International approaches to tunnel safety - … 2012-2013...1. Lessons from the last 15 years’...
Transcript of International approaches to tunnel safety - … 2012-2013...1. Lessons from the last 15 years’...
International approaches
to tunnel safety
Didier Lacroix
Centre d’Études des Tunnels
Short history of tunnel safety
Before 1999
After 1999
Catastrophic road tunnel fires in Europe (1999)
Not an issue!
Road tunnel safety before 1999
Not a serious problem (for public opinion)
- rather less accidents than in the open
- fires : 50 fatalities in 50 years worldwide
However :
- a few serious fires
(up to 9 fatalities; a fire lasted 4 days in Japan)
- some research, recommendations, regulations(in a few international associations / countries)
Limited number of tunnel specific requirements in national regulations
- Safety globally high in rail systems
- Due to regulations regarding the whole system
- Tunnels not specially dangerous parts
More specifications by network owners
Rail tunnel safety before 1999
Even less requirements for tunnel safety in national regulations:- Regulations for stations ( ≈≈≈≈ buildings)
- Low probability of a stop out of a station
- Even then, stations generally used for evacuation
Specific safety concepts of each network(depending on standards for rolling stock)
Metro tunnel safety before 1999
Before 1999
After 1999
1999
Short history of tunnel safety
- Mont Blanc (France - Italy) : 39 fatalities
In 1999
2 catastrophic fires in road tunnels:
- Tauern (Austria) : 12 fatalities- Mont Blanc (France - Italy) : 39 fatalities
In 1999
2 catastrophic fires in road tunnels:
- St Gotthard (Switzerland) : 11 fatalities
In 2001
Another catastrophic fire in a road tunnel:
Further to the 1999 and other fires,
tunnel safety became a major concern
���� Initiatives at the nationalEuropeaninternational levels
���� Aiming at researchnew guidelines & legislation
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
Your questions…
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� The catastrophic fires of 1999-2001
in alpine road tunnels:Mont-Blanc, Tauern, St Gotthard
���� Fires in rail / metro systemsThree rather similar
tunnels…
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
Country France-Italy Austria Switzerland
Length 11.6 km 6.4 km 16.9 km
Traffic Bi-direct. Bi-direct. Bi-direct.
Vehicles /d. 3 300 15 000 18 700
HGV / day 1 300 3 000 3 800
VentilationSemi-transv.
Semi-transv.
Semi-transv.
Opening 1965 1975 1980
MONT BLANC TUNNEL FIRE(24 - 26 March 1999)
MONT BLANC TUNNEL
6
MONT BLANC TUNNEL
OPERATION
• Theoreticallya joint subsidiary of the Fr and It companies
• In facts2 operators that did not cooperate much2 independent control centres
• Safety in operationcommon procedures (1985)private firemen (only at French portal)only one exercice in 34 years…
FIRE LOCATION
BURNT VEHICLES FATALITIES
Found dead Users Staff Firemen
In their vehicle 27
In the tunnel 7 1
In another vehicle 2
In a shelter 1 1
TOTAL 37 1 1
Fire duration = 53 hours… Fire duration = 53 hours…
3 years to reopen…
VENTILATION CONDITIONS
before alarm
VENTILATION CONDITIONS
after alarm
Smoke after 10 min :Italian side
Smoke after 10 min :French side
TAUERN TUNNEL FIRE(29 May 1999)
TAUERN TUNNEL
TAUERN TUNNEL ORIGIN OF THE FIRE
End-of-queue accident (works inside tunnel)
PROGRESS OF THE FIRE
� 8 people are killed in the accident
� Fire starts immediately
� Alert is fastbut firefighters are slow to arrive
� Smoke control is effective in early
���� 80 people escape by car or on foot
� Then explosion and smoke destratification
� 1 HGV driver goes back in the tunneland dies
� 2 people stay in their carand die
� Another person flees before the fire, does not go in the shelter and dies
PROGRESS OF THE FIRE
Fire duration = 15 hoursBurnt vehicles : 16 HGVs + 24 PCs
Fire duration = 15 hoursBurnt vehicles : 16 HGVs + 24 PCs
3 months to reopen
ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL FIRE(24 October 2001)
ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL
ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL OPERATION
• 2 control centreseach responsible in turn(every two weeks)
• A rescue team at each portal2 x (4 people + vehicles)
• Detailed instructions
• Annual exercises
ORIGIN OF THE FIRE
A HGV losses control and crosses the carriageway
PROGRESS OF THE FIRE
� Fire starts very quickly
� Firefighters arrive very fast from South but cannot control fire
� The aiflow pushes smoke to North
� But before that, there was time enough for users to reach the emergency exits
USERS’ BEHAVIOUR
� The drivers of the crushed/burning HGVs flee
� Another HGV driver informs the control centre
� Passenger cars make U-turns and flee
� Passenger cars make U-turns but are blocked
� People escape through emergency exits
� People stay in their car or in the tunnel (or go back there) and die: 11 fatalities
THE TUNNEL AFTER THE FIRE
Re-opening after 2 months
What was learnt?
