Intergovernmental Relations in Canada - The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism by David Cameron...

7/29/2019 Intergovernmental Relations in Canada - The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism by David Cameron and Richard Simeon

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Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative FederalismAuthor(s): David Cameron and Richard SimeonSource: Publius, Vol. 32, No. 2, The Global Review of Federalism (Spring, 2002), pp. 49-71Published by: Oxford University Press

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IntergovernmentalelationsnCanada:The Emergence f CollaborativeFederalism

David CameronUniversityfTorontoRichardSimeon

UniversityfToronto"Executiveederalism"r 'federal-provincialiplomacy"as longbeen onsideredhedefiningcharacteristicfCanadian federalism, hich ombinesederalismnd Westminster-styleabinetgovernment.owever,heserocessesave ome nderncreasingtressnrecentearsrom numberfforceshat ave ffectedhe aturendconductffederalismnd ntergovernmentalelationsn Canada.Executiveederalismasnotbeen isplaced,uthas beenncreasinglynformedy set f racticeshatwe all"collaborativefederalism,characterizedorey he rinciplef o-determinationf road ationalpolicies atherhanby hemore raditionalatternffederal-leadership.The centralobjectiveof this rticle s to describe and explain recentchanges in federalism nd intergovernmentalelations n Canada at the

beginningof thetwenty-firstentury."Executivefederalism" r "federal-provincial iplomacy" aslongbeen consideredthedefining haracteristicofCanadian ntergovernmentalelations, ithtscombination ffederalismandWestminster-styleabinetgovernment.In recentyears, herehavebeen someimportanthanges ntheconductof federalism and intergovernmental elations in Canada. Executivefederalism asbeen increasinglynformed y setofpractices hatwe call"collaborativefederalism," haracterized more by the principle of co-determination f broad national policies thanbyeither the Ottawa-ledcooperative federalism of the post-WorldWar II period or the morecompetitive ederalism f laterperiods. While co-determinationn theCanadian context enerallynvolves hetwo rders fgovernment orkingtogether s equals,itcan also entailprovincial nd territorialovernmentstaking he nitiative n their wn-acting ollectivelyn the absence ofthefederal overnment-toormulate ationalpolicy.Adherents fcollaborativefederalismmostly rovincial overnmentsnd their upporters)view hegovernanceof Canada as a partnership etween twoequal, autonomous,andinterdependentrders fgovernmenthatjointlyecide national olicy.AUTHORS' NOTE: We wish to express our appreciation to the Canadian Centre forManagementDevelopment nOttawafor ommissioning largerworkfromwhichmuchof thethinkingn this rticleisderived, nd to themany olleagueswhose commentshavehelped us refine ur analysis.

? Publius:TheJournalof Federalism32:2 (Spring2002)49

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50 Publius/Spring002AlthoughOttawadoes not generally hare thisview of the nature of thenationalpolicymakingrocess,nseveral fthecases citedbelow, hefederalgovernmenthas been drawn into a process that is premised on thisassumption.'Afterummarizingevelopments ithin anadianfederalisminceWorldWar I,we describe heemergent attern nd explain tsorigins, unctions,and practices.Weconclude with n assessment nd evaluation. How doesthispatterndiffer rompast practiceof intergovernmentalelations;howrobusts t; s t ikelyobe extended o additionalpolicy reas;and what reitsconsequencesfor ffectivend democratic olicy-making?

TRENDS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSSeveralcaveats hould be made clear at the outset.We are notpositingdramatic reakwith hepast;the distinctiveattern hatwe describehas itsroots n whatpreceded t.There s muchcontinuityn theevolving atternsof intergovernmental elations. The subject does not lend itself toanalytically distinct ideal types, nor is there a single pattern ofintergovernmentalelations. tvaries ccording o evel with irstministers'relationshipsmost dominated by strategicand status concerns) andaccordingto issue area. In some areas, a tradition f cooperationhasdeveloped; nothers,mistrustominates herelationship.The rhetoric f"trust"nd "cooperation," ound nmodern ntergovernmentalgreementsoften reflects spirationsratherthan reality.Furthermore, espite thegrowth fcollaboration, he nstitutionsf ntergovernmentalelationsnCanada remain, omparedwith ome otherfederations, elativelyd hocand under nstitutionalized.The volutionf ntergovernmentalelationsinceWorldWarIAs Canada has evolved, o have intergovernmentalelations.2 In thetwodecades after he end ofWorldWar I, the ntergovernmentalgendawasfocusedon theconstructionf the Canadian welfaretate.Thisprojectdeeply ngagedfederalnstitutionsecause,whilemost f tsmajor lementslaywithin rovincialurisdiction,much ofthepolicydesignand fundingcame fromOttawa.Nevertheless,hesystem daptedto thesenewrolesforgovernment ith ew hanges n theformal istributionfpower.The keypolicyinstrumentwas the federalspending power, exemplifiedbytheproliferationof shared-costprograms. Governmentswere relativelydecentralized, and close professionalrelationshipsdeveloped amongprovincial nd federalofficialsnd ministerswithin pecificpolicy reas.

'This wasclearly hecase, for xample,with he Social Union Framework greement."See, for example, Stefan Dupre, "Reflections on the Workability f Executive Federalism,"Intergovernmentalelations,d. Richard Simeon (Toronto: Universityf TorontoPress,1985), pp. 1-32;Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalismin theEighties,3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,1980); Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, State,Society nd theDevelopmentofCanadian Federalism Toronto:UniversityfTorontoPress,1990).



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Intergovernmentalelations nCanada 51"Cooperativefederalism"made the Canadian welfare tatepossible,whileconsiderablynfluencingtstiming nd itsdesign.3Duringthe1960s,thecountrymoved ntoa differenthase. Quebec'sQuiet Revolutionunleashed a progressive ationalismthat transformedQuebec and challenged raditionalssumptionsbout Canadianfederalism.This profoundlyaltered the intergovernmental genda, placing theConstitution t its heart. The growth f the public sector at both levelsmeant thatgovernments ere ncreasinglyikely obump ntoone anotherin the execution of theirmandates and in the pursuitof theirpoliticalambitions. Each order of governmentmoved into new areas of publicconcern,with ew onstitutionalonstraints o hold themback. Moreover,by the 1970s, a growingregionalism,particularlyn theWest,and anincreasing ssertivenessn theEnglish-speaking rovinces s theirbudgetsand bureaucraciesgrew elative othose of thefederalgovernment,ddedto thepressure.PierreTrudeau'sassumption ftheprimeministershipn1968sharpenedthe deologicalconflict etweenQuebec City nd Ottawa,and betweenOttawa nd severalwestern apitals. Provinceswere essandlesspreparedto defer ofederal eadership.The cooperative ederalismfthe1950s wassupplantedbya morecompetitive ynamic.

Federal-provincialonflict ame to a head intheearly1980s.On twokeyissues-theConstitutionnd energy olicy-the ederalgovernment,ed byPierre Trudeau, challenged both Quebec nationalism and westernregionalism.The federalgovernment'sNationalEnergyProgram NEP)and itsdeterminationopatriate heConstitution ith rwithout rovincialconsenthad an explosive ffect n intergovernmentalelations.These two initiativesforced fundamentallydifferent isions of thecountry-Ottawa-centered,rovince-centered,nd Quebec-centered-intopainful ublicdebate;they ivided hecountryegionally,ndposeddifficultquestionsabout thecharacter fCanada's politicalcommunities nd therole ofgovernmentsndefiningndshaping hem.Moreover,hese onflictschallengedthe status nd self-imagefgovernmentsnd political eaders,framinghe ssues nzero-sum erms ncircumstancesnwhichnone oftheparticipantsould afford olose. The publicwas drawn ntothesebattles,at thebeginning s a resourcefor hebattling overnmentctors nd, ater,as a participantn itsownright.By hemid-eighties,he ntergovernmentalgendahadchanged nceagain.Building n electoral oalition hat ncludedall sections fthecountry,heProgressiveonservativeovernmentfBrianMulroney romised new eraoffederal-provincialarmonynd cooperation. The NEP wasdismantled;provinceswereclosely onsultedn thegovernment's ajorpolicynitiative,thenegotiationf free-tradegreement ith heUnited tate; ndprovincialgovernments ere atfirstnsulated rom ederal ffortst cuttingnational3Keith anting, ederalismnd theWelfaretate nCanada,2nded. (Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress,1987).



