IR - II · China India Water Related Issue China’s grand plans to harness the waters of the...

MP2-IR-19-02

INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

PART-2

Unit - 1: India’s Strategic Partners

India-U SA RelationsIndia-China Relations India-Russia Bilateral RelationshipISRAEL Indo-Japan Bilateral RelationshipFrance Germany India-UK Relations India-Brazil Relations

Unit - 2: Multilateral Bodies & Treaties

The World Trade Organization International Monetary Fund Nuclear Security Summit ASEAN BRICS BIMSTEC Asian Infrastructure Investment BankIBSA Multilateral Negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons BanIndia Admitted to Australia GroupIAEA

Wassenaar Arrangement & IndiaThe Ukrain Issue Changes under trump administrationBlack Money Terrorist Organisations Syrian Civil War Migration Crisis in Europe Rohingya issues BREXIT Rising Protectionism & Currency WarsGreek Crisis Iran Nuclear Deal Yemen War & Implications

TOPICS

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Background of the Relationship 1949-1962

The post-independence history of Sino-Indian relation has been that of friendship, setback and normalization. India was the fi rst country in non-communist bloc to recognize China and establish diplomatic relations. India attained independence on 15 August 1947 after a long and nonviolent nationalist movement. China attained independence on October 1949 in the culmination of Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). There was a brief period of cooperation from 1949-1957 where diplomatic relations were formally established (1 April, 1950) and high-level visits were exchanged.Nehru greeted the birth of communist China in October with great pomp. In a rare gesture, India displayed excessive zeal in prompting its membership in United Nations. Nehru did not share the American perception that communism was a threat to world peace and stability. On the contrary, he believed that Western hatred of communism might boomerang, since nationalism in China was stronger than communism. The Indian Prime Minister was convinced that Chinese nationalism played a far better important part than communism and that Chinese civilization was too old to succumb completely to Marxist dogma. The early phase of Sino-Indian relation was marked by a close warm friendship, despite China’s military takeover of Tibet in 1950. Although the Indian government did not register a serious protest with Beijing, opposition leaders in parliament criticized Nehru’s policy on the Tibetan issue but he remained unmoved. He preferred to deal with monolithic China diplomatically by keeping it in check, and isolating it from USSR rather than coming into open confrontation with it. This strategy paid off. India was able to maintain peace and tranquility on its northeastern borders for over a decade.In 1954, India and China signed an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and had an exchange of notes. India thus signed away all its inherited privileges in Tibet by virtue of earlier pacts. The fi ve Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) and the Bandung Conference were highlights of Sino-Indian cooperation. However, the cooperation was not to last.By late 1950s, serious differences between the two states had begun to surface, particularly over the un-demarcated border. The unresolved border issue would lead to war by 1962. Zhou Enlai refused categorically to accept the McMahon line as the fi nal line of the border demarcation between India and PRC. To counter the Indian claim that Beijing had, in the past, never contested the legality of McMahan line, China argued that local Tibetan authorities had no legal rights to conclude any border treaty with the British. Moreover, China regarded the disputed Aksai China area as part of the Chinese province of Sinkiang and not Tibet. To the contrary, India contested that Chinese maps had never shown Sinkiang to extend south of the Kuentun range, which separated it from Tibet. Ultimately, border clashes led to the Sino-Indian war in October 1962.

INDIA-CHINARELATIONS

CHAPTER 2

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War of 1962 The immediate cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to be part of Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China’s construction of this road was one of the triggers of the confl ict.Various border confl icts and “military incidents” between India and China fl ared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962.

Recent Political Developments Cumulative outcomes of key visits in recent times have been transformational for the ties. These were that of Prime Minister Vajpayee [2003], of Premier Wen Jiabao [2005 & 2010], of President Hu Jintao [2006], of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [2008] and President Xi Jinping [2014] Modi visits - xi visit.During Vajpayee’s visit, the two sides signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and also mutually decided to appoint Special Representatives (SRs) to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective. During the April 2005 visit of Premier Wen Jiabao, the two sides established a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, while the signing of an agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, signaled the successful conclusion of the fi rst phase of SR Talks. During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, the two sides issued a Joint Declaration containing a ten-pronged strategy to intensify cooperation. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited China in January 2008. A joint document titled “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century” was issued during the visit. In March 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India for the BRICS Summit. The leaders of the two countries also met on the sidelines of various multilateral summits.Similarly the recent visit by the present Chinese President Xi Jinping boosted this efforts to a great extent. In the recent visit the Chinese President not only tried to boost the bilateral trade which had started showing signs of stagnation but also tried to underplay the alleged strategic designs of China in countering India as a regional player, rather pursued to make India a partner in Chinese global design.

Economic Relation India & China signed a Trade Agreement in 1984 which provided for Most Favoured Nation Treatment and later in 1994, the two countries signed an agreement to avoid double taxation. The India China trade relations have been further developed from 2006, with the initiation of the border trade between Tibet, an autonomous region of China and India through Nathu La Pass, reopened after more than 40 years. The bilateral trade crossed US$62 billion in 2012 from US$ 4.8 billion in 2002. China is now a member of the Bangkok Agreement and India has exchanged tariff preferences with it recently. There is perhaps a need to establish some mechanism for trade facilitation and addressing non-tariff barriers and to examine the potential and feasibility of a framework for liberalizing bilateral trade and investment.

Indian Exports

The principal items of Indian exports to China are ores, slag and ash, iron and steel, plastics, organic chemicals, and cotton. In order to increase the extent of exporting Indian goods to China, however, there should be a special emphasis on investments and trade in services and knowledge-based sectors. The other potential items of trade between India and China are marine products, oil seeds, salt, inorganic chemicals, plastic, rubber, optical and medical equipment, and dairy products. Great potential also exists in areas like biotechnology, IT and ITES, health, education, tourism, and fi nancial sector.

Chinese Exports

The main items that comprise Chinese exports to India are electrical machinery and equipment, cement, organic chemicals, nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, silk, mineral fuels, and oils. Value added items like electrical machinery dominates Chinese exports to India. This exhibits that Chinese exports to India are fairly diversifi ed and includes

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resource-based products, manufactured items, and low and medium technology products. It is said that if India is to capture the markets of China and enjoy profi ts, then it would have to discover new merchandise and branch out its exports to China.

Trade Defi cit with China The trade imbalance has touched USD 52 billion in 2016-17. If the trade imbalance has to be reduced then we need to encourage Chinese businessmen and investors to visit India frequently and seek investment opportunities. Visa liberalization has been held hostage by political considerations. China stapling VISA is a political act and it is not as a matter of visa policy. Our response must be political and not to kill trade and commerce by withholding the visa liberalization agreement.Both sides agreed for cooperation on pharmaceutical supervision including registration, stronger links between Chinese enterprises and Indian IT industry, and completion of phytosanitary negotiations on agro-products. In the recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping, China agreed to invest USD 20 Billion in India in various projects including industrial parks in Maharashtra and Gujrat. It will also have the favorable impact on balance of payment. Along with this the agreements cover a variety of areas including investments into the road and port infrastructure of India, cooperation in space and in nuclear energy, construction of industrial parks in India, joint efforts in combating terrorism, cultural cooperation and a twin cities agreement between Mumbai and Shanghai.