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
ORIGIN OF THE FIRE
Self-ignition
End-of-queue accident
Front-to-frontaccident
Lessons on fire risk
SIZE OF THE FIRE
Mean=30 MW
Max = 100-150>> 30 MW >> 30 MW
53 hours 15 hours 48 hours
EXTINGUISHING BY USERS
Did not try ? ?
EXTINGUISHING BY FIREFIGHTERS
Did not reach fire place
Arrivedtoo late
Did not succeed
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
Possibilities of extinguishing
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
Evacuation by car
OVERTAKING VEHICLES
Yes,successful
Impossible Yes(far from fire)
blocked tunnel
U-TURNS
French side:yes, no successblocked tunnel
Italian side :yes, successful
Impossible? Yes,-some=success-others = noblocked tunnel(⇒⇒⇒⇒ fatalities)
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
Perception of risk by users
STAYED IN THEIR CARS
27 people(dead)
2 people(dead)
several(dead)
CAME BACK FOR BELONGINGS
? 1 (dead) 1 (dead)
Fatal behaviours…
Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard
Operators’ behaviour
Italian side:No extraction According
to plans
(but no thorough,
independent investigation?)
French side:Other mistakes
Both sides: No exercise
Lack of communication
2 separate control centres
According to plans
(but no thorough,
independent investigation?)
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� The catastrophic fires of 1999-2001
in alpine road tunnels:Mont-Blanc, Tauern, St Gotthard
���� Fires in rail / metro systems
Catastrophic fires in rail/metro tunnels too:
- Channel Tunnel (1996 & 2008): no fatality but very serious damage
- Kaprun funicular tunnel (2000):155 fatalities
- Daegu metro (2003):196 fatalities
- Etc.
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
Your questions…
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� at the national level
���� at the European level
���� at the international level
France / Italy���� joint investigation into Mt Blanc fire
France���� check of all road tunnels > 1000 m (40)���� check of important rail tunnels (32)���� new regulation road tunnels (August 2000)���� new law road, rail, metro (January 2002)
Switzerland����Tunnel Task Force
Austria, Norway, etc.
���� Need for consistency!
In / just after 1999
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� at the national level
���� at the European level
���� at the international level
United NationsEconomic Commission for Europe
(Geneva - 55 countries)
Ad hoc multidisciplinary group of experts
���� Report on road tunnel safety (Dec. 2001)(official recommendations – not compulsory)
���� Amendments to European agreements(more or less compulsory agreements, on: road traffic, road signing, dangerous goods, E-roads, vehicles, etc.)
United NationsEconomic Commission for Europe
(Geneva - 55 countries)
Other ad hoc multidisciplinary group of experts
���� Report on rail tunnel safety (Dec. 2003)
European Union
� Included Tunnel Safety in the calls for research projects/networks( 5th & 6th framework programmes)
European research projects / networks
D•A•R•T•S
European Union
� Included Tunnel Safety in the calls for research projects/networks( 5th & 6th framework programmes)
� Not competent for policy on tunnel safety(subsidiarity)
But requested by the Head of States
� Topic not considered urgent in 1999-2001
But became a priority after the St Gotthard fire (Oct. 2001)
European Union
Legislation (compulsory) on tunnel safety:
� Road tunnels:Directive 2004 / 54 / EC of 29 April 2004
on minimum safety requirements fortunnels in the trans-European road network
� Rail tunnels:In the framework of the 2nd railway package
Technical Specification for Interoperability
European Association for Railway Interoperability
European Association for Railway Interoperability
European Railways Agency
AEIF, replaced by the European Railways Agency,was mandated by EC to lay down theTechnical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI)
���� TSI on ‘Safety in Railway Tunnels’
� Published in 2008, currently under revision
� Compulsory in new and upgraded tunnelson interoperable lines all over Europe
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� at the national level
���� at the European level
���� at the international level
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)
Road tunnels: NFPA 502
� Became a standard:Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways
� Successive editions have followedinternational developments
� Last edition = 2011
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)
Rail & metro: NFPA 130
� Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
� Not limited to tunnels (open sections as well)
� Last edition = 2010
Committee on Road Tunnel Operation