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52 Publius/Spring 002spending.Mulroney'smajorachievementwas to secure theagreementofall Canadiangovernmentso theMeechLakeConstitutional ccord 1987),designedtobringQuebec back ntothe"constitutionalamily"y ccordingrecognition f tsdistinct tatuswithinCanada.Toward heend ofthis eriod,however,heMulroney overnmentmadea seriesof decisionsthat ontradictedtsemphasison regionalequity ndits commitment o intergovernmentalollaboration,thusunderminingfederal-provincialarmonynd accentuating nter-regionalivalries.4Citizenoppositiontoexecutive ederalism rew uring hisperiod. Thepassionatedebatessurrounding atriation nd theadoptionof a CharterofRights nd Freedoms n 1981-1982hadfundamentallyhangedattitudestoward heConstitution; o longerwas t a matter fgovernmentsortingout urisdiction;now twasabout citizens nd theirrights. fthiswasso,thenwhatrightdid "elevenmen in suits" have to shape the CanadianConstitution? However, the negotiation of the Meech Lake Accordexemplified he old pattern f executivefederalism. twasdeveloped insecret, mongheadsofgovernment, ith hepublicdeliberatelyxcluded.OnlyRobert Bourassa's federalist uebec government eferred he draftagreement o the egislature efore twassigned nfinal orm.Despitethesupport fvirtuallyll Canadian elites, ground wellofpublicoppositionpavedtheway or tsdefeat n1990.5 Twoyears ater, fter process hatdidattemptto engage citizensmore directly, nother intergovernmentalagreement, he Charlottetown onstitutionalAccord,was defeatedin anationalreferendum."Governmentsameunder ntensepressure omaketheirrelationshipsmore open, transparent,nd participatory.Severalprovinces passed legislation to require popular approval of futureconstitutionalhanges.Citizenmobilizationnday-to-dayntergovernmentalrelations ince thenhas been muchmoremuted,but governments avehad to take accountof the demand fortransparencynd accountabilitystheyhave movedtoward he more collaborativemodel.A second consequence ofthe constitutional ailures fthisperiodwastherealization hat undamentalonstitutionalhangewasprobably eyondreach. Withthefatigue nd frustrationhatfollowedyet notherfailure,politicalleaders and citizens turnedawayfrom uch inherently ivisiveexercises to focus on "makingthe federationwork,"finding olutionsthroughhe nformaldaptation fwhathadalready roved highly lexible

4Among hemany xampleswenote ust a few: decision toaward the maintenancecontract or heCanada CF-18military ighter o Montreal nstead ofWinnipeg;a cap placed on thegrowth f federalpayments o thewealthierprovincesunder the Canada AssistancePlan,which entailed sharingof thecostsofwelfare;mmigration, hereQuebec reachedan unusually dvantageous greementwithOttawa,and whereprovinces nd municipalitieswereleft to deal withthe economic and social challengesofintegrating new immigrants.5SeeRonaldL.Watts' iscussion: Canadian Federalismnthe1990s:Once More nQuestion,"Publius:TheJournal ofFederalism21 (Summer 1991): 169-190.6Robert . Vipond,"SeeingCanada ThroughReferendum: till House Divided,"Publius:TheournalofFederalism 23 (Summer 1993): 39-55.



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 53regime,rather than throughconstitutional hange.' This was a majorimpetusforthe movetoward morecollaborativemodel.Intergovernmentalelations fterharlottetown

Changes in governments nd political leadership along with fiscalpressures lso contributed o the shift. In 1993,Jean Chretienand theLiberalstookofficenOttawa. Chretien s a pragmatic oliticianwhohadbeen burnedbytheConstitutionn thepastand whoseeverynstinct as togovern n a low-key,ractical, tep-by-stepashion, schewing deologyordramaticgestures. In 1994, the PartiQueb6cois (PQ) underJacquesParizeau tookpower nQuebec City, isplacing hefederalist iberals. Thisset the stageforthe drama of the 1995 referendum n sovereigntyndsoured intergovernmentalelations. The PQ had little nterest nworkingwith thergovernments.twould takewhatever asavailable, ndcomplainabout the alleged injusticesvisitedupon Quebec, but would decline toparticipatenthemanagement f the ffairs fthefederationWhileLucienBouchard,Parizeau'ssuccessor sQuebec premier,howedgreaternterestin workingwith his provincialcolleagues, the basic postureof minimalparticipationwassustained, s it has been with heresignation fBouchardand the accession totheQuebec premiership fBernardLandry n 2000.

Changewas also occuring ntheotherprovinces.Alberta remierRalphKlein,elected in 1992, initiated hewaragainst big governmentwithhissocialdemocraticNewDemocratic arty eers nneighboringaskatchewannot farbehind. In 1995,a Conservative overnment,ed byMikeHarris,tookpower nOntario,committed o a "Common SenseRevolution"'withdramatic utbacks, eregulation, nd restructuringfgovernment.BothHarris and Klein initially ocused on a provincial genda; theyhad littleinterestn developments lsewhere nCanada. Both soon discovered hatno firstministeran ignore ntergovernmentaloncerns, nd that itizensangered bypolicychange within he provincecould and would turntoOttawa to protecttheir nterests.9 Success on theirdomestic agendasdemanded some basic changes nhow the federal ystemperated.Bythe 1990s,thepoliticsoffiscaldeficitswas also driving he shift o anewmodel of ntergovernmentalelations. There wasnowa broadpublicand governmental onsensus thatpublic sector debt was too high,thatdeficits ad to be eliminated, nd that thepain associated withbringingfederal nd provincial inances ndercontrolwould have tobe borne. Allgovernmentsegan to addressthesefiscal oncerns,with ome mixofcost-cutting,revenue generation, privatization, efficiencymeasures, anddownloading.1'

7Seetheessays n Harvey azar, ed., Canada: The tate f he ederation,997: Non-Constitutionalenewal(Kingston:McGillQueen's Universityress,1998).'Modeled in largeparton the United StatesRepublican's"ContractwithAmerica."9This, espiteOttawa's ownaggressive eficit utting hat everelyffected heprovinces. Itwas mostevident n the healthcare field."'See CaseyVanderPloeg,Red nk V BackFrom he rink Calgary:Canada WestFoundation,January1998). This is thefourthn a series,whichcommencedin 1993.



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54 Publius/Spring002Central to Ottawa'sdeficit-reductiontrategy as whatmightbe calledthe exercise of the federal pending power n reverse.Utilizing his dis-spendingpower," hefederalgovernmentn 1995substantiallyeduced itstransferso theprovinces or ocialprogramsa reduction rom 18 billionto a floorof$11 billion, ateradjustedto$12.5 billion, n federal upportforhealthcare,socialassistance, nd higher ducation). Federal transfersundertheseprogramswere rolled nto the newCanada Health and SocialTransferCHST), whichpromised reater reedom rom ederal onditions(though those under the Canada Health Act remained, as did theprohibition gainstrestrictingocial assistance n thebasis ofresidency).The broad national onsensus n themagnitude fthefiscal risismeantthat hese actionsdid not occasion the ntense ntergovernmentalonflictthatmighthave been expected nother ircumstances. he criticism eremutedrelative othedamage being nflictedn provincial udgets, houghas deficitpressureseased in the late 1990s, demands intensified orarestoration f earlierfunding evels. Second, Ottawa'spowerover theprovinces,ndcertainlyts egitimacy,erereduced longwith hereductioninfiscal ransfers.fOttawawas no longerpaying hepiper,whatright idithavetocallthetune?Third, hefederal utsfostered waveof"secondary

downloading"-reductionsn the transfersrom rovinces otheir gencies(i.e.,hospitals,municipalities,niversities,olleges, ocialagencies, chools,and thelike),and ultimatelyocitizens. The effects ffederal-provincialrelations husreverberatehroughout anadian society.The net effect fthis xperience (i.e., federalcuts,downsizing hecountry'social, health,and educational ystems,ndcopingwith hefull runt fthepublic nxietyand oppositionthat his ntailed)wasto nvest heprovincial overnmentswith strongerenseoftheir utonomy,heir esponsibility,nd their ightto udge, within heir pheresof urisdiction,whatthe national as wellastheprovincialnterest equires."THE EMERGENCE OF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISMThese developments et thestageforthestrengtheningf "collaborativefederalism,"heprocessbywhichnationalgoals are achieved,notbythefederalgovernment ctingalone or bythe federalgovernment hapingprovincial ehavior hrough heexercise f ts pendingpower, utby omeorall ofthe11governmentsnd theterritoriesctingcollectively.

