The myth of choice in education ‘quasi-markets’:The nature and implications of the emergence of

private schools in Punjab, Pakistan

Renwick Irvine

Dissertation

MPhil Development Studies

Institute of Development Studies

1st September 2004

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ABSTRACT

Pakistan is experiencing a dramatic transformation in the way basic education services

are being delivered due to an unprecedented growth in low-cost private schools. This

paper analyses this phenomenon from the perspective of choice in the quasi-market, in

which parents have to bear the costs of schooling. It first examines the factors driving

the growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the supply side. Secondly, the research

assesses how the quasi-market is manifesting itself within a specific environment.

Thirdly it explores how choice is perceived from the demand side through investigating

parental preferences. This paper shows that poor quality and differentiated access may

result from relying on imperfect markets to deliver services in a highly unequal, feudal

society. It reveals that choice is a myth for poor families in a non-universal education

context such as Pakistan. This poses considerable problems for how government can and

should respond.

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CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS.........................................................................................5

LIST OF ANNEXES......................................................................................................................5LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................6EXCHANGE RATE (AT TIME OF RESEARCH).................................................................................6

ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS 7

PREFACE 8

CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT AND TRENDS OF PRIVATE PROVISION IN PAKISTAN 10

1.1 THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION PROVISION IN PAKISTAN: THE SEEDS OF PRIVATE EXPANSION?............................................................................................................................101.2 AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE PROVISION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. . . .121.3 PROMOTING PRIVATE PROVISION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL....................................13

CHAPTER 2: CHOICE IN EDUCATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 15

2.1 THE RISE OF THE MARKET IN EDUCATION: THE BASIS FOR CHOICE?..........................152.1.1. EXPLAINING THE NATURE AND EXPANSION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS...............................162.1.2 CHOICE AND RESPONSIVENESS IN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETS...................................172.2 MAKING CHOICES: RATIONAL AND PREDICTABLE OR CONTINGENT AND ARBITRARY? AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK...............................................................................................192.2 COUNTER POSITIONS TO THE RISE OF THE MARKET....................................................212.2.1 QUESTIONING THE MARKET IN EDUCATION..................................................................212.2.2 ACHIEVING BETTER EDUCATION? VALUE PERSPECTIVES ON QUALITY..........................222.2.3 WHOSE RIGHTS MATTER IN CHOOSING SCHOOLS?........................................................242.2.4 DEBUNKING MARKETS: EQUITY AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION PROVISION.............24

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCHING THE EDUCATION MARKET 27

3.1 RESEARCHING POLITICS AND POLICIES........................................................................273.2 SELECTION OF SITES FOR FIELD RESEARCH.................................................................283.3 CONSTRUCTING THE ‘QUASI-MARKET’ IN THE RESEARCH...........................................293.4 ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................................................293.5 EXPLORING SCHOOL RESPONSE IN THE PROVIDER DOMAIN........................................293.6 EXAMINING CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES........................................................................303.7 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH.......................................................31

CHAPTER 4: POLICY RESPONSES IN A HIGHLY POLITICISED CONTEXT 33

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4.1 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM......................................334.2 LOCAL ELITES AND DEVOLUTION: INCENTIVES FOR SUPPORTING EDUCATION?.........344.3 ENCOURAGING PRIVATE SECTOR OR LOSING CONTROL?.............................................35

CHAPTER 5: SCHOOL RESPONSE: SUPPLY-SIDE DRIVEN GROWTH OR RESPONDING TO DEMAND? 38

5.1 UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIVENESS..............................................................................385.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PROVISION..................................................................385.3 THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL........................................395.4 PROFIT-MAKING ENTITIES: INCOME-ENHANCING AS A PRIME CONCERN?...................405.5 SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT: CHIMERA OR REALITY?...............................................435.6 DECEPTIVE APPEARANCES?..........................................................................................46

CHAPTER 6: PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE: CONSUMER DEMAND? 49

6.1 RETHINKING CHOICE....................................................................................................496.2 DEMAND FOR EDUCATION ACROSS THE SPECTRUM: VALUING EDUCATION.................496.3 SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION MEDIATING CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY............................516.4 PRIVATE SCHOOLS: PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GIRLS?...................................536.5 CHOOSING BETWEEN OPTIONS: WHO MAKES THE DECISION?......................................546.5.1 COST: “A SACRIFICE WE HAVE TO MAKE”....................................................................556.5.2 THE CLOSER THE BETTER? THE BENEFITS OF THE PRIVATE SCHOOL NEXT DOOR..........576.6 EXPLORING PARENTAL PERCEPTIONS OF QUALITY......................................................586.6.1 PEER-GROUP REFERENCE AND (NON)INFORMATION......................................................586.6.2 TEACHERS: GOOD BAROMETERS OF QUALITY?.............................................................606.6.3 PARENTAL PRIORITIES: DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH OR TEACHING AND LEARNING?..........606.6.4 MINIMUM FACILITIES: ‘THE CHILDREN CAN BEAR IT’...................................................626.7 CHILDREN’S DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES: “A SCHOOL SHOULD LOOK LIKE A SCHOOL”

636.8 CHOICE: SUBJECT TO EVER-PRESENT TRADE-OFFS......................................................646.9 THE MYTH OF CHOICE..................................................................................................65

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE MYTH OF CHOICE 67

7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT PROVISION AND POLICY.........................................687.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POTENTIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH PRIVATE SCHOOLS....................687.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMAND-SIDE CHOICE...................................................................697.4 WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MYTH OF CHOICE.........................................................70

Bibliography 72

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List of tables, figures and maps

Table 1: Gross enrolment ratio in Pakistan in primary schools: change in the 1990s

11

Table 2: Typology of potential school responses to the quasi-market 18

Figure 1: Theorising constructions of choice in the quasi-market through spatial domains

20

Figure 2: Perspectives of quality spectrum 23

Map 1: Sheikhupura: location within Pakistan 28

Table 3: Sample characteristics by school type 31

Table 4: Taxonomy of providers catering to the urban and rural poor 40

Table 5: Summary statistics from mapping by school type 42

List of Annexes

Annex 1 List of persons interviewed 78-80

Annex 2 School mapping with principals questionnaire 81

Annex 3 Education officials semi-structured interview pro-forma 82-83

Annex 4 Parents’ focus group discussion guiding questions 84

Annex 5 PRA with children guidelines 85-87

Annex 6 Teachers’ focus group discussion guiding questions 88

Annex 7 Income, expenditure and profit of a typical middle private school

89

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

ADB Asian Development BankBPS Basic Pay ScaleCRC Convention of the Rights of the ChildDCO District Coordination OfficerDFID Department for International DevelopmentDO District OfficerDEO District Education OfficerEDO Executive District OfficerFBS Federal Bureau of StatisticsFGD Focus Group DiscussionFS Female studentFT Female teacherGBHS Government Boys High SchoolGBPS Government Boys Primary SchoolGGHS Government Girls High SchoolGGPS Government Girls Primary SchoolGoP Government of PakistanHT Head TeacherJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMoE Ministry of Education (Pakistan)MSU Multi Donor Support UnitMT Male teacherMS Male studentP-ERSP Punjab Education Sector Reform Plan PIHS Pakistan Integrated Household SurveyPPP Public-Private PartnershipPRA Participatory Rural Appraisal NFE Non-Formal Education (Centre)NGO Non Governmental OrganisationRs. Pakistani RupessSkp. Sheikhupura District, PunjabSMC School Management CommitteeSSC Secondary School CertificateSTR Student Teacher RatioUC Union CouncilUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganisationUPE Universal Primary Education

Exchange rate (at time of research)

Approx. Rs. 100 = £ 1.00

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ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS

The people who contributed in the process of researching and commenting on this paper

are too numerous to mention. Thanks must go to all those who gave their time and

experience in interviews and discussion groups. Saeed-ul-Hassan and Naima Saeed

helped at every stage of the research in Pakistan, acting as collaborators, translators, and

friends. Mohammad Younas and Abid Hussain Gill from Sudhaar-ITA deserve a special

mention as they provided not only a floor to sleep on for six weeks but imparted their

knowledge of local issues. Amna Wirk and Saima Zarina helped facilitate the PRA

exercises, and provided many tips for working with children in Pakistan. Baela Jamil

(ITA) was a constant source of support and constructive criticism. Mark Poston (DFID-

Pakistan) made context-relevant observations. DFID-Pakistan provided financial support

for a study, out of which this emerged. Thanks must go to my supervisor Ramya

Subrahmanian and to Robert Chambers, Pauline Rose, Alex Shankland, Joanna Wheeler

and Emma Williams for comments and advice. Needless to say, all errors are my own

and the opinions expressed herein reflect that of the author.

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PREFACE

Pakistan is experiencing a dramatic transformation in the way basic education services

are being delivered. The size of the private sector in education has more than doubled in

the 1990s, encompassing, at a conservative estimate, 30% of education intuitions by the

end of the decade, the majority at primary level (MSU 2002). Concurrently, enrolment

in the government schools has been declining (MSU 2002). Yet poverty in Pakistan,

over the same period, has been growing (Hussein et al 2003: 45-47). The conundrum of

why and in what way private school provision has expanded is explored in this paper by

examining choice through the nexus of supply and demand dynamics in the local

environment.1 Primary school level in the province of Punjab, where the growth has

been most marked, is the focus of this paper, based on empirical research conducted over

a six week period (Andrabi et al 2002).

This unheralded expansion seems to take to an extreme the global pattern of

marketisation, the adoption of free market practices in the running of schools, and

privatisation, of both school ownership and administration, in education (Kwong 2000;

Kitaev 1999; Carnoy 1999; ADB 2003). The theoretical underpinnings of the rise of the

market are premised on improving efficiency, enhancing choice and delivering better

quality education. The policy context in Pakistan of promoting public private

partnerships in the state system and encouraging market entry to private schools appears

to lie firmly within this trend. However, the development of a quasi-market in education

provision, which is predicated on parents paying for school and making choices between

options, could have serious consequences (Kitaev 1999). This paper shows that poor

quality and differentiated access may result from relying on imperfect markets to deliver

services in a highly unequal, quasi-feudal society.

The central research question which this research addresses is unpacking the myth of

choice in a context where universal education provision is non-existent and poor people

lack the ability, either financial or otherwise, to exert choice. To do so, the paper

explores three interrelated questions of why private schools have expanded, what

characteristics they have and how they provide a service to parents. It first examines the 1 Private schools are taken to be for-profit institutions which are owned and managed privately.

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factors driving the growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the supply side, requiring

analysis of the prevailing policy environment and political economy of education.

Secondly, the research assesses how the quasi-market is manifesting itself within a

specific environment, and what characteristics it takes. Thirdly it seeks to understand

how choice is perceived from the demand side through investigating parental

preferences. By focusing on two overlapping domains, of producers (school ‘owners’)

and consumers (parents and children), synergies and dissonances in perspective are

highlighted. How they intersect to create particular patterns of market demand and

supply have consequences for the type of education offered, to whom it is accessible and

why it takes the form it does. The issues that have been uncovered in the empirical work,

although based on a limited sample size, reveal unexpected findings, making it

contribution to knowledge on the implications of extensive private school provision both

in Pakistan and for other developing countries.

The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter one tracks the historical trends and maps

the current education policy framings in Pakistan. Chapter two analyses the rise of the

market and the existent critiques, offering a framework through which the growth and

implications of private provision can be understood. Chapter three summarises the

innovative methodological approach utilised to explore these dimensions. Chapter four

unpicks the conventional understandings of the market by showing how the policy

framings play out in the local environment. Chapter five explores how schools respond

to the market from the supply side. Chapter six unpacks the perspectives on choice from

the demand side, juxtaposing parental choice with the experience of children in the

classroom. Chapter seven concludes, drawing together the threads of the argument to

provide some tentative policy recommendations and highlight key areas for further

research.

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CHAPTER 1: Context and trends of private provision in Pakistan

The availability of school choices are determined by the nature of education markets.

Markets do not develop in a lacuna but are subject to historical developments and the

present educational supply-demand dynamics mediated by policy (Kitaev 1999: 61).

This chapter explores the context and trends of education provision in Pakistan.

1.1 The politics of education provision in Pakistan: the seeds of private expansion?

The historical idiosyncrasies of Pakistan and education policies adopted at various stages

have deeply affected the nature of private provision (Bengali 1999). At Independence in

1947, Pakistan was, in essence, an artificial country carved out of British India (Ziring

2003). State-driven mass education, as a mechanism to consolidate a country made up of

diverse ethnic groups and different languages was targeted as a priority in education

planning (Bengali 1999). However, insufficient political will to effectively address the

question of providing mass education resulted in inadequate public provision (Warwick

and Reimers 1995; Hoodbhoy 1998).

Private provision, by contrast was substantial in the period prior to the nationalisation of

schools (1972-73) by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Jamil 2003; Jimenez and Tan 1987).

Although this policy was subsequently reversed under General Zia ul Haq, private

schools took time to respond to new opportunities (ibid.). The policy of promoting and

mixing secular and religious education under the Zia regime, together with the influx of

Afghan refugees, enabled madaris to flourish alongside private schools (Nayyer 1998).2

Jimenez and Tan (1987) tracked this nascent growth in private provision, but did not

foresee the exponential rise in for-profit private education that has subsequently

occurred.

Whilst the expenditure on education remained low in the 1990s (at about 2.7% GNP

throughout the 1990s, compared to an average of 3.8% GNP for other low income 2 Religious schools in Pakistan, in Arabic, madrassah (pl madaris), have also grown exponentially from the 1980s, though it is thought for different reasons (Nayyer 1998). These are included in the study as they provide an alternative for parents, but remain on the periphery of the discussion due to the limited sample size.

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countries during the same period), Pakistan has one of the highest birth rates in the

world, with the average family having six children (Lloyd et al 2002). The result is that

the population of 5-14 year olds has grown from 20.3 million in 1980 to 36.8 million in

2000 (ibid.). Although official figures, notoriously problematic in Pakistan, suggest that

gross enrolment has increased during this period (table 1), given that over a quarter of

children never attend school, considerable shortfalls remain.

Table 1: Gross enrolment ratio in Pakistan in primary schools: change in the

1990s3

YearGross Enrolment Ratio

Both Male Female

1990 60.7 81.5 39

2000/2001 73 84 62Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://www.uis.unesco.org)

Poverty has been recognised as a key constraint to limiting school participation, with

35% of the population living below the poverty line and 15% on the margins (Lloyd et

al 2002). Social demand for education was also considered low (Gazdar 1999). In spite

of this, it seems likely that supply, through government schools, has been outstripped by

demand, as private school growth demonstrates.

The mushrooming of alternative provision throughout the 1990s is unprecedented.

According to Pakistan Integrated Household Survey data, in 1983 there were only 3,300

private primary and secondary schools in the four main provinces, yet by 2000 this had

increased over ten-fold (Andrabi et al 2002). Moreover, from being a predominately

urban phenomenon in the 1980s according to Jimenez and Tan (1987), recent evidence

suggests that private education provision is penetrating rural areas, especially in the

Punjab (Andrabi et al 2002). Punjab been subject to the highest growth out of all

provinces, with over 32% of primary school students enrolled in private schools

(Alderman et al 2001; MSU 2002). A recent survey indicates that there are

approximately 2,700 government and 3,400 private institutions providing education in

Sheikhupura District, the focus-area of this study (Punjab EMIS, forthcoming). The

3 Net enrolment figures are unavailable, but are likely to reveal an even bleaker picture as to the state of education in Pakistan.

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majority of these schools are low-cost, small private schools which appear to be catering

to all socio-economic echelons (Andrabi et al 2002).

However, it is unlikely that this kind of exponential growth can be attributed solely to

excess demand. Politically, little has changed in Pakistan as Heward (1999) asserts that

“despite fifty years of independence, Pakistan’s democracy is fragile, its power centres

controlled by tiny feudal, military and industrial elites”. A rigid hierarchical

administrative structure in the education bureaucracy predominates. As a result there

seems to have been a collective sigh of fatigue at trying to make state education work,

the problems of which have been extensively documented; corruption, bureaucratic

bottlenecks, patronage appointments of teachers, strong yet conservative teacher unions,

teacher absenteeism, ghost schools, poor quality of facilities and missing facilities to

name but a few (Warwick and Reimers 1995). Investment during the 1990s was pushed

through the Social Action Programmes (SAP-I and SAP-II); widely recognised as

having failed to meet their original objectives, school provision remains inadequate

(Gazdar 1999; interview Education Consultant 29/04/05). This is borne out in a low

internal efficiency (high repetition and drop-out rates), pointing to the poor standards of

government schools (UNESCO 2000). Therefore the limitations of the public system

appear to have also prompted the growth of private schools.

