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The Need for a New Intelligence ParadigmWilliam J. Lahneman

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To cite this Article Lahneman, William J.(2010) 'The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm', International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23: 2, 201 — 225To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08850600903565589URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600903565589

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WILLIAM J. LAHNEMAN

The Need for a New IntelligenceParadigm

While traditional state-based security challenges remain important, the mostserious threats to international security come increasingly from transnationalphenomena. Transnational terrorism is the most visible current threat of thistype, and governments are all too aware of the problems of fighting such anetworked opponent that operates across borders, skillfully capitalizing onthe increased travel, multifaceted communications, and expanded financialcapabilities resulting from the process of globalization. Transnationalcriminal networks pose another serious threat, albeit one that lacks thevisibility of terrorist networks because criminals seek financial gain ratherthan mass casualties.Other transnational threats have the potential to cause destruction and

upset international stability to a degree that will dwarf the effects ofterrorism. These include both human-induced and naturally occurringphenomena. Nuclear proliferation, the development of harmfulbiopathogens, continued illegal trade in conventional arms, and climatechange are examples of human-induced phenomena, whereas the continuedspread of HIV=AIDS and the potential for outbreaks of highly infectiousand deadly diseases, such as mutated avian flu and Sudden AcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS), are examples of naturally occurring ones.These threats have one thing in common beyond their potential for

destructiveness: all are transnational. As such, none can be understood—let alone defeated or reduced in intensity—by the actions of single states.

Dr. William J. Lahneman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at TowsonUniversity, Towson, Maryland, and Senior Research Scholar at the Center forInternational and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, CollegePark.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23: 201–225, 2010

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DOI: 10.1080/08850600903565589

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In an ideal world, all states would cooperate to deal with these commonthreats. Cooperation would take many forms, depending on the specificcircumstances and nature of the threat, but the need to share largevolumes of information and knowledge would be a common threadrunning through these efforts.In the real world, impediments to sharing on this scale are significant

because the knowledge and information in question fall into two broadcategories. First comes information and knowledge that virtually allgovernments and other actors have an interest in sharing voluntarily,although they might not recognize this fact. Second is information andknowledge that governments desire to keep secret. For single institutionsto deal with both types equally well is difficult.Intelligence agencies are the segment of national governments charged with

making sense of future security challenges. But their traditions andorganizational cultures emphasize secrecy, not knowledge sharing.Although valid reasons exist for this approach, the bias toward secrecyimpedes knowledge sharing. Mandating that the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity (IC) improve its knowledge sharing is a step in the rightdirection. But doing so is not sufficient to achieve the desired flows ofboth types of knowledge because one set of rules and structures cannotmanage both types of flows as long as the bias toward secrecy persists.Recognizing this fact and designing separate processes and structures tofacilitate both kinds of information flows require a new approach to theintelligence enterprise.

THE PROBLEM1

The world, and the threats within it, are becoming increasingly diffused innature, with nonmilitary threats increasing in relation to purely militaryones. Since the end of the Cold War, the IC has contended with theemergence of new threats to national security from a number of quarters,including such increasingly powerful nonstate actors as transnationalterrorist groups. Many of these individuals and organizations havecapitalized on the still evolving effects of globalization to threaten U.S.security in nontraditional ways. At the same time, global trends such asthe population explosion, uneven economic growth, urbanization, theAIDS pandemic, developments in biotechnology, and ecological trendssuch as the increasing scarcity of fresh water in several already volatileareas are generating new drivers of international instability. These trendsmake the development of a clear set of priorities for collection and analysisextremely challenging.2

Intel l igence analysts are tasked with making sense of thesedevelopments, identifying potential threats to U.S. national security, and

202 WILLIAM J. LAHNEMAN

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE


crafting appropriate intelligence products for policymakers. They alsocontinue to perform traditional missions such as uncovering secrets thatpotential adversaries desire to withhold and assessing foreign militarycapabilities. This fact has three implications. First, it means that,besides using traditional sources of classified information, often fromsensitive sources, analysts must also extract potentially criticalknowledge from vast quantities of available open source information.Significantly, the Community must devise ways to monitor open sourceinformation in transformed ways. Additionally, some kinds ofinformation currently not considered open source must be brought intothe open domain.For example, the process of globalization, empowered by the Information

Revolution, will require a change of scale in the IC’s analytical focus. In thepast, the IC focused on a small number of discrete issues that possessedthe potential to cause severe destruction of known forms. The future willinvolve security threats of much smaller scale. These will be less isolated,less the actions of military forces, and more diverse in type and morewidely dispersed throughout global society than in the past. Theiraggregate effects might produce extremely destabilizing and destructiveresults, but these outcomes will not be obvious based on each event alone.Therefore, analysts must increasingly look to discern the emergentbehavioral aspects of a series of events.Second, phenomena of global scope will increase as a result of aggregate

human activities. Accordingly, analysts will need to understand globaldynamics as never before. Information is critical, as well as an analyticalunderstanding of the new information, in order to understand these newdynamics. The business of organizing and collecting information is goingto have to be much more distributed than in the past, among both variousU.S. agencies and international communities. Information and knowledgesharing will be essential to successful analysis, and most of the necessarysharing will need to be conducted on a voluntary basis.Third, future analysts will need to focus more on the anticipation and

prevention of security threats and less on reaction after they have arisen.For example, the medical community is highly reactive. However, anyonewho deals with infectious diseases knows that prevention is the moreimportant reality. Preventing infectious diseases must become the primaryfocus if pandemics are to be prevented. Future analysts will need toincorporate this same emphasis on prevention to the analytic enterprise.Evidently, in this emerging security environment the traditional

methods of the IC will be increasingly inadequate and increasingly inconflict with those methods that do offer meaningful protection.Remote observation, electromagnetic intercept, and illegal penetrationwere sufficient to establish the order of battle for traditional forms of

