INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY

AGENCY

Agenda: Protection of Nuclear Resources from Natural and

Anthropogenic Disasters

STUDY GUIDE

Table of Contents

LetterFromtheExecutiveBoard..............................................................................................3

AbouttheCommittee...............................................................................................................4Introduction...............................................................................................................................................4

Governance,Structure,andMembership.................................................................................................4

Mandate,Functions,andPowers..............................................................................................................5

IntroductiontotheAgenda......................................................................................................6NuclearResourcesunderQuestion...........................................................................................................6

ProliferationofResources.........................................................................................................................7

AnthropogenicActivity...................................................................................................................8

NaturalDisasters............................................................................................................................8

NaturalDisastersandNuclearWeapons..................................................................................9NaturalDisastersandNuclearTechnology...............................................................................................9

FukushimaDisaster...................................................................................................................................9

IndustryStandards..................................................................................................................................10

PlantsatRisk...........................................................................................................................................11

NuclearTerrorism...................................................................................................................12TopicHistory............................................................................................................................................13

ScenariosofNuclearTerrorism...............................................................................................................14

RadiologicalTerrorism..................................................................................................................14

StealingResources........................................................................................................................15

AttackingFacilities........................................................................................................................15

High-levelobservations................................................................................................................19

ProductionofaDirtyBomb..........................................................................................................19

InternalPolicing.......................................................................................................................................20

CoordinatedPolicing...............................................................................................................................20

IntelligenceSharing.................................................................................................................................20

‘LossofFace’...........................................................................................................................................21

IntelligenceData......................................................................................................................................21

QuestionstoConsider.............................................................................................................................21

SecuringNuclearMaterial......................................................................................................22USSecurityMeasures..............................................................................................................................23

AirplaneAttacks............................................................................................................................24

PossibleImprovements................................................................................................................24

EmergencyResponses..................................................................................................................24

QuestionstoConsider.............................................................................................................................25

References..............................................................................................................................26

Letter From the Executive Board

Dear delegates,

We welcome you to CMS MUN 2019’s simulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nuclear energy has always been a primary concern for security across the globe, ever since humans first learn to harness its powers for destructive use around the time of the Second World War. Though we have progressed to peaceful use of its potential to power an increasingly demanding world, it still remains a threat and a very potent one at that. There has been a growing understanding of that very threat with the release of the TV series ‘Chernobyl’ that is a mini series about a nuclear accident in erstwhile Soviet Union. Nuclear energy is often touted as the best way forward for powering human life, and also as the most dangerous source of energy available to us. On many counts, it would fulfill both those descriptions, and it is the IAEA’s responsibility to ensure that we harness the energy without damages.

This guide is an indicative starting point for your research, but must not represent the entirety of your efforts. We hope you will go beyond this guide and explore much further, the resources for the same are quite vast. If you do need any help before the conference, please feel free to contact any of us. We will always be willing to address any doubts, queries, or anything else you might want to discuss with us.

We hope to have good, constructive debate and look forward to seeing you in committee.

Wishing you the best,

Daksh Walia (Director General)

Rishabh Agarwal (Deputy Director General)

About the Committee

Introduction The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent intergovernmental organization of the United Nations (UN) founded “in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy.” The Agency’s creation began with a speech from US President Eisenhower in front of the General Assembly in 1953 and was formalized with the unanimous adoption of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the Statute) on 23 October 1956 by 81 Member States. Despite the passionate words of Eisenhower, the Agency had a rocky start due to the complicated political climate during the Cold War. However, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the resulting concerns about nuclear weapons, the IAEA was able to launch its work effectively. The Agency’s position and influence was particularly strengthened through the growing number of Member States and the worrisome situations in many regions, such as the violations of the safeguard provisions by Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the nuclear power plant catastrophe in Chernobyl.

Governance, Structure, and Membership The Secretariat, the General Conference, and the Board of Governors. The General Conference, attended by all IAEA Member States, is the highest policy body of the IAEA and meets annually. Apart from the annual meetings, the General Conference can also be convened at any time by the Director General upon request of the Board of Governors or a majority of Member States. The functions and powers of the General Conference are described in Article V of the IAEA Statute. The General Conference has the power to suspend Member States, considers the annual report of the IAEA, votes on the budget suggested by the Board of Governors, adopts reports submitted to the UN, and approves agreement made between the IAEA and the UN or other organizations.

The IAEA currently has 171 Member States. The Member States of the UN and of specialized agencies can become Member States of the IAEA by signing and ratifying the IAEA Statute, or in the case a non-UN Member State, can become a member of the IAEA by accepting the IAEA Statute and by being accepted by the General Conference. A particular situation exists concerning the states that are Member States of the IAEA but have not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968), and the States parties to the NPT that are not Member States of the IAEA. Currently, there are 189 States parties to the NPT and while India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have not joined the NPT, they are, with the exception of North Korea, Member States of the IAEA.

Mandate, Functions, and Powers According to Article 2 of the Statute, the Agency aims to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world” and thus, the primary role of the IAEA is to ensure that atomic energy is used for safe, secure, and peaceful purposes. The mandate is further defined by the provisions of the NPT, which establishes binding international law concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disarmament of existing nuclear weapons systems, and the advancement of peaceful nuclear technology, thereby outlining the tasks and responsibilities of the IAEA.

The functions of the IAEA are described in Article 3 of the Statute, which consist of the assistance and surveillance of the peaceful use of atomic energy accomplished through the provision of research and technical assistance for the practical application and development of atomic energy. To that end, the IAEA makes provisions about the standards for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to conduct research and produce atomic power. Furthermore, the IAEA encourages and assists in the exchange of information, training, and the exchange of scientists. Additionally, the IAEA is able to acquire facilities, plants, and equipment necessary to conduct its tasks and responsibilities.

Under its safeguard provisions in Article 7 of the Statute, the IAEA has the power to examine facilities and equipment, which includes the right to send inspectors to Member State facilities and to request progress reports from those states. Furthermore, the IAEA has the power to require information on health and safety standards, and on the production and recovery on fissionable materials. In case of noncompliance with IAEA provisions, the Agency is able to take further sanctioning steps including the suspension or termination of IAEA assistance or the withdrawal of material and equipment provided by the Agency.

Additional functions of the IAEA are set out in Article 3 of the NPT, which obliges States parties to the treaty to accept safeguard provisions, which should be negotiated between the Member State and the IAEA in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Statute and the NPT. The IAEA is responsible for supervising and ensuring compliance to the established safeguard provisions, including the prevention of the misuse of nuclear material for non-peaceful usage, such as nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices, and the supervision of the production, procession, and usage of fissionable material. Finally, the Statute establishes the IAEA’s reporting to UN bodies, including annual reports to the General Assembly, reports to the Security Council as needed, and reports to other organs regarding matters within the “competence” of those bodies.