1.2 An enabling environment for private provision at the National level

Education in Pakistan is firmly on the policy agenda at national level. Progressive policy

work undertaken in recent years, manifesting itself in the Education For All National

Policy agenda (Ministry of Education 2003), coupled with the PRSP and 2001 Local

Government Ordinances for devolution, has thrown up multiple options to reform a

moribund state education system (MFP 2001). However, the influence of the World

Bank in the education sector is shifting the discourse to promoting private alternatives:

most of the recent studies on private provision have been funded by or attached to the

Bank (Alderman et al 1999 and 2002; Andrabi et al 2002; Burnett 2002; Kardar 2001;

MSU 2002).4 Public-private partnership (PPP) is the new yet ill-defined mantra heard

4 Significant multilateral and bilateral donor investment and a pro-market Government appear to be pushing reform down this path.

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reverberating within the policy environment as a result (GoP 2004). Outlined in the

national policy is “a strategic role” for the private sector: what this might be in practice,

however, remains to be seen (Jamil 2003; GoP 2004).5

1.3 Promoting private provision at the Provincial level

The Government of Punjab has, over the last two years, made significant efforts to

increase provision of government schooling and augment community participation in the

running of schools (interview provincial official 07/06/04).6 The setting up of school

councils or school management committees (SMCs) is an attempt to involve

communities in supporting the local government schools (Khan 2003). The problem of a

lack of state responsiveness to local demands still remains, however. Resultantly, the

government is looking to divest, delegate and devolve government involvement in at

least the direct provision of services, while providing an encouragement to the private

sector.7

The Punjab Education Sector Reform Plan (P-ERSP), the current policy framework, has

earmarked funds allocated per district for government school improvement. This has

developed alongside devolution to district level to facilitate more efficient service

delivery (Jamil 2003).8 The P-ESRP has taken steps to encourage private provision by

providing a package of incentives which includes the provision of land free of cost or at

concessional rates in rural areas; utilities such as electricity and gas assessed at non-

commercial rates; a liberal grant of charter; exemption of custom duties on import of

educational equipment; and exemption of 50% income tax to private sector institutions

for faculty, management and support staff (GoP 2003).

5 One example is the new provincial and national Education Foundations, designed to enhance private sector involvement, but have struggled to make a significant impact (interview government officials 16/06/04 and 07/06/04).6 Education policy is largely determined at Provincial level, rather than Federal. 7 Programmes such as “Adopt-a-school”, in which NGOs manage government schools, and the Community Participation Programme (CPP), which requires the community to run upgraded high schools in the afternoon on government school premises, can be seen as delegation by franchise (Najam 2003). See Savas (2000) for a discussion of these forms of privatisation.8 Devolution is attempting to shift responsibility for delivering services from provincial to lower levels. District, and sub-district, tehsil and union councils level have been reformed to create new opportunities for political representation and power sharing (Nadvi and Robinson 2004). However, devolution is also about creating a constituency for the incumbent President Musharraf, following the coup d’etat in 1999 (interview education consultant 15/05/04).

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The devolution programme, encouragement to the private sector and community

participation are conflated in policy thinking, forming a logic for less direct government

involvement (GoP 2004). How these three policy framings, discernible at the macro and

meso levels, play out at the local level are explored in chapter 4. In order to explain the

rationale for adopting pro-private policies, they need to be situated within broader

international trends.

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CHAPTER 2: Choice in education: a framework for analysis

It is no coincidence that Pakistan is facing a transformation in terms of how educational

services are delivered: it is a reflection of global shifts towards privatisation and

marketisation as “it is now increasingly difficult to understand education in any context

without reference to the global forces that influence policy and practice” (Crossly 2000

cited in Apple, 2001: 409). This chapter tracks the rise of the market and unpacks how

choice and competition should operate. A framework for analysing choice in Pakistan is

subsequently developed and the limitations of choice in a non-universal education

context examined.

2.1 The rise of the market in education: the basis for choice?

Education provision, previously delivered by private actors, became subject to state-

driven control over the 20th century as it became recognised as playing a pivotal role in

national and economic development, especially in newly independent states in the post-

colonial era (Brown et al 1997; Green 1997). Yet in recent decades, the idea of state-

delivered universal education provision has been challenged from two directions (Brown

et al 1997). Firstly, as low public spending and tight fiscal policies became the norm in

economic policy in the 1990s, “the cornerstone of New Right education policy has been

the introduction of market competition into all the education sectors” (Brown et al,

1997: 21). Secondly, the state was seen as failing to deliver appropriate services

efficiently due to pernicious state monopoly (Offe 1984). As a solution, markets are

heralded as being “natural and neutral, and governed by effort and merit” (Apple 2001:

413): parental choice is a central tenet of the education market.

The rise of market-based education policies originated in Western countries which had

already secured universal coverage (Carnoy 1999) but is being exported to developing

countries, such as Pakistan, where universalism is a still a distant goal (Gazdar 1999). As

a result, education is “increasingly considered a quasi-market (Levacic 1995) requiring

families and communities to pay for education – directly or indirectly – as a social

service” (Kitaev 1999: 41). By purchasing education as a commodity, parents (not

children, importantly) are considered to have a ‘choice’, based on school selection in the

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quality and quantity (i.e. number of years) of the service. Moreover, as the market has

shifted the construction of citizens from being welfare beneficiaries to contributing

consumers (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999), individual responsibilities of parents tend to

be emphasised rather than common entitlements or state guarantees in accessing

education. Atomised choice between schools, determined by price, is the outcome.

This appears paradoxical given the prevailing international focus on achieving the

Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015.

The international debates over UPE revolve around financing (UNESCO 2002): at the

national levels the focus is on increased private sector involvement, the creation of

internal and external markets in education and promoting community participation to

plug resource gaps (World Bank 2003b; Mundy 2001; Klees 2002). Bringing services

closer to the poor through decentralisation (Lauglo 1995) and enhancing ownership over

schools through community participation (Bray 2000) are increasingly being conflated

with private provision (Whitty et al 1998; World Bank 2003a).

Private provision, governed by market principles, is designed to bring multiple benefits:

efficiency improvements through competition, a removal of market distortions created

by the state monopoly, increase cost effectiveness of schooling, and ultimately improve

student performance who (or whose parents) value their education more because they are

paying for it (Jimenez and Lockheed 1995). This assumption, based on principal-agent

theory, is that benefit is obtained from a “separation of purchaser from provider and an

element of choice between the providers” by circumventing the state (Levacic 1995,

cited in Whitty et al 1998; World Bank 2003a). What choice actually exists, and how it

has developed, is vital for understanding whether the expected benefits materialise.

2.1.1. Explaining the nature and expansion of private schools

At this juncture, a clearer definition of what constitutes ‘private’ schools needs to be

made. Schools can be private in terms of ownership, management and in a major share

of funding and expenditure (Kitaev 1999: 43-44), yet as Bray (1997) points out,

‘privatisation’ can span a very wide spectrum of schools, including for-profit and not-

for-profit types. Religious, NGO and community schools are likely have different

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characteristics to profit-motivated private schools (Kitaev 1999). This paper focuses on

low cost for-profit schools, the major growth area in Pakistan.

Explanations for the expansion of private provision may be due to both demand and

supply side factors, as illustrated in the case of Pakistan (Kitaev, 1999: 59). On the

demand side, two distinct but overlapping rationales can be discerned; firstly, un-met

demand from gaps in access and coverage; and secondly, diversified demand of parents

for particular schooling conditions, values and quality. On the supply side, three causes

are plausible: firstly, a redundant qualified teaching force creating a potential specific

supply; secondly, efforts by profit-making school managers focused on specific target

groups of population; and thirdly, as a result of inadequate public supply or a deliberate

government policy to reduce pressure upon the existing schools. Several of these reasons

may overlap. The reasons behind the expansion, moreover, determine to a large degree

what characteristics private provision takes.

Thus, it is important to understand why these markets have developed in context in order

to arrive at some conclusions about what, if anything needs to or can be done about

them. Government response to this phenomenon varies between restriction and

promotion (Kitaev 1999). Most governments strike a balance between tighter control to

maintain standards (through curriculum and evaluation) and lighter regulation to enable

the private sector to flourish (Tooley 1999). In Pakistan, private schools are being

positively encouraged by providing incentives and removing barriers to market entry

(Jamil 2003) while excessive regulation and bureaucratic controls, which stifle private

provision, are being removed (Kardar 2001). This is because private provision in

Pakistan is seen to be providing a ‘choice’ for even poor families (Andrabi et al 2001).

2.1.2 Choice and responsiveness in education quasi-markets

The idea of choice, the focal point of this paper, is inextricably linked to the functioning

of the market. Gintis (1996) outlines several preconditions of the existence of an

effective system of school choice and with it the effectiveness of promoting markets.

Choice is effective only if there are several alternative suppliers available to a significant

proportion of families. Moreover, consumers need to be able to accurately assess the

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quality of the goods and services they purchase. Thirdly, consumers must be the best

judge of their needs and these needs are reflected in their options. Finally, a competitive

system is socially efficient if the good is a ‘private good’. Through this, choice is shown

to result from the nexus of both demand-side issues and the ability to respond to this

demand on the supply side.

Response to demand operates in two main ways in a competitive environment: firstly the

creation of new institutions or redefinition of existing ones to cater for unmet needs and

preferences, thereby providing alternatives, discussed above (Kitaev 1999). Secondly,

internal change within schools to attract and retain pupils occurs. This can be categorised

by the typology outlined below (Woods 1994).

Table 2: Typology of potential school responses to the quasi-market

School responses Objective

Competitive responses To increase or maintain number of children at the school

Substantive change Attract students through quality improvements

Environment scanning Understand consumer demand and recognising market niche of school

Promotional activity Activities to raise profile of school to attract students

Income enhancing and efficiency-incrementing

To maximise the income from revenue streams and rationalise expenditure

Political responses Lobbying at local level for changes to rules etc.

Collaborative responses Working together

(Source: Adapted from Woods 1994: 125)

The behaviour of private school owners is influenced by the market, as funding is

demand-driven. They try to understand what parents want, presenting and promoting

their schools accordingly. Moreover, owners attempt to enhance their income and

improve the efficiency of the school by managing their staff better, thereby retaining and

developing a competitive edge as they have autonomy over decisions (Chubb and Moe

1990). They may also use political connections as a mechanism to access funds, lobby

for change of, or even circumvent regulation. The collaborative aspect means joining

forces (with other providers) to complement each other, perhaps even providing services

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together. Whether private schools in Pakistan respond in this manner is explored in

Chapter 5.

It is upon satisfying these assumptions of choice and competition that the advantages of

the market system are hung, which are critiqued below. A framework for analysis is

constructed to show how the choice in the quasi-market can be understood.

2.2 Making choices: rational and predictable or contingent and arbitrary? An analytical framework

Parental ability to exercise choice is critical to the functioning of the market. Quasi-

markets in education are based on rational choice assumptions, yet as this paper will

show, questions of choice are not driven by the neat individual rational calculus of

classical economics, as it entails “messy, multidimensional, intuitive and seemingly

irrational or non-rational elements of choice” (Gerwitz et al, 1995: 6). Choice of what,

in terms of the availability and quality of alternatives, and for whom, are of prime

importance. Whilst certain assumptions can be made as to what significant factors, either

directive or contingent, might be important for parents, they will be both contextually-

specific and heterogeneous.

In quasi-markets, children will tend to “attend the school which is nearest and the most

affordable” (Kitaev 199: 101). Choice is dependent on the resources of the family and

the availability of schooling options. However, quality and perceptions of quality of

schooling, and what education is believed to deliver, is an important variable in

choosing. Expected benefits are not only direct material outcomes but also predicated on

social expectations and aspirations. In Pakistan, caste, class, gender, and birth order of

child may all be contingent factors to school choice. Informational factors, relationships

and dominant discourses about education play a key role.

As Gerwitz et al suggest it is “(o)nly by relating choice, response and distributional

outcomes together in particular local market settings will it begin to be possible to

understand, evaluate and theorise the education market as a social, educational and

political phenomenon” (1995: 3). In order to do this a spatial approach is helpful, as

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represented in figure 1. This portrays not discrete domains but interlocking and

interdependent spheres that shape choice. The overlapping area represents the confluence

of all the factors in decision-making outlined above, and potentially unexpected others,

dictating choice, or rather, as will be shown, the myth of choice.

Figure 1: Theorising constructions of choice in the quasi-market through spatial domains

The consumer domain represents parents as the active (and quasi-independent) chooser

within the household, in which intra-household power dynamics shape decision-making

(Kabeer 1994).9 Providers are schools, or rather education options to which parents in a

locality could conceive of sending their children.10 Likely responses have been

expounded above in table 2. This diagram indicates that both schools and parents must

be situated within the mirco and macro environments. The micro domain is the locality,

catchment area or community, which has the traces of history, geography, local politics,

socio-economic situation, as well as the socio-cultural aspects within an area or

community. Far from being a neat division, it is contested, with communities being

neither homogenous nor easily defined. Here, particular policy framings get played out:

9 The very concept of the nuclear household is recognised as an artificial construct. However, for simplicity, it will be used here. 10 As a caveat, further options such as child labour and not sending the children to school are important considerations. It is estimated that 9-10 million children of school-going age are out-of-school in Pakistan (interview Ameena Khan, ILO 15/06/04). This is beyond the scope of the current paper, and subject to different debates.

Macro environment

Micro environment of locality

Consumer domain(Parents)

Factors in decision-making

Producer domain(Schools)

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in Pakistan, the emphasis on encouraging community participation in government

schools, devolution and the promotion of private options all heavily influence the local

availability and quality of schools. There exists a significant overlap between the

community and the market, as all viable options for schooling (the market) are located

within a particular community, especially in rural areas. This implies that not only are

they mutually-dependent but also that they are likely to reflect the politics and

inequalities within the community.

The macro environment encapsulates the broader policy framework regarding education,

from the rise of the market and the pressure to achieve international targets, to the

availability of concessions, incentives and the regulatory environment which have been

explained in chapter 1. Through this framework, it will be possible to explore how

parental ability to exert choice is determined within a non-universal context such as

Pakistan.

2.2 Counter positions to the rise of the market

Despite the strong claims for promoting the market in education, two different types of

argument exist. One is an economist’s argument that is not critical of markets per se, but

questions whether markets exist for education, given its public/social good elements.

The second raises more fundamental questions about how markets operate from a

sociological perspective. It raises questions as to whether private schools necessarily

provide better quality, if parents are the best judges of their children’s needs and how

education markets can operate in highly politicised environments.

2.2.1 Questioning the market in education

Education can be seen ‘quasi-public good’, rather than a private good, which has spill-

over benefits as well as private returns (Colclough 1996). Accordingly, the state should

invest due to the externalities or social benefits of education (Jimenez and Lockheed

1995). Investing in human resources is recognised as a crucial aspect to poverty

alleviation (ibid.). This is especially true at primary level when the social returns are

highest (and private returns less significant). The market, by contrast, cannot guarantee

the provision of all goods, as a right on a fair basis to all citizens (Colclough 1996). At

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the macro level, privatisation may result in “a highly differentiated school-structure

which closely reflects the relative prosperity of different communities and geographical

areas” (Colclough 1993: 175).

At the household level, many studies show that “income and level of education of

parents turn out to be significant determinate of education spending propensity” (Kitaev

1999: 104). Purchasing power allows parents to select the ‘better’ schools for their

children: but some parents lack the resources to choose (Fowler 1992 cited in Kitaev

1999: 106). The ghettoisation following this exodus of more affluent children from the

“poorer” schools is a serious problem that needs to be tackled not at the local level but

nationally (Kwong 2000: 92). Some have argued that the demand for education is

inelastic (less than unity) with respect to marginal increases in price (Jimenez 1987 cited

in Colclough 1996). However this fails to take into account the differing elasticities

among user groups, as for poor families the demand is highly elastic, thus a marginal

increase in costs creates a tendency to withdraw from the purchase of that good. As a

result, education is likely to be undersupplied by the market and access to schools will be

uneven (Gintis 1996).

2.2.2 Achieving better education? Value perspectives on quality

Exponents of private schools argue that it improves the quality of education provided,

and increases the choice that parents have (Chubb and Moe 1990). Potential conflict

between commercial considerations and wider educational and social concerns exists in

promoting private schools, however.11 Merely aggregating individual preference may

not lead to a better education system, which plays a role in cohering the social and

transforming society (Green 1997; Kumar forthcoming). This appears to corroborate

Whitty et al’s (1998: 97) analysis that “(g)overnment policy, at the state or national

level, is about overseeing performance and consolidating cultural preferences. A

proliferation of alternative schools will not only be more difficult to monitor but foster

modes of teaching and learning that produce ‘inappropriate’ outcomes”. Where the

expansion of private schools is unplanned, leading to “privatisation by default” (Bray

11 The motivation driving private schools is contentious as “even proprietors of entrepreneurial schools are reluctant to admit that they are motivated primarily by profit” (Kwong 1997 cited in Kitaev 1999).