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AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 23, NUMBER 2


warfare and to assure a reasonable standard that any attempt toundertake a massive surprise attack would be detected. But no seriousprospect exists that the problems of civil conflict and embeddedterrorism, of global ecology and of biotechnology can be adequatelyaddressed by the same methods.To be effective in the future, the IC needs to remain a hierarchical structure

in order to perform many necessary functions, but it must be able to generateor otherwise access collaborative networks for various lengths of time toprovide intelligence on issues demanding interdisciplinary analysis. Thesenetworks should integrate open source intelligence (OSINT) and shouldcontain experts from the private sector as well as the IC. The IC alsoshould seek ways to include the knowledge of former IC analysts in thesenetworks.Clearly, the magnitude of this challenge means that analysts in one

intelligence agency will need to share information with analysts in otherparts of the IC—and with outside organizations—to produce accurateintelligence about complex issues. Achieving successful collaboration isdiff icult , however, because this goal clashes with the secretiveorganizational cultures of the various U.S. intelligence agencies. As aresult, the IC has been criticized for ‘‘stovepiping’’—failing to shareinformation when appropriate—and continues to wrestle with this difficultproblem.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARADIGMS

The term ‘‘paradigm’’ as used here is borrowed from Thomas H. Kuhn, whoascribed a central role to this concept in his groundbreaking work TheStructure of Scientific Revolutions.3 While Kuhn’s work focused onscientific revolutions, he noted that his analysis is equally applicable tofields that are not exclusively scientific. His work provides clear insightsinto the nature of change in the intelligence enterprise.First, Kuhn addressed the concepts of ‘‘normal science’’ and ‘‘revolutions

in science.’’ Normal science

. . .means research firmly based upon one or more past scientificachievements, achievements that some particular scientific communityacknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its furtherpractice. Today, such achievements are recounted . . . by scientifictextbooks, elementary and advanced. These textbooks expound thebody of accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successfulapplications, and compare these observations with exemplaryobservations and experiments . . . . These and many other works servedfor a time to define the legitimate problems and methods of a researchfield for succeeding generations of practitioners.4




Kuhn noted that these achievements owe their wide acceptance anddurability to two factors:

. the achievements were sufficiently unprecedented to attract a dedicated group ofadherents away from competing modes of scientific activity and

. the achievements were sufficiently open-ended to leave many problems for thisgroup to resolve during their professional careers.

Kuhn called achievements that share these two characterist ics‘‘paradigms,’’ noting that students wishing to enter a given scientificfield gain entry by studying the appropriate paradigm. Kuhn assertedthat, because new entrants join the ranks of practitioners and scientistswho learned their craft by studying the same principles and traditions,their subsequent research will seldom deviate from normal scientificprinciples to cause overt disagreement with other followers of theparadigm: ‘‘Men whose research is based on shared paradigmsare committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice.The commitment and the apparent consensus i t produces areprerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation ofa particular research tradition.’’5

Kuhn stressed that a great deal of valuable work occurs under theprevailing paradigm. The paradigm identifies pressing questions thatneed answers. Researchers and practitioners attack these questions usingmethods enlightened by the paradigm and generate significant advancesin knowledge and understanding. For example, in the IC’s case, theCold War years produced many impressive innovations in intelligencesources and methods, such as imagery satellites, wiretapping methods,data mining techniques, electronic signature technology, measurementand signature collection techniques, and unmanned aerial vehicles.These vastly improved the intel ligence enterprise by enhancingAmerica’s ability to penetrate the closed society of the Soviet Unionand its satellites.While the prevailing paradigm continues to produce a wealth of valuable

knowledge, that knowledge conforms to the expectations of the currentparadigm. As a result, truly novel discoveries are rare and, if proposed,tend to encounter stiff resistance. Galileo, for example, was brought totrial on suspicion of heresy, forced to recant his views, and imprisoned forclaiming that the earth was not the center of the universe.However, history shows that, sooner or later, every paradigm is supplanted

by a new one. Despite the tendency to reject findings that contradict theprevailing paradigm, each paradigm contains the seeds of its owndestruction because, over the years, a group of findings accumulates thatthe current paradigm cannot explain. This leads to increasing




dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm and a search for alternativeinterpretations.Kuhn labeled the process of shifting from an established paradigm to a

new one a ‘‘revolution in science’’ or ‘‘scientific revolution.’’ Afterreviewing several major scientific revolutions—Copernican, Newtonian,and Einsteinian, among others—Kuhn noted:

Each revolution necessitated the community’s rejection of onetime-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it.Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available forscientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the professiondetermined what should count as an admissible problem or as alegitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientificimagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as atransformation of the world within which scientific work was done.Such changes, along with the controversies that almost alwaysaccompany them, are the defining characteristics of scientificrevolutions.6

Kuhn’s comments concerning political revolutions are particularly germaneto the intelligence enterprise:

Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restrictedto a segment of the political community, that existing institutions haveceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment thatthey have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutionsare inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrowsubdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm hasceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of natureto which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. In bothpolitical and scientific development the sense of malfunction that canlead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution.7

Kuhn’s views offer an interesting point of departure for contributing to theintelligence reform debate. Consider today’s Intelligence Community. TheIC still looks and operates substantially as it did at the end of the ColdWar. This reflects the prevailing intelligence paradigm, which has prevailedsince the end of World War II. New recruits to the IC are indoctrinatedinto these structures and procedures, and they remain immersed in themthroughout their careers. According to Kuhn’s findings, little activeopposition to the traditional ways should occur since most will attempt tofit new developments into the existing paradigm whenever possible.Furthermore, calls for radical measures should meet stiff resistance. Yet, ifthe old paradigm is losing its effectiveness, critics of the old paradigmshould grow in numbers and their arguments should become moreconvincing.




Is the U.S. intelligence enterprise in the midst of a paradigm shift? Somedevelopments tend to so indicate. For example, a small but vocal minoritycriticize the fact that today’s IC still looks and operates substantially as itdid during the Cold War despite the fact that many pressing new threatshave different characteristics than the previous Soviet threat. Were an ICdesigned to provide intelligence against a heavily militarized, secretive,totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union, which threatened the UnitedStates with large-scale nuclear war, to work equally well against a small,lightly armed group of globally dispersed transnational terrorists operatingin a loose network, who threatened to attack the United States with one ortwo nuclear weapons constructed in a secret lab or purchased on the blackmarket, would it not be a remarkable coincidence?Many have dismissed such a coincidence. This has led to a robust

intelligence reform debate that has existed in various forms since the endof the Cold War. This debate has intensified following the 11 September2001 (9=11) attacks. The subjects and the range of this debate have variedwidely. Proposals range from recommendations to fine tune currentprocesses to calls for radical change, often summarized by calls for‘‘transformation’’ or assertions that a ‘‘Revolution in Intelligence Affairs’’is occurring.InKuhn’s terminology, this latter group—the radicals—have grown frustrated

because the traditional paradigm is no longer effective against current threats andthey are calling for the adoption of a new paradigm. They do not necessarilyconceptualize it as one paradigm supplanting another. If they do, theyprobably have not worked out the general shape, let alone the details, of thenew paradigm. But conceptualizing the issue in terms of paradigms andparadigm shifts could be a useful way to advance the debate.

