1970 Nixon ordered ground assault into Cambodia (back into South Vietnam

by June)(d) Violent protests on US campuses – National guardsmen shot dead 4 students at

Kent State University11. March 1972 North Vietnam launches a new offensive in South Vietnam – US responded

with more air attacks on North Vietnam, included Hanoi (also mined Haiphong) 12. October 1972 – US wants an agreement – US and Hanoi in broad agreement but South

Vietnam refused to sign.13. 1973 peace accords

(a) US exits from war but fighting between North and South did not stop14. Nixon resigns in August 197315. April 1975, Hanoi’s final offensive on Saigon – no help from Americans

(f) Mistakes1. By wrongly attributing the conflict in Vietnam to world communism and by rigidly

applying containment to Vietnam, US misjudged internal dynamics(a) The US intervened in a local struggle and elevated it into a major international

conflict


2. LBJ and RSM thought that if the US gradually ratcheted up the level of military pain, it would reach a point where the Vietnamese Communists would decide the costs were greater than the gains. This was wrong – Hanoi’s threshold for pain was higher than Washington could inflict

(g) Why couldn’t US win?1. The US was at the mercy of local forces – a determined adversary and a weak client2. Determined adversary

(a) Success would probably required the annihilation of North Vietnam, which was never the goal

(b) The US drastically underestimated the strength and staying power of its adversary

(i) Strength - VC skilfully employed the strategy of protracted war (already tested against the French)

(ii) Staying power – Vietnamese were prepared to absorb more punishment and fight on than the USA could inflict (the Vietnamese saw themselves as resisting another colonial power)

(c) LBJ feared pushing North Vietnam to total defeat for fear of provoking USSR or China to intervene, which might involve nuclear confrontation

(d) Extending the war even further would have raised the costs of the war out of proportion to the stakes and beyond affordability

(e) Decimating North Vietnam would have created a vacuum into which China could slip

(f) The only alternative was to create a viable South Vietnam, but this was probably impossible

2. Weak client(a) South Vietnam was not politically viable – no bombing or ground war could solve

that(b) South Vietnam was a disastrous place to experiment in nation-building as it

lacked many essential ingredients for nationhood – there was a limit to what the US could have achieved there

(c) Vietnamese economy decimated by first Indochina war against France(d) France destroyed the traditional political order and institutions(e) French departure left a gaping vacuum(f) South Vietnam was torn by conflicting ethnic/religious/political forces(g) The US could never find leaders capable of mobilizing these disparate forces(h) Rapid collapse of SV after US withdrawal in 1973 shows how little was

accomplished(i) The more the US did for SV, the more it induced dependency

3. It was tough-going militarily:(a) The capacity of air power to cripple a preindustrial society was quite limited(b) The war was fought in a climate and on a terrain which neutralised America’s

technological superiority4. Hearts and minds campaign was tough:

(a) Massive use of airpower destroyed the very society the US was purporting to save

(b) Americans, not knowing language or culture, had difficulty distinguishing friend from foe

5. After 1967, public disillusionment with the war (and rising death toll) placed major constraints on policymakers and produced pressures for de-escalation and withdrawal

6. It was a war without fixed objectives or distinct battlelines


(a) JFK rightly asked, how can we tell if we are winning? (b) The answer devised was the notorious body count – both corrupting and

unreliable as a measure of success7. For all these reasons, it was a classic no-win situation

(h) Explanation of Resolution

(i) Outcomes1. The dominoes did not fall in South East Asia2. Spurred on by American failure, the Soviets intervened in civil wars in Angola, Zaire and

Ethiopia – and entered their own quagmire in Afghanistan3. Didn’t the bombing of Cambodia help bring the murderous Khmer Rouge to power

(backed by China)? (a) To install a friendly government next door, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 to

drive Pol Pot out of power and establish a puppet regime(b) China retaliated by invading Vietnam

4. The South Vietnamese suffered oppression, forced labour, re-education camps and 1.5 million boat people fled – around half resettled in the USA

5. Long after the end of the war, Vietnam remained dependent on the Soviet Union6. The Vietnam war was also among the most debilitating in US history