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1996 cited in Kitaev 1999), and the government lacks requisite control for securing

quality, competition and choice may have deleterious results.

Understanding values of quality is the core of education and imbues parental decision-

making (Gerwitz et al 1995). Values are shaped by an interpretative process which

continually absorbs and responds to the surrounding environment, both immediate

(family, locale) and more distant (media, policy environment), making the understanding

of how choice is made, and how quality in education is defined a reflexive process.12

Therefore value perspectives of education dictate the aspects of quality emphasised.

Quality is notoriously hard to pin down (Kumar forthcoming). Thus, rather than

determine quality measurements this paper adopts a value perspective approach to

quality along a subjective spectrum (Woods et al 1998). The instrumental-academic

perspective places an emphasis on the acquisition of particular skills resulting in

quantifiable outcomes, in which education is seen as a means to a particular end.

Conversely, the intrinsic-personal, or social ‘value’ perspective, encompasses the

amalgam of factors which affect the development of a child, such as behavioural,

atmospheric, etc. Figure 2 outlines these perspectives as a spectrum, along which it

should be possible to situate discourses in policies and opinions of school owners,

parents, children and teachers alike.13

Figure 2: Perspectives of quality spectrum

Instrumental-academic Intrinsic-personal value Output-orientated Process-orientatedQualification focused Whole child focused

These distinctions are of prime importance in understanding which aspects of quality are

being ‘improved’ as a result of competition. Private schools have been documented to

12 As Giddens (1984) points out, the recursive character of modern life, in which the medium and outcome of social life are irrevocably intertwined, makes identifying causality and direction of causality problematic.13 Discourse in here understood as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities (Hajer 1995 cited in Keely and Scoones 1999: 24).

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respond to the demands of parents for academic results, who are paying for education,

skewing it towards the instrumental-academic end of the spectrum (Gerwitz et al 1995).

However, parental ‘satisfaction’ is a relative notion, crucially linked to expectations and

aspirations that are mediated through symbols and meanings (Rampal 2004; Schwalbe et

al 2000). Thus how quality is construed needs to be unpacked. This implies that ‘what

values’ as much as ‘whose values’ are fundamental questions in determining quality.

2.2.3 Whose rights matter in choosing schools?

The right balance of rights is satisfied by no education system. The rights of parents to

choose, based on individual freedom, counterpoised to the rights of citizens to education

with the duty of public authority in providing free and comprehensive education is the

crux of this tension.14 Nuancing this, the rights of the child imply that their ‘best interest’

be protected, but who will protect them better, the state or their parents?15 Market theory

assumes that individuals are the best judges of what is in their own interest; parents,

however, are not clearly and indisputably the best judges of their child’s interests (Alder

1993). Adopting a rights perspective to the private schools issue, the fine balance

between preserving the rights of parents and children to choose with the entitlement of

every child to a ‘good’ school needs to be achieved. Whether markets or the state

balance this better is the issue discussed below.

2.2.4 Debunking markets: Equity and the politics of education provision

Markets are, as Ball (1990: 8) observes, “neither natural nor neutral phenomenon, they

are socially and politically constructed”. The actual constructions reflect the power and

interests of different actors in determining its distribution (Ball 1990). The market is

built upon assumptions that are blind to deep-running inequalities which insidiously

14 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 26(iii) states that “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children”. Equally, however, Article 26(i) states that “Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages” (Available from http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html)15 Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989, to which Pakistan is a signatory, indicates that the child’s best interests should be protected at all times (available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm).

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constrain choice and options. To reveal this requires that “both the formal properties of

the market and informal arrangements within that market” be understood (Lauder et al

1994, cited in Gerwitz et al 1995: 5). Social geography, local history, politics, existing

social inequalities, cultural and social norms, class and religion may all act to distort

choice (by providers) and mediate choices (by consumers) along unexpected avenues.

Deeper structural inequalities in society more broadly are also important.

National education policy, enmeshed in complex political economy relationships, could

be weighted against government provision as a result. Governments are likely to pursue

policies which reward the interest groups upon which they depend for power and serve

their own interests (Colclough 1996:606). Supporting private schools may do this.

Moreover, the emphasis in Pakistan on community participation in government schools

and the instigation of a programme of devolution, explored in chapter 4, can also be seen

as a reflection of political interests of the elites rather than a concern for improving

access and quality to government schools. The history of social provision indicates that

“social equity and high levels of universal social provision have only been secured and

retained when those services are available to and used by the middle class. It is the sharp

elbow of the middle class…that has ensured good quality social provision” (Deacon,

2000: 38). When this ‘sharp elbow’ is removed, the likelihood of achieving better state-

delivered education diminishes and the incentive for mobilising collective action to

improve the quality of education for all rescinds.

Inequalities can be reproduced through school choice in different ways. Credentialisim

and the acquisition of ‘cultural capital’ in the form of academic certificates and social

connections, can be seen as central to reproducing middle-class privilege (Brown et al

1997: 15). The different abilities of parents to transmit their cultural capital to their

children by making good choices, based on their own knowledge, connections and

background is heightened by private school options (Whitty et al 1998). When this

‘choice’ can be bought, the effects are potentially even more divisive. The ideology of

competitive individualism, compounded by the emergence of private schools, places a

pressure on parents who can afford schooling to maintain the social boundaries

(Schwalbe et al 2000: 430). Those who are unable to do so fall further behind.

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The interactive processes that reproduce inequality, Schwalbe et al (2000) argue, are not

a static result of class, caste, race or gender differences. Rather, as “inequality cannot be

understood apart from the processes that produce and sustain it” (Schwalbe et al 2000:

420), the actions of parents, school owners, officials and the configuration of mirco-level

political networks are consequential. Private schooling not only provides an entry to

higher social status and opportunities, but actually serves to reinforce and demarcate

these divisions. The process of defensive othering may occur, whereby “subordinate

groups seek safety or advantage by othering those in their own group” by adopting the

symbols and belief system of the more powerful (Schwalbe et al 2000: 425). By sending

children to private schools, parents seek to distinguish themselves from others in the

community, thereby inadvertently aiding the reproduction of a larger system of

inequality. Both mediated entry to, and defining quality of schools can have the effect of

othering and boundary maintenance (ibid. 422).

The wide-ranging debates on choice and private provision have tended to be dominated

by research undertaken in a Northern context. The relevance of these arguments for a

developing country such as Pakistan needs to be carefully examined. The empirical

messiness of a case study is used to illuminate how choice - and the elements which feed

into that choice - is understood, internalised, reflected and refracted through different

domains. The next chapter explains how the empirical research was designed to capture

this.

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CHAPTER 3: Methodology for researching the education market

This chapter outlines the methodological approach employed, including the reasons for

using one a study and the data collection methods used. It also includes a brief

discussion of the strengths and limitations of the study.

The key questions surrounding the myth of choice are overlapping, as shown in figure 1.

It first examines the factors driving the growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the

supply side, requiring analysis of the prevailing policy environment and political

economy of education. Secondly, the research assesses how the quasi-market is

manifesting itself within a specific environment, and what characteristics it takes.

Thirdly it seeks to understand how choice is perceived from the demand side through

investigating consumer perceptions. A semi-inductive approach was taken, in which

already-identified areas of interest were complemented by lassitude for new and

unexpected results to emerge. During the data analysis stage, these three sections were

cross-interrogated to suggest how choice is being constructed and point to the

implications this may have for equity and quality.

3.1 Researching politics and policies

Literature review from secondary sources and policy documents provided the

background information to the growth of private education and the political economy

surrounding it. This was complemented by open-ended interviews with knowledgeable

people working in the education field in Pakistan as well as those from the NGO sector

(annex 1).

In order to explore the policy assumptions in context detailed semi-structured interviews

were undertaken with education, administrative and elected officials at Federal,

Provincial, District and Union Council levels (annex 1). These aimed to see how

attitudes towards private schools, and the practical implications of this in terms of

regulation and support, were being manifested (questions in annex 2). Moreover, given

recent public sector reform through devolution, generating an understanding of roles and

responsibilities was pertinent in these interviews.

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3.2 Selection of sites for field research

Gauging how producers respond to this environment and, subsequently, how choices are

made, a qualitative approach was adopted which focused on two localities, one urban

and one rural within Sheikhupura District, Punjab (see Map 1). Sheikhupura, in Central

Punjab, was selected as an area with rapid growth in private provision (Punjab EMIS

forthcoming), but representative of Punjab in terms of education and literacy, as it is

ranked 16th out of the 34 districts of Punjab in literacy rates (Government of Punjab at

www.punjab.gov.pk/education/.htm).

Map 1: Sheikhupura: location within Pakistan

Accessed from www.encarta.msn.co.uk

Moreover, having both rural and urbanised areas a suitable comparison could be made

between them. One week was spent in an informal scoping survey to gain an overall

picture of education provision within the district, in which many providers were visited

across two different tehsils (sub-division of district). It also provided an opportunity to

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test the methodology across different areas and with different sets of providers in order

to hone the questions within the local context. The process for selecting the locations

was deductive and relied to a certain degree on local knowledge.16 Locations were

selected which had a ‘typical’ mix of provision, including a functioning government

school which enabled a comparison to be made between them.17 1998 Census data

confirmed the socio-economic profile of the communities. Gharibabad is an urban slum

community on the outskirts of Sheikhupura town. Makki 460 is a village located

approximately one hour drive from Sheikhupura, and 20 minutes away from the main

road.

3.3 Constructing the ‘quasi-market’ in the research

This research mapped, in totality, two distinct yet bounded localities, and investigated

the driving forces dictating decision-making within them. Following the mapping, a

smaller purposive sample of schools was then selected. This sample represented a range

of providers, divided equally between rural and urban, in which more in-depth analysis

was undertaken (table 3).

3.4 Assumptions

Two key assumptions were implicit in the research: firstly, proximity being a key factor

in school choice, parents were unlikely to send their children outside the community for

primary education, thus the schools studied would constitute the entire market provision.

Secondly, the selection of locations with at least one functioning government school,

which is used as a comparator, and a range of other schools, may not be entirely

representative. However these localities were chosen to investigate why parents select

private schools even when government schools function, thereby making the findings

even more pertinent.

3.5 Exploring school response in the provider domain

Owners and head teachers (HTs) represent the ‘providers’. Thus each school in the

locality – effectively within reasonable (usually 2-4 km) distance from the government

16 Sudhaar-ITA Alliance, an NGO working in Skp., proved an invaluable source of information as they has mapped all Government, NGO and NFE schools, and were able to draw up a shortlist of possible Union Councils to work in which I was then able to visit. 17 Functioning is taken to mean that the school is open and some teachers are present.

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school - was mapped. This mapping exercise utilised in-depth questionnaires with the

HTs or owners (annex 3) to extrapolate key characteristics of the school and teachers,

rationale for existence, management structure, relationship with the state and modes of

financing. Moreover, issues that owners/HTs faced were explored through probing

questions in an unstructured manner as particular points of relevance arose: most were

very free with their opinions. This facilitated the providers’ perspective on how they

respond to meet the demand. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with teachers (annex 6)

were utilised to not only cross-check owners’ response but also provide an insight into

what is going on in the school, especially in terms of teacher motivation, support or

obstacles from the community, teacher perceptions of the school and the quality of

education that it provides.

3.6 Examining consumer perspectives

Grade five (or children of equivalent ages in 10-12 year bracket, in the case of NFE

schools) was selected as the comparative frame between schools given that it is an

important year for several reasons.18 As an accreditation and exit year at the end of the

primary cycle, the ‘choice’ of school is likely to be more marked than in early years, as

pressure on performance would be greater. It would also enable the researchers to

explore the educational history of the child, as they may have moved schools. Moreover,

the maturity of grade five pupils meant that they would interact more comfortably with

the researchers than younger students. To compare with the responses from owners and

teachers, and delve into why parents ‘choose’ to send their children to particular schools,

FGDs were organised. Parents of grade 5 students were called to the school by their

child with the permission of the head teacher/ owner. Generally consisting of between 4-

8 participants, the prompting questions asked why they had sent their children to a

particular school, what their perceptions are of alternative options and what factors are

important in choosing a school (annex 4).

18 In Pakistan, primary education lasts for five years (grades 1-5), preceded by two years preparatory classes (kachi, or nursery). Secondary education is divided into three cycles: three years' middle school (6-8), two years' secondary (high school grades 9-10) and two years' higher secondary (intermediate 11-12). On completion of the high school, pupils matriculate, taking the Secondary School Certificate (SSC).

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In the same schools, PRA-style exercises with children of grade 5, or equivalent age in

NFE Centres, were carried out (annex 5) (Cox and Robinson-Pant 2003). This exercise,

which involved drawing the family and drawing the school, had multiple purposes:

firstly, to build up an understanding of the socio-economic and familial background of

the children for inferential quantitative comparisons; secondly, to map the education

trajectory of the child and to encourage the child to talk about his or her school and past

schools (Theis 1996). Where time permitted, discussions on aspirations were held, which

frequently brought out many of the problems children faced in going to school.

Participative observation, recorded in field notes, was an important tool utilised

throughout, especially in regarding interactions between actors within the schools and in

lesson observation.

The range of methods reflect Booth et al’s (1998) appeal for ‘robust eclecticism’ in

research, by triangulating findings with information gathered from a variety of different

methods and sources. It also enables the setting up of different subject-perspectives in

the different domains. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the sample characteristics of the

research by school type.

Table 3: Sample characteristics by school type

  Govt. Private NGO NFE Madrassah TotalMapped schools 4 9 1 2 3 19Parents FGD 2 4 0 2 1 9Teachers FGD 2 4 0 2 1 9PRA with children 2 4 1 1 1 9Number of pupils in PRA 17 (2) 34 (12) 4 (4) 6 (1) 4 (2) 65 (21)

(Number in brackets number of boys)

3.7 Strengths and limitations of the research

The strength of this research is that it looks in-depth at two localities, which gives a

unique insight into how quasi-markets function in Pakistan from numerous subject

perspectives. Its qualitative focus is the comparative advantage, as it provides space for

different actors to voice their positions regarding private schools. Unlike other

investigations into this field rely upon quantitative research utilising household surveys

or census data (Andrabi et al 2002; MSU 2002), extensive school information gathering

(Kardar 2001) or pupil testing across schools to assess quality and, thus, efficiency

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(Kingdon 1996; ADB 2002), this study takes an innovative approach to analysing private

schooling. Triangulation with secondary sources and quantitative data points to where

the current research resonates with and differs from broader trends. Thus it aims to fill a

significant knowledge-gap on private schools in Pakistan.

Several limitations are worth noting. Firstly, research collaborators (one male and one

female) undertook much of the research directly, as language and cultural barriers made

this necessary. For this, training with PRA, FGD and interview technique was required,

which only developed through practice. Secondly, access to schools was not always

straightforward, and a significant degree of suspicion had to be overcome to gain access

and trust. Anonymity and assurances that government officials would not be privy to the

details were prerequisites to entry. Much time had to be spent in each school to merely

gain access (and innumerable cups of tea drunk). In the urban locality access was denied

to one private school and one madrassah. Thirdly, managing expectations of the school

owners who hoped for a benefit in return for collaborating was problematic. This was

done by carefully explaining the purposes and outcomes as a piece of academic work.

Fourthly, the shortness of school timings meant that time in research was limited,

especially when travelling significant distances to the rural location. Fifthly, due to

government schools closing prematurely for the summer vacation due excessive heat, in-

depth work required much coordination with local leaders to call people to FGDs.

Where necessary, all responses are made anonymous to protect privacy and school

names have been coded alphabetically (Table 5 below).19 Where permissible, interviews

are referenced by name of individual as follows: (interview name, date). Otherwise, post

and level is substituted for name.

19 Abbreviations for government schools are GGPS (Government Girls Primary School), GGHS (Government Girls High School), GBPS (Government Boys Primary School) and GBHS (Government Boys High School). Other abbreviations used for respondees are covered in the list of abbreviations and acronyms.

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Chapter 4: Policy responses in a highly politicised context

This section picks apart conventional understandings of education markets in the

Pakistani context in which devolution, private sector promotion and community

participation are the driving policy influences.20 Comparing responses from officials

with that of school owners uncovers how the policy framings are translated into reality.

This leads to a questioning of how choice can operate effectively in a highly politicised

context.

4.1 Community participation in the government system

Policy emphasis on community participation is receiving a muted response and active

involvement appears patchy. The setting up of school management committees (SMCs)

has been mandated for government schools (Khan 2003). Yet, in the view of one district

official, “the SMC members are illiterate, and create problems for teachers. Illiterate

people don’t know the problems of schools, they just want to dominate a school as a

choudhry21” (interview 13/05/04). Participation is having an unequal impact as parents

value government schools differently for boys and girls. A significant degree of effective

material participation occurred in the Government Boys High School in Makki 460:

“the community participation in sprucing up the school and making it workable is touching - the government does not help at all, despite petitioning.” (Head Teacher (HT))

The school relies on the council, composed of a few enthusiastic people for school

improvement. The GBHS is in a strong position of being functioning with teachers

present and teaching (table 5). This saves parents the cost of sending boys to private

school, especially as it goes up to grade 10. By contrast, the GGPS in the same

community is seriously under-resourced and ill-supported by the community. According

to the auxiliary teacher, the “parents are very uncooperative”. Yet many girls are being

sent to private schools close by. Why this occurs, rather than improving the government

school, is partially due to the configuration of local politics.