THE TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROCESS PARADIGM

Conventional wisdom holds that the intelligence process is analogous tosolving puzzles, but puzzles to which certain pieces are missing. Sometimesthese missing pieces are quite important for understanding what the puzzlerepresents. The goal therefore is to amass as many pieces as possible—preferably the most important ones—so that analysts can makewell-informed guesses (estimates or assessments) of what the completepuzzles look like. In particular, the IC attempts to describe the level of‘‘substantive uncertainty’’ in its products. The IC achieves this byanswering three questions:

1. What do we know about this issue?2. What don’t we know?3. To what degree is what we don’t know important?




In this traditional paradigm, puzzle pieces fall into three categories. Someare secrets. Secrets are information that is knowable but that certain actorswant to keep hidden from others. The nature of North Korea’s nucleararsenal is one such example. Other pieces are mysteries, which consist ofinformation that is unknowable, often because those thought to have thisinformation haven’t yet decided how they will respond to a given set ofevents. How various transnational issues will develop also falls into thecategory of mysteries because their complexity offers numerous alternativepaths along which they might develop. Information derived from opensources constitutes the third type of piece to the puzzle. Havingexperienced considerable emphasis since the 9=11 attacks, intelligenceanalysts have nevertheless long recognized the value of the OSINTproduced from information available through open sources such as theprint media (journals, magazines, newspapers, and books), newsbroadcasts, Internet sites, academic courses and scholarly opinions, andpersonal observations and conversations.Thus, the traditional paradigm for the intelligence process involves solving

puzzles using pieces that are secrets, mysteries, or OSINT. Again, the processemphasizes discovering secrets. This aspect is understandable considering thekinds of targets—first and foremost the Soviet Union—on which Westernintelligence agencies focused during the Cold War, and the central roleplayed by military power in that conflict.Under the traditional paradigm, the pieces of intelligence puzzles are

assumed to be relatively static in terms of their contribution to the overallanalysis. Furthermore, an analysis produced from such static pieces isunlikely to change significantly over the short run. These are validassumptions most of the time, precisely because the traditional paradigm isused to deal with the capabilities and intentions of traditional state-basedactors. In these cases, a state’s large-scale, expensive outlays in thetraditional foundations of power—principally military forces—translatesinto the biggest threat. Fortunately, these kinds of expensive, large-scaleforces also tend to leave large footprints that help intelligence collectors tolocate them. They also tend to be static in that, once a country fields anew army division or a new weapons system, the country maintains theseassets for a considerable time and the threats posed by them remainessentially the same.These characteristics thus help explain why the traditional paradigm works

well for traditional threats. First, the most threatening aspects of anopponent’s capabilities are also the easiest to find because they are large inscale. Once collectors have found most of the puzzle’s ‘‘largest’’ pieces,they can feel fairly confident that they can perceive the entire picture withreasonable accuracy. Second, once an analysis is produced, it will remainfairly static for a considerable time. Any change, such as another army




division in an area, will be additive in nature. It will not change the meaningof the entire puzzle.

PROPOSAL OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE PROCESS PARADIGM

The traditional paradigm remains essential for developing intelligence abouttraditional state-based threats, and the IC must preserve aspects of theintelligence enterprise that maintain its effectiveness. However, the natureof many transnational threats and trends warrants consideration of adifferent kind of paradigm for the intelligence process. This new approachreplaces the notion of intelligence as ‘‘solving puzzles’’ with that ofintelligence as performing ‘‘adaptive interpretations.’’Adaptive interpretations involve constructing extremely complicated

puzzles for which virtually all of the pieces are available. Furthermore,most pieces to these adaptive interpretations are not secrets or mysteries.Constructing adaptive interpretations is a two-step process. Both steps

must be performed simultaneously and continuously. The necessary piecesof information must be procured and assembled into an accurate picture.Because these pieces of information come from sources across the globe,solving adaptive interpretations requires a very high level of prearrangedinformation sharing. In addition, all the information must be continuouslyupdated.When dealing with adaptive interpretations, the situation is much more

dynamic than under the traditional paradigm for two reasons. First, singlepieces of information can change their value—becoming much more or lesssignificant—in short periods of time. This is also true for the relationshipsamong pieces of information. Pieces that are relatively unrelated onemoment can become significantly related the next. Accordingly, adaptiveinterpretations constantly change their ‘‘picture,’’ sometimes in dramaticways. Second, in adaptive interpretations, small pieces of the puzzle can bedecisive. In fact, most analyses requiring adaptive interpretations will haveno large pieces, only a vast number of small ones. This means thatcollectors, processors, and analysts need to find new ways to assign valueto each small piece of collected information and to continuously reassessthis value.States already use adaptive interpretations to achieve certain important

functions. The integrated systems for routing international mail andtelecommunications provide some insight into adaptive interpretations.They involve a large-scale tracking system, and patterns change overtime, requiring periodic adjustments of procedures. National andregional maritime and air traffic control schemes are even betterexamples of adaptive interpretations because they combine both complexdata requirements and dynamic change. For instance, all major U.S.




