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capabilities could compromise the abil-ity of the joint force to successfully con-duct a full range of operations.

Statements by various proponentsof intelligence support have createdgreat expectations. The QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR) identified ex-ploiting intelligence advantages as oneof the four pillars of military transfor-mation. Senior leaders and defensespecialists anticipate that commanderswill be able to receive markedly fasterand more detailed intelligence on a sit-uation, which is known as information

J oint operations will demand anunprecedented level of intelli-gence support in the future. Likeother aspects of jointness, thisasset will not only require improvementbut transformation. Moreover, it will re-quire more than keeping ahead of po-tential enemies. If the obstructive pat-terns found in the system are notovercome, the gap between needs and

Markus V. Garlauskas is an intelligence specialist with the Department of the Army assigned to Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea.

Intelligence Supportfor Military OperationsBy M A R K U S V. G A R L A U S K A S

Refueling U–2,Iraqi Freedom.

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Matthew Hannen)

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2003 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2002 to 00-00-2003

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Intelligence Support for Military Operations

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,2605th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

7

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

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superiority. Joint Vision 2020 states thatinformation superiority is fundamentalto achieving the necessary capabilities.Thus it is vital to examine the chal-lenges to making that vision a reality.

The Armed Forces must assume acentral role in transforming intelli-gence. An increased reliance on na-tional intelligence agencies has deniedcontrol to commanders and limitedinput by fielded forces. Those leaders

responsible for transformation mustestablish realistic expectations for fu-ture support based on the resourcesprovided. In the past, military expec-tations have been exaggerated giventhe means at hand, setting the stagefor failure. Moreover, transformationmust create an anticipatory supportsystem, which is prepared both geo-graphically and functionally for vari-ous missions. Intelligence often doesnot adequately support military opera-tions other than war or deploymentsto unexpected environments. Finally,institutional inertia must be over-come. The necessary changes can be

made, but time is running out. Trans-formation is continuing, and expecta-tions for support are increasing daily.

The Military RoleSome regard transforming intelli-

gence as synonymous with militarytransformation, with the same dynam-ics, goals, and characteristics. Becauseof this mistaken belief, many propo-nents of military transformation ex-

pect the intelligence com-munity to lead the way inthe evolution of intelli-gence support. As AdmiralWilliam Owens, USN(Ret.), a former Vice Chair-man, viewed the situation,

“The U.S. intelligence communitymust either seek to lead and promotethe on-going transformation of themilitary or bear much of the responsi-bility for a U.S. failure to seize the op-portunities provided by our lead inmilitary technologies.”1

This approach must change or theArmed Forces may be left without in-telligence support to meet their needs.National intelligence agencies—whichare neither commands nor part of themilitary intelligence apparatus—havevarious customers, interests, and prior-ities beyond direct support to joint op-erations. In addition, as the NationalReconnaissance Office has reported,

“[A support] system designed by intel-ligence experts, rather than militaryoperators, would most likely be basedon the information that can be pro-vided, and it could be ignorant of whatinformation is actually needed for op-erational decisionmaking.”2

Since the Cold War, commandshave sought intelligence from outsidetheir organizations to an unprece-dented degree. Intelligence staffs onthe tactical level derive limited benefitfrom intelligence that originates inhigher headquarters because senior-level staffs increasingly turn to agen-cies on the national level to meet thedemands of their commanders.

This change was accelerated bythe Persian Gulf War. The massive re-quirements of the air campaign ledU.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)to depend on the national agencies foran unparalleled level of support. Na-tional agencies offered considerable in-telligence resources, but the resultswere less than satisfactory. That experi-ence may have led the services to in-vest more in intelligence capabilities,but budget constraints produced theopposite result.

As the Cold War ended, nationalintelligence agencies demonstratedtheir capability and willingness to in-crease the emphasis on support to mil-itary operations as they sought post-Soviet missions to protect budgets.Military leaders were meanwhile look-ing for ways to cut spending in orderto minimize the impact on force struc-ture and combat power. Expecting in-creased support from the intelligencecommunity to mitigate any shortfalls,the services drastically cut intelligenceassets. The intelligence community,with the support of the President,made supporting military operationsits top priority in response.