20 The broader debates surrounding community participation (see Bray 2000) and decentralisation (see Lauglo 1995) are relevant to this discussion. Space here does not permit an examination of these; rather they have been highlighted as they directly impinge on the nature of choice available. Without illuminating these here the discussion in subsequent chapters would be incomplete and ungrounded. 21 Choudhury means local boss, and derives from the caste system.

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The discourse of community participation has so deeply permeated the thinking of

education, that if schools are failing, the blame is shifted to the community itself.

Officials emphasise the role that should be played by the community; curiously, they

frame education as a private good to be organised and even managed ‘cooperatively’ but

according to ones’ (the mythical community, the isolated parent?) own interest.

According to a senior district official, “it is not the lack of money to ensure that schools

run well, but rather that the local community give time to properly supervise the local

school” (interview 22/05/04).

This fails to take into account that the people left to use the government schools lack the

wealth and influence within the social system to make change happen. As “the

government never buys the land in a village for a school” (interview district official

13/05/04) the question of who is willing or able to donate land in a society where the

poor are landless labourers and the rich hold extensive lands remains unanswered

(Hussein et al 2003). The better-off in the community have no interest in the proper

functioning of ‘free’ government schools as their children go the private schools, a

poignant point of which local people are well aware:

“There are some influential people in the area … but they don’t do any thing for the betterment of people. No one is ready to allot some land for school: everyone here is just ready to fill his own belly” (Father, NFE C).

Resultantly, those left within the system, and reliant upon it, are those with the least

resources. The system appears tilted against government schools so that they are bound

to fail. Interestingly, no SMCs existed, or were demanded, in the private schools visited.

Education thus becomes a commodity to be bought (and sold), removing the incentive

for collective action.

4.2 Local elites and devolution: incentives for supporting education?

This has been further complicated by the initiation of a process of devolution, in which

local tiers of government have some control over education (see Lauglo 1995 on the

implications of decentralisation for education).22 Although beyond the scope of this

22 A fuller examination of the impacts of devolution is too early to make, given the short time since it was made effective. Indeed, it may offer opportunities to improve service delivery (Nadvi and Robinson

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paper, problems of accountability of the government schools the education department

remain vis-à-vis the functioning (interview, district official, 13/05/04). Moreover, the

elected officials at UC level who should be the most motivated and active are in fact,

partly because of the presence of alternative education options, the least active with

regards to supporting the government schools:

“The [locally elected official] lives just close to government primary school but he is a hypocrite. His claims are high but he is good for nothing…. He doesn’t take interest in the welfare of people.” (Father, NFE C)

One locally elected official from Gharibabad remarked, unblinkingly, that “(m)y own

children are getting education from the eminent private school in the city. I am not only

paying 5000 per month to the school but also 2000 Rs. to the tutor who comes to help

my kids in studies” (interview 04/06/04). The locally elected officials (the new offices

under devolution) were frequently related to owners of private schools (in the case

above, a brother in law), and are more likely to lobby to support them than give

resources to the direct competitor.

Interestingly, as one district official (interview 13/05/04) pointed out sardonically,

“politicians, policy-makers and bureaucrats have the remedy. A son of a Secretary or a

Minister should be taught in Government Schools, not in private schools, to set an

example and to boost the morale of Government schools”. A viscous circle is

developing whereby poorly functioning government schools leads to desertion of those

who can afford private schools, which in turn diminishes the “sharp elbow” (Deacon

2000) of pressure of those with the capacity to improve them. If devolution has given

increased power to local elites as these findings suggest, whose interest in improving

government schools appears minimal, it may have the opposite affect to the stated aim of

increasing responsiveness and improving services. From bad, current policies may in

fact make government schools worse.

4.3 Encouraging private sector or losing control?

2004).

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The “socio-regulatory contexts” (Minogue, 1991: 8) illustrate the degree to which

markets are embedded and conditioned by macro and meso forces. The strategic support

for private schools outlined in the P-ESRP and summarised in chapter 1 appears to have

had no noticeable impact on the running of private schools and none of the owners were

aware of the potential support. It is clear that the measures are aimed at well-established

and wealthy private establishments as the exemption of custom duties for the import of

equipment bears out. Support appears on paper, but has no impact in practice.

Moreover, although clear regulatory procedures exist, a significant confusion about who

is responsible for registering and regulating private schools remains at the district level

(Kardar 2001). When interviewed, the education officials suggested that the Executive

District Officer was the indicated in-charge. Yet he claimed to have no record (or no

knowledge of any record) of private schools. The actual process appeared from these

interviews to bypass the education department in its entirety.

The regulation that school owners were aware of was the need to register, which

contradicts the above. Light but ineffective, or even negative, controls exist:

“The government wants to know how much area the school has, the number of rooms and what all is on the premises. The land should be at least 10 marlas. You also need to have a health certificate. Then government people from Sheikhupura come and check the school, whether it comes up to the health standards or not and whether it is fit for registration. Then after the health inspection is passed the certificate goes to the DO office and then the school is recognized. Bribery is common as it is hard to convince the officials to come to a remote area. The entire process takes 6 months to a year. 1,500 Rs have to be given to the bank for renewal of registration after 3 years.” (Owner, Private School H)

This shows that there is little or non concern for the quality of the education provided.

The ease with which schools can be registered is frightening, as an informal process

decided by bribery and connections exists:

“My friend had some links in the Education Department. I gave him Rs. 8,000 and he got my school registered” (Owner, Private School B)

The political influence of school owners comes through, even in regulation avoidance:

“As I am a Lady Councillor (in the UC) of the area as well, it wasn’t a major problem

for me to get my institute registered” (Owner, Private School C). This emphasises the

power of political lobbying at local level for changes to rules and lax application and the

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negative impact of patronage on healthy competition. Visits are also part of the

mandate, but feed in to the mechanism of buttering up the officials to avoid interference:

“Some officials visit the school and we have to arrange lunch for them…and usually their subordinates take a bribe.” (Owner, Private School E, Gharibabad)

Although the state is unable to effectively monitor public schools (interview district

official 13/05/04) they seem capable of visiting new private schools in urban areas.

These visits appear to be driven by rent seeking which would be unavailable to them in

public schools. Now that their mandate has been expanded to governing a growing

private sector, interest in monitoring and improving government schools may diminish.

In the face of private school growth allied with patronage connections, the state is too

weak to respond. Government officials are cognisant of the negative effects of private

schools on the public system but are incapable of taking action:

“Sons and daughters of government teachers are in private schools - and some are even running their own schools. They sign the attendance sheet and then go into a private school, especially in classes 9 and 10. There may be a tuition centre - and they tell the whole class that they must attend” (interview district official 13/05/04).

The impossibility of appropriately enforcing the regulatory framework and the

acknowledgement of the importance of the private sector by the Government means that

privatisation by both default and design is occurring (Bray 1996). The harsh reality of

Pakistan’s quasi-feudal political economy coupled with recent policy impulses is having

two interrelated impacts. Firstly, education is becoming atomised and personalised as it

becomes a private good. Secondly, the distinction between the government schools and

the private schools is being sharpened. In the words of a district official, “the people who

have money are not concerned (about government schools) - poor families don’t have

such opportunities (of opting out)” (interview 13/05/04). This intimates that the quasi-

market is far from apolitical and that stratification within society is being entrenched.

There seems to be a tacit recognition within policy circles that attempts to reform the

government sector are doomed to failure and private schools offer the solution. To assess

what kind of solution private schools are offering, the next two chapters analyse the ways

in which school owners respond to the quasi-market and how parents and children

perceive the school choices.

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CHAPTER 5: School response: supply-side driven growth or responding to demand?

This section looks how schools respond to the market. This reveals what kind of choice

of schools is available through a taxonomy of school type, and why the options emerged

from the owners’ perspective. This balances supply side availability and market gaps

with nuanced aspects of school response to demands for quality education.

5.1 Understanding responsiveness

Two levels of responsiveness have been recognised in the theory. Firstly, there is a

response to opportunities resulting in the creation of new or redefinition of existing

institutions. The efforts by profit-making school managers, as well as NGOs and

madaris, focused on specific target groups of population thereby responds to

differentiated demand. Secondly, owners initiate change within existing schools to

respond and appeal to parental preferences (Woods et al: 1998). Woods’ (1994: 125)

categorisation of the way schools may respond in a ‘quasi-market’ (see table 2) is tested

by empirical findings.

5.2 Characteristics of private provision

Schools in the two localities can be situated along the spectrum of being financed and

managed by the state (planned) to ‘pure’ private schools. However, four broad categories

of school-type, evidenced in terms of rationale of existence, can be recognised which are

catering to poorer families in the areas surveyed and more widely in Sheikhupura

District (table 4).23

23 Numerous other types exits: highlighted here are the significant types which cater to poor communities and are found in both the scoping survey and as part of observation in different localities in the district (see P-EMIS, forthcoming).

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Table 4: Taxonomy of providers catering to the urban and rural poor

Rationale Type Stewardship/ management Cost per month

Public good

Government schools

Ministry of Education (MoE)

Nominal, but with hidden costs

Adopted schoolsOwned by MoE,

managed by NGOs

< Rs. 25

Not-for profit24

Non Formal Education

(NFE) Centres

NGO managed, ‘local ownership’

Nominal, with funding from NGOs

NGO formal primary schools

Head teacher, NGO managed

Rs. 100- 175 plus scholarships for poor

For-profit

Private Private owners and management Rs 50-150

Tuition CentrePrivate owners, in private school or lone individual

Rs. 30+ depending and time and frequency, used

as a supplement to all types of schools

Religious values Madrassah

Owned and managed by

private religious group/ Mosque

Free education shelter and food, with funding from

political parties, community and foreign

sources.

5.3 The emergence of a new type of for-profit school

From the school mapping, it is clear that the majority of schools have been recently

established, with 11 out of 15 private schools started in the last 5 years (table 5). Given

this, it was pertinent to gauge the perspective of the owner as to why they set up the

school in the first place. Private schools tend to be founded by, and are capitalising on, a

redundant qualified teaching force creating a potential specific supply (Kitaev 1999).

The plethora of unemployed qualified graduates means that there is no shortage of

people who turn to teaching for a few years, whether as teachers or owners:

“I was completely free after my graduation and B.Ed. (unemployed) and I wanted to involve myself in some income generating activity, so I thought

24 NGO schools and NFE centres are a relatively new phenomenon, representing the donor-driven agenda of encouraging NGOs to enter into service provision. As a non-contentious, ‘apolitical’ way of working in development, numerous NGOs, supported by multilateral and bilateral agencies are being co-opted into service provision, especially in the education sector (interview Fareeha Zafar 06/05/04). However, it is beyond the scope of the current study which focuses on for-profit private schools.

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I would use my house as a school and charge a minimal fee of 10 Rupees per child”. (Owner, Private School A).

Interestingly, about half of the owners are female. From informal discussions, and later

visits to the schools, it was discovered that educated wives were encouraged to set up

schools as an income-generating activity to supplement the earnings of their husbands or

other family member. This was seen as a ‘safe’ occupation, as the wives did not have to

leave the house; the teachers employed were frequently related to the owners, thereby

keeping it in the family. Moreover, the status of becoming a head teacher within poor

communities may be significant. Running a school, ostensibly to serve the poor,

generates good will that could be transformed into political capital, which explains why

school owners are the more active members of the community.

5.4Profit-making entities: Income-enhancing as a prime concern?

Business opportunities exist as market space encourages the proliferation of schools.

Although both catchment areas were small and had government schools close by, many

new schools had sprung up. This suggests that government provision was insufficient for

the number of children living in the community. This market space was recognised by

school owners, who highlighted distance between schools and physical boundaries as

reasons for establishing schools, being aware of parental concerns for security:

“Parents were anxious about their children as they had to go to [private school D] which is on the other side of the road…traffic and a lot of hustle and bustle made them think to have a school in their own mohalla so the establishment of our school lessened their anxiety”25 (Owner, Private School F).

The HT of Private School H in Makki 460 suggested that “other private schools in the

area were not doing the job correctly” was the rationale behind setting the school up.

Established in 2001, Private School H already has 150 students.

25 Mohalla can be translated as a part of town or, as in this case, a small cluster of streets.

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[INSERT TABLE 4 SUMMARY STATS]see end

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It started off as a single room, but following some family investment the school grew to

having three small classrooms within the same compound.

The driving rationale behind private schools is profit. Yet the profit motive of the

schools was frequently hidden behind rhetoric of providing education. One owner

describes, with missionary zeal, the establishment of her school as part of “a vision to

bring the people from the darkness of ignorance to the light of educational awareness”

(Owner, Private School E). However, when one of the teachers who worked at the

school was interviewed, she laughed at this, and suggested that the only vision was that

of profit and the head teacher didn’t care about what happened in the school as long as

parents paid their fees (FT NFE A).26

The fee level was relatively consistent across all private schools in both localities, with

fees payable on a sliding scale dependent on grade (Annex 7). However, there are other

costs involved, to which parents are very sensitive:

“In private schools we have to pay heavy fee and buy expensive book. They charge additional funds like the cleanliness fund, picnic, study, recreational tour funds” (Father NFE A)

Private schools do offer incentives in terms of fee concessions and reduction on fees for

families with more than one child enrolled, although this is to attract new customers and

retain valuable ones, rather than an altruistic concern for the poor. However, no

schooling is entirely free: government schools are still charging a ‘nominal’ amount per

pupil, but hidden costs are also involved.27 A case of extortion came out clearly in one

government school, where parents had to pay more than the basic amount and pay for

the ‘free’ textbooks. NGOs and NFE Centres both charge fees, but are more accessible

to poor parents as they supply books and offer scholarships.

Private schools appear to be providing services at substantially lower cost per unit than

government schools (interview Shahid Kardar 09/06/04). This is achieved as the direct

costs of school are kept low, as the private schools tend to be situated within people’s

own homes, thereby minimising risks on investment. Expenditure is limited to utility 26 One teacher taught in the morning at a private school and in the afternoon at a NFE Centre. The other taught at a different private school, which facilitated interesting insights into different perspectives on schools. 27 Primary education is supposed to be free and compulsory in Pakistan for the first five years, yet this is still not the case, especially when hidden costs are taken into account.

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bills, registration fees (where registered) and teacher salaries, as shown in annex 7 for

breakdown of revenue and expenditures. Very little money is re-invested into schools,

which means that the facilities are not upgraded. One hypothesis is that schools, being

family businesses, mirror the traditional method of working along familial lines rather

than as ‘businesses’ in the sense of maximising profit (pers. comm. Miguel Loureiro).

This would explain the apparent glass ceiling on the size to which schools can, and in

fact want to, expand. Private schools have, on average, only 125 students, spanning all

grades, compared to 236 for government schools (table 5). The implications this has for

cost-effectiveness and actual quality provided are significant, as the generally accepted

‘good’ size for a functioning primary school would be larger as economies of scale exist

in primary schools.28 The result is poor facilities, with children packed into very small

classrooms, with limited sanitation facilities: over 75% of private schools had sanitary

facilities, but only a little over 50% had separate facilities for boys and girls. The

limitation on both ready capital and aspiration to build a more substantial school

encourages more schools to enter into the market rather than consolidate into larger

entities. The market in education, with schools run along familial lines, can be

considered antithetical to co-operative efforts (Woods 1994).

Andrabi et al (2003: 16) argue that the most “effective way to decrease fees in private

schools is through the competitive pressure that arises from the number of such schools

providing education services”. However, the outcome may further squeeze the quality

provided; owners are increasingly reticent to invest in facilities and teacher salaries,

already abysmally low, may be pushed down further. Nor do schools compete on quality

provided, as shown below. Adler (1994) argues that there is little evidence in the

education sector “of the market functioning as a self-correcting mechanism”, as schools

form into ‘natural’ layers or go out of business. The implication for sustainability of

these private schools is a significant aspect that requires further (and longitudinal)

examination. Ethical concerns about businesses being involved in service delivery yet

paying dividends from profits to owners with the money that might be spent on

classrooms creates a dilemma for possible government interventions.

28 There is very little work on this. However, small, multigrade classrooms may be the only option in remote rural areas, there seems little logical explanation for them in more densely populated rural or urban ones.

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5.5 Substantive improvement: Chimera or reality?