ports maintain rigorous traffic separation and control schemes to allowcommercial vessels to enter and leave port safely and efficiently. Allvessels above a certain displacement must file arrival and departurereports in advance, and must check in with local authorities, whomonitor vessels transiting through their area of responsibility. Similarly,air traffic control within the United States is a rigorous system thattracks virtually all aircraft—particularly commercial aircraft—throughout the country. The air traffic control system also interfaceswith those of other countries. Aircraft leaving and entering U.S.airspace must check in with controllers at predetermined points. In bothof these cases, the need to ensure public safety and to maintain publicconfidence in economically vital, high-visibility, capital-intensiveindustries has driven the development of these systems for achievingadaptive interpretations.The United States is currently in the process of expanding both its air and

maritime domain programs to provide an integrated national picture forpurposes of homeland security. In the case of shipping, the goal of the‘‘Maritime Domain Awareness’’8 program is to monitor shipping within1,000 miles of the U.S. coastline so that any suspicious vessel can beintercepted and boarded well before it could perpetrate an attack. Similaridentification and tracking schemes exist for air traffic. Both programsdepend on the cooperation of numerous foreign governments as well asprivate firms around the world to provide information.The U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) is another attempt at an

adaptive interpretation, in this case one that improves the security ofstandardized shipping containers entering the United States. The CSIfocuses on prescreening cargo at its last port of call before arriving at aU.S. port. The goal is to reduce the efficacy of using containers to smuggleweapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other terrorist equipment intothe country while minimizing the impact of increased security on the flowof trade.9

All these applications of adaptive interpretations involve processing largequantities of information in a dynamic environment where each piece isonly a small portion of the overall bank of information. These puzzleshave no large pieces. Again, the purpose of these systems is to flag thevery small number of overall aircraft, ships, and cargo containers that posea threat.These examples have another thing in common. They involve activities—

international communications, trade, public safety—supported by everyresponsible state and private firm. Accordingly, both states and privatefirms are motivated to cooperate voluntarily to make those activitieseffective. While none of these systems can guarantee 100 percent success,they improve security while minimizing the negative effects on commerce.




What if these systems operated on a fully integrated, global scale rather thanwithin their current limited domains?

POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM

Many transnational security issues lend themselves to adaptiveinterpretations. Some issues will be much more difficult to resolve thanothers. One way to improve the chances for success is to divide possibleissues into three tiers, with Tier 1 being the easiest to solve and Tier 3 themost difficult.Tier 1 systems would be composed of expanded and integrated versions of

existing systems related to commerce. For example, a fully integrated globaltracking system for shipping, air traffic, personal travel, and containerrouting might be instituted. Anomalous or suspicious activity in onedomain could be correlated with the other domains in a search forpatterns. Such a ‘‘system of systems’’ could provide valuable intelligenceconcerning terrorism and criminal activity. Thus, if a known terrorist hadtraveled to a point from which a suspicious container had been shipped,perhaps on a vessel that had raised concerns in the past, red flags wouldthen be raised to focus increased attention. Under current processes, suchcorrelations would be much less likely detected, and efforts to do so wouldinvolve far more labor and time.Such a system is not that far-fetched when considering the fact that several

independent systems to track shipping, cargo containers, commercial aircraft,and passengers currently exist because of pressing needs, such as public safetyconcerns, the desire to collect revenue, and economic efficacy, that areseparate from any intelligence function. As a result, many of these systemsenjoy a high degree of voluntary compliance. While much of theinformation in these systems is closely held by governments and privateentities due to proprietary and privacy concerns, it also is shared amonggovernments when deemed appropriate. Visualizing globally integratedversions of these systems, in which large volumes of information areroutinely exchanged across borders for the mutual benefit of allparticipants, does not seem like such a large jump of imagination.Tier 2 systems would involve tracking transnational issues that go beyond

purely economic issues, and address matters that, while not affectingnational security directly, are often regarded as ‘‘sensitive’’ by stategovernments. For instance, a Tier 2 system might involve tracking the salesand transfers of conventional arms. The United Nations–sponsoredRegister of Conventional Arms could serve as a starting point for anexpanded system.10 Another Tier 2 system would detect and track theprogression of infectious diseases. For example, many consider the WorldHealth Organization’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response System




(GOARN)—an Internet-based system for reporting the outbreak of SuddenAcute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and other infectious diseases—the bestmethod for detecting related outbreaks. It uses reports by both private andpublic health care providers and, based on the 2003 SARS outbreak,appears to be more effective for signaling potential outbreaks than iswaiting for affected states to report them.11

Tier 3 systems involve information about security issues in the case ofgovernments, and core strategies and activities in the case of private firms.As such, these elements would be the category of information that statesand firms are least likely to submit into a global system. Tier 3 systemswould track things such as biopathogen development and nuclear weaponsinventories and thefts.The fact that Tier 1 and Tier 2 systems are already being implemented in

some areas is a testament to their value in combating transnationalphenomena. Tier 3 systems are likely to become possible only whenexperience with Tier 1 and 2 systems demonstrates the value that adaptiveinterpretations can bring to bear on pressing transnational security concerns.

TWO PARADIGMS, ONE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The 21st century security environment leaves intelligence organizations in theposition of needing to embrace two distinct paradigms to accomplish theirmission. Intelligence organizations must apply the traditional puzzle-solving paradigm in the case of traditional state-based security threats, butthey must use a new adaptive interpretation paradigm to addresstransnational threats.A major problem arises in accomplishing this task because the traditional

model relies on secrecy, while solving adaptive interpretations relies onopenness. The need for secrecy breeds mistrust among national intelligenceorganizations, foreign governments, and private enterprises, whereasopenness requires mutual trust among all participants to succeed. Thisproduces an apparent conundrum. Intelligence organizations’ continuingneed to solve puzzles requires secrecy, which breeds mistrust, but thismistrust prevents intelligence agencies from participating in the adaptiveinterpretation processes essential for dealing with transnational threats.Since different approaches to information and knowledge sharing are at

the heart of the matter, an examination of IC information flows canprovide valuable insights into resolving this conundrum.

INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE

The U.S. government categorizes information as either secret (‘‘classified’’)or open (‘‘unclassified’’).12 Any given piece of information originating from




either secret or open sources is then used to compile either secret oropen intelligence products. Four types of information flows are thereforepossible. Table 1 summarizes these flows, along with an example ofeach type.Secret-to-secret (Block I) and open-to-secret (Block II) information flows

are associated with the traditional intelligence enterprise. In both, secretand open sources are employed. However, secrets are valued more greatlythan information derived from open sources, the use of OSINT is notsystematic, and all processing, exploitation, analysis, and productionremain within classified channels. In both blocks, release of intelligence toU.S. government agencies outside the IC, to foreign governments, privatefirms, and the general public is the exception rather than the rule.The need for secret-to-open information flows (Block III) has received

increased attention since the 9=11 attacks, when the reality that all levels

Table 1. Information Flows in the Intelligence Enterprise: Examples

Source ofInformation

Recipient ofInformation Secret Open

Secret I. Intelligence aboutimpending terroristattack is derivedfrom sensitivesources andmethods, and thenanalyzed withintraditional classifiedIC channels toproduce a classifiedproduct to brief U.S.government officials.

