Introduction to Negotiations Theory and Practice Research Paper

Introduction to Negotiations Theory and Practice

LLAW 3159

Research Assignment

Student Number: 2010982505


Introduction

In this essay, the author will first provide a compendious discussion of rational

choice theory (RCT), followed by an excursive examination of its application in current

academic spheres. Finally, the author will analyse in detail the limitations of applying a

pure RCT approach to human behaviour in the context of negotiations, highlighting in

particular the influence of cognitive and emotional biases.

The Rational Choice Theory

RCT has its genesis in modern microeconomics theory. It based on a series of

assumptions about how people respond to incentives, at the heart of which is the

assumption that human behaviour is guided by instrumental reason, and accordingly,

individuals always choose what they believe to be the best or most efficient means to

achieve their given ends1. Individuals choose the best or most efficient means based on

preferences that are “relatively stable”2, or, for some, “invariable and fixed”3. The theory

adopts methodological individualism4, conceiving that “complex social phenomena can

be explained in terms of the elementary individual actions of which they are composed”5.

Accordingly, RCT presumes that the individual decision-making unit in question is

1 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory” (2004) 30 International Interactions 87—107 at 94.2 Claudia Landwehr, “Rational Choice, Deliberative Democracy, And Preference Transformation” (2005) 11 Studies in Social and Political Thought 40—68 at 43; Michael Spangle, and Myra Warren Isenhart, Negotiation: Communication for Diverse Settings (2003: California, Sage Publications) at 46.3 Henner Gimpel, “Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations” (2006) Negotiation and Market Engineering Conference Paper; see also Samuel Bowles, “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions” (1998) 36 J. Econ. Literature 75—111 at 75 (“Markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they also influence the evolution of values, tastes and personalities. Economists have long assumed otherwise; the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old as liberal political philosophy itself”).4 Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, history and meaning, (2001: London, Routledge) at 288.5 John Scott, “Rational Choice Theory” in Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present (2000: Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli and Frank Webster, eds., California, Sage Publications) at 127.


“typical” or “representative” of collective entities, such as corporations or national

governments6. As a result, patterns of behavior will develop within the society that result

from those choices. As a prescriptive account, RCT has achieved relative success at

understanding markets in the field of economics. It has consequently been transposed to

various other disciplines, which will be discussed in the following section.

Present Application of RCT in Current Academic Spheres

While RCT has long been the dominant paradigm in economics, it has, in recent

decades, been imported into various other disciplines such as, inter alia, psychology7,

philosophy8, political science9, anthropology10, sociology11 and criminology12 and even

genomics13. It is also used in negotiation analysis, which will be discussed in greater

detail below. Generally, in economics, sociology and political science, the main

application of RCT is typically in predicting individual behaviour. The purpose for which

RCT is adopted varies between disciplines, with prediction, prescription, and

interpretation each being seen by some as the model's major role. Contemporary

economics is in many ways defined by its adoption of a predictive form of RCT as its

dominant paradigm. Within the sphere of contemporary political science, RCT is

6 Steven L. Green, “Rational Choice Theory: An Overview” (2002) Baylor University Working Paper.7 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk” (1979) in Econometrica, vol. 47(2), 263—291.8 Christopher Cherniak, “Neural Component Placement” (1995) in Trends in Neurosciences vol. 18, 522—527.9 Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (1994: Connecticut. Yale University Press).10 Sylvia Yanagiasako, “Comments on Rational Choice and the Humanities" in Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities, vol. 1 (October 15, 2009), available at: http://occasion.stanford.edu/node/34.11 Peter Hedström & Charlotta Stern, "Rational Choice and Sociology” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., (2008: Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan).12 Gary Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 The Journal of Political Economy 169—217.13 John Dupré, “Rational Choice Theory and Genomics” in Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities, vol. 1 (October 15, 2009), available at: http://occasion.stanford.edu/node/26.


employed in the study of, inter alia, interest groups, elections, behaviour in legislatures,

coalitions and bureaucracy14. In philosophy, RCT is primarily a normative account,

specifying of how individuals ought to behave, rather than how they actually behave15.