30 countries5 working groups
World Road Association (PIARC)
International association - road tunnels
���� 130 experts
118 member governments> 2000 members
in 130 countries
PIARC Technical Committee on Road Tunnel Operation
Operation, Safety,
Environment, Equipment
25 reports published in 15 years
On-line PIARC Tunnel Manual
(all freely available on www.piarc.org)
+ 9 new reports (2011-2012)
Working party of infrastructure managers/operators:
���� Leaflet ‘Safety in Railway Tunnels’ (2003)
International association - rail tunnels
International Union of Railways(World organisation of railways)
� Tunnels between 1 and 15 km with mixed traffic
� > 50 measures described and analysed���� recommendations (≠≠≠≠ new and existing tunnels)
� Covers infrastructure, rolling stock and operation
� Inspired UN ECE report and SRT TSI
Working group:
���� Recommendations on safety in metro tunnels
International association - metro tunnels
International Association of Public Transport
� Gathers 64 member Nations (like AFTES)
+ 310 affiliate members
� Deals with all aspects of tunnels(and other underground facilities):mainly design and construction, but also operation, safety, etc.
� Agreements with PIARC, UITP, etc. to organise co-operation and avoid duplications
ITA - AITES (International Tunnelling and
Underground Space Association)
International association - all tunnels ITA Committee on Operational Safety in
Underground Facilities (COSUF)
� Initiated by European projects/networks to:- continue / deapen their activities- widen to international level
� Launched by ITA in cooperation with PIARC
� Deals with all kinds of underground facilities
� Main objectives:- create a worldwide network- develop research activities- promote safety underground
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
Your questions…
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
General consensus:
1. Prevention of critical events (����human life, environment, tunnel)
2. Reduction of consequences
Differences road ↔↔↔↔ rail/metro:
� Prevention ���� larger role for rail & metro
� Different ways to reduce consequences
1. Convergent objectives
Road tunnels (EU directive)
���� self-rescue���� intervention of road users���� emergency services
Rail tunnels (UNECE report)
���� mitigate the impact of incidents���� facilitate escape���� facilitate rescue
1. Convergent objectives
Reduction of the consequences of incidents:
2. Take the whole system into account
SAFETY
Users Operation
Vehicles Infra-structure
2. Take the whole system into account
���� a holistic approach!
� a ‘system view’ (UN ECE – rail tunnels)
� ‘all aspects of the system composed of the infrastructure, operation, users and vehicles’(EU directive – road tunnels)
Road tunnels:���� traditionnally, guidelines = infrastructure���� Mont Blanc, Tauern: importance of operations���� Swiss Task Force: users, vehicles
EU Directive provisions���� users + operation + infra + vehicles
Rail and metro tunnels:���� role of rolling stock and operation recognized
TSI ���� infrastructure + rolling stock + operations(users behaviour dealt with, but not as such)
3. Provisions for the infrastructure, operation, users and vehicles
4. Partial move from prescriptive to risk-based approaches
Traditionally: prescriptive standards
« A tunnel is safe if it is designed in line with valid regulations »
Advantages:���� Easy to use / to check
���� Uniformity in tunnels
Drawbacks:���� Choices are not optimal
���� Owners/designers/operators may forget to think about safety
Definition of a risk-based approach:
« A tunnel is safe if it meets predefined risk criteria »
Why no purely risk-based legislation today?
� Quantitative objectives - are difficult to establish- raise objections
� QRA tools are not (fully) reliable
� Authorities (often) do not trust QRA
� It may lead to very different provisions according to cases and experts…
4. Partial move from prescriptive to risk-based approaches
Several current standards provide for an intermediate approach (incl. EU road tunnel directive):
Risk analysis is a complement to prescriptive provisions
� To choose between alternatives
� To check general consistency
� To demonstrate safety in case of deviations from prescriptionsor cases not dealt with by prescriptions
4. Partial move from prescriptive to risk-based approaches
Before opening new or modified tunnel:
� Checks by independent experts
� Authorisation by safety authority
5. Provisions to check tunnel safety
During operation:
� Safety exercises
� Feedback from incidents and accidents
� Possibly periodic inspections
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
Your questions…
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
Your questions?
