INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR …following the genocide in Rwanda, and more than four years...

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALFOR RWANDA:

JUSTICE DELAYED7 June 2001

Africa Report n°30Nairobi/Arusha/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF RWANDA..................................................................................................................................................................... I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................... II

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................3

II. THE ICTR UNDER SCRUTINY: THE FORGOTTEN URGENCY OF ITS MANDATE........................................3

A. SOME SYMBOLIC RESULTS................................................................................................................3

1. Trials : Sending a Message Against Impunity...............................................................................32. The ICTR’s Achievements: Recognition of the Genocide and Political Neutralisation of “Hutu

Power” ...........................................................................................................................................73. Cautious Determination to Prosecute Crimes Committed by the RPF and the Attack of 6 April

1994 ...............................................................................................................................................8

B. THE ICTR’S FAILURES: UNACCEPTABLE BUREAUCRATIC LOGJAMS ..................................10

1. The Heavy Responsibility of Judges ...........................................................................................102. Levels of Staff Competence at the Office of the Prosecutor .......................................................113. Internal Power Struggles..............................................................................................................124. Management of the Defence........................................................................................................12

III. THE ICTR AND STATES: LEGAL COOPERATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY .................................13

A. ARRESTS: CONTINUED PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN CRIMINALS ..........................................14

1. The Democratic Republic of Congo - Protector of Military Fugitives........................................142. The Troublesome Kabuga in Kenya............................................................................................15

B. THE TRANSFER OF SUSPECTS - PROMPT ACTION AND LONG DELAYS ...............................17

C. AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE TO BE ENCOURAGED: FUNDS FOR INFORMERS ......................18

IV. THE ICTR AND RWANDA: THE INEVITABLE POLITICISATION OF JUSTICE............................................19

A. JUSTICE DEPENDANT UPON ACCESS TO THE CRIME SCENES................................................19

1. Relations Initially Marked by Defiance.......................................................................................192. The Barayagwiza Affair ..............................................................................................................203. The Difficult Task of Managing Witnesses.................................................................................22

B. A POLITICAL MANDATE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE .....................................................................23

1. A Tribunal Isolated from Rwandan Society ................................................................................232. The ICTR and Reconciliation......................................................................................................26

V. THE FUTURE OF THE ICTR: THE NEED FOR RESULTS....................................................................................28

A. ARRESTS: MAKING BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS .........................................28

1. Using the Full Procedural Arsenal ..............................................................................................282. Giving the Prosecution More Autonomy.....................................................................................29

B. INCREASING ICTR'S PRESENCE AND INFORMATION IN RWANDA.........................................29

C. ORGANISING TRIALS OR HEARINGS IN KIGALI TO GIVE RWANDANS A NEW SENSE OFOWNERSHIP IN THE TRIALS ............................................................................................................30

D. CONFRONTING THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION.........................................................................31

1. Forgotten Victims ........................................................................................................................312. Victim Reparation vs. Victim Compensation..............................................................................32

E. THE DEBATE ON BROADENING THE MANDATE OF THE ICTR AND THE FIGHT AGAINSTIMPUNITY ............................................................................................................................................34

F. BROADENING THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL COURTS: SHARING THELOAD ....................................................................................................................................................35

CONCLUSION: ESTABLISH A TERM LIMIT ....................................................................................................................37

APPENDICES

A. LIST OF ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................39

B. CHRONOLOGY OF ICTR ACTIVITIES..............................................................................................40

C. SITUATION OF ICTR PRISONERS 9 MAY 2000...............................................................................43

D. DEFENCE AND TRIAL COSTS...........................................................................................................51

E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .............................................................................54

F. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS...........................................................................................55

G. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ......................................................................................................................59

Ile Bugarura

Ile Idjwi

BIRUNGA NAT'L PARK KAGERA

NATIONAL

PARK

Ile Wahu

Ile Gombo

Rusatira

Cyimbogo

Kagitumba

Bukavu

Bugesera

NgaramaGabiro

Kabaya Rushashi

Kirehe

Kiyumba

NembaKagali

Busogo

Nyundo

Gishyita

Mabanza

Ruhango

Gisagara

Rwesero

KamembeRwumba

Cyamba

Mulindi

Goma

RutshuruNyagatare

Munini

Nemba

Kirambo

Murambi

Nyabisindu

Bwakira

Busoro

Bare

Rilima

Rwamagana

GisakuraKarama

Rukira

Runyombyi

Kitabi

Ruramba

Rwamatamu

Gikoro

Ngororero

Sake

Muvumba

Gatunda

KoraMutura

Ngaru

Butaro

Runda

Rusumo

Kinyinya

RutareMuhura

Bicumbi

Rukara

Ngenda

Bulinga

Lubirizi

Katuna

Rwemhasha

Kinihira

Mbogo

Kinyami

Kidaho

Kayonza

Kigarama

Kicukiro

Kaduha

Karaba

BugumyaKarengera

Masango

Nyakabuye

Birambo

Gatagara

Kafunzo

Kisoro

Kabale

Merama

Cyanika

Shyorongi

Butamwa

Gashora

Bugarama

Ruhengeri

Gisenyi

GitaramaKibuye

Byumba

CyanguguGikongoro

Butare

KibungoK I B U Y E

G I S E N Y I

K I G A L I

G I K O N G O R O

B U T A R E

G I T A R A M A

K I B U N G O

R U H E N G E R I

C Y A N G U G U

B Y U M B A

Lake Bunyonyi

Lac Cyohoha

Sud

Lac Rweru

Lac Cyambwe

Lac Mugesera

Lake Mujunju

Lake Bisongou

Lac Ihema

Lac Kivumba

Lac Hago

Lac Mikindi

Lac Rwanyakizinga

Lac Nasho

Lake Mutanda

Lac Kivu

Lac Mpanga

Lac Burera

Lac Ruhondo

Lac Muhazi

Kag

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A

kan

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Nyabarongo

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UGANDA

BURUNDIUNITED

REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE

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30° 30'

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RWANDA

Map No. 3717 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS December 1997 (Colour)

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

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ICG Africa Report N° 30 7 June 2001

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA:

JUSTICE DELAYED(Original Version in French)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Seven years after its establishment immediatelyfollowing the genocide in Rwanda, and more thanfour years since the beginning of the first trial, theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR), based at Arusha, Tanzania, has to datehanded down verdicts on only nine individuals. Of69 indicted suspects, 45 have been arrested. Notone of the alleged masterminds of the genocide hasbeen brought to trial – including ColonelTheoneste Bagosora who has been in prison forfive years. Most of the masterminds of thegenocide, whether officially indicted by ICTR ornot (due to lack of evidence), are able to live freelyin many countries, including the DRC, Gabon,Kenya, and also France and Belgium.

With more than 800 employees, three trialchambers presided over by nine judges, and abudget of around 90 million US U.S.$, theperformance of the ICTR is lamentable. BetweenJuly 1999 and October 2000, the only substantialcase heard1 was the trial of a single accused,Ignace Bagilishema, the former mayor of thevillage of Mabanza, which has just concluded. Fivejudges out of nine have spent more than a year anda half without hearing a substantial case and one of

1 A substantial case is defined as the taking of witnesstestimony, their questioning by the prosecutor, their cross-examination by the defence or the taking of expertevidence during a public hearing. The trial of the formermayor of Mabanza, Ignace Bagilishema began lastDecember and the verdict is expected on 7 June 2001.

them had managed by last March to attain a record28 months without hearing a substantial matter.

There are some points in the ICTR’s favour. It hasprovided indisputable recognition of the Rwandangenocide and has politically neutralised the “HutuPower” movement’s agenda of Tutsiextermination. However, seven years on, it has stillnot been able to shed light on the design,mechanisms, chronology, organisation andfinancing of the genocide, nor has it answered thekey question: who committed the genocide?Compared to the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ICTR hassuffered from international disinterest and ashocking lack of media attention. That is in partbecause the jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited tothe trial of crimes committed in 1994, while theICTY’s jurisdiction is not subject to any time limit.

The symbolic existence of the tribunal has also notdiscouraged the ongoing protection in certaincapitals (Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Nairobi amongothers) of more than a dozen powerful RwandanHutus who are among the principal genocidesuspects. Neither does it appear to have dissuadedthe perpetrators of the 1994 genocide and the warbetween the former Rwandan government ofHabyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF). The perpetrators of the genocide rearmedwith complete impunity in the refugee camps ofeastern Congo, leading to the resumption of thewar by the RPF in 1996 and again 1998 on the

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Delayed JusticeICG Africa Report N° 30, 7 June 2001 Page iii

territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo,where war crimes and crimes against humanitycontinue to be committed by both sides.

It is certainly not the responsibility of the judges ofthe ICTR to write history. But their failure tocomplete the central tasks of delivering justice andestablishing a record of events also prevents themfrom contributing to another mandate set by theSecurity Council: national reconciliation betweenthe Hutu and Tutsi communities. The fact is thatthe political relevance of that mandate has beenrapidly overtaken by the continuation and regionalspread of the conflict.

For the majority of Rwandans, the ICTR is auseless institution, an expedient mechanism for theinternational community to absolve itself of itsresponsibilities for the genocide and its toleranceof the crimes of the RPF. The Rwandangovernment complains of the squandering ofmoney and resources while 130,000 prisoners fillits jails and its courts have tried more than 4000suspects; the survivors of the genocide find thetribunal distant and indifferent to their lot, and thevictims of the crimes of the RPF denounce it as aninstrument of the Kigali regime, seeing the ICTRas a symbol of victor’s justice.

The important task of the ICTR seems to havebeen lost in daily dysfunction and internalbureaucratic conflict. The geographic split of theoffice of the Prosecutor between Arusha, Kigaliand The Hague has seriously impededinvestigations, and the long absences of judges anddefence lawyers have not assisted trialproceedings. There is now a grave risk that thosein custody will be released because of the failure tobring them to trial after a period of years. TheICTR must immediately focus on meeting itsmandate, while the UN Security Council must askthe prosecutor to set a deadline for investigations,and ask the judges to publish a trial schedule.Every day the mission of the ICTR becomes moreof an historical exercise, with less and less chanceof having an impact on events of the present. Totolerate such a situation, and support it for toolong, would be a second betrayal of the people ofRwanda.

Above all, in the short term, it is imperative toestablish priorities among pending cases, and bring

to trial those who are already in custody. Three ofthe key groups that were used by Hutu extremistsin the former Rwandan leadership were the army,the interim government and the media. The trial ofkey media figures is underway. The trial ofmilitary figures, many of whom are already inprison, should also begin as a matter of urgency.This is extremely important in order to show howthe genocide was planned and carried out. Thecases against former ministers of the interimgovernment should also begin as soon as possible.

Once the major genocide trials are complete, theICTR must undertake investigations of crimescommitted in 1994 by the RPF. Despite publicannouncements at the beginning of the proceedingsand the promise of cooperation by the governmentof Rwanda, it is likely that this inquiry will beseriously limited. It is hard to imagine that those inpower will, in effect, lift immunity on the military,especially those who are continuing the war in theDRC. It is nevertheless crucial to insist that theregime in Kigali deliver criminals into the hands ofinternational prosecutors, and so give a strongpolitical signal that no crime, past or present, willgo unpunished.

If the international community really wants todeliver justice and combat impunity it musturgently reform the operations of the ICTR. Therecruitment of judges must be reviewed to ensurethat they have real professional experience incriminal justice. They must be made accountablefor their activities and performance. Theindependence of the prosecutor’s office must bestrengthened and incompetent employees of theprosecutor’s office and registrar’s office should bedismissed. At the same time, internationalcooperation between states and the ICTR must beimproved in relation to the arrest and prompttransfer of suspects.

UN member states should extend their legaljurisdictions to help the cause of justice inRwanda. The best example so far has been that ofBelgium, which has just tried four Rwandansunder a 1993 law that gives its national courts thepower to try suspects for genocide, no matterwhere the crimes were committed.

In the current situation and in the face of such alarge task, it is illusory to think of enlarging the

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Delayed JusticeICG Africa Report N° 30, 7 June 2001 Page iv

mandate of the ICTR to include crimes committedin the DRC, or in Burundi, as some have proposed.Until the permanent International Criminal Courtis established, international law must immediatelybe applied in national jurisdictions to prosecutecrimes committed in Burundi since 1993 and in theDRC since 1995. It may also be envisaged that aspecial court of mixed jurisdiction be created alongthe lines of those proposed for Sierra Leone andCambodia. The question of the enlargement of theICTR may be reconsidered in future, but only if itquickly manages to fulfil its mandate.

In the end, the international tribunal must deliverjustice to the victims of the genocide. Certain trialsshould for example be transferred to Kigali toreach certain audiences and to increase the impacton the Rwandan population. The question ofcompensation for victims by the creation of aninternational fund is equally important.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITYCOUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT

1. Ask the Prosecutor to set a deadline forinvestigations and ensure that the arrest ofthe masterminds of the genocide is made apriority. Require the judges to provide acourt schedule establishing priorities, andinitiate without delay the trials of membersof the interim government, former seniorofficers of the armed forces, and politicalleaders who are already in custody. Ensurethat the prosecution strategy of the Tribunalconforms to stated objectives and thatefficient methods are implemented.

2. Pass a resolution obliging all states whichhave tolerated the presence of seventeenknown fugitives on their territory to make aserious effort to arrest and transfer thesepersons to Arusha, under threat of sanctions.The names of the states concerned should becited in the resolution.

3. Provide half-yearly reports on the activitiesof the ICTR and judges.

4. Give the office of the prosecutor bothautonomy of action and financial autonomyto carry out investigations and issueindictments.

5. Create a commission to study the question ofcompensation for victims of the genocide,taking into account initiatives already put inplace by the Registrar of the Tribunal and bythe government of Rwanda. This complexissue should not be solely in the hands of theTribunal. The commission may consider thecreation of an international fund, run by aboard of eminent persons.

TO MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITEDNATIONS

On the Search for and Arrest of Suspects

6. Make the arrest of suspects a political andfinancial priority for national police.Strengthen assistance to the ICTR in theinvestigation and seizure of suspects, and putdiplomatic pressure on those who aresuspected of providing refuge or protectionto suspects on their territory, such as Kenya(in the case of Kabuga), Congo-Brazzavilleand DRC (Bizimungu, Ntiwiragabo,Mpiranya and Renzaho) and Cameroon(Mpiranya).

On the Transfer of Suspects

7. Transfer those indicted by the Tribunal asquickly as possible and with respect to thelaw, in the absence of any special procedure.

On the Protection of Witnesses

8. Increase the protection options available tothe Tribunal so that it can, if necessary, offerto relocate witnesses summoned to appearbefore it or informers who have assisted theProsecutor.

On the Trial of Alleged “Genocidaires”

9. Encourage states to adapt national laws, asBelgium has, that give them the universalright to try architects and perpetrators ofgenocide.

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Delayed JusticeICG Africa Report N° 30, 7 June 2001 Page v

On Carrying out Sentencing

10. Use diplomatic pressure to encourageAfrican states to respond favourably torequests for cooperation with the ICTR onthe issue of sentencing and provide financialsupport to judicial cooperation programsconcerned with receiving prisonersconvicted by the Tribunal.

TO STATES PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORTTO THE TRIBUNAL

11. Demand a full public audit of the accountsof the Tribunal.

TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE ANDBELGIUM

12. Open investigations into suspects known tobe living in France and Belgium, whether onthe official list of indictments or not, such asthe family of former President Habyarimana.In cases already underway, such as that ofthe priest Wenceslas Munyeshaka, speed upproceedings.

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA

13. Establish an office alongside the office ofthe prosecutor to administer funds for aprogram of rewards for information aboutsuspects wanted by the ICTR.

TO THE PROSECUTOR AND THE PRESIDENTOF THE ICTR

14. Clarify and simplify the issuing of arrestwarrants and if necessary, inform the UNSecurity Council of non-cooperation ofcertain states if they are shown to knowinglyhouse suspects wanted by the Tribunal.

15. Set a final date for investigations andprosecutions and present a schedule for thetrial of those who are already in custody.

16. Urgently resolve the problems observedbetween the registrar of the court and the

prosecutor’s office in relation to theallocation of funds, notably by giving theprosecutor’s office financial autonomy.

On Judicial Cooperation with Rwanda

17. Strengthen legal cooperation initiatives withnational courts in Rwanda. The “youngjurists mission” and the representation ofRwandan judicial officers at Arusha shouldbe developed. The exchange of informationbetween the two legal systems should beencouraged.

On the Outreach Program

18. Seek supplementary funds and supportexisting Year 2000 “outreach programs”which aim to improve knowledge about thework of the ICTR in Rwanda.

On the Holding of Trials in Kigali

19. Arrange, as soon as possible, to conductcertain trials of the ICTR in Kigali toincrease the impact of the proceedings on thepeople of Rwanda. If transferring the trial istoo costly, or is inconsistent with the rightsof the defence, then at least some hearingsshould be held in Kigali.

On Court Delays and the Operation of the Tribunal

20. Stop the unjustifiable delays, which havecharacterised the activities of the Tribunal inthe past two years, and fulfil the mandatepromptly, obliging all chambers of theTribunal to begin hearing substantial casesimmediately and compelling the appealschamber to speed up proceedings.

21. Ensure the recruitment of competent andefficient investigators and lawyers to theoffice of the prosecutor.

22. Examine the possibility of insisting thatdefence lawyers establish residence inArusha once they are appointed, except withthe permission of the President of theTribunal.

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Delayed JusticeICG Africa Report N° 30, 7 June 2001 Page vi

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

23. Assist the work of the Tribunal as much aspossible in Rwanda and give guarantees ofcooperation especially in relation to crimescommitted by elements of the RPF in 1994,immediately suspending suspects fromofficial functions, demobilising them andhanding them over to international legalauthorities.

24. Modernise the legal system, especially incarrying out sentencing, to encourage othercountries in the region to extradite genocidesuspects to Rwanda.

Nairobi/Arusha/Brussels, 7 June 2001

ICG Africa Report N° 30 7 June 2001

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA:

JUSTICE DELAYED(Original Version in French)

I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly seven years after its creation by the UnitedNations Security Council and more than four yearssince the trials of the presumed perpetrators of theRwandan genocide began in Arusha, it is time forthe first comprehensive review of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

On 8 November 1994, less than four months afterthe genocide and massacres that cost the lives ofaround one million Rwandans in under 100 days,the United Nations Security Council created theICTR, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania.Sharing the same appeal court and ChiefProsecutor as the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), created a yearand a half earlier and based in The Hague, theICTR was mandated to prosecute "personsresponsible for genocide and other seriousviolations of international humanitarian lawcommitted in the territory of Rwanda andRwandan citizens responsible for genocide andother such violations committed in the territory ofneighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and31 December 19942". The ICTR’s jurisdiction wasrestricted to a specific time period, unlike theICTY, whose jurisdiction has no time limit.

In its resolution creating the Tribunal, the SecurityCouncil noted that the trials "would contribute tothe process of national reconciliation and to the

2 ICTR Statute attached to resolution 955 of the SecurityCouncil, creating the Tribunal.

restoration and maintenance of peace" and alsoserve to "halt" the crimes and ensure that they are"effectively redressed". It stressed "the need forinternational cooperation to strengthen the courtsand judicial system of Rwanda" and decided "thatall states shall cooperate fully with theInternational tribunal and its organs (…) includingthe obligation of states to comply with requests forassistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber"3.The ICTR was created under chapter VII of theUnited Nations Charter.

The scope of the Tribunal - indeed, its very raisond’être - thus went far beyond the strictly judicialdimension of trials for genocide suspects. Theobjectives laid down by the UN resolution -national reconciliation, peace-keeping, the fightagainst impunity and support for the Rwandancourts and judicial system - demonstratedinternational commitment to a strong penal andsymbolic response to the third genocide of thetwentieth century. In reality, many Rwandans sawthe creation of the ICTR as a mark of aninternational guilty conscience. Having tragicallyfailed in its duty to intervene and stop the 1994genocide, the international community wanted tohelp punish the crime after it had been committed.Right from the start, the ICTR had a paradoxicalmandate: highly ambitious on the level of nationalreconciliation and limited in time and place. Thepolitical weight of the mandate was quicklysurpassed by the continuation and regionalisationof the conflict. Moreover, the legal response to thegenocide and its relevance for those directly

3 Resolution 955 of the UN Security Council.

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Delayed JusticeICG Africa Report N° 30, 7 June 2001 Page 2

concerned - the victims of the genocide and thepeople of Rwanda - as well as its social andpolitical impact, all remain highly questionable.

Since 1994, the ICTR has certainly been given themeans to operate. With more than 800 employeesand a budget in 2001 of over U.S.$90 million, ithas grown into a significant institution on amaterial and human level, capable, in theory, ofachieving its mandate. It is comprised of three trialchambers each with three judges and an appealschamber with five judges. Its activities are nolonger constantly undermined by lack of funds, atleast this has not been the case since 1998.

By early June 2001, the ICTR had put 45 suspectsbehind bars and arrested many major high-rankingfigures. This meant that a large portion of theformer Hutu extremist leaders had beenprovisionally eliminated from the political arena.Moreover, the rulings it handed down providedlegal recognition of the genocide perpetratedagainst the Tutsis. Despite this, the ICTR has onlytried eight individuals to date. Between July 1999and October 2000, court activity revolved aroundthe trial of a single defendant, Ignace Bagilishema,former mayor of the Mabanza commune (in thewestern prefecture of Kibuye), even though threenew judges had been elected and a new trialchamber built in order to “speed up theproceedings”. Above all, the ICTR has still nottried any of the masterminds of the genocide.While the ICTR has been criticised for itsslowness, no one could have ever expected - oreven imagined - such a level of sheer inefficiency.

This said, since the end of 2000, the ICTR appearsto be facing up to its responsibilities moreeffectively. New trials have begun, proceedings areto be taken against members of the l’Arméepatriotique rwandaise (APR) and programs havebeen launched aimed at bringing the Tribunalcloser to Rwandan society. These are all positivesigns. A new administration has been appointedand changes made to management in theprosecutor’s office with the departure on 21 Mayof the Deputy Prosecutor, after four years in office.Three new judges will also be taking up their postsbetween the end of May and the month of June.

So why has the ICTR failed? Essentially, threefactors have influenced the results and impact of

the ICTR: cooperation with UN member states,relations with Rwanda and the court's internaloperations. The ICTR does not have its own policeforce and relies on the cooperation of states tocarry out its work. States are still reluctant to givethe ICTR their full political or financial support inseveral areas, including arrests, witness protectionand the imprisonment of convicts. Nevertheless,the level of cooperation has on the whole beengood and recognised as such, with the exception ofcountries such as the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC). The Tribunal also relies onnurturing good relations with Rwanda. This is noteasy and relations are often strained. The Rwandangovernment sees the Tribunal as a political weaponto help reinforce its moral legitimacy andneutralise its enemies. For Rwandans, the Tribunalhas failed their expectations, and reactions are stillgoverned by ignorance, frustration, remoteness andscepticism. However, the most serious charge ofall is against the Tribunal itself. The relativelyderisory legal work achieved so far is solely theresponsibility of the ICTR. Indeed, the court hasnever fully recovered from the internal operatingcrisis that continues to unjustifiably undermine itsactivities.