In the domain of negotiation analysis, a litany of literature has affirmed rationality as the

premier faculty16. In this context, parties to a negotiation are understood to arrive at the

negotiating table with a stable set of preferences17 (desired outcomes to be derived from

the attempt at conflict resolution), with complete information (a complete understanding

of all the available alternatives and their consequences in terms of specific preferences18),

and with the cognitive ability to maximize their utility (to decide upon an outcome that

maximizes overall benefit based on an appropriate weighting of each preference for each

alternative19). It is primarily a normative rather than descriptive, advising how negotiators

should act rather than how negotiators actually act20, and as stipulating a set of practical,

normative prescriptions, its “rigor, parsimony and productiveness”21 is undeniable: when

negotiating, this is how one ought to act to maximize utilities when and if … etc. But its

predictive value in describing how people actually reach decisions in the real world is

14 Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Models in Political Science (1991: London, Pearson).15 Supra Note 8 at 527. 16 See, for e.g., Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press); Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (1992: New York, Free Press); Edward Russo & Paul J.H. Schdemaker, Decision Traps: Ten Barriers to Decisionmaking and How to Overcome Them (1990: Ontario, Fireside).17 Michael Spangle, and Myra Warren Isenhart, Negotiation: Communication for Diverse Settings (2003: California, Sage Publications) at 46.18 Kevin Avruch, “Toward an Expanded Canon of Negotiation Theory: Identity, Ideological and Values-based Conflict and the Need for a New Heuristic” (2006) 89 Marq. L. Rev. 567—582 at 569.19 Wynn Sterling & Todd Moon, “A Praxeology for Rational Negotiation” AAAI Fall Symposium, 2001, 1—10; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, “Heuristics at the Bargaining Table” (2004) 87 Marq. Law Rev. 795—808 at 795.20 C.f. Raiffa, Supra Note 16 at 21 (Raiffa developed an asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive approach to negotiations, one that described how “erring folks like you and me actually behave” rather than “how we should behave if we were smarter, thought harder, were more consistent, were all-knowing”).21 Supra Note 18 at 569.


less unequivocal, and this will be discussed in the following section.

Limitations of Applying a Purely Economic Rational Choice Theory

Despite the evident value of RCT, Raiffa22 and others23 realized however that

RCT derives its prescriptive value from the flawed assumption of perfectly homogenous

and rational players, which contrarily undermines its prescriptive power in negotiating

situations instead. Negotiations “[involve] joint decision-making, with parties making

concessions and proposals for agreement that only take effect when accepted by all

sides”24, and thus, unless the interests of the decision makers are extremely compatible,

achieving such a compromise will usually require them to be willing to consider lowering

their standards of what is acceptable if they are to avert an impasse. For an agent to

consider lowering its standards, it must be willing to relax the demand for the best

possible outcome for itself, and instead be willing to settle for an outcome that is merely

good enough, in deference to the interests of others. Accordingly, idée fixe with a pure

RCT approach towards negotiations could be destructive to the negotiation process

instead of optimizing gains. Furthermore, exclusive utility maximizing or self-interest

when negotiating engenders a pessimistic and defensive attitude, thus limiting the ability

of a decision maker to accommodate the interests of others. Consequently, the

negotiability of a decision-maker, particularly in cooperative environments, may be

unnecessarily constrained25.

22 Raiffa, Supra Note 16.23 Graham Bonham et al., “Cognition and International Negotiation: The Historical Recovery of Discursive Space” (1987) 22(1) Cooperation and Conflict 1—19 at 2.24 Susan T. Fiske et al., Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 2, 5th ed., (2010: California, Wiley) at 1003.25 Supra Note 19 at 1.