The expected superior quality of private schools derives from impact competition has on

the accountability and responsiveness to demand (Chubb and Moe 1990). Quality is seen

as vital in determining student participation. In developed countries, it has been argued

that, with competition, there has resulted a sharpening of focus on the academic,

manifested in academic output such as examination results which can be measured and

understood by parents in comparison with other schools (Woods et al, 1998). Empirical

work in South Asia indicates that both NGOs and private entrepreneur operators are

more successful in attracting students due to their ability to ensure the proper functioning

of the school (Kingdom 1999; Alderman et al 1999).

Private schools appear to provide a better, more personalised service. From the sample,

overt signs of private school quality such as student-teacher ratio at 22:1 (on average)

and student classroom ratio of 25:1 are much lower than those of government schools

(figures calculated from table 5). In all the private schools visited, teachers were present.

By contrast, the motivation of government teachers is low. In a survey reported in

Gazdar (1999), almost 50% of government schools visited were closed and 30% of the

teachers absent in the schools that were open. Equally, private school teachers appear to

be more accountable to the owners:

“In private schools, teachers are compelled to cover the syllabus and they are instructed to engage the students in studies all the time. Teachers have to work under the strict supervision of the head teacher who is there to humiliate them for nothing.” (FT NFE A/ private school)

However, as this quote indicates, teachers’ working conditions are poor and the

individual teachers lack autonomy within the classroom. There is a predisposition to

authoritarian styles of management in private schools. As a result, an atmosphere of fear

is created within some schools. In a private school during the PRA with students, one

student was recounting that “Mr X (owner) behaves in a rude way with our teachers…we

don’t like it. Sometimes he hits us on the head with the book”, at which point Mr X re-

entered the room. The student became scared, quickly correcting herself “we don’t have

any problems here. All our teachers are so good, they take much care of us” (Female

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student (FS), Private School A).29 Teaching (and learning) in this kind of environment

would be problematic for even the best teachers (or the most diligent students).

However, teachers in private schools are less well qualified and paid less than

government school teachers (Kardar 2001). The majority of teachers are female,

potentially providing an encouragement for girls to enrol. They are also young and

inexperienced, selected for their enthusiasm. Teachers frequently remarked that they

liked teaching for the respect it gave them in the community: “I love to be called

Sirjee ... we are respected by students and parents” (MT NFE C). The job frequently

seen as a fill-in before they get married: “After a few years, teachers leave the school

owing to marriage” (Owner, Private School A). Teacher turnover is relatively high as a

result, as teachers regard the profession as “a chance for us to earn a bit of money for

ourselves and step out of the house” (FT, Private School G). This, coupled with the

reticence of owners to invest, means that teacher training is neither given nor

contemplated by the owners. The fear is that teacher training will lead to demands for

increased wages or poaching from other schools.

An amorphous ‘academic quality’ was the dominant discourse from owners, looking at

‘academic achievement’, although only a few had evidence of results. Indeed, this

emphasis came about as a result of head teacher involvement, as a female student

comments:

“sometimes the head teacher gives us a surprise test, and if we show bad performance she hits us with books and our note copies…last time she gave me a slap and I can still feel it” (Private School C).

However, what this means for actual quality is problematic, as parents seemed unaware

of quantifiable measurements of school quality, as shown in chapter 6. Any advances

children made were a direct result of the hard work and dedication of the school:

“In the very beginning we had to work hard on kids because they were getting education for the very first time in their life; bad accent and lack of guidance from homes lack of concentration were the major issues” (MT NFE C)

29 Setting up the PRA exercises in a way that would provide a neutral and safe environment for the students was a continual problem, due to the lack of free space in schools. Multi-grade teaching and non-compartmentalised classrooms resulted in a disruption to the school and a false environment in which the PRA could be undertaken.

- 46 -

A trend towards traditionalism can be observed in pedagogy as a result of the need to

respond to parents’ wishes. From participant observation, rote learning was the norm,

with children frequently hauled up in-front of the researchers to (painfully) recite a poem

or refrain in Urdu, and for schools where English is promoted, in unintelligible yet

memorised English. This was, the researchers were told by the owners, an example of

the excellent education the children were getting. These children were the more

presentable and were the ones best able to adapt to the necessity of memorising vast

quantities of material.30

The private school phenomenon in rural Punjab, according to recent quantitative work,

“is interesting as it has the largest fraction of teachers with only Matriculation” (of

45%), which, coupled the fact it has seen the most rapid expansion, the lowest per-pupil

expenditure and the highest student teacher ratio means that “potential quality concerns

tend to be more pronounced in rural Punjab” (Andrabi et al 2002: 19-20). 31 This, they

observe, is exacerbated by a “lack of standardization of private schools in terms of

values underlying education, the pedagogic philosophy and actual teacher ‘practice’

(Andrabi et al 2003: 21). This corroborates the findings of this research, but the

conclusion they draw puts a more positive spin on the contribution of private schools.

5.6 Deceptive appearances?

Private schools in Pakistan present an image to the prospective consumers in a manner

which differs quite substantially from that of government schools. Although private

schools and government schools are similar in that they use the same textbooks and are

Urdu medium, differentiation derives from perceptions of quality difference. Image-

making and projecting are done via visible external mechanisms such as signs outside

the front of schools, flags, brightly coloured front walls. They adopt a ‘uniform’,

designed by the owner, consisting of a coloured shirt and trousers for boys, a sash and

coloured shirt for girls, a badge (with the name of the school) or a tie. This homogenised

image of low cost private schools, perhaps in mimicry of an ‘idealised’ private school of

the middle classes, seeks meeting a certain, unwritten yet instantly perceptible notion of

30 Pedagogic styles in Pakistan tend to be reliant on rote learning in all academic institutions as a recent survey of education in Pakistan points out (SPDC 2003)31 Matriculation is a grade 10 graduate who has completed high school, but without any professional training.

- 47 -

what a school should consist of. Each private school looks like and sounds like the next,

with highfalutin names (for example New Jinnah English Medium Public Model High

School), pertaining to something which they are not. This appeals to parents who value

‘middle class’ traits. This resonates with the perceptions of what a quality education is

on behalf of the parents wherein discipline, manners and cleanliness are the important

‘lessons’ children receive, discussed in chapter 6. However, visible signs are a hollow

shell of a good school, given the absence of observable teaching.

The profile of owners within the community is important for bolstering enrolment. The

local Imam, patron of the Madrassah C in Makki 460, is, according to the head teacher

(also his son), “deeply respected and considered a trustworthy person, so they (the

parents) are sending their children to this school”. The school, established only in 2004,

already has a quorum of nearly 150 students, bears this out. Private schools rely on

personal contacts and ties for attracting students, and most owners seemed active on this

front:

“Me and my sister started our studies in G Public School. Study in that school was good but Sir F. (head teacher of H Public School) is my father’s fast friend…he forced my parents to send us in H School …so we are here for the last 2 years.” (FS, Private School H)

Keeping up a reputation is harder than getting one - much gossip was unofficially

discussed regarding scandals either within schools or about the teachers or owners,

which seemed to dictate the relative ‘popularity’ of the school. The sustainability of

private schools may well be a problem as they are so dependent on the fragility of

individual initiative and reputation.

Private schools market themselves and raise their profile through promotional events

such as prize giving days:

“We usually meet the parents in order to convince them to send their children to the school. Here the community is worse than backward villages. On the eve of annual prize distribution, parents are called to attend the ceremony, and at that moment most of the parents are attracted and decide to send their children to our school.” (Owner, Private School A)

A positive spin-off of this effort is that private schools are actually mobilising demand

by raising the profile of education within the community. Yet, paradoxically, the sales

pitch is aimed at parents whose children are already in school, either government or

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other private schools, as they will be the ones who can afford the fees. According to the

HT of GGPS A “(d)uring the last two years 50 students have left the school to get

admission in private schools. But in a very short period of time, 50 more students were

enrolled here”. The impact that private schools have on either alleviating the pressure on

government schools, given the continued high STRs and SCRs in government schools,

or increasing access to education is questionable. Here, the role of NGO schools and

NFE centres is important, as they target specifically the poor in their mobilisation

campaigns and school provision (interview Abid Gill 10/05/04).

Private schools appear to prefer to adopt measures which promote themselves rather than

face up to any internal change which could be beneficial in terms of quality. The reason

behind this is the nature of the demand coming from parents. In a situation where

alternatives are not good, where government school is perceived in such a dim light, and

where there is a high but un-met demand for schools, it is likely that the providers

dictate choice and help shape the discourse around quality.

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CHAPTER 6: Perspectives on choice: consumer demand?

6.1 Rethinking choice

Markets in education are predicated on a demand; in the both the urban and rural areas

studied, demand for education appeared high. This chapter will analyse why parents

make certain decisions about schooling options, which shows that real choice is often

absent. Education has certain values attached to it by parents, which reflect their socio-

cultural milieu and aspirations for their children. Hence as “(the) choice of school…

cannot be made separate from the interpersonal relationships, patterns of parenting and

material environments which constitute and constrain the lives and opportunities of

families” (Gerwitz el al 1995: 50), so the analysis examines all factors that emerged as

influencing choice. However, insights into the ‘black box’ of classroom activities from

the perspectives of those most closely engaged with the process, children themselves,

provides a unique perspective to set alongside reasons for parental decision-making and

school response. Illuminatingly, three aspects can be juxtaposed: the rhetoric of

improved quality by the owners discussed in chapter 5, the perceptions of quality by the

parents, and the reality experienced by the pupils. The research reveals distinct

perspectives.

6.2 Demand for education across the spectrum: valuing education

Contrary to the perception of the education ‘problem’ in Pakistan being a lack of

demand (Warwick and Reimers 1995), this research suggests that not only is the demand

high, it is also high for girls. Until recently, it was a commonly assumed that high

opportunity costs of educating girls due to their value of taking care of siblings,

especially in rural Pakistan, coupled with the custom of exclusion, purdah, created

barriers for the education of girls (Gazdar 1999; Heward 1999). The findings presented

here resonate with recent work argues that it is supply-side constraints that are

hampering expansion (Lloyd et al 2002). If the demand is high, for both boys and girls,

this must be underpinned by a value attached to education, and the role it can play in the

lives of the people.

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The parents in the FGDs in all schools held positive views of education. The value they

attached to education can be divided into five aspects, although parents themselves

understood these benefits conjointly. Firstly, education is viewed as a form of escape

from the poverty stricken life of the slum community or a way out of the village to the

opportunities presented in the city. Much of this is a retrospective response to what the

parents have missed out on as a result of being uneducated as only 60% of fathers and

31% of mothers of the children in the PRA exercises had received some education.

“We are all well aware of the significance of education…I know if I had been provided all the educational opportunities by my parents, things would have been totally different”(Mother, GGPS B)

Secondly, there is utility value attached to education (or functional literacy) as parents

know that “an uneducated person doesn’t know how much bill (utility bills) he has to

pay” (Father, NFE Centre A).

Thirdly, education is perceived to bring benefits in direct monetary terms as parents

believed that through schooling children have a brighter future, better employment

opportunities and, as a result, a better standard of living. Most parents agreed that

education enhances life chances:

“Their life will be made and they will know how to start a business and earn money for themselves. Their thinking will become sharper and better…they will become intelligent people. What could be better than that?” (Father, Private School B)

This is despite the reality of high unemployment rates for school graduates, and

relatively small rates of return to additional schooling at primary level in Pakistan

(Kastis et al 1999). The desire for their children (boys) to be army officers, doctors or

high ranking government officials was pervasive, as these professions are held in high

esteem within society. The result of these employment opportunities is that, according to

a generally echoed view, “families would rather spend more on boys than girls as boys

tend to be a source of income” (Father, Private School F). However, direct material

benefits from investing in girls’ education appear to be changing as “educated girl tends

to get better marriage proposals: people want educated wives and daughters-in-law”

(Father, Private School H). Marriage transactions and employment opportunities for

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married girls may partially explain why families are now prepared to pay fees in private

schools for girls (see Kabeer 1997 on similar trends in Bangladesh). This deserves

further investigation, as it is linked to changing social norms.

Fourthly, education has intrinsic value in the positive impact it has on children which

result from cultural shifts in the acceptance of education. Thus by comparing the opinion

that “children become rude, hot tempered, and hollow if they are out of schools”

(Mother, NFE Centre A) with the expected benefits of schooling, it would make children

well-mannered, temperate and ‘whole’ people. As one father (Private School B)

reflected, “(e)ducation makes a child son of man otherwise there is no difference

between animal and a human”, echoing the teachings of the Quran. The influence of the

media has greatly expanded their perceptions of how children should act and behave,

creating a new standard, as one mother commented: “We watch television and we see all

these boys and girls from all over the Pakistan speaking with such poise and grace. We

want to see our children like that too” (Mother, Private School H). This signifies a shift

in cultural attitudes towards education, which is beginning to be valued as an end in

itself, showing that it education is becoming a social norm for all.32 Cultural attitudes

have moved towards welcoming education even for girls as an Imam of a Madrassah C

stated quite bluntly:

“Our elders had old minds…they were not ready to accept new requirements and were reluctant to send their daughters in schools. They thought they have to ultimately take charge of their homes so they should remain inside the home….now we are all agreed at one point that our all kids must be educated.” (Imam, Madrassah C)

In addition to this, finally, parents tended to associate education with status and power,

as “(a)n educated person is respected” (Mother, NFE Centre A). This reflects the inferior

status ascribed to the uneducated within Pakistan. Put together, these rationales for

education create a strong feeling within the localities studied that education is essential

for both the material benefits and transformative role it plays. Social differentiation and

gender, explored below, however, remain barriers to entry.

32 According to Kabeer (1997: 299), “Social change dos not occur as a single discrete moment of rupture with the past but as a gradual expansion of possibilities as more and more people are prepared to take risks and challenge the old way of doing things”. Sending girls to school is one of these challenges.

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6.3 Social differentiation mediating choice and opportunity

The affect of social class distinctions, such as the education of parents, caste and

household income, appears important to determining both the quality of schooling opted

for and whether children are sent to school in the first place (Sawada and Lokshin 2001;

Gerwitz et al 1995). Indeed, for low income families, it has been suggested that

“Pakistani households might adopt perverse informal self-insurance mechanisms by

using child labour income as parental income insurance, sacrificing the accumulation of

human capital” (Sawada and Lokshin 2001: 19). Rather than seeing these household

decisions as “perverse”, it would be more useful to analyse if and how social

differentiation is influencing demand, determining supply and, more insidiously, subtly

shaping choice. As Bourdieu, describing class effects in Western education systems,

rather pessimistically argues, “the symbolic struggles between the classes have no

chance of being seen or organised as such, and are bound to take the form of competitive

struggles helping to reproduce gaps which are the essence of the race” (1986: 251).

Education is represented by parents as an opportunity for a different life, yet is bought

like a commodity (Gazdar 1999: 53).

In Punjab, the traditional caste status of biraderi has been associated with an

occupational position (which developed from the close mix with the Hindu caste system

pre-Independence). Thus, landless, agricultural labourers are strictly distinguished from

landowners.33 According to Sawada and Lokshin (2001: 14), “(t)his system of caste has

prevailed in the form of social norms, and members of each class are expected to act

according to their social and economic status”. This would make the caste system a

direct constraint on education opportunities for low caste children. Schools are

simultaneously a mirror and reflection of society; not separate mechanisms but deeply

embedded in society, thereby riven by inequalities and exclusion (Subrahmanian 2003).

Thus while socio-cultural background would appear a strong influence on schooling

(Sawada and Lokshin 2001), others suggest that “the concept of social class…does not

apply well to Pakistan” (Warwick and Reimers 1995). It can be argued that, in their

1995 study using prior data, Warwick and Reimers did not look at the effect the

33 Very little sociological or anthropological work has been done on the biraderi system, especially in recent years. Useful starting, and ending, points are Ahmad, S. (1977) investigation into “Class and power in a Punjabi Village”, and the even older Elgar, Z., (1960) “A Punjabi Village in Pakistan”.

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emergence of new private schools was having, as they argue that all government students

come from the same class.

With regard to caste, very little came to light directly in the research. One explanation

for this is that, although present in Central Punjab, biraderi has a much greater hold in

Southern Punjab. Gazdar (2000) points towards how the presence of functioning of

government schools tends to eradicate caste-based differentials. A much more detailed

anthropological study is required to undertake this level of analysis. However, parents,

almost all either first generation literates or illiterates, have a basic unfamiliarity with

both school and the process of schooling. It is an alien environment, which can seem

intimidating and abstract, especially as teachers and owners are educated and therefore in

a position of power. This affects their choice of school, the demands they place on the

school in terms of facilities and the quality of the education expected. This research

shows that not only are social class differences an important feature of shaping

preferences, but they serve to create a hegemonic discourse around quality and symbols

of quality. This presents a serious challenge to equity of opportunity under the current

pattern of provision, and indicates that current policy prescriptions are leading down

dangerous paths. Social class, although having less influence on parental willingness to

educate children, mediates the actual uptake of opportunities.34

6.4 Private schools: providing an opportunity for girls?

Girls have been systematically discriminated against in education in Pakistan, with one

girls’ primary school built for every two boys’; resultantly, only 36.8% of women were

literate in 2000–01 compared with a male literacy level of 61% (Lloyd et al 2002: 3;

Heward 1999). However, private schools appear to offer an alternative. Indeed, more

girls, as a percentage of the total students in each school type, enrol in private schools

than in public at a national level (MSU 2002). This finding, corroborated by this

research, is in spite of the fact that private schools are mixed. Moreover, although on

34 The locations may have been important in reflecting a high demand for education, as other villages visited seemed much more cynical about education and less reticent to support either government schools or private schools. However, broad trends recognised elsewhere suggest the representative nature of this work (Gazdar 1999; Heward 1999; Lloyd et al 2002) as does triangulation via key informant interviews.