The crisis in the way the Tribunal operates can beexplained in part by structural problems. First ofall, dividing the office of the Prosecutor betweenThe Hague, Kigali and Arusha - the result of apolitical compromise with the new Rwandangovernment - has made the work of the Prosecutorvery difficult. Unlike in the ICTY, thedecentralisation of information has jeopardised itsconfidentiality, a factor that is crucial toinvestigations. Secondly, limiting the court'smandate to 1994, the result of another compromisebetween the RPF who wanted the mandate to coverthe pre-genocide period as well as the genocide,and other parties who wanted the mandate to beginin 1994 and not be subject to time restrictions,shows that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is restrictedand has no political impact on the present. Thiscertainly adds to the lack of interest taken in thecourt.

Moreover, the Tribunal operates in a difficultpolitical context. Since the genocide, the new RPF-led government in Rwanda has continued to wagewar with its old enemies on the territory ofneighbouring DRC. In 1996, the first war was a


reaction to the destruction of refugee camps, whereex-FAR soldiers had regrouped and were training.The second war in 1998 was presented by theRwandan government as a “preventative” waragainst Laurent Kabila, the former ally of the RPA,who had re-armed the ex-FAR troops againstRwanda. Rwanda felt that the presence ofcriminals in neighbouring countries obliged it tointervene militarily. The Tribunal is thereforebeing called upon to prosecute past crimes, but in acontext where war crimes continue to becommitted by the same perpetrators.

Finally, the crisis has been deepened by internalpower struggles, the daily malfunctioning betweendifferent departments of the Tribunal, past errorsand the prolonged absences of judges or defencelawyers that paralyse the activities of the court.The bureaucratic, institutional and individualsurvival of the ICTR seems to have become a highpriority. The urgency of its mandate, whichremains largely unachieved to this day, has beencompletely forgotten. It is time to set priorities fortrials and proceedings and a deadline for its work.There is also a duty, for the court's key players andthe international community alike, to demonstratea determination that has so far been seriouslylacking.4

4 The report was the result of constant monitoring of thework of the ICTR from 1997, completed by a series ofinterviews carried out from October to December 2000 ofa panel of representatives or key persons from theRwandan community in exile, a well as thirty intervieweesin Rwanda, representing a large spectrum of opinion andsocial positions.

II. THE ICTR UNDER SCRUTINY:THE FORGOTTEN URGENCY OFITS MANDATE

In 1999 and 2000, trials at the InternationalTribunal for Rwanda slowed almost to a halt. Thenormally slow pace turned into an unjustifiableinertia. This serious and shocking situationoccurred despite the fact that the number of judgesand the overall resources of the ICTR hadincreased. Although new trials have recentlybegun, this modest progress is no guarantee thatthe urgency of the ICTR's mandate will be takenmore seriously.

A. SOME SYMBOLIC RESULTS

1. Trials : Sending a Message AgainstImpunity

By 1 May 2001, the ICTR had issued indictmentsagainst approximately 65 persons. The names of60 of these were publicly disclosed (see completelist in appendix) and 45 have so far been arrested.These come from various power circles -government, the army, the media, militias, clergy -and represent high levels of responsibility5.

Ten of the 19 ministers from the interimgovernment6 established in Rwanda in April 1994,as well as the interim Prime Minister, have beenarrested. Three other top political leaders havebeen apprehended, as well as local authorities,including six (mayors) and four préfets7. Three keymedia figures responsible for broadcasting anti-Tutsi propaganda are also in prison. Finally, nineofficers from the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces

5 Another arrested suspect, Bernard Ntuyahaga, gavehimself up to the ICTR before being released on 31 March1999 after the Prosecutor withdrew his indictment. Sincethat date, he has been detained in Tanzania, awaiting adecision on his extradition to Rwanda.6 The government in power in the aftermath of the attackon the presidential plane on 6 April 1994 in whichPresident Juvénal Habyarimana died. The former membersof this government are today accused by the ICTR ofhaving planned and supervised the genocide againstmembers of the Tutsi community.7 In 1994, Rwanda was administratively divided into 11prefectures and 145 communes.


(FAR), including senior staff, have been putbehind bars.

Add to this list at least three militia leaders andnew targets from clerical and financial circles, andthe overall collection of suspects apprehended bythe Tribunal reveals a diverse "assortment" ofgroups and organisations implicated in thegenocide. However, the fact remains that only avery few real masterminds behind the genocide arebehind bars in the UN prison.

Trials at the ICTR began on 9 January 1997. Sincethat date, eight individuals have been tried. Five ofthese - Jean-Paul Akayesu, Clément Kayishema,Obed Ruzindana, Georges Rutaganda and AlfredMusema - had a trial on the merits. The threeothers – Jean Kambanda, Omar Serushago andGeorges Ruggiu - entered a guilty plea.

! Four judgements on substantial cases

The Akayesu trial - the first ruling on the genocide

The trial of the former mayor of the Tabacommune, Gitarama prefecture, began in January1997 and ended in March 1998. The verdict,announced on 2 September 1998, was the firstconviction for genocide following a substantialtrial before an international court. Jean-PaulAkayesu was found guilty of genocide and crimesagainst humanity for extermination, murder andrape and sentenced to life imprisonment. The trialrevealed that crimes committed by localauthorities, whose power is conferred by centralgovernment, were carried out in accordance withgovernment policy. It was established that thedefendant - who did not have an extremistbackground - fought against the Interahamwemilitias until 18 April, after which he began to leadthe Tutsi hunt the day after a crucial governmentmeeting with local authorities, which marked theextension of the massacres across the whole ofRwandan territory. The defence pleaded that Jean-Paul Akayesu had never changed his behaviourand that he simply found himself overwhelmed bythe militias, who had become the true holders ofpower, but the Prosecutor managed to prove thatAkayesu had willingly followed the government'spolicy. On 1 June, the appeal court upheld thechamber’s judgement and sentence in full.

The Kayishema/Ruzindana trial - genocide inKibuye

The ex-préfet of Kibuye, Clément Kayishema,stood trial from April 1997 to November 1998alongside Obed Ruzindana, a shopkeeper from thesame region. In May 1999, the two men werefound guilty of genocide and sentenced to lifeimprisonment and 25 years respectively. Theregion of Kibuye suffered some of the worst Tutsimassacres, notably in the town of Kibuye (Gitesicommune) and the mountainous region of Biseserowhere several tens of thousands of people tookrefuge and were exterminated. More than 50prosecution witnesses testified in court. ObedRuzindana is the only accused not to have testifiedat his own trial. On 1 June, the appeal court upheldthe ruling and sentences handed down by the trialchamber in full.

The Rutaganda trial - in the name of theInterahamwe

Of the five members of the Interahamwe nationalcommittee - the infamous youth organisationattached to President Habyarimana’s MRND party,which became the main Hutu extremist militia -only Georges Rutaganda has been tried by theICTR. The trial of the former second Vice-President of the Interahamwe is the longest andmost frequently interrupted of all cases before theICTR. Begun in March 1997, it concluded morethan two years later in June 1999. In December1999, Georges Rutaganda was found guilty ofgenocide and crimes against humanity andsentenced to life imprisonment for crimescommitted in Kigali. He is currently appealing thejudgement.

The Musema trial - oral versus written evidence

In 1994, Alfred Musema was the director of the teafactory in Gisovu, Kibuye prefecture. The chargesagainst him partly overlap those already mentionedin the Kayishema/Ruzindana trial. What wasunique in his line of defence was that Musema hada strong alibi, and aimed to prove, mostly throughwritten documents, that he was absent from mostof the places where he had allegedly committedcrimes. The trial, which ran from January to June1999, was the shortest ever, and showed that theICTR was capable of speeding up procedures. It


was notable for having been the first trial wherethe defence team carried out investigations inRwanda itself. Alfred Musema was also the firstaccused to recognise the existence of the genocideright from the beginning. In January 2000, he wasconvicted of genocide and crimes againsthumanity, including direct rape. This was one ofthe most difficult cases for the three judges to ruleon, and is currently before the appeals court.

! Three guilty pleas

The Kambanda trial - confession and denial

Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of theinterim government between April and July 1994,is the most senior figure to be tried by the ICTR todate. He is also the first defendant in the history ofinternational justice to repent and plead guilty togenocide. The former Prime Minister cooperatedwith the Prosecutor, and decided to testify for theprosecution in other trials. On the basis of hisconfession, he was found guilty on 1 May 1998and sentenced to the maximum sentence of lifeimprisonment. The international tribunal views theconfession of Jean Kambanda as its greatestsuccess.

However, this victory was badly dented when theformer Prime Minister did an abrupt about-turnstraight after his conviction. Jean Kambandaimmediately appealed his sentence, then, moreradically, announced that he wished to retract hisguilty plea. During the proceedings, a number offactors came to light which were later made public,calling into question the role of Kambanda'slawyer and his links with the Deputy Prosecutor,Bernard Muna. In particular, the statements madeand positions adopted by the former PrimeMinister raise serious doubts about the sincerityand clarity of his recognition of the crimescommitted against the Tutsis and Hutu opponents,as well as his government’s responsibility in thegenocide. In reality, Kambanda had confessedstrategically, believing he would receive a reducedsentence, but retracted this immediately after hisconviction when he realised that his strategy hadbackfired.

Thus the legal, historical and symbolic import ofJean Kambanda’s confession was significantlyreduced, despite the fact that, in October 2000, the

appeals chamber rejected his request and upheldthe ruling and sentence handed down two yearsearlier. It must also be stressed that althoughKambanda is the highest-ranking person to be triedby the ICTR, he did not mastermind the genocideand his trial does not set an example, as it washoped it would.

The Serushago trial - a repentant militiaman

A leader of the militia in the Gisenyi region, inNorthwest Rwanda, Omar Serushago confessed tohaving participated in numerous crimes in 1994and became an informant for the office of theProsecutor at the beginning of 1997. Hisinformation helped to bring about the wave ofarrests that took place in Kenya in July 1997,which included the arrest of Jean Kambanda. He isalso a potential star witness for the Prosecutoragainst other defendants. In June 1998, OmarSerushago's surrender and indictment wasorchestrated by the prosecution in West Africa,where he had been transferred for security reasons.He pleaded guilty to genocide in December of thesame year and was sentenced to serve a 15-yearterm in February 1999, which was upheld by theappeals chamber a year later.

The Ruggiu trial - a European involved in hatemedia

Georges Ruggiu is the only non-Rwandandefendant to stand trial before the ICTR.Previously an employee of the Belgian socialsecurity service, Ruggiu was employed as ajournalist for the extremist Hutu radio stationRTLM three months before the start of thegenocide. He was arrested in Kenya on 23 July1997, and pleaded not guilty. After nearly twoyears in prison, he decided to confess, and agreedto cooperate with the Prosecutor. On 1 June 2000,Ruggiu, half-Belgian, half-Italian, was sentencedto 12 years in prison for incitement to commitgenocide and crimes against humanity forpersecution. He did not lodge an appeal.

For the three convicts who pleaded guilty, theircases are now closed. They may still testify incourt, but only as prosecution witnesses againstother ICTR defendants. The three guilty pleasprovide, in principle, crucial new information onthe crimes committed, the role of perpetrators and


the means they used, and they help to uncovermore of the truth about the genocide. However,since the contents of each plea have never beenmade public, the extent of this information has sofar been very limited.

! A ruling under deliberation

The Bagilishema trial

The only other completed trial is that of the formermayor of Mabanza, Ignace Bagilishema. It beganin October 1999 and finished a year later. Theruling, set for 7 June, will be the longest finaldeliberation since the creation of the Tribunal. Thetrial, which deals with crimes committed in theKibuye prefecture, appears to be the most disputedon substance. Faced with a defence team whomade repeated visits to Rwanda and gatheredsubstantial documentary evidence backed up bywitnesses, the prosecution delivered a confusingline of argument, based for the most part on oraltestimony. Even more so than in the Akayesu trial,this case raises the issue of the role and powers ofa mayor in Rwanda during the genocide.

! Three trials in process: Cyangugu, Semanzaand the Media

Between September 2000 and April 2001, fivemore trials officially started, two of which are dueto recommence following the death of Judge LaïtyKama.

On 18 September 2000, the Cyangugu trial openedin trial chamber three. This case joins threedefendants accused of carrying out crimes in thisprefecture of Southwest Rwanda: EmmanuelBagambiki, prefect, André Ntagerura, Minister ofTransport and Samuel Imanishimwe, commanderof the local military camp. In June 2001, theprosecution phase was underway. Since 16October, this same trial chamber is also alternatelyhearing the trial of the former mayor and memberof Parliament, Laurent Semanza. The prosecutionphase in this trial ended in April 2001.

On 23 October 2000 one of the ICTR’s flagshiptrials, known as the Media trial, opened in trialchamber one. This concerns three defendants:Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, leader of the extremistparty Coalition pour la Défense de la République

(CDR) and co-founder of Radio Télévision desMille Collines (RTLM), Ferdinand Nahimana,founder and director of RTLM, and Hassan Ngeze,chief editor of the newspaper Kangura 8. The firstdefendant decided to boycott his trial right fromthe beginning. The third has also occasionallydecided not to appear in court. In May 2001, 17prosecution witnesses had appeared and theprosecution phase was continuing. Another trial,that of Gérard Ntakirutimana, a doctor inMugonero (Kibuye) and his father Elizaphan, a 75-year-old Seventh Day Adventist pastor, was due tostart in April before the same chamber, but it waspostponed until September.

In March 2001, trial chamber two opened the trialof the former mayor of Mukingo (Ruhengeriprefecture), Juvénal Kajelijeli, and in April that ofthe former Minister of Higher Education, Jean deDieu Kamuhanda. However, the trials had hardlybegun when they were postponed until July andSeptember 2001 respectively. Another trial hasbeen announced before this chamber, that of thegroup of six defendants from Butare, two of whomhave been in the UN prison for the longest: PaulineNyiramasuhuko, ex-Minister for Family Welfare,her son Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, the mayorsJoseph Kanyabashi and Elie Ndayambaje, and theprefects Sylvain Nsabimana and AlphonseNteziryayo. The trial had been set for 14 May, then11 June, but the death of Senegalese judge LaïtyKama, President of the chamber, on 6 May, andthe announcement that Judge Güney was leavingto sit in The Hague, caused severe disruption to theschedule of a chamber that was already consideredthe least efficient of the three. The Kajelijeli andKamuhanda trials should resume in due course butthe start date for the Butare trial remains uncertain.

! Trials in waiting: the soldiers and thepoliticians

The strategy launched by Louise Arbour in 1997 topromote grouped trials has progressivelydeteriorated since she left her post. The judgeshave rejected some of these initiatives onprocedural grounds. They have also on several

8 A newspaper whose title means "keep awake", a tool ofextremist Hutu propaganda before and during thegenocide.


occasions granted the severance of joinedindictments - that is, separating an accused fromthose with whom he or she was originally to betried. Moreover, the Tribunal is clearly incapable,at least logistically, to run trials that group morethan five individuals. At the present time, there isvirtually no advantage in joint indictments, whichgroup defendants more according to the date oftheir indictment or their availability to stand trial.

Among the main trials-in-waiting, most notable arethose that group soldiers. One of these, which isready on paper, has been due to start for a longwhile. It joins Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, formercabinet director at the Ministry of Defence andconsidered to be suspect number one in the 1994genocide, Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, head ofthe military region of Gisenyi, Major AloysNtabakuze, commander of the para-trooperbattalion and General Gratien Kabiligi, chief ofoperations at the ex-Rwandan Armed Forcesheadquarters. With the presence of ColonelBagosora, the trial promises to be the mostconclusive with regard to knowledge about theplanning of the genocide and massacres. The firsttwo defendants have been in prison for over fiveyears, and the other two for nearly four. The otherpending trial of a group of senior officers from theold Rwandan Army is that which joins GeneralAugustin Ndindiliyimana, former head of thegendarmerie, Lieutenant-Colonel François-XavierNzuwonemeye, commander of the reconnaissancebattalion, his deputy Captain Innocent Sagahutu,General Augustin Bizimungu, head of the FARand Protais Mpiranya, head of the presidentialguard. The first three were arrested betweenNovember 1999 and February 2000, while theother two are still at large.

The other large block of defendants is made up offormer members of the interim government ofApril 1994. As with the soldiers, there will not beone single joint trial for the ministers. AndréNtagerura is currently being tried in the Cyangugutrial, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko will be tried with theButare group and Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda will betried alone, as will Eliezer Niyitegeka, Minister ofInformation. Two large groups remain. The first,containing Casimir Bizimungu, Minister of Health,Justin Mugenzi, Minister of Commerce, ProsperMugiraneza, Minister of the Civil Service andJérôme Bicamumpaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

All four have been in detention for the last two orthree years.

The second group is comprised of four ministers -Edouard Karemera, Minister of the Interior, AndréRwamakuba, Minister of Education, AugustinBizimana, Defence Minister, CallixteNzabonimana, Minister of Youth – to which hasbeen added the two leaders of the MRND party,Mathieu Ngirumpatse, President, and JosephNzirorera, Secretary General, as well as thebusinessman Félicien Kabuga. Of the eightaccused listed above, three have still to becaptured: Bizimana, Nzabonimana and Kabuga.

2. The ICTR’s Achievements: Recognition ofthe Genocide and Political Neutralisationof “Hutu Power”

Despite the slow proceedings and meagre resultsof the Tribunal, it must be said that the ICTR hassuccessfully imposed a legal recognition of thegenocide. As well as allowing the Tribunal toavoid a costly trial on the merits, the confessionproceedings have reinforced the distinct and totalrecognition of the crime committed between Apriland July 1994, established for the first time by theAkayesu ruling.

Moreover, it is undeniable that the ICTR hasenabled individuals to be brought to trial whowould otherwise have escaped justice if theinternational court did not exist. Since 1994,several countries have shown a marked reluctanceto extradite suspects to Rwanda. The only high-ranking suspect that the Rwandan government hasbeen able to obtain with the agreement of anothercountry is Froduald Karamira, who was transferredfirst from India and then from Ethiopia in June19969. States that lent their support to the ICTRwould not have been so cooperative with thegovernment of Rwanda. In this, the Tribunal hasgained a certain legitimacy and fulfilled one of itsimportant objectives.

Less often mentioned are the important politicalconsequences of the Tribunal’s work. By its

9 Former leader of the MDR party, Froduald Karamira wastried in Rwanda in early 1997, sentenced to death, andexecuted in Kigali in April 1998.


proceedings, the ICTR has discredited the Hutuleaders who were in power in Rwanda during the1994 genocide. These have either been taken tocourt, identified and tracked down as fugitives, orreduced to silence. To this effect, the ICTR hasmade a decisive contribution to the task ofneutralising Hutu extremism in the political arenaand the radical ideology of “Hutu power” that itpropagated. Clearly, it has not wiped out thisideology altogether. It continues to spread in theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Burundi andacross the region. However, as a politicalmovement, it has for the moment disappeared fromthe public domain10. This conclusion stands outmarkedly in the analysis made by the former deanof the law school, Aloys Muberanziza, who arguesthat: “The ICTR cannot be seen as a simple court,confined to its role of hearing and determiningcases. Its decisions and omissions have greatsocio-political importance in Rwanda. The stakesat the Tribunal are not merely legal. It also has animpact on a political level. In the current state ofaffairs, it contributes to reinforcing governmentauthority in Kigali. By tracking down the leadersof the fallen regime, the ICTR prevents them fromever claiming to play a political role inRwanda11.”

Placing the Hutu ideological movement beyond thelaw was a necessary stage. In order to fighteffectively against impunity in the region, theTribunal should also begin proceedings against theRwandan Patriotic Front for war crimes or crimesagainst humanity committed during its march onKigali in 1994. This is an integral part of theICTR’s legal mandate. For many Rwandans, thecredibility, independence and equity of theTribunal depend on the initiatives which will betaken without delay in this domain.

10 This observation is even more persuasive if compared tothe former Yugoslavia. In its report of 2 November 2000,ICG stated that "only with the disappearance from publicand political life, by one means or another, of the forces ofextreme nationalism still determined to tear Bosnia apart atthe seams, will the country and its people fully emergefrom the horror of the last ten years.” See ICG, "Warcriminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska : who are thepeople in your neighbourhood ?", 2 November 2000.11 ICG interview with Aloys Muberanzira, Kigali,November 2000.

3. Cautious Determination to ProsecuteCrimes Committed by the RPF and theAttack of 6 April 1994

The press conference held by Carla del Ponte on13 December 2000 in Arusha marked a turningpoint on this issue and an initial response to theother part of the ICTR mandate. For the first time,the Chief Prosecutor publicly announced that shehad opened investigative files on members of theRPF and requested the cooperation of theRwandan authorities to help in her investigations.Four days earlier, she had a private interview onthe subject with the President of the Republic,General Paul Kagame, which she briefly describedin the following way: “I asked him to assist us inarresting fugitives. We discussed problems ofcooperation in detail. We talked aboutinvestigations into massacres committed by theother side, that is, by soldiers from the Rwandan[Patriotic] Army. I am completely satisfied. Wereceived his full collaboration in this area.” In fact,the Rwandan authorities had been informed of theChef Prosecutor’s intentions a long time ago. Carladel Ponte’s approach was pragmatic: “Without thehelp of the country, we will have no results inthese investigations. We need access to documentsand testimonies. Let’s be realistic: withoutcooperation, I’ll get nowhere. I’m moving forwardstep by step. I make no presumptions. I work fromfacts.12”

By the end of October 2000, the Chief Prosecutorhad already discreetly filed her investigationrequests with the Rwandan legal authorities. A fewdays before del Ponte made her public statement,the Rwandan government defined its position assuch: “What is the ICTR’s mission? If this fallswithin its mission, it should continue. If Carla delPonte asks, we will collaborate,” the Minister ofJustice told us. The Chief Prosecutor of Rwanda,whose office had already been informed of theimpending investigations, stated: “The RPFcommitted human rights violations - war crimesand crimes against humanity also, but notgenocide. The international court should bedealing with people on the outside. Not everyone

12 Press Conference in Arusha, 13 December 3, 2000


can be tried.”13 Despite his clear reservations -especially regarding the ICTR’s ability to trypeople who are on Rwandan territory - the ministernevertheless hinted at a cooperation agreement.This was reaffirmed by President Kagame at thestart of 2001.

The nature of the files to which Carla del Pontehas requested access - which naturally have notbeen disclosed to the public - also reveal thecautious approach taken by the Office of theProsecutor. Of the three files she wishes to see,none of the suspects targeted by the threeinvestigations has been revealed. They involvewell-known and well-documented crimes. Oneexpert on Rwanda defines the strategy as: “Ideally,we would begin by a well-documented incident,which would enable us to try the officer or officersresponsible”14.

