Introduction: Chinese Traditions in InternationalRelations

Ming Wan

Published online: 26 February 2012# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2012

We should care about Chinese traditions in international relations for both practical andtheoretical reasons. From a policy perspective, China was a powerful country prior to therise of the West and its return to a top rank in the world now means needing to examinewhether its long traditions will now have a greater impact on how it thinks about foreignaffairs and how other countries view China. Indeed, Chinese leaders and thinkers areincreasingly looking back to Chinese history for inspiration and analogies, apparent inthe current Chinese foreign policy discourse. Chinese President Hu Jintao, for instance,has been promoting the notion of “harmony” in domestic politics and foreign policy.Conversely, policy thinkers outside China are also increasingly highlighting Chinesetraditions as a partial explanation for Chinese diplomatic conduct. Drawing from hisintimate knowledge of U.S.-China relations and of Chinese leaders, Henry Kissingerfocused onChinese strategic traditions in his most recent bookOn China. He started thebook telling the story of how Mao Zedong made decisions in the border war withIndia in 1962 by discussing the Tang Dynasty’s war with India 1,300 years ago.Kissinger marveled, “in no other country is it conceivable that a modern leader wouldinitiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event—nor that he could confidently expect his colleagues to understand the signif-icance of his allusions [1].”

From a theory building perspective, the field of International Relations that tends tobe Eurocentric needs to incorporate non-Western theories and practices. After all, few IRtheorists outside China or even inside China would know of the millennium-old China-India conflict and the Chinese strategic principles related to it as discussed in theKissinger book, but virtually all IR scholars worldwide know the realist principlesdrawn from Thucydides’ classic History of the Peloponnesian War, about an ancientGreek war that occurred a millennium earlier than the Tang China-Indian war. It issimply taken for granted that people should know about the Peloponnesian War.

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2012) 17:105–109DOI 10.1007/s11366-012-9187-1

M. Wan (*)Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USAe-mail: mwan@gmu.edu

People may approach Chinese traditions in international relations from differentangles. To avoid talking past each other, I will use the Table 1 above to introduce thepapers included in this special issue and to contribute to further research by offeringan intellectual landscape for this expanding research area. My organizing schemedivides Chinese traditions into theory and practice and relates them to Western andmodern Chinese theory and practice. Needless to say, this table represents idealizedtypes. In practice, it can be difficult to differentiate what is Western versus Chineseand what is traditional Chinese versus modern Chinese and to determine whorepresents these theories. Furthermore, one does not want to impose categorizationprematurely in the early stage of research. Nevertheless, the table may help us assesswhere different intellectual projects are emerging or might emerge.

Research in Chinese traditions in the field of International Relations essentiallyexpands from the A1, A2, B1 and B2 cells to the 3 and C cells (A3, B3, C1, C2, andC3), building on works by China specialists spreading in all disciplines. GilbertRozman is a rare scholar who moves with ease across the intellectual landscape. Infact, his paper discusses China’s interaction with its Asian neighbors, a dimension notincluded in the table. Equally knowledgeable about theories of international relations,modern Chinese theories and traditional Chinese philosophies, he provides a sharpcritique of the Chinese government’s invocation of Chinese traditions, not simply ashistorical analogies but to offer a legitimation for its supremacy. This Chineseintellectual project has resulted in ideological tension at home because the countryis still officially socialist and it has caused backlash among its Asian neighbors whoobject to Beijing’s mega-historical narrative. Compared explicitly to the realist andliberalist approaches to international relations, Rozman views Chinese invocation oftraditions from a constructivist lens, focusing particularly on interaction of nationalidentities in East Asia. Thus, intellectually based in the A3 cell, his paper takes acritical look at the Chinese government’s project in the B3 cell. Rozman has previouslyconducted extensive research on Confucianism in East Asia, which enables him toassess the Chinese government’s intellectual agenda as a re-imagined historical narrativeto serve its current domestic and diplomatic purposes. To drive that point home, hispaper also includes a succinct summary of how the PRC government has treated Chinesetraditions since its founding.

