Intrinsic Motivation by Csikszentmihalyi

7/28/2019 Intrinsic Motivation by Csikszentmihalyi

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FLOW

MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYISAMI ABUHAMDEH

JEANNE NAKAMURA

A GENERAL CONTEXTFOR A CONCEPTOF MASTERY MOTIVATION

What makes people want to go on with the ef-fort required from life? Every epistemology ofbehavior must sooner or later cope with thisbasic question. The question is not so mysteri-ous for nonhuman organisms, which presum-ably have built-in genetic programs instruct-ing them to live as long as their physicalmachinery is able to function. But our specieshas a choice: With the development of con-sciousness, we have the ability to second-guess and occasionally override the instruc-tions coded in our chromosomes. This evolu-tionary development has added a great deal offlexibility to the human repertoire of behav-iors. But the freedom gained has its down-sidetoo many possibilities can have a para-lyzing effect on action (Schwartz, 2000).

Among the options we are able to entertain isthat of ending our lives; thus, as the existen-tial philosophers remarked, the question of

why one should not commit suicide is funda-mental to the understanding of human life.

In fact, most attempts at a general psy-chology also start with the assumption thathuman beings have a "need" or a "drive"for self-preservation, and that all other moti-vations, if not reducible to, are then at leastbased on such a need. For exampleMaslow's hierarchy assumes that survivaltakes precedence over all other consider-ations, and no other need becomes activeuntil survival is reasonably assured.

But where is this will to live located? Is itnothing but a variation of the survival in-stincts all living organisms share, chemicallyetched into our genes? The last try for acomprehensive human psychology, that ofSigmund Freud, posited Eros as the sourceof all behaviora force akin to the elan vitalof the French philosopher Henri Bergson(1931/1944) and to similar concepts of life

energy proposed by a long list of thinkersgoing back to the beginnings of speculativethought.

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Eros, which originally referred to the needof the organism to fulfill its physical poten-tial, was soon reduced in Freud's writings,

and even more so in those of his followers,to the libidinal pleasure that through naturalselection has become attached to the sexualreproductive act and to the organs impli-cated in it. Thus, "erotic" eventually becamesynonymous with "sexual."

This reduction of the concept of vitality tothe reproductive function rested on a rea-sonably sound logic. The Darwinian revolu-tion highlighted the role of sexual selection

in evolution; thus, it made sense to see sexu-ality as the master-need from which all other

interests and motives derive. A species sur-vives as long as its members reproduce. Ifthe drive to reproduce became well en-trenched in a species, its survival would beenhanced. Following Ockham's principle ofparsimony, one might expect that as long assexual drives are well established, other mo-tives become secondary. Whatever men andwomen do, from making songs to mappingthe heavens, is just a disguised expression ofEros, a manifestation of the reproductivedrive.

On closer examination, however, this sin-gle causality seems much less convincing. Aspecies needs to take care of many other pri-orities besides reproduction in order to sur-

vive. At the human stage of evolution, whereadaptation and survival depend increasinglyon flexible responses mediated by consciousthought, members of the species had to learnhow to master and control a hostile andchanging environment. It makes sense to as-sume that natural selection favored those in-dividuals, and their descendants, who en-

joyed acts of mastery and controljust assurvival was enhanced when other acts nec-essary for survival, such as eating and sex,became experienced as pleasurable.

The various behaviors associated withcontrol and masterysuch as curiosity, in-terest, exploration; the pursuit of skills, therelishing of challengesneed not be seen asderivatives of thwarted libidinal sexuality.They are just as much a part of human na-ture, just as necessary for our survival, as the

drive to reproduce. The ancients understoodthis when they coined the aphorism Libriaut Hberi: "Books or sons." As humans, wehave the option of leaving a trace of our ex-istence by writing books (or shaping tools,

raising buildings, writing songs, etc.) andthus leaving a cultural legacy, as well as leav-ing our genes to our progeny. The two are

not reducible to each other, but are equallyimportant motives that have become in-grained in our natures.

The idea that the ability to operate effec-tively in the environment fulfills a primaryneed is not new in psychology. In Germany,Karl Groos (1901) and Karl Buhler (1930)elaborated the concept of Funktionlust, or"activity pleasure," which Jean Piaget(1952) included in the earliest stages ofsensorimotor development as the "pleasureof being a cause" that drove infants to ex-

periment. In more recent psychologicalthought, Hebb (1955) and Berlyne (1960)focused on the nervous system's need for op-timal levels of stimulation to explain explor-atory behavior and the seeking of novelty,while White (1959) and deCharms (1968)focused on people's need to feel in control,to be the causal agents of their actions. LaterDeci and Ryan (Deci, 1971; Deci & Ryan,1985) elaborated on this line of argument bysuggesting that both competence and auton-omy were innate psychological needs that

must be satisfied for psychological growthand well-being.

