Intergovernmental Co-operation for International Decision making in Federal States: The Case of...

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Intergovernmental Co-operationfor International Decisionmaking in Federal States:The Case of SustainableDevelopment in BelgiumKaroline Van den Brande aa Institute for International and European Policy, KULeuven, BelgiumPublished online: 25 May 2012.

To cite this article: Karoline Van den Brande (2012) Intergovernmental Co-operation for International Decision making in Federal States: The Case ofSustainable Development in Belgium, Regional & Federal Studies, 22:4, 407-433, DOI:10.1080/13597566.2012.680959

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Intergovernmental Co-operation forInternational Decision making inFederal States: The Case of SustainableDevelopment in Belgium

KAROLINE VAN DEN BRANDE

Institute for International and European Policy, KU Leuven, Belgium

ABSTRACT In federal states, intergovernmental co-operation between the federal governmentand the subnational governments can be instigated by international decision making. That isparticularly interesting in the case of sustainable development, which is characterized as an‘outside-in’ policy or a policy that finds its way to the domestic policy agenda because ofinternational pressures. The article analyses intergovernmental co-operation for internationaldecision making on sustainable development and studies the federal state of Belgium. Itconsists of a framework that discusses the Belgian institutional context, and an empirical partthat analyses in detail Belgian intergovernmental co-operation practices. Three internationaldecision-making settings are examined—the UN Commission on Sustainable Development,the OECD Annual Meeting of Sustainable Development Experts and the EU discussions onits Sustainable Development Strategy. The article argues that there is no lack ofintergovernmental co-operation for international decision making on sustainable developmentin Belgium. Yet, the co-operation practices are informal and ad hoc and Belgium lacks aformal framework.

KEY WORDS: Federalism, intergovernmental co-operation, Belgium, sustainable development,UN, OECD, EU

The Co-operation Challenge of Sustainable Development

The study of intergovernmental relations in federal systems is an intriguing research

topic. Many scholars have discussed or touched upon the topic (e.g. Goetz, 1995;

Agranoff and Galların, 1997; Benz, 2000; Cameron, 2001; Opeskin, 2001; Horgan,

2004; Bache and Flinders, 2005; Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2009) or have provided frame-

works for studying intergovernmental relations in federal countries (e.g. Agranoff,

2004; Swenden, 2006; Ongaro et al., 2010). Interest in the topic largely follows

from the fact that federal (or quasi-federal) states, such as Austria, Belgium,

Correspondence Address: Karoline Van den Brande, Institute for International and European Policy, Leuven,

3000, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1359-7566 print/1743-9434 onlinehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2012.680959 # 2012 Taylor & Francis

Regional and Federal Studies

Vol. 22, No. 4, 407–433, October–December 2012

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Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (Swenden, 2006), require intergovernmental

co-operation between the federal government and the subnational governments1 or

among the subnational governments (see also Kassim et al., 2000; Bache and Flinders,

2005). The discussion of intergovernmental relations is often limited to the national

context. Increasingly, however, scholars also investigate intergovernmental co-

operation for international decision making. Cameron (2001) distinguishes four

categories of intergovernmental relations: intra-jurisdictional, inter-jurisdictional,

judicial and international. This article focuses on the last category and looks more

specifically at intergovernmental co-operation for international decision making on

sustainable development. It deals with the following general research question: How

does intergovernmental co-operation for international decision making on sustainable

development take place in federal states?

The case of sustainable development is interesting for two reasons: first, because of

sustainable development, as such. The concept originates from the end of the 1980s

when the Brundtland Commission defined it as: “development that meets the needs

of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their

own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43). Sustainable development policy can be described as

a governmental policy that aims to reconcile three dimensions—an economic, a

social and an environmental one. It is a concept that is now broadly used by various

actors (governmental and non-governmental) at all levels (from the global to the

local). Typical of sustainable development are the many policy principles it entails

(Bruyninckx, 2006). One of them is of particular importance for this article, i.e.

policy integration. That principle necessitates coherence across policy domains (hori-

zontal policy integration) and across different levels of government (vertical policy

integration) (Berger and Steurer, 2008). Vertical policy integration underlines that

co-ordination between different levels of government can improve policy making

and is closely related to the topic of this article: intergovernmental co-operation. Con-

ducting a sustainable development policy thus entails the necessity of good functioning

intra-state arrangements.

Yet, that by no means implies that co-operation and co-ordination are easy to

accomplish. The opposite is true, it is exactly because its attainment is generally a chal-

lenge for many governments that the concept of sustainable development promotes it.

In addition, intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination get an extra dimension

because of the complexity and uncertainty that are inevitably linked to conducting a

sustainable development policy (Lafferty and Langhelle, 1999; Baker and Eckerberg,

2008; Meadowcroft, 2008). Uncertainty results from the fact that sustainable develop-

ment is a new policy area with vague goals. Moreover, it requires new forms of gov-

ernance that include a variety of actors at multiple levels and it asks for long-term

policy planning, which alarms many policy makers. The complexity of sustainable

development is related to the fact that sustainable development is often a shared

responsibility of various levels of governance, which brings along interactions

between various actors at many levels (Meadowcroft, 2008: 113). In addition, decision

making on sustainable development is complex because of the cross-sectoral and

cross-cutting nature of the issues under discussion (e.g. climate change, water, sustain-

able consumption and production). In sum, intergovernmental co-operation is required

in a sustainable development context, yet its achievement can be challenging.

408 K. Van den Brande

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Second, sustainable development is also interesting to study because of its inter-

national character. O’Toole (2004: 34) argues that sustainable development has an

‘outside-in’ dimension, which implies that it is principally put on the domestic

policy agenda because of external (i.e. international) pressures and discussions on sus-

tainable development. Sustainable development is, indeed, a policy area that is mainly

modelled at the international level. Large-scale global summits (i.e. the 1992 Rio

Summit and the 2002 Johannesburg Summit) have created political momentum for sus-

tainable development and have promoted the policy principles typical of the concept.

Those summits have formulated global sustainable development goals and have

created a global action plan (Agenda 21) and a comprehensive implementation plan

(the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation). International organizations, such as the

United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD) and the European Union (EU), keep the sustainable development debate alive

between and after the summits (see also Van den Brande et al., 2011a). For example,

those organizations review the implementation of sustainable development world-

wide, develop policy recommendations and they set the sustainable development

agenda for governments at lower levels.

Data on intergovernmental co-operation are gathered for the federal state of

Belgium. In particular, the article analyses how the federal government and the subna-

tional governments in Belgium co-operate and co-ordinate a common position for

international decision making on sustainable development. Intergovernmental co-

operation practices in Belgium are fascinating to many scholars: Belgian as well as

other European, or even North American, scholars. One of the characteristics of the

Belgian federal state that attracts much attention is its—in theory—dual nature with

its—in practice—co-operative character. Although it is mostly identified as a dual

federal system, many mechanisms for co-operation and co-ordination are at work

(Swenden, 2006). Moreover, Belgian policy making and decision making are largely

influenced by the international level, which is particularly interesting in the context

of sustainable development (cf. supra). European and global decision making play

an instigating role and, more than once, they trigger co-operation between the

federal government and the subnational governments in Belgium. In particular, it

urges them to co-ordinate their actions in order to come to a single position for inter-

national forums (Jans and Tombeur, 2000; Kerremans, 2000b). Earlier studies have

discussed Belgian intergovernmental relations in specific policy areas such as agricul-

ture, economy, environment, social affairs (e.g. Jans and Tombeur, 2000; Kerremans,

2000b; Beyers et al., 2004; Beyers and Bursens, 2006; Swenden and Jans, 2006) or for

EU policy in general (Sepos, 2003). Yet the policy area of sustainable development has

remained unexplored.