(a) 58,000 killed in action(b) Economic cost estimated at $167 billion(c) Vietnam war triggered inflation(d) Vietnam and Watergate undermined public confidence in govt(e) Temporarily crippled the US military(f) Temporarily estranged the US from much of the rest of the world(g) It challenged the US self-image – Americans had seen themselves as benevolent

and thought nothing was beyond reach7. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam war looks like a tactical defeat in what

turned out to be a strategic victory – a lost battle in a Cold War eventually won

4. 1973 Yom Kippur War

(a) Significance1. US actions (massive resupply of ISrael and publicly blaming Russia) damaged détente 2. Oil crisis of 1973

(a) OPEC doubled prices and reduced output (accounted for half world oil supply)(b) Saudi Arabia (or OPEC?) embargoed exports to US for supporting Israel in YK war(c) Fuel prices rocketed, industry slumped, inflation soared, US gas-guzzling motor

industry rocked by cheaper foreign car imports3. Superpowers on alert:

(a) All Soviet airborne divisions were held on standby(b) US armed forces were put on global alert

4. Forced Israel to begin peace negotiations (a) Before YK war, Dayan had referred to Suez canal as a permanent border of Israel

(speech, April 1973)

(b) Causes of Crisis1. Israel still occupied Sinai and Golan since Six-Day War in 19672. Egypt armed by Soviet Union


(a) Nasser had obtained arms from Czech in 1955(b) In five years before YK war, Soviets had supplied the Arabs with $2.6bn in arms,

while the US provided Israel with about half that sum(c) By end 1970 there were 20,000 Soviet advisors in Egypt, followed by pilots(d) After the YK war, the Soviets replaced about $4bn worth of arms to Egypt and

Syria (’74)

(c) The Facts

Day 1 (6th October)1. Egyptian/Syrian coordinated surprise attack on 6th October 1973 to regain Sinai +

Golan(a) Egypt undertook one of the most intense artillery barrages in history along

the 100-mile front of the Suez canal(b) 200 Egyptian planes flew sorties against Israeli airfields and command

centres behind the vaunted Bar-Lev line (the Israeli system of towers, trenches and revetments, or barricades, in the Sinai)

(c) The Egyptians used water-cannons to ‘melt’ through Israeli sand ramparts(d) Syrians temporarily retook the Golan Heights

2. Neither the Israelis nor the US believed war was imminent – they did not think Egypt would launch a war it could not win

3. Meanwhile, in the US, things were difficult:(a) VP Spiro Agnew was resigning after being charged with corruption, (b) Nixon was tussling with the special Watergate prosecutor, Archibald Cox, in

an effort to prevent the release of White House tapes which revealed Nixon’s complicity in the Watergate cover-up

(c) It was Kissinger’s first diplomatic season as Secretary of State(d) There was little the US could do except urge the Soviets to ‘restrain our

respective friends’ and assemble the Sixth Fleet in the Med to be prepared for any contingency

(e) Both Nixon and Kissinger assumed Israel would make quick work of the Egyptian army within 3-5 days

Day 4 (Tues 9th October)1. By the fourth day of the war, the Israeli army faced the prospect of catastrophic

collapse of their forces, maybe even defeat(a) Moshe Dayan was so shaken he told Israeli journalists that Israel might be

destroyed(b) Golda Meir put Israel’s nuclear forces on alert

2. Nixon and Kissinger’s handling of the crisis(a) When Kissinger got to Nixon on Day 4 (Tues 9th Oct) he was determined to

undermine US restraint by raising an exaggerated alarm(b) Clearly, the US wouldn’t allow Israel to lose(c) For Nixon, the issue was how to calibrate the US resupply of munitions to

limit the war and force the Israelis to reconsider whether the conquest of 1967 had brought security

(d) Although Nixon regarded as important the distinction between defending Israel and defending her 1967 conquests, Kissinger (who normally admired subtlety in FP) dismissed the distinction as irrelevant ‘fine tuning’

(e) Nixon initially rejected any large-scale airlift of tanks and heavy weaponry to Israel (instead he said he would replace them after the war); instead he planned to quietly deliver a modest (circa 5,000 tons) amount of


consumables – ammunition, missiles, mortars, shells – so as not to upset the Arabs

(f) Around the same time, the Russians also decided on a modest resupply of the Arabs – essential items only – no massive infusions that would tip the scales