'"Thomas Courchene, "ACCESS: A Conventionon the Canadian Economic and Social Systems,"Assessing CCESS: bTowardsNewSocial Union, d. Institute f Intergovernmental elations (Kingston,Ontario: Institute f ntergovernmental elations,1996), pp. 77-112 nd Andr6Burelle,Le malcanadien(Montreal:Fides, 1995), amongothers, dded a powerfulntellectual timulus.Globalization and fiscalcrisis,Courchene argued,weredrainingpowerfromOttawa downward o theprovinces nd upwardtosupranational nstitutions.Ottawa had neitherthe fiscal bilitynor the political egitimacy o set andenforce national standards. fthe Canadian "social union"was to be preserved, t could onlybe donethrough heprovinces ctingtogether.Provincesmustbe brought morefullynd formallynto thekeysocietalgoal ofpreservingnd promoting ocial Canada." Andrehurelleproposed a partnership asedon interdependence nidion-subordination."



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 55Itcantake wo orms.The firsts collaborationmongfederal, rovincial,and territorialovernmentsFPT in the urrent anadian ntergovernmentaljargon), seekingan appropriatebalance betweenfederal,provincial, ndterritorial olesand responsibilities. PT is based on thepremisethat llthesegovernmentsossess trong iscal nd urisdictional ools nd that s aresultof this nterdependence, ffectiveolicy depends on coordinationamongthem. The second is collaboration mong provincial nd territorialgovernmentsPT), withOttawaon the sidelines. This is based on theviewthatunder theconstitution, ealth,welfare,nd education are provincialjurisdictions. "National"policiesand standards n theseareas,therefore,are matters orprovinces o decide together; he centralgovernment oesnot have to do it. This developmentof some aspectsofnationalpolicythroughagreementsreached among autonomous but associated actors(provinces nd territories)ntroduced n elementof"confederalism"ntothe Canadian system.The collaborativemodel is also an alternative o constitutionalhange.Many of the issues unresolved in the failures of Meech Lake andCharlottetown have re-emergedin the intergovernmental rena-theeconomic union, the social union, "who does what"urisdictionally,ndthe spending power. Now, rather than being expressed in theuncompromising anguage of constitutionallauses,and enforcedbythecourts, they are to be expressed as intergovernmental "Accords,""Declarations," nd "Framework greements."The first oncreteexampleof thiswas theAgreement n InternalTrade(AIT)."2 WhenCharlottetown asdefeated,Ottawa'shopes to clarifyndextend itspowerswithrespectto theeconomic union wentdown with t.The federalgovernmenthereforenitiatedmultilateral egotiationswiththe provincialgovernments esigned to reduce internalbarriers o the

mobility fgoods,capital,people, and servicesn Canada. FirstministerssignedtheAIT in 1994,and itwasimplementednJuly 995. Although tsstructure nd content mirror he approach of international greementssuch as the NorthAmericanFree TradeAgreement NAFTA),it s a non-bindingpoliticalarrangement;tcontains,forexample,a formaldispute-settlementmechanism,but itsrulingsdo not have legal effect.A newInternal rade Secretariat asestablished, ut thasno significantuthorityand citizensdo not have direct ccess toit. Manyrestrictiveracticesweregrandfathered. Yet,consideringthe difficultyhe countryhas had inachieving morefullyntegratedconomicunion, ndprovincial esistance

'2Plans o mplement functionalonsolidation fCanadian stock xchanges, nnounced ntheSpringof1999,offer n exampleofthe xtent owhich ransnationalconomic ntegrations mposing disciplineon domestic,non-governmentalegulators,whether hegovernments ill t or not. The consolidationplanningwas undertaken y heexchangesthemselves,nrecognition fthe mperativesfworldfinancialmarkets,nd inseveral asesagainst hefirstreferencesf the relevant anadiangovernmentshemselves.See WilliamD. Coleman,"Federalism nd FinancialServices,"CanadianFederalism,ds. HermanBakvis ndGraceSkogstad Toronto:OxfordUniversityress, 001), pp. 179-196.



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56 Publius/Spring 002to any ncreasein federalpoweroverthe economy, heAIT is a notableintergovernmentalccomplishment;while its substantive rovisions reweak,it is a usefulfirst tep.'3 Itwasdevelopedwithvirtually o publicinvolvement. ew Canadians realized theagreementwasbeing negotiated;fewrealize t s now noperation.TheAIT reflectsome mportant imensions fcollaborative ederalism.It demonstrates that despite its constitutional responsibility forinterprovincialnd international rade,Ottawahasneither hepowernorthe egitimacyo define nd enforce heCanadian economic union on itsown. An alternativepproach-todefinetherules n theconstitutionndmake themudiciallyenforceable-is lso impossible. Hence, negotiatedintergovernmentalollaborationbecame theonlyway o makeprogress.Identicalforces re at workwith espect othe"socialunion,"which lsofigurednthe gendaofCharlottetown.he socialunion, iketheeconomicunion, spredicatedon the dea that defining haracteristicf a unifiedcountrys a shared and common setofaspirations, tandards, nd normswith espect othebasic elements f ocialcitizenship.Aswith heeconomicunion, wo uestions rise:howwill ommonnational tandards e balancedagainst hevariations hat ederalismncourages, nd who sgoingtodefineand police the standards? n the case of the socialunion,a third uestionarises:how sthefederal pendingpower-whichiesat the base of Ottawa'sfiscaltransfers o the provincesand which was a crucial instrumentnconstructinghewelfare tate-to e exercised nd how s ttobe controlled?In thefaceof federal etreat,heprovincial overnmentsnd territoriestookthe nitiative. irstministersommissioned heirministersesponsiblefor ocial affairsodevelopproposals, nd an intensive eriodofministerialand officialmeetings ollowed.Thus,as they ame to termswith he newfiscal ndpolicy ealities, rovinces egantowork ollaborativelyo fashioncommonpolicy pproachesand undertakeoint initiatives,nd topresentcoherentproposalsto the federalgovernment.Theirevolving onsensus,evenwhen confrontedwith he indifference r oppositionofthefederalgovernment,rovedto be remarkablytrong, onsidering hediversityfinterests nd circumstancesepresented roundthe table.The intergovernmentaliscussions ulminated n February 999 whenOttawa and all the provinces except Quebec signed the Social UnionFrameworkgreementSUFA). ThisagreementxplicitlyndorsesOttawa's

'3Such ritics s Daniel Schwanenand RobertHowse,whileapplaudingtheAIT as a usefulfirsttep,argue that tneeds to be strengthened.See Daniel Schwanen,Drawing n Our nner trengthC.D. HoweInstitute ommentary,une 1996) and RobertHowse, SecuringheCanadianEconomic nion C.D. HoweCommentary,une 1996). Theyrecommend,for xample,that he Secretariat hould be empoweredtoanalyzeobstaclesto implementationnd torecommend olutions, hat he membergovernmentshouldvoteby ualifiedmajorityather hanby he consensus ystem urrentlynplace, that ccess tothedisputesettlementmechanism houldbe extendedtoprivate arties, nd thatpubliceducationon theexistenceand purposesof theAITshould be undertaken.See also MarkR.MacDonald,"TheAgreement n InternalTrade: Trade-offsorEconomic Union and Federalism,"CanadianFederalism,ds. Bakvis nd Skogstad,pp. 138-158.