China India Water Related Issue China’s grand plans to harness the waters of the Brahmaputra River have set off ripples of anxiety in the two lower riparian states: India and Bangladesh. China’s construction of dams and the proposed diversion of the Brahmaputra’s waters is not only expected to have repercussions for water fl ow, agriculture, ecology, and lives and livelihoods downstream; it could also become another contentious issue undermining Sino-Indian relations.As with other rivers originating in the icy Tibetan plateau, Beijing’s plans for the Brahmaputra include two kinds of projects. The fi rst involves the construction of hydro-electric power projects on the river and the other, more ambitious project, envisages the diversion of its waters to the arid north. It maintains that all these are run-of-the-river projects that involve no storage or diversion and that they will not affect the river’s downstream fl ow into northeast India. Still, its plans have generated apprehensions in India’s Northeast and in Bangladesh, where the Brahmaputra is a veritable lifeline and a core part of the cultural life here.Fuelling anxiety over the Chinese dams on the Brahmaputra is the impact that a reduction of the fl ow of the Ganges has had on millions in the region. The increased salinity of soil has adversely impacted agriculture and over the last several decades. Will a reduction in the fl ow of the Brahmaputra add fuel further migration in India from Bangladesh?

Northward Rerouting More worrying than China’s construction of hydropower dams on the Brahmaputra is the proposed northward rerouting of its waters at the Great Bend. This diversion would result in a signifi cant drop in the river’s water level as it enters India. It will have a serious impact on agriculture and fi shing in the downstream areas as the salinity of water will increase.Besides the technological challenges, there are fi nancial and environmental costs that stand in the way of implementing the water diversion plan.Apart from that, it is the Brahmaputra’s tributaries in India and the heavy rainfall here that provides roughly 70 percent of the water volume of the Brahmaputra River. Analysts predict that “water wars” could break out between India and China. “Upstream dams, barrages, canals, and irrigation systems can help fashion water into a political weapon that can be wielded overtly in a war, or subtly in peacetime to signal dissatisfaction with a co-riparian state.

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Even denial of hydrological data in a critically important season can amount to the use of water as a political tool.Other experts reject predictions of a Sino-Indian war over the Brahmaputra. China and India see themselves as responsible regional and global powers and a war of any kind between them will not only set back bilateral relations but also damage their reputations internationally. At the moment, this is not a cost that either side is willing to pay, experts argue.

Trans-Rivers Agreement Major dams by China are

A 640 MW dam will be built in Dagu, 18 km upstream of Zangmu. 320 MW dam will be built at Jiacha, also on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputura downstream of Zangmu.At Jiexu, 11 km upstream of Zangmu. Zangmu; a 510 MW run-off the river project.

India China inked Trans-Border River Agreement (TBRA) in October, 2013. The pact extends a previous MoU to provide hydrological data in the fl ood season to cover a longer time period. It has expanded the scope to discuss other issues of mutual interest.There is a need for Water Sharing Agreement on the lines of Indus Water Treaty. China always maintained that cross border rivers are being developed with extra responsibility.

“String of Pearls Strategy” The tankers that move through Indian Ocean carry 80 percent of China’s oil, 65 percent of India’s and 60 percent of Japan’s, making those waters crucially important to three of Asia’s great powers. A signifi cant slowdown in tanker traffi c — whether from diplomatic standoff, piracy or war — could cripple these countries.

A string of pearls (SOP) strategy is a strategic move that involves establishing a series of nodes of military and economic power throughout a region. Each node is a “pearl” in the string, enhancing the overall power of the parent nation.Under SOP, China increasing access to airfi elds and ports either by subsiding or by cordial relationship or leasing. These include a facility in Gwadar and a port in Karachi (both in Pakistan); a container facility in Chittagong (Bangladesh); and ports in Myanmar along with Hambantota and Colombo (Srilanka).

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Developing better diplomatic relations is also a crucial step in this strategy. Since the strategy may rely on linking a series of pearls, it is important to ensure that each pearl is also safe, and that it will not be threatened by neighboring nations.SAGARMALA is an initiative fl oated by the Government of India to evolve a model of port led development which will transform India’s coastline as gateways of India’s prosperity. The concept of Sagar mala was fi rst announced in 2003. However it didn’t take off. The concept has been reintroduced now and the Ministry of Shipping is the nodal point for implementing the project. The initiative aims at integrating three things-the development of ports, industrial clusters and hinterland and effi cient evacuation systems through road, rail, inland and coastal waterways. The Sagar mala initiative, therefore, focuses on:

Modernisation of port infrastructure- transforming the existing ports to world class ports and development of new ports; Effi cient evacuation system by improving hinterland linkages through rail, road and water; and Encouraging coastal economic development by promoting port based SEZs and ancillary industries.

To realise the objectives of Sagar Mala, two broad strategies have been outlined: development of coastal economic regions and promotion of coastal shipping.A coastal economic region will be identifi ed as a region along the length of the state’s coast (300-500 km) and 10-30 km inland and into the sea. This is to widen the span of economic activity in the region. Sagar mala envisages formation of ten coastal economic regions along the coastline.Sagar mala initiative would encourage coastal shipping and inland waterways as main carriers of people and goods which is very essential to improve India’s sea borne traffi c. With a coastline of 7,500 km, India’s seaborne traffi c is only 950 million tonnes whereas China has a seaborne traffi c of 9 billion tonnes with a coastline of 15,000km.

Write a note on the following in not more than 100 words:

Cold-Peace(a)

Practice Question

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APPENDIX-ICHINA’S MARITIME SILK ROUTE