Despite budgetary benefits, thisarrangement will present problems forthe joint force if it continues. First,painful resource conflicts between com-manders and other national intelli-gence customers are becoming in-evitable. Second, a heavy reliance onnational agency support will hamperthe command and control of supported

a heavy reliance on national agencysupport will hamper the commandand control of supported commanders

CIA headquarters,Langley, Virginia.

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resources must be quickly pulled awayfrom other tasks.

Even if conflicting requirementsonly rarely lead to unexpected drops innational agency support, a similarproblem arises from the inability ofcommanders to fully control that sup-port. According to joint doctrine, com-manders are expected to coordinateand control support. While nationalagencies are central to the intelligenceeffort, it is difficult to achieve suchcontrol in practice. During the air cam-paign in Yugoslavia, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, GeneralWesley Clark, USA, exercised no con-trol over organizations that recom-mended targets for the Allied Force.When the Chinese embassy in Belgradewas attacked, Clark had to deal withthe consequences. If a joint force com-mander does not control the conductof intelligence support, how can he

commanders, who cannot normally di-rectly task most national resources.More generally, overreliance on na-tional agencies will limit the desire andability of the military to shape the re-sponse to increased intelligence sup-port needs.

The impact of these issues wasminimized when the military was theunrivaled number one customer of thenational intelligence agencies. However,those days are now numbered if notover. As far back as 1996, the IC21 con-gressional study concluded that a heavyemphasis on support for military opera-tions was crowding out other intelli-gence customers. With the global waron terrorism, many of those customersnow have increased priority. Nationalagencies will be expected to support lawenforcement agencies and coalitionpartners hunting terrorists as well asenemy units. Similarly, national-level

support to force protection for U.S.units deployed overseas will increas-ingly take a back seat to warning of ter-rorist attacks at home. A moderately in-creased top line in the intelligencebudget will do little to offset resourceconflicts generated by realignment.

As the new priorities come intoplay, commanders will find that theyactually exercise very limited controlover national intelligence support. Inthe past, unified commanders havebeen able to use voluminous and insis-tent submissions of intelligence require-ments and requests to national agenciesto exercise de facto control over na-tional assets. Commanders may findthat the information which is expectedis unavailable because applicable na-tional resources have been devoted toother strategic priorities on short no-tice. Unlike the military, the nationalintelligence agencies do not have signif-icant uncommitted resources for crises,so when a new requirement emerges,

Counterair briefingaboard USS Harry S. Truman.

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issue must be addressed and betterarrangements must be worked outeven if military dependence on na-tional agency support is reduced.

Transformation leaders cannotexpect exponential increases in re-sponsive and effective intelligencesupport while leaving it solely to thenational intelligence community. Ifthe joint force of the future needsmore operational intelligence support,it must be paid for out of service budg-ets. More capable military intelligenceorganizations must be equal partnerswith national agencies, enabling them

to better represent their interests intransforming intelligence communitycapabilities. This may lead the ArmedForces to exercise more control oversome national resources as necessary.Military leaders must show that theyare equal to this challenge by payingcareful attention to the intelligence as-pects of transformation.

ExpectationsIntelligence failures draw popular

attention. What goes unsaid, however,is that flawed expectations can lead tofailure. If expectations are unclear, orunachievable based on available re-sources, military transformation willnot achieve its promise, which proba-bly will be proven on the battlefield.Identifying such a setback as an intel-ligence failure would be small consola-tion. To avert this situation, militaryleaders must exert a leading role insetting expectations for their intelli-gence support.

History has provided transforma-tion leaders with ample warning. Eachsuccessive iteration of U.S. warfightingdoctrine since World War II has heldout higher expectations which werenot fully met. With the heavy reliancecurrent transformation efforts place onintelligence, the emerging generationof doctrine could be the worst exampleof this pattern yet.