The year 2000 thus marked a decisivedevelopment towards fully implementing the ICTRmandate. It also put back on the agendadiscussions over an investigation into the attack onthe presidential plane that, on 6 April 1994, causedthe death of President Habyarimana and markedthe start of the massacres and the genocide.Shedding light on this key historical event alsorepresents, for many Rwandans, a crucial part ofthe ICTR’s work. Opponents of the current regimesay the issue is primordial. The Rally for theReturn of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda(RDR), a Hutu opposition movement in exile,declares: “The ICTR cannot pretend to seek thetruth of the Rwandan genocide and its perpetratorswhile refusing to investigate the event thattriggered the genocide, that is, the murder of twopresidents, Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda andCyprien Nteryamira of Burundi, on 6 April 1994 inKigali, and to punish the architects andperpetrators”15.

Since at least 1997, the Office of the Prosecutorhas officially considered that such an investigationdoes not fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Theexplanation given is simple: the enquiry would not

13 Interviews with Jean de Dieu Mucyo in Kigali on 2December 2000 and Gérald Gahima on 5 December.14 Correspondence with ICG, 13 November 2000.15 Correspondence with ICG, 30 November 2000.

change anything of the legal history of thegenocide, which has already been well established.If it could be proven that the attack was carried outby Hutu extremists, this would provide extraevidence of the conspiracy theory of the genocide.Yet, if this were the opposite, charging thoseresponsible would be extremely difficult, since themurder of a president does not fall directly underthe Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Carla del Ponte hasinherited the exacting task of the woman shereplaced, Louise Arbour. Yet at the same time, shehas taken advantage of the investigation's suddenacceleration by the French examining judge, LouisBruguière, who was seized of the case of the attackon the basis of a complaint filed by the families ofthe French crew who were killed on the plane. Thetask-sharing that has taken place over the last yearis described by the Prosecutor as follows: “Theinvestigation [into the attack] has not been opened[by us] because there is an issue of jurisdiction.Judge Bruguière has begun an enquiry and hasrequested our cooperation. I am working withBruguière. Moreover, he will be returning for morehearings [of ICTR accused]. I am following himclosely. His results will allow me to decidewhether or not we open an investigation. I thinkthat by the beginning of next year we’ll be able tomake an informed decision and we will makepublic the reasons why the enquiry is or is notlaunched”16. The conclusions of the Frenchexamining judge, and the subsequent decision ofthe ICTR Chief Prosecutor, have not been madepublic to date.

The investigation into the crimes carried out by theRPF looks likely to be a particularly fraught affair.Firstly, because although the enquiries into RPFcrimes and the attack on the presidential plane areunable to change the legal history of the genocide,they can certainly contribute to changing itspolitical history. The current Rwandan regimeboasts the incontestable legitimacy of havingprevented the massacres from escalating to an evengrander scale in Rwanda and of having helped tensof thousands of Tutsis to escape death in 1994.More than two years later, the same army ledoffensives in Kivu against the refugee camps thathoused thousands of Rwandan Hutu criminals whohad carried out the genocide and who were

16 Press conference in Arusha, 13 December 2000.


threatening to invade Rwanda and reconquer it.The success of this offensive allowed hundreds ofthousands of Hutu civilians and soldiers to berepatriated, while resulting in the arrest ofnumerous genocide suspects. A seriousinvestigation into the responsibilities of senior RPFofficers for massacres of the population thataccompanied its military campaign in 1994 couldsignificantly sully the regime’s image.

Moreover, the scale of crimes allegedly committedby the RPF has been reduced even before theyhave been properly identified. The massacres ofcivilian populations carried out in 1994 by the RPFare presented by the Kigali authorities as the resultof military errors but never as having beencommitted in a deliberate and systematic manner.It is therefore highly unlikely that a government inpower would agree to lift impunity for its seniorofficers, who, moreover, it is sending out to wagewar in the Congo. Finally, it is clear that theRwandan government will use all available meansto reduce the impact of such a possibility on itsown political base, the RPF, but especially in thearmy, and take steps to discourage informers andinternal rifts. Indeed, many RPA deserters whopossess confidential information, have alreadymade contact with ICTR investigators.

Nevertheless, it is crucial for peace and futurereconciliation that the list of RPF suspects not beovertly politicised and that as many of the crimescommitted as possible be punished. Other crimesagainst humanity were carried out by the AFDL (inwhich the RPA took part) during its advance intoKinshasa in 1996 and 1997 and during Congo’ssecond war. Allowing the crimes of 1994 to gounpunished would send a dangerous message ofimpunity.

B. THE ICTR’S FAILURES:UNACCEPTABLE BUREAUCRATICLOGJAMS

The trials of ten defendants that officially beganbetween September 2000 and April 2001 cannot,unfortunately, cover over the mistakes made by theTribunal. With only eight people prosecuted aftermore than four years of trials and nearly sevenyears since its creation, the ICTR’s results arenothing less than shocking. Proceedings at the

Arusha Tribunal are excessively slow. Since 1997,speeding up the trials has been a constant theme inthe work of judges during their plenary sessions. InNovember 1999, a hundred-page expert report onthe operation of the ad hoc tribunals attempted touncover the reasons for the logjams and concludedthat those recently observed in Arusha were by farthe worst17.

1. The Heavy Responsibility of Judges

International Crisis Group notes with the mostserious concern that the slowness of trials hasactually worsened over the years, despite thesignificant increase in the material resources of theTribunal. Two people were prosecuted in 1998,four in 1999, two in 2000 and, unless there is anew guilty plea, it is likely that only one will betried during the course of 2001.

In February 1999, a third trial chamber wascreated, bringing the total number of judges tonine. However, there has never been a momentduring the last two years when all three chambershave been sitting simultaneously on trials ofsubstantial cases. Between July 1999 andSeptember 2000, only one trial of a singleindividual, Ignace Bagilishema, took place. Theinitial objective was to have each chamberalternate between hearing two trials. This hasnever been the case, with the exception of onechamber that has been seized of two trials sinceOctober 2000. Trial chamber two, as constituted inJune 1999, did not begin its first trial until March2001, only to immediately postpone it to July. Thetrial that opened in April was put back toSeptember after only one day of hearings,following the death of Judge Kama. This shouldre-open when a new judge is appointed. In all, fiveout of nine judges have spent over one and a halfyears without working on a single trial on themerits. One of them set a record in March 2001,with 28 months spent without a trial.

Judges Numberof yearsof term

Number oftrials

concluded

Number ofpeople tried

N. Pillay 6 4 (incl.1 inprocess)

3 (+ 3confessions)

17 Expert group report on the effectiveness of the activitiesand operation of the ad hoc tribunals, November 1999.


L. Kama 6 3 3 (+ 2confessions)

L. Aspegren 4 ½ 3 3 (+ 2confessions)

W. Sekule 6 1 2T. Kahn 4 1 2Y. Ostrovsky 6 3 (incl.2 in

process)2

E. Mose 2 2 (incl.1 inprocess)

1 (+ 1confession)

A.Gunawardana

2 2 (incl.1 inprocess)

1 (+ 1confession)

M. Güney 2 1 1L. Williams 2 2 in process 0P. Dolenc 2 2 in process 0

Such delays seriously affect the ICTR’s ability tocarry out its mandate. They have caused situationsof prolonged detention that give serious cause forconcern. Two defendants, Joseph Kanyabashi andElie Ndayambaje, have been imprisoned for nearlysix years now without trial. Two others, ThéonesteBagosora and Anatole Nsengiyumva, crossed thefive-year mark in March. Since the Tribunal hasalways denied motions for release pending trial,there is an urgent need to begin the trials of thesedefendants in particular.

Beyond the official explanations and argumentsabout procedure or bad legal administration whichare given ample space in the 1999 expert report,the judges are held responsible to a large extent forthis unjustifiable situation. The poor output of theTribunal is linked to the mediocre productivity ofjudges, some of whom are incapable of runningcriminal trials and to their often-prolongedabsences. Moreover, in their work, the tribunalchambers, which deal with the most serious crimesin cases that are often dense and complex, haverelied to an abnormal extent on young legalassistants, even on interns.

Given this assessment, judges should be heldaccountable for their work. International CrisisGroup recommends, in the first instance, that theselection of judges should be more rigorouslyorganised and that candidates who have not hadsolid experience as a judge in criminal affairsshould be rejected. It may be advisable in the shortterm to create an independent commission toattribute responsibility for the delays.

2. Levels of Staff Competence at the Office

of the Prosecutor

The situation at the Office of the Prosecutor isanother contributing factor and a cause of greatconcern. The problem lies with the quality of staffrecruited. Although Louise Arbour worked hard tomake improvements, her efforts did not pay off.Carla del Ponte was faced with the same problemswhen she took over. Over the last year, the ChiefProsecutor has been gradually replacing severalsenior lawyers and other members of her teams,but many posts provided for in the budget stillremain vacant. The dismissals sparked an internalconflict that badly shook the office in 2000,resulting in a major confrontation between theChief Prosecutor and her deputy, Bernard Muna inNovember. Muna strongly protested against delPonte’s sacking of several of his subordinates onthe grounds of incompetence18. At the beginning ofApril 2001, Carla del Ponte announced that shewould not be renewing his contract. BernardMuna, who had been in his post for four years, sawhis mandate expire on 21 May. Most of the staffthat del Ponte wanted to leave have gradually beenousted. Some of these sent a signed petition to theSecretary-General of the United Nations claimingthat their dismissal was an act of racism19. It isclear that incompetence in a large part of thepersonnel tends to discourage others who aredevoted to their work and are trying to move thetrials forward.

Charges of incompetence and inadequate traininghave also been levelled against investigators. Inparticular, questions over the poor preparation andhandling of cases were raised in the Musema andBagilishema trials. This phenomenon becamemuch more apparent in October at the start of theimportant Media trial. For years, those in chargehad seriously neglected the case, leading toallegations of incompetence. The core evidence onthe role of the media in the genocide was in a stateof almost total lack of preparation. One of thereasons for the trial’s extraordinary slowness today- seventeen witnesses have been heard sinceOctober - lies in this original chaos. Once again,there is an urgent need to address a situation that

18 See Ubutabera, an independent publication on theICTR, of 18 September 2000 and Diplomatie Judiciare ofJanuary 26, 2001 at www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com19 "Tribunal officials sacked ", Daily Nation, 16 May2001.


threatens to undermine the efficiency, quality andintegrity of the legal process. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Tribunal’sadministration and management at the Office ofthe Prosecutor must take rapid measuresconcerning the competence and efficiency ofprosecution staff.

3. Internal Power Struggles

The internal crisis at the ICTR has also beenmarked by the conflict between the Registrar,Agwu Okali and the President, Navanethem Pillay.Since her election to the presidency in June 1999,the South African judge has always maintainedthat judges should have greater control overadministrative and budgetary matters. TheRegistrar, on the other hand, has constantly foughtto preserve his authority in these areas, using theTribunal’s 1994 statute to justify this stance.According to the statute, the Registrar is theabsolute authority on administrative and financialmatters, unlike in national courts where theregistrar is clearly answerable to the President.This power struggle has seriously divided thejudges and poisoned relations at the top levels ofthe ICTR. It is symptomatic of the difficulty andreticence of UN bureaucrats to set up a properlegal institution where the administration issubordinate to the judges. In January 2001, the UNSecretary-General dismissed the Nigerian AgwuOkali from the post he had held for four years. Anew registrar, Adama Dieng from Senegal, wasappointed to replace him. It is essential that thepriorities of the ICTR as a court of justice matchthose of the new administration, which should bethere to serve the judicial bodies of the Tribunal.The expert report of November 1999 clearlyenvisaged greater administrative and financialautonomy for the Office of the Prosecutor and thechambers. This is the natural direction to take.Indeed, in the long run this will make the legalplayers, especially the judges, more responsible forthe smooth administration of trials.

4. Management of the Defence

On a different note, the Registrar must also paygreater attention to the management of defencelawyers, a task that is also part of his remit. Inorder to guarantee the defendants' right to a fairtrial, the ICTR registry provides them with legal

aid at the expense of the Tribunal if they aredeemed to be indigent. This practice, which hasbecome the rule, has not escaped abuse, both bysuspects and their defence teams. In its report ofFebruary 2001, the UN Office of InternalOversight Services (OIOS) noted the practice offee-sharing between defendants and their lawyersthat may involve official arrangements between adefendant and their counsel, that is, regularpayments of a share of the lawyer's fees to thedefendant. This may also take the form of giftsmade to the client or his family, or other forms ofaid or indirect contributions. The report alsoestablished that clients sometimes blackmail theirlawyers.

This situation is corrupt and creates the impressionthat the ICTR is a bountiful source of enrichmentfor defence teams and defendants' families. Whileit is clearly a symptom of real abuse carried out bycertain defence teams, it also tends to damage thereputation of all defence lawyers at the ICTR.

The OIOS report does not implicate the Tribunalitself in this abuse. It does not, in particular,account for why a defence team was paid half amillion U.S. dollars in fees even before the trial ofits client had begun, whereas this sum representsthe average total cost for the defence teams thathave already completed their case. If the ICTRtruly wants to preserve its integrity, it mustseriously crack down on such a scandalousexploitation of the UN system. But it must alsoroot out the guilty parties and accomplices withinthe Registry.

Another subject of concern that has been recentlyraised is that of the recruitment of defenceinvestigators. Some investigators are wantedpersons in Rwanda whose names are on the list ofgenocide suspects drawn up by the Rwandangovernment20. In May 2001, an investigatorworking under a false identity was identified as agenocide suspect and arrested by the Prosecutor.

Finally, it must be stressed that it is in the interestof defence lawyers to delay defendants' trials inorder to claim that the rights of their clients are not

20 Press release from the Hirondelle Foundation, 4 April2001.


being respected, and thus obtain their release forunacceptably slow proceedings.

III. THE ICTR AND STATES: LEGALCOOPERATION AND NATIONALSOVEREIGNTY

Without the cooperation of the United Nationsmember states, the Rwanda Tribunal cannotfunction. This cooperation is essential for arrests,the transfer of suspects, witness protection and theserving of sentences. The most serious gap in thisfield is the absence of formal agreements betweenthe ICTR and states to relocate witnesses in adifferent country from where they live or originate,if need be. Cooperation is just as crucial in termsof where a prisoner will serve his or her sentenceafter being convicted by the ICTR. The mostimportant factor at stake is the financial supportthat must be given to the African states who haveagreed to allow prisoners to serve their sentencesin their prisons. Cooperation between states andthe ICTR has generally been good when a countrystands to make political gain. However, it isinfinitely more uncertain when such cooperationrequires political concessions or financial input,despite the fact that the costs of both are usuallyquite low. The most vital form of cooperation forthe Tribunal remains that which allows arrests tobe made, and this is also the area of the greatestresistance.

Not long after it was up and running, the ICTRarrested several key suspects. This was to its creditand considered a huge success. Forty-five arrestswere made in seventeen different countries21, andthe cooperation of African states - eleven countriesagreed to hand over ICTR suspects - was asignificant factor. In July 1997, the biggest everarrest operation took place in Kenya, netting ninesuspects in total. The event was groundbreakingsince Kenya had been an almost untouchablerefuge for former Rwandan Hutu leaders between1994 and 1997. These spectacular arrests alsohighlighted many important issues. Firstly, it was aclear demonstration that the Tribunal’s capacity toact and the cooperation of states depended upon

21 The 45 arrests took place in South Africa (1), Benin (2),Belgium (3), Burkina Faso (1), Cameroon (9), Côted'Ivoire (2), Denmark (1), United States (1), France (2),Great Britain (1), Kenya (13), Mali (1), Namibia (1),Tanzania (1), Togo (2), Switzerland (1), Zambia (3).


the regional and international context. Indeed, thechanged position of the Kenyan authorities wasmore directly due to the fall of Mobutu andLaurent Kabila’s seizure of power in Congo, whichtriggered a shift in the regional balance of powerand consequent renewal of relations with Kigali, asillustrated in the visit made by Vice-PresidentKagame on the eve of the arrests. The internaldifficulties of the Kenyan regime, the seriousviolence that exploded on its territory and strongpressure from donors all played a role in Kenya’schange of heart22.

The arrests also sharply brought into focus thecontinued protection still given to some of themost powerful Rwandan figures wanted by theICTR. According to statements made at the timeby the Deputy Prosecutor Bernard Muna, fifteensuspects had originally been targeted by theoperation. For at least one of these who was able toslip through the net, the businessman FélicienKabuga, clear evidence points to the existence ofprotection23.

A. ARRESTS: CONTINUED PROTECTIONFOR CERTAIN CRIMINALS

The expert report ordered by the UN on theoperation of the two ad hoc tribunals noted inNovember 1999 that in the area of arrests,“generally speaking, the international cooperationgiven to the ICTR may be classified asexcellent”24. This appears to be excessive. InNovember 2000, the Chief Prosecutor Carla delPonte privately disclosed that seventeen fugitiveswere still on the run. She was “concerned” aboutthe fact that not a single arrest had been madesince February 2000, although new indictmentswere imminent25. One month later, she publicly

22 In 1995, the President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi,declared that he would stop and expel any ICTRinvestigators found on its territory.23 Cf. infra.24 Expert group report on the effectiveness of the activitiesand operation of the ad hoc tribunals, November 1999.25 Interview in Arusha, 3 November 2000. The seventeeninclude: Charles Sikubwabo, Aloys Ndimbati, Ryandikayo,Vincent Rutaganira, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, AugustinBizimana, Félicien Kabuga, Callixte Nzabonimana, YusufMunyakazi, Casimir Bizimungu, Protais Mpiranya,Augustin Ngirabatware, Ildephonse Nizeyimana,

indicated, without naming names, the existence of“protection” that prevented her from bringing incertain wanted suspects26.

It must be pointed out that many of themasterminds behind the genocide have not beenarrested, and that some are not even being soughtby the ICTR. Apparently, the Habyarimana clan,strongly suspected of being implicated in thegenocide, has not been indicted by the ICTR owingto lack of evidence. Some of them appear to havetaken up residence in European countries: AgatheHabyarimana’s brothers, Séraphin Rwabukumbaand Protais Zigiranyirabo, and PresidentHabyarimana’s cousin Charles Nzawagerageza arethought to be in Belgium. Agathe Habyarimana,the President’s wife, is allegedly in France, whereher son Jean Pierre is thought to have diedrecently. The Habyarimana clan is mostly living inBelgium. Indeed, some of its members attendedthe trials held in Brussels from April to June 2001.It is urgent that serious investigations be opened bythe Belgian and French legal authorities todetermine these individuals’ involvement in thegenocide.

1. The Democratic Republic of Congo -Protector of Military Fugitives

The situation faced by the ICTR is different fromthat affecting the ICTY27. Unlike suspects from theformer Yugoslavia, those from Rwanda are hard toprecisely locate and the protection they are given israrely transparent. Moreover, obtaining falseidentity papers is easy on the African continent, afactor that clearly facilitates travel. Among thosestill on the run who have been indicted by theICTR or else under strong suspicion, includeseveral key figures from the ex-FAR, such asAugustin Bizimungu (who is known to be inLumumbashi), Protais Mpiranya, AloysNtiwiragabo (apparently in Masisi) and TharcisseRenzaho (who was one of the leaders of theCongolese Armed Forces (FAC) in the battle ofPweto, DRC, at the end of 2000). Other candidatesinclude the former ministers Augustin Bizimana, Ildephonse Hategekimana. The names of other suspectsremain confidential and will not be revealed in this report.26 Press conference in Arusha, 13 December 2000.27 See ICG Balkans report No103, “War criminals inBosnia’s Republika Srpska : who are the people in yourneighbourhood ?”, 2 November 2000.


Callixte Nzabonimana and Augustin Ngirabatware,as well as the famous businessman FélicienKabuga.

Several African countries are suspected ofharbouring or having harboured many of thesefugitives. These include, in particular, Kenya,Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) and, to a lesser degree, Cameroon andGabon. Several ex-FAR members live inBrazzaville, and according to the prosecutor’soffice, some are thought to be employed by thegovernment’s close protection unit for thecountry’s ministers. According to numerousreliable sources, Augustin Bizimana, ex-DefenceMinister in the interim government who wasindicted by the ICTR in mid-1998, allegedly diedaround mid-2000 in Congo-Brazzaville. PresidentHabyarimana’s brother is apparently in Gabon,where he owns a private clinic. On 13 December2000, during a press conference in Arusha, Carladel Ponte limited these accusations to “two Africanstates” that were protecting certain suspectswanted by her office. She did not say whichcountries or which suspects. However, accordingto information held by the International CrisisGroup, the two states to which she was referringare in fact the DRC and Kenya.

Protais Mpiranya, former commander of thepresidential guard, has been seen in Cameroon onthree separate occasions, but is currently thought tobe residing in DRC. Other suspects, such asAugustin Bizimungu, former head of the RwandanArmed Forces (FAR), Aloys Ntiwiragabo, ex-headof intelligence services and Tharcisse Renzaho,former FAR colonel and prefect of Kigali duringthe genocide, are also believed to be living there,mostly in the Lubumbashi region. The DRC hasagain become notorious for harbouring criminalssince the second Congo war in 1998, in which theCongolese Armed Forces loyal to the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila battled with troops from theRwandan Patriotic Army. According to the pressagency Inter Press Services in September 1999,Augustin Bizimungu, who led the Rwandan ArmedForces (FAR) during the genocide, "has often beencited as the military coordinator of the Rwandanforces fighting for Kabila"28. The number of ex-

28 Inter Press Services, 21 September 1999.

FAR troops fighting alongside the CongoleseArmed Forces is estimated at around 15,000 men.Their fate will be decided in negotiations over theframework of the Lusaka agreement. JosephKabila's government recently admitted that 4,500FAR soldiers were on Congolese territory in thecontext of the Joint Military Commission of theLusaka Agreement. However, it is broadly allegedthat many of their leaders are defendants orsuspects of the ICTR, believed to have taken partin the 1994 genocide. Neutralising these forceswas Kigali's main justification for deploying troopsin Congo. The Office of the Prosecutor maintainsthat the situation in the DRC is clearly differentfrom that elsewhere. In the case, for example, ofCongo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire oreven Belgium, Carla del Ponte's team talks offugitives being "assisted"; others would label this"passive protection". The DRC is clearly anexception - suspects are given "state protection".The other exception of this kind, according to theprosecutor's office, is Kenya.

