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Virginia Review of Asian StudiesVolume 18 (2016): 1-20Chen: Hong Kong

CULTURAL FRAMING IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF THE OCCUPY CENTRAL MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG

Xinran Andy Chen1

Rhodes College

Abstract

This paper endeavors to investigate the causes behind the formation of the Occupy Central Movement that took place in Hong Kong between September and December 2014. In doing so, this paper identifies common factors that contribute to the emergence of social movements in general, and ascertains whether some existing explanations can travel to the Hong Kong case in particular. By assessing the political opportunity, resource mobilization, and cultural framing of this movement, the paper concludes that Occupy Central emerged because of effective diagnostic and motivational framing, respected leadership, and the right timing, but failed to achieve intended political objectives due to the lack of moral and cultural resources and the absence of prognostic framing.

“[Chinese] government declared that the ‘Sino-British Joint Declaration’ is no longer valid. That means China is now illegal[ly] occupying Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. We urge the British government to re-activate the ‘Treaty of Nanking’ and the ‘The First Convention of Peking’ [and] re-claim the ownership of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Island.”2

“Mainland Chinese tourists are flocking into Hong Kong, occupying Hong Kong’s limited resources. Last year, among the more than 50 million tourists to Hong Kong,

1 This research study was made possible by the college’s Buckman International Studies Initiative Award, which enabled him to gather first-hand evidence in Hong Kong during the Occupy Central Movement.

Since the completion of this paper, he has received admission offers into Georgetown University’s Asian Studies Program under the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations.

The author wants to thank Dr. Amy Risley and Dr. Stephen Ceccoli from the Department of International Studies at Rhodes College, for their insightful teaching and awakening inspiration, constant support and continuous mentoring.

2 Quoted directly from a popular flyer at Occupy Central demonstration sites. This particular flyer was posted at the Causeway Bay protest site during the Occupy Central Movement, and a photograph was taken by the author on December 12, 2014.

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more than 40 million came from the mainland, largely surpassing other countries, deeply affecting local commercial conditions and people’s daily lives. It is predicted that mainland tourists will reach 70 million by 2017, and break through the 100 million point by 2023.”3

Introduction

In 1842, the British Empire defeated the Qing government of China in the First Opium War, imposing the unequal Treaty of Nanking, forcing the opening of ports and the cession of Hong Kong Island, and marking the beginning of China’s “century of humiliation.” In 1997, People’s Republic of China retrieved the sovereignty of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula from British colonial occupation, under an arrangement known as “once country, two systems.” Beginning in the 1980s and intensified after 1997, some segments of Hong Kong’s civil and political societies have continued their pursuit for electoral democracy. On August 31st, 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’s (NPC) in Beijing, nominally China’s highest legislative body, announced its decision for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s (HKSAR) political reforms. The NPC advised the Chief Executive for HKSAR to be selected by universal suffrage in 2017 for the first time in the city’s history. NPC’s decision is regarded by many as a step forward in the territory’s democratic development, but by opposition forces as authoritarian and “democratic show without democratic substance.”

Under Beijing’s proposal, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive will be popularly elected with universal suffrage by eligible voters from a pool of two or three candidates, preselected by a 1,200-member local nomination committee, which opponents accuse of being pro-Beijing. As a result, the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” civil disobedience campaign, first proposed in 2013, officially began on September 28th, 2014 in the middle of a week-long class strike initiated by Hong Kong’s university and high school students. Occupy Central lasted for 79 days but ended in December 2014 with little concrete results for pro-democracy activists and a divided city uncertain about its political future.

Research Question

This paper seeks to explain the causes behind the formation of Occupy Central, identify common factors that contribute to the emergence of social movements in general, and ascertain whether some existing explanations can travel to the Hong Kong case in particular.

Being both the largest, in terms of participating protesters, and the longest, in terms of duration, demonstration that has happened in the Greater China region since the 1989 protests on the Tiananmen Square, the Occupy Central movement offers several insights for the studies of social movement, public opinion, local autonomy versus national centralization, postcolonial legacies, and democracy.

3 An excerpt from one of the leaflets distributed by the Hong Kong Federation of Students at the beginning of the Occupy Central Movement, originally in Chinese, translated by the author. Available at: https://www.hkfs.org.hk/leaflets/ (accessed on April 16, 2015).

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The movement has major implications for the democratization of not only Hong Kong the city and China the overarching state, but also the entire region of Asia, where Asian values, Confucian teachings, the long tradition of collectivism, and people’s desire for security, stability, order, and continued economic growth, are often seen as incompatible with the Western notions of liberal democracy. For example, Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father and first Premier of Singapore, successfully transformed Singapore from an impoverished outpost into one of world’s wealthiest and least corrupt countries. He did so, however, with heavy-handedness, constant governmental intervention, and sometimes repression of dissent. Lee was famously quoted as saying, “the exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions which are inimical to development” (Allison et al. 2012, 27).

In the early 2000s, after conducting the East Asia Barometer, a comparative public opinion survey investigating citizens’ attitudes toward politics, governance, and democracy, Larry Diamond and other prominent scholars of democracy have argued that the so-called “third-wave democracies” in East Asia are “in distress” (Chu et al. 2008, 1). They note that many are experiencing “inconclusive or disputed electoral outcomes, incessant political strife and partisan gridlock, and recurring political scandals,” and most importantly, the public’s “nostalgia” for the “seemingly effective pro-growth soft-authoritarian” past (Chu et al. 2008, 1). Diamond and his colleagues stated, “there has never been a mass democracy movement in Hong Kong” (Chu et al. 2008, 190). This perceived public indifference toward further democratization in Hong Kong was proven wrong when local students, academics, and law makers carried out the Occupy Central demonstration. Therefore, this “first-ever” democracy movement in Hong Kong provides a unique and invaluable case with which to test existing hypotheses and generate new explanations.

Literature Review

The European scholarship on social movements has been traditionally framed by “Marxist/Hegelian tradition of the philosophy of history” (Crossley 2002, 10). According to Marx, the “fundamental cleavages of capitalist society” are the structural cause of collective action because such socio-economic divides among different classes create the “mobilization potential” for social movements to emerge (Tarrow 1994, 13). As a result, much of European scholarship has since focused on investigating the “constitutive structure and type of society” in which social movements typically emerge (Crossley 2002, 10).

The North American approach, in contrast, has arguably taken a more “empirical, scientific and, to a degree, empiricist” approach (Crossley 2002, 10). In the United States before the 1970s, most social movements were studied as a subfield of “collective behavior” (Crossley 2002, 10) from a “psychofunctional perspective” (Snow et al. 1986, 465). Turner and Killian defined social movements as “collectivity acting with some continuity to promote…or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part” (Turner and Killian 1957, 308). In other words, a social movement is a form of collective self-help intended to impose changes that would be difficult to achieve through individual action. Collective behavior theorists hold that “objective hardships” in the forms of grievances, deprivations, anomie, or structural strains and breakdown, often due to economic contractions, are not only a “necessary” but also “sufficient” cause of social movements’ formation (Crossley 2002, 11).

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Central to the studies of collective behavior is the theory of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation refers to the perceived discrepancy between “value expectations” and “value capabilities” (Gurr 1970, 24). Relative deprivation theory argues it is the social comparisons between the objective inequality and the subjective experience of injustice that foster the emergence of collective action. When facing a gap between value expectation and value capability, one has three ways to address the sense of being deprived: to “exit,” to stay “loyal” by accepting the status-quo, and to “voice” concerns (Hirschman 1970). It is only when people choose to voice their concerns and articulate their grievances, collectively, that social movements begin to take shape. Therefore, “the potential for collective violence” increases when the “scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity” intensifies (Gurr 1970, 24).

However, social movements have not been formed in every society that has grievances. Relative deprivation and the subjective sense of disadvantage thus could not single-handedly explain the emergence of collective behavior or social movement. The free-rider problem or the rational actor model, in which individuals participate social movements only “when the potential benefits outweigh the anticipated costs” (Buechler 1993, 218), has to be taken into consideration. Since social movements seek the collective and public interest over individual and private interest, rational human beings tend to free-ride in the process of social movement but share the outcome with movement participants who actually sacrificed for their common cause.

