Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge · 1 Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About...

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IntuitiveExpertiseandIntuitionsAboutKnowledge

JoachimHorvath&AlexWiegmann

December30,2015

ForthcominginPhilosophicalStudies*

Abstract Experimentalrestrictionistshavechallengedphilosophers’relianceon

intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcasesbasedonexperimentalfindings.Accordingto

theexpertisedefense,onlytheintuitionsofphilosophicalexpertscount—yetthebulkof

experimentalphilosophyconsistsinstudieswithlaypeople.Inthispaper,wearguethat

direct(experimental)strategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefensearepreferableto

indirect(inductive)strategies.Adirectargumentinsupportoftheexpertisedefense

wouldhavetoshow:first,thatthereisasignificantdifferencebetweenexpertandlay

intuitions;second,thatexpertintuitionsaresuperiortolayintuitions;andthird,that

expertintuitionsaccordwiththerelevantphilosophicalconsensus.Atpresent,thereis

onlylittleexperimentalevidencethatbearsontheseissues.Toadvancethedebate,we

conductedtwonewexperimentsonintuitionsaboutknowledgewithexpertsandlay

people.Ourresultssuggestthattheintuitionsofepistemologicalexpertsaresuperiorin

somerespects,buttheyalsoposeanunexpectedchallengetotheexpertisedefense.

Moststrikingly,wefoundthatevenepistemologicalexpertstendtoascribeknowledge

infake-barn-stylecases.Thissuggeststhatphilosophy,asadiscipline,mightfailto

adequatelymaptheintuitionsofitsexpertpractitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensus.

Keywords intuitions,thoughtexperiments,knowledge,expertisedefense,intuitive

expertise,experimentalphilosophy,experimentalrestrictionism

*ThefinalpublicationisavailableatSpringerviahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0627-1

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1 Introduction

Findingsfromexperimentalphilosophysuggestthatlaypeople’sintuitionsabout

philosophicalthoughtexperimentsvarywithanumberofseeminglyirrelevantfactors,

suchasculturalbackground(Machery,Mallon,Nichols,&Stich,2004),orderof

presentation(Liao,Wiegmann,Alexander,&Vong,2012;Swain,Alexander,&Weinberg,

2008;Wiegmann&Waldmann,2014),affectivecontent(Nichols&Knobe,2007),or

heritablepersonalitytraits(Cokely&Feltz,2009;Feltz&Cokely,2009).Basedonthese

findings,experimentalphilosophersofa‘restrictionist’benthavechallengedthe

trustworthinessofthoughtexperimentintuitions(Alexander,Mallon,&Weinberg,2009;

Alexander&Weinberg,2007;Feltz&Cokely,2012;Macheryetal.,2004;Weinberg,

2007;Weinberg,Nichols,&Stich,2001).Otherphilosophershaverespondedina

numberofwaystotheexperimentalrestrictionistchallenge(Bengson,2013;Cappelen,

2012;Deutsch,2009,2010;Grundmann,2010;Horvath,2010;Kauppinen,2007;

Ludwig,2007,2010;Nagel,2012;Sosa,2007,2009,2010)—somemorepromising,

somelesspromising(Alexander,2012;Alexander&Weinberg,2007;Deutsch,2015;

Horvath,2010;Mizrahi,2015;Nado,2014,2015b;Weinberg,Alexander,Gonnerman,&

Reuter,2012;Weinberg,Gonnerman,Buckner,&Alexander,2010).1

Theso-called‘expertisedefense’emergedasoneofthemostfruitfulandhotly

debatedreactionstotheexperimentalrestrictionists’challenge(seeNado,2014fora

recentsurvey).Proponentsoftheexpertisedefensehavevariouslyarguedthat

professionalphilosophersaretherelevantexpertswithrespecttotheintuitive

evaluationofthoughtexperiments,whocanthusbeexpectedtobelargelyresistantto

theinfluenceofirrelevantfactors(Devitt,2006,2011;Grundmann,2010;Hales,2006;

Hofmann,2010;Horvath,2010;Kipper,2010;Ludwig,2007;Turri,2013;Williamson,

1Weusetheterm‘intuition’fairlybroadlyinthispaper,i.e.,aspotentiallycoveringawiderangeofspontaneouscognitiveresponsestothoughtexperimentcases(see,e.g.,Pust,2012foranoverview).Thisbroaduseisopentotheobjectionthatonlyintuitionsofaspecifickindmatterforphilosophicalmethodologyandthuscountasgenuineintuitions(see,e.g.,Bengson,2013;Ludwig,2007).Wedonothavethespacetodiscussthisobjectioninmoredetailhere.However,wewouldliketonotethatweareskepticalaboutthemethodologicalsignificanceofthe‘genuineintuitionsobjection’,sinceitisnotclearwhetherevenprofessionalphilosopherstypicallyrespondtothoughtexperimentcaseswith“genuineintuitions”intheireverydaypractice(fordiscussion,see,e.g.,Alexander,2012,Chapter5;Alexander&Weinberg,2007;Horvath,2010;Weinberg&Alexander,2014).

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2005,2007,2011;Wright,2010).2Sincemostfindingsfromexperimentalphilosophy

concernonlylayintuitions,thesefindingscanaccordinglybeignoredasirrelevantto

philosophicalpractice,whichmainlyreliesontheintuitionsofwell-trainedprofessional

philosophers.3

Therearedirectandindirectstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefense

(Schulz,Cokely,&Feltz,2011,p.1724).TheseminalrestrictionistresponsebyWeinberg

etal.(2010)pursuesanindirectstrategy.Basedonasurveyofthepsychological

literatureonexpertise,Weinbergetal.arguethattheintuitiveabilitiesofprofessional

philosopherslacksomeofthefeaturesthatconstitutegenuineexpertiseinother

domains.Incontrast,proponentsofdirectstrategiesinvestigatetheintuitionsofthe

allegedphilosophicalexpertsmoredirectly,thatis,byperformingsuitableexperiments

withthoseexpertsubjects.

Inthispaper,wefirstargueinfavorofdirectstrategiesforassessingthe

expertisedefense,bothfordialecticalandsubstantivereasons(directandindirect

strategiesneednotbeinconflict,however,andcansometimesevenbemutually

reinforcing).

Toadvancethedebateaboutdirectstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefense,

wethenpresenttheresultsoftwonewexperimentsonexpertintuitionsabout

knowledge.Despitethefactthat“NormativityandEpistemicIntuitions”(Weinbergetal.,

2001)—arguablythe“foundingdocument”ofexperimentalphilosophy—reportsa

numberoffindingsaboutknowledge-relatedintuitions,therehasbeennoattemptsofar

toinvestigatetheknowledgeintuitionsofphilosophicalexpertsmoredirectly.4Thisisa

failurethatwewanttorectifyinthispaper.Ourexperimentswereguidedbythree

ideas:(1)tocompareexpertintuitionsaboutknowledgewithlayintuitions,(2)to

2Foraqualifiedempiricaldefenseofphilosophers’intuitiveexpertise,seeDeCruz(2015)onthebasisofdualprocesspsychology,andBuckwalter(2014)onthebasisofthepsychologyofexpertbiasesandlimitations.SeealsoNado(2015a)foraqualifiedendorsementofphilosophicalexpertisethatdoesnot,however,aimtorebuttheexperimentalrestrictionistchallenge.3Somephilosophershavearguedthatthefindingsofexperimentalphilosophyaremethodologicallyirrelevantbecauseintuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcasesdonot,oncloserinspection,playanysignificantmethodologicalroleinphilosophicalpractice(Cappelen,2012,2014;Deutsch,2009,2010,2015).Inthiscase,theexpertisedefensemightbeobsoletesimplybecausetherewouldbenochallengefromexperimentalphilosophyinthefirstplace.Thecontroversyoverthisimportantissueisstillongoing,however,andanumberofphilosophershaveofferedforcefulrepliestovariousargumentsforthemethodologicalirrelevanceofintuitions(see,e.g.,Bengson,2014;Boghossian,2014;Brogaard,2014;Chalmers,2014;Ichikawa,2014;Nado,2015b;Weinberg,2014).Forthepurposesofthispaper,wewillthereforesimplyassumethatintuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentcases,broadlyunderstood,doplayasignificantmethodologicalroleinphilosophicalpractice.4OnereasonmightbethattheresultsofWeinberg,Nichols,andStichfailedtoreplicate(Macheryetal.,2015;Nagel,2012;Nagel,Mar,&SanJuan,2013;Nagel,SanJuan,&Mar,2013;Seyedsayamdost,2015).

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measuretheirqualityagainsttherelevantepistemologicalconsensus,and(3)tocheck

whethertheexperts’intuitionsareinlinewiththeconsensusoftheirowndiscipline.