The roots of excessive confidencein intelligence support are found in

World War II. The military opinion ofintelligence improved rapidly afterPearl Harbor. The postwar lifting of se-crecy brought some intelligence coupsto light, including the breaking ofenemy codes. Decisive victories at Mid-way, the Battle of the Atlantic againstGerman U-boats, the invasion of Sicily,and even the Normandy landing wereattributed to superior intelligence.

When military doctrine was re-vised in the 1950s, this optimistic viewof intelligence would be apparent. Pen-tomic doctrine envisioned battlegroupsdispersed to minimize their vulnerabil-ity to nuclear strikes, with the gaps

covered by improved sur-veillance and intelligencedirecting long-range fire-power. Meanwhile, doc-trine shifted from retalia-tion against cities to rapid

strikes against hard-to-find targets, in-cluding delivery systems.

At the time new doctrine wasadopted, U.S. intelligence could notmeet targeting support requirements. Amassive improvement program di-rected by President Dwight Eisenhowerled to revolutionary overhead cameras,new platforms, and more photo-interpreters—but only partially solvedthe problem. U-2 aircraft and theCorona satellite provided some abilityto find and track strategic targets insidethe Soviet Union; however, no assetswere deployed to meet the tactical tar-geting needs of Pentomic doctrine be-fore it was abandoned years later.

Such problems were often re-peated, most notably in developingAirLand Battle doctrine, which re-quired quickly finding and selectingtargets deep in enemy territory in rap-idly changing situations. AirLand Bat-tle anticipated strikes on mobile highpayoff targets such as command andcontrol vehicles. Moreover, it expectedhighly accurate bomb damage assess-ment (BDA) to allow rapid reengage-ment of surviving targets withoutwasting deep strike capabilities.

The intelligence capabilities re-quired were not in place, and unlike inthe 1950s there was no crash programto develop them. It was almost a

decade after the adoption of AirLandBattle before assets such as the jointsurveillance target attack radar system(JSTARS) aircraft made it possible tomonitor movements deep behindenemy lines in near-real time. But im-provements in technical collection didnot solve every problem, as DesertStorm showed.

The comments of senior leadersduring the Gulf War illustrated thelevel of expectations. General NormanSchwarzkopf, USA, and General CharlesHorner, USAF, admitted that successwould not have been possible withoutunprecedented intelligence support.But in virtually the next breath theysaid that expectations were not met inkey areas. Horner, who directed air op-erations, lambasted poor intelligencesupport for targeting. Similarly,Schwarzkopf testified before Congressthat the BDA system was abysmal.

Desert Storm revealed that effec-tively tracking key mobile targets, amajor component of AirLand Battle,was a remote goal. After launchinghundreds of missions against mobileScud launchers, it is still impossible toconfirm if any were destroyed. Yearslater, during the NATO bombing ofKosovo, U.S. forces still did not receivesupport to consistently identify andstrike mobile targets from the air,while indications from Afghanistanare that the problem has yet to befully resolved.

High expectations for intelligenceto support targeting and BDA has con-tinued with the focus on precision en-gagement in Joint Vision 2020. Jointforces of the future will be expected toselect, spot, identify, track, and striketargets that will achieve decisive ef-fects, assess the results, and thenquickly reacquire and reengage surviv-ing targets as necessary. Further, thejoint force is expected to accomplishthese tasks with overwhelming speedand throughout a full range of militaryoperations—while minimizing collat-eral damage and fratricide.

The main condition to achievingthis vision of precision engagement isintelligence. The Armed Forces havedeveloped and proven the capability tostrike targets rapidly, once identified.However, experience with precisionstrikes in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and

joint forces will be expected to select,spot, identify, track, and strike targetsthat will achieve decisive effects

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quately cover every location whereforces may be deployed. Therefore, in-creasing coverage in a crisis leads tosacrificing attention elsewhere and pos-sibly missing warnings of other crises.