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 57powerto spend in areas ofprovincialurisdiction. Butthispowercan nolongerbe exercisedunilaterally. ewjointprogramswillnotbe introduced,or existingones changed,withoutdue notice and substantial rovincialconsent. Provincial responsibility orprogramdesign and delivery saffirmed.SUFA containsthefollowing lements:a statement fgeneralprinciples; a mobilityprovision applying to the social-policy field;commitments espectingpublic accountabilitynd transparency; oticeprovisions;rules governingthe exercise of the federal government'sspending power; and procedures for dispute avoidance and disputeresolution. The agreement s to be reviewedwithin he first hreeyears.While this frameworkagreement is a considerable achievement ofcollaborativefederalism,t should be noted that the document remainsloose and general ncharacter,nd that heproofoftheagreementwillbefound n thecommitmentndfollow-throughheparticipatingovernmentsbringto its mplementation.The early ndications re not encouraging.Intensive iscussionon a widevarietyfpolicyfiles ontinues, utthere slittle ense ofa commitmento oint problem solving.The sovereignist government of Quebec joined the social-unionnegotiations n the summer of 1998, recognizingthat in the pendingprovinciallection ampaign,twouldhave omepolitical ifficultyjustifyingitsnon-participationnthe ntergovernmentalrocess. tdeclined,however,tosign heFebruary 999agreement n thegrounds hat fter eavy ederalpressure, he final ompromisefailedtoprotectQuebec's right ooptoutofnew sharedprogramswithout inancialpenalty,s had been agreed inearlierprovincial rafts.Quebec's absencemeansthat tcontinues omarchto a differentrummer, efactofnotconstitutionally."'The Social Union FrameworkAgreementis purelythe product ofparticipating overnments;twasnegotiated tmeetings eldbehind closeddoors, ndhada veryowpublicprofile.'5t was not until heFebruary 999meeting f firstministers, hich oncluded theagreement, hat he matterwasbrought eriously o the attention fCanadians. The agreement s aclassicexampleofeliteaccommodation.The massive ublicmobilization,so evidentnMeech Lake and Charlottetown,ad notbeen repeated. This

"Opinion on the French-speaking cholarly ommunityn Quebec is arrayed tronglygainsttheSocial Union Framework greement.The Government fQuebec commissioned numberof academicstooffer heir ssessments f theagreement; heywereconsistently egative.AlainNoel,a political cientistat theUniversit6 e Montr6al,makesthe critical rgumentverywell in "WithoutQuebec: CollaborativeFederalismwith Footnote?" paper presented tthe Saskatchewannstitute f PublicPolicyConference,PerspectivesndDirections: he ocial Union rameworkgreement,egina,3-4February 000).1'There is no questionbutthat he social-unionprocess asa provinciallyriven nitiative ntilthe aststage.There isdebate, however,bout whether he social union agreementorksmore to theadvantageofOttawa or theprovinces.The variety fways nwhich t has been interpreteds one of tsmorestrikingfeatures. See, for xample, thedebate between David Cameron,who arguesthatthefederal pendingpower ssubjectedtoregulation nd controlunderSUFAand constitutes good arrangement orQuebec,and Claude Ryan,who contendsthat UFAsharplyncreasesfederal cope for ctionunderthespendingpower nd isunacceptableforQuebec. DavidCameron,"The Social-UnionAgreement:ABackward tepforQuebec?" Globe nd Mail,9 February1999; Claude Ryan, The Agreement n theCanadian SocialUnion As Seen Bya Quebec Federalist,"nroads (1999): 25-41.



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58 Publius/Spring 002suggests hatthe stakes are lower, nd public engagement s less,whengovernmentseekaccommodation utsidetheconstitutionalrena.Despite the elitistprocess, the agreementdoes seek to respond todemocratic oncernsbyplacingconsiderableemphasison accountability,transparency,heneed toreport ack toCanadiansabout theperformanceof their ocial programs,nd thenecessityfsecuring ngoing nputandfeedbackfrom itizens nd interested arties. Some observersregardthecitizendimension s one ofthecentralpillarsoftheagreement.'6The AIT and the SUFA are the clearestexamplesofthe collaborativeapproach. Theyconstitute,nthewords fone seniorprovincial fficial,aworkplan forcooperationand a rulebookforcompetition.""7But ithasbeen manifestn a widevarietyf other reas as well.HealthCare

The designand funding fhealthcare nCanada hasbeen described sa "politicalfootballgame ... a sophisticated ne, playedby professionalstatebuilders na chargedatmospherenwhich hepolitical nd financialstakes are considerablyhigherthan theywere in the past."'" Provincesweredeeply ngry tthefederal utstothe CHST (thebulk ofwhichfundshealthcare), whilethe conditionsunder thefederalCanada HealthActremained in force,constrainingprovincialefforts o experimentwithalternative orms ffunding nd servicedelivery,ven as the federal hareof costswasdeclining apidly.n September 000, FirstMinisters'Meetingagreedon some commonpurposes,whileOttawaagreedtorestore totalof$23.4billion nfunding verthe nextfive ears.Thisadditionalfundingwasto be on anequal,per capitabasis, lleviatingne ofthemajorgrievancesofthe wealthier rovinces.In theircommunique,'9thefirstministers choed the anguageof theSUFA. They agreed on a common"Vision"ofproviding ublicly undedhealth care to Canadians "in a cost-effectivend fairmanner." Theycommitted hemselves o"collaborate" npromotingccess tohealthcare,wellnessprograms, rimary ealthcare,communityare,and other reas.They also committedthemselvesto clear performancemeasurement,accountability,nd reportingoCanadiansusing n agreedframeworkndcomparableindicators. (Significantly,his s to be monitorednotbythefederalgovernment, ut by"independent, hirdparty erification.") naddition, s with ther greements, prefatoryoteasserts hat Nothingin thisdocument shall be construed to derogate fromthe respectivegovernments'urisdictions."1'MatthewMendelson andJohnMcLean, "Getting ngaged: StrengtheningUFA ThroughCitizenEngagement," paper presentedat the Saskatchewan nstitute f Public PolicyConference,Perspectivesand Directions: The Social Union FrameworkAgreement, egina, 3-4 February 2000).'7Quoted n Bakvis nd Skogstad, ds., CanadianFederalism,. 11.'8AntoniaMaioni, HealthCareinthe NewMillennium," anadianFederalism,ds. Bakvis nd Skogstad,p. 101.'9Canadian ntergovernmentalonference ecretariat-News eleaseRef:800-038/004,11September2000.



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 59At the sameSeptember 000meeting, irstministers lso agreedto worktogether opromote arly hildhooddevelopment, ommittinghemselvestoreport nnually oCanadianson their nvestmentsndprograms, evelopa shared framework orreporting esults,nd the ike. The commitmentswerevague and open-ended,withno funding pecified. The agreementhad been prepared during extensive discussions among officials ndministers, ut it receivedonlybriefdiscussionamong the firstministersthemselves.Quebec signedthe healthaccord,but not the communiqueon early hildhooddevelopment.20Labor-ForcerainingIn somepolicy reas,collaboration sclosely ssociatedwithdevolutionofresponsibilitieso theprovinces.The clearest xampleis in the fieldoflabor-forceraining,n area of ong-standingomplexityecause itmergesthe federal responsibility or overall economic policywithprovincialjurisdiction vereducation. In 1996,Ottawaoffered owithdraw rom hefield. It would phase out its purchase of trainingand apprenticeshipprograms,nd provinceswereoffered esponsibilityor widesetof"activelabor market" rograms, longwith hefunding elated o them.Moreover,federalemployeesnow involved n these programswould move to theprovincial public services. The provinceswere offered the choice ofcontinued co-management"rcompletedevolution.Bilateral egotiationsfollowed, resultingin agreement with nine provinces and all threeterritories.Thistime, heexceptionwas Ontario.Agreement etween t ndOttawawasfrustratedy hebitter olitical, artisan,nd ideologicalrivalryetweenthe twogovernments,nd the reluctanceofthe 101 LiberalmembersofParliament romOntario toconcede money nd powertotheirprovincialarch-rivalsn Toronto. Fiveprovinces pted forco-managementlargelybecause oftheir wnweakcapacity o absorbthe newresponsibilities)ndfourforfull devolution. Ottawa nitially oughtto ensure thatprovinceswouldbe accountableto it fortheconductofthedevolvedprograms, utin theend, Ottawaagreed to allow oint federal-provincialommittees ooverseereportingnd assessment.This case illustrateswo mportant eatures fcollaborative ederalism.First, ftenoverallagreements re followedup with seriesofseparatelynegotiatedbilateraldeals. Second,this llowsfor onsiderable symmetry21CICS,News Release Ref:800-038/005,11 September2000. Anappended notesays, While haringthe same concerns on earlychildhood development,Quebec does not adhere to the presentfederal-provincial-territorialocumentbecause sections of t nfringe n itsconstitutionalurisdictionon socialmatters. Quebec intendsto preserve ts sole responsibilityordeveloping,planning, managing anddelivering arly hildhooddevelopmentprograms.Consequently, uebec expectsto receive ts hareofany dditional federalfunding or arly hildhooddevelopmentprogramswithout ewconditions." It isworthnoting hatQuebec is theonlyCanadian province ohavea universal, ublicly rovidedchildcareprogram or ll children ged 4 to 12, t a costtoparents f$5 perday. See LindaWhite, The ChildCareAgenda and the Social Union," CanadianFederalism,p. 105-106.