Incontrasttomostotherstudiesonphilosophicalexpertintuitions,ourresults

offersomedegreeofsupportfortheexpertisedefense.Forexample,wefoundthatthe

knowledge-relatedintuitionsofepistemologicalexpertsdiffersystematicallyfromthose

oflaypeopleinanumberofcriticalcases,andthattheydifferinawaythatonewould

expectonthebasisoftherelevantliterature.Ontheotherhand,ourresultshavea

puzzlingaspectaswell,forourexpertsubjectstendedtoascribeknowledgeevenin

caseswhereepistemologicalorthodoxywoulddenyknowledge,suchasfake-barn-style

cases.Thus,ourfindingsalsoraisethetroublingnewquestionwhetherepistemologists

havebeencollectivelyunawareofwhattheirownintuitiveexpertisereallytellsthem

aboutcertainkeythoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge.

2 WaysofAssessingtheExpertiseDefense

2.1 IndirectandDirectStrategiesforAssessingtheExpertiseDefense

Letusfirstconsiderthemeritsofindirectanddirectstrategiesforsupportingor

challengingtheexpertisedefense.Asmentionedabove,theearlyrestrictionistresponse

byWeinbergetal.(2010)pursuesanindirectstrategy.Weinbergetal.extractcertain

findingsaboutgenuineexpertisefromtherelevantpsychologicalliteratureandthen

suggestanampliativeinferencefromthesefindingstotheallegedexpertintuitersin

philosophy.Oneoftheirkeypointsisthat,inawiderangeofdomains,thedevelopment

ofgenuineexpertiserequiresclear,timely,andreliablefeedbackduringtheprocessof

traininginalargenumberoftrainingsituations(seealsoClarke,2013).Weinbergetal.

thenarguethatthetrainingofprofessionalphilosophersintheintuitiveevaluationof

thoughtexperimentsfallsconsiderablyshortofsatisfyingtheserequirementsonthe

developmentofgenuineexpertise,andtheyconcludethatprofessionalphilosophers’

intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentsareunlikelytoresultfromgenuineintuitive

expertise.Thecruxintheirinductiveargumentistheassumptionthatintuitiveexpertise

withrespecttothoughtexperimentsisrelevantlysimilartointuitiveexpertiseinother

domains,becauseotherwisefindingsaboutthelatterwouldnotbeprojectibletothe

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former.Buttherearereasonstobeskepticalaboutthisassumptionofprojectibility(see

alsoAndow,2015).

Forexample,paradigmaticcasesofintuitiveexpertiseinthepsychological

literature,suchasfiregroundcommanders(G.Klein,Calderwood,&Clinton-Cirocco,

1986)ornursesinneonatalintensivecareunits(Crandall&Getchell-Reiter,1993),are

primafaciequitedisanalogoustophilosophicalthoughtexperimenters.Whilethe

intuitivejudgmentsoftheformerareinthebusinessofmakingcausalpredictionsin

highlycomplex,uncertainsituations,intuitivejudgmentsaboutthoughtexperiments

typicallydonotconcerncausalrelationsoruncertainoutcomes.Rather,inatypical

philosophicalthoughtexperiment,allrelevantfeaturesoftheintendedscenarioare

eitherexplicitlystipulatedorotherwiseimplicitlyassumedbythethought

experimenter.Ifimportantfactsaboutthescenariostillremainopenorunclear,thenthe

thoughtexperimentinquestionissimplynotagoodone.Thus,thethought

experimenter’smainjobistoevaluateascenariothatalreadycontainsenough

informationtoforecloseanyuncertaintywithrespecttothetargetquestion,e.g.,

whetherSmithknowsthatsomeoneinhisofficeownsaFord(Lehrer,1965).Thisis

quitedisanalogoustotheinformationalsituationofafirefighterinaburningbuilding,

oraneonatalnursewhocaresforprematureinfants.

Whetheronesharesourreservationsaboutindirectstrategiesornot,theycan

hardlyprovidethemostcompellingwayofassessingtheexpertisedefense.Onereason

isthattherelevantinductiveargumentsarealmostalwaysepistemicallyriskierthana

moredirectinvestigationofprofessionalphilosophers’intuitiveexpertise.5Direct

strategiesarealsodialecticallymoreeffective,forinthefaceofindirectargumentsonly,

manyprofessionalphilosopherswillsurelycontinuetothinkthattheysimplymustbe

betterandlessbiasedintheirintuitiveevaluationsofthoughtexperimentsthanlay

people.Thisexpectationisactuallysupportedbypsychologicalresearchonthebias

blindspot,i.e.,bythefindingthatalmosteveryonetakesher-orhimselftobelessbiased

thanotherpeople(Armor,1998;Pronin,2007;Pronin,Gilovich,&Ross,2004)—a

tendencythatmanyexpertsexhibitintheirownareaofexpertiseaswell(Chi,1978;

Glenberg&Epstein,1987).Directstrategiesforassessingtheexpertisedefenseshould

thustakepriorityoverindirectstrategiesatthepresentstageofthedebate.

5Itshouldbenoted,however,that—duetothemediatingroleofoperationalization—eventhemostdirectpsychologicalinvestigationofphilosophicaljudgmentsandintuitionswillstillbeindirectincomparisonto,e.g.,theobservationofoverthumanbehaviororbodilymovements.Forthisreason,oneshouldthinkofthedistinctionbetweendirectandindirectstrategiesmoreasacontinuumthanasastrictdichotomy.

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2.2 TheTaskforDirectStrategies

Whatneedstobeshownbydirectstrategiesforsupportingtheexpertisedefense?

First,thereneedstobeasignificantdifferencebetweentherelevantintuitionsof

professionalphilosophersandlaypeople.Intheabsenceofsuchadifference,the

questionwhetherprofessionalphilosophershavebetterintuitionsthanlaypeoplewill

typicallybemoot.Ofcourse,wideintuitiveagreementbetweenallegedexpertsandlay

peopleisnotsufficienttoruleoutintuitiveexpertise,nordoessubstantialintuitive

disagreementbetweenexpertsandlaypeoplealreadyestablishintuitiveexpertise(both

expertsandlaypeoplemightarriveattheirintuitiveverdictsinepistemicallydubious

ways).Butontheassumptionthatphilosophicalexpertspossessgenuineintuitive

expertise,somesignificantdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsissurelythe

mostnaturalexpectation,anditsabsencewouldseemtoconstitutestrongprimafacie

evidenceagainsttheexpertisedefense.6

Onedirectstrategyforchallengingtheexpertisedefensewouldthereforebeto

showthatlaypeopleandprofessionalphilosophershavemoreorlessthesame

intuitionsinagivendomain.Extantstudiesthatrevealasignificantdifferencebetween

laypeopleandprofessionalphilosophersareSytsmaandMachery(2010)onintuitions

aboutphenomenalconsciousness,Schulz,Cokely,andFeltz(2011)onincompatibilist

intuitionsaboutfreewill,andMachery(2012)onexpertintuitionsaboutreference.7

Otherpertinentstudies(Hitchcock&Knobe,2009;Schwitzgebel&Cushman,2012,

2015;Tobia,Buckwalter,&Stich,2013;Tobia,Chapman,&Stich,2013;Vaesen,

Peterson,&VanBezooijen,2013)didnotreportanysignificantdifferencebetween

philosophersandlaypeople.Ourownexperimentalresultsindicatethatthereisindeed

asignificantdifferencebetweenprofessionalepistemologistsandlaypeopleconcerning

intuitionsaboutknowledge(seebelow).

Second,asignificantdifferencebetweenexpertsandlaypeoplebyitselfisnot

enoughtosupporttheexpertisedefense,ofcourse.Therelevantdifferencemustalso

involveasignificantimprovementofexpertintuitionsoverlayintuitions,forexample,by

6Thankstoananonymousreviewerforpromptingtheseclarifications.7Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,welearnedaboutarecentstudybyJ.AdamCarter,MartinPeterson,andBartvanBezooijen(2015)thatinteraliasuggeststhatphilosophicalexpertsarelesswillingthanlaypeopletoself-ascribeknowledgeofsimpleanalytictruthsversusknowledgeofwidelyacceptedempiricaltruths(thankstoMartinPetersonforthepointer).

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revealingthatexpertintuitionsarelesssusceptibletotheinfluenceofsomeofthe

irrelevantfactorsthatexperimentalphilosophershaveidentified.Sofar,thereisonly

littleexperimentalevidencethatthismightbethecase.WhiletheresultsofSytsmaand

Machery(2010)areatleastconsistentwithexpertsuperiority,thefindingsofSchulz,

Cokely,andFeltz(2011)indicatethatphilosophers’compatibilistintuitionsaboutfree

willareequallyaffectedbytheinnatepersonalitytraitofextraversionasthoseoflay

people.AndMachery(2012)presentsevidencethatthereferentialintuitionsinvarious

subgroupsoflinguisticexpertspointinratherdifferentdirections.Turri(2013)offersat

leastsomeindirectsupportforanimprovementofintuitionsaboutknowledgethrough

expertise,sincehefoundthatlaypeople’sjudgmentsaboutGettiercasescanbebrought

inlinewiththeepistemologicalconsensusbyamoreperspicuouspresentationoftheir

structure.Ourownresultsalsosuggestthatvariousknowledge-relatedintuitionsof

professionalepistemologistsmightbebetterthanthoseoflaypeopleinsofarasthey

comesignificantlyclosertothetextbookconsensusoncasesoftherelevanttype(see

below).Aswewillsee,however,theymightstillnotcomecloseenough.