2. The Troublesome Kabuga in Kenya

Aloys Ntiwiragabo and Tharcisse Renzaho,together with Félicien Kabuga, are three fugitiveswho managed to slip through the hands of ICTRinvestigators in Kenya on 18 July 1997, during theso-called operation "NAKI"29. Since then, one filehas constantly compromised relations between theOffice of the Prosecutor and Nairobi: that ofFélicien Kabuga. A former powerful businessmanrelated to the Habyarimana family throughmarriage, and president of the RTLM, the 65-yearold suspect who suffers from diabetes tooktemporary refuge in Switzerland in June 1994. Hethen travelled to ex-Zaire and finally settled inNairobi, like many former key figures of the fallenregime. A long-term suspect, Kabuga was formallyindicted on 31 August 1998. However, using hisnetwork of contacts and considerable fortune, andprobably a number of different passports, he hasconstantly escaped justice. After dodging operation"NAKI", he was spotted in Southeast Asia inSeptember 1998, according to a UN report on arms

29 Augustin Ngirabatware, former Minister of Planning andFélicien Kabuga's son-in-law, escaped the Tribunal'sinvestigators in November 1999, who were pursuing himon French territory.


buying by the former Rwandan governmentpublished on 18 January 199930. In 2000, he wassuspected of having transited through Belgium,where his wife resides, but the finger of protectionstill points strongly towards the highest Kenyanauthorities.

In April 1998, Félicien Kabuga was traced byICTR investigators to a house which, according totheir sources, belonged to Hosea Kiplagat, thenephew of President Daniel Arap Moi. The houseadjoined another belonging to the son of theKenyan president himself, Gideon Moi. Theinvestigators also identified three other residenceswhere the fugitive was hiding: one in the district ofKaren in Nairobi, another in Nakuru and a third inEldoret, near the President's fiefdom. Two of thesebelonged to Hosea Kiplagat. During operation"NAKI", investigators searching the house inKaren came across a hand-written note explainingthat a Kenyan police officer had tipped off Kabugato leave the building. Today, such seriousallegations continue to weigh heavily on theKenyan authorities, despite their recent officialdenials31.

30 Quoted from Ubutabera, 13 September 1999.31 “We are not sheltering anybody wanted by the tribunaland we will continue to cooperate whenever requested todo so,” declared the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs DrBonaya Godana in The East African of 18-24 December2000. According to Farah Stockman, a journalist with theBoston Globe who investigated Kabuga’s whereabouts inKenya between March and May 2000, “lawyers closelyassociated with Mr. Kabuga say he owns an estimated 20million US$ in assets and scattered bank accounts aroundthe globe”. On August 17, 1995, one of late presidentHabyarimana’s sons got married to one of Kabuga’sdaughters in Nairobi. “There were 350 attendants”Stockman says, “the total bill was 247,725.00 Kenyanshillings for a three hour wedding reception. The bill wasaddressed care of Susan Matiba, daughter of KennethMatiba, one of Kenya’s wealthiest hotel magnates and themost serious contender for the presidential seat in 1992”.“Although he already operated dozens of truckstransporting goods from Kenya’s port city of Mombasa,into Rwanda, Kabuga set up an import-export company inSeptember of 1995 called Nshikabem, with his wifeJosephine Mukazi and his daughter Bernadette Uwamariyaas shareholders. The business operated out of their homeon Lenana drive, in the up-market Spanish Villamaisonettes. Kabuga is still the owner of house #6 inNairobi, which he rented until recently to an unknowingRed Cross worker for 1,000 US$ a month, through ahousing agency. First Assurance Insurance agency says he

Since Carla del Ponte's arrival as Chief Prosecutorin September 1999, efforts to facilitate the arrest ofFélicien Kabuga have been focused on theconfiscation of his financial assets. To date, he isthe only known ICTR suspect to be subjected tosuch measures. His bank accounts have beenfrozen in France, Belgium and Switzerland. Theexact sum has not been disclosed, although byyear-end 2000, some U.S.$2.5 million had beensequestered, most of which appears to have been inFrance, amounting to some 16 million francs32. Acrucial stage in the cooperation of states will havebeen achieved when African States - includingKenya - comply with the prosecutor's request overthis issue.

Since the Tribunal does not have its own policeforce, its only recourse when faced with states thatrefuse to cooperate is to refer the matter to theUnited Nations Security Council. The ICTR hasnever officially used such a weapon, and hasshown itself to be far less enterprising in this took out fire insurance on property in Kenya up to 1998.His company, Nshikabem, is in the Year 2000 phone book.Despite the fact that they have never paid an annual taxreturn, the registry of company considers that it still exists.A Kenyan civil servant who spoke on the condition ofanonymity told me he saw Kabuga being ferried to theairport in a car owned by the head of the military. Neverofficially given asylum, Kabuga had a business class workpermit since April 1995, which he obtained after setting uphis own company and pledging to invest 8.5 millionKenyan shillings in the country. In early June, 1997, topimmigration officials became aware of allegations againsthim and withdrew his resident status and his work permit.This is where the story is murky. Apparently, he was askedto leave and after immigration officials investigated, theydetermined that he left the country. This was exactly thetime when ICTR investigators were organizing their firstmass arrest in Kenya, and Kabuga was supposed to be oneof them.”After “Naki” operation, there was an attempt to negotiate asurrender to the ICTR through Luc de Temmerman, aBelgian lawyer who once represented Habyarimana’sestate. “But the deal fell through, a family member ofKabuga told me, partly because of the Prosecutor’s refusalto let him live outside the jail on bond until his trial”,recalls Stockman. During her investigation, a son-in-law ofKabuga told Stockman that Kabuga could meet her“outside Nairobi, but in Kenya”. However, the meetingnever took place. Interview with ICG, 15 December 2000.32 Interview with office of the prosecutor, 3 December1999. See also the draft budget 2001 for the ICTR, dated21 October 2000.


respect than its cousin in The Hague. Yet facedwith countries that "assist" or protect suspectswanted by the international tribunal, the questionremains over the level of commitment shown bythe United Nations, and particularly the SecurityCouncil, to use all means to ensure compliancewith the Tribunal's rulings. One American lawprofessor, in his study that appeared in early 1999,accounts for this accordingly: “The political viewsof the UN Secretariat and of powerful UNmembers continue to exert a powerful impact onthe effectiveness of these tribunals, as is clear withrespect to the Council’s unwillingness to imposesanctions on those governments who have to daterefused to cooperate with tribunal orders”33. In thelight of this, it is imperative that the SecurityCouncil passes a resolution requesting theimmediate handing over of all genocide suspects.

For a better understanding of the way theinternational tribunal operates, and of the limitedhelp it can count on, it is also important to pointout that states, including those who cooperatefully, never take on the responsibility of trackingdown fugitives. This is the task of specialisedICTR investigators - a total of twelve people tocover the entire world - whose job it is to providenational police forces with the maximum ofinformation with which to make an arrest. There isno prior cooperation from national police forces totrack down known suspects. If there iscooperation, it only occurs at the time of actualseizure. Given the means at the disposal of theprosecutor's office and the geographical scatteringof suspects, the ICTR's capacity for intelligencegathering and action is, to say the least, limited.

B. THE TRANSFER OF SUSPECTS - PROMPTACTION AND LONG DELAYS

The cooperation of states is not limited to arrestingsuspects. It also involves ensuring their transfer tothe Tribunal's headquarters. Most countries haveorganised the prompt transfer of suspects arrestedon their territory, which usually means in less thanfour months. This has not been the case for the

33 José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/crimes of hate: lessonsfrom Rwanda, The Yale Journal of International Law, notdated.

United States, Great Britain, Denmark and,initially Cameroon. Although it often turns out thatthese longs delays (three and a half years in thecase of the U.S., nine months for the UK andDenmark) are linked to national laws that protectthe rights of the individual, they can seriouslyaffect the legal process at the ICTR. For example,the extremely slow transfer of ElizaphanNtakirutimana by the United States was a keyelement in the postponement of the trial of his sonand co-defendant, Gérard Ntakirutimana34.Similarly, the delay in transferring Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza and Laurent Semanza by Cameroonin 1997 seriously undermined both cases35. Thepositive conclusion of the transfer processes is thatthe ICTR's legal jurisdiction has now been firmlyestablished. Legally speaking, when a State sends adefendant to the ICTR this is not technically anextradition but a transfer. Moreover, during thedrafting of the Tribunal's rules of procedure, it wasspecifically stated that the domestic law ofcountries regarding extradition should not be anobstacle to handing over defendants36. Strictlyspeaking, the cooperation of states has not alwaysbeen as full as it might be.

Consequently, it is recommended that states,particularly those that lack rigorous legalmechanisms, should at least look at ways ofaccelerating national procedures for when theyreceive transfer requests by the internationaltribunal. On the one hand, despite the statutoryprovisions of the ICTR, it would be risky, evenundesirable for certain countries to adopt specialprocedures that could create a precedent toundermine the protection of individual rights. Onthe other hand, giving priority treatment to suchcases would, by default, allow compliance with

34 Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana were initiallyindicted on 17 June 1996. Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimanawas arrested in Texas on 26 September 1996, and his son,Doctor Gérard Ntakirutimana, a month later on 29October, in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the son was quicklytransferred to Arusha on 30 November 1996, whereas hisfather was not handed over until 24 March 2000. Theirtrial, set for 22 January 2001, was postponed until 23April, then again to September 2001.35 The time taken to transfer the two suspects amounted toeight and a half months. For details of these cases, seeeditions of 7 November 1999, 21 February and 31 March2000 of Ubutabera.36 Rule 58 of the ICTR's Rules of Procedure and Evidence.


domestic law and the interests of the internationalcourt to be reconciled.

C. AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE TO BEENCOURAGED: FUNDS FOR INFORMERS

One external initiative has nevertheless beenlaunched to support the efforts of the ICTR inapprehending suspects. On 25 April 2000, RussFeingold, a Democratic senator from Wisconsinand ranking Democrat on the sub-committee forAmerican Affairs in the U.S. Senate, requested theexpansion of the programme of financial rewardsrun by the federal state. The legislation allows theU.S. Secretary of State to grant instant financialcompensation to any person who gives informationleading to the arrest of an ICTY defendant. TheSenate and the House of Representatives ratifiedan amendment to this law to include ICTRsuspects in the programme and President Clintonsigned the new law on 2 October. It is generallyconsidered - and Carla del Ponte has confirmedthis - that the programme has not been very fruitfulin the context of former Yugoslavia37. However, itseems that it is much more likely to bring returnsin the search for Rwandan suspects, given theimpact of such rewards on refugee communitiesliving in extremely difficult environments. “Therewards program may well prove to be moreeffective in the case of the ICTR than in that of theICTY. Offering a reward for information leadingto the arrest and/or conviction of SlobodanMilosevic sent an important political message andserved to underscore his lack of legitimacy. Butobviously, Milosevic's whereabouts were not amystery. In contrast, a number of the individualswanted by the ICTR are indeed in hiding, andextending the rewards program to cover thiscircumstance may make it more difficult for theseindividuals to continue to evade accountability,”explains Brad Jaffe, from Senator Feingold's pressoffice38. Compensation can go as high as fivemillion U.S. dollars. At the start of 2001, a list ofthirteen wanted suspects was posted on theInternet. The next stage consists of publishingposters, as with the former Yugoslavia, and

37 Interview in Arusha, 3 November 2000.38 Correspondence with ICG, 15 November 2000.

distributing leaflets based on the same model39.However, interviews held by International CrisisGroup in December point to the fact that those incharge at the Office of the Prosecutor still havelittle or no idea of how they can use the funds. It isclearly urgent, therefore, that the U.S. governmentexplains the programme if this support is to bringconcrete results.

39 See www.dssrewards.net/english/warcrimes/rwanda_warcriminals.htm. All things considered, this list issomewhat surprising. Two notorious defendants - AugustinBizimungu and Augustin Bizimana are absent from it,whereas two confidential names of defendants - IldephonseHategekimana and Ildephonse Nizeyimana - are madepublic. Moreover, the name of Ladislas Kabera, captain ofthe presidential guard, who has not been indicted, was infact a confidential suspect for ICTR investigators.


IV. THE ICTR AND RWANDA: THEINEVITABLE POLITICIZATION OFJUSTICE

During the second half of 2000, the ICTRacknowledged that it had to improve its impact onRwandan society. The failures it had experiencedthreatened to totally alienate it from the verypeople it was meant to be serving. Rwandans ingeneral, both those living in the country and othersin exile, knew little of what was taking place inArusha. The tribunal's contribution to nationalreconciliation was non-existent as long as it wasstill perceived to be delivering victors’ justice.Clearly, achieving reconciliation in the context ofan ongoing war is not a task that the ICTR canaccomplish alone.

A. JUSTICE DEPENDANT UPON ACCESS TOTHE CRIME SCENES

From the outset, Kigali was offended by theinternational community’s confiscation of its rightto deliver justice. Although the ICTR was initiallycreated at Rwanda’s request, the numerousconditions imposed by the Security Council -refusal of the death penalty, headquarters outsideRwanda, foreign judges and prosecutors, amandate that excludes pre-1994 events, a sharedprosecutor with the ICTY, primacy over nationalcourts, etc, - meant that Rwanda was the onlycountry to vote against the establishment of theICTR on 8 November 1994. Clearly, the ICTRcannot operate without being allowed access towitnesses, and access to the country is crucial forgathering evidence. Since 1994, the position takenby the Rwandan government has swung betweenthis original opposition and more or less supportdepending on the circumstances. The seriousdysfunction the Tribunal’s administration and theOffice of the Prosecutor, exposed in a damning UNreport in February 1997 and resulting in thedismissal of the Registrar and Deputy Prosecutor,did nothing to improve matters. In the spring of1997, reaction in Rwanda to the new ChiefProsecutor, Louise Arbour, was particularlyhostile, with public demonstrations staged bysurvivors’ groups, openly backed by thegovernment. Her successor, Carla del Ponte, hadhardly taken up her post when she was refused an

entry visa to Rwanda, a reaction to the appealcourt ruling in The Hague to release Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza for the repeated infringement of hisrights40.

1. Relations Initially Marked by Defiance

Since its creation, relations between the Tribunaland the Rwandan government have generally beentense. They deteriorated badly in 1996, graduallyimproving afterwards, yet by the end of 1999 hadescalated into a new crisis during the Barayagwizaaffair. A year after the tensions sparked by thisincident, cooperation between the Rwandanauthorities and the ICTR appears to be settlingdown, if still a little fragile. The affair had turnedinto a political trap for the international tribunal,with the Rwandan government adroitly using it toshame the court and, by extension, theinternational community.

When, in June 1996, it was made public thatFroduald Karamira had attempted to escape fromthe plane that was taking him to Kigali during astop-over in Addis-Ababa, Rwanda made itsposition crystal clear to the then ICTR ChiefProsecutor, the South African Richard Goldstone:no interference by his office in the extradition ofthe ex-MDR Power41 leader would be tolerated.Several weeks earlier, the Rwandan governmenthad found it hard to swallow the fact that the ICTRhad quietly stepped in and “netted” former keyleaders of the regime who had been arrested inCameroon on Kigali’s initiative. During the sameperiod, the exhumations carried out by ICTRinvestigators had provoked an outcry in Rwandanpublic opinion, who found the practice indecent.The climate between Rwanda and the UN Tribunalwas at its worst after the final departure of the“blue helmets” serving under the UNAMIR42.

Operation “NAKI” in July 1997 marked the startof a rekindling of relations between the ICTR andKigali. In September 1998, cooperation wasreinforced by the first convictions of Jean-PaulAkayesu and Jean Kambanda, which also brought

40 See “infra”41 The radical wing of the Mouvement DémocratiqueRépublicain.42 United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda.


badly needed recognition and legitimacy for theTribunal. 1999 promised to be the year when theTribunal’s power and status finally blossomed. Anew trial chamber was created, increasing thenumber of judges to nine and it was announcedthat grouped trials involving some of the mostinfamous prisoners in Arusha were to be held. Anumber of factors symbolised the improvements inrelations between Rwanda and the Tribunal. InMarch 1999, for the first time ever, a defence teamtravelled to Rwanda to carry out investigations.Other legal teams quickly followed the example,and by November 2000 a total of seven defenceteams had made twelve visits to the crime sites.Such a crucial part of judicial work was eventuallyto become the norm. While defence lawyers haveregularly encountered obstacles in their research,their physical security has never been endangered.

In August 1999, when Chief Prosecutor LouiseArbour bid the Tribunal farewell, she was given asurprisingly warm send-off by the Rwandanpolitical and judicial authorities, which evenincluded apologies for their harsh treatment of herduring her first few months in office. In October,the normalisation of political relations appearedcomplete after Rwanda’s appointment of a specialrepresentative to the ICTR in the new firstsecretary of the Rwandan Embassy at Dar-es-Salaam. Indeed, in early November, three judgesfrom one trial chamber, accompanied byprosecution and defence parties, made their firstofficial trip to Rwanda to visit the scene of crimesin the Bagilishema case, the mayor from theMabanza commune in Kibuye prefecture (WestRwanda) whose trial had just opened.Paradoxically, it was in such a context of rareentente that, on 3 November 1999, the appeal courtin The Hague handed down its ruling granting astay of proceedings against Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza, the former leader of the extremistHutu party Coalition for the Defence of theRepublic (CDR).

2. The Barayagwiza Affair

According to appeal court judges, Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza had been the victim of serious andrepeated violations of his rights during pre-trialproceedings. The sanction ordered on 3 November1999 was radical: annulment of proceedings,release and a permanent ban preventing the

Prosecutor from resuming proceedings against theex-leader of the CDR and the infamous RTLM.

The prompt reaction of Rwanda was almost asblunt. The government announced the“suspension” of its cooperation with the Tribunaland refused, for two weeks, to issue a visa to thenew Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte.Demonstrations against the ICTR resumed inKigali. In reality, the suspension of cooperationwas more theoretical. Rwanda, despitedeclarations from the Office of the Prosecutor atthe time, never once prevented witnesses fromgoing to testify in the Bagilishema trial in process.Indeed, the affair brought the Rwandangovernment and the office of the prosecutor intotacit agreement by exerting heavy pressure on theTribunal in their common interest.

For Kigali, this was also a means of redefiningrelations with a new Chief Prosecutor in a way thatsuited it best, i.e., weakening the relationship.Inevitably, the Rwandan government’s interests inthe ICTR were ambiguous, especially in itsrelations with the prosecutor’s office. For,although the Tribunal was a useful politicalweapon in turning former Rwandan Hutu leadersinto genocide suspects, it was also a threat, giventhe indictments that it could and should be issuingagainst soldiers from the Rwandan Patriotic Front,in power today. The Barayagwiza affair wasRwanda’s special welcome to Carla del Ponte whohad arrived in September 1999 and had never setfoot in the region. The political-judicial incidentthat marked the period of the current ICTRProsecutor’s arrival was, in the opinion of oneexpert “a psycho-drama to test and soften up Carladel Ponte. To teach her about Africa in theRwandan fashion. This worked perfectly”43.

At the same time, the Swiss Prosecutor needed thisofficial pressure on the Tribunal in order to pull offher legal counter-attack. Del Ponte filed a swiftmotion for the 3 November ruling to be reviewedon the basis of “new evidence” - the only recourseshe had. Less than five months later, the situationhad been remedied. On 31 March 2000, the appealcourt radically reversed its ruling, declaring that

43 ICG interview with a Rwandan political figure, Kigali,21 November 2000.


the infringements of the prisoner’s rights were notas serious as first judged, and that proceedingswould continue against Jean-Bosco Barayagwizabefore the Arusha Tribunal. In the meantime,Rwanda had already announced the “resumption”of cooperation. The affair brought into focusnumerous problems with the Tribunal’s way ofoperating. However, unsurprisingly, the manner inwhich the incident was handled rendered suspectall the ICTR’s efforts to conserve or reinforcerelations with Rwanda.

Since then, politics have openly intervened in thelegal debate. The revision of the Barayagwizajudgement came after the public outcry that itprovoked in Rwanda. It was also preceded by afamous statement made by Carla del Ponte that, ifthe judges did not overturn their decision, theTribunal should, as it were, “put the key under themat”. The “new evidence” presented by the Officeof the Prosecutor and accepted by the judges wasnot new in the legal sense of the term. Moreover,since then, the validity of some of this has beenchallenged by rulings in the Cameroon courts.Despite the fact that the 3 November ruling wasalso legally questionable, the turnaround by thejudges was interpreted by some members of theRwandan community as the result of politicalpressure exerted on judges and as a sign of theirlack of independence. “Even though this is aninternational tribunal, I would see it as an Africancourt. There are demonstrations, politicaldeclarations and when the Tribunal says “we’llsee”, it is not independent” notes Jean Rubaduka, ajudge at the Rwanda Supreme Court, who has heldno official post since July 199944. The impact isobviously even more visible in exiled politicalopposition groups. “The lesson to be learned fromthe Barayagwiza affair is that the Rwandangovernment cannot allow the ICTR to operate if ittakes decisions it does not like. It is the Rwandangovernment that has the last word. (…) The affairdemonstrated the ICTR’s lack of independencevis-à-vis the Kigali government. [It] revealed theextent to which political influence takesprecedence over legal matters at the ICTR”, wroteEmmanuel Nyemera, vice-president of the RDR45.

44 Interview in Kigali, 7 December 2000.45 Correspondance with ICG, 30 November 2000.

A year after the crisis, relations between Rwandaand the ICTR have stabilised. Minister of Justice,Jean de Dieu Mucyo, and the Rwandan ChiefProsecutor both speak of a “very good”cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor46.Meanwhile, Carla del Ponte has made regularvisits to Rwanda. Before obtaining the revision ofthe Barayagwiza ruling, she strongly backed theRwandan government’s request to be allowed tospeak before the Tribunal in the case. Moreover,she granted an old request by the Rwandan courtsto be allowed access to the full text of theconfession of the former Prime Minister JeanKambanda, which was made available in the formof a CD-ROM. This gesture took on a symbolicsignificance - it is perhaps the most prestigiousdocument to have emerged from ICTRinvestigations - and a legal one, given that one ofthe ministers from the 1994 interim government isto be tried in Kigali.

Between August and September 2000, other ICTRinitiatives helped improve the climate of relations.At the end of August, four judges from theTribunal, led by President Navanathem Pillay andVice-President Erick Møse, made an official visitto Rwanda. One notable event on the trip was theirmeeting with the President of the Republic PaulKagame. The following month, the ICTR Registrarwent on the offensive, announcing the launch of an“assistance programme for witnesses and potentialwitnesses”, as well as the opening of aninformation centre in Kigali with the aim ofbringing the Tribunal closer to the Rwandanpeople. Théoneste Murangira, co-ordinator of theRwandan human rights association Kanyarwandasummarises this evolution as follows: “Today, theimage of the ICTR is positive. At first, it was not.The reversal in the Barayagwiza affair was adetermining factor. It was a positive conclusion. Ayear ago, there was exasperation and totaldisappointment47.”

However, the renewed warmth of relations still hasits limits and its setbacks. With regard to theaccess of evidence by defence teams, lawyers whohave travelled to Rwanda complain that localauthorities have sometimes impeded their

46 ICG interview in Kigali, 2 and 5 December 2000.47 ICG interview in Kigali, 4 December 2000.


investigations. In particular, several teams havebeen refused access to archives, bothadministrative and audio-visual, by the RwandanInformation Office (ORINFOR). One of theselawyers, who has made several trips, notes “atotally hypocritical line taken by all officials.”Access to the files of prosecution witnesses whoare imprisoned in Rwanda is another subject ofconstant concern.