Assuming socio-economic conflicts and political discontent exist inherently in every society, the strategy-oriented resource mobilization theorists argue for the necessity of a mobilizing force to uncover these unrealized potentials and incentivize mass participation. The superiority of resource mobilization theory over previous theories of collective behavior was revealed from the empirical evidence used to “account for the 1960s cycle of protest” (Buechler 1993, 217). As the dominant social movements paradigm in the 1970s, the resource mobilization approach stresses both “societal support” and the “constraint of social movement phenomena,” with dependence on “political sociological and economic theories” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1213) and proposes that social movements become “a force for social change primarily through the social movement organizations (SMOs) they spawned” (McAdam et al. 1996, 4). SMOs4 have a number of “strategic tasks” in the social movement, including “mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite public into sympathizers, [and] achieving change in targets” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217). In other words, SMOs always endeavor to mobilize resources and channel discontent “into organizational forms” (Edelman 2001, 289). The capacity of SMOs is measured by their efficiency and effectiveness to mobilize various types of resources. Resource mobilization therefore is the rational behavior of collective action by groups and individuals who share common interests in advancing their common goals. Under this framework, collective behavior is viewed as “interest group politics” (Edelman 2001, 290) and strategic “political enterprise” instead of a “passionate response to felt injustices” (Zomeren et al. 2008, 506).

Synthesizing past work on resource mobilization, Edwards and McCarthy developed a fivefold typology of resources that could be used by SMOs and their leaders to minimize losses and maximize gains: “moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources” 4 SMO is defined as “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1218).

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(Edwards and McCarthy 2004, 117)5, arguing that the more access leadership has to the five different types of resources, the more likely SMOs will form, and the more likely social movement will emerge and succeed.

By investigating the women’s movement in the U.S., Buechler developed ten ways to challenge the dominance of resource mobilization theory in 1993, contending that resource mobilization theory only operates “on the meso-level of analysis to the relative exclusion of both macro-level and micro-level explorations of collective action” (1993, 224). The other two pillars of social movement theory address Buechler’s concern by providing a macro-level analysis of political opportunity and a micro-level explanation of cultural framing.

Recognizing that individual action takes place under conditions that cannot be molded to the actors’ preferences, political opportunity theory lends a structural perspective to social movement studies by asserting the “importance of the broader political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996, 2). Political opportunity theorists assume social movements’ rise, development, success or failure are conditioned by forces and structures beyond the control of even the most capable individuals. In this model, social movements emerge when “ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by leaders, respond to changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable” (Tarrow 1994, 18). Thus timing becomes highly important to the emergence of social movements. When change in the underlying political structure occurs, it creates fresh openings that enable the mobilization of even the resource-poor actors into new movements. According to Kriesi, three general elements can be identified in the political opportunity structure: “the formal institutional structure of a political system,” the “informal procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers,” and the “configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers” (1996, 160). It is argued that social movements are more likely to emerge and succeed in societies with relatively weak institutional setup, such as the U.S. system of separated powers, than in societies with stronger states, such as the U.K.’s system of fused powers. According to a “highly consensual list,” there are four dimensions of political opportunity (McAdam et al. 1996, 27):

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system;

5 Moral resources are centered on the commitment of movement participants, including “legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity.” Cultural resources are defined as “artifacts and cultural products” such as “conceptual tools and specialized knowledge.” For example, how well people understand the issue SMOs are fighting for, affects the movement’s emergence and success, so does movement participants’ prior experience in similar situations, or lack thereof. Social-organizational resources refer to “infrastructures, social networks, and organizations.” Human resources include “labor, experience, skills, and expertise,” in addition to “leadership.” Human resources differ from social-organizational resources in that human resources are individually-focused resources, rather than entity-oriented. Finally, material resources combine both “financial and physical capital,” including but not limited to “monetary resources, property, office space, equipment, and supplies” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, 128). Of these five types of resources, resource mobilization theorists generally regard human resources as the most important. The emergence and success of a movement largely depends on leaders’ capability to identify and articulate existing grievances, deploy resources, motivate and inspire the masses, device strategies, and frame messages.

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2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity;

3. The presence or absence of elite allies;4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.

Based on this list, scholars have argued that there is increased opportunity for social movements to form and succeed when there is increased access to the system by outside actors, when divide among ruling elites intensifies, or when the state is limited to repress dissidents.

The third pillar of political process theory, cultural framing, referred by some as “framing process” (Snow et al. 1986) and “cognitive liberation” (McAdam et al. 1996), offers a dynamic micro-level and ideational explanation to the cause of social movements. Framing is the process of people developing “a particular conceptualization of” or “reorient[ing] their thinking about” an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). In social movements, framing is the strategy used by social movement leaders to nurture shared understandings that “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996, 6). The cultural framing model seeks to solve the puzzles of “who engages in collective action” and “how they view themselves and their allies in struggle” (Buechler 1993, 228). Underlying the model is the assumption that people always want to be part of something greater than themselves and part of a larger collective identity. Leaders thus communicate with and mobilize the masses by appealing to messages, images, and symbols. Some even argue that among all stages of the mobilization process, the most important component is the “social construction of a collective identity,” which is “symbolically meaningful” to participants of collective behaviors, and “logically” superior to any form of cost-benefit calculation in joining a movement (Buechler 1993, 228).

Through these frames, social movement activists “identify perceived injustices,” “articulate grievances,” “make rights-based claims,” and “interpret events and their own life experiences” (Risley 2014b, 709). Framing targets prospective participants, opponents, bystanders, and/or governing elites. Existing scholarship identifies three distinctive tasks of framing efforts. First, diagnostic framing “problematizes” (Cress and Snow 2000, 1071) an issue and “assigns blame” (Risley 2014a, 2) by identifying “who or what is culpable” (Cress and Snow 2000, 1071). Prognostic framing then offers tentative solution to the identified problem, and motivational framing shapes the rationale for joining the social movement primarily by “appealing to justice or morality” and/or emphasizing the problem’s “urgency and severity” (Risley 2011, 668; Cress and Snow 2000)6.

6 Out of the three framing tasks, “positive” and “constructive” prognostic framing is most effective when combined with “hopeful elements” (Risley 2014a, 2), whereas motivational framing alone is “rarely sufficient to thrust civil societal actors into the center of policy debates” (Risley 2011, 668). Risley further delineated four fundamental principles that determine the success and effectiveness of framing strategies (2011, 669): 1. An efficacious frame conveys something positive or hopeful; 2. Frames that emphasize blame can be a hindrance; 3. Organizations enjoy an advantage when their frames suggest feasible remedies for problems; 4. It is beneficial for activists to convince political elites that change is not only possible but also desirable – that undertaking reforms will maximize elites’ preferences and advance their own agendas. Social movement’s emergence and success will also be determined by the ability social movement organizations and activists defend their frameworks’ validity and their personal credibility against counter framing from opposition leaders and groups. Counter framing attempts to rebut, challenge, undermine, and disapprove the established frameworks around the social movement (Benford and Snow, 2000).

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By the 1990s, resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and cultural framing were increasingly seen as elements of “a broader political process,” because none of them alone seems to suffice as a holistic explanation of social movements (Edelman 2001, 290). As a result, the powerful political process theory was born, taking all three explanations of political opportunity, mobilizing structures7, and cultural farming into account when studying social movements.

Yet by the late 1990s and early 2000s, the hegemonic political process model is under attack by Goodwin and Jasper, who argue the theory contains an inherent structural bias that it only searches for invariant cases of social movements, neglecting the focusing events that fail to trigger social movements (2004). They also accuse the theory for ignoring the “diverse ways” that “culture and agency, including emotions and strategizing” help form and develop social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 27). As a result, a sophisticated psychological explanation based on early collective behavior theories but exceeds the limited grievances-centered approach begins to address “the emotions of social movements” (Goodwin et al. 2000, 65). These are all valid critiques on political process theory, and the evidence in this paper points to yet another possible weakness of political process theory, in its limited capacity to explain identity-based and anti-identity driven social and political actions.