Third,adirectstrategyinsupportoftheexpertisedefensewouldideallyshow

thattheexpertintuitionsareinlinewiththetextbookconsensusontheintuitive

evaluationofthoughtexperimentsoftherelevanttype.Iftheintuitionsofprofessional

philosophersturnedouttobesignificantlydifferentfromtherelevantconsensusinthe

literature,thiswouldseemtobeaconsiderableembarrassment,becauseitwould

indicatethatphilosophy,asadiscipline,mightbedeludedaboutwhattheintuitionsof

itsexpertpractitionersactuallysay.Forexample,eveniftheintuitionsofprofessional

epistemologiststurnedouttobefreeofallknownbiases,butalsocameoutinfavorof

ascribingknowledgeinGettiersituations,thiswouldstillbeatroublingresultfor

epistemologyasadiscipline.Forsucharesultwouldsuggestthatthedisciplineof

epistemologyisdysfunctionalinsofarasitfailstomaptheintuitionsofitsexpert

practitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensusintherightkindofway.Ourownresults

indicatethatsomethinglikethismightinfactbethecase(seebelow).

Inconclusion,itmustbeconcededthatthepresentlyavailableexperimental

evidencedoesnotsubstantiatedirectstrategiesforsupportingtheexpertisedefense.

Andwhileourownexperiments—tobereportedbelow—offersomesupportforthe

superiorityofexpertintuitionsaboutknowledge,theyalsosuggestthatsomeofthese

intuitionsdeviatefromthetextbookconsensusinunexpectedandtroublesomeways.

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3 Experiments

3.1 Experiment1

3.1.1 RationaleandMaterial

Afirstideabehindourexperimentissimplytocomparetheintuitionsofexpert

epistemologistsandlaypeopleconcerninganumberofsystematicallyimportanttypes

ofthoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge.

Asecondideaistomeasurethequalityoflaypeople’sandexpertepistemologists’

intuitionsagainsthowclosetheycometotherelevanttextbookconsensusonthought

experimentsofthesamekind.Wethereforeapproachtheissueofintuitiveexpertise

fromaslightlydifferentanglethanusual.Thestandardprocedurewouldbetocheck

whetherprofessionalphilosophersarelesssusceptibletosomephilosophically

irrelevantfactorthatwasfoundtoinfluencelaypeople’sintuitions(see,e.g.,

Schwitzgebel&Cushman,2012,2015).Incontrast,weaimforapositiveevaluationof

thequalityofexpertintuitionsaboutknowledgefromtheviewpointofthepresent

epistemologicalconsensus.Experimentsthat“only”testforthesusceptibilityofexpert

intuitionstophilosophicallyirrelevantfactorscan“atbest”establishapurelynegative

result,i.e.,thatprofessionalphilosophersarenotsusceptibletotheinfluenceofsuch

factors.Ourexperimentsthusbearontheexpertisedefenseinwaysthatdifferfrom

experimentsthatfollowthestandardprocedureand,asaconsequence,leadto

interestinglydifferentresults,aswewillarguebelow.8

Itmightbeobjectedthatregardingthetextbookconsensusasanadequate

standardforevaluatingintuitionsaboutknowledgebegsthequestioninfavorof

intuitionsthatsupportthetextbookconsensus.Inthiscase,however,wefacethe

unusuallydifficulttaskofassessingthequalityofintuitionsaboutknowledgeinthe

absenceofsomeindependentstandard.Moreover,theinsistencethatwehaveto

bracketeventhosecaseswherewedofindarobustepistemologicalconsensusis

arguablyanundulyskepticalmaneuver(Sosa,2007;Williamson,2004,2011).Forthese

reasons,theassumptionthatthetextbookconsensusprovidesatleastadefeasibleor

8Thankstoananonymousreviewerforencouragingustomakeourproceduremoreexplicit.

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primafaciestandardforassessingthequalityofintuitionsaboutknowledgedoesnot

seemespeciallyproblematicorquestionbegging.

Evenifoneshouldrejecttheideathatthetextbookconsensuscanbeusedasan

adequatestandardofcorrectnessforintuitionsaboutknowledge,onecanstill

acknowledgeathirdideabehindourexperiment,namely,totestwhethertheintuitions

ofexpertepistemologistsareinlinewiththerelevanttextbookconsensusoftheirown

discipline.

Inordertotrulyengagetheexpertiseofourepistemologicalexperts,we

confrontedthemwithunfamiliarvariationsofthoughtexperimentsthatalreadyfigure

intheepistemologicalliterature,althoughlessprominentlythan,e.g.,Gettier’soriginal

cases(1963)orthefake-barncase(Goldman,1976).Usingsuchwell-knowncasesmight

havetheunwantedeffectthatepistemologistsmerelyrecalltheirearlierintuitive

verdictsfrommemory,orthattheysimplyreproducethetextbookconsensus(seealso

Rini,2015,sec.5.1).Ofcourse,someonewhoknowstheepistemologicalliteraturereally

wellwillprobablybeabletoidentifythecasesthatinspiredourvignettes.Butusingnew

variationsoffamiliarcasesshouldatleastraisethechancethatevenprofessional

epistemologiststrulyengagetheirintuitiveabilities.

Letusnowintroducethevignettesthatweusedinourfirstexperiment.Ineach

case,wewillfirstreproducethevignettesinexactlytheformthatweusedinthe

experiment,alongsidewiththetargetquestionthattheparticipantswereaskedto

answer.Afterthat,wedescribethepointofthevignetteinamoreabstractway,and

thencitethecasesonwhichitwasmodeled,aswellastheconsensusontheevaluation

ofcasesofthiskindaccordingtotheepistemologicalliterature.

Asecurityguardmonitorsanumberofvideoscreensthatshowwhatisgoingoninan

officebuildingacrossthestreet.Atmidnight,theguardcheckshervideoscreensand

sees,onfivedifferentscreensthatshowfivedifferentoffices,thatpeoplearestill

workingintheiroffices.Shethinkstoherself:“Thereisstillsomeoneinthebuilding.”

Fourofthefivescreensareinfactworkingproperly.Butduetosomeunusual

malfunction,oneofthefivescreensactuallyshowsavideotapefromthenightbefore,

andtodaythisparticularofficeisalreadyempty.

Howmuchdoyoudisagreeoragreewiththefollowingclaim:

Theguardknowsthatthereisstillsomeoneinthebuilding.

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Monitorisacasewherethesubjecthasmultiplepiecesofevidenceforthetarget

proposition,eachofwhichwouldbesufficientforknowledge.Inaddition,thesubject

alsohasonefaultypieceofevidenceforthetargetproposition,inthiscase:theone

malfunctioningvideoscreen.Intheepistemologicalliterature,casesofthiskindare

regardedasclearcasesofknowledgethatrefutetheearlyno-false-assumptionsolution

(Clark,1963)toGettier’s(1963)originalcounterexamplestothestandardanalysisof

knowledgeasjustifiedtruebelief(cf.Lehrer,1965).Suchcasesthengaverisetotheno-

essential-false-assumptionsolution(see,e.g.,Harman,1973;Lehrer,1974;Lycan,2006).

InMonitor,forexample,thesecurityguard’sjustificationdoesnotessentiallydependon

themalfunctioningvideoscreen,sincesheequallyreliesonthefourscreensthat

functionproperly.

ACEOhasownedafamouspaintingforalongtime.Justthismorning,sheshowedittoa

colleagueinherofficewhereshecanwatchthepaintingeveryday.Intheevening,the

CEOreturnshomefromworkandisabouttocheckheremail.Whatshewillfindthereis

anurgentnotebyhersecretarythatsaysthatherpaintingwasstolenshortlyaftershe

hadleftheroffice.Infact,theCEO’scolleaguemerelywantedtoplayatrickonher,and

soitwasactuallyhimwhousedthesecretary’semailaccounttosendherthisnote.The

paintingitselfisstillontheCEO’sofficewall,justasitalwayswas.


AtthetimewhentheCEOreturnshome,butbeforesheactuallychecksheremail,she

knowsthatthepaintingisstillonherofficewall.

Paintingisacasewhereevidencethatthesubjectdoesnot(yet)possess—here,an

unreademail—threatenstounderminethesubject’sjustificationforbelievingthetarget

propositionthatthepaintingisstillonherofficewall.GilbertHarman,whointroduced

casesofthiskindintotheepistemologicalliterature,regardedthemasintuitivecasesof

non-knowledge(Harman,1968,p.172,1973,pp.144–145).Paintingismodeledafter

thecaseofDonaldandtheunopenedletter(Harman,1973,p.143),whichisless

discussedtodaythanthemorefamiliarassassinationcase(Harman,1968,p.172,1973,

pp.143–144).Itisfairtosay,however,thatmanyepistemologistsdidnotfollow

Harman’sintuitiveassessmentofsuchcases,atleastnotwithoutqualifications(see,e.g.,

P.Klein,1981;Lycan,1977;Pritchard,2005).Accordingly,thepresentconsensusisthat

casesofthiskindareintuitivelyunclear(Shope,2002,p.32).