In addition, there are at least two more fundamental aspects of mainstream RCT

that limit its prescriptive value. First, RCT posits that actors possess exactingly valid and

reliable information about many variables that they rely on to arrive at rational

decisions26. However, in reality, such information is often partial or imperfect27. The

elements, structures, and “rules” of many negotiaton situations are often not fully known

to all the players, and there often exists an information disparity amongst the imperfectly

informed players as well28. Hence, decisions are, in reality, far from optimally rational,

which consequently limits RCT’s prescriptive value. The extent to which the prescriptive

value of RCT is diminished by the unrealistic assumption of perfect information is,

however, dependent upon where the main sources of imperfection are held to lie. If they

are exogenous vis-à-vis the actor and is intrinsic in the situation or environment, then

RCT is robustly defensible, as it is the imperfect world that is to blame, not the decision-

making actor. However, if we presume instead that the information deficiencies are

primarily a product of something inherent in the actor’s own regular cognizing processes

— for instance, in a range of fairly frequent and “standard” cognitive distortions — then

the assumption of the cognizing actor as a rational decision-maker becomes a tenuous

one. This leads to the second fundamental limit of RCT, and therefore an approach that

over-emphasizes RCT.

26 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, vol. 1, Economic Analysis and Public Policy (1982: Massachusetts, MIT Press) at 236; James Sebenius, “Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals” (2009) 25(4) Negotiation Journal 499—465 at 454.27 Simon, ibid; Supra Note 18 at 569.28 Simon, ibid.


An extensive and growing body of research suggests that many cognitive and

emotional biases29 often operate subconsciously to distort rational decision-making30.

Although negotiators normally exhibit purposive behavior, they many times depart

significantly from the “imaginary, idealized, super-rational people without

psyches”31 needed to make RCT analysis work. Thus, even where one party wishes to act

rationally, the other side may not behave as a strategically sophisticated, expected utility

maximizer, thus rendering conventional RCT analysis less applicable. The two

aforementioned biases, viz, cognitive and emotional, will be discussed in turn in the

balance of this essay.

Cognitive Barriers to Rational Behaviour

Decision-makers routinely employ intuitive approaches and mental shortcuts (or

“heuristics”) to reduce the complexity and effort involved in the reasoning process32.

In the context of negotiation, several cognitive biases have been identified to affect most

negotiators33, including fixed-pie assumptions, selective and partisan perception,

egocentrism and optimistic overconfidence.

The tendency to view negotiations as involving the division of limited resources is

29 Henner Gimpel, “Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Process” (2008) Negotiations, Auctions and Market Engineering, L.N.B.I.P. 2, 213—226 at 219 (“A bias, i.e. a systematic decision error, is a systematic deviation of actual human behavior from a prescriptive decision-making model like utility maximization.”).30 Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes (2000: Massachusetts, Belknap Press) at 156 (These forces result from predictable, hard-wired mental predispositions); Robert S. Adler, “Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation” (2005) 20 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 683—774 at 689.31 David Bell et al., Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions (1988: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) at 9.32 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, “Heuristics at the Bargaining Table” (2004) 87 Marq. Law Rev. 794—808 at 796; Daniel Kahnerman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics” (2003) 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449—1475 at 1450.33 Max H. Bazerman et al., “The Decision Perspective to Negotiation” in The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (2005: Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., California, Jossey-Bass) at 53.


the product of a pervasive zero-sum, fixed-pie bias cognitive barrier34. This bias generates

the belief that negotiating parties’ interests are always diametrically opposed35, which

usually results in the view that one party’s gain is invariably another disputant’s loss36.

This bias, it has been contended, is so entrenched that “when negotiators are provided

with information designed to refute the fixed-pie perception, many continue to persevere

in this belief”37.