In the post-Barayagwiza context, the visit toRwanda by the judges at the end of August 2000served, in part, to sustain debates over thepartiality of the Tribunal. In fact, the concernsexpressed over the visit, during which four ICTRjudges met the Rwandan president, the PrimeMinister and the Chief Prosecutor Gahima, appearto be limited either to defendants and their lawyersor certain political movements. AloysMuberanziza, former Dean of the Law School andlecturer at the Rwanda National University, offersthe following analysis: “The Tribunal’s initiativesto visit Rwanda, the sites of massacres and theRwandan authorities are not in themselvesmisplaced. If their aim is to seek out the truth andimprove the quality of work and its visibility inRwanda, this is to be appreciated48.” Moreover,François-Xavier Nsanzuwera, former Prosecutor inKigali and currently Secretary General of theInternational Federation of Human Rights (FIDH),firmly asserts that “the meeting with the Rwandanauthorities has nothing to do with theindependence of judges”49.

In reality the visit was not a first. In September1995, ICTR President Laïty Kama had met withthe Rwandan president Pasteur Bizimungu.Accompanied by two other judges, a furtherinterview took place in March 1997. Theembarrassment caused by the recent trip istherefore mostly due to the context generated bythe Barayagwiza affair, which threw the suspicionof impartiality over any initiative taken by theICTR with regard to the Rwandan government.

48 Correspondence with ICG, 5 December 2000.49 Correspondence with ICG, 16 November 2000.

3. The Difficult Task of Managing Witnesses

“Without the cooperation of Rwanda, it is difficultfor the Tribunal to achieve the goal that it set itself,given that most of our witnesses are in Rwandaand that this necessitates collaboration with theRwandan authorities.50” This assertion by theformer ICTR President, the late Laïty Kama,remains perfectly valid four years later51. By June2000, almost 220 witnesses had appeared beforethe ICTR and around 240 had been brought by theTribunal from over twenty different countries52.The question of the protection given to bothdefence and prosecution witnesses has generatedone of the most legitimate and impassioneddebates of the last four years.

The overwhelming majority of prosecutionwitnesses come from Rwanda. Almost all of theseare “protected witnesses”, in other words, theiridentity is not revealed to the public. Althoughdefence witnesses rarely come from Rwanda, theystill enjoy the same protection measures. However,for prosecution witnesses, cooperation withRwanda is clearly a key factor in the protectionprocess. All witnesses from Rwanda, whetherdefence or prosecution, are vulnerable to all kindsof pressure. Since the start of the trials in Arusha,the ICTR has progressively but rapidly installed asystem of systematic witness protection, and whatwas initially envisaged in the rules as an exception,has quickly become the rule. This said, concretely,such protection is minimal: the ICTR’s physicalprotection of witnesses is limited to the time theyspend in Arusha. In addition, the main paradox ofthe situation is that witnesses in Rwandan nationalcourts testify with their faces uncovered.

Four years after the start of the trials, two incidentsoccurred in the course of the ICTR’s activities: thekilling of two prosecution witnesses. The first, atthe end of 1996, was a potential witness in theAkayesu trial. The second had already testified in

50 In Ubutabera, 10 May 1997.51 Laïty Kama, who died in Nairobi on May 6, 2001, wasICTR President from 1995 to 1999. Navanethem Pillaysucceeded in him in the post in June 1999.52 Several witnesses have been sent to Arusha without everappearing before the court. This data may be considered asvalid up until October 2000, after which new witnesseswere transferred to Arusha.


the Rutaganda trial. In both cases, no link betweentheir murder and their status as an ICTR witnesswas ever established53. Ultimately, in the face ofsuch a sensitive issue that is still the subject ofseveral misunderstandings, the Tribunal hasachieved some rather remarkable results.

Nonetheless, the principle of public trials has beenseriously eroded at the international tribunal. Theproblem seems to be a sign of the ICTR’s politicalweakness, and its main fear of being blamed forany incidents. In the ICTR’s defence, it is likelythat it would be criticised for any problems despitethe factors described above. The issue seems tohave become a potential threat to the integrity andtransparency of the trials, especially in a contextwhere suspicions of false testimony abound. In thisrespect, the recent statements by the Belgianexamining judge Damien Vandermeersch beforethe Brussels Court of Assizes sounds a warningbell to the international court. He stressed that “inorder to assess a testimony, identity is capital,”adding that anonymity runs the risk of “lapsinginto rumour” and establishing facts “that cannot beverified”54.

In March 2001, in the so-called Media trial,protection measures were lifted for the first timefor a prosecution witness, with his agreement. In1998, a defence witness in the Akayesu trial hadpersonally requested that his anonymity bedropped. In both cases, the witnesses confirmedthat they had never requested such measures. Theywere merely the result of an automatic protectionpolicy.

Since September 2000, the Rwandan governmenthas also made repeated allegations that prosecutionand defence witnesses are treated differently. Thisis a serious allegation, but it has never beensubstantiated by solid evidence, even less by anofficial complaint. However, once again

53 Only one known case exists where a link has beenconfirmed by a reliable source between a witness’testimony at the Tribunal and retaliation measures. This isthe case of Fidèle Uwizeye, former prefect of Gitarama,called by the defence to appear in the Akayesu trial andallowed to testify in camera. Arrested in Kigali six weeksafter his appearance in Arusha, in February 1998, FidèleUwizeye was released on 2 February 2000.54 Cited in Diplomatie Judiciaire, 21 April 2001.

accusations such as these undermine the ICTR,which suffers from a worrying lack of confidenceover the issue.

B. A POLITICAL MANDATE DIFFICULT TOACHIEVE

The urgent creation of the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda was intended primarily tofight impunity in Rwanda and, to this effect, to usethe legal instrument to help bring reconciliationand contribute towards re-establishing and keepingthe peace. In the same resolution establishing theICTR, the Security Council underlined anotherunderlying objective, "the need for internationalcooperation to strengthen thecourts and judicial system of Rwanda, havingregard in particular to the necessity for those courtsto deal with large numbers of suspects." Thesignificance of this, compared to the Tribunal forFormer Yugoslavia, was underestimated.

1. A Tribunal Isolated from RwandanSociety

“Another serious shortcoming of the ICTY is itslocation in The Netherlands, far from the areaswhere the crimes took place. The only contact theaverage Bosnian has with the proceedings of thecourt are short daily television news stories, whichshow video footage of the accused wearingheadphones, sitting in front of a panel of robedjudges in a foreign court setting. As a result, thecitizens of Bosnia are almost completely out oftouch with the court's day-to-day proceedings. Thislack of understanding prevents Bosnians - Serbs,Croats and Bosniaks alike - from hearing theevidence presented in the court 55.” Thisconclusion from the International Crisis Group inits recent report on the Hague Tribunal is equallyvalid for the ICTR, with one exception: televisionis extremely rare in Rwanda and, for the few urbandwellers who do own a set, there are obviously nodaily broadcasts or footage of the Arusha court.Radio broadcasts on the trials are also scarce. Themain consequence of this is that Rwandans, forwhom the international court was created, havelittle or no involvement outside Kigali in the trials

55 See ICG report, op. cit.


today. This is the most serious and patentlyobvious sign of the huge gap that separates theArusha Tribunal from the people of Rwanda.

Does the ICTR belong to Rwandans? The simpleanswer is no. This is the unanimous conclusion ofthose concerned, who see the Tribunal as theinternational community’s way of absolving itselffor its inaction in 1994. Rwandans are not activelyinvolved in the trial process except for a handfulwho come as witnesses; and for most, the court isinvisible. “What was its mission exactly? Whyelsewhere? Perhaps it should be said that thesepeople are no longer Rwandans. Here, wheninnocent people are released, I can feel thatsomething has been achieved. Over there inArusha, I don’t know. Do you want to rewrite thehistory of our country? Let them come and tell uswhat happened and so that our children canreconstruct their history” argues, for example,Judith Kanakuze, national coordinator of theWomen's’ Network56. This assertion is all the moreworrying as it inevitably raises the question of therole of justice in a society. One of the majorconcerns expressed in the wake of the genocide,which laid the foundations for the ICTR, was theambition to combat the culture of impunity. Morethan just a slogan, this expression conveyed theidea that the mass crimes committed in Rwandawere partly the result of decades of similar crimesgoing unpunished. Setting up an international courtwas a way of punishing the perpetrators of suchcrimes and at the same time hopefully establishinga culture of law.

However, because the court was inherently foreignto the very society that it was supposed to behelping, international justice has forfeited anyimpact on Rwandan society. By so doing, it hasfailed to achieve both its social and educationalfunctions. Protais Mutembe, one of the defencelawyers for Bishop Augustin Misago - a flagshiptrial that took place in Rwanda – accounts for thisfailure: “It would have been far more educationalto have worked here. Tanzania is far away - wedon’t see it. Education in the law takes place onthe ground. It is a culture that is gradually

56 Interview in Kigali, 4 December 2000.

emerging by the force of events, no thanks to theICTR”57.

For a long time, Gérald Gahima, Rwanda’s ChiefProsecutor, has expressed his deep opposition tothe very idea of international justice. A fewmonths before the Rome Conference to set up apermanent international court, he described theICTR’s experience, on 5 February 1998 in Dakar,as “a total failure”. One of the arguments he putforward, speaking on behalf of his government,was the isolation of the court from Rwandansociety. “This leads to a situation where thesocieties against whom the crimes were committedknow little about the tribunal’s work and care evenless about it. Any court that lacks contact with thevictims of the crimes it is trying will always lacklegitimacy,” he declared. Today, the Prosecutorhas barely moderated his criticisms, and still pointsto the lack of impact of the ICTR’s work. “Even ifit has become more efficient, I will not change myopinion on international justice because there is nolink with the society where the crimes werecommitted. Even if improvements are made, it willstill be a case of two or three trials a year costingseveral million U.S. dollars. The internationaltribunal is a symbol. Its impact is minimal. If wedecided to close it today, there would be noreaction. It was created for the internationalcommunity. What impact can it ever have?”58

Moreover, behind the Security Council’sresolution was the need to create bridges betweeninternational tribunals and national courts. To date,this judicial cooperation has mostly operated on aone-way basis. Louise Arbour defended a highlyrestrictive definition of information sharing for theprosecution. “I consider that until the witnessestestify in public and their testimonies have becomepart of public proceedings, the Prosecutor has anobligation of confidentiality. If third parties,including national courts, wish to have access towitnesses, I will never reveal their identity or thecontents of their statements without theirpermission” confided the former ChiefProsecutor59.

57 Interview in Kigali, 7 December 2000.58 Interview in Kigali, 5 December 2000.59 Interview in Arusha, 20 February, 1999.


Carla del Ponte is clearly more flexible over thisissue, and more pragmatic, as illustrated byallowing the Rwandan prosecutor access to theJean Kambanda’s confession. Nevertheless, thisappears to have been more of an exception than therule: in December 2000, the confessions ofGeorges Ruggiu and Omar Serushago were nothanded over to Rwandan courts. While it is truethat the two convicts will later be testifying inother trials before the ICTR, which is why thesecret of their confessions remains protected, JeanKambanda is also, in principle, in the samesituation. It is hard to imagine that the Rwandancourts would not be interested in Ruggiu’sconfession, since they are currently seized of thetrial of his former co-worker at RTLM ValérieBemeriki. Similarly, the testimony of the headmilitiaman Serushago would be a useful documentfor prosecutors in charge of genocide cases inGisenyi. This indicates that, apart from thesymbolic case of Kambanda, in practice there havebeen no fundamental changes. Indeed, theprosecutor’s office in Kigali has not even asked forthe confessions. The biggest request made by thebody of Rwandan legal assistants is of an entirelydifferent nature: for judges and legal staff to begiven extra training.

An expert analyst of Rwandan society and legalquestions, Noël Twagiramungu, executivesecretary of the Great Lakes League of HumanRights, gave this assessment of the situation: “Onthe whole, Rwandans attach very little interest tothe ICTR. We realise that it cannot do very much.Given the pace of its work, it cannot try manypeople. As for the survivors, since compensation isnot on offer, they have almost no expectationsfrom the ICTR. For them, Arusha is a place wherecriminals are kept so that they do not come backhere to be held accountable for their crimes. Thisis somewhat discouraging. If its actions were morevisible, perhaps this would change things. Thenpeople could hear about what was happening”60.

The year 2000 saw the first attempts to do this.Between May and July, six law students fromButare were given internships at the ICTR. InSeptember, twenty judges went to Arusha on aworking visit. Clearly, this change in approach by

60 Interview in Kigali, 5 December 2000.

the international tribunal should be supported andincreased. Generally speaking, however, the twolegal processes continue to operate in a totallyisolated manner. No concrete efforts have beenmade until now by the ICTR to allow Rwandancourts access to its own case law. Similarly, therehave only been rare instances when defencelawyers have cited rulings handed down by theRwandan courts. The international court lives, forthe most part, in total ignorance, if not contempt,of the work of its colleagues in Rwanda.

That said, faced with the progress and experienceacquired by national courts, many people feel thatArusha also has lessons to learn from Kigali. “TheICTR has no impact on our files. Most of the time,it is lagging behind us. Our judges do not havecopies of rulings handed down by the ICTR, and Ido not know whether this would be useful, giventheir technical nature. As for the facts of thecrimes themselves, does the ICTR know more? Onthis issue, I think that Rwanda can teach the ICTRquite a lot,” explains Jean-Jacques Badibanga61,head of Lawyers Without Borders in Rwanda. Hecites an example of such help: in October 2000,the trial of the former deputy Laurent Semanzaopened at the ICTR for crimes committed in thecommune of Bicumbi (Rural Kigali). Over a yearearlier, a trial chamber handed down a ruling in agrouped trial of 40 people regarding the samecrimes. “It would be senseless not to use thisruling,” concluded Badibanga.

In such a context, the cost of international justicehas long been a source of total incomprehension orbitterness by Rwandans who constantly see theissue in terms of numbers. By June 2000, the ICTRhad tried eight individuals, whereas the Rwandancourts had pronounced verdicts against 3,751defendants62. Since this date, the ratio has becomemuch worse as Rwandan courts prosecute anincreasing number of defendants every year,whereas the ICTR has only pronounced one morejudgement against a single individual, in June2001. Between 1994 and 1996, according toHuman Rights Watch, the Rwandan government

61 Interview inKigali, 7 December 2000.62 According to statistics published by the centre fordocumentation on the genocide trials (CDIPG) of theRwanda association, Liprodhor.


received a total of U.S.$19 million in foreign aid tohelp rebuild its legal system. Other sourcesconfirm the sums by assessing the aid given until1998 as around U.S.$ 40 million. This represents arelatively constant sum of around U.S.$10 milliona year. By contrast, the cost of the ICTR for thesingle year of 1999 amounted to the total foreignaid given to Rwandan courts in the five yearsfollowing the genocide. Since its creation, theArusha Tribunal has probably absorbed someU.S.$ 270 million “In my view, the ICTRconsumes more than it produces. I cannot give ascientific justification of this observation but, from1995 to today, I have compared the number ofdetainees tried with the resources the Tribunal has.They have thirty-eight prisoners and haveprosecuted eight. In five years. If you calculate thebudget, this is greater than the entire nationalbudget of the legal sector. It is a real waste,”comments Tharcisse Karugarama, Vice Presidentof the Supreme Court63. For many otherRwandans, incomprehension quickly turns fromsarcasm, from the denunciation of an “industry oftragedy” into the bitter conclusion of CallixteHabamenshi, ambassador during every regimesince Independence, who argues: “We are from theThird World, we have Third World justice: theperformance of the ICTR is ridiculous64”.

2. The ICTR and Reconciliation

Nothing is more linked to the Rwandan people’sappropriation of their own justice than the notionof reconciliation. Among the numerousexpectations of the ICTR, beyond its repressivefunctions, many are expressly stated in theSecurity Council’s resolution creating the ICTR.The best known of all these is that referring tonational reconciliation. Yet, if the opinionsexpressed by the majority of Rwandans are to bebelieved, the ICTR’s contribution to this goalremains invisible to date. “In terms ofreconciliation, it is zero. I see nothing to which ithas contributed. The confessions of JeanKambanda? A failure. Those of Serushago? Whatis their impact here? Nil. In terms of trials, thecriminals say that they are political and the victimsthat they reduce the punishment of criminals.

63 Interview in Kigali, 7 December 2000.64 Interview in Kigali, 6 December 2000.

There is one valid argument in favour: arrests. Butit is very difficult for people to understand that thisis enough,” concludes Noël Twagiramungu. Thewords of the executive secretary of the LDGL areall the more significant as they refer to judicialresults of the UN tribunal that are among its keyachievements - the guilty plea entered by some ofits defendants - since great claims have been madefor their role in reconciliation. The fact that theformer head of government Jean Kambanda laterdecided to retract his guilty plea reduced themeaning of his original approach to nothing.However, the fact that Omar Sherushago'sconfession did not make an impact is more directlyowing to the distance and isolation of theinternational court. The confessions by theperpetrators of genocide could have been one ofthe most spectacular and immediate contributionsmade by the ICTR in terms of nationalreconciliation. Their disclosure could have beenone of the most significant factors in the recordingof a common, accepted memory of events. Thelack of information for Rwandan public opinionand the fact that the contents of the confessionshave never been made public have seriouslyundermined such a possibility.

Depending on political and ethnic sensitivities,such a contribution would depend as much on theTribunal’s commitment to try both parties in theconflict, as on the court’s ability to take intoaccount the interests of victims. All these factorspoint to the conclusion that the isolation of theTribunal is detrimental to the its potential role inreconciliation.

It is important to stress, however, that reactions tothis question are as unpredictable as nationalreconciliation itself. It is obvious that this will notcome from the ICTR but is much more likely to bethe result of a political will to find lastingsolutions. Such solutions must be fair and strongenough to surmount the institutional, political andmilitary obstacles confronting Rwanda and overwhich the ICTR has little influence. The work ofthe Tribunal is above all to deliver justice forcrimes committed in 1994. It cannot be expectedto stop the war and reconcile the Rwandan people.

The fight against impunity, democratisation,struggle against ethnic conflict: such are the tasksthat are more or less directly attributed to the


Tribunal, and such are its failures. One goalremains to be mentioned that the ICTR regularlycites as primordial: establishing an historicalrecord of events, which is impartial, objective andthorough. The most significant trials of theconspiracy that led to the genocide, as alleged bythe Prosecutor, have not yet taken place. However,for the moment, José Alvarez’ analysis cannot bedenied: “Whether or not any criminal trial can everprovide an account of that genocide that doesjustice to this variety of causal explanatory factors,the ICTR’s prosecutions, artificially constrained toevents occurring over one year and limited toactions taken within Rwanda, seem especiallyunlikely to produce the full account of barbarismthat the international legal paradigm demands. (…)It remains to be seen whether that tribunal, whollyindependent in theory from the Security Councilbut dependent on it in fact and consisting of judgesfrom a variety of nations with interests in the wayRwanda’s recent history is told, will be able toengage in the kinds of broad-gauged historicalinquiries into the Rwandan genocide that areessential to preserving collective memory and togenerating public confidence in its accuracy. (…)While international trials of a few Rwandan high-level perpetrators will provide some additionaldetails about much that we already know, namelyhow the genocide was orchestrated and how theactual killings were organized, such trials will tellus next to nothing about those most directlyinvolved in the killings or about their individualvictims”65.

All the trials held so far at the Rwanda Tribunalcompletely confirm this sombre forecast regardingArusha’s contribution to the search for historicaltruth and a better understanding of the mechanismsthat led to the genocide. It is highly improbablethat the ICTR will one-day produce a “completerecord of the barbarity” or even “large-scalehistorical investigations”. The participation ofother states in the 1994 crimes are beyond thescope of the debate in trials that are limited, defacto if not de jure, to the individual criminalresponsibility of Rwandan citizens. The extremelysmall number of people who will be tried and theirlevel of authority does not allow an exhaustiveaccount of massacres by their tens of thousands of

65 José E. Alvarez, op. cit.

perpetrators. It is certainly not the responsibility ofthe judges to write history. But the legal processcan help to uncover and better understand thehistory. Without this dimension, the work of theICTR has even less chance of having thereconciling value that was expected or hoped of it.


V. THE FUTURE OF THE ICTR: THENEED FOR RESULTS

Looking at the results the ICTR has achieved thusfar, it is clear that vigorous efforts to improve thesituation must be made before it is too late. Thereare several initiatives and decisions that could betaken or strengthened in order for the ICTR tosuccessfully fulfil its mandate.

A. ARRESTS: MAKING BETTER USE OFAVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS

Generally speaking, the various prosecutors havealways refused to provide much information aboutpersons wanted by the Tribunal, opting rather for astrategy of discretion. However by the end of 2000,there seemed to be a growing awareness that theTribunal had reached a stalemate and theprosecution began to implement more aggressivestrategies, which were better thought out, eventhough they did not always materialise. A moredirect approach in certain African states such asKenya, Cameroon and the DCR was firstenvisioned at the highest levels by the chiefProsecutor. This approach was to open the way formore concrete and public initiatives with respect tothe alleged lack of cooperation from thesecountries. In addition, several shortcomings wereidentified in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).For example, as perplexing as it may seem, by thebeginning of December 2000, no one on the ICTRwanted list had been put on file yet with Interpol.Even though this is purely a formality, the OTPhad simply never made the request. Under theleadership of the new Chief of Investigations,appointed in May 2000, this astonishing situationwas finally resolved by the end of 2001.