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Thedirectorofasculpturemuseumissoimpressedwithrecentimprovementsof

hologramimagesthatshedecidestoperformasecrettestonthevisitorsofhermuseum.

Tothisend,sheordershologramimagesthatevenartexpertscannotvisuallydistinguish

fromtherealsculpturesinhermuseum,andshereplacesallbutoneofthesculpturesby

theirhologramimage.Asthedirectorhadexpected,noonerealizesanydifference

betweenthehologramimagesandtherealsculptures.Oneday,theworld’sgreatest

Rodinexpertisvisitinghermuseum.Theexpertisstandinginfrontofafamousmarble

sculpturebyRodin,whichistheonlyrealsculpturethatispresentlyondisplayinthe

museum,andshethinkstoherself:“I’mfacingoneofRodin’sfamousmarblesculptures

now.”


TheRodinexpertknowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamous

marblesculptures.

InSculpture,thesubjecthasatruebeliefaboutamarblesculptureonthebasisofvisual

perception.However,themarblesculptureissurroundedbyvisuallyindistinguishable

hologramimagesofsculpturesinthesamemuseum.Inasense,then,itisamatterof

luckthatthesubjecthasacquiredatruebeliefinthissituation,forshecouldhaveeasily

lookedatanothersculptureandtherebyacquiredafalsebelief.Thiscaseispartly

inspiredbyLehrerandPaxson’s(1969,pp.234–235)caseofMr.Promoter,whichthey

presentasacounterexampletoUnger’s(1968)earlyanti-luckanalysisofknowledge,

andmainlybyCarlGinet’sfamousfake-barncase(Goldman,1976,pp.772–773),which

Goldmanusesasacounterexampletohisearliercausalanalysisof(perceptual)

knowledge(Goldman,1967).Thefake-barncasewasoriginallypresentedasaclearnon-

instanceofknowledge,andthisintuitiveverdictiswidelyacceptedinthe

epistemologicalliterature(see,e.g.,EngelJr.,2015;Hetherington,2015;Ichikawa&

Steup,2014;Shope,2004;Steup,2014),withonlyveryfewexceptions(see,e.g.,Gendler

&Hawthorne,2005;Heathcote,2006;Hetherington,1999;Lycan,1977,2006).9

Alittlegirllikestoplayagamewithflippingacoin.Shesometimesgetsa“special

feeling”thatthenextflipwillcomeoutheads.Whenshegetsthis“specialfeeling”,sheis

9Steup,forexample,explicitlynotesthatthereis“…broadagreementamongepistemologiststhatHenry’sbelief[inthefake-barncase]doesnotqualifyasknowledge”(Steup,2014,sec.1.2).

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rightabouthalfthetime,andwrongabouthalfthetime.Justbeforethenextflip,the

littlegirlgetsthat“specialfeeling”,andthefeelingleadshertobelievethatthecoinwill

landheads.Sheflipsthecoin,anditdoeslandheads.


Thelittlegirlknewthatthecoinwasgoingtolandheads.

Thisclearcaseofanon-instanceofknowledge,ClearNon-Knowledge1,wasalready

usedseveraltimesinexperimentalstudies(see,e.g.,Nichols,Stich,&Weinberg,2003;

Swainetal.,2008;Weinbergetal.,2001).Ineachcase,thevastmajorityofthetestedlay

subjectsclassifieditasacaseofnon-knowledge.Asignificantdifferencebetweenexpert

intuitionsandlayintuitionsconcerningthiscasewouldthusbestrongevidenceforthe

superiority(orinferiority)ofexpertintuitions.

Beforeleavingthehouse,awomanwantstocheckwhetherthelightinherbathroomis

off.Sheopensthebathroomdoor,anditiscompletelydarkinside.Shethinkstoherself:

“Alright,thelightinmybathroomisoff.”


Thewomanknowsthatthelightinherbathroomisoff.

Thisnewlydevisedcase,ClearKnowledge1,isintendedasaclear,everydaycaseof

knowledgeonthebasisofvisualperception.AsinthecaseofClearNon-Knowledge1,a

significantdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsaboutthiscasewouldbestrong

evidenceforthesuperiority(orinferiority)ofexpertintuitions.

3.1.2 Subjects

Overall,thedataof224subjectswereincludedinourmainanalysis.82wereidentified

asexpertsubjects(meanagewas38years;82%male)and142aslaysubjects(mean

agewas39years;37%male).

Theexpertsubjectswererecruitedviaacallforparticipationonanelectronic

mailinglistforphilosophers(PHILOS-L)andontheExperimentalPhilosophyblog

(http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/)thatcontainedalinkthatdirected

subjectstotheexperiment.Inordertobeincludedasexpertsubjects,participantshad

toindicatethat,firstly,theyhaveaPhDinphilosophyand,secondly,epistemologyisone

13

oftheirareasofspecializationorcompetence.Furthermore,weexcludedthedataof

subjectswhodidnotcompletethesurveyorcompleteditinlessthanoneminute.Outof

initially421people,82metthesecriteria,whichwerenotannouncedinthecallfor

participationorduringthesurvey.Tomotivatepeopletotakepartinourstudywe

announcedthatabookaboutexperimentalphilosophywouldberaffledamongall

participants.Toenterthisoptionalraffle,subjectswereaskedtoprovidetheiremail

addressattheendofthesurvey.

LaysubjectswererecruitedviaadatabaselocatedintheUK.Theywereinvited

viaanemailthatcontainedalinkthatdirectedsubjectstotheexperiment.Eachsubject

received£0.50.Weincludedthedataofsubjectswhoindicatedthattheyhavenoprior

experiencewithphilosophyandthattheyarenativespeakersofEnglish.Moreover,we

excludedthedataofsubjectswhodidnotcompletethesurveyorcompleteditinless

thanoneminute.Outofinitially284people,142metthesecriteria,whichwereagain

notannouncedinthecallforparticipationorduringthesurvey.

3.1.3 DesignandProcedure

TheexperimentwasconductedontheInternet.Uponclickingonalinkwhichsubjects

receivedviaemailorontheblogpost,theywereredirectedtoawebsitecontainingthe

experiment.Subjectsfirstreadgeneralinstructions.Thesefamiliarizedthemwiththe6-

pointLikertscalerangingfrom1(‘stronglydisagree’)to6(‘stronglyagree’),askedthem

toreadthesubsequentdescriptionsofscenarioscarefully,andappealedtothemtotake

thetaskseriously.Afterthat,thethreecasesMonitor,Painting,andSculpturewere

presentedinarandomizedorder.TheClearNon-Knowledge1caseandtheClear

Knowledge1casewerealwayspresentedonfourthandfifthposition,respectively.We

presentedtherelativelyclearcasesafterthelessclearcasesinordertoavoidcontrast

effectsasfoundinotherstudies(cf.Swainetal.,2008).Onthefinalpage,weaskeda

numberofdemographicquestionsandassessedtheparticipants’levelofphilosophical

educationandexpertise.

3.1.4 Results

TheresultsofourfirstexperimentaresummarizedinFigure1.AmixedANOVA

(betweensubjects:laysubjectsvs.expertsubjects;withinsubject:thefivecases)

showedaverysignificantinteractionofsubjectsandcases,indicatingthattheresponse

patternoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedstronglyoverthefivecases,F(4,

14

888)=20.58,p<.001,η2=.08.Theaveragetimespenttocompletethesurveydidnotdiffersignificantlybetweenlaypeople(322seconds)andexperts(353seconds),F(1,

220)=.77287,p=.38.10

Figure1.Meanratingsforthefivecasesdividedinlayandexpertjudgments.Thescaleranged

from1(‘stronglydisagree’withtheclaimthattheagentknewtherelevantproposition)to6

(‘stronglyagree’).Errorbarsrepresent95%confidenceintervals.

Amorefine-grainedanalysisrevealedthatforthreeofthefivecasesthejudgmentsoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedsignificantly,withtheexperts’judgmentsbeingclosertotheevaluationofcorrespondingcasesintheepistemologicalliterature.ForMonitor,laysubjects(M=4.72,SD=1.51)andexpertsubjects(M=5.10,

SD=1.11)bothtendedtoagreewiththeclaimthattheguardknowsthatthereisstill

someoneinthebuilding.Thelevelofagreementforthiscase,whichcorrespondsto

casesthatareregardedasacasesofknowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature,was

significantlyhigherforexpertsubjects,F(1,222)=3.93,p<.05,η2=.02.11ForSculpture,

laysubjects’(M=4.79,SD=1.20)agreedsignificantlystrongerwiththeclaimthatthe

RodinexpertknowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamousmarble

10Twosubjects(oneexpertsubject,onelaysubject)wereexcludedfromthisanalysisbecausetheyspentover10,000secondslongerthanallothersubjects.11Wecalculatedallcomparisonsassumingequalandunequalvariances.Sincetheresultsdifferedonlymarginally(itwasneverthecasethatacertaindifferencewassignificantusingoneassumptionbutnotsignificantwhentheotherassumptionwasused)wechosetoreportourfindingsinthemostcommonform,i.e.,withoutadjustingthedegreesoffreedom.