(g) Kissinger warned the Israeli ambassador the Nixon was planning to press the UN Security Council for a ceasefire resolution that would lock in Arab gains – the implication was clear – the Israelis had only a few days to erase the Arab gains before they would be confronted with ceasefire demands from the superpowers

Day 5 (Weds 10th Oct) 1. The Egyptians had stopped across the waterway but was not moving into Sinai2. The Israelis were bombing Syrian population centres in Damascus and Homs3. The Russians wanted to know why the Egyptians weren’t moving into the Sinai to

secure strategic points, and suspected (rightly) that they wanted to turn to the US4. Nixon favoured a ceasefire to lock-in Arab gains and avoid an oil embargo5. The Russians contacted Brent Scowcroft (Kissinger’s deputy at the time) to say

they wouldn’t vote against a UNSC ceasefire resolution

Day 7 (Friday 12th October)1. Israel had advanced to within 30 miles of Damascus but had been forced to halt

their offensive because of munitions shortages (a) the Soviets, suspecting that Israel would attack and topple the Assad

regime, put three airborne divisions on alert(b) It was unclear whether Israel could also launch a counterattack on the

Egyptian front2. The modes US resupply effort failed and Nixon/Kissinger came under fire:

(a) Kissinger, the White House and the Israelis were mismanaging the limited US resupply of war materiel that Nixon had approved. Poor weather, reluctant air carriers who didn’t want to antagonize Arab states.

(b) Golda Meir sent a personal message to Nixon pleading for immediate assistance.

(c) Senator Henry Jackson was threatening a Congressional Investigation into whether the Administration had bungled the US commitment to protect Israel (Tyler, p.151)

(d) A newspaper story questioned the Administration’s support for Israel (Tyler p.151)

Day 9 (Sunday 14th October)1. For domestic political reasons, Nixon panicked, abandoned restraint and approved

a massive US airlift to resupply Israel (around 25,000 T)(a) signalled an abandonment of the posture above the fray in the spirit of

détente (b) The US pretext was that the Russians had foiled peace negotiations and

sent in massive arms, and that the US resupply was only to maintain the balance – was not only untrue but damaged US-Soviet relations

Day 12 (Weds 17th October)1. OPEC announces a 5% cut in oil production – and further 5% cuts each month until

Israel gave up Arab lands seized in 1967


2. OPEC ministers, angered by America’s open support for Israel, voted to raise the price of crude by 70%

Day 13 (Thurs 18 October)1. The Soviets proposed a new ceasefire plan calling for Israeli withdrawal to the

1967 borders.

Day 14 (Friday 19 October)1. White House message to Congress asking for a special $2.2bn appropriation to

pay for the arms being shipped to Israel, which incited an intense reaction from the Arabs

2. Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon, suggesting he send Kissinger to Moscow at once to work out a ceasefire – Kissinger departed that night

Day 15 (Sat 20 October) 1. Saudi Arabia announced a total embargo of crude oil exports to the US2. Trouble was that Israel didn’t want anything –the US airlift had eliminated any

notion of leverage – Israel got what it wanted from the US without concessions3. ‘War, embargo and constitutional crisis gripped Washington’ (Tyler p.160)4. Nixon sent a message to Kissinger, instructing him that

(a) a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was their most important final goal

(b) Nixon wanted Brezhnev to know that he would be prepared to pressure the Israelis to the extent required, and to hell with the domestic political consequences

(c) He wanted Brezhnev to know that only the US and the USSR had the power and influence to create the permanent conditions necessary to avoid another Middle East war (i) the Arabs and Israelis could not approach the subject in a rational

manner(ii) The superpowers must determine the proper course to a just settlement

and then pressure their respective friends to agree(d) Kissinger refused to deliver this message to Brezhnev

(i) Kissinger argued it would be hard enough to get Israel to agree to a ceasefire, let alone a global settlement, but Israel had already privately assured him it would agree to a ceasefire if Kissinger would fly to Tel Aviv after Moscow

(ii) The threat for Kissinger was that Nixon’s message would revive détente, which would put them in the firing line from DC conservatives who dismissed détente as naivety towards the Soviet Union

(iii) Kissinger’s refusal was ‘a betrayal of American diplomacy’ – it denied Brezhnev the gesture of respect that Nixon aimed to extend at a crucial moment in US-Soviet relations

(iv) Kissinger regarded the message as damaging to his own self-interest – it would have thrown him into the thankless role of applying pressure on Israel and the inflexible Golda Meir