ü History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf

ü The Statute of IAEA: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/statute.pdf

Introduction to the Agenda The IAEA is concerned with one of humanity’s high potential technologies, but also one that carries tremendous risk as seen previously in both Chernobyl and Fukushima. Ever since the introduction of nuclear technology people have understood that such events could occur, and steps were taken to mitigate the risk associated with nuclear technology. Still, as shown in practice risks are incorrectly assessed on a regular basis, and a lot of improvements are still there to be made.

Nuclear Resources under Question Uranium is radioactive, but U-238 has a very long half-life, meaning that it can be handled fairly safely as long as precautions are taken. More importantly here, though, U-238 isn’t fissile–it can’t start a nuclear reaction and sustain it. U-235, however, is fissile; it can start a nuclear reaction and sustain it. But that 0.7 percent in naturally occurring uranium isn’t enough to make a bomb or even a nuclear reactor for a power plant. A power plant requires uranium with three to four percent U-235 (this is known as low-enriched or reactor-grade uranium), and a bomb needs uranium with a whopping 90 percent U-235 (highly enriched uranium). Uranium enrichment, then, is the process by which a sample of uranium has its proportion of U-235 increased. The specifics of the process are unimportant here; however, it is a fairly complicated process that remains inaccessible to non-state actors and even state actors who do not have international support. Safety guidelines, thus, need to focus on enriched uranium and not the ore itself.

The most difficult challenge for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device is obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). HEU, uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the U-235 isotope to over 20%, is required for the construction of a gun-type nuclear device, the simplest type of nuclear weapon. The greater the proportion of U-235 (i.e. the higher the enrichment level), the less material is needed for a nuclear explosive device. "Weapons-grade" uranium generally refers to uranium enriched to at least 90%, but material of far lower enrichment levels, found in both fresh and spent nuclear fuel, can be used to create a nuclear explosive device.

In 2002, the U.S. National Research Council warned that "crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance," noting that "the primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the availability of [nuclear material], especially HEU." Creating a nuclear weapon from HEU is technically easier than building a plutonium weapon. Moreover, current technology is unlikely to detect a shielded nuclear device on a truck or boat. Therefore, securing and eliminating stocks of HEU is the surest way to decrease the risk that terrorist groups could use this material to create a nuclear explosion.

As of 2010, experts estimated that approximately 70 tons of HEU were being used in civilian power and research programs in roughly 30 countries. Yet as little as 25kg are needed to produce a nuclear weapon; some 40-60kg are needed for a cruder nuclear device. Bomb-grade material can be obtained from both fresh (unirradiated), and irradiated (also referred to as spent), HEU fuel. Fresh and lightly irradiated fuel (such as fuel used in critical assemblies and pulse reactors) is not radioactive, and is therefore relatively safe to handle. Although using nuclear fuel in high-

powered reactors initially makes it highly radioactive and thus very difficult to handle safely (often this fuel is referred to as "self-protecting"), spent fuel loses its radioactivity over time, making it easier to handle and therefore potentially more attractive to terrorists.

HEU is currently used in the civilian sphere to fuel research reactors, critical facilities, pulsed reactors, and in producing medical isotopes. According to the IAEA, 252 research reactors are in operation or temporarily shut down across 56 countries. A further 414 reactors have been shut down or decommissioned, while five are planned or under construction. The IAEA database does not contain information on the enrichment level of fuel currently in the reactors, but it does note that over 20,000 spent fuel assemblies from research reactors are enriched to levels above 20 percent. Nearly half of these stored fuel assemblies are enriched to levels at or above 90 percent. (There is as yet no comprehensive, authoritative inventory of civil HEU globally, another obstacle to progress in this area). Many of the research reactors that have been shut down, but not decommissioned, have spent HEU fuel on-site. (Source: https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/Reports/Container.aspx?Id=A1)

Proliferation of Resources

Nuclear technology uses the energy released by splitting the atoms of certain elements. It was first developed in the 1940s, and during the Second World War research initially focused on producing bombs. In the 1950s attention turned to the peaceful use of nuclear fission, controlling it for power generation.

Civil nuclear power can now boast more than 17,000 reactor years of experience, and nuclear power plants are operational in 30 countries worldwide. In fact, through regional transmission grids, many more countries depend in part on nuclear-generated power; Italy and Denmark, for example, get almost 10% of their electricity from imported nuclear power.

Around 11% of the world's electricity is

generated by about 450 nuclear power reactors. About 60 more reactors are under construction, equivalent to about 15% of existing capacity. In 2017 nuclear plants supplied 2487 TWh of electricity, up from 2477 TWh in 20161. This is the fifth consecutive year that global nuclear generation has risen, with output 142 TWh higher than in 2012.

Anthropogenic Activity Anthropogenic refers to actions or effects originating in human activity. It is a term mostly associated with environmental impact of human actions. In the nuclear context, it primarily refers to two kinds of actions- deliberate and accidental human actions. The former primarily pertains to terror activity and protecting nuclear resources from the same while the latter is focused on building in safety mechanisms to prevent human errors from creating nuclear disasters.

Natural Disasters Natural disasters are extreme, sudden events caused by environmental factors that injure people and damage property. The very same natural disasters that pose threat to human life can also threaten nuclear resources, which in turn can lead to disastrous consequences. Various natural disasters can affect nuclear resources, including hurricanes, floods, hurricanes, etc.

Examples of such cases affecting nuclear resources will be discussed in further sections. Fortunately, no significant case of nuclear terrorism has occurred so far.

Natural Disasters and Nuclear Weapons This topic focuses on the threat of natural disasters to the safety of nuclear technology. Under natural disasters, we understand events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding and volcanic activity. Climate change is likely to give a significant rise to the number of hurricanes and other excessive weather events. Furthermore, seismic and volcanic events remain a risk for numerous plants around the globe. An ongoing discussion to safeguard nuclear technology from these hazards is therefore a must. As of 2019, IAEA has (despite numerous efforts) has no mandatory safety standards for its member states, as IAEA has failed to gain consensus on this.

Natural Disasters and Nuclear Technology Natural disasters have long been considered a threat to nuclear facilities, but the topic received considerable coverage after the incident at Fukushima in 2011 following an earthquake and tsunami. Even prior to Fukushima, there were numerous incidents in which the forces of nature posed a threat to nuclear facilities. Notable for example is the incident in July 1993 involving the Cooper nuclear power station in Nebraska, which suffered from flooding following the collapse of dikes in the area it is situated.