Negotiators generally find it difficult to disconnect themselves from their

idiosyncratic roles sufficiently to view the negotiations in which they are involved in

objectively38. Partisan perception encourages negotiators to accept their beliefs and

analyses as accurate39 as well as selectively recall and look for information that support

their perspectives40. The corollary is that negotiators are influenced by their partisan

perceptions to overlook contradicting information or disparage it when encountered41.

Consequently, the interests of other negotiating parties are overlooked42.

Biased selective and partisan perceptions cause negotiators to develop and suffer

34 Ibid at 73; Leigh Thompson and Janice Nadler, “Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them” in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, 2nd ed. (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2006: California, Wiley) at 246—247.35 Richard Birke and Craig Fox, “Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements” (1999) 4 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1—57 at 30; Leigh Thompson et al., “The Bittersweet Feeling of Success: An Examination of Social Perception in Negotiation” (1995) 31 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 467—492 at 468.36 Thompson and Nadler, Supra Note 34 at 217.37 Ibid at 468—469.38 Birke and Fox, Supra Note 35 at 66; Lyle A. Brenner et al., “On the Evaluation of One-sided Evidence” (1996) 9 J. of Behav. Decision-Making 59—70 at 59.39 Keith G. Allred, “Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with Cooperation” in The Handbook of Dispute Resolution, Supra Note 33 at 83—84.40 Maurits Barendrecht and Berend R. de Vries, “Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?” (2005) 7 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 83—118 at 98; Roger Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping With Conflict (1994: New York, Penguin (Non-classics)) at 21—31.41 Sheila Heen and Douglas Stone, “Perceptions and Stories” in The Handbook of Dispute Resolution, Supra Note 33 at 346—347.42 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2nd ed. (1991: New York, Houghton Mifflin Company) at 51.


from egocentrism and optimistic overconfidence. Egocentrism describes the tendency of

humans to perceive and predict things through a self-serving lens43. Thompson and

Loewenstein44 found that negotiators had self-serving conceptions of fairness and that

such biases were related to the length of strikes during simulated negotiations. This result

has been well replicated in studies that used financial incentives for performance and

across negotiation contexts45.

The tendency for negotiators to act overconfidently derives from egocentric

biases46. Human beings perceive themselves, their side of a negotiation, and the future in

a considerably more positive light than more realistic assessments would justify47. We

perceive ourselves as being better than others on desirable attributes, and we make

unrealistically positive self-evaluations48. An experiment has shown that showed that

68% of MBA students in a negotiation class predicted that their bargaining outcomes

would fall in the top 25% of the class49. Another survey has also shown that United States

attorneys place themselves in “at least the top 80th percentile on such qualities as ability

to predict the outcome of a case, honesty, negotiation skills, and cooperativeness”50.

43 Bazerman, Supra Note 33 at 52.44 Leigh Thompson and George Loewenstein, “Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict” (1992) 51(2) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 176—197.45 Linda Babcock et al., “Biased Judgment of Fairness in Bargaining” (1995) 85(5) The American Economic Review 1337—1343.46 Bazerman, Supra Note 33 at 56.47 Shelly Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-deceptions and the Healthy Mind (1989: New York, Basic Books).48 David Messick et al., “Why We Are Fairer Than Others” (1985) 21(5) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 480—500.49 Roderick Kramer et al. “Self-enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-esteem and Mood” (1993) 56(1) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 110—133.50 Richard Birke, “Settlement Psychology: When Decision-making Processes Fail” (2000) 18(1) Alternatives to High Cost Litigation 203—210 at 203.


These various cognitive barriers account for a frequent disconnect between

negotiators’ behaviour as predicted by RCT and their actual behaviour, resulting often in

negotiations yielding less than optimally rational outcomes.