Argument

The dependent variable of this project is the emergence or the absence of a social movement. The study’s independent variables are drawn from the three pillars of political process theory: political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing. To stress the role different types of resources played in the movement formation, this paper substitute the mobilizing structures with earlier studies on resource mobilization. Political process theory endorses these three elements as absolutely crucial to the formation and development of any social movement. However, this paper will combine cultural framing with an identity-oriented analysis to reveal the important role Hong Kong’s unique identity played in mobilizing the movement. The argument of this paper is that the variable of cultural framing has the most explanatory power in identifying the causes of the Occupy Central Movement in Hong Kong. By examining the empirical evidence regarding resource mobilization, this paper finds that multiple types of resources for the movement were either inadequate or mal-distributed. Some political opportunities were present and opened the window for the movement to emerge, but these opportunities were by no means new phenomena. The available political opportunities had been present for an extended period of time, and they were only mobilized recently by Occupy Central leaders to facilitate collective action. The leading activists managed to come up with effective diagnostic and motivational frames, primarily by manipulating the Hong Kong people’s sense of identity and creating an in-group versus out-group dynamic. However, they performed poorly on the constructive task of prognostic framing. The occupy leaders’ inability to erect a successful prognostic framework and to defend counter framing partially explained the failure of the movement in delivering intended results.

7 Mobilizing structures are slightly different from the resource mobilization approach, because mobilizing structures primarily deal with informal networks and preexisting organizations in social movements (McAdam et al. 1996).

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Specifically, the Occupy Central Movement emerged due to experienced, respected, and competent leaders, who succeeded in diagnostic and motivational framing by augmenting the perceived in-group and out-group differences when political opportunities arose. Occupy Central leaders utilized diagnostic framing to identify the central government in Beijing and its policies as the problem and the source of Hong Kong’s social and economic ills, then used motivational framing to distance the local population from the mainland, drawing on existing anti-China sentiment as a moral resource. The motivational framing in the movement was also successful in persuading the Hong Kong people that the city desperately needs democracy immediately, even though the territory never enjoyed democracy under British rule but still prospered. However, the activists fell short of sketching out a sophisticated prognostic framework. The only remedies demonstration leaders proposed for the complicated, structural, and inevitable socio-economic problems in Hong Kong were democratization and what they called universal suffrage. The social movement leaders saw the ability to elect officials by popular vote as an important way to keep Hong Kong politically independent and separate from the rest of the nation but tried in vain to persuade the Hong Kong people that such political change is the sufficient solution to Hong Kong’s ongoing societal troubles. In summary, this paper argues that the emergence of the Occupy Central Movement was made possible by important human resources, anonymous financial resources, the presence of two dimensions of political opportunity, and the integration of identity with the skillful manipulation of diagnostic and motivational framings. On the contrary, the absence of prognostic framing on top of the lack of moral and cultural resources may provide possible explanation to the failure of the movement after its initial emergence.

Research Design and Methodology

The Occupy Central Movement is a perfect example of a social movement and an ideal case with which to test the validity of political process theory. To specify the dependent variable of this study, this paper will distinguish the emergence of the movement from the non-emergence of the movement. Social movements are, by definition8, “informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protests” (Della Porta and Diani 1999, 16). To measure the independent variables, this paper will look for human, moral, and cultural resources; the accessibility of the political system to outsiders and the existence of elite divisions; as well as diagnostic, motivational and prognostic framing used prior and during the campaign. This paper, however, will not address the material9 and socio-organizational10 resources, nor the political opportunities

8 Studies of social movements first emerged in the 1960s, and the definition of social movements has been modified by waves after waves of scholarship. In 1969, Blumer viewed social movements as “collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life” (99). By defining social movements as “collective enterprises,” Blumer claims that social movements “entail social agents working together in various ways, sharing in a common project” (Crossley 2002, 3). By linking social movements with public spaces, Eyerman and Jamison depict an image of “previously privatized individuals being drawn into a public debate over matters of common concern” (Crossley 2002, 4). Three years later, Tarrow’s definition emphasized on the duration of social movements and the difference between social movements and singular protest events: “[social movements are] collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1994, 3-4). Underneath every social movement is “contentious collective action,” which serves the “main and often the only recourse that ordinary people possess against better-equipped opponents or powerful states” (Tarrow 1998, 3).

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associated with the availability of influential political elites11 and the state’s propensity to repress12. This paper will measure human resources by the experience and reputation of the movement’s leadership, measure moral resources by the percentage change in movement supporters from July 2013 to September 2014, and measure cultural resources by how well Hong Kong people understand the issue of democracy as well as their internal political efficacy. This paper will also specify the openness of political system by comparing the conditions in Hong Kong under Chinese rule to that under British colonial rule, and by identifying major elite conflicts. To uncover the framing strategies used in the movement, this paper will rely on activists’ remarks, official websites, social media, posters, flyers, interviews, debates, televised sessions, and letters to government officials.

Hong Kong’s societal grievances will be categorized in two main areas: material grievances and post-material grievances. Material grievances will be measured by the happiness index, income gap, and economic prospects; whereas post-material grievances will be measured by the perceived threat from the central government, and Hong Kong people’s frustration for their prolonged, but fruitless fight for democracy. This paper compares economic and social indicators in Hong Kong to those of other cities or countries to show the source of societal grievances.

Because the social movement only happened a few months ago, scholarly sources are scarce. Thus this paper has resorted to using a combination of both scholarly sources and news articles. The two primary news sources this paper uses are the South China Morning Post and Ming Pao, both published and circulated in Hong Kong. The South China Morning Post is an English newspaper, whereas the Ming Pao is printed in Chinese. The selected newspapers were 9 In terms of material resources, occupy leaders have attempted to keep their financial sources opaque to media scrutiny. However, leaked emails proved Occupy Central co-founder Benny Tai Yiu-ting received a total of HK$1.45 million in donations from at least one anonymous sources to cover part of the expense for the Occupy movement.10 For social-organizational resources, Occupy Central leaders made a number of strategic bloopers even before the occupy movement had begun. The founders of Occupy Central announced their plan to occupy the heart of Hong Kong’s financial district a year and a half ahead of time, allowing ample time for the government to prepare ahead and direct criticism toward their economically disastrous proposal (Davis 2014, 214). Furthermore, in June 2014, Benny Tai handpicked three alternative political reform proposals from a total of 15 models put forward by different concerned groups for a city-wide popular vote. Because the three chosen models all involve a degree of “civic nomination,” Tai and his supporters were accused of “political screening” themselves, a charge Occupy Central leaders tried to put on Beijing (Chan 2014, 575).11 The pan-democrats in the legislative body are in close relation with Occupy Central leaders, creating the availability of influential elite political alliance that is beneficial to the emergence of social movement. However, this dimension of political opportunity is closely related to the opportunity existed in elite divisions. Therefore, this paper does not address this particular dimension separately. 12 Contrary to political opportunity theorists’ assumption, the government’s “capacity and propensity for repression” is directly, instead of inversely, related to social movement participation rate in Occupy Central’s case. The increased level of state’s inclination to repress, either in form of tear gas, arrests, or Chief Executive’s “strongest warning,” has proven to only have upward effect on participation rate of social movement activists (Kan 2013, 76). During the social unrest, public solidarity with the occupy movement reached its highest level when the police resorted to using tear gas “somewhat indiscriminately” on protesters (Chan 2014, 576). It is the government’s heavy-handedness in “an attempt to disperse protestors” that drew “larger numbers of people” to the streets (Glaser and Vitello 2015, 33).

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regarded as the most trusted newspapers in Hong Kong in their respective language categories in the year of 201313. A few waves of the East Asia Barometer survey results will be used to quantify existing social grievances in Hong Kong and the quality of cultural resources. Multiple public opinion surveys besides the East Asia Barometer will be presented throughout the evidence section to indicate public attitudes and the level of popular support for the movement. Although some of the surveys were conducted with clear biases14, this paper will endeavor to include impartial results and clearly identify the sources of cited surveys.

Evidence Section

Every society has two types of grievances that serve as destabilizing cleavages to divide its people. In Hong Kong, they are the material grievances associated with the “deteriorating living standards” and the “widening of the gap between the rich and the poor”(Cheng 2014, 199), and the post-material grievances generated by the frustration with the slow pace of democratization and the insecurity from perceived tighter control of the central government in Beijing.

