Investor Presentation March 2016

1

Forward Looking Statements

Matters discussed in this presentation may constitute forward-looking statements under U.S. federal securities

laws, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements reflect the

Company’s current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements

concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and

other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. All statements, other than statements of

historical facts, that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, projects, believes or

anticipates will or may occur in the future, including, without limitation, the delivery of vessels, the outlook for

tanker shipping rates, general industry conditions future operating results of the Company’s vessels, capital

expenditures, expansion and growth opportunities, bank borrowings, financing activities and other such matters,

are forward-looking statements. Although the Company believes that its expectations stated in this presentation

are based on reasonable assumptions, actual results may differ from those projected in the forward-looking

statements. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those

discussed in the forward-looking statements include the failure of counterparties to fully perform their obligations

to us, the strength of the world economies and currencies, general market conditions, including changes in tanker

vessel charter hire rates and vessel values, changes in demand for tankers, changes in our vessel operating

expenses, including dry-docking, crewing and insurance costs, or actions taken by regulatory authorities, ability of

customers of our pools to perform their obligations under charter contracts on a timely basis, potential liability

from future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, potential disruption of shipping routes due to

accidents and political events or acts by terrorists. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any

forward looking statement contained in this presentation, whether as a result of new information, future events or

otherwise, except as required by law. In light of the risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward looking

events discussed in this presentation might not occur, and our actual results could differ materially from those

anticipated in these forward-looking statements.

2

Section 1

Euronav at a Glance

2 3

Euronav – Largest Tanker Company in the World

WELL POSITIONED FOR STRONG CASH FLOW GENERATION

Breakeven (including debt service):

~ USD 27,300 / day for VLCC – OpEx / day USD 8,165

~ USD 24,000 / day for Suezmax – OpEx / day USD 7,520

1

3 MM barrels

Avg. age 12 years

2.8 MM barrels

Avg. age 12 years

29 VLCC

+ 2 (TBD)

Up to 330,000 DWT

2MM barrels

Avg. age 6 years

1MM barrels

Avg. age 10 years

22 SUEZMAX

150,000 – 165,000 DWT

1 V – PLUS (1)

Over 441,000 DWT

2 FSO

Stripped water capacity

380k barrels

Notes: 1. Only 4 V-Plus vessels in world fleet

CURRENT FLEET – TOTAL 56 VESSELS – 13.5 MM DWT

Only 4 in world fleet

WHO WE ARE

Leading pure-play tanker company with best-in-class operating platform

Committed to shareholder long-term value creation…

Strong balance sheet

Most liquid big tanker player in the world

… with significant direct return to shareholders

Fixed Income

> USD 100 million of EBITDA (1) generated annually from fixed income contracts (FSO + TC contracts)

2

Spot Income - High Leverage to Upside

Each USD 5,000 uplift (above break-even) in both VLCC and Suezmax rates improves net revenue and EBITDA by USD 72 million

3

Returns to Shareholders

Return 80% of net income to shareholders (2) 4

1. Proportionate consolidation method 2. P&L definition

4

Euronav – Exposed to Structural Growth in Demand for Oil

Europe

U.S.

West Africa

Middle East

Asia Pacific

24 – 26

VLCCs

22 – 24

VLCCs

29 – 32

VLCCs

52 – 54

VLCCs

48 – 50

VLCCs 48 – 50

VLCCs

1.2 mbpd x 365 days = 440m barrels 440m barrels / 2m capacity per VLCC = 220 cargoes

220 cargoes / 4.5 annual journeys for VLCC (1) = 49 VLCCs

INCREMENTAL VLCC DEMAND FOR 1.2 MBPD ADDITIONAL EXPORTS = 36 – 49 VLCC PER YEAR

5

WHAT WE DO

Importer

Exporter

Supply

Demand

Demand

Supply

Russia

China

LatAm / Caribs

(1) Euronav average Source Euronav, Morgan Stanley

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Euronav - Most Liquid Big Tanker Player

Source Bloomberg based on Exchange volumes

LIQUIDITY GIVES SHAREHOLDERS OPTIONALITY

More Trading Hours Euronext Brussels: 9 a.m. – 5. 30 p.m. (CET) NYSE: 9.30 a.m. – 4 p.m. (EST)