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

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Lay Subjects

Expert Subjects

15

sculpturesthanexpertsubjects(M=3.77,SD=1.67),F(1,222)=28.06,p<.001,η2=.11.12Althoughexpertsweremoreskepticalthanlaysubjectsabouttheclaimthatthis

caseconstitutesacaseofknowledge,theywerealsomoreinclinedtoagreewiththis

claimthanonewouldexpectfromtheconsensusintheepistemologicalliterature(see

Figure2forthedistributionofexpertjudgmentsforSculpture).13ForClearNon-

Knowledge1,expertsubjects(M=1.41,SD=0.74)disagreedsignificantlystrongerthan

laysubjects(M=2.64,SD=1.44)withtheclaimthatthelittlegirlknewthatthecoin

wasgoingtolandheads,F(1,222)=51.55,p<.001,η2=.19.14Afurtherinterestingdifferencebetweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsisthatlaysubjects’evaluationsfor

thefirstthreecases(Monitor,Painting,andSculpture)didnotdiffersignificantly,F(2,

282)=2.00,p=.14,whiletheevaluationsofexpertsubjectsdifferedstrongly,F(2,

162)=27.32,p<.001,η2=.25andinlinewiththerelevantconsensusintheepistemologicalliterature.ForthePaintingcaseandClearKnowledge1,nosignificant

differencebetweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjectswasfound(p=.52andp=.09,

respectively).

12SinceSculptureismodeledafterfake-barncases(seeabove),ourfindingthatlaypeopletendtoascribeknowledgeinthiscasebasicallyconfirmsakeyresultofthepioneeringstudyonfake-barncasesbyColaçoetal.(2014).13Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,welearnedaboutanunpublishedstudybyJ.AdamCarter,DuncanPritchard,andJoshuaSheperd(ms)thatinteraliacomparesexpertandlayintuitionsconcerningfake-barn-stylecases,andthatmostlyconfirmsourownfindings.Forexample,Carter,Pritchard,andSheperdalsofoundthat,onaverage,laypeopleandexpertsdoascribeknowledgeinsuchcases,eventhoughexpertsarelessinclinedtoascribeknowledgethanlaypeople(thankstoJoshuaShepherdforthepointer).14Sincetheratingsof3and4werelabeledwith‘mildlydisagree’and‘mildlyagree’,respectively,onemightinterpretratingsof3orbelowascasesofdisagreementandratingsof4oraboveascasesofagreement.Applyingthisclassification,only3.8%oftheexpertsubjectsagreedwiththeclaimthatthelittlegirlknewtheoutcomeofthecoinflip,while33.8%ofthelaysubjectsagreedwiththisclaim.

16

Figure2.DistributionofexpertratingsforSculpture.

Moreover,theresultpatternofexpertswhoindicatedthatepistemologyisoneof

theirareasofspecializationversusexpertswhomerelyindicatedthatepistemologyis

oneoftheirareasofcompetencedidnotdiffersignificantly,F(4,320)=1.67,p=.16(for

theinteractionoflevelofcompetence*cases).Inordertoseewhetherthereisa

significantdifferencebetweenourexpertsubjectsandthosesubjectswho“merely”hold

aPhDinphilosophy,yetwithouthavingepistemologyasoneoftheirareasof

specializationorcompetence,wecomparedtheratingsofthelatter(N=74,not

includedinpreviousanalyses)withtheratingsofourexpertssubjects.Theresponse

patternofthesetwogroupsdifferedsignificantly,F(4,468)=4.51,p=.001,η2=.04(fortheinteractionofepistemologicalexpertise*cases).15Atthelevelofindividualcases,

however,thedifferencebetweenexpertsubjects(M=3.77,SD=1.67)and“mere”

philosophyPhDs(M=4.54,SD=1.32)wasonlyclearlysignificantforSculpture,F(1,

117)=15.20,p=.01,η2=.05,anditwentinthedirectionthatonewouldexpectonthebasisoftheepistemologicalliterature.Thisdifferencebetweenexpertepistemologists

and“mere”philosophyPhDslendssomesupporttothedomain-specificityofintuitive

expertiseinepistemology,whichisawell-establishedfeatureofexpertisemore

generally(cf.Ericsson&Lehmann,1996;Gobet&Simon,1996;Vicente&Wang,1998).

15ThankstoShen-yiLiaoandHannesRuschforpressingthispointonindependentoccasions.

0

5

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Expertra)ngsforScuplture

17

3.2 Experiment2

3.2.1 RationaleandMaterial

Themainideabehindoursecondexperimentwastoreplicateandcorroboratetwo

strikingresultsofourfirstexperiment.

Ontheonehand,thiswasthefindingthateventheepistemologicalexperts

classifiedSculptureasacaseofknowledge(incontrasttohowcasesofthiskindare

commonlyassessedintheepistemologicalliterature).Tothisend,werepeated

Sculptureinthesecondexperimentandaddedtwonewcases,ExamandDollar,that

shouldalsoberegardedasnon-instancesofknowledgeaccordingtotheepistemological

literature(seebelow).

Ontheotherhand,wetriedtoexplainthesignificantdifferencebetween

epistemologicalexpertsandlaypeopleintheirintuitiveevaluationofClearNon-

Knowledge1.Wespeculatedthatthissurprisingdifferencemightresultfromthefact

thattheagentseestheresult,i.e.,thattheagentcomestoknowthatshewasrightabout

theoutcomeofhercoinflip(labeledas“successbias”inthefollowing—seebelow).

Therefore,wereplacedClearNon-Knowledge1byananalogouscase,ClearNon-

Knowledge2,whichonlydiffersinsofarastheagentdoesnotcometoknowthather

predictionabouttheoutcomeofthecoinflipwascorrect.

Letusnowintroduceandexplaintheadditionalvignettesthatweusedinour

secondexperiment,followingthesameschemaasabove(cf.section3.1.1).

Aprofessorofmedicinelearnsthatoneinabillionstudentsdiewhiletakingtheirfinal

exam.Inaboutfiveminutes,theprofessorissettosubstituteforasickcolleaguein

conductingafinalexamofastudentthatshehadnevermetbefore.Theprofessorthinks

toherself:“Thestudentwillsurviveherfinalexam.”Andinfact,thestudentdoessurvive

herfinalexam.


Beforetheexambegan,theprofessorknewthatthestudentwouldsurviveherfinal

exam.

18

InExam,aprofessoracquiresabeliefaboutthesurvivalofastudentonthesolebasisof

overwhelmingstatisticalevidence.Thiscaseismodeledafteralotterycase,whereone

acquiresthebeliefthatone’slotteryticketwilllosemerelyonthebasisofknowingthe

extremelyhighoddsforwinningthelottery(Harman,1968,p.166,1973,p.118).Such

casesaretypicallytreatedasclearnon-instancesofknowledgeintheepistemological

literature(see,e.g.,DeRose,1996;Hawthorne,2004;Pritchard,2005;Williamson,

2000).16

Awaiterwasrecentlyhiredbyarestaurantinaremotepartofthecountrywhere,

unbeknownsttoeveryone,mostofthecirculatingdollarbillsarefake.Therestaurant

managerowesthewaitertendollarsforanextrahourthatheworked.Shetakesaten

dollarbillfromthecashregisterandhandsitovertothewaiter,andthisleadsthewaiter

tobelievethattherestaurantmanagerhasjustgivenhimtendollars.Infact,this

particulartendollarbillhappenstobeoneofthefewgenuinedollarbillsinthearea.17


Thewaiterknowsthattherestaurantmanagerhasgivenhimtendollars.

Dollarisavariationonthefake-barncasethatisusedlessfrequentlythantheoriginal

fake-barncase(seeabove).Justlikethefake-barncase,itistreatedasaclearnon-

instanceofknowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature(see,e.g.,Littlejohn,2012,p.

193;Sutton,2005,p.360).