Besides flooding and seismic activity, nuclear facilities are also regularly exposed to hurricanes and tornadoes; these events have led to nuclear power plants losing all off-site power in the past. This is a threat that is expected to increase in the years to come as climate change is causing superstorms to become more frequent and reach areas where they previously were not expected. On the opposite side of extremes, sustained droughts can also threaten nuclear technology, as access to cool water is required to operate nuclear power plants. This became a serious issue for the United States in the summer of 2012, when numerous plants were forced to be shutdown following long heatwaves.

Fukushima Disaster One of the most notable and disastrous incidents involving nuclear power plants involved the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. On March 11, 2011, a mega thrust earthquake (9 on the Richter scale) occurred off the coast of Japan. The plant, which was located directly at the coast, was immediately shut down. The tsunami generated by the earthquake consequently destroyed the emergency generators that were supposed to power the cooling for the reactors in such events. The consequences were enormous: 3 separate nuclear meltdowns led to the release of radioactive materials into the wide surrounding of Fukushima. The impact of this event is still very much developing, even though 6 years have passed since the initial events.

IAEA Response to Fukushima: The IAEA was on the receiving end of a considerable amount of criticism following the incident in Fukushima, which included the fact that TEPCO, the owner of the Fukushima nuclear plant had put fuel rods too close together in the reactor.

The disaster in Fukushima led to extensive reviews by IAEA and other agencies to improve the safety of nuclear energy. IAEA launched the Action Plan for Nuclear Safety. However, this plan did attract also considerable criticism by several member states of IAEA as not going far enough. A main point in the negotiations is national sovereignty, and to what extent the IAEA should be inspecting nuclear power plants in the member states. Countries such as Japan and France have been in favour of introducing mandatory inspections. In 2011, then President Nicolas Sarkozy pleaded for the establishment of an independent safety authority as well as a rapid response force to nuclear accidents. France made the push for these mechanisms in the light of its G8 Presidency that year. This has firmly been opposed by states such as China and the United States. The United States argued in 2011 that such global standards would lack the flexibility to adapt to situations on a local level, and that therefore an approach through the existing international frameworks was preferential. Instead of introducing mandatory inspections, the IAEA action plan includes voluntary peer reviews, though usage of these peer reviews is still limited and nowhere near where it should be.

Industry Standards In 1994, 65 parties signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). This agreement lines out standards for anything from site selection to emergency preparedness. As of 2017, 86 parties (mostly states, but also a few agencies) had signed the CNS. However, of those 82 parties only 47 have ratified the convention. The CNS establishes a baseline, and since then it has been recognized that additional recommendations are necessary to ensure the safe operation of nuclear plants. IAEA publishes the Safety Standards Series which serves as a guideline for all member states as to how to deal with certain risks. Publication SSG-18 deals specifically with meteorological and hydrological hazards when considering locations for nuclear plants. This publication was issued in 2011, and did not yet include any ‘lessons learned’ from the Fukushima disaster. It must also be noted, as seen with the Action Plan for Nuclear Safety and the Vienna declaration, that the Safety Standards only present guidelines, and thus are not ratified by member states as seen with the CNS. This is leading to various levels of nuclear safety around the world.

Vienna Declarat ion on Nuclear Safe ty

Plants at Risk The risk of natural disasters to nuclear facilities varies widely based on the geographic location of the facilities. On a global level, 1 in 10 power plants is located in an earthquake zone. While many plants have what would be considered adequate safety measures, some other plants in less-developed nations are considered to pose a significant risk to their environments. Following the Fukushima disaster, IAEA and most national authorities did take a closer look at the locations of nuclear plants and to what extent that may be at risk of tsunamis. The studies identified 23 further plants at risk of damage from such an event. A nuclear plant that has received considerable international attention is Metsamor power plant in Armenia. Located in an area with significant seismic activity and operated by a government with relatively few resources to invest into nuclear safety, experts fear that the plant is at a serious risk if an earthquake would occur in the area. In addition to the assessment of current plants, construction plans for new facilities were also increasingly looked at. A proposed facility in South Africa was flagged for the risk posed by both tsunamis and seismologic activity. That said, these findings are often disputed, also given that there are always opposing interests. This is also pointed out by various environmental organizations, who continue to protest the development of nuclear energy. As Greenpeace puts it, “nuclear energy has no place in a safe, clean, sustainable future”. While some governments are taking steps to abandon nuclear power altogether, other governments around the world continue to believe in the use of nuclear energy, calling for the further development of nuclear standards to ensure that these plants are operated safely.

Questions to consider:

o Why do certain member states of IAEA not wish to introduce mandatory standards for nuclear power plants? What can be done to address these concerns?

o What can be done to make the hosting of IAEA peer reviews more attractive? o Can nuclear plants be fully safeguarded from natural disasters? o Are nuclear facilities (and the risks associated with the same) an essential part of our

future energy consumption?

Suggestions for further reading

ü IAEA Nuclear Safety Page: http://www-ns.iaea.org/

ü IAEA Regulation SSG-18: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1506_web.pdf

Nuclear Terrorism Nuclear terrorism is an umbrella term covering the use of nuclear devices, radioactive material or the sabotage of nuclear facilities, for terrorist means. Nuclear terrorism is viewed increasingly as being a plausible threat for all nation states, given the efficacy of even small nuclear devices, and the increasing potential for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat is Real -Nuclear Threat Initiative

Nuclear terrorism is a low probability, high consequence threat. That is, the probability that a terrorist organization would utilize a nuclear strategy is far lower than the probability of many other types of terrorist attacks, but the risk posed by nuclear terrorism – the probability multiplied by the immense consequences of such an event – is unacceptably high. Former US President Barack Obama has stated that the danger of a terrorist group obtaining and using a nuclear weapon is “one of the greatest threats to global security.” Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear terrorism, scholars and policymakers have justifiably focused substantial efforts and resources on understanding and attempting to prevent the threat.

While nuclear terrorism is globally considered a serious threat, it is more significant for certain states due to political and geographical factors. For example, it was alleged in 2009 that Pakistan’s nuclear sites and storage centres had been attacked by al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which Pakistan denies. However, Iran have also expressed their concern on repeated occasions about the potential for ISIS militants to attack their nuclear facilities and attempt to steal a nuclear device. As a result, nations which border states with nuclear weapon capabilities have particular reason to be concerned about acts of nuclear terrorism as a result of theft – overall, in the past 12 years there have been 18 incidents of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, as confirmed by the IAEA. For instance, in 2006 a Russian and three Georgian accomplices were arrested in Georgia with 79.5 grams of 89% HEU.