Emotional Barriers to Rational Behaviour

Most proponents of the RCT paradigm suggest that emotions should be ignored in

order to negotiate rationally51. It is doubtful, however, whether human thought process

and decision-making that occur during negotiations can function independently of

emotions. Jones and Hughes52 contend that our perception of the world is processed

through numerous older subsystems that are responsible for emotional processing, which

takes place in the cognitive unconscious beyond our direct access. As a result, we have

no thought without emotion, and accordingly, no decisions without emotion53. Numerous

case studies have demonstrated that individuals who have lost cognitive access to their

emotions, whether through disease of injury, are incapable of making even the most

minor decisions. An example is Dr. Antonio Damasio’s documentation of his patient

Elliot54, who had suffered brain damage during surgery. His findings revealed that while

Elliot’s rational brain function was perfectly intact after the procedure, he had lost contact

with his mind’s ability to process emotions, consequently preventing him from

appropriately perceiving situations and from making even the most trivial decisions55.

What this indicates is that emotions, not exclusively the rational mind, play a pivotal role

51 See, e.g., Daniel L. Shapiro, “Negotiating Emotions” (2002) 20(1) Conflict Resol. Q. 67—82; Robert S. Adler et al., “Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger” (1998) 14(2) Negotiation Journal 161—179.52 Wendell Jones and Scott H. Hughes, “Complexity, Conflict Resolution, and How the Mind Works” (2003) 20 Conflict Resol. Q. 485—494.53 Ibid at 490.54 Dr. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (1995: London, Harper Perennial).55 An anecdotal example documented was Elliot’s inability to decide between wearing the brown or black socks.


in making good choices.

Similar sentiment about the role of non-rational aptitudes is echoed within the

psychology community56. Within negotiation literature, some scholars have departed

from the emphasis on rationality by calling attention to the bifurcate role that emotions

perform in the negotiation process. On one hand, according to Shapiro, “[p]ositive

emotions foster problem-solving, creative exploration of ideas and empathy with the

perspective of other parties”57, while on the other hand, negative emotions can “cloud a

party’s judgment and make it more difficult to reach an agreement … [A]nger,

resentment and revenge may motivate [negotiators] more than rationality … [while]

competition, anxiety, fear and envy can complicate bargaining”58. In addition, empirical

research demonstrating how emotional influences matter in negotiation abound. On the

positive emotion front, Carnevale and Isen59 investigated the combined effects of a

negotiator’s mood and of visual access between negotiators on the process and outcome

of an integrative bargaining task. Under the set up, a positive mood was induced in some

experimental subjects by having them view and rate humorous cartoons and giving them

a pad of paper that they could keep as a gift. The result showed that positive affect

facilitated cooperative bargaining in otherwise contentious negotiations. In another

experiment, Baron60 manipulated mood by exposing some subjects to a pleasant odor, and

56 See, for e.g., Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (1983: New York, Basic Books); see also Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ (1995: New York, Bantam Books) at 8 (“In a very real sense we have two minds, one that thinks and one that feels”).57 Shapiro, Supra Note 51 at 70.58 Mnookin et al. Supra Note 30 at 166.59 Peter Carnevale & Alice Isen, “The Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation” (1986) 37(1) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1—13.60 Robert A. Baron, “Environmentally Induced Positive Affect: Its Impact on Self-efficacy, TaskPerformance, Negotiation, and Conflict” (1990) 20 Journal of Applied Psychology 365—384.


found that positive affect elevated pre-negotiation goals and stimulated concession-

making. On the negative emotion front, it has been found, in the context of employer-

employee negotiations, that the higher the anger and lower the compassion felt for each

other, the less the likelihood of achieving joint gains and willingness to work with each

other in the future61. Consistent with this is Pillutla and Murnighan’s finding that an

increase in feelings of anger and unfairness is accompanied by an increase in rejection of

ultimatum offers, even where such offers have greater objective benefits than the

alternative option62.