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

In recent days, China’s proposal for a Maritime Silk Route (MSR) has been a subject of speculation and debate. Beijing’s plan for a maritime infrastructure corridor in the broader Indo-Pacifi c region, fi rst proposed by President Xi Jinping’s during his trip to Southeast Asia in October 2013, has attracted attention because of its potential to establish a Chinese foothold in the Indian Ocean. Needless to say, China’s outreach to India - inviting it to join the project - has generated much analytical curiosity.The fi rst thing of interest about the MSR is that it was initially mooted as an ASEAN-centered project. The intention then was to enhance connectivity and cultural links in China’s strategic backyard - the South China Sea. Beijing later expanded the scope of the project to include the Indian Ocean, but in reaching out to Colombo and New Delhi, it found a willing partner only in the former. India has been ambivalent about the MSR and is yet to make up its mind on joining the project.During Indian Vice President’s Hamid Ansari’s visit to Beijing in end-June, China made another unsuccessful attempt at getting India to sign-up. Beijing’s renewed pitch for the construction of ports, logistical stations, storage facilities and free-trade zones in the Indian Ocean was again met with a passive response. While acknowledging Beijing’s sincere approach, the Indian side requested for more details on the project to help reach an early decision. This is the second time running that India has successfully skirted the controversial MSR project. India, however, is not alone in inquiring about the project’s commercial viability - many ASEAN countries have been equally probing about its intended benefi ts. This raises fundamental questions about the project, the principal one being: Why, despite its scale and scope of the planned investment, does the MSR not inspire any confi dence? The problem with the MSR, essentially, is the ‘opaque’ nature of its proposal. Outwardly, the project is about the development of massive maritime infrastructure and connectivity in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacifi c. Beijing has been careful to project the MSR as an exclusively commercial venture, trying hard to dispel any impressions of it being a cover for maritime military bases. Surprisingly, however, China has released no details about the project, and this makes many countries doubt Beijing’s strategic intentions. The lack of specifi cs not only makes it hard to decipher the MSR’s real purpose, it gives credence to suspicions of geopolitical game play by China. Indeed, for a project being touted as a critical enabler of regional sea-connectivity, Chinese planners would have spent much time and effort developing the fi ne-print. The lack of fi rm plans, proposals and timelines then does lead to a suspicion that there may be something about the MSR that Beijing is hesitant to reveal quickly.Even on the few specifi cs that China has released, claims appear doubtful. According to Beijing, the MSR involves the development of maritime nodes that will help enhance trade and sea-connectivity and assist substantially in the development of local economies. Beijing has been promoting the project as an economic game-changer and an enormously benefi cial enterprise for all host nations. Even so, it is hard to disregard the fact that China is the source of much of the maritime turbulence in South East Asia. China’s positioning of an exploration rig in the Vietnam’s EEZ, its skirmishes with Philippines over the Scarborough reef, and the aggressive patrols off the Senkaku islands clearly shows Chinese intensions in the Western Pacifi c are anything but benign. With unsettled issues of sovereignty

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and sovereign jurisdiction over disputed islands in the South China Sea and the East Sea, Beijing’s expectation of a free-pass to create an entire infrastructure corridor in a contested maritime space, appears seriously doubtful.Since it has already shown its approval for China’s BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) development plan, chances are New Delhi will be favourably inclined to consider the MSR. It is, however, certain to go over the details carefully before agreeing to the development of Chinese infrastructure in Indian waters. Even though it will be keen to start-off with Beijing on a positive note, the new NDA government in New Delhi would be wary of displaying undue haste in giving the MSR its full approval.It is felt that India, like some other Indian Ocean states, is so overwhelmed by the scale and scope of the MSR that even in the face of misgivings it will go ahead and sign-up to the project. According to MSR observers, the fear of being left out of its commercial benefi ts would lead many nations to uncritically accept the project as an economic and strategic enabler. Since the project proposal comes coupled with the “New Silk Road” - a land infrastructure project that envisages the development of an ancient route connecting Western China with South and Central Asia - it will be hard for national policy-makers to desist from signing-up.The Chinese state-owned Xinhua News Agency’s recently revealed some information about the Maritime Silk Route. A map attached to the news report showed Kolkata and Colombo (and not the Pakistani port-city of Gwadar) as possible venues of infrastructure development. The omission of Gwadar from the plan appears to be an overt incentive for India to join-up. Saying ‘yes’ to the MSR will, however, serve as an Indian endorsement of China’s supposed ‘benign’ motivations in the IOR. Worse, as informed voices point out, joining the project will not in any way serve to allay India’s original concerns about a ‘string of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean.This is not to deny the MSR its short-term benefi ts, which could - by some accounts - be substantial. China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to fi nance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. These supposedly include port-building and connectivity-enhancing projects within Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean littoral countries that could help local economies enormously. The fi nancial payoffs, however, will likely come at a price and entail long-term strategic implications - especially for regional maritime security.The MSR’s essential rationale is the leveraging of Chinese soft-power. The aim apparently is to shore- up China’s image as a benevolent state. Beijing would also conceivably use the project’s commercial investments to establish its legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. And while China can be expected to do everything in its power to force region states to join the project - including offering economic aid to potential partners - the bottom-line for it will be to make an offer to India that is hard to refuse.

China is a mighty newly emerging global power that naturally deserves space to expand its Q 1. sphere of influence and so, ‘engage China’ would be better option for the existing world order rather than ‘contain China’ policy. Comment.

Practice Question

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The three million square kilometers South China Sea is the maritime heart of Southeast Asia but also a disputable property. Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea are particularly problematic because they involve six separate claimants in a mostly enclosed body of water with a large number of disputed land features. The South China Sea is ringed by Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and dotted with hundreds of small islands, shoals and reefs, many of them occupied by the disputants.The fundamental issue in the South China Sea is one of territorial sovereignty, that is, which state has sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent waters. UNCLOS has no provisions on how to determine sovereignty over offshore islands. As there is no treaty that governs the issue of sovereignty, states have to look for guidance to the rules of customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory.

Main Disputes The Spratly Islands are located in the central part of the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands are claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, while some islands and other features are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines. The Paracel Islands are located in the northern part of the South China Sea. They are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China denies the existence of a dispute over these islands, but they are a continual source of tension between China and Vietnam. Scarborough Reef is located in the northern part of the South China Sea between the Philippines and the Paracels, and is claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan. The Pratas Islands are located just over 200 miles southwest of Hong Kong. They are occupied by Taiwan, and are also claimed by China. Macclesfi eld Bank, a large sunken reef that is completely submerged at low tide, is located between Scarborough Reef and the Paracels. It is claimed by China and Taiwan.

Resources as a Driver of Competition Many analysts feel that resource competition has become one of the key drivers of territorial disputes and tension, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The South China Sea, for example, is a major source of fi sh resources for each of the nations that borders it, and the largest source of fi sh for China, the Philippines and Vietnam. The over-fi shing in coastal waters has led to depletion of resources thus competition has led fi shing boats to work towards offshore.Many energy industry observers believe that the sea also has substantial reserves of oil and natural

APPENDIX-IISOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

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gas. The rising energy demand in countries has encouraged more offshore energy development in their economic planning. New technologies are making complicated offshore oil and gas development more feasible, and high energy prices are contributing to the desire to control these resources.

Energy Resources It could have reserves totaling 213 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Many analysts argue, however, that because much of the northern part of the South China Sea is deep, energy resources may not be exploitable on this scale. Still, industry analysts believe that international energy companies have considerably more technical ability to develop resources in diffi cult offshore settings-and thus, much of the sea will likely go undeveloped as long as the disputes continue.Offshore energy development is based on assertion of sovereignty over parts of the sea, and because such assertions are still widely overlapping, there are increasing chances for confl ict. Vietnam had already tendered and, in some cases, in which companies were already exploring and drilling. This action prompted angry reactions in Vietnam, which deemed the moves illegal. Such disputes have created uncertainties that constrain offshore resource exploration and development, which requires long-term periods of stability. There are, however, some examples of exploration and development that have taken place in disputed areas. China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have each undertaken oil-and-gas exploration in disputed parts of the South China Sea, and the Philippines and Vietnam have offered exploration and development contracts to international oil-and-gas fi rms, including American companies.