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
International approaches to tunnel safety
Responsibilities
Procedures
Safety measures
Directive bases & applicability
Based on���� UN ECE group of experts report���� PIARC (World Road Association) reports���� Pre-existing national regulations (eg. France)
Main novelties���� 1st plurinational tunnel legislation worldwide���� introduces the main components of
a Tunnel Safety Management System
Directive 2004 /54 /EC of 29 /4 /2004 on minimum safety requirements
for tunnels in the trans-European road network
Directive 2004 /54 /EC of 29 /4 /2004 on minimum safety requirements
for tunnels in the trans-European road network
� Applies to tunnels:���� on the Trans-European Road Network���� > 500 m
� Existing tunnels shall comply by 2014 / 2019���� 400 existing tunnels in 2004
� New tunnels shall comply from preliminary design
Directive 2004 /54 /EC of 29 /4 /2004 on minimum safety requirements
for tunnels in the trans-European road network
� Applicable only once transposed
into national legislation / regulations
� All EU members States (+ Norway & Switzerland)have transposed (except 7 with no tunnel on TERN)
� Most States have made the same or similar provisions also applicable to:
- tunnels > 500 m not on the TERN- and / or shorter tunnels
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
International approaches to tunnel safety
Responsibilities
Procedures
Safety measures
Directive applicability
����
� A single Tunnel Manager for each tunnelat each stage (design, construction, operation)
� The Tunnel Manager is responsible for the day-to-day operation and safety
(not explicitly written in Directive, but essential!)
Tunnel Manager (TM)
� Ensures that - all aspects are taken into account - all tasks are performed
(inspections, schemes and plans, risk-reduction measures, etc.)
� Authorises and can suspend / restrict tunnel operation
Administrative Authority (AA)
� Are imposed few requirements
� But mentioned 29 times in the directive!���� very important role
� Provisions relate to their:- information - training - possibilities of action - coordination with Tunnel Manager
Emergency Services
� Nominated by Tunnel Manager
� Independent
� Coordinates all preventive & safeguards measures
� Checks safety and takes part in exercises, analysis of incidents, etc.
Safety Officer (SO)
� Inspection entities:���� perform inspections, evaluations
and tests
� Experts:���� give opinion on safety
Technical expertise
Tunnel
AdministrativeAuthority
auth
ori
sati
on
TunnelManager
EmergencyServices
InspectionEntity
Safety Officer
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
International approaches to tunnel safety
Responsibilities
Procedures
Safety measures
Directive applicability
A very important tool: the Safety Documentation
� To be compiled by Tunnel Manager
� Describes all preventive and safeguard measures
� Includes all information important for safety
���� Communication tool between all players
���� Basis of all safety procedures
Directive 2004 / 54 / EC of 29 April 2004
SAFETY
DOCUMENTATION
Tunneldescription
Opinionof external expert
Op
erat
ion
al s
afet
y m
easu
res
Operational means / measures
*
* From commissioning stage
Dem
on
stra
tio
n o
f sa
fety
lev
el
Trafficforecast
Dangerous goodsrisk analysis
Specifichazard investigation
Any otherrisk analysis
** Once tunnel in operation
Emergency response plan
*
System of permanent feedback
*
List/analysisof exercices
**
Report/analyseson incidents
**
1. Procedures for new constructionand modifications
� Before construction starts:Safety documentation submitted to AAThen design approved by competent authority
� Before tunnel is opened to traffic:Authorisation of AA
� Substantial modifications of the tunnel:Authorisation by AA before reopening to traffic
� Other modifications of the tunnel:Opinion of Safety Officer
2. Procedures once tunnel in operation
� Safety documentation to be keptpermanently up to date by Tunnel Manager
� Significant accidents and incidentsto be reported within 1 month to AA and emergency services
� Exercises to be jointly organised by TM and emergency services with Safety Officer
� Periodic inspections at least every 6 years���� measures must be taken if not satisfactory
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
International approaches to tunnel safety
Responsibilities
Procedures
Safety measures
Directive applicability
� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system composed of
Basis for deciding on safety measures
Users Operation
Vehicles Infra-structure
� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system
Basis for deciding on safety measures
� Minimum requirementswith some derogation possibilities
���� Infrastructure requirements for existing tunnels ≤≤≤≤ new tunnels
���� Operationrequirements for existing tunnels ≡≡≡≡ new tunnels
� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system
Basis for deciding on safety measures
� Minimum requirementswith some derogation possibilities
� Risk analyses
���� To justify alternative measures (derogations)
���� When tunnel has special characteristics
���� Before regulations on DGs are set / modified
include a Specific Hazard Investigation
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� Terminology and methodologies
���� Dangerous goods transport
���� Lessons on risk analysis
Based on PIARC reports (2008 & 2012)
What is risk analysis?