1. Using the Full Procedural Arsenal

The procedure for issuing international arrestwarrants is hardly clear. Except for the specialprovisions of Rule 6166 that the ICTY used at the

66 Rule 60 allows the Prosecutor to advertise an indictmentin the media and to invite "any person with information asto the whereabouts of the accused to communicate thatinformation to the Tribunal." Rule 61 states that in caseswhere a warrant of arrest has not been executed "within a

beginning of its mandate, there are no rules thatclearly give judges the power to issue aninternational arrest warrant straightaway.Consequently, until very recently, all the arrestwarrants were national warrants. This paradoxicalreality for an international court is an obvioushandicap in terms of making arrests, in thatsuspects move from one country to another,thereby rendering an arrest warrant that wasinitially issued in a particular country ineffective insome cases. International Crisis Group is aware ofat least one case in which by the end of 2000, thesuspect was no longer in the country specified inthe arrest warrant issued against him a few yearsearlier. This is undoubtedly not an isolated case. Inthese cases, the Office of the Prosecutor is forcedto file a motion for a judge to grant a new arrestwarrant, a process that is not very compatible withthe rapid action that is sometimes crucial in orderto arrest a suspect. In September 2000, Carla delPonte requested the judges in Arusha to modify theprocedure for issuing arrest warrants. She basedher argument on the Milosevic example. On May24, 1999, ICTY judge David Hunt sent a warrantfor the arrest of the former president of the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia to "all United Nationsmember states." This was never done at the ICTR.However, the judges reacted differently to delPonte's request. On November 2, JudgeNavanethem Pillay issued an international arrestwarrant against one of the fugitives. Shortlythereafter, in another case, Judge Kama requestedadditional information before issuing such awarrant, but he never received the information. On22 November, Judge Yakov Ostrovsky refused togrant a motion to issue an international warrant foranother accused, asking that the procedure inArticle 61 be scrupulously followed. Clearly, the reasonable time", the judge is obliged de facto to invite theProsecutor to report on the measures taken. If the Judge issatisfied that these measures were sufficient, the matter issubmitted to the Trial Chamber and a public hearing isscheduled. During the hearing, the Prosecutor explains thecharges against the accused and may call witnesses.Following this hearing, the judges may issue aninternational arrest warrant, which is sent to all States.They may also order "a State or States" to freeze the assetsof the accused, if they are satisfied that the situation is due"in whole or in part" to failure of a State to cooperate, theTrial Chamber so certifies and informs the SecurityCouncil thereof. These Rules have not been used muchbecause they require the Prosecutor to advertise theindictments and they require too many resources.


prosecutor needs to have the benefit ofinternational arrest warrants in order to make morearrests. Therefore, it would be preferable toeliminate this legal obstacle by clarifying andsimplifying the legal foundation for issuing thesewarrants.

2. Giving the Prosecution More Autonomy

Apart from the issues related to cooperation fromstates, two other factors of a completely differentnature seem to be hindering the ICTR's ability tomake arrests as of late. These factors differ in thatthey are linked to the internal operations of theTribunal. The first pertains to the organisation ofthe Office of the Prosecutor. Approximately tensuspects could have been arrested by the end of2000 if the legal division of the prosecutor's officehad followed through and drafted the indictments.Several arrests had to be delayed during the secondhalf of the year because the indictments were notready, for lack of human resources to allocate tothis task.

The second obstacle is not a new one and is asmuch a source of concern as a source ofcontroversy. It pertains to the degree of financialmanoeuvrability that the prosecution has toconduct investigations and the oversight that theTribunal, i.e. the Registry, exerts in this area. Aconfidential report issued by the Americangovernment at the beginning of 1999 that quotedan inside source at the Office of the Prosecutionrevealed that "at least four arrests were missed" inthe autumn of 1998 due to bad fiscal managementby the Tribunal administration67. Once again, thesecond half of 2000 was riddled with the sametypes of conflicts, something Carla del Pontedenied, saying, "I have never had any problems inthat respect.68" However, other reliable sourceshave regularly described how allocations to thebudget for investigations, research and arrestingsuspects were blocked between September andDecember. According to these sources, no moneyat all was put into this account between June andDecember, after which money was only allocatedin an erratic manner because the Registry financial

67 See Ubutabera, 13 September 199968 Press Conference, 13 December 2000

office felt that the accounting items submitted bythe Deputy Prosecutor were not in compliance. BySeptember, the situation was totally paralysed. InDecember, ICG observed firsthand the extremelyrandom and chaotic way in which funds weremade available to the prosecution teams in chargeof arrests. One symptom of the dysfunctionalorganisation, among others, was that betweenU.S.$10,000 and U.S.$12,000 were owed toinvestigators for "advances" they had made for thegood of the operations underway. The quarrelbetween these offices dates back a long time andthe office of the Deputy Prosecutor and theRegistry seemed to be equally responsible.However, the consequences of these conflicts areserious. ICG recommends that the newadministration and the new OTP leadership find alasting and responsible solution.

B. INCREASING ICTR PRESENCE ANDINFORMATION IN RWANDA

Following the example of the Tribunal for theFormer Yugoslavia, the ICTR recently offered up apreliminary response to its problem of visibilityand impact in Rwanda. On Sept 25, 2000, theTribunal inaugurated an information anddocumentation centre in the Rwandan capital. Onthis occasion, the former Registrar of the ICTRsummed up what was at stake: “The ICTR cannotmake a significant contribution to peace inRwanda if the Tribunal’s work and achievementsare not effectively communicated to the Rwandanpeople. We at the ICTR are of the view that it is ofthe utmost essence that our work should have theimpact inside Rwanda that was the goal of theUnited Nations Security Council when itestablished the Tribunal in November 1994. That,in our view, is a key indicator of whether or not theTribunal will ultimately be adjudged as a success.”

The centre was launched within the context of anambitious initiative called the "outreach program."The concept is not new. It first surfaced in 1998 inspeeches given by Tribunal officials and wasclearly announced in writing at the beginning of1999. Over the past three years, Rwandanjournalists made many visits to the tribunal and theRwandan national radio had a regular presence inArusha thanks to this program. With budgetaryneeds assessed at U.S.$157,615 for 2000 and


U.S.$178,952 for 2001, the ICTR is nowcontemplating a program that is much moredynamic, although still modest bearing in mindhow far behind it currently is. However, fundingfor these programs is not entirely guaranteed. Theproject designed to reach more people livingoutside Kigali by equipping caravans with mobileprojection equipment may not actually take effectuntil much further down the road. ICGrecommends significantly strengthening the mosturgent activities in order to remedy the problem oflack of information in Rwanda about the Tribunal.With the opening of the Information Centre,expectations are high. It is essential that they notbe disappointed again, and that this continues to bea priority for the ICTR.

C. ORGANISING TRIALS OR HEARINGS INKIGALI TO GIVE RWANDANS A NEWSENSE OF OWNERSHIP IN THE TRIALS

Another request that many Rwandans continue tomake is to have hearings held in Kigali. Again, theidea is as old as the Tribunal itself. However, itbegan to be voiced more strongly in 2000 to suchan extent that the idea now seems less improbable,even though it sharply divides communities alongideological and political lines. "The main problemis not a psychological, moral or legal problem, buta practical problem of security," said AntonioCassese, former presiding judge of the appealschamber, in 199769. Louise Arbour revived theidea in a more spectacular manner during her lastvisit to Rwanda in August 1999 just before she leftoffice. "The Tribunal is in its fifth year ofexistence. In my opinion, this is a challenge that itmust now start to tackle," said the formerProsecutor who was already talking about"visibility" and "increasing Tribunal presence inRwanda" and to this end, calling upon theinternational community to provide financialassistance for the construction of a new courtroomat the Supreme Court [of Rwanda] 70. Hersuccessor, Carla del Ponte, took up these samewords. In December 2000, del Ponte announcedthat she intended to file a motion along these linesin the so-called media trial. During an interview in

69 in Ubutabera, June 9, 199770 Hirondelle Foundation newswire of August 7, 1999.

September, Navanethem Pillay, who is presidingover both the Tribunal and this trial, said withrespect to this topic, "We would consider thematter but I made clear that a decision to holdhearings in Rwanda, as much as we support theprinciple, is actually a complex matter."71 By April2001, however, no initiatives had been taken inthis respect.

The positions on this issue offer a vast range ofoptions. The Rwandan government continues todefend the idea it has had from the start: setting upthe Tribunal in Rwanda. Failing that, thegovernment has officially offered assurances that ifhearings were held in Rwanda, it would be able toprovide all necessary guarantees. Though he isunlikely to pass as an ideologist of the regime,lawyer and human rights activist François-XavierNdeze is in favour of the idea, "but only withmaximum security."72 In fact, very few in Rwandaare strongly opposed to this idea. Abroad,however, there are very few who support it.According to the DRC, "the fact that the seat of theICTR was established outside Rwandademonstrates the UN Security Council's concernthat trials be conducted on neutral ground in orderto guarantee the independence of the Tribunalinsofar as possible. Holding ITCR trials in Rwandawhen the Tribunal's independence vis-à-vis theRPF-controlled government of Rwanda is alreadyquestionable, would completely undermine itscredibility."73 Those who would be most affected,ICTR defendants, are obviously radically opposedto the idea, at least among those who sign commoncommuniqués. The idea of having a teleconferencelink has been proposed to overcome this obstacle.However, the lawyers are quick to point out that itwould be impossible for them to communicatefreely with their clients. In any case, without theapproval of the defence, this strategy would neverwork. In private, however, some lawyers are nothostile to the idea. One lawyer even contemplatedrequesting a teleconference hearing to facilitatehearing defence witnesses who live in Rwanda anddo not wish to travel to Tanzania.

71 Interview with Hirondelle Foundation, September 1,200072 Interview in Kigali, 6 December 200073 Letter to ICG, 30 November 2000


This points to the first rule of action: be pragmatic.The idea of organising a full-blown trial in Kigalistill seems unthinkable for many reasons.Undoubtedly, the main reason is ensuring the safearrival of defence witnesses who often come fromplaces other than Rwanda. However, it isconceivable that some of the hearing could be heldin Kigali. Because of the impact that this sense of"ownership" by the Rwandans could have on thejudicial process in Arusha, it is imperative to takethe initiative.

D. CONFRONTING THE ISSUE OFCOMPENSATION

The year 2000 was marked by a revival, or at leasta strengthening and increased awareness of theissue of the role of victims in the legal process inThe Hague and in Arusha. The renewed interest inthis issue should make it a key element in thedebate over the mandate of the ICTR.

1. Forgotten Victims

The Prosecutor is one of the driving forces behindthis new desire to redefine the role of victims, andthus to bring it closer to the civil law tradition. Assoon as she arrived, Carla del Ponte decided toaddress the Tribunal as a representative of thevictims. In June 2000, during an ICTR plenarymeeting, she went even further by requesting achange in procedure in order to allow victims tohave passive representation.74

In Rwanda, victims indeed feel extremelyfrustrated, which greatly adds to the crucialsentiment that they have no ownership in theTribunal - that it was not established by them orfor them.75 Since then, the issue has not evolvednoticeably. For his part, the former ICTRRegistrar, Agwu Okali, officially launched a"witness and potential witness assistance program"in Rwanda on 26 September 2000. The totalbudget for this program is U.S.$379,000.76

74 Press conference held in Arusha on 13 December 200075 Interview in Kigali with Ibuka, 4 December 200076 U.S.$300,000 are from the ICTR Trust Fund and theremainder from "other donors." In the initial phase of theprogram, the association Rwanda Women Networkreceived 25,562 US$ for a one year program to provide

Officially, the initiative covers several areas:medical and psychological rehabilitation, physicalsecurity for person and property, legal advice andguidance, financial assistance after trials,relocation/resettlement. Okali first set forth theprinciple in a memorandum dated 22 June 1998." It is assistance specifically directed, throughvarious means, to enable the targeted group –victims and survivors, especially widows andorphans – participate more effectively in theTribunal’s work of investigating, prosecuting andtrying suspected perpetrators of the genocide. It isnot a generalised economic and social assistanceprogramme for the people of Rwanda and it is alsonot a compensation programme. "

This program is presented as a manifestation of theneed to develop restorative justice along with theretributive side of the trials. However, the programis the object of a longstanding major controversy.If it took three years for the program to finally seethe light of day, it was because this initiativeraised, and continues to raise, serious concerns.These concerns are varied. Some involve the riskof subornation of witnesses, others the possibleimpression that the program only benefitsprosecution witnesses, or the difficulty inmaintaining the confidentiality of protectedwitnesses, and still others, the risk of a completebreakdown in terms of the responsibility forwitness protection.

medical supplies to Hope Clinic, with an anticipated 3,024recipients. ASOFERWA (the social association ofRwandan women) received 52,000 US$ for theconstruction of a village of peace in Kamonyi (Tabacommune). This amount represents 15percent of the totalproject cost that will benefit 153 genocide survivors. Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, a group of 35 NGOs working onwomen's development, received U.S.$11,000 for a five-dayseminar to train trainers in trauma counselling that willbenefit 40 people. Haguruka, the association for thedefense of women's and children's rights, receivedU.S.$24,708 for a project that involves two informationalradio programs about the ICTR, the training of twentyparalegals in Byumba prefecture, legal aid to some 160women and children in this prefecture and the productionof 500 calendars on human rights. Avega-Agahozo, theassociation of widows of the April genocide, receivedU.S.$35,365 for trauma counselling training for 10 people,and emergency health care fund for victims of sexualviolence and potential witnesses in five prefectures, whichrepresents a total of 200 beneficiaries, and social workervisits in 24 different communes.


In short, the grievances against this program areparticularly serious because if the UNadministration responded in a way that was notpurely legal, it would go beyond the mandate ofthe Tribunal, causing the institution to driftdangerously. Okali defended himself beforeshocked defence counsel, saying, "There is nothingwrong with such a body being associated with orproviding support to a third party, such as a Non-governmental organisation, assisting such victims,especially where such activity is carried outthrough a neutral organ such as the Registry."77

The Rwandan government clearly approves theinitiative of the Tribunal Registry. This programhas also received support from severalinternational women's rights organisations.

However, there is strong criticism and it issignificant to note that it also comes from Rwandaand even from organisations that are supposed tobe the main beneficiaries. "I was surprised that itwas open to women's groups rather than genocidevictims' groups. Looking at it from a lawyer's pointof view, I would have to side with the defencecounsel. There is a risk of confusion. Thedistinction must be made between assistance andreparation. Assistance is a voluntary,commendable act. Reparations are entirelydifferent: one gives what is owed. We do not lookto the Tribunal for assistance. Rather, it shouldhelp us recover our debts by including us in thejudgements. This is just a means of distracting us.Assistance funds cannot be confused withreparation funds. The only assistance we expect isto allow us to be present at the trial."78 AnastaseNahahire from the association Ibuka is relentless inher reaction and she is not alone. "It's all staged.They are pretending. We want something strategicthat will bring about lasting change," said JudithKanakuze, Coordinator of a coalition of NGOs,even though one these NGOs benefited from theICTR program.79 "What does it mean? We have25,000 members. How much did we receive?U.S.$32,000. That's a good start, but it's only abelated drop in the ocean," vents the executivesecretary of Avega, one of the five organisations

77 Registrar's response to Jean-Paul Akayesu's lawyers on 5October 2000.78 Interview in Kigali on 4 December 200079 Interview in Kigali on 4 December 2000

that benefited directly from the program.80 Legaldrifting on the one hand, publicity stunt or politicalmanoeuvring on the other, the Registry's programclearly does not provide answers to thefundamental questions victims are asking. Nowthat everyone is working to ensure that victims'rights are no longer ignored, the problem from nowon will be how to best respond.

2. Victim Reparation vs. VictimCompensation

The contrast between the ICTR and the ICTY isstriking. Faced with the same issue, it was thejudges in The Hague who took the time to reflectand to act. At their request, a 14-page report wasdrafted last summer that voluntarily focuses onfinancial compensation in order to "avoid turningto the broader concept of reparations (…), and toavoid dealing with other forms of reparation that,much like rehabilitation, require a more thoroughanalysis and seem to go beyond the scope of theProsecutor's proposals and the discussion duringthe June 2000 plenary."

The task force underscored the followingdifficulty: "It seems that international lawrecognises the right of victims to compensation.Although this right is being developed, themechanism for implementation is clearly muchless developed. In the context of the Tribunal,other rights and other general politicalconsiderations must be taken into account,including the right of the accused to a speedy andfair trial." One of the points raised briefly is ofcourse, "the core issue of the source of funding forsuch compensation." The options are few. There isproperty that the prosecution has seized, but onceagain the crucial issue of cooperation from statescomes into play. Then there is the UN budget andvoluntary contributions from member states.Finally the task force recommends establishing aninternational compensation committee. Theadvantage of this committee is that "it can processmore requests, more efficiently than the court andin theory, it can at least examine all the substantialrequests made by the victims of the crimes inquestion." At any rate, the Tribunal’s statute would

80 Interview with Hillary Mukamazimpaka on 7 December2000


have to be modified. This is why ICTY President,Claude Jorda, wrote to the United NationsSecretary-General on 12 October 2000. The letterwas passed on to the Security Council on 2November, as it is the only body with the power tomodify the Tribunal statute.

Unfortunately, a similar study adapted to therealities of the ICTR was never conducted. It ispossible that the case of the ICTR is different fromthe Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The briefICTY report also notes that within the scope ofwork on the issue carried out over the past tenyears, the creation of a national victimcompensation fund is clearly encouraged.Consequently, the task force members presentedan option other than the institution of aninternational committee: the possibility of having"national courts indemnify victims." But how canthe fact that Rwanda is also dealing with this issueof victim compensation be ignored? Should thereonce again be a national solution and aninternational solution that do not mix?

According to the Rwandan courts, the question isnot whether victims have the right to seekdamages, because this right is already guaranteedby the law. Rather, the question is, compensatewith what money? Assistant public prosecutor,Emmanuel Rakangira, explained the situation asfollows: "Currently, there are billions of Rwandanfrancs in the form of damages (awarded bynational courts). No, it's practically impossible."81

In the four years since trials started in Rwanda, theamounts were of course, very generous on paper.Close to U.S.$100 million have been awarded afteronly some 4,000 people have been tried. In reality,however, not a single cent has been paid outbecause the defendants are all indigent. The ICTYtask force members clearly concluded, and rightlyso, that the responsibility for processing andascertaining damages should not be given to the adhoc tribunals. They pointed out in particular thatthis would slow down the pace of the trials evenmore, which would prevent the tribunals fromfulfilling their main objective. Rwandans haveadvanced other arguments. Some fear first andforemost that the judges in Arusha are not in anyposition to be able to truly assess the amounts to

81 Interview in Kigali on December 4, 2000

award. The main concern, however, is the risk oftwo-track compensation, hence two-track justice.

The penal solutions have proved to be limited inRwanda. With some 130,000 persons in prison -the highest prison density in the world - theRwandan court system cannot try everyone in areasonable time frame. This is the main reasonwhy the government has promised to implement analternative solution of gacaca, decentralisedpeople's courts based on some of the operatingprinciples of traditional Rwandan justice. Thegacaca trials are slated to begin in January 2002.However, among the prerequisites that theauthorities feel must be in place in order tosucceed in this unprecedented undertaking, is thenational compensation fund, the draft legislation ofwhich was being finalised in December 2000. Alot of Rwandans support the idea of a nationalcompensation fund with "international oversight"of the use of the funds. However, one of the issuesraised is that fact that it might be complex, to saythe least, even absurd, to have to deal with twocompensation funds. As previous experienceelsewhere, such as in South Africa, has shown, theState plays a critical role in the responsibility forcompensating victims for crimes it committed orthat were committed in the name of thegovernment. In this respect, it is important to notethat currently the Rwandan government devotes5% of its budget to a victim's assistance fund.

Currently in Rwanda, courts are awarding damagesranging from 5 to 20 million Rwandan francs topeople whose fathers were killed.82 Obviouslythese sums will never be available. Thus, in itsdraft legislation, the government is contemplatingalternative modes of compensation, such asproviding health care or education. Before the draftlegislation was finalised, Tharcisse Karugarama,Vice President of the Supreme Court, describedthe current prospects: "First of all, one can nevertruly compensate the genocide victims. Damagesare only symbolic. It is a national, even aninternational symbol. Even if 10,000 Rwandanfrancs are awarded, it acknowledges that a crimewas committed. It is not the monetary amount thatmatters, it is the fact that 'we are showingsolidarity with you.' Second, it is possible to award

82 Between U.S.$11,500 and U.S.$46,500


individual damages according to a scale. It is alsopossible to give money to associations in atransparent manner. I am not saying that therewould not be any errors, and that there would notbe any crooks, but guidelines have to beestablished. There are risks, but they arereasonable risks."83

It is easy enough to see that Rwanda, and thus theICTR, is in a unique situation. Consequently, theinternational tribunal needs to do a concrete andthorough study of all possible options for victimassistance. The tribunal Registry cannot be leftalone to face this responsibility, as has been thecase up till now. The response must be legal innature and must bear in mind the followingthought: “When there are large segments of thepopulation affected by human rights violations,private redress is insufficient to ensure the equalityand efficiency of the compensation and reparationprocess. The State must, therefore, assume theresponsibility of ensuring that the collective resultis fair. (…) Without a comprehensive approach toreconciliation, the commitment to compensationand reparation becomes an illusion, by virtue ofthe fact that the process is simply ineffective.Examples such as Rwanda demand that we becautious and forward-thinking in our institutionaldesigns: we must be sure that the models weadvance at the international level leave reasonablechances of being transplanted successfully into theheart of a ravaged community. "84 ICGrecommends that the Tribunal not be responsiblefor the solution envisioned by the internationalcommunity for compensating victims in Rwanda,who should be compensated quickly and in athorough manner. It also recommends that thissolution should not be such that it clashes withsolutions set up by national institutions, whichserve as the foundation for the particularly delicateundertaking in gacaca justice.

83 Interview in Kigali on 7 December 200084 Iris Almeida, in Compensation and Reparation forGross Violations of Human Rights: Advancing theInternational Discourse and Action." Siracusa Conference,September 1998.

E. THE DEBATE ON BROADENING THEMANDATE OF THE ICTR AND THE FIGHTAGAINST IMPUNITY

The fact that the existence of the ICTR has notbeen a deterrent is one of the underlying themes inone of the debates surrounding the mandate of theTribunal. Should its mandate be extended both intime and in place? In other words, should theTribunal be authorised to try crimes committedafter 1994 and outside the territory of Rwanda andby persons other than Rwandan nationals?Obviously, this debate concerns the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo and Burundi first andforemost. Politically speaking, only one concreteattempt has been made to date to broaden themandate of the ICTR. Yet, this shows what otherissues are at stake. In April 2000, AmericanSenator Russ Feingold, speaking to his fellowSenators, recalled this attempt, which he initiated."I have come to this floor in the past, Mr.President, to raise the issue of parity between theICTY and the ICTR. In particular, I have pointedout that whereas the ICTY has the authority toprosecute individuals for serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law committed since1991 through the present, the ICTR's mandatecovers only those acts committed within Rwandanborders during 1994. Last year, the Senateapproved an amendment that I offered to the StateDepartment authorisation bill requiring a report onthe merits of expanding the mandate to the ICTRin space and time, both to deter further abuses andto hold the perpetrators of the continuing atrocitiesin the Great Lakes accountable for their actions.85”Last year, when the Senate voted on the StateDepartment bill, it approved an amendment that Ihad proposed requesting a report on the merits ofextending the ICTR mandate in space and in time,in order to both prevent future abuses and to holdthe perpetrators of the atrocities that are still beingperpetrated in the Great Lakes region responsiblefor their acts."

In August, the American Congress had in factdrafted a resolution stating that, "there have been

85 Actually, the ICTR mandate also authorises it toprosecute Rwandan citizens for crimes committed inneighbouring States in 1994.


well substantiated allegations of major crimesagainst humanity and war crimes that have takenplace in the Great Lakes region of Africa that falloutside of the current mandate of the Tribunal interms of either the dates when, or geographicalareas where, such crimes took place.” Noting thatthe "the attention accorded to the ICTY and theindictments that have been made as a result of theICTY’s broad mandate continue to play animportant role in current United States policy inthe Balkans,” Congress felt that the Americangovernment should promote a new assessment ofthe ICTR within the Security Council and that thisassessment should include the "the potentialimpact of expanding the original mandate of theICTR." The subsequent report that the USSecretary of State was to submit to Congress wasto discuss "the ICTR’s ability to meet its currentmandate and an evaluation of the potential impactof expanding that mandate to include crimescommitted after calendar year 1994 . In the end,this initiative, which was the only one of its kind,failed because the amendment was laterwithdrawn. The report was never written.