Most IR scholars, including many in China, approach Chinese traditions from aWestern intellectual tradition, arguing essentially that existing Western IR theory isEurocentric and needs to integrate non-Western international relations practice to betruly universal. But they adopt Western concepts, theories and methodologies familiar

Table 1 Intellectual projects related to Chinese traditions in international relations

A. Western Theory B. Modern Chinese Theory C. Traditional Chinese Theory

1. Western Practice A1: Westernexceptionalism

B1: Chinese perspective C1: Chineseuniversalism

2. Modern ChinesePractice

A2: Westernuniversalism

B2: Chinesecharacteristics

C2: Residual? Revival?

3. TraditionalChinese Practice

A3: Westernuniversalism

B3: Rejection, ignorance,reconstruction

C3: Chineseexceptionalism

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to mainstream IR scholars. Thus, the A3 cell is a logical place for extending Westerntheory to traditional Chinese practice.

Vitoria Hui has published some well-received work showing how rigorousresearch on Chinese history may correct the Eurocentric bias in mainstream interna-tional relations theory. Her paper in this issue engages a modern Chinese understand-ing of Chinese traditions, particularly Yan Xuetong’s recent book Ancient ChineseThought, Modern Chinese Power. Similar to Rozman, Hui sees problems in Beijing’shistorical narrative. Her main criticism is that leading Chinese scholars such as Yanhave focused on Chinese political thought devoid of history, which explains why somuch emphasis has been placed on Confucianism. One gets the sense reading her paperthat it would be better to go straight to Chinese historical facts for constructinginternational relations theory without the hindrance of flawed modern Chinese politicalthinking.

Objecting also to oft-propagandish modern Chinese invocation of traditions for policyexpediency, I view it as valuable intellectually to push research in the A3 cell. But therecan be different Western approaches to studies of Chinese history in IR. From aconstructivist perspective for example, one cannot separate Chinese history fromChinesepolitical thought. Chinese history was what the Chinesemade of it, for better or for worse,and how the Chinese acted had much to do with their political thought. In fact, ancientChinese thinkers put a particular emphasis on practice-based theorizing [zhixing heyi].Whether one argues that Confucianism or any other Chinese philosophy offered amisguided reading of history, they did help to shape Chinese history to what it was. Ina way, there was a dynamic of myth-making being self-fulfilled. It would be wrong toprivilege a particular strand of Chinese tradition, but one solution is to provide richerrather than less discussion of Chinese political thought.

Most IR scholars would be comfortable incorporating Chinese or any non-Westernhistorical facts into theory. The more data and greater variation that we have, thestronger theories we can build. The challenge is how. As noted by Robert Gilpin inhis 1981 book on political change in international relations, our lack of politicaltheorizing in IR had resulted largely from “the paucity of reliable secondary studies ofnon-Western systems [2].” But what counts as “reliable secondary studies”? To bereliable, studies have to be conducted using concepts and theories readily intelligibleto the established scholars in the field and meeting the academic standards held by themajority of the academic community. For those who are concerned with Westernintellectual dominance, that is precisely the problem with mainstream IR theory andwhy alternatives to it might be desirable. Why would Western concepts, theories andmethodologies be the right way to read Chinese history?

Some scholars of Chinese traditions are not merely interested in bringing Chinesehistory into mainstream international relations theory to improve it. Rather, they areinterested in looking at the world differently. Even for someWestern-trained scholars, it isdifficult to stay within the A cells. Studying traditions necessarily expands the intellectualhorizon. At the very least, one may want to see the intellectual applicability of traditionalChinese theory to modern conditions while avoiding undue influence from the contem-porary historical narrative promoted by the Chinese government.

As an exploratory attempt moving from the A cells to the C cells, Ming Wan’spaper looks at the world partially from the lens of Chinese traditions, but in a wayreasonably intelligible to those who are not that familiar with these traditions and

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differing from the “official” Chinese historical narrative. Different from most currentstudies on Chinese traditions that focus on military affairs, his paper discussesopposing Chinese strategic principles linking domestic political order and politicaleconomy of empire, as vividly revealed in a First Century B.C. Chinese intellectualand policy debate. It examines these Chinese political thoughts in the Chinesehistorical context (C3) and views Chinese traditional thinking about financing,economic foundation and moral purpose of empire as relevant to the United States(C1) and China (C2). Wan sees vibrant and sophisticated intellectual debates in theformative years of the Chinese imperial system rather than any particular Chineseschool of philosophy as the ideational foundation for the success of that system in twomillennia.