� A big family of - different approaches, methods, models- combining various components- for specific tasks
� A systematic analysis of sequences & interactionsin potential accidents
� Thereby identifying weak pointsand recognising possible improvements
� Risk analysis can attempt to quantify the risk
What is the purpose of risk analysis?
� To check general consistency of safety planning
� To choose between alternatives
� To demonstrate safety in case of deviations from prescriptions
� To optimise safety planning in terms of cost-effectiveness
� To assess safety in the framework of a performance-based approach
Risk Assessment Process
Two types of risk-based approaches
1. Scenario-based approach
Types of risk-based approaches
1. Scenario-based approach
� Optimisation of design
� Check consistency of all safety provisions
� Detailed investigation of specific problems
� Planning of emergency response measures
Types of risk-based approaches
1. Scenario-based approach
2. System-based approach
Types of risk-based approaches
1. Scenario-based approach
2. System-based approach
���� Risk indicators for an overall system:
� Evaluation of different safety measures
� Comparison with other cases(or acceptance criteria)
Methodological components used at each step
Examples of methods(not aimed at dangerous goods )
� France: Specific Hazard Investigation(scenario-based approach)
� Greece: Specific Hazard Investigation(very similar to France)
� Austria: TuRisMo model(system-based approach)
� Netherlands: both- scenario analysis- and system-based model (RWSQRA)
Examples of methods(not aimed at dangerous goods ))
� Italy: IRAM - Italian Risk Analysis Method(system-based approach)
� Germany: System-based approach
� …
A little more on the Italian method(as an example among others)
� Compliant tunnel (with Directive, not special
case): no risk analysis
� Non-compliant tunnel (or special case):
perform risk analysis (IRAM)
1. Compare EV (average number of fatalities/year)with « standard » (directive-compliant) tunnel ���� if lower: acceptable, stop here
if higher: next step
2. Compare tunnel F-N curve with criteria fixed by law
A little more on the Italian method(as an example among others)
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� Terminology and methodologies
���� Dangerous goods transport
���� Lessons on risk analysis
����
Dangerous goods
Tunnels
� Very low accident probability
� But possible catastrophic consequences
� Very high psychological impact
Dangerous goods
Tunnels
Decide if / which DGs can go through
If DGs allowed,reduce risks
Apply decision���� regulations
Joint OECD/PIARC projectTransport of dangerous goods
through road tunnels
From 1995 to 2001:
� Harmonisation of tunnel regulations
� Rational decision process
� Risk reduction measures
Basis for an harmonised regulatory system for DGs in road tunnels
Rational approach to risks in tunnels:
1. Explosions:- "Very large" explosion (e.g. hot BLEVE)- "Large" explosion (e.g. cold BLEVE)
2. Large releases of toxic gas(or volatile toxic liquid)
3. Large fires
Above order corresponds to:- Decreasing consequences- Increasing effectiveness of mitigating measures
Principle of tunnel categories
Category A No restriction
Category B Restriction for cargoes with a risk of very large explosion
Category C Restrictions of category B + for cargoes with a risk of largeexplosion or large toxic release
Category D Restrictions of category C + for cargoes with a risk of large fire
Category E Restriction for all DGs
Risk Assessment and Decision Process
• Principles for the decision:
� based on comparison of various alternatives
� taking into account tunnel and detour routes
Other data+political preferences
Choice of alternativeDSMQRA
modelRisk
indicators
Data
• Structure of recommended process
Development of a DG QRA model
� A system-based risk analysis model���� Societal risk: F-N curves for users / neighbours ���� Individual risk (neighbours)���� Damage to the tunnel, to the environment
� Applicable to a route including (or not) a tunnel
� Based on 13 scenarios - representative of each of the 5 tunnel categories
(but cat. D and E cannot be distinguished: similar risks)
- probability and consequence models imbedded
� Available from PIARC (500 euros)
United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe(located in Geneva; gathers 55 countries;
manages ADR: European Agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road)
� Group of experts on road tunnel safety(Report December 2001: recommended all OECD/PIARC proposals)
� WP 15: Amendments to ADR for tunnels(Compulsory since 1st January 2010; based on OECD/PIARC proposals)
Tunnels: category is compulsory
� Any restriction to DGs in a tunnel⇒⇒⇒⇒ assign the tunnel to a category