In addition, nuclear terrorism does not only extend to the detonation of nuclear devices. With a minimal amount of radioactive material, a standard explosive device could be used to contaminate large urban areas. Additionally, the death of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 as a result of radioactive polonium poisoning was described by Andrew J Patterson as “an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism”. While, to date, there have been no large scale radiological attacks on nation states, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Aum Shinrikyo and terrorists from the North Caucasus region of Russia have all expressed interests in launching nuclear-armed attacks – in the case of North Caucasus terrorists, groups have repeatedly attempted to seize Russian submarines armed with nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in 1995 to attack the Tokyo subway, resulting in the deaths of 12 people, with 50 others being injured and over 5000 experiencing serious vision problems. The potential for groups with experience with using biological and chemical weaponry to use nuclear weaponry is a serious concern for the IAEA.

Topic History While no known radiological terrorism has taken place to date, the topic of nuclear terrorism was discussed as early as December 1945. J. Robert Oppenheimer was quizzed on the topic by the United States Congress in light of the possibility of an atomic bomb being smuggled into a United States city centre, and the potential for detecting such an attack. Further discussions regarding nuclear terrorism remained focused on smuggled atomic devices during the 1950s, especially in light of the attempts by both the United States and Russia to make suitcase nuclear devices throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

In the 1970s, nation states began to consider the threat of non-state nuclear terrorism. For example, in 1975 The Economist published an article expressing concern at the potential of making “a bomb with a few pounds of plutonium”, as by the mid-1980s, “power stations may easily be turning out 200,000 pounds of the stuff each year”. States also began to consider the various methods via which nuclear terrorism could come to take place – for example, beyond the theft of a nuclear device, the theft of radiological material during its transit between nuclear power stations. These discussions became more frequent as nation states began to seriously consider the potential of organised, international terrorism, especially in light of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre.

The exposure of the significant neglect of the physical safeguarding of atomic material in the United States included a private panel of experts known as the International Task Force on the Prevention of Terrorism releasing a report in 1986 to all nuclear armed states highlighting the extensive dangers of nuclear terrorism. As their report stated, “the probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing and the consequences for urban and industrial societies could be catastrophic’.

In 2008, the World Institute for Nuclear Security was founded following the 2007 Pelindaba nuclear facility break-in in South Africa, where thieves had the chance to steal enough enriched HEU to make several nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was formed in 2006 as a partnership of 86 nations and 5 official observers to work together to improve capacity for prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorist events. Both organisations work closely with the IAEA, and conduct ongoing meetings to discuss improvements and changes to security regimes.

The potential of nuclear terrorism is currently considered one of the most significant security threats for any member state. Joe Cirincione, the President of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy, has stated that nations should be surprised that radiological attacks have not occurred to date, and that the theft of nuclear material should remain a serious concern – highlighting the potential attacks on Pakistani facilities, the Belgian base just outside of Brussels where over a half-dozen nuclear weapons remain from Cold War deployments and the United States Incirlik air base in Turkey, where an estimated 50 weapons are stored just 200 miles from the war-torn Syrian border, as particularly troubling examples.

Scenarios of Nuclear Terrorism Experts have typically divided nuclear terrorism dangers into three categories:

(1) radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs, which include conventional explosives that disperse radioactive materials, known as dirty bombs) or radioactive emission devices (REDs, or fixed radiological sources that expose potential victims to radiation);

(2) attacks or sabotage of nuclear facilities; and (3) terrorist acquisition and detonation of a nuclear device.

Each type of nuclear terrorism poses different risks and requires different capabilities from terrorist organizations. The following sections will analyse each type of nuclear terrorism in turn while providing examples from the empirical record.

The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism - Woodrow Wilson Centre

Radiological Terrorism Of the three types of nuclear terrorism, an act of radiological terrorism would likely cause the lowest scale of destruction, and would not lead to catastrophic levels of death and injury on the scale of a nuclear weapons detonation. The largest impact of most dirty bomb events would be economic, for example, the substantial costs involved in the evacuation, relocation, and clean-up of areas contaminated by radiation. Radiological terrorism could also cause significant short- and long-term health problems for people in the area exposed to the radiation, and would undoubtedly engender widespread distress and panic. This mode of nuclear terrorism would be the easiest for a terrorist organization to execute due to the ubiquitous nature of radiological materials and the relatively less complex technical demands of such an undertaking. Radiological devices as weapons of mass disruption: Radiological terrorism could take several forms. The two most commonly cited scenarios include the use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or a radiological exposure device (RED). The use of an RDD would involve the intentional dispersal of radioactive material, either by using conventional explosives (a.k.a. a “dirty bomb”) or spreading the material actively (e.g. using a sprayer) or passively (i.e. without the assistance of a powered mechanical device). Despite media and other reports to the contrary, a dirty bomb is in noway similar to a nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb creates an explosion that is millions of times more powerful than that of a dirty bomb. The cloud of radiation from a nuclear bomb could spread tens to hundreds of square miles, whereas a dirty bomb’s radiation would be dispersed only within a few blocks or miles of the explosion. RDDs are considered “weapons of mass disruption” because they are not expected to kill large amounts of people but instead destabilize the economy and functioning of a society through panic, the destructive force of the blast, and the spread of radiation and radioactive materials.

Stealing Resources Since non-state actors cannot currently manufacture their own nuclear material, attacking a facility where highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu) is housed is a potential means to obtain the materials necessary to build a nuclear device. Nuclear facilities also often store large amounts of radioactive material, spent fuel, and other nuclear waste products that terrorists could use in a dirty bomb. As Gary Ackerman correctly notes, although non-state actors may be the ultimate recipient of the nuclear material, the perpetrators of the theft at the facility could be experienced, profit-driven criminal groups who would then sell the material to a violent non-state customer. The disappearance of nuclear material from a reactor in Kinshasa is one of the few cases where a perpetrator was successful in actually stealing substantial amounts of nuclear material. During the late 1970s, unknown perpetrators stole two fuel rods, which contained small amounts of uranium enriched to twenty percent, from a small research reactor at the University of Kinshasa’s Kinshasa Nuclear Research Center in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then, Zaire).