With respect to principles and prevention,researcher Fillip Reyntjens demonstrated the needto broaden the mandate as follows, "Even thoughthe ICTR is already functioning rather poorly, itsmandate should be extended in time and in spacefor the following reasons: it involves a practicethat did not end in 1994; the guilty ones are oftenthe same; the causes and mechanisms are similar;the conflicts and their parade of massacres areoften carried out in an extra-territorial situationand the events of one period in one countryinfluence other times and other countries."86 At theend of its fourth regular congress held in Bukavu(DRC) from 12-13 July, 2000, the Great LakesLeague of Human Rights took the first step and inits declaration, called for an extension of thejurisdiction of the ICTR to cover Burundi and theDRC.

However, the Tribunal is indeed not functioningwell and those who are opposed, or outright hostileto broadening the mandate advance, at leastofficially, the operational problems of the Tribunalas their main argument. "Why extend its mandate

86 Letter to the ICG, 13 November 2000

when it is not meeting its goals?" asks theRwandan Minister of Justice.87

Even if the political motives were set aside, theargument is still clear and simple. There is a riskthat the current mandate would be diluted andpossibly that the Tribunal in Arusha would bestruck with a fatal blow. "The monster is alreadytoo big for what it has to do. Increasing its taskswould push it over the imaginable limits of obesityand would open up the gates of eternity to it"decided one expert who wished to remainanonymous.88 Thus what is at issue is the ultimateconsequence of the Tribunal's failure to fulfil itsmandate efficiently and swiftly. This failure nowstands in the way of any reasonable contemplationof enlarging the Tribunal. At the same time, judgesin national courts are less bureaucratic and moreefficient. For the time being, they are the bestprospects for trying crimes committed in the DCRand Burundi.

F. BROADENING THE UNIVERSALJURISDICTION OF NATIONAL COURTS:SHARING THE LOAD

There is another arena in which to developcooperation between states. Although it comes inanother form, it could have a positive effect on thework of the ICTR. That is, strengthening lawenforcement on a national level. This would alsopromote the development of international justiceand above all, send a clear message that theprosecution of persons suspected of genocide orcrimes against humanity is the responsibility ofeach State (and not merely that of a UN institutionto which they delegate this responsibility with asigh of relief). Besides Rwanda, Switzerland is theonly other country to have successfully tried anindividual in its national courts for crimescommitted in Rwanda in 1994.89

87 Interview in Kigali, 2 December 200088 Letter to ICG, 21 November 200089 Fulgence Niyonteze, former Mayor of Mushubati, wastried before the military tribunal of Lausanne in April 1999and sentenced to life in prison in the first instance. In May2000, the Geneva court of appeal commuted his sentenceto fourteen years in prison and the Court of Cassationupheld his final sentence in April 2001.


On 17 April 2001, Belgium in turn finally beganthe long-delayed trial of four Rwandan suspects.90

The judgement in this case is expected to be issuedby the beginning of June. Other trials opened inFrance, which have proved to be a lot less speedy.The proceedings that began in France now seem tohave dissipated and the public prosecutor's officedoes not seem to be in any hurry to finish them.

The ICTR will not handle all these cases alone.However, due primarily to the fact that the deathpenalty is legal in Rwanda, most states refuse toextradite suspects to this country. Moreover,Rwanda already has 120,000 prisoners to try first.Thus when cases come to states that the ICTRProsecutor does not feel should be handled by theTribunal, it is up to the states to decide whether ornot to try these individuals in the name ofupholding the principles of internationalhumanitarian law. Canada, which now has adaptedits legislation to meet this requirement, seemsready to take this route.

The example of the trial in Switzerland of MayorNiyonteze revealed that there are some logisticalproblems when such cases are heard on a nationallevel. Even these trials, which in all likelihoodwould only involve a handful of cases, havedefinite public interest, witness the media coverageof the trial in Belgium. Moreover, these trials are amatter of legal obligation. In addition, judgementsrendered by these different courts will go a longway toward benefiting the advancement ofinternational justice. Finally, these proceedingsgive new meaning to the principle ofcomplementarity of courts. In this respect, it is alsoimportant to note that just as in its relations withthe Rwandan courts, the ICTR does not view thiscooperation as a two-way street. Belgianexamining magistrate, Damien Vandermeersch,first lamented this fact back in 1998.Unfortunately, apart from the agreement onrequests for judicial assistance, it does not appearthat this situation has changed much.

90 The trial of Alphonse Higaniro, Vincent Ntezimana,Gertrude Mukangango and Julienne Mukabutera, whichwas initially scheduled to last 6 weeks, has been underwaysince 17 April 2001


CONCLUSION: ESTABLISH A TERMLIMIT

"Given the current pace of the trials, it will takethe Tribunal at least seven or eight more years toachieve its mandate," wrote the team of expertswho were asked to assess the workings of the twoad hoc tribunals on 11 November 1999. Theirreport indicates that "approximately 90investigations" were underway and that "about 20suspects might be collectively indicted in 2000."

Since then, the ICTR has fallen considerablybehind vis-à-vis this forecast. And yet, the sense ofurgency often seems to be a foreign notion to manyTribunal staff members, including andundoubtedly more seriously, among some of itskey officials. Whereas the Rwandan government isnow talking openly of impasse, even "failure" interms of handling the massive caseload ofgenocide litigation it is facing, the ICTR has notproved that it is able to fulfil its mandate in areasonable time frame either. This situation isparadoxical given the changing political discoursein Rwanda about the stakes of justice. With theupcoming implementation of the gacaca tribunals,Rwanda has, in fact, put "political considerationsahead of the message of impunity" and is nowstarting to talk about the next step: "We have toput the genocide behind us."91

A year and a half ago, experts said that "after beingactive for several years in the former Yugoslaviaand in Rwanda [the Prosecutor and the DeputyProsecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR] thoughtthey had an overall and sufficiently clear vision ofthe circumstances of the crimes to be able todetermine which cases were worth prosecuting,and they have identified virtually all those that areworth pursuing. They estimated that it would takeabout 10 years to complete this task and that theynow had enough staff to do so." This "overall andclear" vision seems even more accessible at theICTR since its mandate is limited in time and inplace.

In the context of the current ICTR mandate, it hasnow become necessary to set a concrete goal of

91 Interview with Gérald Gahima, Kigali, 5 December 2000

establishing a fixed term for the mandate of thisinstitution. The Office of the Prosecutor will, ofcourse, play a decisive role in this respect. Carladel Ponte seemed to be determined to follow thiscourse. During her press conference on 13December 2000, she publicly stated that the timehad come to provide a more definitive outlook asto when the Tribunal will accomplish its work.This has already begun at the ICTY, with theinvestigations now estimated to end around 2004."We will undergo the same exercise at the ICTR,"she promised, announcing that she would bepresenting a "work plan" to the President of theTribunal "before the end of January." This planwas in fact given to Navanethem Pillay, but it wasnever made public, and it should be.

In May 2001, the Office of the Prosecutor hadabout 20 suspects still at large plus about tensuspects who were about to be arrested. "We canreasonably expect around twenty newindictments," confided a senior official at the OTPin December 2000, thus bringing the total numberof people to be charged by the ICTR to aroundtwenty-four. "I do not see how we could still beconducting investigations in four years," added thisofficial.

What little is known about the work plan Carla delPonte submitted indicates an entirely differentslant. It would involve potentially indictingapproximately 30 people per year until 2005. Thatwould be a total of 200 people prosecuted and triedin the end. This prospect can only make onewonder about the ability of the ICTR to handlesuch a heavy workload.

However, the mere fact of determining the finalextent of the investigations and indictmentsshould, at any rate, prompt those involved in thetrial stage itself to vigorously tighten the courtcalendar, which up to now has been flexible to afault. The responsibility that falls to the judges,which is part of the problem with the currentdelays, will only increase. As a judge at theSupreme Court of Rwanda pointed out,"prolonging the trials does not benefit the victimsor the detainees."92

92 Interview with Aloysie Cyanzayire, Kigali, December 7,2000


On the whole, the international community hasgiven the Tribunal the resources it needs tooperate. A few areas could use a little moresupport, especially in relation to victimcompensation and disseminating information toRwandans. In addition, the states as well as theNGOs and media must show renewed interest in aTribunal that is isolated and remains fragile andplagued with serious malfunctions. It is alarmingthat none of the major international human rightsorganisations have done any fact-finding reports onthe ICTR for the past three years. The group ofobservers that was relatively consistent in thebeginning has all but disappeared. The Tribunal inArusha seems now to be only a place of study andwork for specialised legal experts. Yetinternational justice is not merely a technicalinstrument for drafting international law. It alsoinvolves political and social stakes.

According to a recent book on the Rwandangenocide, “There is nothing the West can say nowto the people of Rwanda to compensate for thefailure to intervene in their hour of need.”93 Whatthe West and other UN members can do is ensurethat the mandate they gave the ICTR is finallyfulfilled in an efficient and rapid manner.

Arusha/Nairobi/Brussels, 7 June 2001

93 in A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in theRwandan Genocide by Linda Melvern, September 2000


APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Abakombozi: Youth groups called "the liberators"created by political parties following thedemocratisation of Rwanda in 1992.

Akazu: Means "household" and refers to theimmediate entourage of President Habyarimana.

CDR: Coalition for the Defence of the Republic.Extremist political party close to former party inpower, the MRND. Created by President JuvénalHabyarimana. This party was against the Arushanegotiations.

Ex-FAR: Former Rwandan armed forces.

Gacaca: Term in Kinyarwanda that refers totraditional courts. Currently, this term refers to theauxiliary people's courts that the Rwandangovernment plans to establish in order to renderjustice in the hills (rural areas).

Hutu Power: Term that designates the radicalHutu groups that were against the Arushanegotiations and power sharing between the RPFTutsi rebellion and the Hutu political parties.

Impuzamugambi: Extremist Hutu militia of theCDR party.

Interahamwe: Extremist Hutu militia of theMRND party.

MRND: Mouvement révolutionnaire national pourla démocratie (National Revolutionary Movementfor Democracy). Only party from 1973-1992.

RDR: Rassemblement pour la défense de ladémocratie et le retour de refugiés. (Rally for theReturn of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda)Opposition party established in exile.


APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF ICTR ACTIVITIES

November 8, 1994: ICTR established by theSecurity Council. Richard Goldstein from SouthAfrica is appointed Prosecutor of both the ICTYand the new-established ICTR. The ad hocTribunal is given a four-year mandate.

February 1995: The seat of the ICTR isestablished in Arusha, in the north of Tanzania.

May 1995: The UN General Assembly elects thesix ICTR judges: Laïty Kama (Senegal),Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), William Sekule(Tanzania), Yakov Ostrovsky (The Federation ofRussia), Tafazzal Khan (Bangladesh) and LennartAspegren (Sweden) are elected to a four-year,renewable term. Judge Laïty Kama is electedPresident of the ICTR for 2 years by his peers.

November 1995: First indictment of suspects fromKibuye prefecture.

May 1996: First transfer of accused to the UnitedNations Detention Facility in Arusha: Zambiahands over Georges Rutaganda, ClémentKayishema and Jean-Paul Akayesu to the ICTR.

September 1996: Louise Arbour from Canadareplaces Richard Goldstein as Prosecutor of thetwo Tribunals.

January 1997: Trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, formermayor of Taba in Gitarama prefecture, opens.Transfer of four accused detained in Cameroon,including Théoneste Bagosora, former Chief ofStaff of the Ministry of Defence, and FerdinandNahimana, founder and former director of RTLM(Radio télévision des Milles Collines).

February 1997: Publication of the "PaschkeReport", which criticises the serious malfunctionsof the ICTR. The Registrar, Andronico Adede(Kenya), and the Deputy Prosecutor, HonoréRakotomanana (Madagascar) are asked to resign.Agwu Okali (Nigeria) and Bernard Muna

(Cameroon) are appointed Registrar and DeputyProsecutor, respectively.

March 1997: Trial of Georges Rutaganda, formersecond Vice President of the Interahamwe, opens.

April 1997: Trial of Clément Kayishema, formerPrefect of Kibuye, and Obed Ruzindana, formerKibuye businessman, opens.

May 1997: Bernard Muna takes office and LouiseArbour redefines the prosecution strategy.

July 1997: Operation "Naki" (Nairobi-Kigali) inKenya. Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister, isarrested.

March 1998: Akayesu trial ends. Tribunal rejectsan indictment submitted by the prosecution joining29 accused.

May 1998: Jean Kambanda pleads guilty togenocide and crimes against humanity.

June 1998: Operation "Kiwest". Several suspectsare arrested in West Africa, including JosephNzirorera, former MRND Secretary General, andEdouard Karemera, former Minister of the Interior.

September 1998: Akayesu is found guilty ofgenocide and crimes against humanity. One monthlater, he is sentenced to life in prison. JeanKambanda is sentenced to life in prison. Akayesuand Kambanda appeal.

November 1998: Kayishema-Ruzindana trial ends.UN General Assembly elects ICTR judges. JudgesKama, Pillay, Sekule and Ostrovsky are re-elected.Lloyd George Williams (Saint-Kitts and Nevis),Pavel Dolencs (Slovenia), Erik Mose (Norway),Mehme Güney (Turkey) and Dionysos Kondilys(Greece) are elected. Kondilys resigned in March1999 and was replaced by Asoka de SoizaGunawardana (Sri Lanka).


December 1998: Omar Serushago, former militialeader in Gisenyi, pleads guilty to genocide.

January 1999: Trial of Alfred Musema, formerDirector of the Gisovu tea factory in Kibuyeprefecture, opens.

February 1999: Serushago sentenced to fifteenyears in prison.

March 1999: First visit to Rwanda by a team ofdefence investigators.

May 1999: Kayishema and Ruzindana are foundguilty of genocide and sentenced to life andtwenty-five years in prison, respectively.

June 1999: Musema/Rutaganda trial ends. JudgeNavanethem Pillay succeeds Judge Laïty Kama asPresident of the ICTR.

July-October 1999: No trials held at the ICTR.

September 1999: Carla del Ponte (Switzerland)succeeds Louise Arbour as Prosecutor.

October 1999: Trial of Ignace Bagilishema,former Mayor of Mbanza (Kibuye prefecture),opens.

November 1999: The Appeals Chamber ordersthat charges be dropped against Barayagwiza,former head of RTLM and CDR party, and that hebe released immediately. The Rwandangovernment "suspends" is cooperation with theICTR.

November 1999-February 2000: Arrests inEurope, including the arrest of AugustinNdindiliyimana, former Chief of Staff of thegendarmerie.

December 1999: Georges Rutaganda found guiltyof genocide and crimes against humanity andsentenced to life.

January 2000: Alfred Musema found guilty ofgenocide and crimes against humanity andsentenced to life.

April 2000: The Appeals Chamber reviews itsjudgement in the Barayagwiza case and theRwandan government resumes cooperation withthe ICTR.

May 2000: Georges Ruggiu, a former RTLMpresenter of Belgian-Italian nationality, pleadsguilty to direct incitement to commit genocide andcrimes against humanity. On June 1, he issentenced to 12 years in prison.

September 2000: Cyangugu trial opens, joiningthe cases of André Ntagerura, former Minister ofTransportation, Emmanuel Bagambiki, formerPrefect, and Samuel Imanishinwe, former militarycamp commander.

October 2000: Trial of Laurent Semanza, formermember of Parliament and mayor of Bicumbi(Kigali-rural) commune, opens. Media trial opens,joining the cases of Jean Bosco Barayagwiza,Ferdinand Nahimana and Hassan Ngeze, formerEditor-in-Chief of the newspaper Kangura.Bagilishema trial ends. Judgement and sentence inKambanda case upheld on appeal.

January 2001: Agwu Okali's contract is notrenewed as Registrar and he is replaced by AdamaDieng (Senegal).

March 2001: Trial of Juvénal Kajelijeli, formerMayor of Mukingo in Ruhengeri prefecture, opensand is immediately postponed to July.

April 2001: Trial of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda,former Minister of Higher Education, opens and isimmediately postponed to September. Two newjudges elected: Winston Churchill MatanzimaMaqutu (Lesotho) and Arlette Ramoroson(Madagascar). These two judges replace JudgesGunawardana and Güney, who were appointed tothe Appeals Chamber.

May 2001: Judge Laïty Kama dies. DeputyProsecutor Bernard Muna leaves office, along withother staff of the Office of the Prosecutor, aftertheir contracts were not renewed. Arrest of adefence investigator suspected of participating inthe genocide.


June 2001: Judgements on the Akayesu,Kayishema and Ruzindana appeals. Judgement inthe Bagilishema case.


APPENDIX C

SITUATION OF ICTR PRISONERS 9 MAY 2000

Name &Case No.

Date & Place ofBirth

PreviousPost

Date & Placeof Arrest

Date ofTransfer

InitialAppearance

Trial Date Situation DefenceCounsel

POLITICAL LEADERSBICAMUMPAKA,Jerôme1:ICTR-99-49-DP2:ICTR-99-50-I

xx.xx.1957RuhondoCommune,RuhengeriPréfecture

Minister ofForeignAffairs

06.04.99Cameroon

31.7.99 17.08.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Francine Veilleux, PierreGaudreau; Canada

BIZIMUNGU,Casimir1:ICTR-99-45-DP2:ICTR-99-50-I

xx.xx.xxRuhengeri

Minister ofHealth

11.02.99Kenya

23.02.99 03.09.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Brian Shell, MichelyneChénard-St-Laurent;Canada

KAMBANDA,JeanTPIR-97-23-T

19.10.55Butare

PrimeMinister

18.07.97Kenya

18.07.97 01. 05. 98 01.05.98Chamber 1Pleaded guilty

04.09.98 Sentenced to lifeimprisonment. Ruling upheld on19.10.00

Tjarda Eduard Van derSpoel, Gerard Mols;Netherlands

KAMUHANDA,Jean de DieuICTR-99-54-I

03.03.53

GikomeroCommune,Rural KigaliPréfecture

Minister ofCulture andHigherEducation

26.11.99France

07.03.00 24.03.00 17.04.01Chamber 2

--- Aicha Conde, GraceAmakye; Guinea,United Kingdom

KAREMERA,EdouardICTR-98-44-I

xx.xx.xxMabanza,Kibuye

Minister ofthe Interior inthe InterimGovernmentand VicePresident ofthe MRND

05.06.98Togo

10.07.98 07.04.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Didier Skornicki;France


MUGENZI, Justin1:ICTR-99-47-DP2:ICTR-99-50-I

1949RukaraCommune,KibuyePréfecture

Minister ofCommerce

06.04.99Cameroon

31.07.99 17.08.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Howard Morrison, BenGumpert;United Kingdom

MUGIRANEZA,Prosper1:ICTR-99-48-DP2:ICTR-99-50-I

1957KigaramaCommune,KibungoPréfecture

Minister ofCivil Serviceand Labour

31.07.99Cameroon

02.08.99 17.08.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Michael Greaves;United Kingdom

NGIRUMPATSE,MathieuICTR-98-44-I

xx.xx.xxTare Commune,Rural KigaliPréfecture

DirectorGeneral atthe Ministryof ForeignAffairs andPresident ofthe MRND

11.06.98 Mali

10.07.98 07.04.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Charles C. Roach,Frederic Weyl; Canada,France

NIYITEGEKA,EliezerICTR-96-14-I

xx.xx.52Kibuye

Minister ofInformation

09.02.99Kenya

11.02.99 15.04.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Sylvia HannahGeraghty, FeargalKavanagh; UnitedKingdom

NTAGERURA,AndréTPIR-96-10A-T

02.01.50KarengeraCommune,CyanguguPréfecture

Minister ofTranspor-tation

27.03.96Cameroon

23.01.97 20.02.97 18.09.00Chamber 3

Joint trial with Imanishimwe andBagambiki cases.Trials in progress

Benoît Henry, RetyHamuli; Canada, D.R.Congo

NYIRAMASUHUKO, PaulineTPIR-97-21-I

xx.xx.46Ndora CommuneButarePréfecture

Minister ofthe FamilyandWomen's'Affairs

18.07.97 Kenya

18.07.97 03.09.97 Not set Chamber1

--- Nicole Bergevin, GuyPoupart; Canada

NZIRORERA,JosephICTR-98-44-I

xx.xx.50MukingoRuhengeriPréfecture

President ofthe NationalAssemblyand SecretaryGeneral ofthe MRND

05.06.98Benin

10.07.98 07.04.99 Not setChamber 2

--- Andrew J. McCartan,Martin Bauwens;Scotland/Belgium


RWAMAKUBA,AndréICTR-98-44-I

xx.xx.50Gikomero, RuralKigali

Minister deof NationalEducation

21.10.98Namibia

23.10.98 07.04.99 Not setChamber 2

--- David Hooper; UnitedKingdom

HIGH-RANKING OFFICERSBAGOSORA,ThéonesteICTR-96-7-T

16.08.41Giciye,GiseyniPréfecture

CabinetDirector atMinistry ofDefence

09.03.96Cameroon

23.01.97 20.02.97 Not setChamber 3

--- Raphael Constant;Jacques Larochelle;France / Canada

IMANISHIMWE,SamuelICTR-97-36-I

25.10.61D.R. Congo

Lieutenant inRwandanArmedForces(FAR)

11.08.97Kenya

11.08.97 27.11.97 18.09.00Chamber 3

Joint trial with Ntagerura andBagambikicases. Trial in process.