Decreased level of living standards exists in Hong Kong society in the forms of worse employment prospects, increased living expenses, and shabbier earnings. Education fails to yield the expected rate of return in Hong Kong, especially among the younger generation who are betting unprecedented investment in their higher education. Said to be the best educated group of people in Hong Kong’s history, the territory’s “post-80s generation” is experiencing “worse employment opportunities,” “lower earnings,” and “less hopeful lifetime prospects” than their parents (Wu 2010, 40). The Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, a local public policy think tank, found that the city’s 1997 median household income was 15.8 percent higher than that of 2005. Within the same period, number of households with monthly earning below HK$8,000 increased by 76.5 percent, which corresponds to 22 percent of the total number of households, compared to only 13 percent in 199615. In addition, property prices have gone up significantly due to corruptive relation between local government and business elites, making housing increasingly unaffordable for wage earners. The ratio of median home prices divided by median household income, a measure of property affordability, reached 14.9 in Hong Kong recently, far higher than other international metropolises such as Tokyo, Singapore, New York, London, San Francisco, and Vancouver (see Figure 1). Employment prospects become dimmer for recent college graduates, whereas social welfare remains “minimal” (Sin 2014).

On the national level, the shining economy of the once dynamic and prosperous “Pearl of the Orient” is now overshadowed by newly-emerged southern Chinese cities of Shanghai, Zhuhai and Shenzhen (Sin 2014). By bridging the foreign financial resources with mainland investment need, Hong Kong enjoyed tremendous economic growth before Deng Xiaoping opened up the mainland market and invited foreign direct investment, especially in the 1950s

13 Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey. The Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Tracking Research: Public Evaluation on Media Credibility – Survey Results.” 2013. Available at: http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/research/Credibility_Survey%20Results_2013_ENG.pdf (accessed on April 16, 2015).14 So, Peter and Jeffie Lam. 2015. “Surveys on Hong Kong’s 2017 Political Reform Are Polls Apart.” South China Morning Post. April 12.15 South China Morning Post. January 10, 2007.

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during the Korean War (Zheng and Keat 2007, 248). With business-friendly law, simple tariff, low taxation, and sophisticated experience in managing capital markets, Hong Kong excelled as an economic and financial gateway to mainland China. However, this advantage enjoyed by Hong Kong soon faded away as Beijing decided to privatize the mainland market. The establishment of five special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan in 1980 destroyed Hong Kong’s previous monopoly on facilitating foreign funds and commercial trades in or out of the mainland’s vast market. In other words, Hong Kong’s previous economic success largely relied on the mainland as its most important market. About 70 percent of Hong Kong’s market capitalization is “related to mainland companies operating on the mainland and earning in yuan”16. Official data from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department shows Hong Kong’s increasing economic dependence on the mainland, with trade volume with the mainland increasing three-fold over the past decade, and mainland tourists number growing at an approximate 10 percent rate since 2009 (Yuen 2014, 71). The perceived deteriorating living standards felt by Hong Kong residents, combined with the unease of being elbowed out of financial dominance in East Asia, and the jealousy of mainland cities’ rapid economic development, all contributed to the formation of Hong Kong people’s contemporary material grievance.

Worse still, Hong Kong people’s perceived injustice is intensified by the growing socio-economic inequality within the city. Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient, measuring income disparity, has been in constant growth since 1976, reaching 0.537 in 2011, significantly exceeding the 0.4 level deemed as prone to the emergence of social unrest (see Figure 2). In 2010, Oxfam, an international organization dedicated to poverty alleviation, revealed no improvement in the incomes of the poorest one-fifth of Hong Kong households for the past five and a half years, whereas the median monthly income of the richest one-tenth of households increased by 16 percent during the same period17. By Hong Kong government’s own standard, 1.3 million Hong Kong people still live under the designated poverty line by 201318. Meanwhile, the 45 Hong Kong billionaires in 2014 had a combined net worth of $214 billion19, equaling roughly 78% of Hong Kong’s 2013 GDP of a little more than $274 billion20.

In recent years, claims have been emerging that the living standards of the underclass in Hong Kong are hurt by a rapidly growing influx of tourists, mostly coming from mainland China, who would like to take advantage of Hong Kong’s low taxes when shopping, and who inadvertently drove up the local prices. Beginning in 2003, the central government in Beijing allowed mainland Chinese to visit Hong Kong and Macau more freely, under the Individual Visit Scheme, in an attempt to revive the two Special Administrative Regions’ tourism and economy. According to the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau of HKSAR Government, more than 54 million visitors from around the world were received by Hong Kong in 2013, an 11.7% increase from previous year. 40.7 million Mainland Chinese tourists accounted for 75 percent of

16 Harris, Richard. 2014. “Loss of Confidence a Hazard of Occupation.” South China Morning Post. December 04. 17 Ming Pao. September 20, 2010.18 Hong Kong’s Information Services Department. Poverty Line Set For HK. September 28, 2013. Available at: http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/health/html/2013/09/20130927_191059.shtml (accessed on April 16, 2015).19 Robehmed, Natalie. 2014. “Meet the Richest Billionaire in Every Country.” Forbes. November, 3. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2014/03/11/meet-the-richest-billionaire-in-every-country/ (accessed on April 16, 2015).20 The World Bank. Data. GDP. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed on April 16, 2015).

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the total arrivals, a 16.7% increase from 201221. The rampant social inequality, intensified by Hong Kong’s crippling economy and Hong Kong people’s decreasing living standards, made the Hong Kong government an easy and natural target for the blame, offering ample room for diagnostic framing by Occupy Central leaders.

Post-material grievances in Hong Kong are composed of the frustration people have for

their 30 years of unrewarded fight for democracy, and the increased perception of threat from a central government that some recently perceive as less committed to the “one country, two systems” principle. Democratic sentiment began to emerge in Hong Kong around 1985, when Britain and China were in the midst of negotiating the 1997 transfer of sovereignty and drafting of the Basic Law, the mini Hong Kong constitution, where the “one country, two systems” doctrine is documented. In 1989, the Tiananmen Incident aroused an unprecedented level of democratic appeals in Hong Kong, whose citizens staged pro-democracy demonstrations in the city on every anniversary of the event ever since. In the new century, pro-democracy and anti-government sentiments have been growing in the territory in response to a series of legislative initiatives such as the Individual Visit Scheme in 2003, controversy over Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23 as whether mainland security law should apply to Hong Kong, and the 2004 NPC Standing Committee interpretation of the Basic Law, which dictates any form of political reform in Hong Kong must be pre-approved by Beijing (Zheng and Keat 2007, 235). The Moral and National Education school curriculum in 2012, which intended to boost Hong Kong youth’s patriotism, their understanding of the country’s history, and their identification with the state, added too many another straw.

Despite the pan-democrats’ historical win on forcing both the central government and Hong Kong local government to give up on the Moral and National Education project, the city never achieved full democracy either electorally, institutionally, or procedurally. In fact, both Beijing after 1997 and London prior to 1997, intentionally attempted to shape a Hong Kong government that combines “representative deliberativeness with authoritarian decisiveness” (Overholt 2001, 5). Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and ordinary citizens who believe they are entitled to a greater degree of political and individual freedom are fatigued and frustrated by thirty years of fighting and waiting. In an early 2015 survey conducted by the City University of Hong Kong, an overall happiness index of 6.98 out of 10 indicated that Hong Kongers are the least happy people of three Asian cities, of which Singapore had a happiness index of 7.56 and Osaka scored 7.41. The survey also revealed the two areas angered Hong Kong residents the most are housing and political factors, scoring 4.22 and 4.41 respectively22. A similar survey conducted by Hong Kong’s Lingnan University in December 2014 confirmed the lack of happiness enjoyed by Hong Kong people with a calculated happiness score of 7.05 8.

Perhaps more importantly, Beijing’s recent actions and remarks regarding Hong Kong triggered more worries on the city’s democratic future and elevated Hong Kong people’s post-material grievances. In 2007, when addressing the doctrine of the “one country, two systems” policy, China’s former President Hu Jintao pointed out that the “one country” comes before “two

21 Tourism Commission. Commerce and Economic Development Bureau. The Government of the HKSAR. April 10, 2014. http://www.tourism.gov.hk/english/statistics/statistics_perform.html (accessed on April 16, 2015).22 Cheung, Elizabeth. 2015. “Sad City: Hong Kong Comes Bottom of Asian Happiness Survey.” South China Morning Post. February 17.