While twenty-percent low-enriched uranium isn’t particularly useful for either an actual nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb, this case symbolizes potential intent or terrorist to acquire more dangerous material. At the time, the theft raised no alarms at the facility, and the rods were only noticed to be missing during a routine inventory check. The reactor was said to be poorly guarded by a token fence and small group of security guards. It is worth noting that the fuel rods used in the reactor were provided to Zaire by the US with almost no security stipulations as part of the Atoms for Peace Program. The fuel rods remained unaccounted for over the next two decades until the late 1990s, when an Italian smuggling ring obtained one of the rods and sold it to an Italian police sting operation whom they believed to be a Middle Eastern buyer. While the Kinshasa case is considered to be uniquely significant in that the perpetrators managed to steal a significant amount of nuclear material, according to the Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD) at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), there have been seventeen successful incidents of nuclear or radiological theft (along with two unsuccessful attempts) at nuclear facilities from 1961 to 2014.

Attacking Facilities A second way in which terrorists might target a nuclear facility for malicious purposes is by causing harm to the facility itself, in other words, by sabotaging the normal operations of the facility with the intention of causing a meltdown of the reactor core and releasing radioactivity into the environment. This scenario would be attractive to terrorists seeking to cause considerable damage. As John Holdren notes, a successful attack on a nuclear power reactor could, “destroy the facility itself, worth hundreds of millions to billions of dollars; produce tens to hundreds or even thousands of early fatalities and tens of thousands of delayed cancer deaths; and severely contaminate hundreds to thousands of square miles of land, requiring removal of much of it from habitation, commerce and agriculture for periods ranging from months to many decades.” The disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 2011 underscores the vulnerability of nuclear power plants and demonstrates the terror, disruption, and massive costs that could be caused by a major nuclear accident.

Airplanes and Drones There are several kinds of nuclear sabotage that are discussed in the public domain. First, as the attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored, terrorists could use an airliner or plane packed with explosives as a guided missile to crash into a nuclear power plant, specifically a number of potential targets: the reactor core or the reactor’s spent-fuel storage pool would be the most dangerous targets, but a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant, a dry-cask spent-fuel storage facility, or a nuclear waste-repository also represent targets.

It is worth noting that only as recently as 2009 has the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required all new nuclear power plants to incorporate design features that would ensure that, in the event of a crash by a commercial airliner, the plant’s reactor core would remain cooled or the reactor containment would remain intact, and radioactive releases would not occur from spent fuel storage pools. The fact that these guidelines are only beginning to take shape at nuclear power plants in the US, whose nuclear power plants are widely considered to be the best guarded in the world, does not bode well for the security of plants in other nuclear power states, particularly those just beginning to develop nuclear power.

In addition to the threat posed by aircraft, more recently, government officials have also been forced to take into account the emerging threat of small drones. In 2014, thirteen nuclear power plants in France were plagued by around twenty unexplained drone overflights, while a similar unmanned aircraft was spotted flying over Belgium’s Doel-4 nuclear site that same year. Terrorist groups could harness drones as an intelligence-gathering tool in order to capture precise images of nuclear plants for use in a future breach attempt, or could be packed with explosives to cause immediate damage to the plant.

Land Attacks Second, terrorists could attack a nuclear facility by land using mortars, rockets, or other emplaced explosives. One of the most recent manifestations of this type of attack occurred in 2014 during the conflict between Hamas and Israel. On one day of the conflict, Hamas fired seventy-four rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel’s territory, at least three of which targeted the Negev Nuclear Research Facility, which houses an operational nuclear reactor. Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepted one of the missiles before it could land, while the other two landed in open areas. While Hamas has been thought to target the reactor in the past, this incident represents the first time that the group explicitly stated that it had been attempting to strike the reactor. According to Gary Ackerman and James Halverson, “Although the attack caused no damage, this incident represents perhaps the most significant instance of a non-state actor attacking a nuclear facility in either a genuinely airborne or “standoff” capacity.”

This scenario is particularly concerning given its feasibility: Mortars and rockets are relatively low cost, unsophisticated weapons already possessed by many non-state actors. Moreover, most nuclear facilities around the world are not protected by expensive missiledefence systems like Iron Dome. One could imagine such an attack being carried out on one of South Korea’s twenty-five nuclear power plants by North Korea, which is rapidly developing and expanding its ballistic missile arsenal. This scenario is all the more concerning as a recent report by South Korea’s operator, the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNP), revealed that the outer protective walls of South Korean reactors were never meant to withstand a missile strike or

other forms of concerted attack. Again, while the IAEA recommends in its nuclear security guidance that countries “protect targets against stand-off attacks consistent with their design basis threat (DBT),” this recommendation is not required and few states have encoded it in their domestic legal framework.

Ground Assault A third mode of sabotage terrorists could carry out on a nuclear power plant is a ground assault by a commando team. This commando-style attack could be mounted using a small armed force, whose members are potentially familiar with the plant layout or possibly aided by accomplices inside the plant, to gain entry to a facility in order to use explosives or other means in an attempt to release radioactivity into the area. In 2007, eight men, split into two four-man teams, simultaneously attacked the outer security perimeter of the Pelindaba Nuclear Facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium are stored. One of the teams breached the outer perimeter and exchanged gunfire with a guard until they were eventually chased away, but the other team disabled the electrified outer fence and proceeded to disable the alarm while raising no alarms. Once inside, the intruders disabled the security cameras and entered the emergency control centre where they shot a guard in the chest. The four intruders spent a total of forty-five minutes within the facility’s security perimeter without being apprehended by security forces, and then escaped the same way through which they arrived. Although the perpetrators did not set off explosives inside or steal material, it is a reminder of the highly capable adversaries that nuclear security measures must be designed to prevent, detain, and deter.

Cyber Attacks Finally, cyber-attacks are an emerging vulnerability for nuclear power plants. Several notable cyberattacks have already occurred at nuclear facilities, including the Stuxnet virus that damaged Iran’s Natanz centrifuge facility, the placement of a virus into the computers of the Ignalia nuclear power plant in Lithuania in 1992, and the hacking of the computer systems of KHNP, South Korea’s nuclear operator by presumably North Korea. Attackers could use cyber techniques to undermine security at nuclear reactors to facilitate, on one end of the spectrum, the theft of confidential or proprietary information, or the release of radiation on the other. According to a 2015 report published by Chatham House, “An adversary with sufficient technical knowledge and adequate resources could mount an attack on a nuclear power plant that could trigger the release of ionizing radiation. All nuclear power plants need offsite power to operate safely and all have a standby generator which is designed to be activated when a loss of main power occurs. Attacks on the offsitepower supply and on the on-site backup system could create some of the effects that occurred following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami at Fukushima Daiichi, although multiple failures of the many safety features at modern nuclear power plants could also need to occur at the same time as that loss to offsite power and the disruption of standby generators.”