16ThereisadisanalogybetweenExamandstandardlotterycasesthatmightberelevanttotheirknowledge-relatedassessment,however.Foronthenaturalassumptionthatthestudentisinnormalphysicalcondition,theremightbenoclosepossibleworldwherethisparticularstudentdiesduringherfinalexam.Andinthatcase,theprofessor’sbeliefthatthestudentwillsurviveherfinalexamcouldnoteasilyhavebeenfalse,i.e.,theprofessor’sbeliefissafe.Forthisreason,onemightcountcaseslikeExamasbonafidecasesofknowledge—unlikestandardlotterycases,whereweassumethateverylotteryticketwinsinsomeclosepossibleworld(see,e.g.,Pritchard,2005).Amoresystematicinvestigationof(expert)intuitionsaboutlottery-stylecaseswouldthushavetocomparecaseslikeExamwithcasesthataremorecloselyanalogoustostandardlotterycases(thankstoJensKipperforpressingthispoint).17Afterthispaperwasacceptedforpublication,AaronMeskinpointedouttousthatthephrase‘dollarbills’—withoutthequalifier‘ten’—isnaturallytakentorefertoonedollarbillsonly.Sotakenliterally,ourvignettewouldtriggerareadingaccordingtowhichonlytheonedollarbills—butnotthetendollarbills—arefakeinthescenariodescribed,andthiswouldweakentheanalogywiththeoriginalfake-barncase.However,noneofthepeoplewhotookthestudy,orwhosawthevignetteinconferencepresentations—andnoteventhenativespeakersamongourproof-readers—seemtohavenoticedthemistake(or,morecautiously,noneofthemfelttheneedtopointitouttous).Moreover,ourresultsforDollararealmostidenticaltootherresultsforfake-barnstylecases(seeaboveandbelow).Therefore,itseemsreasonabletoassumethattheparticipantsinourexperimentsimplyaccommodatedthemistakeinlinewiththeintendedreadingofthecasedescription,whichisclearlysuggestedbythefinalsentenceofourvignette—asentencethatmakeslittlesenseontheassumptionthatonlytheonedollarbillsinthescenarioarefake.Inallfairness,however,itwouldbeusefultohaveafollow-upstudythatconfirmstheinsignificanceofourmistakenphrasing(thankstoJoshuaAlexanderandAaronMeskinfordiscussion).

19

Alittlegirllikestoplayagamewithflippingacoin.Shesometimesgetsa“special

feeling”thatthenextflipwillcomeoutheads.Whenshegetsthis“specialfeeling”,sheis

rightabouthalfthetime,andwrongabouthalfthetime.Justbeforethenextflip,the

littlegirlgetsthis“specialfeeling”,andthefeelingleadshertobelievethatthecoinwill

landheads.Sheflipsthecoin,anditdoeslandheads.Butshehasinadvertentlyflipped

thecoinoutofthewindow,andthereforeshecannot—andwillnot—seetheresult.


Thelittlegirlknewthatthecoinwasgoingtolandheads.

ThemainpointofClearNon-Knowledge2wastotestastrikingresultconcerninglay

people’sintuitionsaboutClearNon-Knowledge1fromourfirstexperiment,namely,that

asignificantnumberoflaysubjects(33,8%)didinfactascribeknowledgeinthiscase.

Ourmainhypothesisforexplainingthisfindingwasthatlaypeoplemightbesusceptible

tosomethinglikea“successbias”,i.e.,thattheymightbeinfluencedbythefactthat,

afterflippingthecoin,thelittlegirllearnsthather“specialfeeling”abouttheoutcomeof

thecoinflipturnedouttobecorrect(see,e.g.,Baron&Hershey,1988).Arelated

phenomenonthatmightexplainwhyathirdofalllaysubjectsascribedknowledgetothe

littlegirliscalled“protagonistprojection”anddescribespeople’stendencytoproject

themselvesintothepointofviewoftheprotagonist(see,e.g.,Holton,1997;Nagel,San

Juan,&Mar,2013).Totestthesehypotheses,wereplacedtheclearcaseofnon-

knowledgefromexperiment1withacasewheretheagentdoesnotand,infact,cannot

seetheresult.

3.2.2 Subjects

Overall,thedataof227subjectswereincludedinouranalysis.50wereidentifiedas

expertsubjects(meanagewas33years;76%weremale)and177aslaysubjects(mean

agewas46years;53%weremale).

Therecruitingandclassificationprocedureforexpertsubjectswasthesameasin

experiment1,withthefollowingexceptions.Inordertogainenoughexpertsubjects,we

includednotonlyparticipantswhoindicatedthattheyhaveaPhDinphilosophy,but

alsothoseparticipantswhoindicatedthattheyhaveanMAinphilosophy(inadditionto

havingepistemologyasoneoftheirareasofspecializationorcompetence).Subjects

20

whoindicatedthattheyhadparticipatedinourfirstexperimentwereexcluded.Outof

initially186people,50metthesecriteria.

Apartfromthefactthatweonlyinvitedsubjectswhodidnotparticipateinour

firstexperiment,therecruitingandclassificationprocedureforlaysubjectswasthe

sameasinexperiment1.Outofinitially293people,177mettherelevantcriteria.

3.2.3 DesignandProcedure

Thedesignandprocedurewasthesameasinexperiment1,i.e.,participantssawthefirst

threecases(Exam,Sculpture,andDollar)inarandomizedorderwhilethecasesClear

Non-Knowledge2(seeabove)andClearKnowledge1(sameasinexperiment1)were

alwayspresentedinfourthandfifthposition,respectively.

3.2.4 Results

TheresultsofoursecondexperimentaresummarizedinFigure3.AmixedANOVA

(betweensubjects:laysubjectsvs.expertsubjects;withinsubject:thefivecases)

showedaverysignificantinteractionofsubjectsandcases,indicatingagainthatthe

responsepatternoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedstronglyoverthefivecases,

F(4,900)=13.80,p<.001,η2=.06.Therewasasignificantdifferenceintheaveragetimespenttocompletethesurveybetweenlaypeople(267seconds)andexperts(370

seconds),F(1,224)=7.54,p>.01,η2=.03.18

18Oneexpertsubjectwasexcludedfromthisanalysisbecausesheorhespentover1,000secondslonger(2,554seconds)thanallothersubjects.

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Expert Subjects

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Figure3.Meanratingsforthefivecasesdividedinlayandexpertjudgments.Thescaleranged

from1(‘stronglydisagree’withtheclaimthattheagentknewtherelevantproposition)to6

(‘stronglyagree’).Errorbarsrepresent95%confidenceintervals.

Amorefine-grainedanalysisrevealedthat,asinexperiment1,thejudgmentsoflaysubjectsandexpertsubjectsdifferedsignificantlyforthreeofthefivecases,withtheexperts’judgmentsbeingclosertotheevaluationofcorrespondingcasesintheepistemologicalliterature.IncaseofDollar,laysubjects(M=5.10,SD=1.31)andexpert

subjects(M=3.84,SD=1.73)bothtendedtoagreewiththeclaimthatthewaiterknows

thattherestaurantmanagerhasgivenhimtendollars.Thelevelofagreementforthis

case,whichcorrespondstocasesthatareregardedascasesofnon-knowledgeinthe

epistemologicalliterature,wassignificantlylowerforexpertsubjects,F(1,225)=28.97,

p<.001,η2=.11.Interestingly,andincontrasttothetextbookconsensus,themajorityofexpertsubjects(60%,cf.footnote9)evaluatedDollarasacaseofknowledge.For

Sculpture,weobtainedthesameresultpatternasinourfirstexperiment.Laysubjects’

(M=4.94,SD=1.35)agreedsignificantlystrongerwiththeclaimthattheRodinexpert

knowsthatthesculptureinfrontofherisoneofRodin’sfamousmarblesculpturesthan

expertsubjects(M=3.72,SD=1.86),F(1,225)=26.83,p<.001,η2=.11.Again,expertsubjectsweremoreinclinedtoagree(56%)withthisclaimthanonewouldexpectfrom

theconsensusintheepistemologicalliterature,whichisanalmostexactreplicationof

thesurprisingresultfromourfirstexperiment.ForClearNon-Knowledge2,theresult

patternwassimilartotheoneobtainedforthecorrespondingcaseinourfirst

experiment.Expertsubjects(M=1.40,SD=0.67)disagreedsignificantlystrongerthan

laysubjects(M=2.94,SD=1.63)withtheclaimthatthelittlegirlknewthatthecoin

wasgoingtolandheads,F(1,225)=42.52,p<.001,η2=.16.Again,asurprisinglyhighnumberoflaysubjects(40%)agreedwiththisclaim.Theresultspeaksagainstour

hypothesisthatthehighnumberofagreeinglaysubjectsinourfirstexperimentwasdue

tothefactthattheprotagonistofthecasecomestoknowtheoutcomeofhercoinflip.

Wediscussthissurprisingfindingbelow(seeDiscussion).

ForthecasesExamandClearKnowledge1,therewasnosignificantdifference

betweenlaysubjectsandexpertsubjects(p=.73andp=.19,respectively).Interestingly

andagainintensionwiththetextbookconsensus,themajorityofexpertsubjects(68%)

consideredExamasacaseofknowledge.

22

Moreover,theresultpatternofthoseexpertswhoindicatedthattheyhaveaPhD

versusthoseexpertswhoindicatedthattheirhighestdegreeinphilosophywasanMA

didnotdiffersignificantly,F(4,192)=1.00,p=.40(fortheinteractionofdegree*

cases).Inaddition,wecomparedourexpertsubjectswiththosesubjectswhoholdat

leastanMAinphilosophybutindicatedthattheyhavenocompetenceinepistemology

(N=32,notincludedinpreviousanalyses).Theresponsepatternofthesetwogroups

differedsignificantly,F(4,320)=3.18,p=.01,η2=.04(fortheinteractionofepistemologicalexpertise*cases).Atthelevelofindividualcases,however,the

differencebetweenthesetwogroupsdidnotturnouttobesignificant.

