Noël CarrollInterpretation, Theatrical Performance, and Ontology

Both James Hamilton and David Saltz challengethe ontological view that theatrical perfor-mances are interpretations. Saltz even calls thecorrelation between theatrical performances andinterpretations a fallacy. Because there are manydifferent ways to understand the relevant notionsof interpretation and because there are alterna-tive ways of deploying them in characterizingthe ontological status of theatrical perfor-mances, Hamilton and Saltz explore a number ofdifferent formulations of the putative fallacy andspike them one at a time.

I found both of these essays immensely richand penetrating, and I learned a great deal fromthem. I agree with many of their findings. Forexample, I believe that Saltz is absolutely cor-rect to argue that the assimilation of so-calledtheatrical/performative interpretation with criti-cal interpretation is mistaken.1 However, sinceinterpretation figures in the ontological distinc-tion that I draw between mass artworks and livetheatrical performances,2 both Saltz and Hamil-ton fear that I, too, commit the interpretation fal-lacy. But on that point I have yet to be con-vinced.

In certain respects, I have backed into this de-bate. In the offending passages of my writing, Iwas not directly concerned with developing anaccount of the ontology of theatrical perfor-mance, but rather an account of the ontology offilm and, then, of mass art. Part of my account ofmass art evolved through a contrast betweentoken performances of mass artworks, such asfilm screenings, and token theatrical perfor-mances. Both sorts of performances are tokensgenerated from types, but I claim that there areontologically significant differences in theirmanner of generation. Token performances ofmass artworks, such as film screenings, are gen-erated by templates, such as reels of celluloid,whereas token theatrical performances are gen-erated from interpretations. The pertinent tem-plates with regard to mass artworks are them-selves tokens, whereas the interpretations thatmediate between theatrical types and token per-formances thereof are types.

Connected to this distinction, then, is another,which, though present in my writings, was not

perhaps as salient as it might have been.3 Tokenperformances of mass artworks, such as a filmscreening, are derived from the relevant tem-plates mechanically, electronically, or somehowautomatically without the intervention of inten-tional processes. Getting a token performance ofa film onscreen involves essentially setting amechanism in motion; the process can be fullyautomated.

In contrast, evolving an interpretation of atheatrical type and implementing it require themediation of intentional processes—acts ofimagination and judgment by actors, directors,set designers, costumers, lighting specialists,and so on. Put into a rough slogan: token perfor-mances of mass artworks are mechanically me-diated; token theatrical performances aremind-mediated.4

That is, if you want to explain why a characteris physically placed screen left in tonight’sscreening/performance of The Phantom Men-ace, you advert to a causal chain involving pho-tography, chemistry, and the optics of projec-tion. If you want to explain how the charactergot to be standing stage left in tonight’s theatri-cal performance of Titus Andronicus, you referto a network of judgments, intentions, and gov-erning interpretations, including the actor’s be-lief that that is where he should be standing.

The screen placement of the film actor tonightis counterfactually dependent (in terms of proxi-mate causation) on physical processes—thestructure of the relevant template and the projec-tion system. The stage placement of the theateractors tonight is counterfactually dependent onintentional processes, including the actor’s be-liefs, relative to a governing interpretation,about where he or she should be. All thingsbeing equal, the placement of the film actor to-night in relation to the overall screen space can-not be otherwise, whereas the placement of thetheater actor can vary, should the actor judge orbelieve that, in accordance with a better inter-pretation of the scene in this space, he or sheshould stand a little more upstage or downstage.

I use the notion of interpretation to label theintentionally mediated distance between thetheatrical type and the token theatrical perfor-

Symposium: Staging Interpretations Carroll, Interpretation, Performance, Ontology 313

mance.5 The label “interpretation” was chosen,not to align theatrical interpretation with criticalinterpretation, but in the perfectly unexception-able sense of “interpretation” as a matter of “fill-ing something in.” “Interpretation,” in my sense,involves going beyond the given; in this context,it signals going beyond what is given by the playtype. From the perspective of executing a tokentheatrical performance, the play type—whichmay be specified by a text, or, as in many impro-visations and rituals, by a mere action plan—isincomplete. The performers and designers mustfill it in with determinate choices. That is to treatthe theatrical type as a recipe or a set of instruc-tions or a baseline from which variations, i.e.,interpretations, are to be spun.