As with platforms, there are fewerpeople to go around than before budg-etary cuts began. More importantly,analysts are not universally inter-changeable between regions and spe-cialties. Specialized expertise on de-ployment areas or the surroundingregions is vital for good collection andanalysis. This knowledge has normallybeen in short supply when unexpectedevents cause forces to be deployed be-cause most intelligence personnel havebeen trained and conditioned to dealwith just a few longstanding threats.

When North Korea invaded theSouth in 1950, the U.S. intelligencesystem was unprepared to meet thehuman requirements for operations onthe peninsula because it had been fo-cused on Europe. A study of lessonslearned during the Korean War re-vealed a critical shortage of trained lin-guists in the Army.3 The National Secu-rity Agency (NSA), which providessignal intelligence to the military, hadonly one analyst tasked to cover Ko-rean message traffic and only onetrained Korean linguist at the outbreakof the conflict.

Forty years later, little hadchanged. When Iraq invaded Kuwaitin 1990, DIA had only one analyst as-signed to Iraq fulltime. When forceswere deployed to Somalia the follow-ing year, CIA had to send case officerswho did not speak the language andhad little knowledge of Somali historyor the clans which ran the country.Military intelligence units were soshort of trained personnel that they re-lied on Somali civilians as interpreters,some of whose backgrounds taintedthe resulting intelligence.

Even after troops are deployedand an area becomes an intelligencepriority, experience demonstrates thatit can take a long time to overcome alack of advance preparation. Intelli-gence organizations will quickly assigncollectors and analysts, but recruitingand training area experts and linguistscan require years, and building an ef-fective human intelligence (HUMINT)

Afghanistan have demonstrated thatthe joint force can hit targets moreconsistently and quickly than it canidentify and select targets. Poor BDAhas also meant that no one knowswhat was really accomplished in agiven strike for months if ever. Inshort, doctrine is ahead of intelligencesupport again.

It will require tempered expecta-tions and increased capabilities tobring the two factors into closer align-ment. If the military allocates suffi-cient resources and attention, intelli-gence capabilities may be able torealize the expectations of Joint Vision2020 by the appointed year. However,in the intervening years, doctrine mustreflect—and commanders must esti-mate—goals for intelligence support.

Transformation leaders must alsobe specific in communicating their vi-sion of the future. This will mean as-sessing intelligence support needs forvarious contingencies in doctrinalterms rather than in terms of the tech-nological capabilities available for ex-ploitation. Without precise guidanceon future needs, the national intelli-gence agencies will choose to build ca-pabilities based on their priorities,while military organizations will not beable to optimize structures, doctrines,and training programs to best accom-plish their missions.

Anticipatory Support The Armed Forces have made

great strides in the physical ability torapidly project power over vast dis-tances as well as deploy and sustainforces in areas with little preexistinginfrastructure. They have made far lessprogress toward rapidly meeting intel-ligence support needs for operations inall but the highest priority locationsand missions. To address this problem,the Armed Forces must build a systemthat anticipates and prepares for, notreacts to, the challenges of an increas-ingly diverse threat.

Since World War II, U.S. forceshave been frequently deployed toplaces regarded as low intelligence pri-orities until the outbreak of a crisis,which has meant that intelligence or-ganizations were unprepared to pro-vide support. Similarly, the intelligencesupport system has had problemsmeeting the unique demands of mis-sions other than the full-scale tradi-tional warfare for which it was de-signed. These shortcomings havebecome obvious in non-war militaryoperations in various parts of theworld since the Cold War.

Both the breadth and flexibility ofU.S. intelligence is currently limited.The increasing cost of collection plat-forms results in fewer entering the

UAV operator stationsinside tactical controlshelter.

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ence. Cultivating, placing, and evaluat-ing the reliability of human sources isbest done over a long period. Rushingthe process to support operationswhich are underway can compromiseeffectiveness, as became clear in Soma-lia. Among other issues, HUMINT sup-port for Task Force Ranger led to hit-ting the wrong targets several times,including a pro-U.N. Somali general.