Day 17 (Monday 22 October)1. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire within 12

hours(a) Israel and Egypt kept fighting, struggling for last-minute advantage

2. Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv to meet with Golda Meir


(a) Instead of preparing them for compromise as Nixon had wanted, he reinforced their intransigence

(b) Kissinger said Israel had won a great victory and gained more Arab land(c) He gave the Israelis a green light to keep fighting and encouraged the

Israelis to violate the ceasefire even if the Egyptians complied(d) He told Meir that UN Resolution 242, calling for withdrawal from occupied

territories was a joke and Israel should hold out for its land-for-peace only in direct negotiations with the Arabs

3. Within 24 hours the Israelis had encircled the Egyptian Third Army and Sadat petitioned the US and USSR jointly to insert a military force into the Sinai to police the ceasefire

(a) Dobrynin said the Kremlin wanted troops to get between the opposing armies

(b) Kissinger said the US would veto any resolution calling for superpower intervention but did not call Nixon

(c) Brezhnev drafted a direct appeal to Nixon, urging that the superpowers act together to enforce the ceasefire or, if they US wouldn’t act jointly, the Soviets would consider the question of doing so unilaterally

(d) Instead of telling Nixon that he had given the Israelis the green light to keep fighting, or to tell him that the Israelis would soon start bombing Suez as a cover to rescue a trapped paratroop unit, he depicted Brezhnev’s message as a challenge to a crippled president

(e) Haig told Kissinger off for not informing the President before responding to the Soviet message – Haig thought the Soviets were acting in good faith

(f) Kissinger was against a cooperative act and said Senator Jackson had called to protest violently against any concept of a joint US-Soviet force, although this wasn’t true – he had merely enquired about the truth of reports of a joint force

(g) Kissinger convened and ran an NSC meeting while Nixon was drunk in bed – the consensus was for drafting a forcible reply that the US would not tolerate a unilateral Soviet deployment to the Middle East and they would raise the level of alert for US forces to DEFCON 3 to show they were ready for confrontation

(h) Kissinger fomented the confrontation with the Soviets to buy extra time for the battlefield to settle in Israel’s favour

4. In a conversation with Nixon, Kissinger told him nothing to bring him up to date about the mounting crisis – instead Nixon focused on how to convince the Senate to grant Moscow MFN trade status to reward Brezhnev’s constructive behaviour and boost détente – Nixon was extolling the triumph of the ceasefire and the success of détente

5. Kissinger sent a message to Brezhnev in Nixon’s name, saying any unilateral action by the Soviet Union would be regarded by the US “as a matter of the gravest concern involving incalculable consequences”

The Politics1. Why did Egypt attack?

(a) the Arabs were not seeking all-out victory but a credible showing against a superior Israeli army to attract sustained superpower diplomacy and the return of Arab lands

(b) They knew Israel was now a full-fledged nuclear power(c) They knew they could not defeat the Jewish state


(d) Sadat had told the Soviet leadership that this would be a war of ‘limited objectives’

2. On Day 2 (Sunday 7) Golda Meir asked Kissinger to delay any ceasefire discussions at the UN by 3 or 4 days so the Israelis would have time to achieve a position of attack rather than defence

3. Kissinger told Nixon that if the US did not ‘break ranks’ with Israel, then Israel would be beholden to him in the future

4. Nixon admonished Kissinger to stay more aloof from the Israelis – he didn’t want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states would break ranks and join the fighting

5. Nixon told Kissinger that the US must come out of the war with a permanent settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute, because he didn’t’ want it to hang over for another 4 years! He was determined not to be at odds with the Arab world

6. Kissinger convened a meeting of top national security advisers on Tues 9 Oct (a) Defense Sec James Schlesinger challenged Kissinger – why would they

intervene when the battle favoured the Arabs, who were fighting to retake their lands?

(b) Schlesinger was positing a critical choice for US national interest but Kissinger was too partisan to take it on board

(c) the US was committed to defend Israel’s survival but it was not bound to protect the conquests of 1967.