Theories that provide explanations forwhy people are motivated to master andcontrol tend to be distal. In other words,they provide sensible explanations, typicallybased on an evolutionary framework, forwhy such behaviors should have become es-tablished over many generations, in order tosupport the reproductive success of the indi-vidual. However, for an activity pattern tobecome established in a species' repertoire, ithas to be experienced as enjoyable by the in-dividual. To explain how this happens, a

proximal theory of motivation is needed.Such a theory must rely on at least four

complementary lines of explanation. In thefirst place, it is likely that mastery-relatedbehavior has become personally rewardingbecause it has evolved, through literally mil-lions of years of trial and error, as an effec-tive strategy to achieve other goals, such asmates and material resources. Overcoming

challenges and excelling is therefore adap-tive and increases chances for reproductivesuccess.

Second, one may adopt a more Freudianline and see mastery-related behavior as an


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internalized drive that could serve either thepurposes of the id (in the case of tyrants orrobber barons) or of the superego (in thecase of creative, prosocial individuals). Inthis, as in the previous case, the behaviordoes not serve an independent function butis a disguised manifestation of other forcesseeking their own aims.

Third, the person may seek out such be-haviors because of innate or learned psycho-logical needs, such as competence and au-tonomy. According to this explanation, theenjoyment one experiences during intrinsi-cally motivated behavior is largely a result ofthe satisfaction of these basic psychologicalneeds.

This chapter deals with a fourth kind of

explanation, which we call the "phenome-nological account." It tries to look veryclosely at what people actually experiencewhen they are involved in activities that in-volve mastery, control, and autonomousbehavior, without prejudging the reasons forwhy such experiences exist. This line of ex-planation assumes that the human organismis a system in its own right, not reducible tolower levels of complexity, such as stimulus-response pathways, unconscious processes,or neurological structures.

These four kinds of explanations are notincompatible with each other. In fact, theyare likely to be all implicated in the genesisand maintenance of mastery behavior at theindividual level. Quite often, they supporteach other, driving the organism in the samedirection. But it is also often the case thatthe genetically programmed instructionsmay come into conflict with the learnedones, or that the unconscious forces press ina direction contrary to what the phenome-nological reality suggests.

THE NATURE OF FLOW

The fourth of these lines of explanation, fo-cused on events occurring in the conscious-ness of the individual, is the one here identi-fied with the study of the flow experience.This experience emerged over a quarter-cen-tury ago as a result of a series of studies ofwhat were initially called autotelic activities;

that is, things people seem to do for the ac-tivity's own sake.Why do people perform time-consuming,

difficult, and often dangerous activities forwhich they receive no discernible extrinsicrewards? This was the question that origi-nally prompted one of us into a program ofresearch that involved extensive interviewswith hundreds of rock climbers, chess play-ers, athletes, and artists (Csikszentmihalyi,1975; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi,2002). The basic conclusion was that, in allthe various groups studied, the respondentsreported a very similar subjective experiencethat they enjoyed so much that they werewilling to go to great lengths to experience itagain. This we eventually called the "flowexperience," because in describing how itfelt when the activity was going well, severalrespondents used the metaphor of a current

that carried them along effortlessly.Flow is a subjective state that people re-port when they are completely involved insomething to the point of forgetting time, fa-tigue, and everything else but the activity it-self. It is what we feel when we read a well-crafted novel or play a good game of squash,or take part in a stimulating conversation.The defining feature of flow is intense expe-riential involvement in moment-to-momentactivity. Attention is fully invested in thetask at hand, and the person functions at his

or her fullest capacity. Mark Strand, formerPoet Laureate of the United States, in one ofour interviews, described this state whilewriting as follows:

You're right in the work, you lose your senseof time, you're completely enraptured, you'recompletely caught up in what you are doing.. . . When you are working on something andyou are working wel l , you have the fee l ing tha tthere's no other way of saying what you're say-ing, (in Csikszentmihalyi , 1996, p. 121)

The intense experiential involvement offlow is responsible for three additional sub-

jective characteristics commonly reported:the merging of action and awareness, a senseof control, and an altered sense of time.