Reliance on HUMINT in Somaliaalso illustrated that various types of op-erations call for different requirementsand present unique challenges. Suchmissions can be best addressed withmethods, structures, and equipmentoptimized for the task at hand. For ex-ample, requirements in Somalia couldonly be effectively met by humanagents, leading the U.S. military to de-pend on comparatively weak HUMINTcapabilities. In other situations, such aslarge-scale conventional wars, elec-tronic sensors might be more useful.

The full spectrum dominance in-voked by JV 2020 means the intelli-gence system must be able to supportany type of operations on short notice.But the system is trained and organ-ized today to support large-scale con-ventional warfare and can only betemporarily or marginally modified tosupport other missions. The ArmedForces are beginning to make signifi-cant changes, such as the increasedHUMINT capabilities of the Strykerbrigade combat team within the Army.Further progress will require broadertraining and more flexible organiza-tions, as well as units that can supportparticular missions and be ready for at-tachment to deploying forces.

Moreover, the joint force must laythe intelligence groundwork for sup-porting operations in areas that maynot be priorities today. In many placeswhere the military will be deployed,and some where they are currently de-ployed, there are insufficient HUMINTand other specific resources. A rela-tively small long-term investment in

recruiting and training area specialistsand better monitoring lower-priorityareas may provide substantially im-proved support when the time comesto deploy on short notice. By carefulanalysis, areas that may become crisisspots can be identified to receivegreater attention with enough leadtime to put the groundwork in place.

There will be resistance to thisanticipatory approach. It would takeresources from other concerns andtraining from conventional warfight-ing support. In addition, most of theassets would come from the military.The national agencies are focused oncurrent requirements and cannot ded-icate more than a token effort to areasthat might only potentially be criticalto military customers.

Despite the expense, if a predic-tive approach is not pursued, jointforces will find it difficult to achieveinformation superiority in the future.Local and regional threats have a sig-

nificant home groundadvantage that has his-torically overcome theU.S. intelligence advan-tages alluded to in theQDR report. Transfor-mation leaders cannot

afford to concede information superi-ority to an enemy at the outbreak of acrisis because of reluctance to pay thecosts of better preparing for a wide va-riety of contingencies.

Overcoming InertiaIn meeting these challenges,

transformation leaders will encountercultural, budgetary, and organizationalinertia. Many patterns must bechanged to achieve transformationaladvances in intelligence support ofmilitary operations. Some have alreadybeen considered, while others mayonly have a minimal impact on trans-formation. Yet two problems requirespecial attention: the preference forhigh-tech collection and communica-tion over other forms of intelligenceand the relatively low priority intelli-gence is assigned within the military.

It has long been part of the intelli-gence culture to prize collection overanalysis, and technical means of col-lection in particular have dominated

budgets. Similarly, the defense estab-lishment has a strong tendency toequate fielding advanced technologywith transformation. As a result, intel-ligence transformation has focusedlargely on using new technologies togather and distribute a flood of raw in-formation, which the United States al-ready does fairly well.

Leaders insist that the intelligencefocus is moving toward more person-nel and analysis, but technology andcollection still receive most of thefunds—along with the power and pres-tige. Of nine programs cited as keytransformation initiatives by the Trans-formation Study Report in 2001, onlythe Army distributed common groundsystem was not a technical sensor orplatform. Designed to improve intelli-gence processing, analysis, and dissem-ination, this system was only assignedas a C list priority.4

When combined with the tradi-tionally secondary status of intelligencein the military, this bias can have dam-aging effects on transformation. Onehas been the funding and attention de-voted to enhancing sensor-to-shooterlinks, such as connecting fighter pilotswith real-time imagery from platforms.This approach to the transformation ofthe targeting process wastes limited re-sources and is partially driven by thedesire of shooters to limit reliance onintelligence personnel.

Shooters already have sensors,and providing more raw unanalyzedsensor data will solve few of their prob-lems. Linking warfighters directly toadditional sensor information meanslittle without the analytical capabilityto accurately determine what the sen-sors are actually looking at. Trainedimagery analysts who had ample timewere deceived in Iraq, Kosovo, andAfghanistan, and shooters under im-mediate threat will be far less effectiveanalysts. Worse, the transmission of allthis data will place huge and unneces-sary demands on overburdened com-munications networks, not to mentionthe attention of the shooter.