While the concern of radiation release is remote, even a small-scale cyber incident at a nuclear facility would likely have a disproportionate effect on the public’s opinion of nuclear energy and nuclear industry. Although terrorists are not currently believed to possess an advanced cyber capability, groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have developed a sophisticated strategy of online recruitment, which utilizes not only Facebook and Twitter but also encrypted

platforms on mobile devices. Moreover, it is not implausible that a group’s desire to cause damage at a nuclear facility could lead them to develop the necessary skills or employ a profit-motivated cyber-criminal group to do this. Cyber defence of nuclear power plants requires a significant financial and intellectual investment on the part of states.

Threats and Exposes by Protestors The intrusion of a nuclear power plant as a form of protest, while not necessarily an act of attack or sabotage on a nuclear facility, is nonetheless included in this discussion because the intrusion of protestors or activists into a nuclear facility highlights the vulnerabilities that could be exploited by individuals or groups with violent or malicious intentions. In these scenarios, the perpetrators are usually anti-nuclear or environmental activists and do not intend to acquire material, shut down a facility, or even cause serious harm to the facility. Rather, they seek to draw attention to their cause, which often times includes pointing out the deficiencies in security at nuclear plants.

Greenpeace activists have broken into nuclear facilities around the globe numerous times. In October 2012, Greenpeace activists entered two nuclear power plants in Sweden by breaking open a gate and scaling fences without being interdicted by security guards. Four of the activists hid on the roof of one reactor overnight before being discovered by guards and surrendering the next morning. In 2014, Greenpeace activists broke into the Fessenheim nuclear plant near the German border and hung a banner from the reactor building. One of the most serious and well-known cases of protestor intrusion at a nuclear power plant was the 2012 break-in at the Y-12 National Security complex in the US. This incident is of particular interest because Y-12 is ostensibly one of the most stringently guarded nuclear facilities in the world, as it houses the main US repository of weapons-grade uranium. Indeed, according to Matthew Bunn, before the intrusion, nuclear security managers at the US Department of Energy (DOE) would have pointed to the securityprogram at Y-12 as one of the strongest at DOE. Nevertheless, an 82-year-old nun along with two other activists breached the outer layer of security at the complex, with little more than a pair of bolt-cutters, and succeeded in getting to the building where thousands of bombs’ worth of HEU was stored. The activists evaded multiple cameras, alarms, and other sensors. The activists proceeded to vandalize the building, using their own blood and sledgehammers, for two hours before being detected and arrested by a single security guard. Stunningly, because the facility had experienced hundreds of false alarms in months leading up to the break-in, security guards heard the alarms but did not act upon them because they thought they were not real. Similarly, the guards heard the protestors hammering on the building’s wall but assumed that the sounds were being made by maintenance workers. While their intent was not to cause serious harm to the facility, the protestors revealed major weaknesses in the complex’s nuclear security and highlighted the damage that could easily be done by adversaries with more nefarious intents.

High-level observations The Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD), a database complied by the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), examines all incidents of assaults, sabotage, and breaches of nuclear facilities from 1961 to 2014. The database points to some interesting high-level observations about the scenarios discussed above. First, there are eighty cases of attacks, sabotage, or breaches against nuclear facilities in the empiric record, a sizeable number compared to the general perception of the frequency of these events. While many of the notable and reported cases were discussed above, there are many more cases that have not received the same level of media attention. Second, according to the database, at least sixty percent of the attempted attacks on nuclear facilities were deemed “successful,” that is they met the defined or ostensible goals of the perpetrator. Third, in one-third of all cases examined, the perpetrators penetrated structures where nuclear or radiological materials were actually housed. Finally, in more than seventy-five percent of the cases examined, the perpetrators managed to breach the outer defences of the facility. Fortunately, for now, the most successful types of perpetrators appear to be criminals and anti-nuclear or environmental activists. However, the empirical record demonstrates that successful attacks, sabotage, and breaches of nuclear facilities are indeed possible.

Combined with a historic interest by violent non-state groups in nuclear weapons, it may simply be luck that these two forces have not yet coincided.

Production of a Dirty Bomb Given the difficulty of producing a full nuclear weapon, the terrorist group may well create what is known as a dirty bomb. This is a large conventional explosive device wrapped in highly radioactive material. The goal of a dirty bomb is to spread the highly radioactive material across a large area, rendering it uninhabitable for many decades into the future. Given that producing a dirty bomb is a much simpler process than that of producing a true nuclear weapon, it is probable that any terrorist group in possession of the radioactive material required, instead of going through the process of enrichment and the challenges of building a nuclear bomb would most likely choose the option of building a dirty bomb.

Therefore, the risk of a dirty bomb may well be greater than that of a standard nuclear weapon, as the most difficult aspect of the production of such a weapon is the procurement of the radioactive materials. The ability for member states to adequately protect their nuclear facilities therefore is of paramount importance to the IAEA in the matter of suppressing the possibility of nuclear terrorist activities. This requires all member states to agree upon methods and systems of protection of nuclear materials, and further for all member states to adhere to the agreed standards. Interception

The interception of potential nuclear terrorists will reply upon both the police and security services of the member states where any theft took place, as well as those of other member states. Therefore, all member states should be able to share and make use of deterrent and investigative best practice, and share this with others.

Internal Policing The main deterrence and hindrance to any terrorist organisation is the internal policing and security services of member states. Any terrorist organisations operating in member states can be a threat to any member state. Therefore, there is a duty upon all member states to ensure that they adequately maintain the rule of law within their borders.

Whilst the IAEA involvement in the member states internal policing is limited, advice can be given upon policing and security measures pertaining to safety and security and nuclear facilities. Further to providing advice and guidance to member states, the IAEA can act as the body to set the standards of best practice when it comes to these aspects of nuclear security, as well as for the most effective methods of tracking and stocking nuclear materials.

Coordinated Policing Further to the internal policing of member states, the combating of international terrorist organisations involves the cooperation and coordination of the police forces and security services of many member states. Whilst again the IAEA has limited authority and responsibility when it comes to the police and security services of member states, it can have an important role in the cooperation and coordination of various member states police and security forces when it comes to security and investigations of transnational crimes involving nuclear facilities.

The IAEA can serve in the role of the main point of contact for all investigating agencies, ensuring the efficient transfer of necessary information between agencies, and for supplying any expertise and detailed information within the nuclear energy remit of the IAEA which the agencies may require for their investigations. Member states should look to this area to ensure that in the event of a terrorist organisation being able to acquire nuclear materials, the failures of national investigative agencies will not give the terrorist organisations the ability to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon.