Fishery Resources Fishing presents another potential source of confl ict. The South China Sea is the largest source of fi sh, an important foodstock, in each of the claimant countries. The fi shing industries of each of the disputants include large numbers of vessels which travel increasingly farther from their home coasts due to overfi shing in coastal waters, bringing them into disputed waters. This has led to frequent incidents of harassment of vessels, confi scation of catches and equipment, and sometimes imprisonment of fi shermen. Some analysts point to joint management of fi sheries as a potential path towards lowering tensions and fostering functional cooperation among disputants.

Attempts for Resolution Currently, states in Southeast Asia are utilizing four different strategies to try to solve the issue. First, states are pushing for bilateral solutions in incremental stages. Beijing has repeatedly stated a preference for this method, but regional states widely regard it as an attempt to freeze resource development, while doing little to actually resolve the various claims. On the other hand, Vietnam and China recently used bilateral diplomacy to reduce tensions.Second, attempts are being made to resolve the issue at the multilateral level, that is utilizing ASEAN. So far it is diffi cult to achieve much, as only four of ASEAN’s 10 member states are involved in the South China Sea issue, and China has been able to detach the other six members at various times from positions taken by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.Third, fostering closer ties to the US also remains an option, as Washington is still the predominant power in the region. The Philippines and Vietnam in particular have sought strategic reassurance through new or renewed security agreements with the US; and Washington - concerned that China covets such a strategic sea line of communication - has responded warmly. And fourth, Southeast Asian nations are involving non-regional states in the issue. Vietnam’s agreement with India on drilling in contested waters falls into this strategy. But these strategies are not making the slightest difference, and serve only to exacerbate tensions. Rather, the fi fth way is more appropriate: the introduction of a legal framework for the South China Sea issue.Choosing one of the three legal mechanisms on offer - the UNCLOS tribunals, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or the International Court of Justice - would neatly bypass this challenge, putting responsibility for any decision with a third party. The lengthy period taken in international cases of this type may also be benefi cial to regional states: ASEAN and its members could take the time to put resources into education and public awareness on maritime law, investing in legal conferences, seminars and workshops for journalists, politicians and diplomats. This could at least persuade the populations of the legal process’ fairness.

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India and South China Dispute India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacifi c and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacifi c transits through the South China Sea. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be diffi cult for India to continue with its activities through this channel. But China’s hard line on the South China Sea has affected India too. New Delhi was a bit taken aback after Beijing denounced plans by an Indian Company to develop oil fi elds in the region. The Chinese objection was to ONGC Videsh’s (OVL) venture for off-shore oil exploration in water’s belonging to Vietnam (not recognized by China), Beijing urged India to refrain from entering into deals with Vietnamese fi rms exploring oil and gas in the disputed South China Sea over which China enjoys ‘indisputable’ sovereignty.However, while China opposes India’s entry into the South China Sea, it insists on building strategic projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and on deploying troops there. However during SM Krishna’s visit to Hanoi on September 15-17, 2011, the External Affairs Minister of India underlined that OVL will go ahead with oil and gas exploration in the two offshore blocks (127 and 128) claimed by Vietnam. China, however, appeared unconvinced and announced plans to expand maritime exploration of 10,000 sq km of seabed in Southwest Indian Ocean.India however, in recent years, has been seen as a credible counterweight to China. Southeast Asian countries, wary of continued Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, have encouraged joint maritime exercises with India. In February 2010, the Indian Navy concluded its Milan series of maritime exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and almost all ASEAN countries participated in Milan exercise.India, which has helped Malaysia in building up its Coast Guard in the past, must consider assisting other ASEAN countries. India has a strong Navy with technological credibility that can be leveraged by ASEAN. Collaboration on missile technology, radar systems, defence component systems and supporting hardware are again areas where ASEAN countries can work in partnership with India. China, naturally, does not welcome the ASEAN move to interact militarily with India. India has also shown keenness to sell Brahmos missiles to friendly countries including the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Most of the ASEAN countries have been engaged in a defence modernization programme and would like to obtain assistance in weapons up-gradation and systems integration. Like India, most of the Southeast Asian countries also rely on Russia for their defence procurements. India with its long experience in using Russian products and developed the technological capabilities for low cost servicing could be a potential ally for ASEAN in this fi eld. Assisting ASEAN will also improve India’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries bilaterally and multilaterally and it will also boost India’s morale in balancing China in the IOR.

Recent Developments India and China continue to be at a loggerheads on a range of bilateral issues, as China shows no signs of budging on key issues that matter to India. There was no change in Beijing’s stance on blocking efforts to get Pakistan-based militant Maulana Masood Azhar listed as a terrorist under UN resolutions as well as Beijing’s ongoing opposition to India gaining entry to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.India has also been left asking, how it can take part in the Silk Road summit being held in China when the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir violates India’s sovereignty.There was, however, some positive engagement on the unlikeliest of issues Afghanistan: China reportedly expressed its admiration for India’s assistance efforts in Afghanistan and the two sides explored the possibility of joint development projects. This came against a backdrop of the growing threat the Islamic State (ISIS) poses to China.A rattled China is calling for greater global cooperation against ISIS, which is also a reason why China has joined ranks with Russia in a bid to engage the Taliban in Afghanistan.

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There is now a new realism in New Delhi in acknowledging and articulating these bilateral differences. The diffi dence of the past has been replaced by a new self-confi dence in asserting India’s vital interests vis-à-vis China.India-China relations have turned from being suspicious-but-workable to tense, following recent developments between the two countries. Some of the important events that happened during the same period are as follows:

Dalai Lama Visiting Arunachal Pradesh The Dalai Lama is visited Arunachal Pradesh, during which he was scheduled to hold religious discourse with devotees in Tawang, Bomdila and other areas.This visit was vehemently opposed by China, as it claims parts of Arunachal Pradesh as southern Tibet and had warned that if India allowed the visit of the Dalai Lama, whom it calls an “ant-China separatist”, it would cause “serious damage” to the ties.China is sensitive to the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang region in Arunachal, which happens to be the birthplace in 1683 of the sixth Dalai Lama and is at the centre of Tibetan Buddhism.

China renaming towns using local language in Arunachal Pradesh on its maps China tried to sent a strong message this week that Arunachal Pradesh was non-negotiable as the Chinese government released “standardized” Chinese names of six towns in the north-eastern state.Rewriting Tibetan names like Bumla into Mandarin, China aims to strike the Tibetans by ‘Sinicizing’ the names and at the same time challenge India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh which it regards as “South Tibet”.

Implications The new names will be shown in the international diplomatic arena as proof of China’s claims, informed sources said. China might even pull out old maps and records to show that these names existed for hundreds of years. At present, it has scant historical record to support its claims besides the fact that the 6th Dalai Lama was born in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, and the Tawang monastery was linked to monasteries in China in the past.