The variations may mesh with or go againstthe grain of the theatrical type, but either waythey are interpretations that fill in the recipe.That is, I count as interpretations both attemptsto get at the authorial meaning of the text, suchas William Poel’s production of Hamlet, AndréAntoine’s production of The Power of Darkness,and Katie Mitchell’s production of Henry VI,6 aswell as more radical rereadings, such as RichardForeman’s of Three Penny Opera, Peter Sellars’sof The Merchant of Venice, and Joan Akalaitis’sof Cymbeline.7

Moreover, interpretations, in my sense, notonly concern the thematic meaning of the type,but also judgments about the way in which theactor should wear her hat, lower her sword, lighta cigarette or not, and so on. How that happenstonight onstage is intentionally mediated, or, as Iwould say, “interpretively mediated.” How thathappens in a token performance of a motion pic-ture is mechanically determined by a device run-ning the template in accordance with the way themachine was designed to be used. We see theactor smoking a certain way in an episode ofMelrose Place because that is what the camerarecorded and what the appropriately functioningprojection apparatus (here a TV monitor) ren-ders.

I further argue that the template-mechanismmodel can be generalized across the productionof token performances and presentations of massartworks, and that it reveals an ontological dis-tinction between them and the intention-alistically or interpretively mediated productionof things like token theatrical performances on-stage (as opposed to recordings therefrom). I still

think that this is a workable distinction, though Iwill mention one potential sort of problem casebefore concluding.

With these (I hope) clarifications in hand, letme now turn to the reservations that Saltz andHamilton have voiced about my position. First, Ihave repeatedly spoken of theatrical perfor-mance tokens as being generated from interpre-tations; I do not identify theatrical performancetokens with interpretations.8 I think that I under-stand Saltz’s reluctance to call Rex Harrison’sthree hundredth live, onstage rendition of “I’veGrown Accustomed to Her Face” an interpreta-tion and his preference for calling Harrison’stheatrical performance an execution of the song.But I do not think that this inclination compro-mises my claim that the pertinent theatrical per-formance token was generated from an interpre-tation—a set of choices about cadences anddramatic intonations—that, in this case, wereworked out in advance in concert with the direc-tor and perhaps others. There is something thatwe can call “Rex Harrison’s interpretation of‘I’ve Grown Accustomed to Her Face,’” and histhree hundredth theatrical performance token ofit is counterfactually dependent on that, whereasthe one millionth film performance token of thatsong at a screening somewhere in Sri Lanka isgenerated by running a template of GeorgeCukor’s My Fair Lady on the right kind of ma-chine in the right way.

In speaking of the generation of performancetokens by means of interpretations, I think that Ican acknowledge the distinction Saltz wishes tomaintain between interpretation and executionwithout abandoning my central thesis about thegeneration of theatrical performance tokens. Atthe same time, however, though I agree that inter-pretations are generally in place before perfor-mances, I would not wish to preclude the possi-bility that they may be born during performances.An actor may discover a new line delivery—aninterpretive act of filling in the play, on my ac-count—during a performance and then continueto act in accordance with that interpretation onsubsequent evenings. Although Saltz is right thatnot every element of a theatrical performancetoken can be called an interpretation, even if it isdependent on one, I do not think that he should, ifhe does, want to deny that interpretations—thatthen govern later performances—can emergeduring token theatrical performances.

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Both Saltz and Hamilton appear to connectthe notion of interpretation pretty strictly to theexcavation of the meaning of a text. Thus, Saltzcorrectly reminds us that performances maychallenge the meaning of a text, while Hamiltonhelpfully points out that most theatrical perfor-mances involve a great deal of what might becalled the stimulation of effects rather than theprojection of meanings. However, as alreadymentioned, my use of “interpretation” is broaderthan that of determining the meaning of a theat-rical type; it refers to the filling out or fleshingout of a theatrical text or action plan with effectsas well as implied meanings, whether or not theycorrespond to authorial intentions.9 Casting anactor, planning a lighting scheme, designing aset, and adopting an “alienation technique” areall parts of composing an interpretation on myaccount and not merely, as Saltz might say,“choices consistent with their interpretation.”10