(d) A strategy of US restraint (the CIA said Israel could hold its own) would show Israel it was no longer possible to hold on to their conquests

(e) Kissinger argued that an Arab defeat of Israel (using Soviet arms) would skew the political and strategic equilibrium in the Middle East – but the war showed there was no equilibrium, rather instability that could only be overcome by superpower pressure to get a permanent peace settlement – the 1967 war results had so polarised the region

7. Pressure was building among Arab states to use the oil weapon against the US, particularly if Israel began to score victories and if the US is actively resupplying Israel

8. Kissinger was telling the Israelis that Nixon was under unbelievable UN and Arab pressure to end the war, and the main thing for Israel to do was to push the Arab armies back to their starting lines so the war could end in stalemate

9. Kissinger was pressing Haig and Scowcroft for thirty-six hours for Israel to gain enough ground on the Syrian front before a ceasefire so that it wouldn’t look like a disaster for Israel or a victory for Egypt on the strength of Soviet arms

10. Détente was giving way to Kissinger’s argument that Israel had to win so that the Soviets would lose, which was a perversion of US interests since the Soviets had made overtures to head off the crisis and work cooperatively towards a permanent peace settlement

11. Saudi threatened to send the major part of its army to support Syria – the Pentagon saw this as a catastrophe – if Israel destroyed the Saudi army, both superpowers might lunge towards the Persian Gulf to protect now-vulnerable Saudi oil

12. The US Airlift(a) The massive airlift shifted US policy so transparently towards Israel that it

undermined the US image in the region that Eisenhower had established(b) This prompted an oil embargo that ravaged western economies(c) It undermined détente as a realistic vehicle for joint action(d) It emboldened Israel’s militarist instinct, already growing with its nuclear

arsenal and its political influence in Washington


Other Crises

1948-49 Berlin Blockade and Air Lift

1953 Crisis in East Germany 1. Stalin had chosen Walter Ulbricht as rule of East Germany

(a) Like Stalin, Ulbrict tolerated no opposition(b) The Stasi had informants everywhere(c) Censorship prevailed

2. Heavy industry was built up to meet the demands of the Soviet economy but everyday needs were neglected

(a) The average person lived badly – coal was rationed, electricity for domestic use was simply not available

(b) The morale of the population was very low(c) Workers were constantly pressured to increase output to meet production targets

3. East Germany was unable to stop thousands of people deserting to the West 4. After the death of Stalin, the Kremlin ordered Ulbricht to soften his rigid policies 5. June 1953 - Popular anger exploded

(a) Strikes and mass demonstrations erupted in the streets of East Berlin to protest at work quota increases

(b) Demonstrators tore down Soviet symbols(c) Govt authority in East Berlin collapsed(d) The Soviets were astonished that Ulbricht had allowed the crisis to get out of

control(e) Soviet troops quelled the revolt throughout East Germany –

(i) Tanks on the streets in East Berlin – demonstrators were shot in the streets(ii) about 40 killed and thousands arrested(iii) The Soviet sector of Berlin was closed off from the rest of the city for the

first time6. The situation was stabilised and Ulbricht went to Germany – the Soviet leadership

decided to stick with Ulbricht7. The West didn’t want to get involved

1956 Poznan Strikes and Riots (June 1956)1. Eastern European countries were allowed by USSR to find their own way to socialism on

two conditions:(a) They were not to leave the bloc(b) They were not to undermine Soviet rule

2. Religion (power of Catholic Church), nationalism and democratic aspirations posed problems

3. Clients looked to USSR to bolster them against domestic reformers4. Poznan protests (June 1956)

(a) Unrest partly encouraged by propaganda broadcasts from the West – Radio Free Europe.

(b) Poznan workers went on strike to demand bread, liberty, freedom for the Catholic Church and an end to Soviet domination

(c) Protest was met with violent repression by Polish government – tanks sent in, 74 people killed

(d) It was a blow to the regime that it was the workers who protested, not the intellectuals whom they feared


(e) West decided against intervention to avoid causing more suffering and risking war

5. Polish Communist reformers and Gomulka:(a) Backed by Polish workers, reformers in the Communist party made radical

demands, including withdrawal of Soviet troops(b) Without consulting Moscow, the reform-minded Polish communists backed

Gomulka as their new leader(i) Gomulka was a patriotic communist who had been imprisoned by Stalin in

1948(ii) G wanted an end to Soviet domination and for Polish communists to decide

their country’s future6. Soviet Intervention

(a) Fearful of an anti-Russian revolt, Moscow ordered Soviet troops to advance to Warsaw