India not attending the BRI Forum summit despite request from China India, however, has boycotted the summit owing to sovereignty concerns related to the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Unlike India, none of the other countries have sovereignty related issues with OBOR initiative.

Views in favor of decision The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is both geo-political and geo-economic, though the Chinese dissimulate their political ambitions by stressing the purely economic thrust of their initiative.India’s objections to BRI have mainly centred on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a fl agship project of the initiative that passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Kashmir. As both India and Pakistan claim all of Kashmir, the area is considered a disputed territory by India.China has maintained a rather snobbish attitude towards India’s protests as they have not even regarded India’s concerns.

Views against the decision Many security experts feel, it is a certainly not a “mistake” not to attend the BRI forum (BRF) , but it is just not the right forum to make a point regarding sovereignty issues. US/South Korea and China have sovereignty issues over THAAD deployment but they still sent a delegation to attend BRF.Japan and China have sovereignty issues over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, but Japan still sent a delegation to attend BRF. Philippines/Vietnam and China have sovereignty issues over the South China Seas but their presidents and prime ministers attended the BRF.While India’s protest over China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is justifi ed, the confrontationist approach doesn’t bode well for India’s economic interests. India cannot signifi cantly halt the BRI due to the multitude of independent nodes across the globe, neither can it ignore or be immune to its effects. While it’s true that highways, pipelines and railroads leads to mostly singular destination, ports and airports do not, and can be used by anyone. If China promotes an economic zone in Sri Lanka or East Africa, Indian businesses are free to utilise them for their own ends.

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Context

In a bid to maximize China’s absorption of the West Asian nation’s comparative advantage in terms of high technology China is in the middle of a complex diplomatic dance with West Asia, by engaging rivals such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran all at the same time.China is faced with a complicated geopolitical situation, and the Middle East is not in the core area of China’s diplomatic interests. To strengthen its economic power and partnership in a low-profi le manner is the right strategy for China’s Middle East policy.

Present Scenario of West Asia West Asia has been a sensitive and confl ict prone region, especially since the early 20th century with the discovery of oil. It was also an enduring space for confl ict during the Cold War.More recently, the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring” added another dimension to the existing geopolitical challenges in the region.The relationship between the two crucial regional players—Saudi Arabia and Iran—has worsened, making the situation even more complex.There have been allegations of Saudi-Iran proxy wars taking place in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The increasing Iranian activism in the region and its rising capability, along with rapprochement with the West, has alarmed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states thus inhibiting the chances of any dialogue between the two sides. Intra GCC tensions have also surfaced in recent times.Increased intervention by external players has been another characteristic feature of recent political developments in the region. Another important feature has been the rise of the Islamists on the political horizon of the region.The escalation of confl ict in West Asia has created anxiety among major oil importers in Asia, particularly India, China, Japan and South Korea. These Asian economic giants are heavily dependent upon the energy supplies from the Gulf region. There has been a concern among the Asian oil importers over the possibility of disruption in production and supplies of oil and gas in the face of growing unrest in the region. While energy supplies from the Gulf to these countries have not been affected thus far, but the recent drop in oil prices notwithstanding, apprehensions about wild fl uctuation in energy prices over the medium to long term, as a result of instability in the region, continue to persist.

China’s Policy in West Asia The basic building block of Chinese policy remains the development and expansion of economic and trade links. There is clear and long-standing evidence of an expanding Chinese economic presence throughout the region - from the massive energy markets of Saudi Arabia and the infrastructure developments in Iran to the domination of trade with Lebanon.

APPENDIX-III CHINA REACHES OUT TO WEST ASIA

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China’s emphasis on a classic conservative support for state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs and a “no enemies” policy offer a stark contrast to the interventionist policies of the West in the past century. This policy refl ects China’s own parochial interests as well as a formula that enables Beijing to enhance its economic and political power broadly, even in such polarised regions as the Middle East.China is one of the top buyers of oil from Saudi Arabia and a key trading partner of Israel. China has remained a trusted ally of Iran even during the time of economic sanction(s) on it.Further China’s economic ties with West Asia assumed greater signifi cance after the induction of One Belt, One Road initiative. West Asia plays a major role in this Silk Road revival plan.

China – Israel Comprehensive Partnership China and Israel has recently got engaged into innovative comprehensive partnership between both the countries.China’s focus in the partnership is on maximizing absorption of Israel’s technology in hi-tech and other advanced domains.The partnership proves to be timely and in sync with China’s “Made in China-2025” strategy to tap the potential of Internet, Big Data and robotics to help advance its manufacturing sector.Other top priorities of the two countries include clean energy, agriculture, fi nance, space, investment and medical services. Israel also expressed hopes in joining China’s Belt and Road initiatives.

China – Saudi Arabia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Unperturbed by the complex web of rivalries and friendships, the Chinese are also aiming high in building ties with the region’s controversial heavyweight, Saudi Arabia.China and Saudi Arabia has signed 15 agreements and memorandum of understandings on Sep 2016 ranging from understandings on energy development and oil storage to cooperation promises on housing development and water resource issues. Meanwhile, Huawei, a leading global ICT solutions provider from China received an investment license from Saudi Arabia.With energy, and infrastructure investments by China as the centre, the two countries ended up signing agreements and letters of intent worth around $65 billion involving investment, energy, space and other areas.China will support the Kingdom’s “Saudi Vision 2030” plan — a blueprint for reducing Riyadh’s dependence on oil, and reliance on other drivers of the economy such as infrastructure development — where China is a world leader — apart from health, education and tourism.

China – Iran Iran has historically been one of China’s most signifi cant trading partners engaged in trade over land and sea.Chinese leaders and entrepreneurs are reinvigorating the history of close economic ties between the two countries which is also being boosted by US sanction on Iran in recent time.The two government ambitiously agreed to increase bilateral trade from $55 billion to $600 billion over the next decade.China’s decision to increase bilateral trade with Iran, however, coincides with recent economic problems in China. Last year, China’s 6.9 percent increase in GDP marked its slowest growth rate in a quarter century. Likewise, the economic activity of China’s manufacturing and services sectors experienced a slowdown. Despite these challenges at home, China has continued to place a high value on its increased trade and investment in Iran.China sees Iran as a Middle Eastern partner in ensuring the United States is not dominant in the Middle East. Moreover, China’s partnership with Iran and the recent multilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program may have been mutually reinforcing.The trade and investment trends emerging in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal provide a valuable window into China’s possible strategic ambitions in the Middle East.In the midst of economic challenges at home and brewing tensions in the Middle East, President Xi’s historic visit to Iran in Jan 2016 and the new $600 billion trade deal may be part of China’s larger strategy of sustaining a balance of power against the United States while reaping the economic benefi ts of a more globally integrated Iranian economy.