The analysis of intergovernmental co-operation can reveal interesting insights

because of three reasons related to sustainable development in Belgium. First, sus-

tainable development is a rather new policy area and Belgium was one of the fron-

trunners among the European countries to formally institutionalize it with the Law of

5 May 1997 on the Co-ordination of the Federal Sustainable Development Policy

(Belgisch Staatsblad, 1997). The law realized the creation of various federal insti-

tutions for sustainable development. Later, the institutionalization of sustainable

development also took place at the subnational level. In Flanders, for example,

The Case of Sustainable Development in Belgium 409

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since 2004 the Minister-president is responsible for sustainable development. In 2006

the Flemish government adopted its own sustainable development strategy and in

2008 the Flemish government approved a Sustainable Development Law. Only a

few other European subnational governments have institutionalized sustainable

development in their policy. One example is Wales, which has a statutory duty to

promote sustainable development since the end of the 1990s (Royles, 2012). In Wal-

lonia, the institutionalization of the concept has embarked on a much slower path, as

only recently can signs of a possible institutionalization be traced (Happaerts, 2012).

Second, sustainable development is a shared responsibility of the federal government

and the subnational governments in Belgium. That has been endorsed in 2007 by

including the following text in the Belgian constitution: “While exercising their

respective competencies, the federal state, the Communities and the Regions aim

for the objectives of a sustainable development in its social, economic and environ-

ment-related aspects, considering the solidarity between the generations” (Belgian

Senate, 2007, art 7bis, own translation). Finally, earlier research on the involvement

of the subnational entity of Flanders in international decision making on sustainable

development has pointed at the relevance and importance of Belgian intra-state

arrangements and intergovernmental co-operation in that policy area (Van den

Brande et al., 2011b). Flanders primarily uses intra-state routes to be involved at

the international level (e.g. it attends national co-ordination meetings and takes

part in the national delegation for international meetings).2 Intergovernmental

co-operation and co-ordination indeed increase in importance because the Belgian

governments are required to arrive at a solid common position for international

decision-making forums.

A more specific research question that arises is the following: How does intergo-

vernmental co-operation for international decision making take place in a federal

country like Belgium with regard to a policy area that requires it? In addressing

that question the article starts with a section that gives an overview of intergovern-

mental relations in the context of Belgian federalism. That section first looks at

some of its core characteristics. Subsequently it discusses the main institutional

arrangements guiding the external relations of the Belgian subnational entities and

finally deals with the institutional framework for intergovernmental co-operation

on international decision making on sustainable development. The article then elab-

orates the Belgian intergovernmental co-operation practices for three international

settings that discuss sustainable development: the Commission on Sustainable Devel-

opment (CSD) of the UN; the Annual Meeting of Sustainable Development Experts

(AMSDE) of the OECD; and the EU with regard to its discussions on the EU Sustain-

able Development Strategy (EU SDS).3 The article proceeds with a discussion of

similarities and differences, the involvement of the various Belgian governments,

and their motivations for intergovernmental co-operation. It ends with a conclusion

on intergovernmental co-operation practices in Belgium. The empirical data result

from about 30 semi-structured interviews with governmental and non-governmental

actors at the subnational and the federal level in Belgium, non-participatory obser-

vations of the national co-ordination meetings for each of the three decision-

making settings and an analysis of (confidential) government documents.


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Intergovernmental Relations in the Context of Belgian Federalism

Characteristics of Belgian Federalism

The federal character of the Belgian state has been extensively discussed before by

various scholars (e.g. Poirier, 2002; Beyers and Bursens, 2006; Swenden, 2006;

Brans et al., 2009). The article, therefore, mentions only its most relevant character-

istics and refers to the work of others for a more detailed elaboration.

Belgium has turned from a unitary state into a federal state by means of four state

reforms.4 The state reform of 1992 ultimately gave Belgium a fully federal character

(Swenden, 2006). It is now a federal state composed of six subnational entities, in par-

ticular three Communities and three Regions. The Communities (the Flemish Commu-

nity, the French Community and the German-speaking Community) are responsible for

language and culture-related policy issues, e.g. education. Regional competencies (i.e.

of the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region) are ter-

ritorially bound, including policy issues, such as agriculture, spatial planning and trans-

port (Swenden et al., 2006).5 It is important to note that the division of competencies is

principally based on the idea of transferring exclusive powers to those subnational enti-

ties, which implies that the latter are solely responsible for legislation and execution of

those competencies (Swenden and Jans, 2006). The federal government retains the

responsibility of the residual powers or “those powers that are not explicitly listed in

the constitution” (Swenden, 2006: 51). Linked to that, it was decided to put all

Belgian governments on an equal footing, introducing the principle of ‘no hierarchy’.

As a result, all Belgian governments are fundamentally equal, without any hierarchy of

their laws or regulations (Beyers et al., 2004). The logic behind the idea was to mini-

mize the necessity of co-operation between the federal government and the subnational

governments (Swenden and Jans, 2006).

Yet, heterogeneous rather than homogeneous policy packages were created. The

division of competencies is not made watertight as, more than once, some aspects of

a policy area are exclusively ascribed to the subnational level and other aspects to

the federal level. That makes that policy area de facto a shared responsibility of

various levels of government, because each of those levels is made responsible for

other aspects of the entire policy area (Jans and Tombeur, 2000; Beyers and

Bursens, 2006). The policy area of sustainable development is an excellent example

of such a heterogeneous policy package and shared responsibility. Generally speaking,

the competency on sustainable development policy is divided for and within each of its

dimensions (economy, environment and social policy). In particular, several levels of

government are responsible, for example, for tax policy (economic dimension), and

also employment and education policy are responsibilities of more than one govern-

mental level (social dimension). Environment is largely a responsibility of the subna-

tional governments, with the exception of certain issues, such as the issuing of product

norms.

In theory, Belgium has the formal characteristics of a dual federal state system

(Swenden, 2006). In such a dual system, responsibilities are explicitly divided

(Braun, 2000) and intergovernmental relations can be adversarial (Skogstad, 2000).

Swenden (2006: 49) defines dual federalism as “a method of dividing powers which

neatly separates legislative and executive functions between the central and the


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regional levels of government, and ideally turns each level into ‘watertight compart-

ments’”. Beyers and Bursens (2006: 1060) describe the basis of the Belgian system

with the terms: “non-co-operative”, “competitive” and “centrifugal”. De facto,

however, the Belgian federation has many co-operative characteristics, e.g. co-oper-

ation agreements and institutions managing intergovernmental co-operation, such as

the Deliberation Committee and Interministerial Conferences (Jans and Tombeur,

2000; Beyers et al., 2004). That co-operative character is, according to many scholars,

the result of exogenous forces, in particular the impact of European-level decision

making on domestic decision making and of the necessity of co-ordinating Belgian

positions for EU and global forums (Kerremans, 2000b; Beyers and Bursens, 2006).

For example, as elaborated earlier, sustainable development is a shared responsibility

of both the federal government and the subnational governments in Belgium. Negotiat-

ing sustainable development issues at the international level is thus also both a federal

and a subnational responsibility. Such a division of competencies obviously necessi-

tates intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordinated action.