Wan’s paper provides some ready strategic principles for contemporary thinkers. Butit does not draw a direct linkage between Chinese traditions and contemporary Chinesediplomatic conduct. By contrast, Joseph Cheng and Mark Lai focus their papers onwhere Chinese traditions stand in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Cheng exam-ines Beijing’s current effort to convince the world of its intention to promote aharmonious world. He puts Beijing’s invocation of traditions in the context of its foreignpolicy spanning decades, viewing China’s emphasis on a harmonious world as related toits strategic objective of maintaining a peaceful international environment for its mod-ernization drive. But he observes that China’s current emphasis on traditional notions isunlikely to be successful because of rising nationalism, existing territorial disputes andChina’s military modernization. Lai explicitly tests the saliency of cultural factors inshaping Chinese foreign policy and concludes that a nuanced approach incorporatingChinese traditions and other cultural factors offers the best explanation for Chineseforeign policy in 2010–2011.

We are at an early stage of research on Chinese traditions for IR scholars, with manyunanswered questions. Serious research is needed for all of the C and 3 cells. As a case inpoint, the most drastic approach would be to use traditional Chinese concepts, theoriesand methodologies to explain Western practice in the C1 cell. While invoking Chinesetraditions to critique theWest, much of what is being said in China is sloganeering and isreally situated in the B1 cell where people use Chinese traditions as a convenient guise tooffer a contemporary critique of the West serving current Chinese political purposes.Among serious scholars, Zhao Tingyang’s work on Tianxia [all under heaven] hasmade the greatest intellectual contribution [3]. As a philosopher, Zhao is not seekingto prove empirically his claim that Tianxia is superior to the Western internationalsystem. But he discusses Tianxia as a political subject matter and engages mainly theassumptions of Western international relations theory, divorced from the cosmic-religious foundation of the Chinese traditional notion of Tianxia. A Qin Dynasty orHan Dynasty scholar would view Western practice as virtually incomprehensible. Weknow that might be true if we consider how Chinese scholars reacted during China’sinitial serious exchange with the West.

Zhao of course lives in a world fundamentally different from the ancient Chineseuniverse and does not have to think like an ancient Chinese philosopher. This real-world condition limits our intellectual search necessarily. But it is also an opportunityfor an inclusive, open-ended intellectual project. From a constructivist perspective,people are making the world as of now and our discussion of Chinese traditions is

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part of that historical process. Belonging to a globalizing world, we are all entitled toparticipate in discussion of any country’s history. I introduce this special issue in thatspirit.

References

1. Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China. New York: Penguin Press.2. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.3. Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu zhexue daolun (The Tianxia system: a philosophy for

the world institution). Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe.

Ming Wan is Professor of Government and Politics of George Mason University. He is on academic leavein Japan from August 2010 to August 2012, as a visiting professor at Keio University. His Ph.D. was fromthe Government Department, Harvard University. He held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard from theProgram on U.S.-Japan Relations, the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Pacific BasinResearch Center, and was also a visiting research scholar at Tsukuba University and a George WashingtonUniversity-WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars Luce Fellow in Asian Policy Studies. He hasauthored The Political Economy of East Asia: Striving for Wealth and Power (CQ Press 2008), Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford 2006), Human Rights in ChineseForeign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests (UPenn 2001), and Japan between Asia andthe West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance (M.E. Sharpe 2001). He has also published in journalssuch as Asian Survey, Human Rights Quarterly, Orbis, Pacific Affairs, Pacific Review, and InternationalStudies Quarterly and in edited volumes. His current research interests include the China model, Sino-Japanese relations, Japanese party politics and foreign policy, and East Asian international relations.

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