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China - Syria China’s expanded support for Syria is a powerful indicator of Beijing’s growing power projection capacity in the Middle East.By expanding China’s infl uence in the Middle East/North Africa region, Chinese policy makers can demonstrate to their own people and to the international community that China is on the verge of becoming a superpower with global geopolitical reach.The Syrian Crisis has brought a golden opportunity to advance a normative agenda that bolsters China’s infl uence in the developing world.The Chinese government’s active involvement in resolving the Syrian confl ict has also allowed Beijing to assert itself as a major diplomatic arbiter in the Middle East.Joint military exercises, military weapons procurement and China’s involvement with Syria to crackdown on Islamic State. Jabhat al-Nusra and moderate rebel groups are some positive contribution to China.Chinese diplomatic assistance in Syria to rally international support for its pro-Assad military campaign and boost its prospects of membership in the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has responded to Iran’s diplomatic overtures by providing support for Assad in the UN and endorsing Iran’s SCO membership goals.

Conclusion

Beyond its obvious need to secure long-term oil supplies and take steps to curb radical Islam in a key area, China that will increasingly take action to protect its strategic interests in the Middle East and Africa and farther afi eld. Witness, for instance, its decision to build its fi rst overseas military base in Djibouti, East Africa.However, China’s policy in the Middle East has a proven ability to conduct fruitful ties with a range of players in the region, and even maintain parallel relations with bitter enemies (Iran and Saudi Arabia; Israel).Based on this potential, it would be appropriate to promote joint initiatives for China, Israel, and the pragmatic states, so as to maximize existing and developing potential and highlight China as a signifi cant player in advancing regional stability by means of an economic strategy that incurs limited risks.In the Middle East, it is clear that China has decided it cannot simply watch from the sidelines. For now the talk is about investment and trade. However, as it involves itself more, Beijing will come under pressure to take sides politically and to do more to promote regional stability. How deftly it handles the competing pulls will determine the trajectory of the global leadership it aspires to.

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Introduction

Recently Pakistan and China has signed MoU to build the Bhasha and Bunji Dams on the River Indus in Gilgit-Baltistan – which India claims to be its own territory.China’s dam building overdrive is a concern for India because there are no bilateral or multilateral treaties on the water. India believes China’s projects in the Tibetan Plateau threaten to reduce river fl ows into India. Dams, Canals, irrigation systems can turn water into a political weapon to be wielded in war, or during peace to signal annoyance with a co-riparian state.Besides, construction of reservoirs and dams has led to three major consequences in China – economic impoverishment, social instability and environmental degradation.

Regional Implications of China’s Dams Socio Economic Crisis: China’s management of the Mekong River that originates in the Tibet has faced criticism from the entire world, particularly Southeast Asia, which is at its receiving end. Four countries of the lower Mekong basin – Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam – depend on this river for food, water and transportation; and they have been distressed by China’s activities on the river. Dams on this river have been held responsible for drought in some of these countries. This is said to have been exacerbated by dams upstream in China. It generated losses worth millions of dollars. In Thailand, fi shing communities are the most-affected as they are forced to stop fi shery when the water levels go down signifi cantly. Vietnam’s farming area that is fed by the Mekong has been threatened time and again. When the freshwater fl ow from Tibet decreases, seawater intrusion is expected to increase and reduce the agricultural yield further.Regional Confl icts: The environment is changing at an unprecedented pace due to both natural and human-induced causes, if not put in perspective could defi nitely culminate in tensions or confl icts between China and its neighbours. Simultaneously, China, a closed system that does not disclose any information regarding its river management policies, has been in the process of changing various facets of environment to fulfi ll its requirements. Beijing has always maintained ‘strategic silence’ on its water diversion proposals and projects that makes any form of cooperation between China and its neighbours, including India, a diffi cult proposition. Impact on India and Bangladesh: If China decides to divert waters during the monsoons, such an act is also not expected to cause any water insecurity for India and Bangladesh. The excess waters during monsoons have always been a source of concern for those two countries as they cause annual fl oods. However, if China diverts during the entire year, it could pose serious challenges for India and Bangladesh.

APPENDIX-IVWATER DIPLOMACY THROUGH DAMS

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Why is India worried about China’s dam projects? China’s dam building overdrive is a concern because there are no bilateral or multilateral treaties on the water and China believes dam building on the Brahmaputra helps it assert claim over Arunachal Pradesh.India believes China’s projects in the Tibetan Plateau threaten to reduce river fl ows into India. The projects can turn water into a political weapon to be wielded in war, or during peace to signal annoyance with a co riparian state.China is contemplating northward re-routing of the Yarlung Zangbo. Diversion of the Brahmaputra is an idea China does not discuss in public, because it implies devastating India’s northeastern plains and Bangladesh, either with fl oods or reduced water fl ow.India and China signed two pacts in 2008 and 2010 which facilitates India with data on water levels and rainfall twice a day from June 1 to October 15 at three hydrological stations in Tibet.2013 MoU - India and China have set up an Expert Level Mechanism on trans-border Rivers. In 2013, they signed a memorandum of understanding on trans-border Rivers, under which China has been supplying data to India on water fl ows.India came out openly against the OBOR policy manoeuvre, describing it as little more than a colonial enterprise, while also expressing reservations against the ‘ecological and environmental’ damages that a project of this size would cause.Activists in India concede that while Chinese engineers possess great expertise in building mammoth dams, the environmental impact of these hydro projects has not been placed in the public domain.In terms of ecological destruction, “when the Tehri Dam was constructed, it is known to have caused a great deal of ecological destruction. Since the size of these dams is much larger than our own Tehri Dam, the amount of destruction is going to be that much greater.

Conclusion

China’s water/river policies could adversely affect not only the population of other countries in its neighborhood but also its own population as seen in the case of the Three Gorges Dam. China is confronting immense socio-economic and environmental challenges due of its damming policies. Additionally, the country is also reeling under cases of corruption and environmental change-related disasters caused by its development policies. Dam maintenance has inevitably become one of the biggest concerns for the Chinese offi cials as more and more instances of cracks in the construction of dams are emerging.

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Facts about proposed dam

The Bhasha Dam, being built with a height of 272 metres, will produce 4,500 megawatts of electricity. It is being built as a gravity dam and will be the highest roller-compacted concrete dams in the world.

The Bunji Dam is also being built on the Indus River. It will be 190 metres high and will have an installed capacity of 7,100 megawatts.

These two mammoth dams are being constructed at a total cost of $27 billion and can be seen as part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of the Chinese government.

The Three Gorges Corporation, which built the largest dam in the world (Three Gorges), will help fi nance this project with a capital of $50 billion.

China is also planning to build 55 reservoirs on the rivers fl owing from the Tibetan plateau. Already, they have completed the Zangmu Dam, built on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra in 2010. Three more dams at Dagu, Jiacha and Jeixu are presently under construction, while in 2015, work started on the Zam hydropower station – which will be the largest dam on the Brahmaputra river, which the Chinese refer to as the Yarlung Tsangpo.