These experiments indicate that pure rationality as defined by the RCT paradigm

is incongruous with the realities of the negotiation process. The evidence is mounting63,

and it should now be recognized that emotions exert profound influence over negotiators

and therefore cannot be disconnected from completely in the way the RCT school

advocates, particularly considering that negotiations is inherently an interpersonal

communication that “takes place within a relationship64, a context in which emotions

inevitably arise”65. Indeed, as Bierhoff remarked, “a theory of inter-personal behavior is

61 Keith Allred et al., “The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance” (1997) 70(3) Organizational, Behavior and Human Processes 175—187 at 184; Sigal G. Barsade, “The Ripple Effect: Emotional Cognition and its Influence on Group Behaviour” (2002) 47(4) Administrative Science Quarterly 644—675.62 Madan Pillutla & Keith Murnighan, “Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers” (1996) 68(3) Organizational, Behavior and Human Processes 208—224 at 220.63 Joseph P. Daly, “The Effects of Anger on Negotiations over Mergers and Acquisitions” (1991) 7(1) Negotiation Journal 31—39; Max H. Bazerman et al., “The Death and Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiations” in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology (2000: G. Fletcher & M. Clark eds., Massachusetts, Blackwell); George Loewenstein et al., “Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts” (1990) 57(3) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 426—441.64 Michael W. Morris & Dacher Keitner, “How Emotions Work: The Social Functions of Emotional Expression in Negotiations” (2000) 22 Research in Organizational Behaviour 1—50 at 18 (“Negotiations present a number of qualitatively different relational problems to negotiators, including the problems of initiating an exchange with a stranger, protecting oneself from exploitation, claiming value, creating value through efficient trades, locking in a commitment to a settlement, and so forth”).65 Shapiro, Supra Note 51 at 68.


incomplete without inclusion of the feeling states of the actors”66.

Associated to the theme of emotions is that conflict and its resolution are driven not only

by the pursuit of instrumental goals and rational interests, but also by desires for less

tangible things such as dignity, recognition and prestige. This is encapsulated in what

Rothman has called identity-based conflicts, which “arise from the depths of the human

heart rather than the material world”67. Using an example in the arena of international

negotiations, it has been acknowledged that while the Rwanda genocide was attributed in

part to the economic chasm between the Tutsi and the Hutu, fruitful negotiations at

Arusha in 1992 were made possible by adopting a negotiation strategy which targeted at

removing fear, distrust and hatred and restoring trust and confidence among Rwandans of

different ethnic groups68. What this clearly demonstrates is that conflicts rooted in

underlying value differences, identity issues, or unacknowledged emotions cannot be

approached in the same way as disputes over tangible resources, and an approach that

emphasizes the assumptions of RCT may be counter-productive and destructive instead69.

This also highlights the importance of context in negotiations, as what might be a suitable

approach in one situation might not be for another, particularly in international peace

negotiations, which require more than settlements and rational agreements70.

66 Hans W. Bierhoff, “Affect, Cognition, and Prosocial Behaviour in Affect” in Cognition and Social Behaviour (1988: K. Fielder & J. Forgas eds., New York, Psychology Press) at 167.67 Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organisations, and Communities (1997: California, Jossey-Bass Publishers) at 11.68 Ami R. Mpungwe, “Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process” in Mark Malan, Wither Peacekeeping in Africa? (1999, ISS Monograph 36, South Africa).69 Robert S. Adler et al., “Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger” (1998) 14(2) Negotiation Journal 161—179.70 See, for e.g., Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson ““Sticking One’s Neck Out”: Reducing the Mistrust in Sri Lanka’s Peace Negotiations” (2006) 22(4) Negotiation Journal 367—387 (The authors suggest, in the context of the Sri Lankan peace negotiations, that the building of trust is an essential component in any meaningful restart of the ceasefire negotiations that had stalemated since 2003).


Conclusion

While RCT is a useful general approach to negotiations, there is danger in placing

too much emphasis on it in view of the foregoing limitations. RCT overlooks the

complexities of the human brain thus, RCT should serve only as a guide to the

negotiations process, and not be taken as gospel.


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