Internal Politics of Non-state Groups and the Challenges ... · Internal Politics of Non-state...

Internal Politics of Non-state Groupsand the Challenges of Foreign Policy

Livio Di Lonardo Scott A. Tyson

Non-state groups

• Ungoverned Spaces (Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc)

• Haven for emerging groups

What are non-state groups doing?

1. Consolidate control of territory (Proto-state)

2. Next generation of terrorism (Global terror)

Foreign policy toward non-state groups?

Non-state groups

Foreign policy challenges:

• Pressing need to address evolving terrorist threats

• Uncertainty about ultimate goals

(Control territory, conduct terrorist attacks, etc.)

• Internal politics of non-state groups

(Presence of factions with different goals etc. )

• Forced to rely on actions (recruiting, extremism, etc)

Relevant literature: Arce and Sandler (2007, 2010);Berman (2006,2008,2009); Bueno de Mesquita(2005,2007,2008); Dragu & Polborn (2014); Lake (2002);Lapan and Sandler (1993); Overgaard (1994)

• What can the authorities in potential target countries learnfrom groups’ actions?

• Can target countries exploit internal divisions within groups toget rid of threats to national security?

• Does a more aggressive approach deter groups from planningterror campaigns?

• Are inflexible and committed strategies a better tool tocombat potential terror threats?

Model — Non-state Groups

Non-state Group

• Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction

• Each faction

Moderate: θi = 0Extremist: θi = 1

• Terrorism T and other political tactics L:

u(T , L | θi ) = θi · T + (1− θi ) · L

Preference Composition:

1. Cohesive (C ) — both extremist (µC )2. Divided (DE ) — led by extremist (µE )3. Divided (DM) — led by moderate (µM)

Non-state Group

• Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction• Each faction

u(T , L | θi ) = θi · T + (1− θi ) · L

Non-state Group

u(T , L | θi ) = θi · T + (1− θi ) · L

Non-state Group

u(T , L | θi ) = θi · T + (1− θi ) · L

Model — Target Country

Politician

• Uncertain of preference composition

• Wants to stop global terrorism

Military intervention

• BInary action: intervene or not

• Cost of intervention to politician: c

• Cost of intervention to faction: K

Model — Target Country

Politician

• Uncertain of preference composition

• Wants to stop global terrorism

Military intervention

• BInary action: intervene or not

• Cost of intervention to politician: c

• Cost of intervention to faction: K

Actions & Timing

1. Incumbent:

• Group endowed with a resource• Invest in global terror potential (r = 1) or no (r = 0)

2. Elite:

• Support incumbent (s = 1) or not (s = 0)• If r = 0 non-support depreciates resource by δ

3. Politician: Intervene or not

• Eliminates group q(φ+ s(1− φ))

4. If group survives, faction in control allocates group’s resources

Actions & Timing

1. Incumbent:

2. Elite:

Actions & Timing

1. Incumbent:

2. Elite:

Actions & Timing

1. Incumbent:

2. Elite:

Terrorism

Allocation (x , y , z) for final resources W Explicitly

Terrorism T

1. Local terrorism: β · y

2. Global terrorism: r · G (x)

• G (x) = γ + Γ(x)• Γ(x) — increasing, concave• γ lone-wolves

Terrorism T (x , y) = rG (x) + βy

Other political tactics

• L(z) — increasing, concave

Terrorism

Terrorism T

1. Local terrorism: β · y2. Global terrorism: r · G (x)

Terrorism

Terrorism T

Terrorism

Terrorism T

Substantive Restrictions

1. Intervene against known threats

• c ≤ qφΓ(x∗)

2. Extremist factions interested in conducting global terrorattacks

• G (x∗) > 2β

3. Intervention imposes large costs

(a) Factions: K ≥ K(b) Politician: c ≥ cCost Cutoffs

• c ≤ qφΓ(x∗)

• G (x∗) > 2β

• c ≤ qφΓ(x∗)

• G (x∗) > 2β

What are the Primary Forces?

Fact 1

Without recruitment, the elite faction supports if and only if thegroup is cohesive.

Ideological differences lead to internal divisions

Fact 2

If the group is divided and the incumbent recruited, then the elitesupports iff support deters intevention.

Intervention can unify an otherwise divided group

Fact 3

Extremist incumbent of a divided group has a dominant strategy torecruit.

Effect of lone wolves on leaders of organizations

Fact 1

Fact 2

Fact 3

Fact 1

Fact 2

Fact 3

Persistent Uncertainty

Proposition 1

There does not exist a fully seperating PBE.

Politician can’t learn perfectly the ideological composition ofthe group

Factions choose their actions to generate uncertainty

• Extent of uncertainty depends on c

Foreign policy with regard to non-state groups always achallenge

Proposition 1

Reluctant Politician

Proposition 2

When the politician is reluctant to intervene (c ≥ c), then thereexists a unique semi-separating PBE where only extremistincumbent recruits, no elite supports.

Recruitment signals ideology of incumbent

• Moderate wants to signal they’re moderate

• Extremist wants to mimic moderates

Cohesive extremist groups strategically project image ofinternal division

Proposition 2

A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing

Proposition 3

There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate andextremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremistelites support. If c < c, it is unique PBE.

Politician intervenes if the group is divided

• Incumbents exploit this to quell internal disagreement

What about moderates?

1. Moderate elites support extremists2. Moderate incumbents recruit

Threat of intervention provides a common ground

Proposition 3

1. Moderate elites support extremists

2. Moderate incumbents recruit

Proposition 3

Committed Strategies and Red Lines

Might the politician do better commiting to strategies lessresponsive to manipulation by non-state groups?

Two strategies:

I. Commit to never use interventionII. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force

Proposition 4

1. Reluctant politician: Does not benefit from I. Only benefitsfrom II if c is not too high.

2. Willing politician: Better off committing to I and II.

Reluctance to use military intervention is a strategic advantage

• Harder to exploit by non-state groups

Two strategies:

I. Commit to never use intervention

II. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force

Proposition 4

Two strategies:

Proposition 4

Two strategies:

Proposition 4

Two strategies:

Proposition 4

Two strategies:

Proposition 4

Summary

Uncertainty and internal politics of non-state groups presentchallenges for foreign policy

Factions exploit, and benefit, from this uncertainty

• Cohesive groups project an image of divisions• Moderates project an image of extremism to quell

challenges

Hawkish politicians are better off by drawing red lines

A dovish position can be a strategic advantage

Summary

challenges

Summary

challenges

Thanks!

Optimal Allocation

In the final stage of the game, for each preference type θj of theleader, the optimal allocation a∗(θj | r) is

(i) A moderate leader (i.e. θj = 0) invests all resources intonon-terrorist political tactics, i.e. a∗(0 | r) = (0, 0,W ) for allr ;

(ii) An extremist leader (i.e. θj = 1), following no recruitment(i.e. r = 0), invests all resources into local terror, i.e.a∗(1 | 0) = (0,W , 0);

(iii) An extremist leader (i.e. θj = 1), following recruitment (i.e.r = 1), invests resources both in campaign of global and localterror, choosing a∗(1 | 1) = (Γ−1

x (β),W − Γ−1x (β), 0).

Cost Restrictions

• K = max{(1− q)(Γ(x∗) + β(1− x∗)), (1− q)L(1)}

• c = (µC + µE )φqΓ(x∗)

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