Given the broadness of my concept of inter-pretation, I resist those criticisms that emphasizethat there is more to theatrical performance thanthe determination of meaning, or even canonicalmeaning, narrowly construed. For I agree thatthere is “more,” but I count much of that “more”as interpretation. Perhaps Saltz and Hamiltonwill complain that my conception of interpreta-tion is too broad. Nevertheless, I find some con-firmation in my usage in ordinary language,where the notion of dramatic interpretation, asfound, for example, in theater manuals, oftenranges beyond the decipherment of meaning tothe kinds of choices I count under the rubric offilling in the theatrical type. And, in any event, ifit turns out that I have misused language here,then I will be happy to look for another word forthe intentional processes I have located as onto-logically essential for the generation of theatri-cal performance tokens.11

My use of the concept of interpretationprompts Hamilton to worry that I must be think-ing exclusively of text-based plays and herightly stresses that not all theatrical perfor-mances are text based. Thus, he suggests that mydistinctions rest too narrowly on recent, espe-cially western, models. His reasoning seems tobe: if performances are generated from interpre-tations, these must be interpretations of some-thing, and the most likely candidates are playtexts. But I think that interpretations in my sensecan also be fillings-in or fleshings-out of sketchy

action plans or oral instructions or traditional,unwritten scripts passed down through the mem-ory of a community or a troupe. The theatricaltype that is filled out by an interpretation neednot be a well-made play; therefore, my relianceon interpretation does not entail an inadvertentprivileging of somewhat recent, arguably paro-chial forms of western theater.

Saltz objects to my notion that token theatri-cal performances are generated by interpretationtypes on the grounds that actual performancesinvolve more fine-grained choices than are man-dated by an interpretation type. That is, the exe-cution of the performance token is not fully de-termined by the interpretation. Tonight the wavein the protagonist’s hair is a little flatter than itwas last night. But I do not see why this callsinto question my claim that the actor’s coiffureis governed by an interpretation—in this in-stance, a predetermined design-type intention-ally created to fill in the “look” of the character.Two numerically different coins may differ inmany subtle details (within certain variances)while still being tokens of the same type.12 Per-haps the problem here is that Saltz is confusingmy thesis about the generation of token theatri-cal performances from interpretation types withthe thesis that token theatrical performances areidentical with interpretations.13

In short, then, I remain fairly satisfied withthe ontological distinction that I drew betweenthe generation of token theatrical performancesand the generation of token presentations ofmass artworks. However, before concluding, Ishould mention, as promised, one possible prob-lem case.

There is a theatrical performance group calledSurvival Research Laboratories. They specializein pieces involving machines crashing into anddestroying other machines in what might becalled “metallic gladiatorial spectacles.” Sincethese machines are directed by remote controland, therefore, are intentionally mediated, theseperformances are token theatrical performancesnot only in terms of their distribution venues, buton my theory as well. Nevertheless, it is easy toimagine these machines being run automaticallyby computers so that one might have congruentperformance tokens of the same program occur-ring simultaneously at numerous different re-ception sites in theaters all over the world.

Would such performances—which might

Symposium: Staging Interpretations Carroll, Interpretation, Performance, Ontology 315

pave the way for synchronic, robotic, Disneyproductions of Beauty and the Beast every-where—count as theatrical performance tokensor as mass art performance tokens? Would theyblur the distinction that I set out earlier? My dis-position would be to regard them as mass artperformance tokens, rather than theatrical per-formance tokens, since they are mechanicallymediated rather than mind-mediated. But if intu-itions lean powerfully in the opposite direction,that would, of course, weigh heavily against mytheory.

NOËL CARROLLDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin–MadisonMadison, Wisconsin 53706

1. One reason that I concur with Saltz is that whereas al-ternative, incompatible critical interpretations cannot bothbe acceptable, since they cannot both be true, incompatibletheatrical interpretations of the same play may each be theat-rically acceptable.

2. See Noël Carroll, “Towards an Ontology of the MovingImage,” Film and Philosophy, ed. Cynthia Freeland and TomWartenberg (New York: Routledge, 1995); Noël Carroll,“Defining the Moving Image,” in my Theorizing the MovingImage (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); andNoël Carroll, “The Ontology of Mass Art,” in my A Philoso-phy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).