III. Intelligence aboutimpending terroristattack to the U.S.homeland is derivedfrom sensitivesources andmethods, thensanitized anddeclassified fordistribution to stateand local lawenforcementagencies.

Open II. CNN reports thatlarge scale civil warhas begun in Iraq. ICseeks correlationusing classifiedsources and methods.All resultingproducts are secret,used to brief U.S.government officials.

IV. CNN reports theoccurrence of severalhuman Avian flucases in Beijing.Used by U.S.Centers for DiseaseControl to issuetravel advisories forAmericans planningtrips to China.




of government, as well as private sector entities, are important collectors,analysts, and consumers of intelligence in the U.S. homeland securityeffort became apparent. Also recognized was the fact that existinginformation security classification and clearance systems impededinformation sharing among these entities.The last category—open-to-open information flows (Block IV)—has not

to date been developed systematically by the IC, but its importance isnevertheless recognized. For example, government officials constantlymonitor what the major media outlets report, since the media frequentlyare the first to break news of important events.

POST–9/11 REFORMS AND INFORMATION FLOWS

Since the 9=11 attacks, the heightened awareness of the need to collectintelligence against al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups hasunderscored the need to improve all four types of information flows inorder to improve the sharing of both secret and open information acrossorganizational boundaries. Given the widely dispersed, networked natureof these threats, the list of organizations that must share data now includesnot only IC and other U.S. government agencies but also state, local,tribal, private, and foreign agencies and firms.The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)

mandated three principal reforms aimed at improving information sharing.First, IRTPA required the President to designate ‘‘. . . a single entity tooversee the security clearance process and develop uniform standards andpolicies for access to classified information. The President also designates asingle entity to conduct clearance investigations . . . . Reciprocity amongclearances at the same level is required.’’13 Second, IRTPA emphasized theneed for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to ‘‘. . . ensure that theIC makes efficient and effective use of open source information andanalysis.’’14 This has led to the establishment of an ‘‘Open Source Center’’in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The OpenSource Center is responsible for ensuring that OSINT is fully integratedinto all IC processes. Third, IRTPA mandated that the President takeaction to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitatethe sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state,local, tribal, and private sector entities through the use of policy guidelinesand technologies.15 The ISE is the agent to research, recommend, andmonitor the implementation of any technological, legal, and policy changesto improve information sharing while preserving the security of classifiedmaterial.These reforms are firmly grounded in the traditional intelligence process

paradigm and the understanding of information flows derived from it.




In response to the need to increase sharing with many nontraditionalpartners, the IC has embarked on a program to provide security clearancesfor individuals in newly partnered organizations so that they can haveaccess to classified information. This approach addresses this issue byexpanding secret-to-secret information flows. An alternative approachwould have been to design ways to declassify information so that state,local, tribal, and private partners could have access without the need forclearances. A question remains, however, as to whether the IC’s decisionto expand secret-to-secret information flows is the optimal course of action.Similarly, the IC’s approach to integrating OSINT involves expanding

open-to-secret information flows. The Open Source Center’s mission is toimprove OSINT collection and integrate it into all aspects of intelligenceanalysis and production. This means that relevant OSINT will be madeavailable at the right time and place to support classified analysis. Onceagain, the approach has been to expand the universe of secret information.And again the question remains: Is this appropriate?Lastly, the ISE will be designed to support the other two mandates,

enabling a greater sharing of secret-to-secret and open-to-secretinformation and knowledge.Expanding the body of secret knowledge and the number of persons with

access to it has a number of disadvantages. Increasing the number ofindividuals with clearances will prove expensive and time-consuming. Italso runs the risk of being ineffective—after all, how long can informationremain secure if hundreds or thousands of individuals have access to it?However, choosing this course of action has one important advantage that

overrules the disadvantages: it preserves the security of classified material,which is essential for maintaining the effectiveness of the traditionalintelligence paradigm. Despite IRTPA’s emphasis on greater knowledgesharing, all initiatives for this purpose must preserve the integrity of secretinformation. In most areas of the U.S. government, information is highlyclassified because it pertains to activities and capabilities the governmentprefers to keep secret, such as war planning, new weapons systems, andproposed negotiating strategies. In the case of intelligence, however, muchof the most highly classified material has been assigned its classificationbecause it involves particular types of collection activities. These arereferred to as ‘‘sensitive sources and methods.’’16 The information derivedfrom sensitive sources and methods is highly classified because knowledgeof the information gained therefrom can be sufficient for an opponent todeduce their existence. Once the existence of a particular sensitive sourceor method becomes known, opponents can take actions to neutralize itseffectiveness. Thus, effective security systems are absolutely essential if theIC is to learn secrets using sensitive sources and methods, and use theinformation derived from them to solve traditional intelligence puzzles.




Given this need, the IC has been correct in expanding information sharingthrough secret-to-secret and open-to-secret channels. Efforts to expandopen channels would jeopardize the effectiveness of the traditional paradigm.At any rate, large-scale efforts to expand open channels would encounter

serious problems. Security systems are designed to restrict access toclassified information to the minimum number of individuals who needthe information in order to perform their duties effectively. To achievethis purpose, all individuals with security clearances are indoctrinated inthe consequences for disclosure or loss of control of classified material.These consequences are not trivial. They can involve lengthy prisonterms, even when unauthorized disclosure of classified material isinadvertent. No countervailing incentives for sharing information arecurrently available. As a result, given the clear penalties for unauthorizeddisclosure of classified material, personnel subject to security classificationprograms will remain strongly biased toward withholding information,not sharing it.Recognizing these facts is valuable, but it still fails to answer the question

of how the IC will expand information sharing to include the very largenumber of individuals and entities needed to provide information to solveadaptive interpretations under the new intelligence paradigm. The sheernumber of required partners—many, if not most, of whom are foreign—rules out extending security clearances to everyone in this group. Even ifthe IC could surmount this hurdle, the conundrum would still remainbecause expanding the domain of secret information in the IC willexacerbate mistrust among potential partners. Clearly, the traditional viewof IC information flows is inadequate to resolve this dilemma.