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systems”23. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s interference in the 2008 HKSAR elections (Sing 2009, 111), and its repeated emphasis on the condition that both current and future HKSAR chief executives “must love China and love Hong Kong” (Kan 2013, 74), reinforced Hong Kong people’s fear for Beijing’s political influence. To reiterate Beijing’s position, Chinese high-profile officials have asserted on numerous occasions, that the future Hong Kong chief executive “must be trusted by the central government,” and a “filtering mechanism” must be in place to ensure candidates who “opposes Beijing” will not be elected into power 24 25. Finally, in June of 2014, China’s State Council released a white paper on Hong Kong, enouncing explicitly its “complete jurisdiction” over the territory, while identifying the central government as the source of Hong Kong’s autonomy: “the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong is subject to the central government’s authorization”26. Hong Kong activists also pointed to other subtle details in Chinese government official’s speeches as proof of Beijing’s tightened control on the city’s autonomy. In the Chinese Premier’s 2014 annual work report delivered to the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang left out the phrases “the people of Hong Kong governing Hong Kong” and “high degree of autonomy” when he addressed on issues related to Hong Kong (Yuen 2014, 73). Absent for the first time in ten consecutive annual work reports by the Premier, these two phrases are considered as conventional talking points when it comes to Hong Kong affairs, and was added back by Premier Li in his 2015 work report to dismiss “unnecessary” worries27 28.

The increasingly assertive rhetoric from Beijing fuels Hong Kong people’s apprehension toward the CCP. The Wall Street Journal noted that Hong Kong is becoming keener to engage in self-censorship and attacks on independent journalists29, leading to the drop of ranking on World Press Freedom Index from 18th in 2002 to 61st in 2013 (Yuen 2014, 74). Although the world-renowned Chinese politics expert Andrew Nathan regards some of these policy outcome as unintended, “incidental” (2015, 165), and can only be counted as collateral damage in “Beijing’s pragmatic efforts to protect the regime from challenges at home” (2015, 158), he still acknowledges the central government’s policies can “roll back existing democratic institutions” or “stifle sprouts of democratic change” in its specially administrated territory (2015, 163).

The Occupy Central Movement has displayed a generational divide within the Hong Kong community in addition to the apparent economic and class cleavages. At the peak of these societal grievances is perhaps the younger generation. Hong Kong’s youth is not only frustrated by “the growing competition for jobs,” “economic uncertainty,” “lack of affordable housing,”30 and the unwillingness of their government to defend their interests against their counterparts on

23 “Ten Years On, Hong Kong Still Has Money but No Democracy.” The Business. Hong Kong. July 7, 2007.24 “Zhang Xiaoming: Te Shou Pu Xuan Yao You Shai Xuan.” (Zhang Xiaoming: There Must Be Filtering Mechanisms for Chief Executive Election). Ming Pao. March 10, 2013.25 But, Joshua and Collen Lee. “Opponents of Beijing Ineligible to be C.E.” South China Morning Post. March 25, 2013.26 “Full Text: Chinese State Council white paper on ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong.” South China Morning Post. June 10, 2014. 27 Cheung, Tony. 2014. “What Premier Li Keqiang DIDN’T Say About Hong Kong: Key ‘Autonomy’ Phrases Missing From Report.” South China Morning Post. March 06. 28 Kang-chung, Ng. 2015. “Fears That Beijing is Tightening Grip on Hong Kong ‘unnecessary’: Li Keqiang.” South China Morning Post. March 16. 29 The Wall Street Journal. February 13, 2014. “Hong Kong, Taiwan’s eroding freedom of Press.”30 Sautin, Yevgen. 2014. “Hong Kong’s Generational Divide.” The American Interest. October 9.

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the mainland, but also disappointed by the “uncompromising attitudes of the older generation,” who share “a huge discrepancy in values and worldviews” with the younger generation (Sin 2014). Young Hong Kongers claimed there is no point of access for them within the existing political system to voice discontent, because most Hong Kong lawmakers are over 40 years old. Even the Commission on Youth, a government body, is chaired by a 55-year-old man, they argued (Sin 2014). According to the Hong Kong Ideas Centre, a think tank, one out of three Hong Kong youths is dissatisfied with society, especially among the age group of 20 to 24, in which 42.7 percent feel deprived from expectation31. The unfair and reluctant representation of young people in the political realm explains Hong Kong youth’s leading role in the Occupy Central Movement.

The societal grievances and dissatisfaction discussed above set the conditions for occupy leaders’ framing of the movement. Through framing, they articulated these economic and social hardships experienced by ordinary citizens, identified the origin of the societal malfunctions, and motivated Hong Kong people, especially the youth, to join the movement.

Cultural Framing/Cognitive Liberation

First and foremost, Occupy Central leaders engaged in diagnostic framing of the issue by identifying the problems with a threatening and authoritarian central government, an incompetent local government, and the collusion between local officials and pro-Beijing business tycoons.

Beijing’s authoritarianism is framed by activists as wanting a “democratic show without democratic substance” when they interpreted the NPC’s August 2014 proposal for Hong Kong’s political reform (Ma 2011, 66). Although the political system of Hong Kong, as discussed in the political opportunity section, was no more democratic, and even less democratic during the British colonial rule than after 1997 under Beijing’s supervision, Occupy Central leaders still managed to twist the rhetoric and frame the issue otherwise. They claim that before 1997, Hong Kong was “the epitome of a prosperous liberal autocracy,” which was entitled to “the rule of law and a high degree of freedom,” made possible by a local government that is “while unelected, nonetheless enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the people over whom it ruled” (Sing 2009, 110). Diagnostic framing becomes ever more obvious when pro-democracy demonstrators argued “the legitimacy of this undemocratic political structure has suffered serious erosion amid conditions of deepening social inequality, ever more blatant cronyism, failed economic restructuring, low political accountability, and mounting threats to freedom” (Sing 2009, 110–111). The diagnostic framing used in Occupy Central Movement concentrated on the blaming of the post-1997 political system for the deteriorating socio-economic prospects in Hong Kong. However, Gini Coefficient indicates the fastest growth of income disparity in Hong Kong happened during the decade between 1986 and 1996, when the city was still a colony under British rule (see Figure 3).

Hong Kong local government’s incompetence is framed by leading activists as “unsatisfactory performance” and “lack of concern for the interests of ordinary people” (Cheng 2014, 211). The Hong Kong government is accused of running a “legitimacy deficit,” which 31 Lau, Stuart. 2015. “One in Three Young Adults Dissatisfied with Hong Kong Society: Survey.” South China Morning Post. April 13.

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requires Beijing’s support (Cheng 2014, 211). It is precisely through this mutually reinforcing relationship between the Hong Kong and central governments, that Hong Kong people’s discontent spread upward into Beijing’s center of decision making. Occupy Central leaders seized the opportunity to strengthen their diagnostic framework by identifying the Hong Kong government as culpable when the Chief Executive was caught in a scandal that he received secret HK$50 million dollar payment from an Austrian company before taking office32. Moreover, the Occupy Central leaders framed Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying as anti-poor people and seeking the minority control of the political apparatus in Hong Kong based on an interview he had with foreign media33 34.

The collusion between government officials and business elites is said to be most vividly displayed in Hong Kong’s housing policy. Since “the bulk of wealth” of the city’s richest tycoons is derived from the real estate industry, Hong Kong government’s policies on public housing and land supply “are perceived to be related to these tycoons’ fortunes” (Cheng 2014, 210). In addition, occupy leaders further accused the “government-sponsored cartel system” and “monopolies” also exist in the “travel and transport services, auto sales, property, food, natural gas, electricity, household moving, medical care, law, teaching, banking” and even “entertainment” industries (Overholt 2001, 10). The occupy central leaders were able to come up with this effective diagnostic framework of putting the entire blame on the local government and Beijing, despite the fact that it was the British government, who changed gradually from “total colonial dictatorship to a form of consultative colonialism,” attempted to rally local support by making “most influential groups feel that they were part of the system and that their interests had been taken into account” (Overholt 2001, 11). Because of the British government’s strategy to maintain political control of Hong Kong during colonial rule, Hong Kong elites were left with no “experience of broad societal and political leadership” and “no adequate experience with crisis management and complex project management” in 1997 (Overholt 2001, 12).