It would be more useful to focustechnological resources on helpingthose personnel who now see sensor

intelligence transformation has focusedlargely on using new technologies togather and distribute raw information

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ucts. Once the obstacles to sharingamong agencies are overcome, thisshared knowledge would help resolvemany problems inherent in intera-gency cooperation without sacrificingorganizational independence. Militaryintelligence could get increased valuefrom national agency resources with-out contesting control. Analysts couldcontinue to provide analysis tailoredfor their organizations but withouthaving access to only part of the infor-mation collected on the subject.

Transformation will be a difficultprocess unless the Armed Forces acceptintelligence as an equal partner ofother aspects of joint operations. Dur-ing successful military transforma-tions, new relationships are formedamong the various arms of each serv-ice. The current situation is no excep-tion. A sustained effort will be requiredto substantially increase the level of at-tention and resources that intelligencereceives within the military. If intelli-gence support is becoming more vital,it must assume an increased priorityacross the defense establishment. Thechallenge can be met—and intelli-gence can fulfill its promise as thefoundation of military success. JFQ

N O T E S

1 William Owens, “Intelligence in the21st Century,” American Intelligence Journal,vol. 19, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring 1999), p. 15.

2 Thomas Behling and Kenneth Mc-Gruther, “Planning Satellite Support to Mili-tary Operations,” Studies in Intelligence(Winter 1998–99) n.p., http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art10.html.

3 8th U.S. Army Military History Section,Intelligence and Counterintelligence ProblemsDuring the Korea Conflict, reprint of 1954 re-port (Washington: U.S. Army Center forMilitary History, 2002), p. 1.

4 Jim McCarthy, Transformation Study Re-port: Transforming Military Operational Capa-bilities (Washington: Government PrintingOffice, 2001), p. 57.

data to identify targets more accu-rately. Substantially more effective au-tomatic target recognition softwareand hardware would enhance data ex-ploitation from existing sensors andplatforms, improving intelligence ap-plication across the board. At the sametime, more effort should be devoted toimproving analyst-shooter links forwarfighters to get valuable finished in-telligence more quickly.

Even when technology connectsshooters with virtual or human im-agery analysts to help identify targetsin real time, sensor-to-shooter links donot resolve the targeting support prob-lem. Effective targeting in an age ofprecision warfare is more complicatedthan simply finding things that belongto an enemy and designating them forattack. U.S. precision strike capabilitiesare finite and must be directed at themost important targets to be decisive.As Joint Vision 2020 states, “success de-pends on in-depth analysis to identifyand locate critical nodes and targets.”

Improvements in processing,analysis, and tasking—not more rawdata—are the keys to achieving trans-formational improvements in intelli-gence. Billions of dollars are to bespent on more unmanned aerial vehi-cles, satellites, and advanced sensors,

while it is clear that intelligence organ-izations lack the manpower to thor-oughly examine even a small fractionof the information currently collected.A more appropriate approach wouldredirect resources to building a systemthat more efficiently uses the collec-tion capacity. That would focus taskingmore tightly on areas likely to containvital pieces of information, improveprocessing to speed their identifica-tion, and provide the analytical re-sources to interpret what they meanmore reliably and completely. Thatwould provide better intelligence with-out increasing the amount of informa-tion collected.

Technology may find its optimumcontribution in streamlining the labor-intensive task of information process-ing. Deploying improved automatictarget recognition, electronic languagetranslation, virtual collaboration, anddata mining technologies would yieldsavings in manpower and time and re-sult in greater effectiveness. Ultimately,the processing, analysis, production,and storage of intelligence can andshould be far more automated.

The final transformational stepwould be creating a common intelli-gence knowledge base to allow ana-lysts from different organizations to se-curely, quickly, and efficiently access

Analyst checkingU–2 images.

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