The Merging of Action and Awareness

The default option of consciousness is a cha-otic review of things that one fears or de-

sires, resulting in a phenomenological statewe have elsewhere labeled "psychic en-tropy" (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi,


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1988). During flow, however, attentional re-sources are fully invested in the task at hand,so that objects beyond the immediate inter-action generally fail to enter awareness.

One such object is the self. Respondentsfrequently describe a loss of self-conscious-ness during flow. Without the requiredattentional resources, the self-reflective pro-cesses that often intrude into awareness andcause attention to be diverted from whatneeds to be done are silenced, and the usualdualism between actor and action disap-pears. In the terms that George HerbertMead introduced (1934/1970), the "me"disappears during flow, and the "I" takesover. A rock climber in an early study of

flow put it this way:

You're so involved in what you're doing youaren't thinking about yourself as separate fromthe immediate activity. You're no longer a par-ticipant observer, only a participant. You'removing in harmony with something else you'repart of. (in Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 86)

A Sense of Control

During flow, we typically experience a sense

of controlor, more precisely, a lack of anx-iety about losing control that is typical ofmany situations in normal life. This sense ofcontrol is also reported in activities that in-volve serious risks, such as hang gliding,rock climbing, and race car drivingactivi-ties that to an outsider would seem to bemuch more potentially dangerous than theaffairs of everyday life. Yet these activitiesare structured to provide the participantwith the means to reduce the margin of errorto as close to zero as possible. Rock climb-ers, for example, insist that their hair-raisingexploits are safer than crossing a busy streetin Chicago, because, on the rock face, theycan foresee every eventuality, whereas whencrossing the street, they are at the mercy offate. The sense of control respondents de-scribe thus reflects the possibility, ratherthan the actuality, of control.

Worrying about whether we can succeedat what we are doingon the job, in rela-tionships, even in crossing a busy streetis

one of the major sources of psychic entropyin everyday life, and its reduction duringflow is one of the reasons such an experiencebecomes enjoyable and thus rewarding.

Altered Sense of Time

William James (1890, Ch. 15, Sec. 4) notedthat boredom seems to increase when "wegrow attentive to the passage of time itself."

During flow, attention is so fully invested inmoment-to-moment activity that there is lit-tle left over to devote toward the mentalprocesses that contribute to the experienceof duration (Friedman, 1990). As a result,persons deeply immersed in an activity typi-cally report time passing quickly (Conti,2001).

Exceptions occur in certain sports or jobsthat require precise knowledge of time, butthese are exceptions that prove the rule: Bas-

ketball players must learn not to dribble theball in their own side of the court for morethan 10 seconds; football players must learnto "manage the clock" in a close game.Awareness of time in these situations is notextraneous information signifying boredom,but a challenge that the person has to over-come in order to perform well.

THE CONDITIONS OF FLOW

Flow experiences are relatively rare in every-day life, but almost everythingwork, studyor religious ritualis able to produce them,provided certain conditions are met. Past re-search suggests three conditions of key im-portance. First, flow tends to occur when theactivity one engages in contains a clear set ofgoals. These goals serve to add direction andpurpose to behavior. Their value lies in theircapacity to structure experience by channel-ing attention rather than being ends in them-selves.

A second precondition for flow is a bal-ance between perceived challenges and per-ceived skills. This condition is reminiscent ofthe concept of "optimal arousal" (Berlyne,1960; Hunt, 1965), but differs from it inhighlighting the fact that what counts at thephenomenological level is the perception ofthe demands and abilities, not necessarilytheir objective presence.

When perceived challenges and skills arewell matched, as in a close game of tennis or

a satisfying musical performance, attentionis completely absorbed. This balance, how-ever, is intrinsically fragile. If challenges be-gin to exceed skills, one typically becomes


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anxious; if skills begin to exceed challenges,one relaxes and then becomes bored. Thesesubjective states provide feedback about theshifting relationship to the environment andpress the individual to adjust behavior in or-

der to escape the more aversive subjectivestate and reenter flow.

Finally, flow is dependent on the presenceof clear and immediate feedback. The indi-vidual needs to negotiate the continuallychanging environmental demands that arepart of all experientially involving activity(Reser & Scherl, 1988). Immediate feedbackserves this purpose: It informs the individualhow well he or she is progressing in the ac-tivity, and dictates whether to adjust ormaintain the present course of action. It

leaves the individual with little doubt aboutwhat to do next.