Institutional Arrangements Guiding Subnational Entities’ External Relations

One of the core principles for subnational governments in Belgium is the in foro

interno, in foro externo principle, which results from the 1988 state reform. That prin-

ciple allows the subnational governments to carry out a foreign policy for those policy

issues for which they are internally responsible according to the Belgian constitution

(Beyers et al., 2004). In order to apply the principle and to anticipate the next state

reform, in 1991 Belgium (together with Germany) asked the EU for a change of

former article 146 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community

(Beyers et al., 2004). The rewritten article6 makes it possible for national governments

to be represented in the Council of Ministers by members of subnational governments

as long as those representatives defend national interests (Hooghe and Marks, 2001;

Sepos, 2003). It urges member states to come up with one unified national position

and, in that regard, it instigates domestic intergovernmental co-operation. In theory,

the in foro interno, in foro externo principle defines that the Belgian subnational gov-

ernments can conclude international treaties for issues that belong to their exclusive

competencies,7 can be involved in the national co-ordination of a Belgian position

and can include representatives in the national delegation for EU and global meetings.

Yet many practical issues were undefined, especially with regard to how exactly the

Belgian governments would co-ordinate a Belgian position and how Belgium would

be represented at the European and global level (Beyers et al., 2004).

In order to organize intergovernmental co-operation three intergovernmental

mechanisms were already at work in Belgium (Poirier, 2002; Swenden and Jans,

2006): the Deliberation Committee, Interministerial Conferences and co-operation

agreements. The Deliberation Committee is a decision-making body at the highest pol-

itical level established for settling conflicts of interest that cannot be resolved by lower-

level bodies. Its members are the federal Prime Minister, the Minister-presidents of the

subnational governments and a number of other federal and subnational ministers (Jans

and Tombeur, 2000). The Committee is only approached as a last option and does not

easily succeed in its goal to reach a compromise (Swenden and Jans, 2006). Second,


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Interministerial Conferences are set up for dealing with high-level specialized discus-

sions on specific policy issues (e.g. institutional reforms, foreign policy and environ-

ment). They consist of those ministers of the federal and the subnational

governments that are responsible for the issue under discussion. The decisions that

have to be taken at Interministerial Conferences are usually prepared beforehand by

specialized working groups consisting of experts at political and administrative level

(Jans and Tombeur, 2000). Decisions of both the Deliberation Committee and the

Interministerial Conferences have no legally binding nature, but are politically rel-

evant. They are based on a consensus rule, which implies that when no agreement is

reached, there is no common position and the status quo has to be retained (Jans and

Tombeur, 2000; Swenden, 2006). Finally, co-operation agreements can be negotiated

between all Belgian governments. Jans and Tombeur (2000: 148) state that those

agreements facilitate governments “to organise common services, to jointly exercise

their authority over a given policy domain and to develop common policy initiatives”.

In particular, the rules that guide intergovernmental co-operation are written down in

those agreements (Beyers et al., 2004). It is important to note that the federal govern-

ment, the Regions and the Communities are obliged to conclude a co-operation agree-

ment for “the representation of Belgium in international or supranational organisations

and the procedures to establish the position and the attitude for lack of consensus” (Jans

and Tombeur, 2000: 150). Unsurprisingly, co-operation agreements are often the result

of indirect international pressures for co-ordinated action (Jans and Tombeur, 2000;

Beyers et al., 2004).

For this article, those co-operation agreements dealing with the representation of

Belgium at the international level are important, in particular. A first example of

such an agreement is the 1994 Framework agreement on international organizations,8

which arranges the representation of Belgium in international organizations that

discuss issues that are shared responsibilities. A second example is the 1994

Cooperation agreement on the EU,9 dealing with the representation of Belgium in

the Council of Ministers. That agreement formally fixes the presence of the Belgian

federal and subnational ministers in the different Council formations. All matters

that are discussed by the Council of Ministers are assigned to one of six categories

and for each category the ministerial representation of Belgium is defined. In 2003

that co-operation agreement has been changed, in particular with regard to the issue

of environment that was assigned another category in order to allow a subnational min-

ister (accompanied by a federal assessor) to represent Belgium (Belgisch Staatsblad,

2003).10 The representation by subnational ministers is arranged by a rotation

system that admits the participation of another subnational entity each new semester

(Kerremans, 2000b).

The in foro interno, in foro externo principle and the (formal and informal)

arrangements that over the years resulted from it mean that the Belgian subnational

governments are often seen as unique among subnational governments world-wide

with regard to their foreign policy competencies (Paquin, 2010). Indeed, they belong

to the few subnational governments that have managed to come to an agreement

about participation in national decision making on international policy issues and in

the national delegation for EU and global negotiations, and about subnational minister-

ial representation in the Council of Ministers. Also, in Austria, an agreement is laid


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down in the federal Constitution that determines how the Lander have to be implicated

in national co-ordination on EU policy making (Muller, 2000; Woelk, 2004). Another,

more recent, example is Spain where, since December 2004, representatives of the

Spanish Autonomous Communities can attend meetings of the Council working

groups and a subnational minister can take part in the Spanish delegation to the

Council, when subnational matters are concerned (Morata, 2007). Direct access to

the Council of Ministers is now granted to the subnational governments of Austria,

Belgium and Germany, to a different extent. Moreover, Woelk (2004) states that it hap-

pened once that a Scottish Minister represented the UK. The actual participation and

involvement of subnational governments is thus highly dependent on domestic insti-

tutional arrangements and only a limited number of subnational governments have

been able to successfully negotiate their access domestically (Hooghe and Marks,

2001; Woelk, 2004; Tatham, 2008).

Framework for Intergovernmental Co-operation on Sustainable Development

Belgian intergovernmental co-operation for international decision making on sustain-

able development is not based on a formal framework. At the time of writing (2011),

intergovernmental co-operation does take place and is slightly based on existing

co-operation practices in other policy areas, yet it is rather informal as a formal co-

operation agreement has not (yet) been concluded. Informal intergovernmental

relations on international policy making are not uncommon in Europe, especially

with regard to low-politics issues, such as sustainable development. Hogenauer

(2012), for example, argues that intergovernmental relations in the UK usually have

an informal character when EU policy making is concerned (see also Horgan,

2004). Moreover, informal and ad hoc co-operation practices are also typical of

Belgian decision making in other policy sectors (e.g. social affairs) (Kerremans,

2000a). In Belgium, a first attempt to start the negotiations on a co-operation agreement

on (national and international) sustainable development policy was made in 2005 by

the ad hoc Interministerial Conference on Sustainable Development (IMCSD). It nego-

tiated a framework text for a National Strategy for Sustainable Development, which

mentions the possibility of drawing up a co-operation agreement on sustainable devel-

opment policy (IMCDO, 2005). Yet, until now, no further concrete steps have been

undertaken, except for some informal talks (interviewees) and some declarations of

intent to restart the talks by the government of Flanders. In theory, such a co-operation

agreement could, however, be useful for arranging co-operation on international

decision making on sustainable development.

The current intergovernmental co-operation practices are, however, not held in an

institutional void. Indeed, some of those practices are based on rules and norms that are

written down in existing co-operation agreements. One such agreement is the

Framework agreement on international organizations (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1994a),

which indirectly applies to international decision making on sustainable development.