(b) Khrushchev and high-level delegation visited Warsaw to show Gomulka who was boss and to threaten Soviet troops

(c) Khrushchev accused the Polish Communist leadership of wanting to break away and said he wouldn’t allow it

(d) Gomulka, with backing of Polish army and people, won his argument with Khrushchev

(e) The Deal:(i) Gomulka and Polish élite reassure Soviet leaders that they could manage the

unrest without Soviet intervention(ii) Gomulka threatened Polish troops would resist Soviet troops(iii) Gomulka promised Poland would remain a loyal member of the Warsaw

pact – faithful in ideology and foreign affairs(iv) In return he secured greater freedom of action in Polish domestic affairs

and (v) Soviet troops were ordered back to barracks(vi) Soviets agreed to ease agricultural collectivization, some independence for

Catholic church(f) Russians push for once-purged reformers to be promoted to prevent unrest from

spreading to East Germany (possibly sparking Western intervention)(g) Gomulka becomes nationalist Polish leader – confirmed by Soviet Union as First

Secretary of the Polish Communist Party in Oct 1956(h) Gomulka’s promise of a freer, more Polish Poland calmed the demonstrators

1956 Hungarian Uprising1. In Hungary, Rakoczi was a hard-line Stalinist dictator – he killed and imprisoned his

rivals(a) After Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership disapproved of Rakoczi(b) Mikoyan was sent to Hungary to tell him that the Soviet leadership had decided

Rakoczi was ill, needed treatment in Moscow and had to resign2. Reformers in the Hungarian Communist party wanted a new leader more independent

from Moscow and backed Imre Nagy, a reform-minded communist(a) Nagy had already been Hungarian leader 1953-55(a) Nagy had abolished internment camps and amnesty for political prisoners(b) Nagy’s ‘New Course’ in socialism comprised social and economic reforms(d) The Kremlin disapproved and Nagy had been sacked

3. Then Hungarians hear news of the Polish uprising.


(a) Like the Poles, they tried to get Nagy returned to power.(b) 300k protestors in Budapest demonstrated, calling for Nagy’s return to power(c) Student and worker protestors demanded free speech, the disbanding of the

secret police and the withdrawal of Soviet troops – they toppled monument to Stalin

(d) Nagy’s support came from students, workers and army, but police were loyal to the government

4. By October, there was a split between the majority who supported Nagy and those who supported his predecessor Rakoczi

(a) Andropov, in the Soviet embassy in Budapest, warned Moscow it felt uneasy and favoured backing the hardliners, but Khrushchev thought he could cope with the situation

(b) In 1955 Nagy criticised for being a ‘right wing deviationist’, removed from office and expelled from the Communist Party.

(c) Soviets prevaricated Summer-Autumn 1945 over which camp to back.5. Soviets Intervene

(a) On 23rd Oct, Communist leadership appeals for Soviet help to quash revolt. (b) Soviet soldiers and tanks on Hungarian city streets quashed uprising.(c) Hungarian civilians stood their ground with Molotov cocktails and rifles during

four days of fighting(d) Unlike in Poland, the Nagy govt appeals for NATO help and tries to hold out for

independence(e) Many western Communists tore up Party cards in protest at the repression(f) Imre Nagy arranged a ceasefire – the Soviets agreed to withdraw troops

4. Nagy was brought back as Prime Minister – the Hungarians thought they had won their revolution for freedom

(a) He formed a new government which include non-communists(b) Announced end of one-party system(c) Free trades unions were allowed(d) Un-censored newspapers went on sale(e) Nagy announced withdrawal from Warsaw Pact and asked US for guarantee of

neutrality(f) Communist party offices were destroyed and secret police were lynched (g) Nagy’s threat to leave Warsaw Pact would have undermined the stability of the

whole Soviet sphere of influence … so might Poland, then Czech …5. This was too much for Soviets to accept

(a) On 4th November Soviet soldiers with 6,000 tanks re-entered Budapest. (b) Heavy fighting for a week – thousands were killed and the revolution was crushed(c) Nagy took sanctuary in Yugoslav embassy, was tricked out, arrested, taken to