A NEW CONCEPTION OF INFORMATION FLOWS

The traditional concept of information flows is still relevant when the ICperforms its routine mission of solving puzzles using secrets and OSINT.This suggests that, rather than abandoning the usual view in favor of atotally new concept of information flows, traditional flows should beaugmented by new types in order to perform adaptive interpretations. Anew concept of information is needed, which will include a new form ofinformation known as ‘‘trusted information,’’ in addition to secret andopen information.Trusted information is circulated within ‘‘trusted networks,’’ in which all

the members are trusted to enter only validated information and to usenetwork information responsibly. Within these constraints, networkmembers can be any organization that can provide needed information.This will include government agencies, private firms, intergovernmentalorganizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even




individuals in various informal communities of interest. Since their purpose isto address transnational issues and threats, trusted networks must be globalin scope. The overriding principle is that members of a trusted network mustagree to voluntarily share their own information to be able to access thenetwork’s contents. In short, the network depends on mutual trust amongits members.Only member organizations of the network would have access to its

information, and they would have access to all of the information in thenetwork at all times. This trusted information is not open sourceinformation because it is not available to the public. Nor is trustedinformation classified information, since its distribution is not restrictedto the minimum number of people possible. In fact, distribution will beimpossible to control, since members are free to use network informationfor any responsible purpose. Such uses would include use by a country’sintelligence organizations. For example, in the United States, the ICcould receive access to all or to selected network information from theU.S. government organization participating in the network. The IC coulduse this information as another collection source, correlating it withvarious classified databases on the issue in question. At the same time,other national intelligence services might be using the trusted networkinformation in the same or different ways.Trusted information sharing systems will be increasingly important in the

future as current transnational phenomena mature and new ones arise inresponse to increasing globalization and resource use. The IC will not beable to perform adaptive interpretations without them because it cannotprocure the vast quantities of required information by itself. At the sametime, the IC cannot be a member of these networks. Since effectivenetworks depend on mutual trust among members, it will be essential thatgovernments administer trusted networks using agencies that do notperform secret intelligence collection, conduct classified analysis, orproduce classified products for very limited distribution. This rules out theuse of the IC.When trusted information is taken into account, a new conception of

information flows comes into focus. This is outlined in Table 2. Blocks I,II, III, and IV are carried over unchanged from Table 1. They remainessential for solving traditional intelligence puzzles involving secrets. Thenew blocks of Table 2 give examples of ways that trusted information fitsinto the picture.Trusted information networks will provide the kinds of information

needed to construct adaptive interpretations concerning transnationalissues and threats. However, if national intelligence organizations can’tparticipate as members, the dilemma rests in how they relate to trustednetworks and the valuable information they contain.




Table

2.

New

Inform

ationFlowsforSolvingAdaptiveInterpretations

#Source

Secret

Recipient!

Secret

Trusted

Open

I.Intelligence

aboutim

pending

terrorist

attack

isderived

from

sensitivesources

andmethods,

andthen

analyzedwithin

traditionalclassifiedIC

channelsto

produce

aclassifiedproduct

tobrief

U.S.

governmentofficials.

Notapplicable

Classified

inform

ationdoes

notmigrate

into

trusted

networks.

III.Intelligence

aboutim

pending

terrorist

attack

totheU.S.

homelandisderived

from

sensitivesources

and

methods,then

sanitized

and

declassifiedfordistribution

tostate

andlocallaw

enforcem

entagencies.

Trusted

ICmonitors

trusted

network

containingglobalairtravel

inform

ation.Looksfor

correlationswithIC

’sclassified

terrorist

watchlist.Results

remain

classified.

Every

mem

ber

ofatrusted

network

hasaccessto

allofthenetwork’s

inform

ationallofthetime.

Centers

forDisease

Control

monitors

trusted

network

for

globaldisease

reporting.Issues

warningsto

Americanpublic

when

warranted.

Open

II.CNN

reportsthatlarge-scale

civilwarhasbegunin

Iraq.IC

seekscorrelationusing

classifiedsources

and

methodsAllresulting

productsare

secret,usedto

brief

U.S.government

officials.

CNN

reportstheoccurrence

of

severalhumanAvianflucasesin

HongKong.CenterforDisease

Controllooksforadditional

evidence

intrusted

network.

IV.CNN

reportstheoccurrence

ofseveralhumanAvianflu

casesin

HongKong.Used

byU.S.CenterforDisease

Controlto

issuetravel

advisories

forAmericans

planningtripsto

China.



IMPLICATIONS: WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Liberal democracies tend to define intelligence in one of two ways. These aregenerally referred to as the American and British definitions of intelligence,although each represents an idealized view for purposes of discussionrather than an accurate depiction of each country’s approach. As PhilipH.J. Davies explains:

In his 1996 Intelligence Power in Peace and War, British scholar andformer intelligence officer Michael Herman tried to present the rangeof conceptualizations of intelligence as a spectrum, ranging from thebroad definitions that approach intelligence primarily as ‘‘all-sourceanalysis’’ (typified by [Sherman] Kent’s view) to narrow interpretationsthat focus on intelligence collection, particularly covert collection.Herman notes in passing that the broader interpretations tend to befavored by US writers and narrow approaches by the British.17

Davies goes on to describe the American definition of intelligence:

In current usage, ‘‘intelligence’’ in U.S. parlance tends to refer to‘‘finished’’ intelligence that has been put through the all-source analysisprocess and turned into a product that can provide advice and optionsfor decision makers. Perhaps the classic U.S. definition comes from apast edition of the Dictionary of United States Military Terms forJoint Usage, which states that intelligence is ‘‘the product resultingfrom the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretationof all available information which concerns one or more aspects offoreign nations or areas of operation which is immediately orpotentially significant for planning.’’ This definition includes thecollection of raw information, but the end result does not become‘‘intelligence’’ as such until it has been thoroughly analyzed. Hence, inthe U.S. context, intelligence production means analytical production.18

Regarding British practice:

. . . in British practice, raw intelligence moves straight into policymakingcircles without passing through a separate, intervening analytical stage.This is not because there is no assessment process but becauseall-source analysis is subsumed by the civil service employees who, intheir role as advisors to ministers of the crown, take ultimateresponsibility for the policies and actions of their departments beforeParliament. As a result, intelligence as such tends to refer morenarrowly to those kinds of information not available from the ‘‘normalproduct’’ of departmental activity.19

Taken together, the concept of trusted information and the narrow Britishdefinition of intelligence offer a solution to the conundrum. Foreigngovernments and private concerns are much more likely to cooperate with




U.S. government departments and agencies that do not involve themselves inthe business of discovering secrets. While all understand that some part ofeach government must perform this function, the important factor is todistance those agencies involved in espionage and other secret collectionactivities from those involved in open, mutual exchange of informationthrough trusted networks. One way to do this is to reduce the scope of U.S.‘‘intelligence’’ to make it more closely resemble the British definition ofintelligence while simultaneously constructing some U.S. government entityto serve as an interface for the country’s participation in trusted networks.

A NEW U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ENTERPRISE

Under this new approach, the ‘‘new’’ Intelligence Community (new IC)would retain those functions and activities associated with the collection ofsecrets. These would include:

. All secret collection activities, including human intelligence (HUMINT). Thiswould include imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and HUMINT. HUMINTshould be conducted by case officers on a nonofficial cover basis so that otherparts of the government such as the State and Commerce Departments candissociate themselves from secret collection activities. Diplomats and tradeattaches would still observe and report on developments in the countries wherethey were posted, but these activities are sufficiently time-honored as to be anexception to the rule.

. All covert action. These capabilities would be under the control of the NationalClandestine Service.

. All defense-related intelligence activities. These activities would fall under thedirect control of the Secretary of Defense to make it clear that they are part ofthe military establishment. Current Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, andSpecial Operations Command Intelligence organizations would remainessentially unchanged since they directly support their respective militarybranches.

. All counterintelligence activities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wouldcontinue to perform its counterintelligence function as well as its law enforcementrole in apprehending terrorists.

If conforming with the strict British definition of intelligence, the currentall-source analytic functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the State Department’s Bureau ofIntel l igence and Research (INR) would be disestablished, then‘‘normalized’’ by incorporating their analysts and managers into analyticstaffs in the Departments of Defense, State, and other departments asappropriate. With the exception of the CIA, this is not really a change.The DIA is already in the Department of Defense, INR is in the State




Department. The same holds true for analytic offices in the Treasury, Energy,and Homeland Security Departments. These normalized agencies wouldreceive secrets discovered by the new IC and incorporate them into theirown analyses. In general, the rule would be to keep secret collection,processing, and exploitation activities within the new IC, and divest otheractivities into mainstream government departments as much as possible.Under the new system, offices charged with analysis also would haveaccess to information from trusted networks.Outside of the new IC, an Office of Strategic Information (OSI) would

constitute the U.S. component of trusted networks. The OSI would enterU.S. information into the integrated global trusted information networks forsuch legal activities as shipping, air traffic, cargo movements, and passengertravel. Since these kinds of activities are generally not controversial, and sincethe OSI was not involved in learning secrets, most countries and privateentities would be willing to participate because of the system’s clear benefitsto commerce, travel, and security. Hopefully, as these Tier 1 activities becamevalidated, Tier 2 activities (infectious disease reporting, arms transfers),and even Tier 3 activities (biopathogen developments) could be added tothe list of trusted networks in which the United States was a trusted partner.OSI networks would constitute an innovative collection source for the new

IC. Integration of the large volume of information from Tier 1 networksalone—travel, finance, and trade information—could prove invaluable foranalyzing both emerging and current transnational trends and issues. Forexample, Tier 1 integrated network analysis could provide informationabout terrorist plans, smuggling, and other kinds of illegal activity,particularly when combined with the new IC’s secret collection efforts.Identifying and integrating data on this scale will require data mining on a

scale never before envisioned. While challenging, this is a blessing in disguise.Although all members of trusted networks have access to networkinformation, none can approach the technological ability of the UnitedStates to exploit this data. Thus, successfully tapping into trusted networkinformation will impart a significant asymmetrical advantage to the UnitedStates.The OSI could not itself perform this function because the results of data

mining would be classified, and the OSI must not deal in secret information ifit is to preserve the trust of its network partners. Rather, the mining andintegration of trusted network information would need to be performed bya part of the new IC. This would be a new agency devoted solely to thisnew collection method, perhaps a new CIA directorate or an entirely newagency, as long as it is not tied to any one Cabinet department. Theexistence of this agency would be kept as secret as possible. The lessattention drawn to the fact that the new IC is exploiting trusted networkinformation the better.




Analysts in the various Cabinet departments would seek to make sense ofthe raw intelligence provided from new IC collection activities—includingtrusted network analyses performed by the new data mining agency—andfrom OSINT. The successful marriage of traditional secret collectionactivities, new trusted network data mining techniques, and OSINT shouldgive the United States a decided edge over its adversaries—both nationaland transnational.

RESTATING THE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

Eight propositions presented here argue for a transformation in the U.S.intelligence enterprise:Proposition 1. Transnational security issues are becoming increasingly

important to international security. These potential threats tend to bediffused in nature and countering them successfully require preemptiverather than reactive action. The magnitude and nature of this challengemeans that governments and private entities must be willing and able tovoluntarily share large amounts of information.Proposition 2. The traditional paradigm compares the intelligence process to

solving a puzzle in which some pieces are secrets, some are mysteries, and someare found in open sources. Moreover, some pieces of the puzzle are alwaysmissing. While essential for dealing with traditional state-based securityconcerns, this model is not effective for addressing transnational threats.Proposition 3. A new paradigm, called an adaptive interpretation, is needed

to understand and deal with many transnational security threats. Adaptiveinterpretations are extremely complex puzzles for which virtually all piecesare available. While some of these threats (e.g., terrorism) still require thediscovery of secrets and mysteries, others require the capability to processhuge amounts of open information provided by many sources.Proposition 4. Intelligence organizations need to solve puzzles and work

adaptive interpretations simultaneously, which poses an apparentconundrum. Solving puzzles requires learning secrets, which engendersmistrust among foreign actors. Performing adaptive interpretationsrequires openness, which requires mutual trust among both foreign anddomestic partners.Proposition 5.The traditional paradigm rests on the view that all information

is either secret or open. To preserve the sensitive sources and methodsupon which the collection of secrets depends, the IC must maintain strictsecurity practices. Thus, mandates to increase knowledge and informationsharing tend to be accomplished through expanding secret informationflows by increasing the number of persons with security clearances andthe amount of secret information. This approach is unavoidable if the IC isto preserve its capability to employ the traditional paradigm.