Because flow takes place at a high level ofchallenge, the feedback one receives duringthe course of an activity will inevitablyinclude "negative" performance feedback.From a phenomenological viewpoint, thisnegative feedback will not necessarily bedetrimental to task involvement. Providedthe individual perceives that he or she pos-sesses the skills to take on the challenges ofthe activity, the valence of the feedback is of

less consequence for activity enjoyment thanthe usefulness of the feedback in suggestingappropriate corrective measures. Indeed, it isnot difficult to think of situations in whichwe intentionally elicit negative feedback inorder to direct attention and behavior (e.g.,a pianist practicing with a metronome).

To summarize, clear goals, optimal chal-lenges, and clear, immediate feedback are allnecessary features of activities that promotethe intrinsically rewarding experiential in-volvement that characterizes flow. Ofcourse, this is not to say that these are theonly factors that affect the degree to whichone becomes involved in an activity. Re-search on task involvement suggests that theimportance an individual places on doingwell in an activity (i.e., "competence valua-tion") predicts the individual's involve-ment in that activity (Greenwald, 1982;Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1998; Harackiewicz& Manderlink, 1984), as does the congru-ence between task-specific, behaviorally

based goals (e.g., "I want to attach a flag tomy car's antenna") and higher level, moreabstract goals (e.g., "I want to show my pa-

triotism"), with greater congruence leadingto greater involvement (Harackiewicz &Elliot, 1998; Rathunde, 1989; Sansone,Sachau, & Weir, 1989). Furthermore, thepersonal implications an individual attri-

butes to success or failure at an activity canaffect his or her interpretation of perfor-mance feedback, which in turn has conse-quences for task involvement (Mueller &Dweck, 1998). With respect to individualdifferences, Wong (2000) found that auton-omy orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) waspositively related to involvement in school-related activities; absorption (Tellegen &Atkinson, 1974), a trait construct used tomeasure hypnotic susceptibility, and concep-tually related to openness to experience, has

been shown to be positively associated withexperiential involvement (Glisky, Tataryn,Tobias, Kihlstrom, & McConkey, 1991;Levin & Fireman, 2001; Wild, Kuiken, &Schopflocher, 1995).

FLOW AND MOTIVATION

Theories of motivation generally neglect thephenomenology of the person to whom mo-tivation is being attributed. They explain the

reason for action in functional terms, that is,by considering outcomes rather than pro-cesses (Sansone & Harackiewicz, 1996).How the person feels while acting tends tobe ignored. Yet individuals constantly evalu-ate their quality of experience and often willdecide to continue or terminate a givenbehavioral sequence based on their evalua-tions. Our research suggests that the phe-nomenological experience of flow is a pow-erful motivating force. When individuals arefully involved in an activity, they tend to findthe activity enjoyable and intrinsically re-warding. Whatever the original motivationfor playing chess or playing the stock mar-ket, or going out with a friend, such activi-ties will not continue unless they are enjoy-ableor unless people are motivated byextrinsic rewards.

Flow and Competence Motivation

Perceived competence has traditionally

played a central part in theories of motiva-tion (Bandura, 1982; Deci, 1975; Harter,1978; White, 1959). These theories gener-


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ally argue that intrinsic motivation is pro-moted by feelings of competence and effi-cacy. In support of this, several researchershave found that positive competence feed-

back is positively related to subsequentmotivation to perform an activity (Deci,1971; Elliot et al., 2000; Fisher, 1978;Harackiewicz, 1979; Ryan, 1982; Vallerand& Reid, 1984).

These findings are consistent with past re-search on flow. Our studies have found thatactors who perceive that they lack the skillsto take on effectively the challenges pre-sented by the activity in which they are par-ticipating experience anxiety or boredom,depending on how much they value doing

well in the activity (Csikszentmihalyi &LeFevre, 1989; Csikszentmihalyi & Naka-mura, 1989; Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, &Whalen, 1993). Simply put, if an actor feelsincompetent in a given situation, he or shewill tend not be motivated. However, our re-search also suggests that although perceivedcompetence seems to be an important pre-condition for intrinsic motivation, it is oftennot a predominating characteristic ofthe phenomenological experience associatedwith intrinsically motivated behavior. Morespecifically, much of the reward of intrinsi-cally motivated behavior is derived from theexperience of absorption and interest, theepitome of which is flow.