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average over 80% of the teachers are female, they have a mixed teaching staff (table 5).

Parents stated that they have ‘no qualms’ about male teachers, and, at least until grade

eight, no problems with mixed classes: “Boys and girls could study together till middle

(grade 8) but not after that ….because too many scandals may be created as after middle

the youngsters become too ‘aware’ and making them study together is asking for

trouble” (Father, Private School B). This has significant policy implications for the

Government, which has built at hugely additional costs, separate primary and middle

schools

(Warwick and Reimers 1995). It also suggests that the requirement to employ female

teachers for girls is no longer the constraint it was, as long as there is a mixed teaching

staff in the school.

Furthermore, girls are better students than boys, a feeling which came across in every

school regardless of type. Boys were not as “enthusiastic” (Mother, Private School B),

whilst “(g)irls are more prudent…more intelligent and hardworking” (Father, NFE

Centre C). One reason given for the lack of interest is that “they (boys) have lands and

they will have to ultimately take care of their lands so there is no need for education”

(Father GGPS C). Moreover, the disciplining of girls in that they remained in the home

and were less likely to be playing in the streets produces better results:

“Here girls are more seriously involved in education. Under the strict supervision of mothers girls find a better environment to focus on studies without any distraction.” (Father, Madrassah C)

The dedication of the girls, especially when parents are paying for education, results in

them being given more opportunity to study and parents are more willing to pay.

However, the barriers remain as long as there are insufficient numbers and inaccessible

high schools for girls: one mother aptly commented that, given the boys lack of

enthusiasm “it is sad that they got the opportunities for higher education, not the girls”

(Mother, Private School C). Menarche often marked the time when girls were no longer

allowed to go to school. However, cultural norms, for example the practice of purdah in

Muslim families, should not be seen as rigid and unchanging structures. Private schools

appear to be offering girls more leeway to continue studying than was previously

facilitated by public schools alone, especially after primary grades.

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6.5 Choosing between options: who makes the decision?

The actual process of parental decision-making about schools is complex, and merits

further research. Bargaining and negotiation can occur between husband and wife, parent

and child (Kabeer 1994). The decision-making about education appeared to be made

jointly within the household, with fathers deciding the price-range and mothers looking

after the actual selection and monitoring of the school: “My mother scolds us when we

don’t want to go to school. She forcefully sends us here” (Male Student (MS), Private

School G). This division of responsibility, however, was far from neat, with conflict

arising over the education:

“My daughter has completed her 5th grade and is so passionate to continue her studies but we don’t have enough money to let her continue her studies. I fully understand the significance of education but my husband doesn’t do any thing (unemployed) and when I enrolled my son here in class prep without his father’s permission he punished me…he often beats me…my son is 7 years old and has been admitted here in class prep. His father wants to send him in some hotel but I categorically told him I will do anything, but I will send him to school and finally I succeeded.” (Mother, NFE A)

This dilemma reflects the constant tension which poor parents face regarding costs of

education and the benefits that their children could reap. Choice, in this situation, is of a

very limited nature.

There are multiple perspectives on what is important in making choices. Three key

elements stand out, however: the material costs of the school, the location and the

perceived quality.

6.5.1 Cost: “A sacrifice we have to make”

No schooling is ‘free’ in Pakistan as direct, hidden and opportunity costs of the child not

working need to be factored in. Countervailed to this is the high value given to education

resulting in a significant demand, creating a tension in the struggles which poor people

go through in trying to educate their children:

“Education is essential if you want to be successful in life and we’d rather spend money on our children’s schooling than ourselves; that’s a sacrifice that we have to make if we want to see our children flourish.” (Father, Private School H)

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It seems, rather than there being a surfeit of choice in the Pakistani education market as a

result of the growth of private provision, choice is immediately curtailed by a lack of

money (Gazdar 1999). This results in a ranking of schools according to costs, just to see

whether it is within the price range of the family. The process of deciding according to

cost is simple: many parents stated that “this school was not as expensive as other private

schools” (Mother, Private School H). For parents who are unable to afford private

schools, the other cheaper options are more viable “as we don’t have to pay anything …

tuition and especially books are free” (Father, NFE A). Parents seem to be very price

sensitive, both about fees and other costs. When the Government introduced free school

books into primary schools, anecdotal evidence suggested that children enrolled into

government schools from private ones, especially in the lower grades (pers.comm. HT

GGPS A). Equally, in private schools, incentives and cost-management are prevalent:

“The best thing about this school is (that) it lends books to parents, helping them cut

costs (and) families are given leeway to pay fees late or in instalments” (Parent, Private

School H). Social differentiation occurs between school-going children and those either

out-of-school or in child labour, as well as between schools. According to one parent

“only the really destitute don’t send their children to school” (Father Private School G),

which shows how contingent opportunities are on material well-being.

Even the madrassah option is subject to costs: in rural and urban areas alike, madaris

were considered but discarded by many parents on the basis of cost: “We like

madrassahs and have nothing against them, but what can we do? They are just additional

costs.” (Father, Private School G). As a result, only very “religious minded people send

their kids to madrassahs” (Mother, GGPS C). This runs counter to the generally held

assumption that madaris have a social safety net function, their low or absent cost seen

as an attractive feature (Nayyer 1998); however, no conclusions can be drawn due to the

small sample size of madaris in this study.

Surprisingly some parents felt that paying for education did not result in value for

money and saw private schools as businesses: “(p)rivate school are here just to make a

lot of money” (Father, NFE A). Yet, private school parents viewed other options as

determined by cost: “NFE is an option for people even poorer than us. Such families

have an inclination to educate their kids but at the same time they want their children to

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help their parents in their work to increase the monthly income” (Mother, Private School

H).

The very fact that they were paying for education private school, some parents felt,

would automatically lead to a better result, and as a result were complacent about the

quality delivered. This may be one explanation for the apparent growth in ‘tuition’

centres. The more that is spent on education and the more a child is in school, the better

are the expected learning outcomes. Even poor parents who send their children to NFE

Centres also send their children to the tuition centres run by ‘qualified girls’ of the area.

This is because parents feel they cannot help the children in their studies: “the parents

who are educated to some extent, check the daily work of their kids and guide them

accordingly… but uneducated parents who can afford….don’t find any other choice

except sending them to tuition centres” (Mother, NFE Centre C). It is also a strategy for

covering all bases, as tuition centres are a kind of diversification mechanism to spread

the risk amongst schools: “I send my two daughters who are studying in government

primary school to X private school who offers tuition after the school time is over. I pay

Rs. 50 each (child) as tuition fee” (Mother GGPS C). Other literature alludes to the

possibility that parents are being duped into paying additional fees for extra classes in

the afternoon in the same school by unscrupulous owners who suggest that children need

special attention, especially in the higher grades (Bray 2003). This is probably true, but

begs the question as to why children actually pay to attend school in the first place where

less qualified teachers in multi-grade classrooms struggle to ‘impart’ the required

knowledge.35

6.5.2 The closer the better? The benefits of the private school next door

If cost is the principal factor determining whether children go to school, location and

proximity would be likely to be a key element in parents deciding which school to go to

(Gerwitz et al, 1995). Certainly, parents did tend to send their children to schools which

were close by. Indeed, it ranks alongside cost and quality for some parents in choosing

and changing schools, as this student commented:

35 The curriculum in Pakistan at Primary and Middle level is about learning and regurgitating facts. Time is required to do this effectively; hence tuition centres are prevalent in higher grades where more time is required.

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“I got admission here in prep [but] there were some domestic problems so my father transferred me to Government school. I studied there for just three months [but] Government school is far from here so my parents decided to send me here as we live in the next street” (FS, Private School B)

Proximity was associated with safety, both in terms of the dangers of crossing main

roads but also the idea that the social space of the street was dangerous and unknown.

Furthermore, proximity for parents was conflated with knowledge of the school. Typical

for many parents is the following comment from a mother in Gharibabad:

“The good thing about this school is that it is nearby and we don’t have to worry about our children wandering away. Sending our children to a school that is far away is a risk because…who knows what the school may do to them?” (Private School B)

Transport connections and distance severely restrict access, especially in the rural areas.

At primary level, with government schools located within walking distance, access was

not a problem. However, after grade five, children frequently had to travel significant

distances for middle and high government school, or pay substantial fees for private

schools or private tuition.

“No one can imagine how traumatic it becomes when we send our young girls to high school which is 18 to 20 kilometres away from our area. We don’t have any proper transportation facility in our area. It is so miserable for young girls to go by local vans which are already fully packed. Our male family members are against girl’s higher education.” (Mother, GGPS C)

This alludes to different cultural attitudes which come into play with older girls, which

are frequently passed off as transport considerations, limiting access to post-primary

opportunities (Gazdar 1999):

“After middle girls are considered ‘young women’ and are expected to stay home and not step outside unless necessary. The boys have it better: they can travel to schools by vans or bicycles outside the village if they want to pursue higher studies” (Father, Private School H)

The comparative advantage of private schools and tuition centres catering to this age

group, especially for girls, is considerable as they are located close to the home.

However, unless the family has money, the child will be denied access to education. This

suggests double discrimination, where opportunities are based on both social class and

on gender.

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6.6 Exploring parental perceptions of quality

Parental perception of quality is shaped by an amalgam of different elements. How

parents, who may not have that much experience of schools, actually rate the ‘quality’ is

a complex phenomenon. Four aspects emerge as important in determining how parents

choose schools based on their perception of quality: firstly, personal relationships, peer

group reference and reputation; secondly, the role of the teacher; thirdly, the internal

environment within a school matters of what is taught and how it is taught; and fourthly,

the external environment of the facilities of a school.

6.6.1 Peer-group reference and (non)information

Parents suggested that certain schools gave better results. The basis for this appears to be

speaking with neighbours and family, and a process of trial and error in school selection.

Unlike a ‘pure’ market, information about schools is difficult to attain, and for illiterate

parents, difficult to understand; no parent looked at the results of schools (admittedly

only recently made available at 8th grade). This means that people rely on reputation and

trust. Government schools were subject to a poor reputation, which appears to be

something deeply ingrained within Pakistani society (Warwick and Reimers 1995).

Private school parents felt that government school was below them:

“My kids have never been in government schools but I am well aware of the bad reputation of government schools as teachers hardly come to teach and when they come they barely teach and the students spent most of their time playing and wasting time.” (Mother, Private School C)

However, private schools are not always held in high regard by parents. Securing trust

also points to why private schools strive to get themselves registered:

“We cannot trust private schools. Usually without any serious intentions people decide to set up a school with the help of their own young unemployed educated family members. When these youngsters get some better employment opportunities they leave the school and ultimately, after one or two years, they have to close the schools.” (Father, GGPS C)

Although this may smack of resentment because of a lack of material resources to afford

private schools, there is often a deep scepticism about private schools. This lack of trust

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in private schools reflects a feeling that collusion between education officials and private

owners, discussed in chapter 4, results in sub-standard education in which poor parents

are being exploited (Sawada and Lokshin, 2001):

“Most of the private schools are not registered. They just claim [to be] but in reality, with the underhand co-operation of education officials they are running schools…all these things cause trepidation....and parents don’t opt for private schools.” (Father, Madrassah C)

Moreover, there is still a feeling that “a boy who completes his education from

government school can get government job (more) easily than the student of an

unacknowledged private school” (Father GGPS C). As a result, parents will frequently

move their children between schools, basing decisions on how their children are doing

and how other people’s children appear to be doing in other schools. Personal

connections matter, however, in choosing schools, and private schools are often run and

staffed by people from the community, whereas government schools have appointed

teachers from outside. Chapter 5 shows how owners attract parents by paying personal

visits and their profile in the community. This differs little from other research into

parental choice, in which the head teachers’ style, personality, outlook and

approachability is important for parents (Gerwitz et al 1995: Woods et al 1998).

6.6.2 Teachers: good barometers of quality?

Teachers are seen as barometers of quality, and are most closely associated with the

‘results’ the child attains. The parents tended to focus on the role of the teacher, as they

have daily dealings with the children. Both the attitude and the physical attendance of

teachers mattered in judging a school. Unsurprisingly, government teachers came under

much criticism as “(t)he major problem with govt. schools was that the teachers didn’t

bother to be regular in their attendance… those schools are complete mess and they are

run with no sense of responsibility” (Father, Private School F). Nor were they able “to

pay individual attention” (Mother, GGPS C) to the children, due to the class size and

lack of teachers. Their ‘quality’, in terms of academic qualifications, was not an issue

with most parents: they were seen to be good if they could maintain discipline, emerging

as one of the key factors of ‘quality’ of a school. How this is achieved and maintained,

however, is a matter of deeper concern.

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6.6.3 Parental priorities: Discipline and punish or teaching and learning?

Parental interest about what was being taught was notable by its absence. Issues of

curriculum, levels of maths, science and languages or pedagogic methodology did not

emerge in the FGDs. This may partly be due to the difficulties parents have engaging

with an alien environment such as a school, and the power dynamics of parents speaking

with head teachers or teachers. This made it problematic for them to measure student

progression and school quality. Actual learning does not enter into the purview of

parents, but the very fact that children go to school - especially when they are paying for

it and can hear children chanting, in chorus, numbers or the alphabet, must mean they

are learning something.

Conversely, this research points to a set of values as prime qualitative concerns for

parents. The ability of the school to provide discipline (and the appropriate punishment),

create orderliness and ensure cleanliness dominated responses. This reflects the

aspirations of parents for their children to lead a different kind of life from them.

Although a natural concern, it is also modelled on a ‘middle class’ attitude and

impressions gained from increased access to the media.36 According to Bourdieu, “(e)ven

when it is in no way inspired by the conscious concern to stand aloof from working class

laxity, every bourgeois profession of vigour, every eulogy of the clean, sober and neat,

contains a tacit reference to uncleanliness, in words or things, to intemperance or

imprudence” (1986: 246-7). Whilst this is written of a different society, the

underpinning value-ordering process remains relevant. This sense of othering or

bordering which reproduce inequalities through education is important for understanding

not only the high demand for private schools, but also important for understanding why

quality concerns take the form they do (Schwalbe et al 2000).

Demand for discipline is double-edged sword for schools. Parents seek environments

which ensure that their children are provided firm discipline, to make them educated and

36 Whilst it has been noted that there is a very small middle class in Pakistan, I would argue that the image, seen everywhere on posters, TV and radio advertisements and programmes, is very powerful. The media has been highlighted as one of the key drivers of change in Pakistan (Nadvi and Robinson 2004).

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‘polite’, through appropriate punishment. This is of express concern for boys, as girls, it

was repeatedly said, were much more amenable:

“Here boys are so rude. They don’t obey their parents. They are so insolent, they must be punished. We ourselves ask the teacher to punish our children …children study well only if they fear their teacher” (Father, NFE Centre C)

Thus whilst fearing the teacher is seen as integral to the learning process, punishment

should not extend too far. Parents seem relatively responsive to their children’s concerns

about punishment, who become “totally fed up with the maltreatment of his teachers”

(Mother, NFE Makki 460) and will remove their children from school if they are

excessively beaten. This creates a fine line for schools to follow, who must have teacher

and head teachers who are “strict disciplinarians” but not excessive:

“One of the teachers in our previous school (private) slapped me so forcefully on my face that blood came out from my mouth…..now here in this school I am happy as our teachers do not punish us.” (MS, Private School H)

The inculcation of manners and politeness in children was the aim for parents. Private

schools were seen as having the advantage. As one mother stated, “by sending my

children to a private school, I am ensuring that they learn manners and the proper way of

speaking” (Private School C). This reflects the status symbol that education represents,

and the trappings of ‘civility’ for which they strive.

The advantage of having a uniform was apparent, yet is construed differently than

previously recorded (Andrabi et al 2002; Alderman et al 2001). Children who are sent to

private schools become clean; teachers ensure that the children’s appearance is spruced

up in school, thereby giving the parents the impression that the children are improving.

A package of ‘values’ is provided by schools, where cleanliness and manners were

closely associated; “the uniform is regularly checked here and the children were taught

proper manners and cleanliness” (Mother, Private School C). By contrast, government

schools were seen by private school parents in both localities as unreliable, dirty, a place

to play and not to study, and unsafe; “(c)hildren just waste time and get filthy” in

Government Schools (Mother, Private School B).