Among others, the agreement is applicable with regard to UN (including its Economic

and Social Council, ECOSOC) and OECD negotiations. The agreement states that

specific co-operation agreements can be concluded when the singularity of an

international organization would require a more detailed elaboration. That has not


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yet been the case for the sustainable development discussions in the UN and the

OECD. A co-operation agreement that could include some relevant regulations,

primarily for the EU discussions on sustainable development, but also for the EU prep-

arations of global discussions, is the 1994 (and 2003) Cooperation agreement on the

EU (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1994b; 2003). Finally, some of the co-operation practices

seem to be closely related to how co-operation is regulated for international environ-

mental policy, i.e. in the 1995 Cooperation agreement on international environmental

policy (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1995) and in the so-called “Handbook on the negotiations

of EU and multilateral environment dossiers and the role of pilots and experts”

(CCIM, 2004). The former deals with general agreements on how co-operation

has to take place, the latter deals with specific regulations on actual co-ordination

practices.

The arrangements that are discussed in those co-operation agreements on inter-

national issues usually focus on the same four areas—consultation, representation, dis-

semination of information and conciliation. The first area is consultation, which treats

the preparatory co-ordination process or the process of the formulation and establish-

ment of a Belgian position for international negotiations. Aspects that are dealt with

are: the co-ordinating decision-making body, its chair, its members, the frequency of

its meetings, its mandate, its functioning, the nature of its decisions, and on-the-spot

co-ordination. Second, the composition of the delegation—together with who rep-

resents, negotiates and votes for Belgium at the international level—is a common

point that is arranged in such co-operation agreements. The dissemination of the infor-

mation is a third point. Who is responsible for disseminating the available information

to all governments involved and how is the available information circulated? Infor-

mation exchange is a crucial aspect of every decision-making process, especially in

the internet age in which we now live. Governments at all levels want to be informed

about the latest developments, and they increasingly acquire more possibilities of

obtaining valuable information. Finally, it is also important to lay down the concilia-

tion procedure, or what happens in case no consensus can be reached. Which body dis-

cusses conflicts of interest in the last resort?

The four areas of co-operation will be used to structure the discussion on the inter-

governmental co-operation practices in Belgium for decision making on sustainable

development in the CSD, the AMSDE and the EU.

UN Commission on Sustainable Development

Established in 1992, the CSD is a functional commission of ECOSOC and is a direct

result of the Rio Summit. The Commission is principally responsible for the follow-

up of the implementation of the commitments made at the Rio and Johannesburg

Summits and for providing policy guidance to UN member states. It meets annually

in New York for a two-week period, including a three-day high-level ministerial

segment. The CSD process is unique as it makes close involvement of civil society

actors possible. Representatives of nine so-called Major Groups can actively participate

at its discussions.11 Each year, the CSD discusses a cluster of thematic issues that are

related to sustainable development. At the time of writing, the most recent complete

thematic cluster of issues (2010–11) dealt with the issues: transport, chemicals,


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waste management, mining, and sustainable consumption and production patterns.

A cluster of twelve cross-cutting issues is also considered each year; examples of

those issues are education for sustainable development and poverty eradication.

The participation of Belgium at the CSD discussions can be direct, by bringing a

national position at one of its sessions, but principally occurs indirectly, i.e. through

the EU. The EU has been attending the CSD sessions as a negotiating group since

1993 and has its own preparatory process. For CSD issues, the main and highest co-

ordinating decision-making body at the EU level is the Council Working Party on

International Environmental Issues dealing with global issues (WPIEI global), which

gathers monthly. As soon as the WPIEI global has negotiated and concluded an EU

position, that position is brought to the CSD and is not discussed at higher levels,

i.e. in the Committees of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) or in the Environment

Council.

Division of Competencies

Especially in the case of the CSD it is important to come back to the issue of the div-

ision of competencies. Governments will be motivated to be involved in the CSD dis-

cussions particularly when the issues that are under discussion belong to their

responsibility. Moreover, the CSD discusses many issues, some of which can be exclu-

sive competencies of the Belgian federal or subnational governments and some of

which can be shared responsibilities of both levels of government. More than once,

that results in a complex division of responsibilities in Belgium (interviewees). For

example, in 2008 and 2009 the CSD discussed the following cluster of issues: agricul-

ture, rural development, land, drought, desertification, Africa, and the cluster of twelve

cross-cutting issues. The first three issues were clearly distinguished as subnational

competencies. The other issues, however, are shared responsibilities of both the

federal and the subnational governments. In that context it is important to note that sub-

national competencies are often also EU competencies (e.g. agriculture), which illus-

trates what Jeffery (2007: 2) calls the “Europeanisation of issues falling under the

[subnational governments’] domestic legislative powers”.

Consultation

Belgian co-ordination on CSD issues, i.e. the formulation and establishment of a

Belgian position for the EU or for the CSD itself, takes place in a co-ordination

body labelled COORMULTI (Coordination of multilateral issues) (see Figure 1).

The COORMULTI has various formats, the CSD is discussed by the COORMULTI

Sustainable Development, labelled here as ‘COORMULTI SD’. It meets monthly, a

few days before the EU co-ordination meeting. Its secretariat and chair are filled by

the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assisted by mandated experts from the

Federal Planning Bureau.12 The members of the COORMULTI SD are political offi-

cials representing federal and subnational ministers, federal and subnational adminis-

trative officials and representatives of non-governmental stakeholders, such as

advisory bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities, whose

attendance depends on the CSD issues under discussion. Decisions taken by the


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COORMULTI SD have the statute of being (informal) agreements based on a consen-

sus among the participants; they do not have a legally binding nature. As for each

Belgian co-ordination body, the COORMULTI SD has to withhold from bringing a

position in the absence of unanimity. Yet, CSD issues are considered by many

Belgian decision-makers to be low-level politics (interviewees), resulting in a rather

easily reached consensus position (in comparison with high-level policy issues). Con-

sultation can also take place on the spot under the chair of a federal representative

involving members of the Belgian delegation. Those co-ordination meetings can be

formal and predetermined or informal and ad hoc. It principally concerns general

issues or orders of the day as ministerial attendance at CSD meetings is rare and

few high-level issues are thus discussed (interviewees).

The COORMULTI was set up at the beginning of the 2000s on the initiative of the

federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the intention to systematically co-ordinate all

Belgian positions for global meetings (interviewees). Its statute and functioning are not

laid down in a co-operation agreement. As the co-ordination body of the Directorate-

General for Multilateral Affairs and Globalization, it mirrors the functioning of the

established co-ordination body P.11 (labelled ‘DGE’ since 2003) of the Directorate-

General for European Affairs and Coordination of the federal Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, in the mid-1990s (interviewees). P.11, now DGE, is a political body respon-

sible for all high-level co-ordination of European affairs (cf. infra). Some interviewees

see the COORMULTI SD as partly linked to the 1995 Cooperation agreement on inter-

national environmental policy. Indeed, it seems to follow some of the rules that are

applied by the Coordination Committee on International Environmental Policy

Figure 1. Belgian intergovernmental co-operation on CSD


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(CCIEP) (interviewees), which is a direct result of that co-operation agreement. Just

like the CCIEP, the COORMULTI SD applies a system of pilots,13 laid down in the

previously mentioned “Handbook on international environmental negotiations”. Yet,

two important differences between the two bodies need to be remarked. First, the

COORMULTI SD complements the work of the CCIEP, as it deals with issues

related to international sustainable development policy, which are not dealt with by

the CCIEP. Second, the COORMULTI SD is a political body dealing with broad pol-

itical outlines. The CCIEP, on the other hand, deals with a wide variety of issues

ranging from very technical to political.

Representation

The EU co-ordination meetings in the WPIEI global, which prepare the CSD meetings,

are attended by representatives of the federal government, who take the floor, and by

representatives of subnational governments (mostly from Flanders), who can take the

floor in the absence of a federal representative (interviewees). The latter is a rather

informal rule and not based on formal procedures.