Average daily volume shares = 1.38 mm shares per day

6

Ticker Symbol: EURN

Average daily volume USD = USD 20 mm per day

Velocity = 334%*

Free float = 85%

*Calculation method = daily volume x trading days / free float

TOTAL TRADED VALUE OF EURONAV US AND BB SHARES (SAME SHARE) - EURN US EQUITY & EURN BB EQUITY

Section 2

Industry Dynamics

5 7

Demand for Oil

ROBUST

• Oil demand growing last 25 years

• Yearly average 1.1 mbpd

• IEA forecast 1.2m bpd EVERY year to 2020

• 1.2 m bpd oil demand growth = for 36-49

VLCCs

Supply of Oil

EXCESS

• Market share strategy

• USA production shale: very resilient &

responsive

• Iran increase of 900k bpd

Supply of Vessels

MANAGEABLE

• Natural replacement cycle of 5% p.a.

• Order book largely industrial not speculative

• Order velocity substantially fallen since

Q3 2015

Ton Miles

BALANCED

• Trade lines established from production in West to consumption in East

• Ton miles a dynamic function in tankers

• Chinese imports diversification

• USA crude exports to increase ton miles

Financing

NEW BARRIER TO ENTRY

• New regulations (Basel 2&3) restricting

lending

• Distress in shipping loans has reduced risk

appetite

• Shipyards under pressure to reform

Oil Tankers – Five Key Drivers

1 2 3 4 5

8

Oil Price – Impact on Demand

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110Lack of disruption/market share game

Iran and other supply remain high Shale - as swing producer increases

output

Capex cuts in E&P Potential coordinated cuts in production

QE returns/$ loss of value/oil as financial asset

Demand Destructive 2009 - 2014 proved in this oil price range that demand was destroyed

Neutral

Demand Stimulating proven over time that the cheaper the commodity price the greater it is used

Demand Disruptive Current structure of global markets mean energy/capex/sovereign wealth effects > consumer stimulus from lower oil prices

OIL PRICE OUTLOOK (ILLUSTRATION)

9

Demand for Oil

1

Demand – steady and robust outlook

GLOBAL OIL DEMAND 1990-2015 (MB/D) AND AVERAGE OIL PRICE

0.3

1

0.5 0.3

1

1.5

1.9 2

0.3

1.7

0.8 0.7 0.7

1.5

3.1

1.4

1

1.6

-0.7 -0.9

3.1

0.8

1.1 1.3

0.7

1.8

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Mil

lio

n b

arrels

per d

ay

Demand for Oil

1

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

92.5

93

93.5

94

94.5

95

95.5

Oil

pric

e (

US

D p

er b

arrel)

Co

nsu

mp

tio

n (

mb

pd

)

Actual demand (million barrels) Average oil price

10

Average oil demand growth 1990-2015 =1.1 mbpd Grow almost always

2015 oil demand growth

= 1.8 mbpd

IEA forecast 1.2 mbpd consumption growth EVERY year to 2020

in line with historical

average

Source IEA

Source IEA

Transport

(road and air -

consumer-led)

42.1%

Commercial

heating (mix industry and consumer)

14.9%

Industrial

usage 28.8%

Other

14.2%

Source Bloomberg

China, Oil Demand & Oil Tankers

CHINA OIL DEMAND – VERY STEADY (UNLIKE GDP GROWTH)

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE – SPR A KEY DRIVER

CHINA CRUDE OIL IMPORT DIVERSIFICATION CONTINUES

CHINA OIL DEMAND – TO BE DRIVEN BY THE CONSUMER NOT INDUSTRY

Russia 14%

Saudi Arabia

14%

Oman 11%

Angola 10% Iraq 9%

Iran 6%

Venezuela 6%

Kuwait 4%

Brazil 3%

Kzakhstan

1%

Libya 1%

Other 20%

In China, transportation (road and air) makes up about 42% of demand for oil

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

GD

P g

ro

wth

(%

)

Im

po

rts

(m

bp

d)