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6.6.4 Minimum facilities: ‘the children can bear it’

The extent and standard of physical facilities have been seen to be determinates in

sending children, especially girls, to school in Pakistan, as elsewhere in South Asia

(Heward 1999). It is a commonly accepted assumption that parents are looking for

security and respectability before they send their children in school (Lloyd et al 2002).

Some responses corroborated this opinion; “We feel ashamed of sending our girls in a

school where there is no security, no boundary wall” (Mother, GGPS C). From the

mapping survey, the difference between government and private schools is not that

significant: indeed, observed facilities - in terms of playground, water, sanitary facilities

- tended to be marginally better in government schools.37

However, the relative importance that parents gave to the facilities within private schools

was surprisingly low. An oft-repeated remark was that children can make do with the

minimum - and that minimum refers to security issues rather than anything else: as one

mother from a private school (H) remarked, “(t)he Government Schools had bathrooms,

but most private schools do not have good bathrooms. But it doesn’t matter: the children

can bear it”. The same was said for water supply, which they could get from home, and

limited classroom space. The benefits that private schools have, from this research

seemingly the most crucial, is the constrained space and security of being inside a home-

like environment. This has attractions for parents who expect their children to be neat,

clean and tidy, which is easier to ensure by not letting children out. The parents’ subject

perspective juxtaposed with that of the children reveals diverging priorities.

6.7 Children’s differing perspectives: “A school should look like a school”

By contrast to their parents, children were much more aware of the quality of education.

Quality is seen by some children in a more holistic way - indeed, their understanding of

‘good’ education appears to be far more sensitive and nuanced that that of either their

parents or, indeed, the teachers. One student commented on his previous school that

“their method of teaching was not good. Our English teacher used to skip important 37 As a caveat, it is important to note that government school facilities have been found to be seriously deficient in other work (Gazdar 1999). Much depends on the locality.

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words” (Private School C). The physical environment matters to the students much more

than for either their parents or the providers. This is due to the fact that the students have

to suffer daily the frequently dreadful conditions of the schools. Reflecting on his

previous private school, one student recoiled: “there were only 2 rooms…it was so

difficult to concentrate on studies as there was a lot of noise.” (MS, NGO B). The NGO

School, offering easily the best facilities and standard of teaching observed, was

recognised by the children as a good school:

“I was studying in a private school. Now here in NGO B…I like the capacious building and cleanliness of my school. Teachers are so kind: they teach us in an interesting way.” (MS, NGO B)

A selection of the many observations from all types of schools furnishes a snapshot of

general perception of other schools offering undifferentiated quality: “the site of our

school is not proper. There are rubbish heaps outside the school” (MS, Madrassah C);

“Our toilet is not good. Most of the time it is blocked” (FS, Private School G); “I wish

the class had more classes; it just gets too crowded” (FS, GGPS C); “there are unlimited

flies in the school” (MS, Madrassah C); “We have a hand pump here but it gives

contaminated water” (FS, Private School H).

Children yearn after the opportunity to play, desiring trees, a play ground, plants, and

swings. Inside the classroom they want tables, chairs and charts. Overall, children

wanted an atmosphere that matched their mental image of a good school. Their PRA

drawings all showed their idealised picture. The following quote captures this succinctly:

“I don’t like this school as it resembles home… A School should be like a school not

like a home.” (MS, NFE A). Yet neither parents nor owners give much credence to this.

This suggests that children lack agency to influence their parents, whilst owners place a

low value on improving facilities as long as parents still send their children. Children’s

perceptions of schooling, and their degree of agency in decision-making, merits further

research.

6.8 Choice: subject to ever-present trade-offs

Choice of school is not a one-off decision for most parents, but an on-going balancing of

different options permitted by their own situation. In tracking the education history of

the children, it became apparent that many had changed school. From the PRA data,

31% of all children changes school at least once in their primary school career, rising to

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over 40% of children in private schools. Determined by both cost, proximity and quality

considerations, one mother typifies the problems with paying for school:

“My kid of grade 2 was in a private school, I was paying Rs. 30 as fee. But my husband fell prey to paralysis and we had no other choice except to take our child out of school. But when this school was opened here we thought it was the only choice for him.” (Mother, NFE Centre A)

This reflects the dynamic nature of poverty within Pakistan, with households becoming

transitorily poor (in which expenditure levels fall below the poverty line for a period),

making household decisions about expenditure on schooling more acute for a short

period (Baulch and McCulloch 1999). The outcome is that parents will remove children

from school, and at a later date put them back in to either the same or a different school

at a different price level. Whilst advocates of ‘choice’ in schooling would, perhaps, view

this as exercising voice through exit, in reality the choice is a false one. It is not likely to

push the prices down (as the market mechanism would indicate) as there are enough

consumers to pay for the commodity at that price, given that household shocks and

transitional poverty are idiosyncratic (household specific) rather than covariant risks.

Children are likely to suffer from a disruption in their education as a result, as the

following quotes bear out:

“My father is a chronic victim of T.B. He gets fits sometimes. We all become so sad (because) our financial condition didn’t allow my elder brothers and sister to continue their studies. He (father) wants me to discontinue my studies but my mother encourages me to study properly.” (FS, Private School C)

The prioritisation of education spending within the household basket, despite the high

value, will take second place to more pressing concerns, such as debt:

“My parents cannot afford my fee so I will discontinue my studies…and when my father will pay all the debts then I shall re-continue my studies.” (FS, Private School B)

Having dropped out, children often find it harder to re-enter the education cycle (Moore

2001). This makes for a fragmented education for the child and places a strain on the

schools, given that are never sure of their sustainability. Moreover, a ‘herding’ between

schools exists. One example is when a private school sacked their teachers and the new

ones were not “as good”, according to several parents who had taken their children out

of that school and put into others close by. Parents may have an instinctive belief

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whether their children are progressing well or not, due to the fact that they would

involve their children in ‘school-hopping’ from one school to the next. However, as

shown above, their criteria for choosing may not protect the ‘best interest’ of the child

concerned.

6.9 The myth of choice

The chronically poor, however, cannot afford any education: even that of the supposedly

free government schools is beyond their means. Children have to “share the burden” of

survival with their parents. This problem affects urban and rural poor alike: “We have a

lot of domestic problems…there are more than 6 or 7 members in the family and the

bread winner is only one. And one man cannot fulfil the requirements of the whole

family so we are compelled to send our children to do some work to share the burden of

their fathers.” (Mother, NFE C). This may lead to selecting, on birth order, perceived

intelligence or diligence, which of the children is given the opportunity of schooling,

issues which merit further research.

However, child labour is more than an economic survival strategy but a means for a

relevant training in skills necessary for life. Indeed, some parents recognise it as an

education in itself, rather than child labour:

“Our children are not involved in child labour. We send our kids to the fields and kilns where their fathers work to hand over lunch to them and they start working over there not only to help their fathers but also to learn the art of brick making or harvesting after their own accord.” (Mother, NFE A)

This may reflect the lack of relevance of what is taught in school to the daily lives of

children (SPDC 2003). This questions the very fundamentals of what is taught and what

is learned in school.

The consumer domain is not homogenous, and many parents appeared to have

contradictory reasons for choosing certain schools. This matches Lloyd et al’s (2002: 14)

findings, which indicates that both “public and private (options of schooling) each have

distinct features valued by parents”. However, access to schools, decided by a trade off

between cost and dubious quality considerations, is neither transformative nor

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emancipatory (Gazdar 1999). Instead it appears to be entrenching inequality in curious

ways. The result is the development of a pyramidal structure of school types by

preference, determined by cost, with private schools elevated to a badge of status. The

positive aspect is that private options augment female access to schools.

Demand for education appears to be high, but how this willingness to educate their

children translates into active demanding by the parents for a good quality in any school

deserves further education. Initial findings suggest that parents feel a lack of agency in

their ability to change facilities within all schools which develops into a fatalism about

the standard of education: “Children of junior level sit on the ground under the

trees...most of them without mats…we know our kids will have to study in the open area

in scorching sunlight but we cant do anything” (Mother, GGPS A). Even when paying

for education, parents did not exert voice nor pressure the school to deliver. Children, in

all schools, lack agency. Thus choice in the quasi-market is not producing better quality

as understandings of basic standards are absent and informational asymmetries pervade.

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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion and implications of the myth of choice

The emergence of low cost private schooling poses multiple challenges to the provision

of quality universal basic education in Pakistan. This paper has attempted to disentangle

the factors that have driven their growth and explore some the implications of a vibrant

private sector. This paper took as its original premise that choice was increasing for poor

people, even in rural areas (Andrabi et al 2002).38 Indeed, the range of education

alternatives in Pakistan has expanded over the last decade through rising supply via

private provision. Proponents of private provision argue that such an expansion is likely

to, via competition, augment choice, improve the quality and increase the efficiency of

the education delivered (Chubb and Moe 1990; Jimenez and Lockheed 1995).

However, research undertaken in one urban and one rural setting in Punjab show that

choice is a myth in quasi-markets in Pakistan as there are insufficient alternative

suppliers available to a significant proportion of families (Gintis 1996). The poor,

excluded from accessing private provision primarily by a lack of money but also through

other socio-cultural constraints, are finding that government provision is worsening. This

is a consequence of the withdrawal of the powerful from the use of these services.

School owners, by contrast, are able to make significant profit without having to provide

quality education, given that the government schools are so poor. Parents, even those

who can afford private schools, are left with little choice between poor quality schools.

Parents struggle to accurately assess the quality of the services they purchase due to

information asymmetries mediated through patronage connections, and the quality they

do demand is of an inferior type.

The findings of this research and their related implications fall into three broad and

interconnected categories: government level policy and state provision; potential

engagement with private schools on the supply-side; and demand side issues.

Connections to the wider debates on the promotion of choice through private provision

are subsequently drawn.

38 The current literature trumpets the growth of private provision as providing a choice for poor parents, which was the starting point of the research. The subsequent questioning of the actual choice available to poor parents became apparent during the empirical and data analysis stage.

- 69 -

7.1 Implications for government provision and policy

Current government policy is merely reacting to unregulated, spontaneous provision

caused by deficient schools and systematic under-provision by the state. Lax application

of regulation by a disinterested state bureaucracy enables private schools to flourish. For

national policy, state provision seems likely to be ineffective so long as the current

policy trajectory continues without taking into account embedded inequalities. The

education market is politicised in Pakistan, as elsewhere, but politics bites more deeply,

reflecting the feudal and patronage-ridden environment. As a consequence, there is a

negative impact on efforts to improve government schools, as those with power,

influence and money within communities, including elected officials, bureaucrats and

teachers, have bought out of the system by sending their children to private schools. The

removal of the ‘sharp elbow’ to improve the state sector reflects deeper inequalities

within Pakistan (Deacon 2000).

No silver bullets exist to transform a moribund government sector: tentative policy

recommendations need to be located within the bureaucratic, political and economic

constraints. In areas where demand remains low, private provision will not develop,

causing market failure. Equally, in the absence of competitive markets, private schools

are allowed the luxury of sinking to the lowest common denominator, which at present is

the government school (if one is functioning). Measures to reform government schools

are beyond the scope of this paper, but would appear to be of utmost importance if

overall access and quality improvements are to be achieved. In a context where universal

provision is still a chimera, the government would appear hypocritical to enforce rigid

quality standards and restrict private provision. However, regulation through district-

level private education cells and capacity building on monitoring of all schools would be

useful first steps.

7.2 Implications for potential engagement with private schools

In terms of Wood’s (1994) model of school response (table 2), schools attempt to

understand and respond to parental preference. However, the use of political connections

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and lobbying through patronage networks is being played out in a way that undermines

the basis of the competitive environment. Moreover, schools do not attempt to maximise

the profit as they are run along the lines of small family businesses, and are therefore

reticent to expand beyond a certain size or invest in facility upgrading. This minimises

risk for the family but, as a corollary, private schools remain ill-conducive learning

environments. The policy implications of this are significant. External efforts to improve

private schools, such as providing teacher training, are likely to come up against owner

intransigence, fearing that teachers will seek better employment or demand higher

wages. How the government can engage effectively with diverse and numerous forms of

provision deserves further research, but given the current prognosis, the opportunities for

doing so appear limited.

7.3 Implications for demand-side choice

Parental ‘choice’ is shown to be a complex and contingent process which is frequently

constrained by cost. Even where different education options exist (and in the two

communities studied, they are numerous) choice between them is not a realistic option

for many. Four findings stand out as surprising on the demand-side. Firstly, parental

perception of quality differed from the expected. Parental discourse on quality did not

emphasise the instrumental-academic and outcomes as making a good school, as an

expected response to a competitive environment (figure 2), nor veer towards the

intrinsic-personal dimension of education being process-orientated (Woods et al 1998).

Instead, the instillation of values of good manners, cleanliness and orderliness through

firm discipline were dominant tendencies. This reveals that the values that parents in

Pakistan hold differ from those understood in the literature on choice. In a comparison

with empirical work in India, Rampal (2004) found that “poor parents may have good

reason to be satisfied with a school where the teacher comes regularly…irrespective of

what goes on in the name of teaching and, more crucially, the quality of learning”. One

policy recommendation that emerges is the need to fill informational gaps about what

standards – a basic minimum or quality threshold – should be expected of any school.

Bottom-up efforts and an exertion of parental voice to demand real quality would

thereby be encouraged.

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The quality concerns of children are markedly distinct to that of their parents or the

school owners. Children value space for playing and lay an emphasis on the school

environment as well as the quality of the teaching. Whether the parents are the best

judges in choosing the schools, however, needs to be situated within the context of non-

universal and sub-standard provision. One interesting aspect that deserves further

attention is the potential to make the children’s voices be heard in the running of schools

and even in policy, as has happened elsewhere in South Asia (Williams 2004).

Thirdly, parents are sending their girls to private school. Several reasons for this

emerged: access of boys to better government schools; the proximity and security of

private schools; the better study habits of girl students. It points to changing social

norms, but also to the opportunities presented by private schools to expand female

enrolment. One area of policy focus would be to assess the opportunity of subsidising

girl students in registered and quality-assured private schools, especially at secondary

school level. It also indicates that government policy of creating single-sex institutions

should be revised.

Fourthly, there is a temporal and dynamic aspect of choice that was not captured by the

spatial framework of figure 1, as schooling decisions are subject to ever-present trade-

offs, resulting in children dropping out and shifting schools frequently. This suggests the

need to establish mechanisms for tracking children in their education career to ensure

that efforts to keep them in school are properly targeted. Further research would provide

a better understanding as to the nature of this dynamic, and how it links with poverty

cycles for poor families.

7.4 Wider significance of the myth of choice

The private sector in education in Pakistan looks set to remain an important element in

delivering basic services, even in poor communities. However, where various perverse

incentives combine to exclude quality-based competition and a diminution of support for

government schools, the empirical evidence provided in this paper reveals an actual

narrowing or even denying of choice. Thus a pragmatic approach that recognises the

importance of successfully reforming the public sector while harnessing what private

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schools offer but mitigating their negative impact emerges as the most appropriate

response. Yet given the current environment, there is a distinct danger that policy will

further be pushed along the path towards privatising education provision.

This critical analysis of choice in education quasi-markets has wider resonances, as

private provision is increasingly been lauded as a mechanism for delivering good

services cheaply (World Bank 2003a). The education market in Pakistan, despite its

historical idiosyncrasies, is typical of a developing country context in which quasi-

markets develop within a context of non-universal provision. Comparative research to

highlight similarities and differences would help foster a more informed debate on the

implications of private provision and the myth of choice. Efforts to make the myth of

choice into a reality are both ideologically questionable and, until universal provision

has been achieved, practicably impossible. Concentration on delivering free education to

all in Pakistan, as elsewhere, should remain the highest priority.

- 73 -

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ANNEX 1: List of persons interviewed

Officials/ Government Sector interviewees

Person interviewed Post and place of interview Date of interview

Mr Qazi Afaaq Managing Director, Punjab Education Foundation, Islamabad

16/06/04

Mr Afzal Ahmad District Officer, Planning, Skp. District, Skp. 15/05/04

Mr. Ch. Sardar Ali District Education Officer (DEO) Male Elementary Education, Skp. District

13/05/04

Mr. Mukhtar Ali Gill District Education Officer (DEO) Secondary, Sheikhupura District, Skp.

13/05/04

Prof. Javed Iqbal Executive District Officer (EDO) Education, Sheikhupura District, Skp.