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APPENDIX-VCHUMBHI VALLEY & DOKLAM PLATEAU

Introduction

The Doklam plateau has become the unlikely scene of the latest India-China imbroglio. The region falls within Bhutanese territory, but this is now questioned by China.Recently, China started constructing a road in the disputed territory of Doklam plateau and Chumbhi valley, to which India and the Royal Bhutanese Army has raised an objection. India intervened in the crisis and asked China to halt its construction work. The incident stems from differences between Bhutan and India on the one hand and China on the other as to the exact location of the tri-junction between the three countries.China’s current claims over the Doklam plateau should be seen as yet another instance of cartographic aggression, which China often engages in. It is, however, China’s action of building an all-weather road on Bhutan’s territory, one capable of sustaining heavy vehicles, that has prompted Bhutan and India to coordinate their actions in their joint national interests, under the terms of the 2007 Friendship Treaty.

Indo-Bhutan-China Borders

The complex tri-junction frontier between India-Bhutan-China can be understood by analyzing the signifi cance of Sikkim, Nathu-La pass and Chumbi valley.

Sikkim: Strategic Importance

Sikkim’s 204km (approx) border with China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) remains heavily disputed and unsettled.The strategic importance of Sikkim was realized in 1960s during the 1962 Indo-China war and subsequent clashes at Nathu La and Cho La in 1967. Sikkim is a strategic territory for both India and China. Sikkim borders countries such as Nepal and Bhutan, in which India and China are competing to have infl uence.Sikkim also lies very close to the Siliguri corridor (also called as the Chicken neck corridor), which if cut in the case of war or otherwise would cut the connection between mainland of India and the North-eastern states.As a part of cultural diplomacy and people-to-people contact, India has announced e-visa facility for Chinese tourists. The two sides in 2015 also signed an agreement that provides an additional route for the annual Mansarovar Yatra through Nathu La Pass in Sikkim, in addition to the existing Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand.Ironically, the route through Nathu La pass is viewed as around about and circuitous alternative route for pilgrims, given the fact that Kailash-Mansarovar is located close to the Uttarakhand-Nepal-Tibet tri-junction. The new route entails a long and arduous detour for the pilgrimages.

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Nathu La Pass

After the 1962 border war with China, Nathu La and Jelep La, the two main passes, which connect Sikkim with Tibet, were closed for trade.Lhasa, which is the capital of Tibet is barely 425 km from Nathu La. In June 2006, the Nathu La Pass, a century-old trading post, which is 4,545 meters above sea level was reopened after being closed for 40 years.In 2003, both countries agreed to resume trade through Nathu La pass and signed the declaration of principles for relations and comprehensive cooperation including the memorandum on expanding border trade that provided for the formal reopening of Nathu La as a border trade pass between Indian and China.In 2003, China invested about 200 billion RMB (USD24.3 billion) in infrastructure projects in the western region. China has further unveiled its plans to extend the Chinese National Rail Network to the border with India. Nathu La will help China in connecting to Kolkata, the closet warm water port to Lhasa.It is envisaged that a fully equipped route across Nathu La has the prospect to change the trade in this sector of Asia as the distance from Kolkata to Lhasa through this route is less than 1200 km.Trade through Nathu La is in the interest of people from both sides of the border and would bring economic prosperity. However, the fl ip side of the problem is small traders may face competition from the Chinese market competition and the market in the region would be fl ooded with cheap Chinese goods and would make the indigenous market less competitive.The benefi t of opening Nathu La is not only for economic prosperity. The strategic and political dimensions must also be considered.

Chumbhi Valley and Doklam Plateau

Chumbi Valley is located at the tri–junction of India-China-Bhutan. The region is close to India’s Siliguri Corridor (Chicken Neck). The Siliguri Corridor connects the rest of India with the North-east, and Nepal with Bhutan. Chumbi Valley is also of equal strategic signifi cance to China because of the valley’s shared border with Tibet and Sikkim. Any development in the Chumbi Valley that alters the status quo in Beijing’s favour will have serious implications for India. It is to be noted that China wants to widen the Chumbi valley by claiming areas in the west and north of Bhutan. History of Bhutan-China border dispute starts from 1950 and bilateral talks to resolve the issue started from 1984. In the event of a war, China could seek to cut off the Siliguri corridor.In the event of war, India’s Brigade-sized military presence inside Bhutan, stationed at Ha, allows it to attack the Chumbhi valley from two sides, potentially cutting off Chinese troops stationed facing Sikkim.But China’s recent assertions in the area are portentous for Bhutan which has never faced territorial issues with the China in the past. China, citing the 1890 China-Britain treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the fact saying the convention applies to the India-Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.China has long eyed this area. It has been keen to establish its physical presence in a region that it claims belongs to China according to the 1890 Convention. With China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gaining momentum, and completion of infrastructure programmes such as the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway, China appears to have turned its attention to the Doklam plateau, eying an opportunity to establish a strong presence close to the Indian border.

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How is the dispute/ standoff affecting India-Bhutan-China ties?

China’s current claims over the Doklam plateau should be seen as yet another instance of cartographic aggression, which China often engages in. It is, however, China’s action of building an all-weather road on Bhutan’s territory, one capable of sustaining heavy vehicles, that has prompted Bhutan and India to coordinate their actions in their joint national interests, under the terms of the 2007 Friendship Treaty.Ever since the standoff came to light, there has been a series of arguments, counter-arguments and statements from both sides enough for the foreign ministries to interfere as well. Indian said that the road construction efforts by the Chinese PLA are aimed at getting closer to Doka La, the last Indian military post on its border with Bhutan and China.The construction ‘would represent a signifi cant change of status quo with serious security implications for India. India underlined that the two governments had agreed in 2012 that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be fi nalised in consultation with the countries concerned. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.As of now, there is no push and shove at the border although tensions are high. Both countries have said that they would use offi cial diplomatic channels to fi nd a solution to the dispute.China may have temporarily halted its road construction programme, but it appears determined to hold on to its position. India is equally clear that it cannot afford to back down, as of now, having gone to Bhutan’s assistance at a time of need. With both sides intent on a show of strength, the potential it has to provoke an incident with unintended consequences is quite high.China and India see the Doklam stand-off very differently. For China, the issue is one of territorial ‘sovereignty’. For India, the issue is one of national security. Both appear irreconcilable. China is generally not known to make concessions when it comes to aspects of territorial ‘sovereignty’. The entire saga of the Sino-Indian border dispute hinges on this, with China unwilling to make territorial concessions regarding areas over which it once claimed suzerainty.India, for its part cannot be seen to be compromising on its national security. This would be the case if Chinese claims to the Doklam plateau are accepted and the tri-junction is accepted to be further south at Mt. Gipmochi. It would bring China within striking distance of India’s vulnerable ‘Chicken Neck’, the Siliguri Corridor, the life-line to India’s North-east. This has always been seen as India’s ‘Achilles heel’, and ensuring its security has fi gured prominently in India’s calculation from the beginning. The possibilities and consequences are both immense and serious.Diplomacy should ordinarily have been the way out, but relations between India and China are far from cordial at present. Even at the highest levels, there are few signs of a thaw. No bilateral meeting took place between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Hamburg earlier this month. There were no consequential meetings subsequently, including during the BRICS conclave.