Oil imports (million barrels per day) Real GDP growth (%)

Additional 110 mm bbls in 2016 (source: BP)

11

Demand for Oil

1

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

mil

lio

n b

arrels

Source Argus, FGE, Reuters, Barclays Research

Source Bloomberg

1

1

1

1 1

China & Oil Tankers – Four Reasons for Confidence

• SPR is not a luxury OR a STATIC number

• China needs 55 days coverage of consumption – so 12m bpd x 55d = 660m bbls today

• Target is comply by 2020 = 600m bbls 2015 SPR is currently 350m bbls

• Reforms have granted licences up to 1 mbpd (source: Bernstein)

• “Use it or lose it” element to the licences

• Substitution demand – new for tankers

• March 2016 – merger of teapots for procurement

• China continue to look to diversify sourcing of oil imports and decrease of domestic oil production

• Domestic production growth stagnant since 2012 (Source: Bernstein)

• Consensus is for 100k bpd requirement of imports replacing domestic production

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Build out to slow 2016

C 50-110m bbls to be added = 140k bpd to 300k bpd

TEAPOT REFINERY

Refinery legislation anniversary June ’16

2016 = 50k bpd growth

DIVERSIFICATION OF SUPPLY & LIKELY

PRODUCTION PEAK

Consensus = 100k bpd

1

4

3

2

• BASE EFFECT – China consumes 11.8m (source: IEA) bpd so small % change means large no of barrels

• 500m people joined middle-class in past decade (source: McQuilling)

• Oil demand underpinned by consumer – diesel, gasoline & kerosene demand

OPERATIONAL ECONOMY

3% import growth = 210k bpd 5% import growth = 350k bpd

12

TO

TA

L 5

00

– 8

00

k b

pd

Source IEA, McQuilling, Bernstein

Demand for Oil

1

0.6

2.5 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5

4.4 4.6 5.0

5.7

Oil Supply = High but Production Cuts Unlikely

OIL SUPPLY – SHALE PROVING TO BE VERY RESILIENT

WHO IS GOING TO MATERIALLY CUT? NEED CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE TOP 10 PRODUCERS = 60% WORLD SUPPLY

SHALE OIL SPEED TO PRODUCTION IS KEY OPEC QUOTAS? … OPEC HAS NEVER COMPLIED WITH QUOTAS

Supply of Oil

2

Average field development (approval to start up) time by resource [years, selected areas]

Source SBC Analysis, Rystad

USA 12.8*

Russia 11.1

Saudi Arabia

10.2

Canada 4.5

China 4.4

Iraq 4.3

UAE 2.9

Iran 2.9

FSU ex

Russia 2.9

Kuwait 2.8 million barrels per day

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Th

ou

san

ds o

f b

arrels

per d

ay

Nu

mb

er o

f o

il r

igs

Baker Hughes crude oil rig count

North Dakota crude oil production

Texas crude oil production

13

* includes bio fuel

Source IEA November 2015

Ton Miles – a Key Driver Ton Miles

3

1.2m bpd x 365 days = 440m barrels 440m barrels / 2m capacity per VLCC = 220 cargoes

220 cargoes / 4.5 annual journeys for VLCC (1) = 49 VLCCs

Asia Pacific

24 – 26

VLCCs

22 – 24

VLCCs

29 – 32

VLCCs

Exporter

Supply

Demand

Demand

Supply

Russia

China

LatAm / Caribs

U.S.

Europe

INCREMENTAL VLCC DEMAND FOR EACH 1.2 MBPD ADDITIONAL EXPORTS

52 – 54

VLCCs

48 – 50

VLCCs 48 – 50

VLCCs

Importer

Arabian Gulf to China 5,500 miles

21 days

West Africa to USA 5,000 miles

19 days

West Africa to China 9,650 miles

33 days

LatAm to China 11,500 miles

44 days

Source Morgan Stanley

Note: 1. Atlantic – Far East trade route

One way voyage durations

Order Book Dynamics – Structure - VLCC

54 62

49

30 24 23

45 45

30

-48

-25

-13

-22

-11

-1 -5 -8 -7

-16 -8 -10

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Could be scrapped (≥20 years old) depending on market levels

