Intro day 13

Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy

Professor Michael Hicks

5 February 2014

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 1 / 8

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person

I Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”

Midterm: next Friday

Study Guide will go up this weekend


Introductory


Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);

I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”




Introductory


Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;

I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”




Introductory


Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”




Hume on Personal Identity

Hume on identity in general

Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative

I Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake

Principles of identity

I Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)




Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”

I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake






Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake







Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)

I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)





Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)

I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)





Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)

I sympathy of ends (organism)





Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)



The Self (per Hume)

What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?

I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,cause-and-effect

I Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t

cause my ideas

Role of memory

I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the

appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.

In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?

I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately

causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity



The Self (per Hume)

What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,

cause-and-effect

I Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t

cause my ideas

Role of memory








The Self (per Hume)


cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)

I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’tcause my ideas

Role of memory








The Self (per Hume)


cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t

cause my ideas

Role of memory








The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas

Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas

I But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the







The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas

Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it

I What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in theappropriate causal relationship.

I Other ideas do too, and so also count.






The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas

Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the

appropriate causal relationship.

I Other ideas do too, and so also count.






The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas








The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas



In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?

I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriatelycausally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.

I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity



The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas



In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately

causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.

I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity



The Self (per Hume)



cause my ideas



In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately



Strawson on the Person

Anti-Cartesianism

Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”

I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to

form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we

think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.

The Anti-Cartesian analysis

I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.

I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.

Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?



Anti-Cartesianism

Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”

I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together toform a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).

I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when wethink solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.







Anti-Cartesianism

Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to

form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).

I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when wethink solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.







Anti-Cartesianism










Anti-Cartesianism




The Anti-Cartesian analysisI Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the

relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.





Anti-Cartesianism




The Anti-Cartesian analysisI Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the

relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.




The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:

I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night

Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”

I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we

predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.

Cartesian reply

I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”

I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.

I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.




I Joe believes in God

I Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night




Cartesian reply







I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tall

I Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night




Cartesian reply







I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be taller

I Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night




Cartesian reply







I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircut

I Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night




Cartesian reply







I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letter

I Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night




Cartesian reply











Cartesian reply








Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively

I More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we


Cartesian reply








Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller

I But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we


Cartesian reply








Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.

I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What wepredicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.

Cartesian reply








Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we


Cartesian reply










Cartesian replyI Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind

that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”










that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically

misleading.









that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically

misleading.I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.



Subject side

Subjects and Predicates

I In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.What about the subject?

I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”

I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?

Two examples

I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances

These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing

I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.



Subject side

Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.

What about the subject?

I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”


Two examples






Subject side


What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:

“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”


Two examples






Subject side



“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just one

I With what right, “the”?

Two examples






Subject side



“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?

Two examples






Subject side




Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison

I momentary soul-substances





Subject side




Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances





Subject side






I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!

I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.



Subject side









Diagnosis

The difference between meditation and ordinary life

I Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we

can ignore our own body too.

So, does Strawson think I am my body?

I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,

but because person is.



Diagnosis

The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activity

I “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we







Diagnosis

The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.

I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, wecan ignore our own body too.






Diagnosis

The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we







Diagnosis



So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : person

I So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,




Diagnosis



So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.

I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,but because person is.



Diagnosis



So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,



Intro day 13

Education

Transcript of Intro day 13