4 Discussion

Whatistheupshotofourexperimentswithrespecttothethreemotivatingideas

explainedabove,i.e.,(1)tocompareexpertwithlayintuitions,(2)tomeasuretheir

qualityagainsttherelevanttextbookconsensus,and(3)tocheckwhetherexpert

intuitionsareinlinewiththetextbookconsensus?

First,thereisindeedasignificantexpert-laydifferenceinthemajorityofthe

testedcases.ThisconcernsthecasesMonitor,Sculpture,andClearNon-Knowledge1in

experiment1,andthecasesDollar,Sculpture,andClearNon-Knowledge2inexperiment

2.Incontrast,wefoundnosignificantexpert-laydifferenceforPainting(experiment1),

Exam(experiment2),andbothinstancesofClearKnowledge1.Inthelattercase,expert-

layagreementmaynotcomeasabigsurprise,butexpert-layagreementonthemore

probingcasesPaintingandExamsuggeststhatthereisnostraightforwardgeneral

patternofexpert-layagreementordisagreement.Overall,however,theexpert-lay

differencesthatwefoundareprimafacieencouragingforproponentsoftheexpertise

defense.

Second,whenthequalityofexpertandlayintuitionsismeasuredagainstthe

relevanttextbookconsensus,theresultsareagainprimafaciefavorableforthe

expertisedefense.Inallcaseswherewefoundasignificantexpert-laydifferencethe

meanexpertratingswereclosertotherelevantconsensusintheepistemological

literature.IncaseofSculpture,forexample,onewouldexpectthatthemeanexpert

ratingissignificantlyclosertothe‘disagree’-endofthescalethanthatoflaypeople,

giventhatSculptureisinspiredbyfake-barncases,whicharewidelyconsideredascases

23

ofnon-knowledgeintheepistemologicalliterature(seeabove).Andindeed,thatiswhat

wefoundinbothofourexperiments.

Oncloserinspection,however,thedistributionpatternofexpertresponsesover

theratingscaleraisescertaindoubtsabouttheirintuitiveexpertise,inparticularwith

respecttothefake-barn-stylecasesSculptureandDollar.19Inbothcases,wefoundthe

samestrikingpatternofexpertresponses.First,theslightmajorityofexpertratingsfall

intothe‘agree’-halfofthescale.Second,thetwomiddleoptions(‘mildlydisagree’and

‘mildlydisagree’)werenotthefavoriteoptions,indicatingthatmostofourexpert

participantswereprettyconfidentintheirjudgments(seeFigure2foratypical

distributionpatternofexpertjudgmentsaboutthesecases).Thefactthatmostofour

expertparticipantstendedtoclassifythesecasesasinstancesofknowledgeraises

questionsofitsown,whichwillbediscussedbelow.Butevenapartfromthissurprising

finding,thefactthattheexperts’intuitionsaredividedinthewaydescribeddoesnot

reallycountinfavoroftheirintuitiveexpertise,atleastwhenweconsiderthemasa

group.Thus,whenonetakesdistributionpatternsintoaccount,theinitialimpression

thatourexperimentsfavortheexpertisedefensealreadybeginstofade.

Afurtherstrikingresultwasthehighlysignificantexpert-laydifferenceincaseof

ClearNon-Knowledge1,whichwasusedasacontrolcaseinearlierstudies,withthe

explicitpurposeofweedingoutparticipantswhodidnotunderstandtheprobes

correctly(see,e.g.,Swainetal.,2008).Thedegreeofexpert-laydifferencesforthiscase,

bothinmeanratingsandabsolutenumbers,isaboutthestrongestevidenceforthe

superiorityofexpertintuitionsthatonecangetfromourexperiments.Giventhatthe

caseofsomeonewhocorrectlyguessestheoutcomeofarandomcoinflipissuchaclear

non-instanceofknowledge,thehighnumberoflaypeoplewhotendtoascribe

knowledgeinthiscasecallsforanexplanation.

Thefirsthypothesisthatwetestedinexperiment2wasthepresenceofa“success

bias”inlaypeople,i.e.,thetendencytoascribeknowledgetosomeonewholearns,on

independentgrounds,thathertargetbeliefistrue—irrespectiveofhowproblematically

herbeliefwasinitiallyacquired.Inordertosuppressthistendency,weaddedthe

followingsentencetoourfollow-upvignetteClearNon-Knowledge2:‘Butshehas

inadvertentlyflippedthecoinoutofthewindow,andthereforeshecannot—andwill

not—seetheresult.’Sincewefoundthesameexpertlay-differenceasinexperiment1,

19ThankstoShen-yiLiaoandHannesRuschforpressingtheimportanceofdistributionpatterns.

24

ourhypothesisofa“successbias”inlaypeoplewasclearlydisconfirmed.Thesame

holdsforthehypothesisof“protagonistprojection”inlaypeople,i.e.,thetendencyto

projectoneselfintothepointofviewoftheprotagonist,becauseinClearNon-Knowledge

2theoutcomeofthecoinflipisnotaccessiblefromthepointofviewofthelittlegirl.

Thesecondhypothesis,whichwetestedinanadditionalfollow-upexperiment

withlayparticipants,turnsonasubtledifferencebetweenourversionofthecoinflip

caseandthestandardformulationthatwasusedinearlierstudies.InourvignettesClear

Non-Knowledge1and2,wereferredtotheprotagonistofthecaseas‘alittlegirl’,while

inearlierstudiestheprotagonistwassimplycalled‘Dave’,andonemightspeculatethat

laypeoplearemorewillingtoascribeknowledgetolittlechildrenthantonormalhuman

adults.20Totestthishypothesis,weconfrontedlaypeoplewithsixversionsofthecoin

flipcase,wheretheonlydifferencewasthat—inthefiveadditionalcases—thephrase‘a

littlegirl’wasreplacedwith‘alittleboy’,‘awoman’,‘aman’,‘anoldwoman’,and‘anold

man’,respectively(pronounswereadjustedaccordingly).Wefoundnosignificant

differenceinlayresponsestothosecases,butwecouldagainreplicatethehighlevelof

layagreementforthisclearnon-instanceofknowledge.21

AthirdhypothesistradesonAlvinGoldman’sclaimthattheEnglishword‘know’

isambiguousbetweenaweakandastrongreading(Goldman,1999,2001).Accordingto

Goldman,‘know’intheweaksenseismoreorlesssynonymouswith‘truebelief’,while

‘know’inthestrongsensealsoentailsjustificationorotherepistemicproperties(see

alsoHawthorne,2002).InlightofGoldman’sclaimaboutthemeaningof‘know’,one

mighthypothesizethatasignificantnumberoflaypeopleinterpretoccurrencesof

‘know’inthecoinflipcaseintheweaksenseof‘truebelief’,giventhattheywerenotin

anywaypromptedtofocusonthestrongsenseof‘know’.Epistemologicalexperts,on

theotherhand,aretrainedtointerpret‘know’inthestrongsenseinthecontextof

philosophicalthoughtexperimentsaboutknowledge,andsotheyshouldnotbeinclined

totheweakreadingof‘know’insuchcontexts.Ourfindingsarehighlyconsistentwith

thishypothesis.Moreover,ifoneconsidersthedistributionoflayresponsesinallofour

20ThankstoJonathanWeinbergforthesuggestion.21Thelayparticipantsforthisadditionalexperimentwereselectedinthesamewayasinourtwomainexperiments(seeabove).178laysubjectswereincludedinouranalysis.Themaindifferenceinthedesignoftheexperimentwasthateachparticipantonlyrespondedtoonerandomlyselectedversionofthesixversionsofthecoinflipcase,whichhelpedtopreventordereffects(thankstoShen-yiLiaoforsuggestingthatouroriginalfindingsmightinvolveordereffects).Themeanratingsforthesixcasesdidnotdiffersignificantly,F(5,172)=.41,p=.84,withmeansvaryingbetween2.45and2.92(overall=2.74)andpercentagesofagreementbetween24%and46%(overall=36%).Sotheadditionalexperimentclearlydisconfirmsoursecondhypothesis.

25

experimentswithcoinflipcases,onefindsthatthereisapeakatthe‘stronglydisagree’-

endofthescale,andanotherpeakaround‘mildlyagree’.Itseemsnaturaltoassumethat

theparticipantsintheformerpeakread‘know’inthestrongsense,whileparticipantsin

thesecondpeakread‘know’intheweaksense,althoughwithsomehesitation(maybe

becausethecoinflipcaseissuchaclearnon-instanceof‘know’inthestrongsense).

Nevertheless,confirmingtheambiguityhypothesiswouldrequireadditional

experimentsthattargettheideaofanambiguitybetweenaweakandastrongsenseof

‘know’moredirectly.Inthemeantime,itseemsadvisabletosuspendtheuseofcoinflip

casesascontrolcasesinexperimentswithlaypeople.

Irrespectiveofwhatthebestexplanationforthestrikingratesoflayagreement

forClearNon-Knowledge1and2andotherversionsofthecoinflipcasemightbe,it

shouldbepointedoutthatallconsideredhypothesesfavorexpertoverlayjudgments

withrespecttosuchcases.