The COORMULTI SD decides the composition of the Belgian delegation to the

CSD and also who exactly will represent, negotiate and vote for Belgium. That

delegation is headed by a minister of one of the Belgian governments or by the

Belgian Permanent Representative to the UN. In most cases the delegation consists

of federal representatives of Belgium’s Permanent Representation to the UN and of

federal and subnational administrative officials, but also includes representatives of

non-governmental stakeholders, which is rather exceptional for national delegations.

Most commonly, during the first and rather technical part of the CSD meeting,

Belgium is represented by a federal representative. It can occur, however that a subna-

tional representative takes the Belgian seat, yet that has to be agreed and is sometimes

the result of a Belgian ‘no-empty-seat’ policy (interviewees). During the high-level

part of the CSD, Belgium is usually represented by the Belgian Permanent Represen-

tative or another highly placed diplomat.14

Dissemination of Information

Information on the CSD discussions and its preparations at the EU level is circulated by

the chair and the secretariat of the COORMULTI SD, who receive information directly

from the EU Council Secretariat, the CSD Secretariat and the Belgian Permanent Rep-

resentation to the UN. As members of the national delegation to EU meetings, repre-

sentatives of subnational governments also receive information directly from the EU

Council Secretariat.

Conciliation

Small conflicts of interest with regard to CSD issues have popped up before. Some

interviewees pointed to those meetings as the place where, at times, symbolic issues

are battled out between the Belgian governments. For example, the attendance of

EU co-ordination meetings on the spot, the ‘head’ of the Belgian delegation in case


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no Belgian minister attends the CSD meeting or the friction between sustainable devel-

opment and development co-operation experts. Yet the national co-ordination meet-

ings always seem to succeed in concluding by unanimity.

Because of the lack of a co-operation agreement on international sustainable devel-

opment policy and because of the rather vague formal character of the COORMULTI

SD, the higher-level body that is responsible for solving conflicts of interest of the

COORMULTI SD is not formally defined. Yet, interviewees state that when conflicts

arise in the COORMULTI SD, those are referred to the Interministerial Conference on

Foreign Policy, which generally deals with conflicts on international policy issues. In

the last resort, the Deliberation Committee is responsible. Many interviewees state that

neither the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy nor the Deliberation Com-

mittee have yet been appealed to for CSD issues and that governments generally

only appeal to such higher-level bodies when all other possibilities are exhausted.

OECD Annual Meeting of Sustainable Development Experts

Sustainable development came on the agenda of the OECD in 1997. From that date, the

group of industrialized countries has discussed sustainable development within various

formats with different mandates. Since 2004, the OECD has discussed issues related to

sustainable development within the AMSDE, which meets yearly for two days in Paris

and involves diplomats from national permanent representations to the OECD and

experts from national ministries. The AMSDE discussions can also be attended by

civil society actors from business and labour sectors and from NGOs. During the

year, the sustainable development discussions related to the AMSDE are kept going

through the work of the AMSDE Chair and the organization of Sustainable Develop-

ment Counsellor Meetings. The AMSDE mainly aims to monitor how sustainable

development is integrated in the work of the OECD and to share best practices on sus-

tainable development issues (e.g. on sustainable development strategies) among the

member states. It also indicates which sustainable development areas (e.g. sustainable

development statistics) should take priority in the OECD’s work. Because of its goals

and functioning, many interviewees see the AMSDE primarily as a forum for discuss-

ing scientific reports rather than for conducting actual negotiations between OECD

member states.

At the EU level, co-ordination on AMSDE issues rarely takes place. As EU

member states are individually represented at the AMSDE, no EU position is prepared.

In fact, only 21 of the 27 EU member states are OECD members, which makes it

impossible for the EU to speak with one voice. When EU co-ordination meetings do

take place, it is on the initiative of the EU Presidency and solely used by EU

member states to brief the others of their position (interviewees).


Contrary to the CSD, the AMSDE does not discuss a complex variety of specific policy

issues. The AMSDE rather deals with general sustainable development discussions,

related to the integration of sustainable development in the work of the OECD or to

conducting a sustainable development policy. Since in Belgium both the federal and


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the subnational governments have the responsibility of conducting a sustainable devel-

opment policy and since many of the issues that belong to the OECD’s work are sub-

national competencies (e.g. innovation, science, education and environment), the

AMSDE’s agenda is in the interest of both the federal and the subnational govern-

ments. Also in this case, co-operation and co-ordination are required, yet difficult

because of the necessary involvement of various levels of government and of

various policy departments within each government (interviewees).

Consultation

Although the issue ‘AMSDE’ can sometimes be found on the agenda of the COOR-

MULTI SD (cf. supra), that is not the main forum for national co-ordination on

AMSDE. The format of the national co-ordination meeting is a small ‘working

group on AMSDE’ (see Figure 2), which consists of federal political officials and

federal and subnational administrative officials.15 National co-ordination is led by

the head of the Federal Planning Bureau (and/or his deputy), who has been mandated

by a political agreement to represent Belgium in the AMSDE and, accordingly, to co-

ordinate the Belgian position too (interviewees). Close co-operation takes place with

the federal sustainable development department, i.e. the Federal Public Planning

Service on Sustainable Development. Co-ordination takes place once or twice in the

months before the AMSDE. The main goal of the co-ordination meeting is the

exchange of views and expertise, which serves as the basis for the formulation of

the Belgian position. As for CSD, the outcome of the national co-ordination meeting

has a rather informal nature of low political weight, as no political or legally

Figure 2. Belgian intergovernmental co-operation on AMSDE


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binding decisions are taken. That is partly due to the nature of the AMSDE (cf. supra).

On the spot, the members of the national delegation have informal and ad hoc talks, but

in contrast to what happens for CSD, no formal co-ordination meetings take place

(interviewees).

Representation

The national delegation for the AMSDE is composed of the working group and has

roughly the same composition. The delegation is headed by a federal representative

of the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the OECD. The meeting is at expert

level, thus there is no ministerial attendance. During the meetings, Belgium is rep-

resented by the federal chair of the working group.


Being responsible for the Belgian consultation process on the AMSDE, the head (or

deputy) of the Federal Planning Bureau circulates most of the information directly.

Information is disseminated to all officials involved in the process. Yet, federal and

subnational officials also receive information directly (through e-mail) from the

AMSDE secretariat at the OECD. During the year, the Belgian Permanent Represen-

tation to the OECD, in particular federal and subnational representatives, report about

ongoing AMSDE business and the agenda and the outcome of the Counsellors’ Meet-

ings. Positions for those meetings are gathered through regular e-mail correspondence.

Conciliation

Until now, it seems that no real conflicts of interest have occurred. As for the CSD, the

lack of a co-operation agreement creates a situation in which it is not formally defined

how possible conflicts of interest have to be settled. Yet, issues that are related to

Belgium’s foreign policy would have to be discussed first by the Interministerial

Conference on Foreign Policy and subsequently by the Deliberation Committee.

EU Discussions on the EU Sustainable Development Strategy

The EU is a promoter of global sustainable development and it plays an active role in

the discussions of the CSD and the AMSDE. Moreover, it has its own sustainable

development policy. In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU adopted sustainable

development as one of its core goals. That was followed by the formulation in 2001

of an EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS). The Strategy has been

renewed in 2006. It defines seven key challenges16 for sustainable development in

the EU and results in some practical requirements for the European Commission

and for the EU member states. For example, the EU SDS of 2006 states that the Euro-

pean Commission has to draw up a progress report on the implementation of the EU

SDS every two years. Such a report was released in 2007 and 2009. Moreover, the

member states are asked to appoint an EU SDS focal point that provides the necessary


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information on national (and subnational) progress on sustainable development. In

2007, Belgium wrote a national progress report.