Consider the following example: A personpicks up a novel to read. As she begins read-ing it, she senses that her abilities are not upto the task, that the material is too complexfor her to appreciate fully. Feeling unable totake on the challenges of the book becauseher skills are lacking, she will experience

anxiety or boredom, and will probably optfor a less demanding novel or activity. How-ever, if she feels that the complexities of thebook are within her capacities and is able todigest the material, her decision either tocontinue reading the novel or to put it downwill be based primarily on her quality of ex-perience while reading the book, namely, theextent to which she finds the book involvingand interesting.

Emergent MotivationThe phenomenology of flow further suggeststhat we may enjoy a particular activity be-cause of something discovered through the

interaction. It is commonly reported, for in-stance, that a person is at first indifferent orbored by a certain activity, such as listeningto classical music or using a computer. Then,

when the opportunities for action becomeclearer or the individual's skills improve, theactivity begins to be interesting and, finally,enjoyable. It is in this sense that the rewardsof these types of intrinsically motivating ac-tivities are "emergent" or a priori unpredict-able.

The phenomenon of emergent motivationmeans that we can come to experience a newor previously unengaging activity as intrinsi-cally rewarding, if we find flow in it. Themotivation to persist in or return to the ac-

tivity arises out of the experience itself.What happens next is responsive to whathappened immediately before, within theinteraction, rather than being dictated by apreexisting intentional structure locatedwithin either the person (e.g., a goal ordrive) or the environment (e.g., a tradition,script, or set of rules). The flow experience isthus a force for expansion in relation to theindividual's goal and interest structure, aswell as for the growth of skills in relation toan existing interest (Csikszentmihalyi &Nakamura, 1999).

Certain technologies become successful atleast in part because they provide flow, thusmotivating people to use them. A good ex-ample is the Internet, developed with fundsmade available by the U.S. Department ofDefense for purposes of national security.This technology has been adapted to allsorts of unexpected uses and has made pos-sible an enormous variety of unpredicted ex-periences. It partly accounts, for instance,

for the spectac ular success of the Linux opensystem software, where tens of thousands ofamateur and professional programmerswork hard to come up with new softwarefor the sheer delight of solving a problem,and for being appreciated by respectedpeers. In the process, Linux has been makingheadway against much more formidablecompetitors, such as Microsoft, who have topay their programmers to write softwareaclear example of emergent intrinsic rewardsactually trumping extrinsic rewards.

In summary, quality of experience is theproximal cause of intrinsically motivatedbehavior. When an individual begins, contin-ues, or ends an activity that is not motivated


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FLOW AND SPECIES-LEVELDEVELOPMENT

Flow and the Evolution of Consciousness

Consciousness is the complex system thathas evolved in humans for selecting, process-ing, and storing the profusion of informa-tion provided by the senses. Consciousnessgives us a measure of control, freeing usfrom complete subservience to the dictatesof genes and culture, by representing alter-native courses of action in awareness,thereby introducing the alternative of reject-ing rather than enacting them. It thus servesas a clutch between programmed instruc-tions and adaptive behaviors (Csikszentmihalyi& Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Alongside thegenetic and cultural guides to action, it es-tablishes a teleonomy of the self, a set ofgoals that have been freely chosen by the in-dividual (cf. Brandstadter, 1998; Csikszent-mihalyi & Massimini, 1985; Deci & Ryan,1985). It might, of course, prove dangerousto disengage our behavior from direct con-trol by the genetic and cultural instructionsthat have evolved over millennia of adaptingto the environment. On the other hand, do-

ing so may increase the chances for adaptivefit with the present environment, particu-larly under conditions of radical or rapidchange.

In order for consciousness to be used forsuch positive ends, however, a person mustlearn to enjoy being conscious. People valuein principle but seldom resort to free choice,reflection, and the weighing of alternatives.As Dostoevsky eloquently described in histale of the Grand Inquisitor, it is much easier

to act in terms of habit and convention, rely-ing on genetic and cultural programs, thanto decide in terms of one's own experience.This is in part due to the fact that the skillsfor being conscious need to be cultivated, orthe task will seem too daunting and thusproduce anxiety.

Our schools are geared to teach cognitiveskills, but these do not necessarily developthe skill for being conscious. A young per-son needs to exercise freedom in the alloca-

tion of attention, the pursuit of interests,and the mastering of challenges; only thenwill he or she begin to enjoy being con-scious. This opportunity is rarely present inthe normal school environmentor even

earlier, in the family environment of theyoung child. But unless we learn to enjoy us-ing the mind freely, yet in an orderly fashion,the evolution of consciousness is going to be

hampered.