Must be scrapped (over 22,5 years old)

Scrapped

Forecast Additions

Additions

Net:13

Q1=9 Q2=9 Q3=8

Q4=19

Q1=12 Q2=4 Q3=4 Q4=25

Q1=10 Q2=5 Q3=5

Q4=10

Net:6 Net:40 Net:8 Net:22 Net:37 Net:36 Net:37 Net:23

VLCC – ADDITIONS, SCRAPPING, REMOVALS IMPLIED BUFFER

Supply of Vessels

4

BASE CASE

15

Source Clarkson

38 43 45

27

8 10

27

45

10

-19

-7

-20

-7 -9

-3 -6 -7

-5

-8

-17

-45

-35

-25

-15

-5

5

15

25

35

45

55

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Could be scrapped (≥20 years old) depending on market levels Must be scrapped (over 22.5 years old)ScrappedForecast AdditionsAdditions

Q1=1 Q2=4 Q3=10 Q4=12

Q1=16 Q2=10 Q3=4 Q4=15

Q1=3 Q2=4 Q3=2 Q4=1

Net:20 Net:-1 Net:10 Net:24 Net:3 Net:39 Net:25 Net:36 Net:19

Order Book Dynamics – Structure - Suezmax

SUEZMAX – ADDITIONS, SCRAPPING, REMOVALS IMPLIED BUFFER

Q1=3 Q2=4 Q3=2 Q4=1

Supply of Vessels

4

BASE CASE

16 Source Clarkson

19

12

5

14 16

14

9

4

1

21

3

14 13

1

14

4 2

7 10

2 3

3

8

17

1

8

1

6

6

2

8

3

7

3

23

-45

-40

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

Nu

mb

er o

f vessels

delivered

≥15 years old ≥17.5 years old ≥20 years old

2017 2018 2019

Order Book – Logical Fleet Renewal – VLCC

ORDERS FROM INDUSTRIAL SHIPPING ARE DIFFERENT THAN ORDERS FROM SPECULATIVE SHIPPING

SPECULATIVE SHIPPING*

Supply of Vessels

4

2016

23

6

0

5

10

15

20

25

2016 2017 2018 2019

Nu

mb

er o

f vessels

deli

vered

• Industrial players don’t order to speculate on asset value

• Industrial players run their ships on committed programs less in the spot market

*including independent owners backed by private equity 17

National Oil Companies Traditional Ship Owners Chinese Ship Owners

Source Clarkson

Source Clarkson

HUGE REDUCTION

IN SHIPPING BANK

EXPOSURE Around USD 70bn

withdrawn from shipping sector since 2008

REGULATIONSFORCE

LEVERAGE DOWN

• Banks lending flexibility severely

curtailed due to Basel II & III

• Shipping & Energy loans in distress

• Quantum of available lending capital restricted for

commercial reasons

PRIVATE EQUITY IN RETREAT

• PE exiting shipping

• PE been surprised by the lack of liquidity

implying a return to the sector as difficult to

realize

SHIP OWNERS UNDER

PRESSURE

• Other shipping segments: Dry Bulk, Offshore, Container

under severe financial pressure

• Most tanker owners have mixed fleets so pressure felt within ownership structure

SHIPYARD PRESSURE TO RESTRUCTURE

& REDUCE CAPACITY

• Low order books in all shipping segments leading to ship yard

distress

• Reforms being actively adopted by shipyards driven by

governments

Increasing Barriers to Entry Financing

5

Bank (USD bn) 2008 2014

HSH Nordbank 58 25.5

Deutsche Schiffsbank/

Commerzbank 44.8 14.7

RBS 30 12

Lloyds/HBOS 12.2 0

HVB/UniCredit 11.2 5.7

Source Marine Money + Deutsche Bank

18

DEMAND

• Agencies forecast steady growth to 2020

• Incremental expansion from Asia Pacific region

CHINA – GROWTH

• China oil demand by very diverse range of factors

• Base effect of economy consuming 12m bpd key

$ • Financing being restricted – new

barrier to entry

• Restricted access reducing vessel supply growth

SUPPLY OIL

• Supply of oil to remain elevated into 2017 with Iran and no co-ordinated production cuts