Intelligence Sharing Given the international nature of many terrorist organisations, intelligence on any plans of nuclear attacks by terrorist organisations should be shared between member states. Without this sharing of information, terrorist organisations are more able to act in multiple member states, splitting their activities between states in order to disguise the true nature of their organisation and to make it more difficult for the security services of member states to disrupt their activities.

Member states are often reluctant to share intelligence gained by their security services due to the risks involved. These risks include the intelligence being inadvertently released into the public domain, as has been done in a number of cases recently, along with the risks of the nature of the information shared revealing the manner in which it was gained. Further, if the intelligence concerns actions carried out by other member states, the holder of the intelligence information may well wish to withhold it so as to not expose the fact that they have operations ongoing within the borders of other member states.

‘Loss of Face’ One major issue is the attempt of member states that have lax nuclear security, or have lost nuclear material to ensure that they do not lose face in the eyes of the international community. Member states might falsely deny any security failings, or otherwise act to frustrate investigations which might show the failings of their governmental or investigative organisations.

Due to the nature of international terrorism, cooperation between member states is essential. However, cooperation often involves the sharing of best practice and standardisation of the systems used by investigative agencies. Member states might resist the input of the IAEA and other UN bodies to their internal security apparatus due to it being seen as an infringement on their national sovereignty.

Delegates will have to decide how to overcome the reluctance of member states to follow the recommendations of the IAEA due to concerns surrounding national sovereignty. This may prove difficult as there are many internal and external influences on each member states view of the issue of national sovereignty, and making changes to solve the issues that one-member state might have with the sovereignty issues may well give rise to concerns from other member states.

Intelligence Data The politics of the sharing of intelligence data and other information gathered by clandestine means are deeply problematic for any supranational body recommending the sharing of such information. These problems are based on the concerns of member states that revealing information to other member states invariable involves the loss of control of that information, and greatly increases the risk of the source of the information being revealed with the related risk of the loss of the source or the intelligence agency networks of member states being infiltrated by foreign agents.

Overcoming this obstacle will be very difficult, and will require member states to agree upon either a method of sharing intelligence which reduces the risk of exposing the source of the information, or otherwise come to an agreement on sharing the information as needed to combat the threat of international nuclear terrorism. Alternately, member states could agree to continue the status quo of member states deciding on a case by case basis which intelligence to share and how to do so.

Questions to Consider • How do we reinforce the security measures of nuclear facilities? Is it possible to

implement universal standards for the IAEA members? • What are the ways to dispose of HEU waste being used? • How can data sharing and collective policing mechanisms be installed in order to combat

transnational crime? • What measures should be imposed on nuclear facilities to safeguard them from possible

ambush attacks?

Securing Nuclear Material Terrorists are indeed interested in nuclear facilities, which exist in numerous locations worldwide. According to the IAEA, there are 440 power reactors in operation (with 60 under construction) around the globe, along with 218 operational research reactors, which are used to produce medical isotopes and train nuclear scientists. The global nuclear industry also includes hundreds of plants that enrich uranium and fabricate fuel for reactors. The security measures at these facilities can vary widely, as there are no binding global standards for physical protection at civilian nuclear facilities. The IAEA recommends general provisions to protect reactors against attack or sabotage, but IAEA inspectors do not verify whether these measures have actually been implemented at sites. Rather, each country adopts its own domestic laws and regulations which operators are supposed to implement at their facilities. The following sections will describe several possible scenarios in which an attack or sabotage of a nuclear facility could occur, and provide examples from the empirical record.

Even as nuclear terrorism remains a credible and urgent threat, the challenge of securing global supplies of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is growing. This stems from the projected growth globally of nuclear power plants in response to increasing needs for energy and the desire of a number of states to generate that energy without producing the pollution and carbon emissions associated with fossil fuel plants. The growth in nuclear power is expected to be greatest among states that do not have a long or, in some cases, any history of nuclear power or limited or no experience in securing nuclear materials.

Additionally, some nuclear power newcomer states are located in regions with political and security challenges, which will complicate efforts to sustainably secure their nuclear material. The growth of nuclear power and the increased amounts of associated nuclear material are already promoting the development of innovative nuclear technologies and practices that may have an impact on how nuclear material and nuclear facilities that contain it have to be secured and checked. The emerging evolution in nuclear users, technologies, and practices must be factored into the development of a global nuclear security regime in a timely way, not after delays of years or decades or after the wake-up call of a serious nuclear security incident.

The increasing amounts of nuclear material outside the IAEA safeguards regime is a further source of concern. Some states with such nuclear materials have demonstrated a commitment to good nuclear security practices, but others have not. North Korea, for example, has a track record of irresponsible behaviour, including engaging in illicit activities to supplement the regime’s financial resources. The behaviour of such states puts a premium on the need for all other states to collaborate in sharing information about illicit nuclear activity and preventing the illicit transhipment of nuclear material that could be used by terrorist groups.

Although states-parties to the original convention may have been committed and active in meeting their national obligations, the treaty’s review mechanism, which was established to allow states-parties to discuss and assess treaty implementation issues, has been essentially dormant. The first and only such meeting to review the treaty was held in 1992. There were subsequent meetings of experts to discuss the need for amending the treaty and then negotiating the

amendment that entered into force in 2016, but there have been no other meetings of states-parties to review the treaty’s implementation.

This lack of implementation review stands in sharp contrast to the way other important treaties dealing with threats stemming from complex technical issues, such as nuclear safety, nuclear non-proliferation, and the protection of the ozone layer, have reviewed treaty implementation and the changing treaty environment. The Convention on Nuclear Safety has held seven formal review conferences of contracting parties since the treaty entered into force in 1996. The parties to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) decided in 1995 to increase the number of meetings devoted to reviewing the treaty’s implementation, so there are now preparatory meetings in the three years leading up to review conferences, which are held every five years. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer has held 22 meetings of states-parties and been updated six times since it entered into force in 1989.

A successful nuclear terrorism attack would have the potential to destabilize not just a city but also a nation and possibly the global economy, with incalculable human and financial costs. As a result, the international community needs to do all it can to prevent such an event because no response could undo the damage done. Existing international anti-terrorism conventions, including on nuclear terrorism, mainly focus on what to do after an attack. Yet, preventing a dynamic threat involving sophisticated technologies and determined terrorist groups requires an equally dynamic process, not a static or reactive approach and certainly not a moribund one. Global nuclear security arrangements, therefore, need to be subject to regular review and improvement to ensure they are attuned to evolving threats, technologies, and industrial practices. IAEA meetings and conferences on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism, as well as the nuclear security summit process, have begun to bring a dynamism that had been lacking in global nuclear security arrangements, but it is imperative that states-parties use the amended convention to sustain and further develop these nascent efforts.