Flow and the Evolution of Culture

Flow is not only an important mechanism inthe development of the person, but it alsoplays an important role in the developmentof culture. As we mentioned earlier in dis-cussing the successful spread of the Linuxopen software system, new technologies, be-liefs, lifestylesand even political systemsare often adopted or rejected on the basis ofwhether they enhance or diminish the prob-ability of producing flow.

Professor Fausto Massimini of the Univer-sity of Milan was the first scholar to realizethe potential of flow to explain the selectionof new cultural artifacts, or "memes"(Csikszentmihalyi & Massimini, 1985;Inghilleri, 1999; Massimini, Csikszentmihalyi,& Delle Fave, 1988). Essentially, the likeli-hood that a new idea, product, or processwill survive over time is a function of the at-

tention it attracts. A song, a scientific theory,or a religious system will be rememberedand transmitted to the next generation onlyif some people pay attention to it. And peo-ple will pay attention in large part becausethe new meme provides an enjoyable chal-lenge.

This is clearly the case in the advancementof science. Thomas Kuhn (1970) describeshow by focusing attention upon a smallrange of relatively esoteric problems, scien-

tists are able to delve in greater depth anddetail into their investigations, and therebyadvance their field. Yet such focused atten-tion cannot be sustained unless there are in-teresting problems that challenge the scien-tist. If there are none, the paradigm becomesboring, and the field disappears for lack ofyoung recruits who are attracted to a differ-ent field by more interesting problems.

The same holds true for art, according toCollingwood (1938) and Martindale (1990).

More generally, any field of creative accom-plishment requires concentrated attention,to the exclusion of all other stimuli, whichtemporarily become irrelevant (Csikszent-mihalyi, 1975; Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi,


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1976; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001).Yet one does not need to look at great ac-complishments to realize this basic functionof attention. More mundane work is just asdependent on it. In describing the workers

that made industrialization possible at thedawn of capitalism, Max Weber (1930, p.71) commented on the relationship betweenpuritanical religious beliefs and training onthe one hand, and productivity on the other:"The ability of mental concentration . . . ishere most often combined with ... a coolself-control and frugality which enormouslyincrease performance. This creates the mostfavorable foundation for the conception oflabor as an end in itself."

The late Roman Empire, the last decades

of Byzantium, and the French court in thesecond half of the 18th century are only afew of the most notorious examples of whatcan happen when large segments of societyfail to find enjoyment in productive life. Toprovide such experiences, the rulers of soci-ety had to resort to increasingly elaborateand expensive means of control and repres-sion, or else artificial stimulations circuses,chariot races, balls, and hunts that drainthe attention of a passive population with-

out leaving any useful residue. Whenever asociety is unable to provide flow experiencesin productive activities, its members willfind flow in activities that are either wastefulor actually disruptive.

CONCLUSIONS

The ability to enjoy challenges and thenmaster them is a fundamental metaskill thatis essential to individual development and tocultural evolution. Yet many obstacles pre-vent individuals from experiencing flow.These range from inherited genetic malfunc-tions to forms of social oppression that re-duce personal freedom and prevent the ac-quisition of skills.

But even in the most benign situations,flow may be difficult to attain. For instance,in our society at present, most parents aredetermined to provide the best conditionsfor their children's future happiness. They

work hard, so that they can buy a nice homein the suburbs, get all the consumer goodsthey can afford, and send the children to thebest schools possible. Unfortunately, none of

this guarantees that the children will getwhat they need to learn in order to enjoylife. In fact, a growing number of studiessuggests that excessive concern for safety,comfort, and material well-being is detri-

mental to optimal development (Csikszent-mihalyi & Hunter, 2003; Kasser & Ryan,1993; Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). The ster-ile surroundings of our living arrangements,the absence of working parents and otheradults who could initiate young people intothe joys of living, the addictive nature ofpassive entertainment and the reliance onmaterial rewards, and the excessive concernof schools with testing and with disembod-ied knowledge all militate against learningto enjoy mastering the challenges that life in-

evitably presents.Thus, understanding how flow works is

essential for social scientists interested in im-proving the quality of life at either the sub-jective or objective level. Transforming thisknowledge into effective action is not easy.But the challenges this presents promise al-most infinite opportunities for enjoyment tothose who are willing to develop the skillsnecessary to master them.

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