• Increased supply = increased demand for shipping

STORAGE

• Storage increasing across due to oversupply or strategic build e.g. India

• Ultimately stored crude needs to be shipped to final destination

19

• Tankers a highly cyclical sector – always repeats past mistakes

• Large vessel supply to drive freight rates lower

ASSET VALUES

• Asset values falling despite positive tanker earnings trend

• Lower NAV reduces valuation support

SLOWDOWN

OTHER

INVENTORY

• Inventory at record highs – will need to be cleared at some point thus reducing need for shipping

• Storage / contango on ships in present cycle been limited

• Worldwide shale development – unlikely outside of USA

• OPEC output cut / Middle East reduce exports

• Global GDP growth stagnant

• Tanker market - a transportation sector geared into GDP growth

CYCLICAL

BULL CASE BEAR CASE

Section 3

Our Strategy

16 20

Maximizing Value Through Information

Other VLCC Tanker Pools (Ships on the Water)

• Tankers International = Only owner-led VLCC pool

• No value leakage; no commissions Cost center

• Leading spot market oriented VLCC pool in which ship owners with vessels of similar sizes and quality participate

• Spreading information (VL Database, TI Pool App)

Source: Clarkson’s – Total 658 VLCC ships @ February 2016 Source: Company reports

Red indicates Captive or Sovereign fleet Blue indicates fleet in stock listed companies

VLCC Chartering Undertaking Leadership Role

Differentiate spot players vs industrial players

SIZE IS CRITICAL TO IMPROVE MARKET KNOWLEDGE BARRIER TO ENTRY – INFORMATION

Heidmar – VLCC Seawolf

7

Navig8 – VL8

25

China VLCC

32

1 Ship Owner, 37 Vessels

2 Ship Owner, 52

3 Ship Owner, 24

10 – 15 Ship Owner, 103

COSCO Group, 32

4 – 10 Ship Owner, 154

SK Holdings, 18

NYK, 21

Fredriksen Group, 25

Euronav NV, 28

Angelicoussis Group, 29

Bahri, 31

MOL, 32

China Merchants Grp, 35

NIOC, 37

Top 10 Owners

Control 44%

of Global

VLCC Fleet

56

40 16

21

Small owners are data deficient (267 owners)

Capital allocation strategy

CAPITAL ALLOCATION

Capex Liquidity reserve

M&A criteria – balance sheet

M&A – operational Shareholder Returns

• Approximately USD 20 million maintenance capex (Drydocks)

• $130m outstanding capex on 2 VLCC to be delivered in 1H16 – fully funded

• Retain min TWO years of operational liquidity at all times

• Maintain strong banking relationships

• Will never issue non-accretive new equity

• Additional vessels must on pro-forma basis either match or reduce break even costs

• Distribute regularly excess cash to shareholders

2

3

Strong balance sheet Leverage

• Maintain strong balance sheet through cycle

• Target 30% to 50% leverage according to where we are in the cycle

1

22

Euronav Positioned for Powerful Cash Generation

Notes:

1. Based on full year contribution of 57 ships on proportionate basis’

2. Proportionate consolidation method

3. P&L definition

WELL POSITIONED FOR STRONG CASH FLOW GENERATION

Returns to Shareholders

Return 80% of net income to shareholders (3)

Fixed Income

> USD 100 million of EBITDA (2) generated annually from fixed income contracts (FSO + TC contracts)

Breakeven (including debt service):

~ USD 27,300 / day for VLCC – OpEx / day USD 8,165

~ USD 24,000 / day for Suezmax – OpEx / day USD 7,520

264

339

493

650

1,092

0

500

1,000

1,500

+$5,000

per day

+$15,000

per day

+$25,000

per day

+$55,000

per day

Each USD 5,000 uplift (above breakeven) in both VLCC and Suezmax rates improves net

revenue and EBITDA by

USD 72MM

PRO FORMA FLEET EARNINGS CAPABILITY (EBITDA, $MM) (1)

VLCC

TCE RATES $25,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000 $80,000

SUEZMAX

TCE RATES $20,000 $25,000 $35,000 $45,000 $75,000

Next 12 Months Spot Days Exposure = 14,341 Days ($MM)

1

2

3

23

Section 5

Supplemental Materials

22 24

Appendix - Ton mile dynamic – still more to deliver

Europe

U.S.