(A to E: those proposed by OECD and PIARC)
� Category may change according to hour / day
� Categories must be signed:- Category A: no sign (no restriction)- Other categories:
BBBB CCCC DDDD EEEE
DG vehicles: tunnel restriction code
� each DG vehicle gets a « tunnel restriction code » (B to E)
� a DG vehicle can only pass through tunnel categories before its restriction code(in the alphabetical order)
E.g. - a vehicle with code C
���� only through tunnel categories A and B
- a vehicle with code E
���� only through tunnel categories A, B, C and D
UN No. 1073 : refrigerated liquefied oxygen
ADR : tunnel restriction code C
?No
sign
BBBB CCCC DDDD EEEE
Current DG risk assessment practice
Example of the Alpine countries(cover a very large majority of the TERN tunnels)
� 4 countries use very similar approaches, based on specific assessment of DG risk: AT, CH, DE, FR
� Italy does not assess DG risk separately
���� First examine AT, CH, DE, FR methodologies,then IT approach
Common features (AT, CH, DE, FR)
� Progressive development of methods:- FR started first (published in 2005; ongoing revision)- Parallel developments in AT, CH then DE
(all to be finalised soon)
� Step-by-step process - First step(s): quickly deal with low-risk cases
(identify those which do not deserve detailed analysis)- Next step(s): only for tunnels with significant risk
� Based on a system-based risk analysisfollowed by evaluation of Expected Values (EV)
and possibly F-N curves
� Using the OECD/PIARC QRA modelat least for some steps, possibly with adjustments
Summary of AT methodology
� Step 1: Classification matrix
EV threshold value = same as FR = 10-3 fatality / year
Summary of AT methodology
� Step 1: Classification matrix
� Step 2: Detailed approach (OECD/PIARC model)
Step 2a: Comparison with acceptance F-N curve
Category A
Category A
Step 2b: Idem with additional measures
Category A
� Step 3: Comparison with alternative routes
Similar to FR approach Category B, C, D, E
The IT approach to DGs in road tunnels
� DGs are not considered separately
� DGs included in a global risk acceptance criterion ���� F-N curve proportional to 1/N ���� Applicable per tunnel (whatever its length)���� Cumulates fires and DG accidents ���� Road accidents are excluded
���� DG restrictions (choice of category B, C, D, E)are only one measure among others to reduce global risk if needed
Conclusions on DG transport in tunnels
� Harmonisation of DG tunnel regulations: a large progress for DG transport organisation and safety(even though the system is indeed complex!)
� Decision making processes:. diverse . but rational and based on risks
Differences reflect different national risk cultures���� harmonisation is not envisaged,
and not necessary
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
International approaches to tunnel safety
���� Terminology and methodologies
���� Dangerous goods transport
���� Lessons on risk analysis
Lessons drawn on risk analysis
1. As they provide a structured & transparent
assessment of risks,
Risk-based approaches are a valuable complement to prescriptive requirements
2. No method is today the most suitable in all cases:
Possibilities for harmonisation are limited
3. General guidelines could be developedto ensure appropriate use of risk analysis
4. Uncertainties are high due to the limited data and
modelling techniques
���� results of quantitative risk analysis mustbe interpreted as orders of magnitude
���� risk evaluation by relative comparisonmay improve robustness of conclusions
Lessons drawn on risk analysis
1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires
2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety
3. Current trends
4. Example of the EU Directive
5. Risk analysis for road tunnels
6. Conclusions
Your questions…
International approaches to tunnel safety
� The 1999 (and other) fires have showed that:- Existing tunnels are of concern (also) - Safety is not ensured by infrastructure (only):operation, users, vehicles must be considered
� A profusion of initiatives have taken place:- Research, syntheses- Recommendations, legislation
� Many documents are available:
A huge work has been done since 1999
Consensus is being achieved on
� Safety objectives 1. Prevention2. Reduction of consequences
� Holistic approach users, operation, infrastructure, vehicles
� Risk analysisto complement prescriptive provisionsto check global consistency
� Feedback from experienceto improve safety
���� All elements of a safety management system(best Example = EU directive 2004/54/EC)
6-YEAR VIRTUOUS
CIRCLE
CONTINUOUSVIRTUOUS
CIRCLE
Analysis of incidents
Exercise every year
Feedback from operation
Inspection and external point of view
every 6 yearsSafety
documentation
Safety measures
Riskanalysis
Technical reference system