Third,areexpertintuitionsinlinewiththeconsensusintheepistemological

literature?Inexperiment1,meanexpertratingswereinlinewiththerelevantconsensus

forMonitor,andforClearNon-Knowledge1andClearKnowledge1(theresultsforthose

clearcaseswerealsoreplicatedinexperiment2).Withrespecttotheremainingcases,

Painting,Sculpture,Exam,andDollar,ourtwoexperimentssuggest,however,thatthe

intuitionsofexpertepistemologistsarenotinlinewiththeconsensusintheliterature.

EvenifweputPaintingaside,whichtheliteraturewouldclassifyasanunclearcase,we

stillgetthestrikingresultthatthreecasesthattheepistemologicalliteraturewould

regardasnon-instancesofknowledgeareneverthelessclassifiedasknowledgebyour

experts.Whatmightexplainthisstrikingmismatchbetweentheintuitionsofindividual

expertepistemologistsandthecorrespondingdisciplinaryconsensus?

Afirstandsomewhatfriendlysuggestionwouldbethatonlytheintuitionsof

epistemological“super-experts”reallycount,whomightroughlybeunderstoodasthose

philosopherswhopublishpapersonknowledgeinphilosophicaltop-journals—anditis

arguablythose“super-experts”whoshapetherelevantdisciplinaryconsensus.22This

hypothesisistentativelydisconfirmedbythefactthatwefoundnosignificantdifference

betweenvariousgroupsof“first-rate”vs.“second-rate”experts(e.g.,epistemologyas

areaofspecializationvs.areaofcompetence,orPhDvs.MAinphilosophy—seeabove).

So,unlessthedevelopmentofintuitiveexpertiseishighlydiscontinuous,thehypothesis

22ThankstoEddyNahmiasforthissuggestion(inacommentonourpost“ExpertIntuitionsAboutKnowledge”ontheExperimentalPhilosophyblog;cf.Horvath&Wiegmann(2013)).

26

ofintuitive“super-expertise”inepistemologyisrenderedprimafacieimplausiblebyour

results.Yeteveniftrue,thisrelativelyfriendlyhypothesiswouldstillrequirefar-

reachingmodificationsofouractualphilosophicalpractice,becauseitsuggeststhat

everyoneshoulddefertoareallysmallgroupof“eliteintuiters”whenitcomesto

intuitionsaboutthoughtexperimentsonknowledge.

Asecondandlessfriendlysuggestionmightbethatcontemporaryepistemology

fallssquarelywithinthe“puzzle-solving”paradigmofphilosophy,likemostanalytic

philosophyingeneral,accordingtosomeauthors(cf.Rorty,2007).Andofcourse,the

moredifficulttherelevantpuzzlesare,themoreinterestingtheactivityofpuzzle-

solvingbecomes.Therefore,onemighthypothesizethatepistemologistsareoverly

liberalinacceptingfake-barn-styleorlotterycasesasnon-instancesofknowledge—

despitetheirintuitivetendencytothecontrary—becausethismakesthepuzzleof

analyzingknowledgealotharderandthusalotmoreinterestingtosolve.Itgoes

withoutsayingthatthishypothesis,ifcorrect,wouldsignificantlyunderminethecurrent

practiceofprofessionalepistemology.

Athirdandevenlessfriendlysuggestionmightbethatthedisciplinaryconsensus

inepistemologywithrespectto,e.g.,fake-barnorlotterycasesissimplytheresultof

somekindofsocialconformity.Maybecertainepistemological“opinionleaders”,suchas

AlvinGoldmanincaseoffake-barncases,initiallyclassifytherelevantcasesasnon-

instancesofknowledge.Thebulkofepistemologiststhensimplyfollowtheintuitive

evaluationsofsuchauthorities,forexample,inordertobetakenseriouslyin

professionaldiscussions,ortogettheirpaperspublishedinleadingjournals(cf.Turri,

forthcoming;Weinberg,2007,p.337).

Ourresultsdonotactuallytelluswhichofthesehypotheses,ifany,providesthe

bestexplanationforthemismatchbetweenexpertintuitionsandthedisciplinary

consensusthatwefoundinexperiments1and2.However,noneoftheseexplanations

wouldprovideavindicationforouractualdisciplinarypractice,forbothexplanations

appealtoirrelevantfactorsintheexperimentalrestrictionistsense,thatis,tofactors

thatareirrelevanttothetruthoftherelevantfirst-orderclaimsaboutknowledge.Our

experimentsthereforerevealasurprisingproblemwithexpertintuitionsabout

knowledgethatisdifficulttoexplainwithoutunsettlingtheexpertisedefense.Despite

thefactthatourexperimentsprovidesomeevidencethatfavorstheexpertisedefense,

theyalsogiverisetoachallengingnewproblem—andultimatelyraisemorequestions

thantheyanswer.

27

5 Conclusion

Inthispaper,wefirstdistinguisheddirectandindirectstrategiesforassessingtheclaim

thatprofessionalphilosophersareintuitiveexpertsforevaluatingphilosophicalthought

experimentcases.Aproblemforindirectstrategiesisthattheparadigmsofempirical

researchonintuitiveexpertiseareveryunlikethought-experimentingphilosophers,

becausetheformer,unlikethelatter,primarilyengageincausalpredictions.Incontrast,

directstrategiesthatarebasedonexperimentaldataaboutphilosophers’intuitionsare

epistemicallylessriskyanddialecticallymoreeffective.Inordertoadvancethedebate

aboutdirectargumentsforassessingtheexpertisedefense,weconductedtwonew

experimentswithexpertepistemologistsandlaypeople.

Inthefirstexperiment,wetestedanumberofunfamiliarthoughtexperiment

casesaboutknowledgewithexpertepistemologistsandlaypeople.Inthemajorityof

thetestedcases,theexperts’intuitionswereindeedsignificantlydifferentfromthoseof

laypeople,andthedifferencewasalwaysinthedirectionthatonewouldexpectonthe

basisoftherelevanttextbookconsensus.However,concerningthefake-barn-style

vignetteSculpturewefoundtwothingsthatchallengetheintuitiveexpertiseofour

epistemologicalexperts:first,onaverage,theytendedtoascribeknowledgeinthiscase,

andsecond,theiroverallresponsepatternexhibitstwoopposingpeaks.Wealsofounda

strikingdifferencebetweenexpertandlayintuitionsconcerningthecoinflipcaseClear

Non-Knowledge1.Asignificantnumberoflaypeople—unliketheexperts—tendedto

ascribeknowledgeinthiscase.

Thepointofoursecondexperimentwastotestandcorroboratethemore

surprisingresultsofourfirstexperiment.Tothisend,wetestedtwofurthernon-

instancesofknowledge:Dollar,anotherfake-barn-stylecase,andExam,acasethatis

inspiredbylotterycases.Onaverage,theepistemologicalexpertsagainascribed

knowledgeinthesecases,andagainwiththesamepolarizeddistributionpattern.

Toexplainthehighrateoflayknowledgeascriptionsinthecoinflipcase,wealso

testedthehypothesisofa“successbias”inlaypeople,whichwasnotconfirmedbyour

secondexperiment.Inanadditionalexperimentwithlaypeople,wetestedthefurther

hypothesisthatlaypeoplemightbemorewillingtoascribeknowledgetolittlechildren

thantoadults,whichwasdisconfirmedaswell.Thehighrateoflayapprovalincoinflip

28

casesthereforeremainspuzzling.Themostpromisingexplanationmightbeintermsof

anambiguitybetweenaweakandastrongsenseof‘know’.

Ourmosttroublingresultfromtheviewpointoftheexpertisedefenseisthe

strikingmismatchbetweentheintuitionsofourexpertsubjectsandtherelevant

consensusintheepistemologicalliterature.Thisfindingsuggeststhattheremightbe

somethingwrongwithphilosophyasadiscipline,giventhatitapparentlyfailstomap

theintuitionsofitsexpertpractitionersontoadisciplinaryconsensusintherightkindof

way.Friendlyexplanationsofthismismatcharehardtocomeby,andsoour

experimentsindicateaproblemthathasnotbeenacknowledgedsofar—andthat

challengestheexpertisedefenseinunexpectedandtroublesomeways.

Acknowledgments WewouldliketothankJoshuaAlexander,JamesAndow,SteveClark,JensKipper,

Shen-yiLiao,AaronMeskin,JonasNagel,EddyNahmias,JenniferNado,MartinPeterson,HannesRusch,

JoshuaSheperd,JonathanWeinberg,andthreeanonymousreviewersforveryhelpfulcommentsand

discussions.ThanksalsotoouraudiencesatthelectureseriesGedankenexperimente—Kannmanausdem

LehnstuhldieWelterforschen?atUniversitätZürichinMay2014,theX-PhiWorkshopViennaat

UniversitätWieninJune2014,theconferenceMöglichkeitenundGrenzenderExperimentellenPhilosophie

atPhilippsUniversitätMarburginJune2014,andtheconferenceInvestigatingtheNatureandour

UnderstandingofCausality,Morality,Language,Mind,andAesthetics—theinauguralmeetingofthe

ExperimentalPhilosophyGroupGermany—atRuhr-UniversitätBochuminNovember2015.

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