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60 Publius/Spring 002in the relationships hatdevelop-"checkerboard ederalism" s HermanBakvisputs t.2'TheEnvironment

The environments anotherarea in whichbothorders ofgovernmentexercise broad urisdiction. Despite strongmisgivings ya parliamentarycommittee,heopposition f eading nvironmentalroups, nd a SupremeCourtruling hat trengthened ttawa's bilityo use its riminal-lawowerin environmentalegulation,llgovernmentsagainexceptQuebec) signedthe Canada-Wide Accordon EnvironmentalHarmonization nd a set ofSub-agreementsnCanada-Wide tandards,nspectionsnd EnvironmentalAssessment"2nJanuary1998. The accord can be amended onlywithunanimousconsent, lthoughparties an withdraw ith ix-months otice.While expressing the commitment to "achieve the highest level ofenvironmentalualitywithin he context f sustainabledevelopment,"heprimarymphasis sonovercoming uplication nd overlapping y reatinga "one-window"etofdeliverymechanisms ywhich nygiven ervicewouldbe providedby onlyone order ofgovernment.The criteria or llocationofresponsibilities ere to be based on such criteria s proximitynd theability o meet client nd local needs.23Thus,the federalgovernment asdelegatedmost butnotall) of ts nvironmentalegulationnd assessmentactivities to the provinces. A similar "harmonized, collaborativeintergovernmentalpproach"has been adopted forotherenvironmentalissues, uchas implementing anada's environmentalommitments nderthe KyotoProtocol regardingclimate change (in which oil- and gas-producingprovinces re deeplyhostileto emissions tandards hatwouldaffect hese ndustries),nd thedevelopment f nationalstrategieso dealwith mogand acid rain. As MarkWinfield uggests, hesedevelopmentshavesharplyeduced ntergovernmentalonflictntheenvironmentalield."However,heir ositive ffectsn the actualprotection ftheenvironmenthave been far ess clear,"24 articularlyn lightof weakinfrastructurensome smallprovinces nd majorcutbacks n environmental nforcementactivitiesn others.Trade olicyInternational radepolicy-bothn respect o the NorthAmericanFreeTrade Agreement and to global bodies such as the World TradeOrganization-alsongagebothfederal ndprovincialnterestsndpolicies.International ommerce s a clear federalurisdiction, ut (unlikein theUnitedStatesorAustralia), heConstitution as been interpretedomean2For an excellent nalysis f this ase,see HermanBakvis, Checkerboard ederalism? abourMarketDevelopmentPolicy n Canada," CanadianFederalism,ds. Bakvis nd Skogstad,pp. 197-219.22CanadianCouncil ofMinisters ftheEnvironment, 998.23This nalysis s drawn fromMark S. Winfield, Environmental olicyand Federalism,"CanadianFederalism,ds. Bakvis nd Skogstad,pp. 124-137.21Ibid., 131.



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IntergovernmentalelationsnCanada 61that the federal power does not extend to imposing the terms ofinternational greementson the provinceswhen they nvolveprovincialjurisdiction.As nternational reaties ave movedbeyondtariffsobroaderissuesof ubsidies, rocurement,nd regulation fbusinesses, hepotentialimpactson theprovincesbecome wider.As a result, omeprovinceshavecalled fordirect articipationnCanadian negotiatingeams,mostrecentlyin possible discussion of a NorthAmericanenergyregime. Ottawahasrefused opermit his.Nevertheless, ttawahas takenconsiderablepainsto involvethe provincesfullyn tradepolicy, nd to consultcloselywiththem(and with ndustry) s agreements re being negotiated. As GraceSkogstad concludes, "The extensive efforts to build a domestic,interprovincialonsensus"haslent upport nd legitimacyo theoutcomes,and hasmeantthat ndividual rovinces re "less nclinedto takeunilateralefforts o secure bestpossibleoutcomes fortheirprovince t theexpenseof a coherentnational trade trategy."25These and other examples demonstrate the varietyof forms thatcollaboration an take, nd thevariabilityf tsoutcomes.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISMThe collaborativemodel has had an importantmpacton theinstitutionsof intergovernmentalelations. Perhapsthemost obvious is in the roleand positionof theAnnualPremiersConference APC). Initiated t theinstigationfQuebec in the1960s as littlemorethan a summer etreat orpremiers and their families, the APC has evolved into a significantintergovernmentalnstitution.ongovershadowedy hefederal-provincialFirstMinisters'Conference FMC), it has become moreprominent s thefrequencynd significancefthe FMCs havedeclined. Held everyAugustundera rotating hairmanship,his ssociationofprovinceshas become afull-fledgedntergovernmentalnstitution, rofessionallyupported byprovincial ivil ervants. he APC preparesand receivespositionpapers,issues ommuniques,nd launchesprojects o be undertaken y herelevantministers;talso has an on-going genda ofwork hat onnects ne meetingto another. The chair has assumed a substantive ole as thespokespersonfor hepremiers etweenmeetings. t was at one of thesemeetings hat hesocial-unionnitiative asbegun.In strikingontrast othegrowthftheAPC is thedeclining mportanceof the FMC. The set-pieceFMC,held in theNationalConferenceCentre,with irstministersurroundedbyphalanxesofministersnd officials,ndwith combination fpublicand privatemeetings hatwere so prominentfrom he 1960sto the 1980s,haverecently een absent,replaced byshortworking essions.

25"InternationalradePolicy nd Canadian Federalism:AConstructive ension?"CanadianFederalism,eds. Bakvis nd Skogstad,pp. 159-177.



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62 Publius/Spring 002Advocatesof collaborative ederalism ave often een the FMC as thepinnacleof the ntergovernmentalystem,esolvingonflicts t thehighestleveland providing irection othenetwork f ower evelmeetings,muchlike the Council of Ministers in the European Union. Numerouscommentators ave suggested hatFMCs be made at least annual events,andperhaps vengiven onstitutionaltatus.However, ewhavebeen calledsince the election of the Liberal federalgovernmentn 1993. This reflectsthe federalgovernment's uspicionthat a fullydeveloped collaborativemodel willundermine ts senior" tatus, hatFMCsprovide platformorpolitical ttacks n Ottawa, nd that hey levatepremiers rom rovincial

politicians o national decision-makers. he weakpresenceoftheFMC isone reasonwhy heAPC has takenon such an important ole.Another nstitutionalorum hat s assumingmuchgreater mportanceis the ministerialouncil,sometimes ederal-provincial,ometimes urelyprovincial.Such councils have existedformanyyears. Recently, owever,theirnumbershave increased,theyhave become more institutionalized,and haveplayeda more formal ole in carryingut mandatesassignedbyfirstministers. heyhave become the workhorses f thesystem,ssuminga centralrole in thepolicyprocess, ncluding, n some cases,developingclose relationshipswithrelated interestgroups. Councils now exist forministries oncerned with ocial-policy enewal,forestry,ransportation,education, nd theenvironment. thergroupings fministersobynamessuch asforums,ommittees,ndmeetings f"Ministers esponsible."Somemeetregularly,thers n an ad hoc basis.The Provincial/Territorialouncil on Social PolicyRenewalhas beenparticularlyctive.Actingunder the nstructions f thepremiers,ectoralministersnd officials evelopedpositionpapersand fashioned trategiesforthe considerationof the premiersand in preparationforfederal-provincial iscussion. The councilwasinstrumentaln developingSUFA,and itwillplay n important ole inhelpingto makeitwork.A keyquestion in this process is the legal and political status ofintergovernmentalgreements. Many of the most importantfederal-provincial rrangementsre not nfact ormal ontracts,houghtheymaylater be enshrined in federal and provincial legislation. Theintergovernmentalgreementshemselves, owever,renot egally indingor enforceable.This was made clear na recent upreme Courtjudgementthatrejected a provincial appeal againsta change in federalpolicybyassertinghesupremacy fthegovernment'sccountabilityo Parliament.Taken to ts imit,he ogicofcollaborationmplies hat overnmentshouldbe legallybound by intergovernmentalccords and thatthey hould beaccountable to each other. However,this is a major challenge in theCanadian constitutionalystem, hichrequiresthateach government eresponsible o tsown egislaturend thatgovernmentsannotbind future



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Intergovernmentalelationsn Canada 63legislatures. hus,there sa deep tensionbetween he ogicofcollaborativeintergovernmentalism and the logic of responsible parliamentarygovernment.