Conclusion India has to revise its frontier policy and should devise policies, which will be pragmatic and proactive. Bureaucratic and procedural hurdles have to be curtailed in order to improve our strategic assets in the Indo-China-Bhutan tri-junction.India must read proper meanings into China’s unwillingness to hold talks at the highest level. China is categorically laying down diffi cult pre-conditions for talks, though India is open to the idea of discussions without pre-conditions. These are well refl ected in the differences seen between the high voltage Chinese reaction and the measured response of the Indian side.

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Introduction

A peaceful and friendly neighborhood is essential for India’s security. Wars with Pakistan and China refl ect how dangerous an enemy in neighborhood can be. Since ancient times, India have maintained deep cultural, economic and friendly relations with its neighbors. Such ties were imbedded in trade, religion, missionaries etc. However, the recent rise of China has posed a signifi cant challenge for India’s predominance in its neighborhood.According to foreign experts, the current climate of South Asia has been described as a geopolitical struggle between India and China to win over their common neighbors.Many foreign experts believe that India’s foreign policy has not been able to deliver a friendly neighborhood and China because of its rise has been winning over India’s neighbors.

Reasons for China Winning Over India’s Neighbors Geopolitical Balancing: India is the only major actor in the subcontinent. Hence, small neighbors want an extra-regional balancer to infl uence India and to secure better terms from India. Foreign experts have termed it as ‘fl ashing the China card.’ China is the most obvious option to balance India.Aggressive Expansion Policy: Republic of China, since its inception is pursuing an aggressively expansionist policy – both territorial and maritime. This expansionism policy clashes with India’s interests in its neighborhood.Economic Rise of China: China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is fi ve times that of India. This enables China to extend loans, Line of credit etc. towards India’s neighbors and win over them. Ex.: development of Hambantota port. Military Advantage: China’s defense budget is more than three times that of India. This huge difference means that China has more resources to infl uence South Asian countries away from India.Belt and Road Initiative: Its offer of infrastructural, trade and economic opportunities for India’s neighbors and hence they have joined it. Example – Nepal joined Belt and Road Initiative despite India’s displeasure. String of Pearls Theory: According to foreign experts, China is building a String of Pearls around India. To contain India’s infl uence, China is maintaining friendly relation with India’s neighbors. Ancient Chineses Kingdom: Current territories of Bhutan, parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Kashmir etc. were part of China’s ancient kingdom according to their ancient maps and beliefs. Hence, China wants these territories under its traditional sphere of infl uence.

Examples that Show China Winning China in the past has been deliberately strengthening its ties with the countries having common terrestrial or maritime border with India. Some of the examples that refl ect it are:

APPENDIX-VIWHY CHINA IS WINNING OVER INDIA’S

NEIGHBORS

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Pakistan: Development of CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) and construction of Gwadar port.Myanmar: Development of Kyaukphyu port. China is also one of the biggest arms supplier to Myanmar.Sri Lanka: Development of Hambantota port. China also has stakes in Colombo port.Nepal: China has been taking advantage of the growing differences between India and Nepal. The latest two instances are where India and Nepal could not come on the same page over internet access and the rights of Madhesi people. China fi lled the void and provided Internet access to Nepal. In Nepal, K.P. Oli is elected as Prime Minister. China helped him get elected by brokering an alliance of the left parties to take on the pro-India Nepalese Congress.Maldives: Maldives President Abdulla Yameen has gone against India’s repeated warnings and imposed a state of emergency.

Why India is Loosing over its Neighborhood Historical factor: India’s independence came with price of partition. Because of this Independent India did not have the adequate resources to establish infl uence. India’s relative size by itself is another problem. It is no surprise that small neighbours would want an extra-regional balancer to temper Indian infl uence and even to secure better terms from India. China is the most obvious option to balance India.Geopolitical rivalry between India and China has been skewed in favour of the China because of its economic and military advantage. China has gross domestic product (GDP) fi ve times that of India and its defence budget is more than three times that of India. Because of this power disparity China has more resources to wean South Asian countries away from India. Besides geopolitical balancing, there is genuine need for capital for infrastructure projects in India’s neighbouring countries. If India cannot fulfi l those needs, then China can help to fulfi ll these needs.China has invested or committed more than $150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. China is now the largest overseas investor in the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Chinese penetration is the highest in Myanmar and Pakistan. Chinese investment is concentrated in hard infrastructure such as power, roads, railways, bridges, ports and airports. China is also investing in the fi nancial systems of these countries. It has taken stakes in the Dhaka and Karachi stock exchanges and cultivated a Yuan trade between China and Pakistan. It is establishing China-based courts for arbitration or disputes. It seeks to create new rules, governing business and fi nancial systems in the region.

Solutions Infrastructure Development in Neighbouring Countries: Efforts in Afghanistan by India refl ects how positive steps can help reap long strategic relations. Not Meddling with Domestic Issue: The recent Rohingya crisis and Nepal’s economic blockade effected its relations with Bangladesh and Nepal. Using Traditional Ties: India has a long history of shared culture, P2P contact and deep religious ties with its neighboring countries. They should be reaped through cultural engagements, tourist circuits etc.Engaging in Mulitlateral Forums: Forums and initiatives like BIMSTEC, BBIN, SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region) should be used to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.Reviving SAARC: SAARC originally conceived regional grouping has been a non-starter. It can be effectively used as a forum to engage with neighboring countries. Highlighting China’s Dominance Motive: Mounting debt of Sri Lanka shows China’s use of hard power and money power against India’s neighbors.

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Soft Power: Favorable visa policy, tourism, Bollywood etc. can be used to build favorable image of India amongst its neighboring population. Abiding by Panchsheel while dealing with neighbors.Ironing Out Issues With China: China should not always be seen as a hostile adversary. Being two big powers in South Asia, they can engage to bring prosperity and economic development to the region.

Way Forward The future of India’s relationship with its neighbors depends a lot on China’s policies towards the same. India’s foreign policy should be guided by a short term and a long term solution.In short and medium term India needs more partnerships and careful maneuvering of its foreign policy while dealing with its neighbors. In long-term India needs to focus on accelerating its economic growth and also upgrading its military capabilities.India must recognize that doing better with its neighbours is not about investing more or undue favours. It is about following a policy of mutual interests and of respect, which India is more culturally attuned to than its large rival is. Each of India’s neighbours shares more than a geographical context with India. They share history, language, tradition and even cuisine. With the exception of Pakistan, none of them sees itself as a rival to India, or India as inimical to its sovereignty.

Conclusion A peaceful neighborhood is very crucial for the peace and economic prosperity of a country. India holds a position of pre-eminence in its neighborhood because of its size and recent economic development. However, it has been recently losing its strong hold to China.China’s rapid rise cannot be matched by India in short-term. However, careful steps while dealing with neighbors can help to win them back. In the long term, consistent engagement and development through mutual efforts is the key to let both neighbors and India to prosper.

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IR - II · China India Water Related Issue China’s grand plans to harness the waters of the...

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