13/05/04

Mr Afzul Haq Managing Director, National Education Foundation, Lahore

07/06/04

Mr Mohammad Khokhar

Provincial EMIS Co-ordinator, Punjab, Lahore 04/05/04 (multiple)

Mrs. S. Naheed Munawar

Lady Councillor, Union Council 62 Urban 4, Skp., Gharibabad

04/06/04

Mr Muhammad Jamil Najam

Director, Public Instruction (Elementary Education) Punjab/ Director, Community Participation Project (CPP), Lahore

07/06/04

Mr Tariq Najeeb Najami District Co-ordinating Officer (DCO), Sheikhupura

22/05/04

Mr Yawar Saeed Naib Nazim, Union Council 83, Makki 460 01/06/04

Dr. Muhammed Saleem Director EFA Wing, MoE, Islamabad

Mrs. Iffat Anwar Shah District Education Officer (DEO) Female Elementary Education, Skp. District, Skp.

13/05/04

Mr. Malik Muhammad Sharif

Executive District Officer (EDO) Literacy and IT, Skp. District, Skp.

14/05/04

Mr Sana Ullah Virk UC Nazim, Union Council 62 Urban 4, Skp, Gharibabad

04/06/04

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NGO sector intervieweesPerson interviewed Post Date of

interviewLt. Col. M. Anwar Awan

Regional Manager, The Citizens Foundation, Lahore

07/06/04

Ms. Nadia Ejaz Co-ordinator PULSE-NGO Project, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore

04/0/5/04

Mr Abid Gill District Manager, Sudhaar-ITA Alliance, Skp.

10/05/04 (multiple)

Mrs Nasira Habib Khoj’ - Society for People’s Education (NGO), Lahore

07/05/04

Mr Randy Hatfield Programme Manager Education, Aga Khan Foundation (Pakistan), Islamabad

16/06/04

Mrs Zibha Hussein Director, Child Resources International 15/06/04

Ms. Baela Jamil Director, ITA (Centre for Education and Consciousness) NGO, Lahore

28/4/04 (multiple)

Mrs Zarina Jillani Research Co-ordinator, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child, Islamabad

15/06/04

Hamib Khawaja Co-ordinating Director, Co-operative for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE), Lahore

07/05/04

Mrs Beena Manza Co-ordinator, School Improvement Network Programme, Lahore

15/05/04

Mr Fiaz Shah Programme Officer Education, Save the Children (UK), Islamabad

15/05/04

Dr. Fareeha Zafar Director, Society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE), Lahore

06/05/04

Mr Fawad Usman Executive Director, Sudhaar NGO, Lahore 01/05/04

Mrs Tracey Wagner-Rizvi

National Co-ordinator, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child

15/06/04

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(SPARC), Islamabad

People working in/ researching the sector

Person interviewed Post Date of interview

Mrs Monazza Aslam DPhil candidate, Wolfson College, Oxford (researching private schools on field work), Lahore

04/05/04

Dr Faisal Bari Professor, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore

04/05/04

Mrs Maliha Hussein Independent Education Consultant, Islamabad 29/04/04

Mr Rafiq Jaffer Consultant, Institute of Social Studies, Lahore

15/05/04

Mr Shahid Kardar Independent education consultant, Systems Private Limited, Lahore

09/06/04

Ms. Ameena Khan Project Officer, ILO, Islamabad 15/06/04

Takumi Koide JICA Expert, Punjab Literacy Programme, Lahore 08/05/04

Miguel Lourerio Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore 11/06/04

Mr Paul Oquist District Empowerment Through Community Participation (DETCP), UNDP, Islamabad 14/06/04

Dr. Masako Ota JICA Expert, EFA Wing, MoE, Islamabad 29/04/04

Dr. Mark Poston Education Advisor, DFID-Pakistan, Islamabad/ Skp. 29/04/04

(Multiple)

Mr Maurice Robson Chief, Education and Child Protection, UNICEF, Islamabad 16/06/04

Mrs Sofia Shakeil Independent education consultant, Islamabad 29/04/04

Dr Gulzar Shah Associate Professor, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore 11/06/04

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ANNEX 2 : Government Officials (district level and below) semi-structured key informant interviews pro-forma

Date of visit/time:___________ Interviewer:__________________________

Name of interviewee:____________________________

Post: ________________________________________________________________

Held from/ until: _______________________

1. Responsibilities (i.e. what is your mandate, what do you do on a daily basis etc)

2. Relationship with other levels of administration (issues of accountability, autonomy, problems arising)

3. Attitude towards Government Schools (failing/ working, reform initiatives undertaken)

4. Attitude towards Private Schools (Are private schools a ‘good thing’? levels of regulation, data collected)

5. Attitude towards NGOs (Is there close collaboration/ rivalry, NGO adopting schools, good service providers, sustainability)

6. Incentives to non-state and non-government sector - how do these work? (taxation, land, books)

7. Attitude towards Madaris (What role do madaris/ madrassah education play in Pakistan? What is the impact at the UC/Tehsil/District level)

8. Perspective on Community Participation (Is it good that the Community participates in education? How should they do so? Are there any drawbacks to this?)

9. Impact of devolution (How has devolution affected your role? What has changed/ stayed the same?)

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ANNEX 3: School mapping with principals questionnaire

Principals/ managers/ owners semi-structured pro-forma for mapping exercise

Date of visit/time:___________ Interviewer:__________________________Name of interviewee:____________________________

1. School details:1.1. Name1.2. Address

1.3. Teshil: Markaz: Village/area:1.4. Date of establishment:

2. Rationale for existence (cultural, economic, social - FP/NFP)

3. Location3.1. R/U3.2. Socio-economic locale

3.3. Proximity to closet available alternative

4. School characteristics:4.1. Cooed/ Single sex

4.2. Grades served

4.3. Number of students/ gender division

4.4. Register available?4.5. Language medium4.6. Textbooks used4.7. Accreditation/ certification

5. School facilities5.1. Number of classrooms

5.2. Sanitary facilities (y/n, mixed)

6. Management structure6.1. By whom (NGO, religious, entrepreneur)

6.2. Links with community

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7. Stewardship7.1. I/C

7.2. Autonomy in decision-making

7.3. Regulation/ relations with gvt.7.3.1. Registered? Details

7.4. Visits/ supervision

7.5. Incentives received/ barriers confronted

8. Teachers8.1. Number/ grade and total

8.2. Gender

8.3. Level of experience/ qualifications

8.4. Turnover rate

8.5. Pay (monthly Rs)

9. Financing and financing 9.1. Fees/ month

9.2. Costs covered/ not covered (uniforms, food, books)

9.3. School expenditure/ revenue per child total

9.4. Surplus generated/ reinvested

9.5. External financing (donors/ gvt/ philanthropists)

9.6. Government aid received

Other comments:

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ANNEX 4: Parents FGD: key questions and prompts

Introduction of who we are and what we are doing

1) Why are your children in [ ] centre/ school? what was your child doing before school? what is education/ why is it important? Is there a difference between the education of boys and girls? Are they in

different schools? What problems have you encountered in getting your child educated?

2) What do you think about the other education options nearby? Govt School Private School Madrasah NFE What about not being in school at all - is that a viable option?

3) What factors are important for choosing a school Possible prompts:

Proximity female teachers teachers qualifications attendance of teachers head teacher/ organiser motivation School buildings Number of classrooms latrines water electricity fans boundary wall cost textbook provision uniform popularity within community separation of boys and girls language medium

- 86 -

ANNEX 5: PRA Exercise with Children: “This is my family” 39

What is PRA?

Participatory Rural Appraisal (sometimes called Participatory Reflection and Action), commonly known as PRA, is a research tool which attempts to let people speak through exercises and activities. In the case of adults, these can be done through village mapping, seasonal charts, matrix and preference ranking. For children, activity-based and play exercises, such as drawing and singing are commonly used. This allows the children to express their thoughts, feelings and experiences in a more relaxed manner, and can produce some rich data as children have a unique and personal position both within the family and within the school. They are the ones who really know what life is like for them. One of the key elements is handing over control to the children and allowing free expression. However, as they are children there must be some framework for guidance provided. This is done by the facilitators in a sensitive and relaxed manner: a sense of fun is imperative!

PurposeThe purpose of this exercise is to find out what the children think about their schools, discovering in the process key elements which stand out for them. This is not predetermined but should emerge throughout the process. An auxiliary purpose of this exercise is to understand the decisions that parents, and children as active agents within the household, make in selecting certain schools. Important factors could be: the socio-economic profile of the child’s family (occupation father/ other relatives) the education attainment of parents the gender of the children/ and of brothers and sisters the birth order of the child (i.e. first born opportunities may differ from last born) the nature of the school (environment, teachers attitude etc)Through describing their family, the facilitators should probe as to what is important, and pursue avenues of discussion as they arise.

This exercise should also provide a form of retrospective mapping of educational life of children - both the child taking part and his/her siblings. This will capture which schools (if any) the children have gone to previously and establish why changes have occurred (such as household shocks, changes in familial circumstances, changes in schools and increased opportunity). This will be done via informal probing and recorded by the facilitators.

Methodology

PRA is a flexible means of investigation. There are no set rules, and the facilitator should adapt to the situations which arise. In every situation they should select what they consider to be the most appropriate approach, and be prepared to change to arising circumstances. However, when working with children, it is vital to provide a framework of activities from which they can work off. This can be through games, discussing, drawing and feedback. The main PRA activity selected is communication through drawing with probing questions used, supplemented by ice-breakers and one-on-one

39 This sheet was distributed to the facilitators. A clear briefing and trial run was done to practice and change the questions. The number of activities was increased to keep the children occupied. Photographic examples of the environments in which the PRA was conducted are appended.

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discussions, which are recorded on paper. The following steps should be used as a guideline and reminder:

Step 1: Outline of exercise. Explain purpose of research and why we want to speak with the children. The facilitator with wall chart of his/her family will explain the drawing of the family, and the questioning that occurs simultaneously. Step 2: Icebreaker games with children (clapping, miming game, role play of acting as your teacher/ parents)Step 3: Distribution of charts and crayons. Encourage the children to draw family on the sheet, beginning with the parents and the siblings in age order. Step 4: Simultaneously, probing questions should be asked. These are outlined below, with a suggested sequencing. Step 5: In-depth conversations with children using the pictures as a framework for discussion.Step 6: Drawing of school and further discussions about likes and dislikes.Step 6 (optional, depending on time): Aspirations in a FGD with the children. What do they want to do next year, what are they likely to do? What they want to be in 10 years time (this could be done via another picture session, time permitting). Step 7: Wind up and post charts on walls.

Outline questions: These questions should serve to jog the memory, and not be used as a concrete format. They ensure that all the areas are covered. However, if one aspect seems interesting, it is worth pursuing this. They should be used throughout the process of drawing, as people emerge. The names of the children should be recorded on the blank piece of paper - both on the chart sheet and facilitators’ note pad. Prompts:

1) Parents background (questions to ask at time of drawing): What does your father/ mother do? Did he/she go to school? Is your home near here? Do they like you going to school? Who encourages/ discourages you going to school? (mother/ father)

2) Siblings (questions to ask at time of drawing) Does your elder/ younger brother/sister go to school? Where, and have they always been in that school? Do your parents like your sisters going to school? What do they work as now (if elder)? If in different schools, why? If dropped out/ working, why and what are they doing?

3) Child in exercise (at time of drawing themselves) Were you always in this school? (track educational history of child if been in different

schools - probe to why they moved) What do you like/dislike about this school? (encourage them to expand on answers -

e.g. nice teachers, good environment, good friends, close to home etc)

Step 6: (optional, given time) FGD on aspirations

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What do you want to do after this year? What do you want to be in 10 years? [This can be done via subsequent drawings on

A4 sheets of paper a picture of what they would like to be. This will reveal gender stereotypes and also provide data on internal limitations of child’s perspective]

Practical and ethical issuesWorking with children is very sensitive. If you feel it inappropriate to ask questions, or probe more deeply, DONT. We must have the child’s best interests in mind at all times. It is important to avoid exposing children or putting them in awkward positions. This exercise should be fun and like a conversation - give something of youself and provide encouragement and support to the children in undertaking the exercise (such as complements). The work should, if possible, be carried out in a shady area without the (close) presence of teachers or other students, as this will both distract them and make them reticent to talk.

Amna, Saima Saeed (L-R) suggesting ways to draw the families in GGPS Gharibabad

Informal discussion with children with facilitator Amna in NFE Centre, Gharibabad

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ANNEX 6: Teachers FGD prompting questions pro-forma 40

This focus group discussion is aimed at exploring several key threads in the research from the perspective of the teachers. The purpose is to get to the root of the issues of why parents are choosing certain schools. Teachers have unique insights as they are at the chalk face on a daily basis, having direct contact with the children and frequent contact with parents and community members. It will also allow us to triangulate (i.e. check) what the head teachers say in the mapping, and confirm opinions, doubts etc of the parents. However, as a starting point the teachers’ perspectives on motivations are explored, as this will allow a space for comfort and will enable all participants to speak. The questions are semi-structured which should allow for debate and disagreements. It is important to let the conversation flow; question prompts are offered below.

1. Why did you choose to become a teacher? - how long have you been teaching- past experience/ different schools- education attainment and from where

2. Do you enjoy it? - if so, why – what is it you enjoy? - If not, why not?

3. What support do you get? - from parents/ community- from institution- from government- from own family

4. What kind of children go to your school?

5. Why do you think they go to that schoolPrompts:- Reputation- Cost- Teachers- Atmosphere - Facilities- etc.

6. Do the children enjoy school?- What could be improved for them?- Do many drop out?- Do many repeat the year?

7. Any other comments (try to make sure that what the teachers say is the same as the principal’s etc. If there are differences, probe).

40 This blurb was given as an explanatory note to the facilitators, and has been included here for reference.

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ANNEX 7: Monthly income, expenditure and profit of a typical middle private school

Income - direct

GradeNumber per class

Cost (Rupees

)Total

Nursery 25 50 1,250 1 30 60 1,800 2 20 70 1,400 3 12 100 1,200 4 12 120 1,440 5 9 150 1,350 6 7 200 1,400 7 6 250 1,500 8 5 300 1,500

Total 126 12,840

Expenditure per month

Teacher salaries

Qualification

Monthly salary (Rs.)

BA 1200FA PTC 800Matric 600Matric 600Matric 600Total 3800

Utility bills 1500Upkeep 500Registration 150Expenditure total 5950

Profit margin: Rs. 6,890

Using data from table 5 and the questionnaire surveys, a ‘typical’ private school has been designed to indicate how monthly income and expenditure work out. From this, the monthly profit margin can be deduced.

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Table 5: Summary statistics from mapping by school type

School Type Location Established Mixed Level served RegisteredStudent

population

Student-Teacher

ratio

Student Classroom ratio

Percentage of male teachers

Teacher pay

(Rs./mth)

Fees (Rs./ month)

GGPS A Urban 1988Yes

(partially) Primary Yes 400 67 133 0%3180 - 4150 5

GGPS B Urban 1989Yes

(partially) Primary Yes 175 88 88 0%1000 - 7000 5

GGPS C Rural 1985 No Primary Yes 170 85 85 0% BPS41 5GBHS Rural 1922 No High42 Yes 200 18 40 100% BPS 5                 NFE Centre Urban 2003 Yes Primary Yes 72 36 36 0% 1350 5

NGO School Rural 2001 Yes Primary Yes 175 16 22 0 3200-2800100 – 17543

NFE Centre Rural 2003 Yes Primary Yes 65 33 33 100% 1450 5                 Private A Urban 1992 Yes Middle Yes 225 19 38 17% 500 - 1000 30 - 100Private B Urban 1993 Yes High Yes 109 16 18 29% 1000-1200 50 - 300Private C Urban 1996 Yes Middle Yes 125 16 31 13% 600- 1000 50 - 150Private D Urban 2000 Yes High Yes 125 31 42 50% 750-1000 25 - 300Private E Urban 2000 Yes Middle Yes 110 28 37 25% 500-1000 100-150Private F Urban 2003 Yes Middle Yes 110 28 55 0% 500 - 600 30 - 200Private G Rural 2001 Yes Middle No 150 25 30 33% 700 - 2000 50 - 200Private H Rural 2001 Yes Middle Yes 113 19 38 0% 500-1000 50 - 150

Private I Rural 2004 Yes Primary No 60 20 30 0%1000 - 1500 40 - 70

                 

41 Basic Pay Scale for teachers, dependent on qualifications and years of service, generally from Rs.3000-6000.42 Upgraded in 1995 to Middle 3 With 100% scholarships for about 60% of students 4Mixed private and madrassah in same site43

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Madrassah A Urban 1998 No Middle and religious No 100 11 14 11%1500 - 3000 0

Madrassah B Rural 2002 Yes Religious and 1-3 No 50 50 50 0%yet to

receive 50 - 100Madrassah C44 Rural 2004 Yes Primary and religious No 147 18 37 25% 500 - 1000 50

Basic Pay Scale for teachers, dependent on qualifications and years of service, generally from Rs.3000-6000. Upgraded in 1995 to Middle 3 With 100% scholarships for about 60% of students 4Mixed private and madrassah in same site

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