ASSESSING THE PATTERNOF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISMAlthough hecontent ndspecificityf ntergovernmentalrocesses ndagreements arywidely,urreview f everal ecent xamplesdisplaysomecommon threads.* The equalitybetweenprovinces nd Ottawa s underlinedby

the fact that most councils and meetings re co-chairedbyafederal nd a provincialminister.* The northern erritoriesf Canada-Yukon,theNorth WestTerritory,nd thenewlystablishedNunavut-are ow ntegratedwith heprovinces.Meetings reFederal/Provincial/Territorialor Provincial/Territorialespite the factthatthe territoriesremain onstitutionalffspringfthe federal overnment. hisevolutiontowardprovincial tatushas evokedremarkablyittlecomment, venthough thas some potentialforchangingthedynamicof intergovernmentalelationsbecause three morevoicesare added to thesixsmaller nd poorerprovinces.* The relative bsence ofQuebec. Usually tsrepresentativesparticipate in meetings, but the Quebec governmenthasdisassociated itselffromsome of the agreements. Quebec'spositionis that fields ike education,welfare, nd health areexclusive reas ofprovincialurisdiction, nd that heability fthe federal governmentto spend money in such areas isillegitimate. For Quebec, national standards and normsemerging romntergovernmentalonsensus re little etternprinciple hanfederalunilateralism. t isremarkable, owever,that uccessive nd6pendantiste remiers fQuebec havebeenable todevelopeffective orking elationships ith heir ellowpremiersdespite the fundamentaldifference ver Canada'sfuture.* Mostagreements tress hat he formal onstitutional owersassigned to governmentsremain unchanged; the goal is toexercise thesepowers ina coordinatedmanner."* Minimizing uplicationand overlapping n orderto achievegreater fficiencynd costsaving re universal hemes.*Consistentwith hedoctrine fthe "NewPublicManagement,"agreementsemphasize the need to share "bestpractices," o



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64 Publius/Spring 002developperformancendicators,nd to monitor esults.This smostevident n the text fSUFA.* Frameworkgreements eached among all governmentsreoftenfollowedby ndividually egotiatedbilateral greementsorby dditional ub-agreements.* All agreements pay lip service to the need for greatertransparencynd for clearer lines of citizenaccountabilitynintergovernmentalelations, ut citizen access to the dispute-settlement echanismsftheAIT and SUFA remain eryimited.*An increasingnumber ofagreements xplicitly cknowledgethe need to "engage stake holders"and to "build linkagestoother structures in the broad social and economicenvironment.'"26While thesedevelopments eflect greater egreeof nstitutionalizationin Canadian intergovernmentalelations,t simportant ot toexaggeratethechange. ComparedtoGermany r theEuropeanUnion,for xample,Canadian intergovernmentalelations emainhighly luid nd ad hoc. Theprocesshasno constitutionalr egislativease, ittle ackupbybureaucrats

linkedto the success of theprocessrather han to individual overnments,no formal ecision-rules,nd no capacity or uthoritativeecision-making.This meansthat he copeor extent f ntergovernmentalelations emainsheavilydependent on whetherthe firstministers, speciallythe primeminister,ind tadvantageous r not. The systemn this ense isfragile.27It sfar ooearly ojudgethe uccessofthisnewmodel. Indeed,differentactorsmaydefine "success"verydifferently.or some, theprocessitselfmight constitute success if it leads to more cooperation and lessintergovernmentalonflict.There is strong ublicopinion evidence thatsuggests itizenswantnot moreor esspowers or nyorderofgovernment,but"an end tothewrangling" etweenthem.Forprovinces,speciallyhemore ssertivenes, uch asOntario,Alberta,and BritishColumbia,successwill be measuredchiefly ytheir bility owrestlehe nitiativeromOttawa,imitOttawa's bilityo"intrude" n theirprogramsndpriorities,nd increase heir utonomyn sharedurisdictions.Forsmaller, oorerprovinces,utonomy illbe less mportanthan nsuringthe continued low ffederal ollars.Quebec,on theevidence, pproachestheemerging atternwith eep reservations,eeing dvantages o theextentthat tprovides llies n their idto constrainhegovernmentfCanada,butfearful hatthe extension f collaborative ederalismmight imply eplace

2See discussionnF. LeslieSeidle,"Executive ederalism nd Public nvolvement:ntegrating itizen'sVoices,"(paper presented to the Conference on The ChangingNature ofDemocracy nd Federalism n Canada,Winnipeg,14April2000).27Thissalso thecase inanotherparliamentaryederation, ustralia.Therea highly romisingxercisein intergovernmentalollaboration,the COAG process,effectivelyame to a halt when the nationalgovernmentwaschanged in 1996.



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Intergovernmentalelations nCanada 65Ottawa'soversightnd directionwith hecollective versightnd directionof the English-speakingrovinces. The SUFA is seen less as a provincialconstraint n the federal pendingpower hanas a re-affirmationf t.Success forOttawa ies in itsability o retain ts nfluence nd visibility,particularlyn an era of budgetsurpluses. It seeks to maintain inks tocitizens yproviding enefits irectlyo themrather han ndirectlyhroughtheprovinces. ndeed,some ofthefactors hat nitiallyed Ottawa oacceptcollaborative ederalism ave nowchanged. In the1990s,Ottawawasfacedwith fiscal risis hatforced t, ike it or not,towithdrawmassivelyrommany olicy reas, ncluding hedevolution fbothcosts nd responsibilityto theprovinces.Atthe same time, n the aftermath f the "near-death"experience of the 1995 Quebec referendum,Ottawa was anxious todemonstratets ommitmentocooperation.By henewcentury, ithargefiscal urpluses at least for hemoment),with uccessive lectionvictories,withnoviableoppositionon thehorizon, nd with slowbutsteady eclinein supportforQuebec sovereignty,ttawa ppears lesspreparedto takeaback seat to theprovinces nd moreconcerned to reasserttspresence nthe lives ofCanadians. Clearly, his ctivistmpulsewillbe shaped bythefallout from he tragedy f 11 September2001. On one hand, a slowingeconomymaybe pushedfarther oward ecession, husreducingOttawa'sscope for ction;on the otherhand,the rise ofsecurityssuestothetopofthe national genda putsthefocus quarely n matters alling learlywithinfederalurisdiction.In general, most governments take a pragmatic approach tocollaboration. Most seek to maximize their freedom of action and tominimizeexternalconstraints, iscal or regulatory; ome-especiallythefiscally eakerurisdictions-will e preparedto trade off ome autonomyin returnforadequate and stable financialassistance.Both Ottawaandthe provinceswill continue to guard their turfand to exploit everyopportunity o win credit and avoid blame. This historicdynamicofexecutivefederalismhas not changed, and it is a major reasonwhythecollaborativemodel sso fluid nd adhoc. Successfulollaboration ependson high levels of mutual trustamong the participantsand on theirinternalization f its mplicitnorms. Instead,there s some indicationofconsiderablecynicism mong officials t both levels withrespectto therhetorical romisesofcollaboration."Success"willbe definedvery ifferentlyythosegroups nd by itizensnot concernedwithfederalism r therelative tatusofgovernments,utratherwith ubstantive olicyand itsoutcomes. Theywillask: does thisprocessenhanceorimpedetheachievement fthepolicy bjectiveswe areinterested n? Answerswillvary, f course,depending on the group inquestion. To theextent hatgovernmentsan achievetogetherwhatnone