It is through these successful diagnostic framing, the Occupy Central leaders were able to manufacture and amplify the perceived discrepancy by the Hong Kong public between the in-group and out-group. The leaders created an in-group represented by loyal Hong Kongers, democracy lovers, freedom fighters, honorable idealists, and victims of an incompetent Hong Kong government and vicious Beijing government. The out-group created by social movement leaders consists of an authoritarian central government in Beijing, an obedient and incapable local government in Hong Kong, pro-Beijing politicians and business elites whose interests are deeply imbedded in their alliance with the central government, the timid and indifferent segments of Hong Kong population that does not support their actions, and the “Mandarin-speaking” mainland tourists who cause “considerable inconveniences” to the city (Cheng 2014, 219). “Hong Kong is not Beijing. It is an open society with a free press. Hong Kong has the rule of law and respect for human rights” (Davis 2014, 213). Slogans such as these that aim to

32 Ng, Joyce, James Griffiths and Benjamin Robertson. 2014. “CY Leung Faces Separate Probes of HK$50 Million Deal with Australian Firm.” South China Morning Post. October 10. 33 France-Presse, Agence. 2014. “CY Leung: ‘Democracy Would See Poorer People Dominate Hong Kong Vote’.” South China Morning Post. October 21. 34 In the interview, Leung said: “If it’s entirely a numbers game and numeric representation, then obviously you’d be talking to the half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than US$1,800 a month.” Wall Street Journal; Financial Times; International New York Times. October 20, 2014.

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identify and amplify certain intergroup differences, in order for the in-group to feel superior, are prevalent during the occupy movement. Movement leaders accuse the growing influx of mainland tourists of making Hong Kong “very crowded,” “driving up prices” of local housing and daily necessities, creating “a shortage of supply” for baby formula, occupying the limited resources of medical care, and “forcing the relocation of small businesses” that used to serve only the locals (Cheng 2014, 219). Although counter framing efforts have pointed out that tourism constitutes a major part of Hong Kong’s economy nowadays, movement leaders have dismissed such claim by asserting they “do not feel they have benefited directly from it” (Cheng 2014, 219).

Instead, the emphasis was put on the immediate need to “preserve the local identity and way of life under economic integration with China” (Yuen 2014, 75). For example, two representative books, Hong Kong as a City-State and Hong Kong Nationalism35, have become particular hits during and after the Occupy Central Movement. Both books urged the autonomy, “de-Sinicisation,” even the independence of Hong Kong, distinguished by “unique and superior features such as its Cantonese-speaking population, traditional Chinese characters, and its preservation of the Cantonese culture” (Yuen 2014, 75). The leaders’ efforts to maximize the divide between Hong Kong and mainland were largely successful. According to a regular identity survey that has been conducted ten times since 1997, 8.9 percent of 810 people polled in a survey identified themselves as “Chinese” in October 2014. The same poll revealed that 26.8 percent chose to identify with “Hongkongers,” 42 percent chose to identify with “Hongkongers but also Chinese,” and 22.3 percent identified with “Chinese but also Hongkongers.” The same study in 1997 discovered 32.1 percent identified as Chinese36. The Hong Kong’s local “nativist identity” has been mobilized to serve as a “nascent political force” (Yuen 2014, 76). These proponents of the nativist Hong Kong identity argue the “interfering” of Beijing “puts their very identity at risk” (Davis 2014, 214).

Furthermore, through motivational framework, Occupy Central leaders succeeded in providing morality for the movement and persuading segments of the Hong Kong population to believe their civil disobedience action was justified and democracy is desperately and immediately needed in the city. The full name of the Occupy Central Movement is “Occupy Central with Love and Peace.” Movement leaders added “love and peace” into the name of the civil disobedience campaign to appeal to the general public by stressing the peaceful nature of the protest and their virtuous intention. Leaders also successfully recruited more supporters by framing their pro-democracy message around images and symbols of umbrellas and yellow ribbons. The yellow ribbons used to represent Occupy Central largely resemble the orange ribbons used to embody Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Whereas the symbol of umbrella, used by protesters to defend tear gas from police, resonates with the sympathetic audience who gave the movement a nick name, “Umbrella Revolution.”37

35 Cheung, Tony and Peter So. 2015. “Hong Kong Nationalism Files off Shelves Following Leung Chun-ying’s Policy Address Criticism.” South China Morning Post. January 21. 36 Siu, Phila and Tony Cheung. 2014. “Poll Finds Fewer Hongkongers Identifying as Chinese, Thanks to Occupy.” South China Moring Post. November 11. 37 Chow, Vivienne. 2014. “Umbrella Revolution: More Designs on Hong Kong’s Protest Movement.” South China Morning Post. September 29.

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Moreover, the leaders of Umbrella Movement framed the Basic Law in the way that it promises democratization and the implementation of universal suffrage in Hong Kong in 2017. In fact, the Basic Law only described universal suffrage as the “ultimate aim” for the selections of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and members of the Legislative Councils (Glaser and Vitello 2015, 33). Some proponents of this claim further conceived a new frame that the Standing Committee of NPC made a promise to Hong Kong in 2007 for the delivery of universal suffrage in 2017, which was also untrue but motivated poorly informed Hong Kongers to protest on streets38. Protesters soon learned and adopted the frameworks created by their leaders and started to ask for Hong Kong government to accept “international standards for democracy” (Davis 2014, 212). This motivation framing of the so-called international standards for democracy is extremely powerful in revealing the unrealized gap Hong Kong has with the rest of the world, stimulating the Hong Kong people’s feelings of unfairness and jealousy.

However, the “international standards for democracy” in the eyes of Occupy Central leaders all involve a certain level of “civil nomination,” which is in fact very rare in the international community (Davis 2014, 212). The major candidates for presidency are nominated by political parties even in the United States. Movement leaders further motivate the masses, provide morality for their actions, and point to the urgency and severity of the matter by claiming “when an authoritarian government claims full control and full authority over the matter, then there really are no other institutions to challenge them” (Davis 2014, 213). Some even attempted to stress the seriousness of the situation by drawing analogy to the Tiananmen Square Incident that happened in 1989. To reinforce the movement’s moral authority, movement strategists framed the rhetoric of “absolute non-violence” as the peaceful principle guarding the collective action (Kan 2013, 75).

In fact, the motivational framing was primarily targeted at Hong Kong’s “unsympathetic, unmoved public” (Kan 2013, 78). This “silent majority” that makes up approximately 50 to 70 percent of Hong Kong’s population consists of middle-aged and middle class residents, who are “neither strongly supportive…nor highly critical” toward the Occupy Central campaign (Kan 2013, 75). In order to mobilize this portion of the population, diagnostic framing alone isn’t enough.

Occupy Central Movement leaders achieved very little with prognostic framing beyond articulating their impractical, and often divided objectives of the civil disobedience campaign. The student leaders put forward four demands: “(1) withdrawal of the NPCSC decision in August 2014; (2) endorsing civic nomination for the election of the CE; (3) abolition of functional constituencies; and (4) a clear timetable to achieve these objectives” after realizing it is impossible to force the resignation of the current Chief Executive (Chan 2014, 577). Potential solutions activist leaders developed include “an electronic voting platform for a citywide vote as an endorsement” for Occupy Central’s causes, and the resignation of pan-democrat legislators in order to trigger a “by-election or pseudo-referendum” for citizens to express support or opposition to Beijing’s proposed political reform package (Kan 2013, 76). Student leaders even

38 HKSAR Government, Consultation Document: Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012 (November 2009), p. 42. It clearly states: “appropriate amendments may be made to the specific method for forming the fifth term Legislative Council of the HKSAR in the year of 2012. The election of the fifth executive of the HKSAR in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage.”

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planned to demonstrate in Beijing during the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Pact meeting, but were not granted entry permits to the mainland39.