LatAm

West Africa

Middle East

Asia

Source Morgan Stanley

• TRADE ROUTES NOW SET FROM ATLANTIC BASIN TO FAR EAST • REPEAL USA EXPORT BAN OPENS NEW MARKET TO TANKER SHIPPING • IRAN – POTENTIAL SHORT TERM BENEFIT FOR COMMERCIAL FLEET AS IRAN RE-ENTERS GLOBAL MARKETS

USA: infrastructure spend required to fully facilitate US exports ($1-4bn)

China domestic production likely peaked 2015 – more imports required

Key routes established

Iran impact neutral

WAF to Europe likely displaced by USA exports

Existing heavy Saudi/Iraqi to complex US refinery 25

Ton Miles

3

Appendix – Supply Manageable

MOST TANKER OWNERS HEAVILY EXPOSED TO OTHER SHIPPING

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Suezmax Aframax Product Dyr Bulk Container

0-5 VLCCs owned (120)

5-9 VLCCs owned (11)

10-14 VLCCs owned (9)

15-19 VLCCs owned (3)

20++ VLCCs owned (9)

Iranian VLCC fleet total 40

Only net 15 VLCCs to re-enter global commercial

fleet

IRANIAN FLEET RE-ADMITTANCE TO GLOBAL FLEET – NEUTRAL IMPACT

17 VLCCs

trading during sanction

to China, Turkey, India, Taiwan Syria, S Korea and Japan

4x2013, 4x2012, 6x2008, 1x2007, 2x2004

7 VLCCs

been on storage

3x2013, 1x2012, 2x2009, 1x2008

8 VLCCs

been on storage

near 3rd special survey

5x2003, 3x2002

8 VLCCs

full time storage

1993-1999 vintage

26

Source Citi

Source Clarksons

ORDER BOOK AS % OF FLEET – MANAGEABLE

Source Clarksons

Orderbook as a % of Fleet

(%)

20

56

31

39

24

52

29 25

30

39 37

10

49

29

36

8

63

18

27

16 13

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0-5 Years 5-10 Years 11-15 Years 16-20 Years +

Source Clarksons

AGE PROFILE OF VLCC FLEET – SCRAPPING TO RISE 2018+

(# of Vessels)

= 111 = 160 = 194 = 186

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

VLCC Suezmax

Supply of Vessels

4

million USD

Special Survey #1 Special Survey #2 Special Survey #3 IS Dry #4 SS #5

cost $1.5m $2m $2.5m $3.25m $4m

5 year 10 15 17.5 20 22.5 25

Years

TANKER SHIPPING – A HIGHLY REGULATED INDUSTRY

Appendix – Cost of Dry-Dock by Age Profile

Costs of surveys increase during tanker life leading to scrapping decision

Average cumulative survey cost

(17.5 21 years)

= USD 7.25 mm

Median scrap age =20 years

27

Reduction in available markets for vessels and reduced utilization

Supply of Vessels

4

SPECULATIVE SHIPPING*

2

12

3 3

31

3 4 2

5 9

17

3 6

5

2

9

1

8

1

12

1 3

9

3

23

2

16

1

23

1

-45

-40

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Nu

mb

er o

f vessels

delivered

≥20 years old ≥17.5 years old ≥15 years old

2016 2017 2018 2019

Appendix - Order Book – Logical Fleet Renewal Suezmax

ORDERS FROM INDUSTRIAL SHIPPING ARE DIFFERENT THAN ORDERS FROM SPECULATIVE SHIPPING

Supply of Vessels

4

National Oil Companies Traditional Ship Owners Chinese Ship Owners

13 13

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2016 2017 2018 2019

Nu

mb

er o

f vessels

deli

vered

*including independent owners backed by private equity 28

Source: Clarckson

Source: Clarckson