Marie-Louise Mbida,So'o Georges;Cameroon

KABILIGI,GratienICTR-97-34-I

18.12.51Cyangugu

BrigadierGeneral inFAR(Rwandan ArmedForces)

18.07.97Kenya

18.07.97 17.02.98 Not setChamber 2

--- Jean Y. Degli; France

MUVUNYI,TharcisseICTR-2000-55-I

19.08.53ByumbaPréfecture

Commanderof l'École desSous-officiers(ESO)

05.02.2000UnitedKingdom

30.10.00 8.11.00 Not set --- Michael Fisher, UnitedKingdom

NDINDILIYIMANA, AugustinICTR-2000-56-I

xx.xx.43Butare

Head ofPersonnel inthe NationalGendarmerie

29.1.2000Belgium

22.04.00 27.4.00 Non set --- Christopher Black,Canada

NSENGIYUMVA,AnatoleICTR-96-12-I

04.09.50SatinbsyiCommune,GisenyiPréfecture

Lieutenant-Colonel

27.03.96Cameroon

23.01.97 19.02.97 Not setChamber 3

--- Kennedy Ogetto;Gershom B'Omanwa;Kenya

NTABAKUZE,AloysICTR-97-30-I

xx.xx.54Gisenyi

Commanderof FARBattalion

18.07.97Kenya

18.07.97 24.10.97 Not setChamber 3

--- Clemente Monterosso;Canada

NTEZIRYAYO,Alphonse

xx.xx.xx Butare Commanderof Military

24.04.98Burkina Faso

21.05.98 17.08.98 Not setChamber 1

--- Titinga Frédéric Pacere,


ICTR-97-29-I Police thenPréfet ofButare from17.06.94 tohis departure

Richard Perras; BurkinaFaso, Canada

NZUWONEMEYE, François-XavierICTR-2000-56-I

30.8.55Rural KigaliPréfecture

Commanderof 42nd

Reconnaiss-anceBattalion ofRwandanArmy

15.02.2000France

23.05.00 25.05.00 --- François-XavierCharvet, France

SAGAHUTU,InnocentICTR-2000-56-I

Cyangugu Commanderof secondReconnaiss-anceBattalion ofthe RwandanArmy

15.02.2000Denmark

24.11.00 28.11.00 --- --- Fabian Segatwa;Burundi

MEDIA LEADERSBARAYAGWIZA,Jean BoscoTPIR-97-19-T

xx. xx. 50MuturaCommune,GisenyiPréfecture

Dir. OfPoliticalAffairs atMinistry ofForeignAffairs

27.03.96Cameroon

19.11.97 23. 02. 98 23.10.00Chamber 1

Joint trial with Nahimana & NgezeTrial in process

Giacomo BarlettaCalderera, AlfredPognon; Italy, Benin

NAHIMANA,FerdinandICTR-96-11-T

15.06.50 GatoneCommune,RuhengeriPréfecture

Director ofRTLM(RadioTélévisiondes MilleCollines)

27.03.96Cameroon

23.01.97 19.02.97 23.10.00Chamber 1

Joint trial with Barayagwiza &NgezeTrial in process

Jean-Marie Biju-Duval,Diana Ellis, Q.C.;France, UnitedKingdom

NGEZE, HassanICTR-97-27-T

Xx.xx.61Rubavu(Gisenyi)

Chief Editorof newspaperKangura

18.07.97Kenya

18.07.97 19.11.97 23.10.00Chamber 1

Joint trial with Nahimana &Barayagwiza.Trial in process

John Floyd, René MartelUSA, Canada


RUGGIU, GeorgesH.Y.J.ICTR-97-32-T

12.10.57Belgium

Journalist atRTLM

23.07.97Kenya

23.07.97 24.10.97pleaded notguilty

15.5.00Chamber 1pleaded guilty

1 June 2000

Sentenced to 12 years' imprisonmentCase closed

Mohamed Aouini &Jean-Louis Gilissen;Tunisia, Belgium

HIGH-RANKING CIVIL ADMINISTRATORSAKAYESU, Jean-PaulICTR-96-4-T

Xx.xx.53Taba, Gitarama

Mayor ofTaba

10.10.95Zambia

26.05.96 30.05.96 09.01.97Chamber 1

02.10.98 life imprisonment. Appealheard on 01 and 02.11.00

John Philpot, AndréTremblay; Canada

BAGAMBIKI,EmmanuelICTR-97-36-T

Xx.xx.48CyanguguPréfecture

Préfet ofCyangugu

05.06.98 Togo 10.07.98 19.04.99 18.09.00Chamber 3

Joint trial with Ntagerura andImanishimweTrial in process

Vincent Lurquin, LucBoutin; Belgium,Canada

BAGILISHEMA,IgnaceICTR-95-1-T

MabanzaCommune,KibuyePréfecture

Mayor ofMabanza

20.02.99South Africa

20.02.99 01.04.99 28.10.99Chamber 1

Trial ended on 19.10.00Deliberation until 7 June

François Roux; MaroufaDiabira; France,Mauritania

KAJELIJELI,JuvenalICTR-98-44-T

Xx.xx.xxMukingo,RuhengeriPréfecture

Mayor ofMukingo

05.06.98Benin

10.09.98 19.04.99 13.03.01Chamber 2

--- Lennox Hinds, RichardHarvey; USA

KANYABASHI,JosephICTR-96-15-I

Xx.xx.37Butare

Mayor ofNgoma

28.06.95Belgium

08.11.96 29.11.96 Not setChamber 2

--- Michel Marchand,Michel Boyer; Canada

KAYISHEMA,ClémentICTR-95-1-T

Xx.xx.54 Kibuye

Préfet ofKibuye

02.05.96 enZambia

26.05.96 31.05.96 09.04.97Chamber 2

21.05.99Sentenced to life imprisonment.Appeal heard on 30.10.00

André Ferran, PhillippeMoriceau; France

MUHIMANA,MikaeliICTR-95-1-I

Xx.xx.50Gishyita

Towncouncillor inGishyita

08.11.99Tanzania

08.11.99 24.11.99 Not setChamber 1

--- Nyabirungo MweneSonga; Congo

NDAYAMBAJE,ElieICTR-96-8-I

08.03.58 Butare Mayor ofMuganza

28.06.95Belgium

08.11.96 29.11.96 Not setChamber 2

--- Pierre Boulé, IsabelleLavoie; Canada

NSABIMANA,SylvainICTR-97-29-I

29.07.53 Butare Préfet ofButare

18.07.97Kenya

18.07.97 24.10.97 Not setChamber 2

--- Josette Kadji, CharlesTchakounte Patie;Cameroon


SEMANZA,LaurentICTR-97-20-T

Xx.xx.44BicumbiCommune KigaliPréfecture

Mayor ofBicumbi

27.03.96Cameroon

19.11.97 16.02.98 16.10.00Chamber 3

Trial in process. Charles Acheleke Taku,Sadikou Alao;Cameroon, Benin

OTHERSMUSABYIMANASamuelICTR-2001-62-I

06.07.56 Bishop ofAnglicanChurch inShyogwe

26.04.01Kenya

26.04.01 02.05.01 --- --- ---

MUSEMA, AlfredICTR-96-13-T

22.08.49Byumba

Director ofTea Factoryin Gisovu

11.02.95Switzerland

20.05.97 18.11.97 25.01.99Chamber 1

27.1.2000 life imprisonment.Appeal pending.

Steven Kay, MichailWladimiroff; UnitedKingdom, Netherlands

NSHAMIHIGO,SimeonICTR-01-63

xx.xx.59GatareCommuneCyanguguPréfecture

19.05.01Tanzania

NTAHOBALI,Arsène ShalomICTR-97-21-I

xx.xx.70Israel

Student andleader ofMRNDmilitia group,Interahamwe

24.07.97Kenya

24.07.97 17.10.97 Not setChamber 1

--- René Saint-Léger,Michael Bailey;Canada, USA;

NTAKIRUTIMANA, Elizaphan1:ICTR-96-10-T2:ICTR-96-17-T

xx.xx.24Kibuye

Pastor atSeventh DayAdventistChurch inKibuye

29.09.96Texas, USAReleased andarrested26.2.98

24.03.00 31.03.00 Set for 23.04.01Chamber 1

Joint trial with GérardNtakirutimana

Ramsey Clark, USA

NTAKIRUTIMANA, Gérard1:ICTR-96-10-T2:ICTR-96-17-T

12.08.58Kibuye

Doctor 29.10.96Côte d'Ivoire

30.11.96 02.12.96 Set for23.04.01Chamber 1

Joint trial with ElizaphanNtakirutimana

Edward Medvene; USA

RUTAGANDA,GeorgesICTR-96-3-T

xx.xx.58Gitarama

Businessmanand SecondVice-President ofInterahamwe

10.10.95Zambia

26.05.96 30.05.96 18.03.97Chamber 1

6.12.99Sentenced to life imprisonment.Appeal pending.

David P. Jacobs, DavidPaciocco; Canada


RUZINDANA,Obed1:ICTR-95-1-T

20.12.62Kibuye

Businessmanin Kibuye

20.09.96Nairobi, Kenya

22.09.96 29.10.96 09.04.97Chamber 2

21.05.99Sentenced to 25 years'imprisonment. Appeal heard on30.10.00

Pascal Besnier; WillemVan Der Griend;France, Netherlands

SERUSHAGO,OmarICTR-98-39-T

24.04.61GiseyniPréfecture

Businessmanand leader ofInterahamwein GisenyiPréfecture

09.06.98Côte d'Ivoire

10.07.98 14.12.98 14.12.98Chamber 1

05.02.99Sentenced to 15 years'imprisonment. Appeal rejected on14.02.00

Mohamed Ismail;Tanzania


Released (1)Bernard Ntuyahaga (indictment withdrawn)

Convicted (6)

Jean Kambanda (life imprisonment, after guiltyplea)Georges Ruggiu (twelve years, after guilty plea)Omar Serushago (fifteen years, after guilty plea)Jean-Paul Akayesu (sentenced to lifeimprisonment)Clément Kayishema (sentenced to lifeimprisonment)Obed Ruzindana (sentenced to 25 years)

Defendants convicted on trial, and in theprocess of appeal (2)

Alfred Musema (sentenced to life imprisonment)Georges Rutaganda (sentenced to lifeimprisonment)

Defendant awaiting judgement (1)

Ignace Bagilishema (Ruling expected 7 June 2001)

Defendants currently being tried (9)

Emmanuel BagambikiJean-Bosco BarayagwizaSamuel ImanishimweJuvénal KajelijeliJean de Dieu KamuhandaFerdinand NahimanaHassan NgezeAndré NtageruraLaurent Semanza

Accused in detention awaiting trial (27)

Théoneste BagosoraJérôme BicamumpakaCasimir Bizimungu

Gratien KabiligiJoseph KanyabashiEdouard KaremeraJustin MugenziProsper MugiranezaMika MuhimanaSamuel MusabyimanaTharcisse MuvunyiElie NdayambajeAugustin NdindiliyimanaMathieu NgirumpatseEliezer NiyitegekaSylvain NsabimanaAnatole NsengiyumvaAloys NtabakuzeArsène Shalom NtahobaliElizaphan NtakirutimanaGérard NtakirutimanaAlphonse NteziryayoPauline NyiramasuhukoJoseph NziroreraFrançois-Xavier NzuwonemeyeAndré RwamakubaInnocent Sagahutu

Defendants at large, whose names are publiclyknown (14)

Augustin BizimanaAugustin BizimunguIldephonse HategekimanaFélicien KabugaProtais MpiranyaYusuf MunyakaziAloys NdimbatiAugustin NgirabatwareIldephonse NizeyimanaLadislas NtaganzwaCallixte NzabonimanaVincent RutaganiraRyandikayoCharles Sikubwabo


APPENDIX D

DEFENCE AND TRIAL COSTS

Defence money: what the report fails tomention

Diplomatie Judiciaire is publishing for the firsttime, some of the defence costs at the ICTR. Thesefigures shed light on areas where there have beenabuses, something the UN apparently refrainedfrom investigating further.

In its report on abusive practices by the defence,the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services(OIOS) finally emphasised the defence costs at thetwo ad hoc tribunals. It notes that in 1999, the UNspent a total of U.S.$8.5 million on defence at boththe ICTR and the ICTY. The same amount wasspent in 2000. These amounts cover defencelawyers' fees as well as their costs andexpenditures.

$U.S. 8.5 Million per Year

The report states, "The fees paid to defence teamsrepresent significant amounts. In 1999, the ICTRand ICTY spent approximately U.S.$4.5 millionand U.S.$4 million on this respectively. In the firsthalf of 2000, the period for which we had figures,the ICTR spent approximately U.S.$2.4 million. Inthe first nine months of 2000, the ICTY spent inexcess of U.S.$2.6 million for defence counsel.However, these amounts do not include all thedefence costs for this period because many of thedefence teams have not yet billed their services.Based on the amount spent in the first six monthsof the year, the ICTR will likely spend more thanU.S.$5 million on defence teams for the year, andthe ICTY will spend U.S.$3.5 million by the endof 2000." The report is more succinct in the detailsof the expenditures. It includes two graphsshowing fees paid in 1999. There is considerablevariation from one team to another. At the ICTR,the fees range according to the team from 0 -U.S.$300,000 per year. Eleven teams cost betweenU.S.$200,000 and U.S.$300,000, five cost betweenU.S.$100,000 and U.S.$200,000 and twenty costbetween 0 and U.S.$100,000. The average seemsto fall somewhere around U.S.$125,000 per team,

per year. At the ICTY, one team is already overU.S.$300,000 per year, five are betweenU.S.$200,000 and U.S.$300,000, fifteen arebetween U.S.$100,000 and U.S.$200,000, andeight are between 0 and U.S.$100,000. Theaverage is somewhere around U.S.$150,000 perteam per year.

Basic Information

The report points out that these variations are dueto a number of factors, such as the stage of theproceedings of the case in question and whether ornot the case involves a grouped trial. However, thereport offers no analysis of these factors. Thepayment amount follows a well-established feescale. Depending on the number of years ofexperience, senior lawyers make between U.S.$80to U.S.$110/hour, with a maximum allowance of175 billable hours per month. "An experiencedlawyer can therefore make up toU.S.$19,250/month, which is more thanU.S.$230,000 per year," says the OIOS report. Co-counsel are paid U.S.$80/hour and can also bill amaximum of 175 hours per month. Thus they canearn the equivalent of U.S.$14,500 in a month.Legal assistants and investigators work atU.S.$25/hour with a maximum of 100 hours/month(at the ICTY, they earn between 30 and 50deutschmarks/hour, depending on their level ofexperience). In order to be paid, defence counselmust submit, as the report reiterates, "a detailedstatement of their fees, with a maximum amount ofinformation about the nature of the servicesrendered and if necessary, the link between theseservices and the case pending before the Tribunal."

No Late Payments?

The OIOS investigators say that they first lookedinto the allegations that "fees owed to ICTRdefence counsel were paid late on a regular basis."However, after having "verified a sampling ofinvoices," they asserted, "on average, only 35 dayselapsed between the time when the ICTR defencecounsel management section received the invoice,


and when payment was authorised. By way ofcomparison, the same research was conducted atthe ICTY and the same process took an average of36 days there." The investigators therefore quicklyconcluded that there was no problem in thisrespect. This part of the investigation wassurprising. There are clearly excessive delays inpayments at the ICTR. One case in particular is aglaring example - that of Vincent Lurquin, lawyerto Emmanuel Bagambiki, who holds the record forlate payments. He was paid for the first time inSept 2000, precisely during the same month whenthe OIOS investigators were in Arusha. Yet, hehad been assigned to the case for a year and a halfwithout receiving a cent.

The "Hyperactivity Phenomenon"

The report talks more about what it refers to as the"hyperactive lawyers phenomenon," a form of overbilling or abusive billing on the part of defencecounsel. However, the report only gives a fewtrifling examples of this phenomenon withoutciting numbers or names. It notes, for example,that "some defence lawyers at the two Tribunalsregularly bill the maximum allowable hours permonth. Moreover, some lawyers bill the equivalentof twenty hours and others the equivalent of fivehours to file a motion." The report further states,"The ICTR points out that there is practicallynothing it can do in this case, since the amountsrequested do not exceed the authorised limit."

It is imperative to have greater transparency inthese practices. Investigating abuses requires acase-by-case study, bearing in mind the variouscriteria, such as the stage of the proceedings, thelength of the trial, as well as the geographicaldistance of the lawyers, and the nature of the case.The aforementioned examples do not provide acomplete picture since it was not possible to gatherall the pertinent information. However, they doprovide other leads for the OIOS if it truly wants toferret out the abuses and pin down the guilty onesand their accomplices.

Average Cost of a Trial: U.S. $ 500,000

One document in particular sheds a little light onthe total cost of defending an accused and on theincomprehensible, or at least, unjustified,disparities between the various teams. Thedocument is a summary from 1996 to July 1999.The total cost mentioned here is only an indication.On the one hand, it may not include theinvestigators, and on the other hand, it may notinclude the most recent expenses paid out beforethis document was finished. However, thesefigures speak volumes.

The trial of Clément Kayishema and ObedRuzindana ended in July 1999 and they were justsentenced recently. The trial opened in April 1997.The total UN outlay for the two lawyers forKayishema was U.S.$481,000. For Ruzindana, itwas U.S.$499,000. It is interesting to comparethese costs with the defence costs of the Jean-PaulAkayesu trial, which also just concluded. Expensesin his case were U.S.$509,000. During the sametime, the longest trial in the history of the ICTR,that of Georges Rutaganda, was finally concluded.Expenses in his case were comparable atU.S.$547,000. Thus at first glance one canconclude from these amounts that the cost of a trialbefore the ICTR should be relatively consistent forthe defence at around a half a million U.S. dollars.With this index in mind, this is where matters startto sour.

The Ogetto Case

Back in July 1999, other teams had already startedto reach comparable amounts even though theircases had not yet gone to trial. AnatoleNsengiyumva is one of the ICTR detainees whohas been in detention the longest. Indicted in 1996,he was transferred to Arusha in January 1997.However, his trial has still not begun. He also hasnever changed lawyers. His lawyer does not livefar away. He lives in Nairobi, four hours from theseat of the Tribunal. This is interesting to notebecause the Registry has sometimes argued that ithas to recruit lawyers from the region under thepretext of saving money. And what savings! By1999, Nsengiyumva's lawyer, Kennedy Ogetto andhis co-counsel had already cost the TribunalU.S.$462,000, thus setting the ultimate record forsuch an early stage in the proceedings. Is there anycomparison? The case of Ferdinand Nahimana isinteresting. This accused was arrested and


transferred at the same time as AnatoleNsengiyumva. Objectively speaking, his file israther thick due to the nature of the case. SinceNahimana is one of the most renowned accused atthe ICTR, there is a mountain of literature abouthim and his lawyer has to read it all and knowalmost everything about Rwanda in 1994 sinceRTLM, the extremist radio station, run byNahimana, and that was a key factor in themassacres, was everywhere. However, by July1999, his lawyers had only cost the TribunalU.S.$101,000, a quarter of the amount ofNsengiyumva's lawyers.

Number two in the hot seat: the Kanyabashi case.Transferred to Arusha at the end of 1996, JosephKanyabashi first had a Kenyan lawyer who, in lessthan one year of service, cost a modest sum ofU.S.$128,000. His next two lawyers, both fromCanada, were not guilty of any unworthy action,with a total of U.S.$301,000. By July 1999, thetotal cost of this case, which had yet to go to trial,had reached U.S.$429,000. A string of otherexamples of cases that had not yet gone to trial bythis same date are: Nsabimana (U.S.$300,000),Imanishimwe ($250,000), Kabiligi (U.S.$248,000).By contrast, some are quite thrifty such as thelawyers for Ntahobali, at U.S.$43,000, but whowithdrew from the case a little later.

Comparisons

The second reference document is the tableshowing expenditures for 1999. In this year alone,almost U.S.$130,000 went to pay the fees ofAnatole Nsengiyumva's lawyers. Mr. Pacere alone,lead counsel for Alphonse Nteziryayo, madeU.S.$111,000. Counsel Degli, lawyer for GratienKabiligi, - U.S.$106,000; the Marchand and Boyerteam (lawyers for Joseph Kanyabashi) -U.S.$84,000; the Josette Kadji and CharlesTchakounté team (Nsabimana case) - U.S.$91,000;and the Konaté and Henry team (Ntagerura case) -U.S.$102,000. The prize goes to counselMonterosso, lawyer for Aloys Ntabakuze, whopocketed more than U.S.$125,000. A littlecomparison is in order. During the first half of thatyear, one team was in trial in Arusha, the team forAlfred Musema. His counsel, Kay and Wladimiroffonly requested U.S.$113,000 in fees. Another hotcase in the first half of 1999 was that of Ruggiu.The accused in this case was in the confession

stage and naturally his lawyers were working flatout. The total for their fees: U.S.$116,000.

The Need for Reform

These numbers must be explained. The gaps theyreveal must be justified. Moreover, the Registrarshould explain how it could allow so manyexpenses to accumulate in the cases that were stillblocked in the pre-trial phase. The OIOS reportpoints out that the ICTY rules for remuneration"were finalised by the end of 1995, based on thehypothesis that legal activities before and duringthe trial would take approximately nine months."However, in international justice, the months turninto years. The Tribunal in The Hague appears tobe contemplating reforming the system in order tomake it more rational. According to the Tribunal,this would entail, "giving the defence teams moreflexibility to decide how many work hours theywish to use per month, while also limiting themaximum number of hours that can be billed forthe entire trial period. The hope is that by so doing,the counsel will have full responsibility for anefficient defence, since the Registry would onlyhave to regularly verify the accuracy of theinvoices." This process, if it remains flexible andtransparent, could be beneficial. The ICTR shouldfollow suit, but with flexibility and transparency.

Source: Diplomatie Judiciaire, 22 April 2001


APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the ground incountries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisationsand made generally available at the same time viathe organisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generate supportfor its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board -which includes prominent figures from the fieldsof politics, diplomacy, business and the media - isdirectly involved in helping to bring ICG reportsand recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chairedby former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evanshas been President and Chief Executive sinceJanuary 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates or is planning field projects in nineteencrisis-affected countries and regions across fourcontinents: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,Sudan and Zimbabwe in Africa; Burma/Myanmar,Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanin Asia; Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,Montenegro and Serbia in Europe; and Colombiain Latin America.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable

foundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, theSmith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

August 2001


APPENDIX F

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS*

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature,Africa Report N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, AfricaReport N°24, 9 juillet 2001

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of theSuspension of Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and MultilateralCo-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté dela Presse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom ofthe Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December

2000Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadrede négociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a NewNegotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republicof Congo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa Report N°15,4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence de juger,Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000

*. Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

Indonesia’s Shaky Transition, Indonesia Report N°1, AsiaReport N°5, 10 October 1999Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Indonesia ReportN°2, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21February 2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? Asia Report No 18,27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia ReportN°14, 1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Fault Lines in the Security Map, Asia Report N°20, 4 July 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test ofStability and Democracy, Balkans Briefing 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans Report Nº111,25 May 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – ThreeCrises and Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation, Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives FourYears After, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, BalkansReport N°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, BalkansReort N°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001

No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001


Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001

KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans Report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo,Balkans Report N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo,Balkans Report N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica,Balkans Report N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing,10 October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, EyesFixed on Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent PoliticalDevelopments, 14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000

Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding: Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30November 2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, BalkansReport N° 114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans ReportN°65, 11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term BalkanStability, Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop,Balkans Report N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)and of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001


REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia andthe Region, Balkans Briefing Paper, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19 June2001EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N° 2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX G

ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor to the President

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman,Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunalfor former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, United Kingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, Sierra Leone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; former EuropeanCommissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Graça MachelFormer Minister of Education, Mozambique

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland


Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace and EconomicCo-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African National Congress;Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, German Bundestag;former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR …following the genocide in Rwanda, and more than four years...

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Transcript of INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR …following the genocide in Rwanda, and more than four years...