Hong Kong Federation of Students published a letter40 filled with all three tasks of framing to Chinese premier Li Keqiang on November 15, 2014. First, the letter identified “a few elites” who dominate Hong Kong’s “political and economic lifeline” as culpable, and the “undemocratic system” as the roots for Hong Kong’s social-economic ills. Then it blamed the August NPC decision for having “undermine[d] the confidence of the Hong Kong young people,” and the Hong Kong government for failing to offer “good governance” and “a good blueprint for economic development and social reform.” Through motivational framing, the letter drew attention to the “unjust and desperate city” and the severity of the situation because there was “no other way” to appeal. Their prognostic framing once again implied “democratic reform” is the only remedy to the “political power crisis” between pro-establishment and pan-democrats coalitions.

Moreover, Occupy Central leaders were ineffective in defending some of the counter frameworks constructed against them, including the accusations that the radical elements of the social campaign is counter-intuitive to the spirit of law, that the movement “sacrifices collective interests for personal political ambition,” that the demonstration created enormous “economic losses” and resulted in the eroding of “Hong Kong’s competitiveness,” that the movement lacks “broad-based popular support” (Kan 2013, 76), that the protest caused “considerable inconvenience to the public” (Chan 2014, 576), and that the peaceful rally later turned into “riots” (Chan 2014, 579). Local businesses later managed to obtain injunction order from Hong Kong’s High Court, providing the legal basis for the clearance of protest sites.

Movement leaders’ failure to defend counter framing and their inability to device effective prognostic framing made the emergence of the movement more dependent on resource mobilization and political opportunities.

39 Ng, Joyce, Amy Nip and Stuart Lau. 2014. “Beijing Bans Student Leaders from taking Trip to Mainland to Press for Democracy.” South China Morning Post. November 15. 40 Hong Kong Federation of Students’ Open Letter to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. November 15, 2014.

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Resource Mobilization

The organizers’ access to and mobilization of human, moral, and cultural resources, crucial to the emergence and success of social movements, are not unproblematic.

In regard to human resources, the three primary leaders of Occupy Central enjoy a high level of public respect and credibility because of their occupations and social statuses. Benny Tai Yiu-ting is a law professor at the University of Hong Kong, arguably the best university in Asia, whereas Chan Kin-man is an associate professor in sociology from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Chu Yiu-ming is the minister of Chai Wan Baptist Church in Hong Kong. Besides the three pioneers of the Occupy Central movement, there are two important student groups that have been the backbones of this social movement. The Hong Kong Federation of Students is the biggest student organization in Hong Kong, including student members from eight higher level education institutions. The Scholarism is a Hong Kong high school activist group, led by the 18-year-old Joshua Wong, who was ranked 10th as the “world’s greatest leaders” by Fortune41. Joshua Wong is a young but experienced leader, who founded the Scholarism in 2011 in opposition to the Moral and National Education school curriculum proposal.

Although respected and experienced leaders were at the helm of the Occupy Central movement, the leadership structure is subject to pluralism and internal disputes as well. Other radical groups that have played important roles in the movement, such as People Power, Civic Passion and the Proletariat Political Institute, have also “openly disputed or disavowed the student leadership”42. The student leaders and the three founders of Occupy Central even fought against each over the leading role in the social movement. In September 2014, prior to the Occupy Central founders’ designated movement start date of Chinese National Day on October 1st, student leaders staged boycotts of classes and started demonstration outside of the government headquarters (Chan 2014, 576). After the student movement gained momentum, the three Occupy Central founders had no choice but to officially declare the start of Occupy Central movement on September 28th, two days before their original plan.

The moral resources for the Occupy Central movement, in terms of public solidarity, support, and commitment of the people, were inconsistent throughout the campaign, and met its peak when Hong Kong police used tear gas on protesting students. Despite the 2001 Asian Barometer Survey found that 87.6 percent of Hong Kong respondents claimed “democracy is desirable [for Hong Kong] now” and 66.8 percent Hong Kong respondents deemed “democracy is suitable [for Hong Kong] now,” the level of public support for further democratization was relatively low in the dawn of the Occupy Central Movement (Chu et al. 2008, 22). According to a series of surveys conducted by Ming Pao, public support for the movement prior to its actual emergence increased from 25 percent in April 2013 to 32 percent in July, before falling back to 25 percent in October; whereas public opposition to the Occupy Central Movement fell from 51 percent in April to 46 percent in July, before rising to 55 percent in October (Cheng 2014, 222).

41 Fortune. 2015. “World’s Greatest Leaders.” Available at: http://fortune.com/worlds-greatest-leaders/joshua-wong-10/ (accessed on April 16, 2015).42 Lo, Alex. 2015. “Fortune Article on Joshua Wong Chi-fung in the Top 10 for Errors.” March 30.

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Occupy Central therefore is viewed by the majority of Hong Kong people as “making unnecessarily radical demands” (Kan 2013, 77).

When asked to give opinion on the formation of the nominating committee, almost half of the surveyed respondents agree to leave “the 1,200-member Election Committee as it is” (Kan 2013, 77). In September, only 48 percent of Hong Kong people embraced the less radical approach of having lawmakers veto Beijing’s reform framework, let alone the radical street politics that could cause tremendous amount of economic damage to the city43. A generational gap is also revealed in a July 2013 survey conducted by the Public Opinion Program of the University of Hong Kong, showing 44 percent of people between the age of 30 and 49, and 54 percent of people above the age of 50 oppose to the idea of occupying Central district, while 41% percent of 18 to 29-year-olds support the plan (Kan 2013, 78) (see Table 1). The generational gap further indicates the success motivational framing has achieved in mobilizing the Hong Kong youth.

Finally, the cultural resources for Occupy Central, measured by how well people understand the issue, were extremely divided and overwhelmingly scarce among movement supporters. Although the Occupy Central Movement itself had guiding philosophical and ideological principles, its participants and supporters do not seem to fully comprehend the causes they were fighting for. James Fishkin’s philosophical paradigm of deliberative democracy served as the overarching ideology for the Occupy Central Movement (Cheng 2014, 222). Deliberative democracy advocates the access to “thoughtful interaction and opinion formation that are normally restricted to small-group democracy” (Fishkin 1991, 4).

Occupy leaders endeavored to promote rational discussion on political reforms, in order to reach public consensus to better amend the Hong Kong political system, in spite of the lack of Hong Kong people’s commitment on liberal democratic values. Modifying the Asian Barometer Survey results into a “two-by-two typology,” researchers have managed to categorize people into four groups based on their commitment and understanding of democracy (Chu and Huang 2010, 117) (see Table 2). Based on the researchers’ definition, a critical democrat is someone who is “normatively committed to liberal-democratic principles” but also have some reservation regarding democracy’s “preferability, desirability, suitability, efficacy, or priority in a specific historical context”; a consistent democrats are “true supporters of democracy” because they both subscribe to liberal democratic values and express support for them; non-democrats refer to “consistent believers in authoritarianism” who harbor “anti-democratic values”; and superficial democrats are people who don’t completely comprehend democratic principles but only “pay lip service to the idea of democracy” (Chu and Huang 2010, 117).

Using this classification and two waves of Asian Barometer Survey results in 2002 and 2007, the researchers found both non-democrats and superficial democrats have increased in numbers between the five years, implying a declining cultural resource for pro-democracy movement (see Table 3). To put these numbers in perspective, consistent democrats in Hong Kong, the genuine supports of democracy, compose a much smaller percentage of the total population than in the Chinese mainland, whose consistent democrats made up 32.6 percent of 43 Lam, Jeffie. 2014. “Half of Hongkongers Say Lawmakers Should Veto Beijing’s Electoral Reform Plan.” South China Morning Post. September 15.

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the total population in 2003 and 26.5 percent in 2008 (Chu and Huang 2010, 118). Mainland Chinese are arguably entitled to a lower degree of democracy than Hong Kongers, but did not form any major social upheavals in the years followed, indicating Hong Kong consistent democrats’ likely inability to stage pro-democracy demonstration. Although Hong Kong registered voters’ Legislative Council Election turnout rate has been increasing steadily since 2008 (see Figure 4), the level of Hong Kong people’s internal political efficacy is the lowest in 2001 among seven other East Asian societies surveyed by the Asian Barometer (see Table 4). An important indicator for the political effectiveness of citizenship, internal political efficacy is defined as “beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics” (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991, 407). As discussed above, Hong Kong’s Occupy Central Movement relied primarily on respected human resources to gain the initial momentum, while the movement clearly lacked tremendous amounts of moral and cultural resources.