Proposition 6. The new paradigm depends on a new view of information,one that includes a new category—trusted information—in addition tosecret and open information. Trusted information is contained in trustednetworks, which have many participants, including nonstate entities.Proposition 7. The IC cannot be associated with trusted networks because

this would undermine the mutual trust needed to make trusted networkseffective. However, the IC needs access to trusted information to performadaptive interpretations in the new paradigm. The conundrum can beresolved by adopting a narrow definition of intelligence as secretintelligence only. This approach conforms to the traditional Britishunderstanding of intelligence. If intelligence involves only learning secrets,then other activities commonly associated with intelligence in America,such as analysis of a wide range of issues, become normal functions ofgovernment rather than intelligence. By casting the intelligence function ashighly focused and distinct from the ‘‘normal’’ operation of the U.S.government, foreign states and private firms should be more inclined tocooperate with mainstream U.S. government agencies to provide trustedinformation necessary for performing adaptive interpretations.Proposition 8. The U.S. Intelligence Community should be restructured so

that it includes only secret collection activities and covert action capabilities.A new Office of Strategic Information (OSI) should be established to collectand process trusted information on a wide range of issues. Network partnerswould agree to share information because doing so would improve commerceand public safety in a number of open, legal, and accepted ways. The OSIwould integrate and analyze network information to identify and analyzeanomalies that might signal the start of an epidemic, an impendingdisaster, or a planned terrorist attack. It would forward such informationto appropriate intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which could addvalue through their secret collection activities. However, all information inOSI-administered trusted networks would remain open and available to allpartners, and the OSI would not use secret information from theintelligence community.These eight propositions argue for a radical departure—a ‘‘Revolution in

Intelligence Affairs’’ or a radical ‘‘transformation’’—from current practicesin the intelligence enterprise.20 While the recommendations concerning thestructure of the new U.S. information enterprise are preliminary andrequire further study, the general direction appears clear. The UnitedStates and other countries need to develop a new apparatus of governmentcapable of integrating vast streams of information from a number offoreign and domestic sources if transnational threats are to be combatedsuccessfully. This information will have to be shared voluntarily since it isnot collectable through traditional clandestine means. To accomplish suchvoluntary openness, developing ways to forge mutual trust is paramount.




At the same time, however, preserving the IC’s ability to deal effectively withthreats to U.S. security from traditional sources is vitally important.

REFERENCES1This section is excerpted from William J. Lahneman, The Future of IntelligenceAnalysis Project Final Report, 10 March 2006, Center for International andSecurity Studies at the University of Maryland. The study, commissioned bythe Office of the Director of National Intel l igence, is avai lable atwww.cissm.umd.edu; John Steinbruner, CISSM’s Director, drafted an earlierversion of this section of the report.

2For an appreciation of the uncertainty surrounding how the world of 2020 mightdevelop, see the alternative future scenarios in Mapping the Global Future: Reportof the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on Consultations withNongovernment Experts Around the World (Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, December 2004). Available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html

3Thomas H. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1996). First edition by University of Chicago Press,1962.

4Ibid., p. 10.

5Ibid., p. 11.

6Ibid., p. 6.

7Ibid., p. 92.

8Frank Hoffman, ‘‘Border Security: Closing the Ingenuity Gap,’’ in RussellHoward, James Forest, and Joanne Moore (eds.), Homeland Security andTerrorism: Readings and Interpretations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 149.

9Jane A. Bullock, George Haddam, Damon Coppola, and Sarp Yeletaysi,Introduction to Homeland Security, 2nd ed. (Boston: Butterworth Heinemann,2006), p. 66.

10A global system with this goal—the Register of Conventional Arms—alreadyexists under United National sponsorship. However, many states do notparticipate. For more information, see http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html

11For more information about the GOARN, see http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/

12There are three categories of classified material: ‘‘Confidential,’’ ‘‘Secret,’’ and‘‘Top Secret.’’ Confidential material contains information that, if disclosed tounauthorized parties, ‘‘could be expected to cause damage to the nationalsecurity.’’ Inadvertent disclosure of Secret material would cause ‘‘seriousdamage,’’ whereas release of Top Secret material could cause ‘‘exceptionallygrave damage.’’ Quoted from Executive Order 13292 of 25 March 2003.Described in Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed.(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006), p. 74. The Top Secret (TS) classification




has a number of subcategories within it, which are denoted by code words. Thesesubcategories pertain to ‘‘sensitive compartmented information,’’ which meansthat the information is associated with a particular sensitive project oroperation to which only a small group of individuals have access. Individualsmust meet two requirements before being given access to classified material.First, they must have the appropriate security clearance. A person is cleared foraccess to classified information following a background investigation duringwhich security personnel research details of the person’s life to see if anyfactors might make him or her a security risk. Second, an individual must havea ‘‘need to know’’ to be granted access to particular classified information. Forinstance, a person with a Top Secret clearance will be granted access to onlythe TS material that pertains to his or her current assignment. Access isrevoked as soon as the person no longer has a need to know.

13Summary of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,6 December 2004, p. 10.

14Ibid., p. 9.

15Ibid., pp. 5–6.

16For example, if the CIA has recruited an agent who is a high official in the NorthKorean government, this agent would be a sensitive source. Similarly, a newtechnology that greatly improves U.S. ability to track submerged submarineswould be an example of a sensitive method.

17Philip H.J. Davies, ‘‘Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts andInstitutions,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2002,pp. 62–67.

18Ibid., pp. 62–67.

19Ibid., pp. 62–67.

20For an argument that an RIA is occurring, see William J. Lahneman, ‘‘Is aRevolution in Intelligence Affairs Occurring?,’’ International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 1–17.




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