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66 Publius/Spring 002could do separately,o the extentthatthey an coordinate ntoa singlewholepoliciesand programs t all levels, nd to the extentthatthe costsand frustrationsof overlap and duplication can be reduced, thencollaborative federalism erves all Canadians. Moreover, t suggestsareasonablewayto balance the inevitable ensionbetweennational normsand standards n the one hand,and the desiretorespondto thespecificneeds,circumstances,ndpreferences fdifferentrovincial ommunitieson theother.However, here remanypotential oststothe collaborativemodel thathave been well described n the literature n theEuropean Union. The'joint decision trap"emergeswhen autonomous, nterdependent ctorscommittedo consensusdecision-makingeekto make decisions.The timeand costofcoordination an escalate;solutionsmaybe avoidedor simplyexpress he owest ommondenominator.28 he political nd institutionalconcernsof the actors-fortatus nd recognition, o win credit nd avoidblame-can dominate the substantivessues themselves. None of thesedilemmas s resolved asily.29Perhapsthe most cutechallengeconfrontingollaborative ederalism,aswith xecutive ederalismngeneral,30stheneed to meetthe democraticexpectations f citizens. These expectations ppear to outpace theverylimited dvances hathavebeen made to democratize heprocess, nd thereisnothingntheprocessofcollaborative ederalismhatwillmake this askanyeasier. KeithBanting,notingthatfederalism alues and democraticvalues reoftenntension, laims hatCanadiansocial-policyiscussioninceWorldWar I ismarked y the trongestorm f ntergovernmentalism-theco-determinationmodel." He warnsthat t is "worth emembering hedemocraticcritique of such potent intergovernmentalism.""' notherobserver, ogerGibbins, rguesthat ollaborativemodelswould, at east atthemargins, educe the role and effectivenessf legislatures,f politicalparties, lections, nterest roupsand the public. Theywould promotegovernmenthat s ess ccountable, nd inthat ense, essdemocratic."Thecombinationfdecentralizationndintergovernmentalismmoves ecisionsout of legislaturesnd intoforarelativelynsulatedfrompublic pressure,

28See FritzScharpf,"The JointDecision Trap: Lessons fromGerman Federalism and EuropeanIntegration," ublicAdministration6 (Summer 1988): 236-278.29For iscussion fthis ntheCanadian context, eeAlbertBreton, Supplementarytatement," oyalCommissionnthe conomic nion nd Canada's Developmentrospects,eport, ol. III (Ottawa:SupplyandServices, 1985); Steven Kennett,Securing he ocial Union:A Commentaryn theDecentralizedpproach(Kingston: nstitute f ntergovernmentalelations,1998).3"In 1979,Donald Smiley,hedean of Canadian students ffederalism,pened hiscritique fexecutivefederalism hisway: My charges againstexecutivefederalism re these. First, tcontributes o unduesecrecy n the conduct of thepublic's business. Second, it contributes o an unduly ow level of citizenparticipationn public affairs.Third, t weakens and dilutesthe accountability fgovernment o theirlegislaturesnd to thewiderpublic." "AnOutsider'sObservations f ntergovernmentalelationsAmongConsentingAdults,"Confrontationr Collaboration:ntergovernmentalelationsnCanada Today,d. RichardSimeon (Toronto: Institute f PublicAdministration fCanada, 1979)."KeithBanting, The PastSpeaksto the Future:Lessonsfrom he Postwar ocial Union,"Canada: TheState f he ederation,997,ed. Lazar,pp. 39-69,64.



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Intergovernmentalelationsn Canada 67partisandebate and electoral combat."32Manyothers, n Canada andelsewhere,xpress imilar iews.33ManyCanadian interest roups ndmovements-notablyhose ssociatedwith ocialpolicy nd theenvironment34havehistoricallyookedtofederalleadership, elieving heprovincesackeither he resources r thepoliticalwill otake leadingrole. Theyworrybout a possible rush o thebottom."Hence, they end to be skepticalof the collaborativemodel, seeing it asinherentlydecentralizing. In a carefully rgued rebuttal,Alain Noeldisagrees.He notesthat here re"conservativendprogressivergumentson bothsidesofthecentralization/decentralizationebate"and that TheCanadian welfare tate became better nchored than theAmericanone,largely ecause anada was a moredecentralized ederation."He concludes:"Betting verythingn elites and on central nterventions notonlypoortheory;t s also bad politics orthe eft."35A final ine of criticismees collaborative ederalism s littlemorethan"cartel felites," n whichfederal nd provincial overnmentsmanagethesystemn order to servetheir wn nterests, hilefreezing ut citizen ndgroup nterests. n thisview, hedanger s that ome of theprimaryirtuesof a federal ystem-innovation,xperimentation,ariety,nd competition-will be lost in an over-zealous earchforharmonization,onsistency,ndagreement.36

COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM: HOW DURABLE?Is thepattern fcollaborative ederalismikely obe a durable feature ftheCanadian federation? ome observers elieve that twas at root implya responseto thegrowing iscal ncapacity fthe federalgovernmentndthat it will rapidlydisappear withOttawa's returnto financialhealth.Certainly,he Government f Canada's budgetsof 1999 and 2000-flushwithnewrevenues-seemed osuggest return o an earlierperiod nwhichOttawaused itsresources oimposeconditions n transfersotheprovinces

32"Democratic eservations bout the ACCESS Models,"AssessingCCESS:Towards New ocial Union(Kingston:nstitutef ntergovernmentalelations, 997), pp. 43-44. See also SusanPhillips, The CanadaHealth and Social Transfer," anada: TheState f he ederation,995,eds. Douglas Brown ndJonathanRose (Kingston: nstitute f ntergovernmentalelations,1996), pp. 65-96; nd MargaretBiggs,BuildingBlocksor heNewSocial Union Ottawa:Canadian PolicyResearchNetwork, 996).33In heEuropean context, ee MarcusHoreth, The Trilemma fLegitimacy-Multilevelovernancein the EU and the Problem of Legitimacy,"Discussion paper C 11, Center forEuropean IntegrationStudies,RheinischeFriedrich-Wilhelms-Universitatonn, 1998), pp. 6-7.34See,for example, PatrickFafard,"Groups, Government, nd the Environment,"ManagingtheEnvironmentalnion:ntergovernmentalelations ndEnvironmentalolicynCanada,eds. Patrick afard ndKathryn arrison Kingston:nstitute f ntergovernmentalelations nd Saskatchewan nstitutef PublicPolicy, 000), pp. 81-104; nd RobertHowse, Federalism, emocracy nd Regulatory eform: SkepticalViewofthe Case forDecentralization," ethinkingederalism:itizens, arketsndGovernmentsna ChangingWorld,ds. KarenKnop et al. (Vancouver:UniversityfBritishColumbia Press,1995), pp. 273-293.35Alain oel, "Is DecentralizationConservative?"tretchinghe ederation,d. RobertYoung Kingston:Institute f ntergovernmental elations,1999), pp. 195-218.36This iew s expressedmostforcefully yAlbertBreton. See his Supplementary tatement,RoyalCommissionn the conomic nion nd Canada'sDevelopmentrospects,eport, olume III (Ottawa:Supplyand ServicesCanada, 1985).



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68 Publius/Spring002and tobolster tspublicvisibility ytransferringundsdirectlyo citizens(as in ts Millenniumcholarship" rogram) atherhan hrough rovincialgovernments.Past experiencehas shown that the federalism f publicaffluence an be at least as conflictual s thefederalismffiscalrestraint.Moreover, here s someevidencethat heemphasis n cooperation ndcollaborationmay ften e littlemorethanrhetoric. thas notyetbecomefullynternalizedn thewayfederal nd provincial oliticians nd officialsthink about each other. Indeed, even though the SUFA and otheragreements re full of commitments o "consultation," collaboration,""trust,"nd other uchsentiments,herealityften eems tobe high evelsofmutualdistrust nd deep unwillingnesso accept constraints n one'sfreedom f action. This is much more evident t the evel of firstministersand their entral genciesthan t samong ine ministersnd officials, hoare more likely to share policy goals and political constituencies.Intergovernmentalelationshavemanyof thecharacteristicsf two-levelgames, nwhich heparticipantsmust espondto two udiences. Yes,thereare oftenstrong ncentives o collaborate,but equally often,these aretrumpedbythe more immediate ncentives fwinning upporton one'shometurf.The final arrier o a deeper nstitutionalizationfcollaborativefederalism emains helogicofresponsiblegovernmentn a Westminstersystem.Governmentsmustremain accountable to their egislatures; heycannot be accountable to others. Hence, governmentsmay exchangeinformation, argain,cajole, persuade, threaten, nd even agree at anintergovernmentalonference, utthey annotbindeach other.Yetthere re reasonsto believethat ollaborative ederalism illremaina feature f thesceneinthefuture.One is thatCanadiansconsistentlyatecooperation among their governments as an important objective;collaborative ederalismn Canada emergedin partin responseto thatdemand. Another s thatearlierapproachesbased on federal eadershipand itsuse of thespending powerare no longeras feasibleas they ncewere. ndeed, Ottawa,recognizing hatthegame has changed,has madecommitmentsharplyimitingtsfreedom o act n the oldways.A thirdsthatthe achievements f collaborative ederalism-the IT and theSocial-Union Framework greement hief mongthem-make t more ikely hattheprocedurewillbe followednthefuture. here snow ome momentumbehind theapproach. Federal and provincial fficials eport hatSUFAisincreasingly eingfactored ntothecalculationsofpublic administratorsand interest roups. A fourth eason is thattheprovinces nd territorieshave learnedthatthey an makesignificant rogressbysetting heir wnagenda andworking mongthemselves.The inter-provincialynamics acounterpoint o thefederal-provincialelationship hat lassically efinedintergovernmentalismn Canada. The institutionalizationfthe AnnualPremiersConference nd ministerial ouncilsadds administrative uscle