Political Opportunity

To begin with, there is relative openness in Hong Kong’s political system after the 1997 retrocession than during the 156-year of British rule. Increased openness in institutionalized political system means more access of entry by outsiders, making the system more prone to social unrest. Prior to 1982, democratic elections only existed at local consultative level and the “colonial polity remained centralized and executive-centered” (Lo 1997, 38). Direct popular elections were expanded to a small portion of the Hong Kong Legislative Council seats for the first time in 1991, because of London’s desire to remain control of Hong Kong’s political climate after the 1997 handover (Lee 2005, 300). The percentage of the Legislative Council subject to popular vote keeps increasing under Beijing’s administration. Half of the total legislative seats were decided by universal suffrage by 2008 (Ma 2011, 55).

When Hong Kong was still administrated by its British colonizer, the Governor of Hong Kong was appointed directly from London, but after 1997, Beijing allowed the Chief Executive to be selected by an election committee, whose members rose from 400 in the first term to 1,200 in the third term (Chan 2014, 572). Every Governor appointed by London was British, while Beijing implemented the policy of “the people of Hong Kong governing Hong Kong” (Yuen 2014, 73). British governors acted like “dictators,” imposing policies “at will” with a “vast policy and administrative apparatus in London to back them up” (Overholt 2001, 11). Under the 156 years of colonial rule, Hong Kong people never enjoyed universal suffrage nor the level of civil liberty “that can bear comparison with anything available in any Western democracy” (Ma 2011, 55). Only after 1997, Beijing granted local bureaucrats “a freer hand in the administration of the territory” (Zheng and Keat 2007, 237).

The instability of Hong Kong’s political alignment provided further opportunity for the emergence of the Occupy Central Movement. Though the political spectrum in Hong Kong is characterized as political pluralism, its political realm is essentially divided into two major camps: the pro-establishment camp, also called the pro-Beijing coalition, and the pro-democracy pan-democrats (Chan 2014, 572). The pan-democrats have recently secured approximately 60 percent of Hong Kong’s popular vote in legislative elections, but only occupy less than 30 percent of the seats in the Legislative Council, resulting in an awkward situation where “those who are in power have no popular mandate, and those who have a popular mandate have no

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power” (Chan 2014, 572). The fierce political competition between the pro-Beijing coalition and pan-democrats has been going on for decades. For one example, the Alliance for True Democracy, a coalition form in March 2013, bringing 27 legislators together from 12 political groups, suggested in May 2014 to allow the nominating committee members be elected by all 3.2 million registered voters on a “one person, one vote” basis (Kan 2013, 74). Even today, pro-establishment legislators still need the votes from at least four out of the 27 pan-democrats to pass Beijing’s August 2014 political reform package in Hong Kong44.

Conclusion

On April 22, 2015, the Hong Kong local government announced the final deal on the 2017 electoral reform blueprint, which sticks rigidly to the framework Beijing suggested in August 2014. In June, the pro-democracy legislators in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong voted down the proposal, keeping the electoral system the same way as before, stripping away what would have been Hong Kong people’s first practice of universal suffrage in history. The further development of the political situation in Hong Kong will not only affect the democratic prospects of the Hong Kong people, but also provide significant implication on Beijing’s relation with its unstable peripheral autonomous regions of Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

Overwhelming evidence illustrates the important roles diagnostic and motivational framing, coordinated by experienced and respected social movement leaders, played in mobilizing the emergence of the Occupy Central Movement. This paper examines and verifies various implications the political opportunity structure, the resource mobilization, and the cultural framing approaches have on social movements. The findings not only point to the necessary force of cultural framing in the development of social movements, but also make the distinction among diagnostic, motivational and prognostic frameworks.

It is demonstrated that when appropriate political opportunities are present, not all types of resources are needed for social movements to emerge, as long as the movement can successfully manufacture effective diagnostic and motivational frames. However, it seems to take more resources, and a pragmatic prognostic framework that emphasizes less on blaming but more on constructive solutions to problems, for social movements to continue and to eventually succeed. This conclusion discredits the rigid political process theory, which insists on the necessity of seeking all elements in political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing from every social movement.

The Occupy Central case also sheds insights on the important roles different categories of resources have on the emergence and development of a social movement. However, political process theory has deviated from evaluating the availability of and access to various resources in social movements, but rather focused on analyzing informal networks and preexisting organizations. Given that the quantity and quality of resources can determine the formation and success of social movements, this paper calls future researches on collective behaviors to revisit the important implications of the resource mobilization approach.

44 Cheung, Gary. 2015. “Pan-democrats ‘Would Only Support Beijing Reforms if 70 Percent of Hongkongers Back Proposals’.” South China Morning Post. March 06.

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This paper also draws attention to the influence the socially constructed identity has on the emergence and build-up of social movements. It is particularly interesting to see intergroup discrepancy can be magnified to such huge extent between two ethnically, linguistically, and culturally similar civil societies. The anti-Beijing feeling was not only reflected in Hong Kong’s Occupy Central Movement, but also in Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, as well as a series of smaller scale protests and unrests in China’s autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. This study calls for future research to explore the myth behind the opposition sentiments toward centralization that is at the core of Hong Kong people’s rejection of the Chinese identity and their resistance to political influence only from Beijing, but not from London.

This paper has a number of shortcomings. For one, the identity analysis of cultural framing could be better structured by including the literatures on identity theory and social identity theory. However, due to space limitation, only different explanations within social movement theories are considered. Last but not the least, the emotional factors of this social movement remain unexamined (Goodwin et al. 2000).

FIGURESFigure 1: Median Multiple: House Price/Household Income45

45 Figure 1: Chen, Liyan. 2014. “Beyond The Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong’s Struggle with Inequality in 8 Charts.” Forbes. October, 8. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/10/08/beyond-the-umbrella-revolution-hong-kongs-struggle-with-inequality-in-8-charts/ (accessed on April 16, 2015).

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Figure 2: Income Inequality – Hong Kong’s Gini Coefficient46

46 Figure 2: Chen, Liyan. 2014. “Beyond The Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong’s Struggle with Inequality in 8 Charts.” Forbes. October, 8. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/10/08/beyond-the-umbrella-revolution-hong-kongs-struggle-with-inequality-in-8-charts/ (accessed on April 16, 2015).

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Figure 3: Household Income Disparity of Hong Kong47

47 Figure 3: The Gini Coefficient of Hong Kong: Trends and Interpretations. Half-yearly Economic Report 2012. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.

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Figure 4: Legislative Council Election Turnout Rate48

48 Figure 4: Legislative Council Election Turnout Rate. Social Indicators of Hong Kong. Available at: http://www.socialindicators.org.hk/en/indicators/political_participation/2.2 (accessed on April 16, 2015).

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TABLESTable 1: Generational Gap – Attitudes Toward Occupy Central

Attitude toward Occupy Central

Age Group

18-29

Age Group

30-49

Age Group

50 or above

Support 41% 33% 27%

Half-half 22% 14% 9%

Oppose 31% 44% 54%

Don’t know/

Hard to say

6% 8% 11%

Table 2: Understanding of Democracy

Low HighHigh Critical Democracts Consistent DemocratsLow Non-Democrats Superficial Democrats

Support for Democracy

Democratic Value

Table 3: Democratic Orientations in Hong Kong(Frequency Distribution in Percent)

Table 4: Level of Internal Political Efficacy49

(Measured by percent of respondents)

Hong Kong China Taiwan Korea Mongolia Thailand Philippines JapanNeither 82.5 63.3 60.8 38.5 21.0 12.9 37.5 59.2

Can understand politics 13.9 9.9 11.4 36.3 16.9 2.8 31.6 16.9Can participate in politics 2.1 19.1 17.7 7.3 32.7 71.7 17.7 13.8

Both 1.5 7.4 10.0 17.8 29.4 12.5 13.2 10.2N= 811 3184 1415 1500 1144 1544 1203 1419

49 Chu, Yun-Han, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. (table on Page 15) New York: Columbia University Press.

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Year2002 26.7 42.8 17.5 132007 26.4 39.3 19.5 14.8

Consistent Democrats

Critical Democrats

Non-Democrats

Superficial Democrats


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