Romania and executed.6. Soviets reinforced the iron curtain – a clear message to satellites that attempts to move

too far from the Soviet idea of Communism would no longer be tolerated by Moscow.(a) Khrushchev’s position at home was tenuous and he had to put on a show of

strength over Hungary(b) Khrushchev thought it unlikely West would intervene over Hungary

(i) France and Britain had just invaded Egypt and the eyes of the world were on Suez, so Russia could act with impunity

(ii) The West would not risk world war – it signalled that Hungary was regarded as within the Eastern sphere


(iii) There were Presidential elections in the USA, Eisenhower did no more than protest

7. Role of China in this crisis(a) China was considering rapprochement with the USSR(b) Mao didn’t like de-Stalinisation or attack on cult of personality(c) China urged Khrushchev to use force against Hungarian reformers

1960, U-2 Spy Plane shot down over Russia

1961, Berlin Wall 1. Soviets wanted to keep East Germany as showcase of Communist progress and prevent

it from being subsumed within the FDR economic system2. Tens of thousands of 18-30 year-old well-educated East German taxpayers were leaking

into the West3. Stalin’s solution had been to make the East German work harder to become more

prosperous(a) Industrial workers protested new practices and higher food prices

4. Beria and Malenkov were reluctant to subsidize East Germans and thought a properly neutral East Germany should be considered.

(a) East German leadership panicked that they would be voted out of a neutral East Germany and so aligned to topple Beria.

(b) Khrushchev emerged strongly after backing East German leaders.(c) Since USSR security was tied to that of East Germany, Ulbricht only had to

squeeze to make Khrushchev squeal!(d) Khrushchev backed GDR and misread his capacity to face down the West. (in

what?)5. By 1960-61the population haemorrhage from East Germany had become an existential

crisis for the GDR.(a) JFK stands up to Khrushchev at Vienna(b) the West hints that the wall would be met with protest but not force

6. 1961 Operation Rose – erection of barrier. (a) a propaganda victory for the West(b) stabilizes the East German crisis(c) JFK describes the wall as one hell of a lot better than a war (there were thermo-

nuclear weapons by now)(d) Two-state solution emerges piecemeal

1961, Bay of Pigs

1968, Prague Spring1. Economically, Czechoslovakia had been doing well before WW2 and before Communism

(a) By 1968 the economy was in severe decline and people were dissatisfied with their standard of living

2. Leader was Novotny, a Soviet hardliner(a) There was growing opposition to Novotny within the ranks of the communist

party in Czechoslovakia(b) Novotny invited Brezhnev to visit and shore up his support but when B saw the

extent of opposition to Novotny, he declined to support him(c) Novotny was ousted by Dubcek

3. Prague spring followed:


(a) Dubcek sought to create ‘socialism with a human face’(b) Commemoration and celebration of nationalist holidays(c) Liberalisation of the media, including permitting criticism of the government(d) Foreign travel allowed(e) Dubcek sought to eliminate the most repressive features of communist society(f) Reforms brought pressure for greater reforms and concern grew that the

Communists could lose their grip on the country4. Soviets, and particularly the East Germans, became concerned that the communist

party would lose control of Czechoslovakia(a) Feared Czechoslovakia would defect from the Warsaw Pact – despite Dubcek’s

repeated protestations of loyalty5. Whole Politburo visited Czechoslovakia and forced Dubcek to agree to roll back his

reforms July 1968 (a) Dubcek forced to agree to reinstate censorship

6. Dubcek’s agreement was too late – Soviets had already decided to take over(a) August 1968 – Soviet tanks entered Prague(b) Dubcek arrested but later returned to his post(c) The Moscow Protocols were signed and the Prague Spring reforms were reversed

over a period of several months(d) In 1970 he was expelled from the communist party and lost his seat in the

parliament

Bibliography[1] Pelopidas, French Nuclear Idiosyncrasy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs

24(4), as yet unpublished.On the Missile Crisis Fursenko & Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, Hershberg, ‘The Cuban

Missile Crisis’ in Cambridge History of the Cold War (Vol 2, Ch.4), James Blight and Joseph Nye, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited’ in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1987)

On Vietnam, mainly Sanders, The USA and Vietnam: 1945-1975, Herring, ‘America and Vietnam, the Unending War’ in Foreign Affairs and Mac Bundy, ‘Vietnam, Watergate and Presidential Powers’ in Foreign Affairs

On Yom Kippur, mainly Tyler, A World of Trouble

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