Interest Group Influence on Exchange Rate Policy during Speculative Attacks Stefanie Walter Swiss...
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Transcript of Interest Group Influence on Exchange Rate Policy during Speculative Attacks Stefanie Walter Swiss...
Interest Group Influence on Exchange Rate Policy
during Speculative Attacks
Stefanie WalterSwiss Federal Institute of Technology
Claremont Workshop on Political Economy Data and Analysis,
CGU, October 7, 2005
Motivation
• Policy Options when faced with speculative attacks:– Defense of XR– Devaluation
• Research Question:
How do private sector preferences influence the government‘s decision?
Policy Responses to Speculative Attacks
1970-2003
0%
20%
40%
60%
ImmediateDevaluation
Failed Defense SuccessfulDefense
Effects of Devaluation on Competitiveness
Reliance on Exports relative to Imports
High Low
Devaluation Positive Negative
Defense Neutral Neutral
Effects of Devaluation on Balance Sheets
Reliance on Foreign Currency Liabilities relative to Domestic Currency Liabilities
High Low
Devaluation Negative Neutral
Defense Neutral Negative
Previous Research
Leblang (2003) Shambaugh (2004)
Blomberg, Frieden, Stein (2004)
Alesina/Wagner (2004)
Dependent Variable
similar different different similar
Competi-tiveness
exports Exports,
imports,
manuf. exports
Manufacturing,
openness,
trade balance
Openness,
trade shocks
Balance Sheets
(Foreign debt) Bank lending
FDI
Portfolio investm.
– Foreign liabilities
Joint effect – theory: yes, empirics: no
– –
Joint Effects: Portfolio
Defense: C: neutral B: neutral
Devaluation: C: negative B: negative
Reliance on Exports / Reliance on Imports
Rel
ianc
e on
$ L
iabi
litie
s / R
elia
nce
on
Dom
estic
Cur
renc
y Li
abili
ties
Defense: C: neutral B: negative
Devaluation: C: negative B: neutral
Defense: C: neutral B: neutral
Devaluation: C: positive B: negative
Defense: C: neutral B: negative
Devaluation: C: positive B: neutral
C = Effect on Competitiveness
B = Effect on Balance Sheets
Portfolio Position and Preferences
Defen
se
Deval
uatio
n
Indi
ffere
nce
Reliance on Exports / Reliance on Imports
Rel
ianc
e on
$ L
iabi
litie
s / R
elia
nce
on
Dom
estic
Cur
renc
y Li
abili
ties
Case Studies
• Identify relevant groups– Private sector interest group, urban workers etc.
• Identify these groups‘ preferences– using portfolio approach
• Identify political influence of these groups– Small and well organized groups vs. large and
dispersed groups, access to government etc.
Large N analysis (country level)
Idea:• Apply portfolio-analysis to countries and
identify aggregate preferencesOperationalization:• Reliance on exports relative to reliance on
imports– (X-M)/GDP *(X+M)/GDP
• Reliance on $ debt relative to reliance on domestic currency debt– Net Private Foreign Liabilities/M2
Preliminary Results
XR change in 3 months after attack
Ordinal Policy Response
Competitiveness -0.169** (0.07)
-0.707 (0.69)
Net foreign liabilities/M2
0.008* (0.00)
0.030 (0.06)
Constant -0.203*** (0.04)
N 273 273
R2/Pseudo R2 0.0102 0.0034
Portfolio Position and Policy Responses to Speculative Attacks
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5
Defense Failed Defense Immediate Devaluation
Discussion
• On the aggregate, effects may cancel out• Data on foreign debt is readily available, data
on foreign-currency-denominated debt is not.• Variable so far does not consider net
domestic liabilities and assets• Measurement of the joint effects