At the EU level, decision making on the EU SDS does not take place on a regular

basis. The process is largely defined by the activities of the European Commission who

has, for example, formulated communications on the EU SDS in 2001 and 2006. In

addition, an important role is played by the European Council (e.g. it has adopted

the renewed EU SDS in June 2006) and by the General Affairs Council and the

Environment Council (e.g. both Council formations sometimes discuss EU SDS

issues). It is also at the level of the (European) Council that member states can be

largely involved in the process. The most recent phase of EU decision making on

the EU SDS took off mid-2009, when the European Commission published its 2009

progress report on the implementation of the renewed EU SDS, and partly ended in

December 2009, with the discussion by the European Council of that progress report

and of a next review of the EU SDS.17 In the intervening time, the lead was taken

by the Swedish Presidency, who formulated a Presidency report on the 2009 review

of the EU SDS. That report was first discussed by a Friends of the Presidency

Group on Sustainable Development, subsequently by Coreper II, and finally it was

taken note of by the General Affairs Council. It also served as an input for the Presi-

dency Conclusions of the December meeting of the European Council. Occasionally,

some EU SDS issues were also discussed by the Council Working Party on Environ-

ment and, subsequently, by Coreper I and by the Environment Council.


As mentioned earlier, in Belgium many EU competencies are subnational competen-

cies too, which urges intergovernmental co-operation. An illustration is the Flemish

Sustainable Development Strategy, of which the themes were an exact copy of the pri-

ority areas for action defined in the first EU SDS. The EU decision-making process on

the EU SDS thus deals with issues (such as energy) that are shared responsibilities of

both the federal and the subnational governments. Moreover, the EU SDS sets out

reporting requirements for the member states on the progress of the implementation

of sustainable development at the national level, asking at the same time for data on

subnational entities’ progress where necessary. Obviously, it is in the interest of

both the federal and the subnational governments to participate in the process.

Consultation

Belgian consultation on EU SDS issues happens in a different way than that on CSD or

AMSDE issues. DGE (the co-ordination body of the Directorate-General for European

Affairs and Coordination of the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cf. supra) plays a

crucial, (rather) political, role in the national co-ordination of a Belgian position on EU

SDS issues. The role of that co-ordination body is decided by the 1994 Cooperation

agreement on the EU, dealing with the representation of Belgium in the Council of

Ministers. The agreement states that the body is responsible for the co-ordination of

Belgian positions (of each kind) for Council of Ministers’ meetings. The chair and sec-

retariat of DGE are provided by the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its members


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are political officials, representing federal and subnational ministers, federal and sub-

national administrative officials, and representatives of the Permanent Representation

of Belgium to the EU (including of the attached subnational Representations). Non-

governmental actors are not directly involved in the process. The Cooperation agree-

ment on the EU defines that ad hoc co-ordination meetings can be organized when

technical issues are concerned. Yet, DGE has to be informed about the outcome of

those meetings and enters the stage for political aspects of the discussions (Belgisch

Staatsblad, 1994b). Decisions that are taken by DGE are based on consensus, and

have a political, but no legally binding nature. DGE meetings provide the Belgian

representative with a mandate for European negotiations. Interviewees state that, in

general, discussions on sustainable development in the EU are considered to be politi-

cally more important than those in the CSD and the AMSDE.

Mid-2009, the discussions of the General Affairs Council, including those of

Coreper II and of the Friends of the Presidency Group, were prepared first by an ad

hoc body, namely an administrative Working Group on the EU SDS (see

Figure 3).18 That working group was a joint initiative of CCIEP (cf. supra) and the

Interdepartmental Commission on Sustainable Development (ICSD), including

federal and subnational administrative officials. The ICSD is a federal institution

resulting from the 1997 federal Law on sustainable development, and responsible

for parts of the federal sustainable development policy. It is principally composed of

representatives of all federal departments, but each subnational government is

invited to appoint a representative too. The secretariat of the ICSD is provided by

Figure 3. Belgian intergovernmental co-operation on the EU discussions on the EU SDS


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the federal sustainable development department, which also leads the discussions in

the Working Group on the EU SDS. Subsequently, the position prepared by the

working group was discussed and adopted at political level, first, by an ad hoc Inter-

governmental Working Group on Sustainable Development and, finally, by DGE.

The CCIEP itself can also enter the stage when specific environmental aspects of

the EU SDS need to be discussed (interviewees), which are on the agenda of the

Working Party on Environment. In any case, the prepared position is finally discussed

and adopted by DGE. In December 2009, the European Council considered the 2009

progress report of the European Commission. On average, a European Council meeting

is prepared in Belgium through one or more national co-ordination meetings in Brus-

sels organized in the framework of the federal Directorate-General for European

Affairs and through one or more small meetings on the spot. National co-ordination

meetings discuss the agenda of the European Council meeting and negotiate on speak-

ing points for the Prime Minister. Interested subnational governments can also attend

the meetings.

Representation

At the level of the Council working party meetings (e.g. the Working Party on Environ-

ment or the Friends of the Presidency Group) and of Coreper, Belgium is represented

by a diplomat of the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU. That is the Per-

manent Representative of Belgium to the EU for Coreper II meetings and the Environ-

ment Attache for meetings of Coreper I, of the Friends of the Presidency Group and of

the Working Party on Environment. Those representatives take the floor for Belgium,

but are assisted by federal officials and sometimes by subnational officials (mostly

from Flanders).

Belgian representation at meetings of the Council of Ministers of the EU follows

the arrangements laid down in the 1994 and 2003 Cooperation agreements on the

EU and is confirmed by the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy. When sus-

tainable development issues are discussed in the General Affairs Council, a federal

minister, in particular the federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, represents Belgium.

When those issues are on the agenda of the Environment Council, since July 2003,

a subnational Environment Minister, accompanied by a federal assessor, is responsible

for representing Belgium. In contrast to what counts for CSD and AMSDE, ministerial

involvement at the EU level is thus more common for EU SDS matters. Belgium’s rep-

resentation in the European Council is similar to that of all other EU member states: the

European Council is composed primarily of Heads of State or Government of EU

member states. For Belgium, the federal Prime Minister takes the floor in the meetings

of the European Council.


All information on the progress of the EU discussions on the EU SDS first comes in

through the Belgian Permanent Representation to the EU. While the latter plays an

important role with regard to the EU discussions on the EU SDS, it is not directly

involved with regard to EU discussions on the CSD (or the AMSDE). Subsequently,


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information gets circulated to the subnational Representations to the Belgian Perma-

nent Representation to the EU, which forward the information by e-mail to their

respective governments. In addition, the federal sustainable development department

and the secretariat of DGE play a role in circulating information on (ad hoc) co-

ordination meetings on the EU SDS.

Conciliation

Contrary to the rather undefined character of the conciliation procedure for national

consultation on CSD and AMSDE, the conciliation procedure for national consultation

on the EU SDS is similar to that for all EU issues. In particular, in case of conflicts of

interest a first step of conciliation takes place in the Interministerial Conference on

Foreign Policy and in a next step an appeal is made to the Deliberation Committee.

Yet, as for the two other decision-making processes, national decision making on

EU SDS issues has passed largely without struggle. None of the interviewees could

remember a possible conflict that has arisen with respect to the topic.