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 69to thisdevelopment. A fifth eason is thatgovernments ave foundthattheycan achieve accommodationsthroughcollaborationon substantivepolicythat re impossible oachieve n theconstitutionalorum.More generally,he evolutionoftheCanadian federation verthe astfourdecades has been substantiallyefinedbytwopowerful orces:nation-buildingin Quebec and province-buildinglsewhere. Both forceshavehad a major mpacton thegovernmentfCanada and its bility o call theintergovernmentalhots. Although thas byno means been a zero-sumgame,thematuring fprovincial overnments as altered thebalance ofpowerwithin onfederationndhasredefined hemanner nwhichOttawacan seek to achieve itsobjectives. Collaborativefederalism its ogicallyintothebroaddevelopment fConfederation uring he astfourdecades.To say that collaborative federalism is likely to be a feature ofintergovernmentalelations n thefuture s not to saythat t willbe theonlygamein town.Manyofthethings hatmattermost oCanadians-andtherefore to the federal government-fallbroadly withinprovincialjurisdiction. Provinces ften ct quite independently f each other, ndwhenthere s coordination rparallelpolicy evelopment,tmay e a resultoftheneed torespond osimilar roblems rpressures,rsimplymulationof others' examples, ratherthan the result of explicitdiscussion andagreement. To the extentthatOttawa'sfreedomofaction is constrainedwhen t ntersnto ollaborationwith rovinces,twill eekother pproacheswhere ts bilityo actwillbe unimpeded.Forexample, nthefuture, ttawamight xploitevery pportunityo take nitiativesn thesocial-policyieldvia the tax systemor by means of direct grants to individuals andorganizations.An example of thefirst, singthe taxsystem,s the ChildTax Credit,althoughthis nitiativewas theproductoffederal-provincialcooperation; an example of the direct grant approach is Ottawa'sMillennium cholarshipFund,a controversialundertaking,articularlynQuebec. While thepursuit fthese lternatives oes not,ofcourse,permitOttawa oavoid allpolitical ontroversy,tputs t na freer osition nwhichitscapacity o act is not subjectto thewill of the provinces. Ottawawillcollaboratewhen tfeels thas to; so willtheprovinces.

CONCLUSIONCollaborativefederalismalso needs to be set in the largercontext ofmultilevel overnance nCanada. It willbecome increasingly ecessary olook to the roleof ocal, territorial,ndAboriginalgovernmentsnd theirinterface ith rovincial, ational, ndinternationalnstitutions.his articlehasfollowed standardCanadian pattern;municipalities avenotfiguredgreatlyn our analysis.This is so notonlybecause municipalities ave noindependent onstitutionaltatus, ut lsobecauseprovincesendto controlthe structurend powersof local governments ightly,obbingthevery



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70 Publius/Spring 002governmentshat re closestto the citizen nd the most nvolvedwith hequality f theirdaily ivesof much of theirpotentialdynamismnd vitality.This has occurredat a timewhen cities nd city egions re thecenters feconomic and cultural nnovation, re increasinglymulticultural,nd, inmany ases,are increasinglyinked tonationaland international etworksrather than to their provincial hinterlands. Enriching democraticmultigovernancemust nvolve hem.In addition,Canada is experimenting ithyetother nstitutional ormsoutsidethe traditional ederal-provincial-municipalramework. anada'snorthern erritoriesre actingmore and more ikeprovinces han federalprotectorates. he creation f the newterritoryfNunavut,tspopulationmade up largely f Inuitpeople, is Canada's first ulldefacto xperimentwithAboriginal elf-government.boriginal eoples elsewhere nCanadaare also seekingtodefinetheir wnmodels ofself-government.heytoowillbecome playersna multigovernance orld.Finally, uebec hasbeena relatively inor haracternthedevelopmentof collaborative ederalism.With hesovereignistartiQueb6cois inofficeformuch of the period under review from1994 to the present), t hasbeen a limited nd reluctant articipant.There are signs,however, f atransformationn politics and attitudes n Quebec. The sovereigntymovementscurrentlynretreat.Thereappearsto be a deep public fatiguewiththeperpetualdebate on thenationalquestion,dominatedbyhard-line sovereignistsn one hand and byhard-line ederalists n theother.This is encouraging n as yet nchoate search n theprovincefora freshpolitical discourse.37Manythought hat thefederalgovernment's 996reference f the questionofQuebec secession to the SupremeCourtofCanada" and thepassage n 1999of the federal Clarity ct"outlining hefederalgovernment'spproach to a possiblesecessionbid would arousenationalistentiment,ut thisdidnot occur.Finally,n thefederal lectionon 27 November2000, the sovereignist loc Queb6cois (BQ) won fewerseatsthan t had in either ftheothertwoprevious lectoral ontests thadparticipatedn (38 seats n 2000, as comparedto 44 seats n 1997 and 54seats in 1993). More significant, erhaps,was the factthat the federalLiberals n2000received higher roportion fthepopularvote nQuebecthandid theBQ (44.2 percent s comparedto 39.9 percent).Thisraises hepossibilityhatQuebec may e-engagen a federalist atherthana sovereignistiscourse,particularlyfthe federalist iberalParty f

"7Alain ubuc, a senioreditorialwriter orMontreal's argest ailynewspaper, a Presse, rote seriesofeighteditorials xploring his ssue entitled RWinventerotre venir:Des idWes our sortir u cul-de-sac" ("Re-inventingurFuture; deas forGettingOut of the Dead End"). Reprinted s "We Must BreakThis Vicious Circle,"PolicyOptions, une 2000, pp. 8-28. See also Gilles Paquet, Oubliera Revolutiontranquille:ourune NouvelleocialitiMontreal:Liber,1999); Jean-LucMigu,6, tatismetd&clin u Quibec:Bilande a rivolutionranquilleMontreal:EditionsVaria,1999); MichelVenne,ed.,PenseraNation uiebcoise(Montreal:EditionsQuebec-Am6rique,2000)."3Referencee SecessionfQuebec,1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. See also, PeterLeslie, "Canada: The SupremeCourtSets Rules for he SecessionofQuebec," Publius:TheJournalf ederalism9 (Spring1999): 135-151.



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Intergovernmentalelations n Canada 71Quebec underJean Charestwins the nextprovincial lection,and ifthefederal Liberals can overcome theirdeep distrustof theirprovincialcounterparts.fQuebecersdo optfor he beaurisqueffullparticipationnthecollaborativeystem,nd if tsprovincial artnersreprepared oacceptthat thismayresult n a substantial lement of asymmetryr "variablegeometry,"hen thecollaborativemodelwilltake on added impulse.Strong orces ushfor further laborationofthecollaborativemodel-therelativelyven balance offederal nd provincial owerand status, hehigh degree of interdependence among governments, he desire foradministrativefficiencynd clarity,nd the interests f citizens n thecollective bility fgovernmentsomeet theirneeds. Yetmuch ofthe ogicof Canadian federalismtands n theway.The lack of a unifying ationalparty ystem,he lack ofmobility fofficials nd politiciansbetween thetwo evels, hecompetition ogaincredit nd avoidblame,the mportanceofregional nd ideologicaldivisionsmong governments,nd the nequalityin wealth distribution mong the provinces-all these push toward anadversarialrelationship. As Canada enters the new millennium, heseopposingforcesremain n contention.Collaborative ederalism oes nothave tsown nternaldynamic. t willgrow, rnot,only nsofar s itmeetstheneeds of federaland provincial lites, nd theirconstituents,s theyface thechallengesofthe newmillennium. t is nowpartof whatDonaldSmileydescribedas thefederal condition" n Canada.39

"3The ederal onditionn Canada (Toronto:McGraw-Hill yerson, 987).

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