US Security Measures The United States has some of the most advanced measures in place for protecting nuclear resources. This section seeks to introduce these policies and the possibility of applying them across IAEA members to protect all resources.

Even prior to the 9/11 attacks, nuclear plants had extensive security measures in place. Each plant has a trained security force and a series of physical barriers. Security personnel undergo thorough background checks and submit to lengthy personal searches when entering and exiting the plant. The physical barriers consist of an "owner-controlled" buffer zone of land around the facility, a restricted-access "protected area," and a further restricted "vital area." Double fences, barbed wire, and surveillance systems are common. The containment vessels for nuclear reactors are among the world’s sturdiest man-made structures. The vessel at the Indian Point plant, for instance, is made of three-and-a-half-foot thick concrete reinforced by three-inch thick steel bars.

After 9/11, the NRC began a top-to-bottom review of its security requirements, and in 2003, issued new orders to tighten security. Some $1.25 billion was spent on these measures, which included adding security barriers and detection equipment, creating more rigid access control, and increasing the number of security personnel by 60 percent. The NRC also revised the DBT to include what it claims is "the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard

force should be expected to defend." While details are classified, experts say this covers an assault by multiple armed attackers.

Airplane Attacks A 2002 report by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association suggests a nuclear reactor would remain intact if crashed into by an average private aircraft. Even a much larger commercial jet, such as a Boeing 757, would not cause critical damage to a reactor, the report concluded. NRC studies have reached similar conclusions. Peter D. Zimmerman, a professor at King’s College, London who was among the authors of a National Academies report on spent fuel storage, says, "I think there are some reactors where it is possible to fly an airplane into the spent fuel pool and crack it open." He says, however, that the consequences of such an attack are unclear.

Nuclear facilities are not required to have plans in place to repel such an attack. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration, the agency charged with protecting the nation’s transportation system, is responsible for preventing a 9/11-style airborne attack. Nuclear plant operators are in close contact with the national air defence command, and, in the event of such an attack, the two groups would cooperate to head off the assault or mitigate

Possible Improvements Most experts suggest revising the DBT to more accurately reflect the terrorist threat nuclear plants face. Beyond that, there are a variety of suggestions to improve security. One of these is better management of the spent nuclear fuel. Used fuel rods are currently placed in containment pools, which experts say could be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. One way to reduce this risk is to move spent fuel into more secure storage containers. While this cannot be done immediately, Zimmerman says "it is wise to move the fuel to dry storage casks sooner rather than later."

Ferguson recommends addressing the nuclear industry’s complaints about the high cost of extra security. "We need some hard numbers to determine how much additional money we are talking about," he says. If the price tag proves too high, he recommends an assessment of all the nation’s nuclear plants to identify the most vulnerable sites, which would then receive additional resources.

Daniel Hirsh, president of the nuclear watchdog Committee to Bridge the Gap, suggests nuclear plants implement a two-person rule whereby "no single person can be left alone in a vital area." While this doesn’t completely prevent the possibility of sabotage, it would greatly reduce the likelihood, he says. He also advocates the construction of beamhenge shields, large steel cages constructed around nuclear plants to offset the risk of attacks from airplanes.

Emergency Responses Around each nuclear power site is a ten-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). Within the EPZ, nuclear plant operators are required to maintain emergency sirens and conduct evacuation drills. Since 9/11, some critics have called for an expansion of the EPZ, especially for plants near large population centres.

One of the main effects of an accidental or terrorist release of radiation from a nuclear facility would be the dispersal of large quantities of radioactive iodine, which can concentrate in the human thyroid gland and cause serious health problems. Administering iodine orally prior to

exposure can prevent the absorption of the radioactive iodine. In 2002, the NRC began distributing iodine pills to populations within several EPZs. Iodine pills do not protect against other forms of radiation, and this program is only available in states that have requested it.

Questions to Consider • Is it possible to create universal standards for nuclear safety? If so, will the IAEA take up

responsibility for the funding of implementation of such measures? • Should a lower cost-lower safety approach be adopted to ensure maximum

implementation, or a higher security-high cost approach to create a standard for all countries to aim towards?

• How can we fund implementation of safety mechanisms in underdeveloped or developing countries? Should richer, developed countries take responsibility for such an action?

References (Also, resources for further reading)

"Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, pp. 12 and 16, www.fissilematerials.org.

Birmingham, L. (2012, November 07). Nuclear Power and Superstorms Don’t Mix. Retrieved September 30, 2017, from http://ideas.time.com/2012/11/07/nuclear-power-and-superstorms-dont-mix/

Climate Central. (2012, July 18). Heat and Drought Pose Risks for Nuclear Power Plants. Retrieved September 30, 2017, from http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/heat-and-drought-pose-risks-for-nuclear-power-plants

CNS Vienna Declaration 2015. (2015, February 9). Retrieved September 27, 2017, from https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/cns_viennadeclaration090215.pdf

Greenpeace USA. (n.d.). Nuclear Energy. Retrieved September 27, 2017, from http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/global-warming/issues/nuclear/

Gunter, P. (2004). Natural Disasters and Safety Risks at Nuclear Power Stations. Retrieved September 3, 2017, from https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/factsheets/naturaldisaster&nuclearpowe

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IAEA. (2014, May 29). IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Retrieved September 27, 2017, from https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/nuclear-safety-action-plan 17 http://in.reuters.com/article/nuclear-safety-iaea/un-atom-safety-plan-to-win-backing-despite-criticism-idINL5E7K7

IAEA. (2016, June 08). Nuclear safety conventions. Retrieved September 27, 2017, from https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Incident and Trafficking Database,” December 9, 2014, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp.

Jonathan Herbach, “Reinforcing the Three Pillars: How Nuclear Security Efforts Underwrite the Strength of the Non-Proliferation Regime” (paper, Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Energy: Fresh Ideas for the Future symposium, April 28, 2015), p. 11, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/JDHerbach.pdf.

M. V. Ramana. “Twenty Years after Chernobyl: Debates and Lessons.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 41, no. 18, 2006, pp. 1743–1747. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4418166.

Pomper and Tarini. “Nuclear Terrorism: Threat or Not?” AIP Conference Proceedings. https://aip.scitation.org/doi/abs/10.1063/1.5009230

Research Reactor Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, https://nucleus.iaea.org