Intergovernmental Practices for Sustainable Development: HorizontalFindings

This section first considers similarities and differences in intergovernmental co-

operation in Belgium for the three international decision-making processes, with

regard to each of the four distinguished areas of co-operation. As a starting point,

Table 1 presents the most important characteristics of Belgian intergovernmental co-

operation for CSD, AMSDE and the EU. Then, this section discusses the different

degrees of involvement of the federal government and the subnational governments,

which has been touched upon throughout the empirical discussion. Finally, it examines

why in Belgium the federal government and the subnational governments co-operate

so extensively, i.e. what are the motivations for intergovernmental co-operation?

Similarities and Differences

The analysis revealed many similarities. First, with regard to consultation, it is notice-

able that the national co-ordination meeting is always chaired by a federal representa-

tive, that federal and subnational political and administrative officials can participate at

the meeting, and that the outcome of the meeting is based on a consensus, though not

legally binding. Second, concerning representation, when there is no ministerial

attendance at the international meeting (i.e. because it is not a high-level meeting or

because the minister is unable to attend the meeting), the head, and also spokesperson,

of the Belgian delegation is primarily a federal representative, often of Belgium’s

Permanent Representation. Subnational representatives can be part of the national del-

egation to EU and global meetings and informal agreements can substantially increase

their role in the national delegation (for example as Belgian spokesperson at expert-

level meetings). Third, information is key in decision making, and governments

obtain it through an increasing number of channels. All governmental members of

the Belgian delegation can acquire information through international secretariats.


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Table 1. Characteristics of Belgian intergovernmental co-operation on CSD, AMSDE and EU

CSD AMSDE EU

ConsultationCo-ordination body COORMULTI SD working group on AMSDE ad hoc working group and DGEChair federal federal federalMembers federal and subnational political and

administrative officials, civil societyactors

federal political officials, federal andsubnational administrative officials

federal and subnational political andadministrative officials; representativesof Belgium’s Permanent Representationto EU

Decisions based on consensus, not legally binding based on consensus, not legallybinding

based on consensus, not legally binding

On the spot formal or ad hoc no ad hocRepresentationDelegation decided in COORMULTI SD working group on AMSDE DGEHead of delegation Minister, or Belgian Permanent

Representative to UNfederal representative of Belgium’s

Permanent Representation to OECDMinister, or federal representative of

Belgium’s Permanent Representation toEU

Composition of delegation Minister, federal representatives ofBelgium’s Permanent Representation toUN, federal and subnationaladministrative officials, civil societyrepresentatives

federal and subnational representativesof Belgium’s PermanentRepresentation to OECD, federaland subnational administrativeofficials

Minister, federal and subnationalrepresentatives of Belgium’s PermanentRepresentation to EU, federal andsubnational political and administrativeofficials

Who speaks? Minister, federal representative, orsubnational representative

federal representative Minister, or federal representative

High level rare ministerial attendance of CSD high-level segment

no Council of Ministers and EuropeanCouncil

Dissemination of informationCo-ordination body by chair and secretariat of co-ordination body (COORMULTI SD, working group on AMSDE, DGE)Permanent representation by Belgian Permanent Representation (to UN, OECD and EU) and attached subnational RepresentationsInternational secretariats by secretariats of CSD, AMSDE and CouncilConciliationStatute undefined undefined 1994 Cooperation agreement on Council

of Ministers of the EUConflict sometimes, yet small and easily resolved;

low-level politicsno; low-level politics rare; situated at political level, yet still

rather low-level politicsFirst step Interministerial Conference on Foreign

PolicyInterministerial Conference on Foreign

PolicyInterministerial Conference on Foreign

PolicyLast resort Deliberation Committee Deliberation Committee Deliberation Committee

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Moreover, information is spread by the Belgian Permanent Representations and, when

applicable, also by the subnational Representations attached to them. Throughout the

decision-making process a core role in information exchange is played by the chair and

the secretariat of the national co-ordination bodies. In general, much of the correspon-

dence occurs through e-mail. Fourth, as for all international policy issues, conciliation

is mainly a role, first, of the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy and, in the

last resort, of the Deliberation Committee. Yet, the analysis reveals that—in compari-

son to other (international) discussions—the international sustainable development

discussions usually have a low political salience. That facilitates the achievement of

a consensus and contributes to a minimal number of conflicts of interest.

Intergovernmental co-operation for international decision making on sustainable

development also differs on some points. First, national consultation in Brussels

takes place in three different consultation bodies, largely involving other federal and

subnational officials. On the spot, formal or ad hoc consultation takes place for CSD

and EU SDS, yet for AMSDE national consultation on the spot is rare and usually

only informal and ad hoc. Second, with regard to representation, high-level involve-

ment is most common for EU SDS matters. Indeed, while the EU SDS is discussed

by the European Council and by the Council of Ministers, ministerial representation

at CSD is rare and the AMSDE only takes place at expert and diplomat level. Third,

a conciliation procedure is defined only formally, i.e. by a co-operation agreement,

for national discussions on EU SDS matters. Fourth, it is interesting to note that slightly

more political weight is given to the EU negotiations on the EU SDS than to the global

discussions on sustainable development. A last point of difference concerns the invol-

vement of civil society members. Only when CSD matters are discussed can members

of civil society attend national consultation meetings and be part of the national del-

egation. That is consistent with how global CSD meetings are conducted (cf. supra)

and with the idea of sustainable development.

Involvement of the Federal Government and the Subnational Governments

Differences can also be noticed with regard to the extent of participation of the Belgian

governments at the national co-ordination meetings and in the national delegation for

CSD, AMSDE and EU meetings (interviewees). Obviously, the responsibilities of the

federal government make the latter an important player. The federal government plays

a crucial role with regard to the co-ordination of a national position and the represen-

tation of Belgium at the international level. Moreover, by being actively involved for

years the federal government has acquired much experience and institutional memory.

At the subnational level, Flanders is a very vigorous player. It actively participates at

all national co-ordination meetings and it makes a large effort to be part of the Belgian

delegation for EU and global meetings. Flemish activity in national decision making

can be explained partly by ‘identity politics’. Flanders wants to be present and

visible at the national and the international level and it appeals to the Flemish identity

for legitimizing its actions at those levels. It considers involvement through the Belgian

context the most effective way to have both access to and visibility at the international

level. The other Belgian Regions and Communities have proven to be less active with

regard to international decision making on sustainable development. For example,


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until a few years ago the Walloon Region and the French Community did not consider

(international) sustainable development policy to be of high importance and they

invested only few resources (staff and budget) in it. More than once, they have put

their trust in the federal government to represent them at the EU and global levels.

Their highest activity can be found with regard to CSD, where representatives of

both subnational entities regularly attend co-ordination meetings and make up part

of the Belgian delegation for CSD. Recently, they are catching up with regard to

their involvement in national co-ordination processes for international decision

making on sustainable development (interviewees). The other subnational entities

(the Brussels-Capital Region and the small German-speaking Community) participate

on an irregular basis and to a very limited extent.

Motivations for Intergovernmental Co-operation

Sustainable development is a shared responsibility of the federal government and the

subnational governments in Belgium. As a result, all Belgian governments have an

interest in international decision making on sustainable development. The division

of competencies ensures that they are mutually interdependent in reaching a

Belgian position for an international meeting. The federal government depends on

the subnational governments to formulate a Belgian position on issues that are

(partly) subnational competencies and it is, therefore, very willing to involve them

in the national co-ordination process. The subnational governments are a demanding

party to be involved in national consultation because it offers them the most oppor-

tunities to raise a subnational position (that is integrated in the Belgian position or

that is adopted as the Belgian position) to the international level. Moreover, inter-

views reveal that even when subnational governments use extra-state channels,

they still want to be loyal to the nationally agreed—Belgian—position. Interviewees

argue that there are many advantages to national co-operation in the context of inter-

national decision making on sustainable development. First, co-operation results in an

abundance of expertise, ideas, information and burden-sharing of the workload. A

second advantage is a kind of positive competition among the participating govern-

ments, as none of them wants to lag behind. Third, the involvement of more than

three governments—on an equal footing—to a certain extent prevents one govern-

ment from defending an extreme position and blocking a consensus. And, lastly,

according to the interviewees, co-operation in a Belgian context leads to compro-

mises that usually bear resemblance to what the European, or even global compro-

mise could be.

Conclusion: Informal, Ad Hoc and Various Co-operation Practices

Intergovernmental co-operation is crucial in federal states, especially for an outside-in

policy, such as sustainable development, which urges governments to co-operate with

various actors at multiple levels. This article examined intergovernmental co-operation

practices between the federal government and the subnational governments in Belgium

with regard to international decision making on sustainable development. It paid par-

ticular attention to co-operation practices in four areas, i.e. consultation,


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representation, dissemination of information and conciliation. The Belgian co-oper-

ation practices result from international pressures. More specifically international

decision making on sustainable development has instigated intergovernmental co-

operation in Belgium. Moreover, the Belgian governments are mutually interdepen-

dent with regard to international decision making on sustainable development,

because of the in foro interno, in foro externo principle and because of the fact that

sustainable development is a shared responsibility of the federal government and of

the subnational governments in Belgium.

The results of this article confirm the argument of earlier scholars that the Belgian

federal state system is co-operative by nature, although dual in theory. In Belgium,

extensive co-operation and co-ordination take place with regard to international

decision making on sustainable development in the UN Commission on Sustainable

Development, the OECD Annual Meeting of Sustainable Development Experts and

the EU with regard to the discussions on its Sustainable Development Strategy.

The co-operation practices are adequate and function well. The atmosphere for co-

operation is constructive and a lack of large conflicts of interest seems to be proof

of it. Serious conflicts that had to be settled at a higher political level have never

occurred and small conflicts of interest that popped up were usually easily solved.

Yet, the co-operation practices are informal, ad hoc and varied. In some cases they

are only called into being when co-operation is needed. In other cases, they result

from a historically developed situation. There is a lack of a formal framework to

hold on to in case of uncertainty. Flanders advocates the establishment of a formal

co-operation agreement, among other things for increasing its role in the decision-

making process. At the time of writing (2011), however, the formal discussions are

on hold. Given the political crisis in Belgium (between 2007 and 2011), it is

unclear when the rather low salience policy subject of sustainable development will

regain its place on the political agenda.

Acknowledgements

This research was partly funded by the Flemish Policy Research Centre for Sustainable

Development (2007–2011). It is part of a doctoral research project (Van den Brande,

2012). An earlier version of the article was presented at the 52nd Annual Convention of

the International Studies Association (16–19 March 2011, Montreal, Canada). The

author thanks all members of the Belgian delegation for their co-operation to this

research. Moreover, the author highly appreciates the useful comments and sugges-

tions of Stephane Paquin and Wilfried Swenden, and of two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1A subnational entity is defined as a “coherent territorial entity situated between local and national

levels” and its government as the “set of legislative and executive institutions responsible for author-

itative decision-making” (Marks et al., 2008: 113). The notion ‘regional’ indicates the level immedi-

ately above the nation-state, including, for example, the EU. The term ‘international’ is used when

referring to both the regional and the global level.2That can also be described as the choice for a co-operative strategy instead of a separating strategy, as

labelled by Beyers and Bursens (2006). They argue that subnational entities can adopt a co-operative


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strategy entailing that those entities “remain hierarchically nested within a domestic institutional fra-

mework” (Beyers and Bursens, 2006: 1060) or a separating strategy implying that they “separate

themselves from the central government by increasingly bypassing or acting beyond the existing

member state structures” (Beyers and Bursens, 2006: 1060).3The discussion is based on co-operation practices for the two-yearly CSD cycle of 2008 and 2009, for

the 2009 and 2010 AMSDE meetings and for the 2009 EU discussions on the European Commission’s

progress report and the next review of the EU SDS.4For an overview of the most important decisions taken at each of those state reforms (in 1970, 1980,

1988 and 1992), see Swenden et al. (2006).5The competencies of the Flemish Community and the Flemish Region are managed by the government

of Flanders.6Art. 146 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC); art. 203 TEC according to the

new numbering of the Amsterdam Treaty.7For shared responsibilities, co-operation with the federal government is required (Beyers et al., 2004).8In full: Framework agreement of 30 Jun 1994 for co-operation between the federal state, the Commu-

nities and the Regions on the representation of the Kingdom of Belgium in international organizations

discussing issues that are shared competencies (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1994a).9In full: Cooperation agreement of 8 Mar 1994 between the federal state, the Communities and the

Regions on the representation of the Kingdom of Belgium in the Council of Ministers of the European

Union (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1994b).10For matters in category I (on general affairs), a federal minister represents Belgium. In category II (on

the internal market), a federal minister can be accompanied by a subnational assessor. In category III

(on industry), a subnational minister can be accompanied by a federal assessor and, for category IV

matters (on culture), a subnational minister represents Belgium. Category V and VI concern one

matter—fisheries and agriculture, respectively. For the former, the Flemish Minister of Fisheries rep-

resents Belgium, in the case of the latter, the federal minister speaks for the Flemish and the Walloon

government (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2003; VVPV, 2009).11Agenda 21 defines the following nine Major Groups: women; children and youth; indigenous people;

non-governmental organizations; local authorities; workers and trade unions; business and industry;

scientific and technological communities; and farmers.12The Federal Planning Bureau is a federal public agency engaged in economic analysis and forecasting.

Its role has developed historically. When the federal government institutionalized sustainable develop-

ment with the Law of 1997, experts of the Bureau had already been following the international

decision-making process on sustainable development closely for years. They had built up expertise

and institutional memory that could not be replaced overnight. As a result, a political agreement

has assigned those experts a mandate to follow-up on international discussions on sustainable devel-

opment in the CSD and the AMSDE (interviewees).13A pilot can be defined as “a federal or subnational official who is made responsible for the internal

Belgian supervision of an individual dossier” (Van den Brande et al., 2011b: 76).14If a minister attends the CSD meeting, that minister represents Belgium. Yet, federal and subnational

ministerial participation at the high-level part of the CSD has been rather exceptional. More than once,

ministers found it difficult to attend the CSD because of a problematic political situation in Belgium.15Flanders attends the meetings regularly, the Brussels-Capital Region less and the other subnational

governments only rarely (interviewees).16The seven key challenges for the EU are climate change and clean energy; sustainable transport; sus-

tainable consumption and production; conservation and management of natural resources; public

health; social inclusion, demography and migration; and global poverty.17In 2009 and 2010, a discussion took place at the EU level about a potential revision of the EU SDS

in 2011. At the time of writing, it is likely that the EU SDS will not be revised or renewed

(interviewees).18Previously, when the ad hoc IMCSD was at work for negotiating a national strategy for sustainable

development, national co-ordination of a Belgian position on the EU SDS took place in a working

group of that Interministerial Conference (interviewees). In a next phase, the agreed Belgian position

was adopted by DGE.


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