3. See my “Defining the Moving Image,” pp. 68–69, and“The Ontology of Mass Art,” pp. 213–214.

4. This is why I disagree with Saltz’s suggestion that the-atrical productions could be templates in my sense. For the-atrical performance tokens that are governed by what Saltzcalls “productions” involve the mediation of intentional pro-cesses, whereas the templates I have in mind are machine in-struments. I do, however, discuss some similarities betweentheatrical productions and film productions in my “Towardsan Ontology of the Moving Image.”

5. This, of course, is not intended to deny that interpreta-tions go into the production of a film type. Certainly inter-pretation is involved as a background condition in the cre-ation of the templates that subsequently generate filmperformances/screenings. However, once the template hasbeen fixed, you get to the token performance of the film typeby running the template on a machine, some sort of projec-tion apparatus. The generation of the token film perfor-mance, then, is achieved mechanically rather than via an in-terpretation.

6. Mitchell says that when she works on an old play, shelooks up the etymological root of every word in the text. SeeGabriella Giannachi and Mary Luckhurst, eds., On Di-recting: Interviews with Directors (New York: St. Martin’sGriffin, 1999), p. 95.

7. For an account of contemporary rereadings such asthese, see Amy S. Green, The Revisionist Stage: AmericanDirectors Reinvent the Classics (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994).

I should also note that my understanding of interpretationis not so broad as to count Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest orHeiner Müller’s Hamletmachine as interpretations of Shake-speare, since each is an original play in its own right.

8. One of the subheadings in Saltz’s article asks, “AreRecipes Interpretations?” I should note that this query can-not apply to my position, since, on my view, from the per-spective of performing a play, it is play types and not inter-pretations of play types that are recipes.

Also, Saltz says something very peculiar in this subsec-tion of his essay. He maintains that determining with respectto an apple pie recipe whether “sugar” should be understoodas granulated white sugar or unbleached sugar is a matter ofinterpretation, while determining whether to read “apple” asGranny Smith or Roma apples is a matter of execution. I donot see the distinction that Saltz is getting at. Both decisionsseem to me to be interpretations, ways of filling in the recipe.Thus, I am not moved by these examples to abandon myview of interpretation.

Perhaps Saltz has in mind that the sugar case involves fig-uring out what the recipe means, while the apple case is con-cerned with figuring out how to implement the recipe. Nev-ertheless, since my conception of the pertinent sort ofinterpretation is not restricted to determining meaning, butincludes, as well, other kinds of decisions about the ways inwhich to embody the play type, Saltz’s distinction, if he re-ally has one, does not threaten what I claim about theatricalinterpretation.

9. Thus, I count Brecht’s treatment of the opening sceneof Coriolanus as a theatrical interpretation.

10. One possible counterexample to the claim that playsare interpretations might be the performance of a drama by aplay-reading group of amateurs which is governed by noth-ing more than the idea that an attempt be made to read everyword in the text. Here, it might be said, there is no interpreta-tion. However, in this case, I would argue that the commit-ment to the rule that every word be read constitutes a theatri-cal interpretation—a way of filling in the recipe—albeit avery minimal one.

11. Marking this distinction, of course, does not provide areal definition of theatrical performance, but it may recordone of its essential characteristics. Thus, there may be roomfor some ontology here even if Hamilton is right that a realdefinition of theatrical performance is unlikely. That is, itmay not be the case, as Hamilton suggests, that the illumina-tion of the historical conditions of what counts as a theatricalperformance in a certain tradition is all we can ever hope for.

12. Maybe Saltz’s worry is that because of the variabilitybetween theatrical performance tokens, there is no system-atic way to identify whether a given performance is a tokenof the pertinent interpretation type. However, although Ihave not worked this out in detail, it seems to me, as a firstapproximation, that the pertinent criteria for counting atoken theatrical performance as an instance of an interpreta-tion type include (1) that it be causally related to (that it bederived from) the interpretation in question, and (2) that it beconstrained to respect the practice-sensitive similarities be-tween interpretation types and token performances that arerequired to obtain in the relevant performance tradition.

13. But I cannot be taken to hold the latter thesis, since Imaintain that interpretations are types, not tokens.

316 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism