IntegrationPolicy&Attitudes

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The relation between integration policy and majority attitudes toward

immigration. An empirical test across European countries.

Bart Meuleman & Tim Reeskens

University of Leuven, Belgium

Contact:[email protected]

Abstract.

Recently, students of attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigrants and immigration have

shown considerable interest in contextual factors that shape these attitudes. Various studieslead to the conclusion that ethnic diversity has a general negative effect on immigration

attitudes. Yet, the currently available research has some shortcomings, as most of this

research neglects the policy dimension. Potentially, migration and integration policies

mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity. The case of Europe offers a unique

opportunity to study the relation between integration policy and attitudes toward immigration,

since the European countries have adopted specific integration regimes, despite the European

Unions attempts toward harmonization of such policies.

The data used in this paper are twofold. First, we will use the Migration Integration

Policy Index (MIPEX) data (Niessen et al., 2007) to construct a typology of integration

policies. This valuable data set consists of more than 140 indicators covering minority

policies in diverse areas (such as labour market access or political participation) for 27

European countries. In a second step, the obtained typology is linked to measures of attitudes

toward immigrants. These measurements are taken from the European Social Survey.

Merging MIPEX and ESS data allows a comparative analysis across more than 20 European

countries.

Key words: integration policy, attitudes toward immigration, perceived ethnic threat, Migrant

and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), European Social Survey (ESS)

Paper gepresenteerd op de Dag van de Sociologie, 29 mei 2008, Leuven


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Introduction

Although migration is as old as mankind itself, migration flows into Europe have undeniably

increased during the last decades (Hooghe et al., 2008). In 2006, net migration into the EU-27exceeded 1.6 million, which is almost six times more than the net immigration figure 20 years

earlier.1 Europe has de facto become a continent of immigration, irrespective of whether

policy-makers acknowledge this or not. The increased immigration flows make deep inroads

on various domains of social life. In certain strata of the European population, anti-

immigration development have arisen, often driven by the perception that immigrants threaten

certain prerogatives of the own social group (Blumer, 1958).

Social scientists of various disciplines have always shown great interest in public attitudes

toward immigration, immigrant groups and ethnic minorities. Recently, considerable

scholarly attention has been paid to the contextual factors that shape these attitudes

(Scheepers et al., 2002; Coenders et al., 2004; Semyonov et al., 2004; Kunovich, 2004;

Semyonov et al., 2006; Strabac & Listhaug, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Bail, 2008;

Semyonov et al., 2008; Schneider, 2008). Taking group conflict theory (Blalock, 1967;

Quillian, 1995) as a point of departure, several of these studies lead to the conclusion that

ethnic diversity has a general negative effect on immigration attitudes among the majority

population. Yet, the currently available research has some shortcomings, as most of this

research neglects the policy dimension. However, migration and integration policies

potentially mediate the relation between ethnic diversity and public attitudes toward

immigration.

This study attempts to fill out this lacuna by focussing on the connection between integration

policies on the one side, and perceived threat and attitudes toward immigration on the other.

For this purpose, a comparative stance is taken: we use data from over 20 European

countriesalso including Eastern and Southern European countries that only started to

experience substantial immigration very recently. The case of Europe offers a unique

opportunity to study the relation between integration policy and attitudes toward immigration,

since the European countries have adopted specific integration regimes, despite the European

Unions attempts toward harmonization of such policies (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). In the

past, various other studies have elaborated upon the nexus between integration policy and


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attitudes (Castles, 1995; Castles & Alastair, 2000; Geddes, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Weldon,

2006). Yet to the best of our knowledge, this is study is the first to provide a systematic

empirical test taking such a diverse range of European countries into account.

Concretely, this papers tries to answer to main research questions. First, we examine to what

extent it is possible to distinguish different types of integration regimes within Europe.

Therefore, we use data from the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Niessen et

al., 2007). This valuable data set consists of more than 140 indicators covering minority

policies in diverse areas (such as labour market access or political participation) for 27

European countries plus Canada. Second, we assess whether there exists a relation between

the integration regime that a country adopts and measures of perceived ethnic threat and

attitudes toward immigrants. These measurements are derived from the European Social

Survey (ESS).

1. Setting the scene: post-war immigration into European countries

At the beginning of the 21st century, immigration into Europe has reached historically high

levels. These immigration flows have not developed in a linear way during the last decades,

nor have they set off at the same moment in various countries. This is illustrated by the net

migration rates given in table 1, even though these figures can only sketch a very broad

picture of immigration flows into Europe.

Western and Central European countries were among the first to experience sizeable post-war

immigration. Initially, these migration flows developed mainly through two mechanisms.

First, former colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands

granted special entrance rights to citizens from (ex-)colonies. Second, several countries

actively recruited immigrants to tackle shortages on the post-war labour markets. These

labour migrants originated mainly from the periphery of Europe (especially Southern

European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) or the Mediterranean area. In

various countries, policy-makers thought of labour migration as a temporary phenomenon.

However, what was intended as temporary migration often resulted in permanent settlement.

Logically, the first wave of labour migration was followed by a second wave of family

reunification.


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Table 1. Yearly net migration per 1000 inhabitants (averaged over 5-year periods) for

various European countries (source: Eurostat)

60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-06

EU27 0.66 -0.12 0.14 0.50 -0.01 0.67 1.46 1.33 2.91 3.32

Western & central Europe

AT 0.13 1.36 2.54 -0.40 0.44 1.90 6.25 0.90 4.82 4.72

BE 1.55 1.75 0.92 0.73 -0.72 0.83 1.87 1.07 3.13 5.11

CH 10.17 2.81 0.42 -4.36 2.48 3.95 6.86 1.58 5.25 6.13

DE 2.20 2.86 2.17 0.19 0.02 4.24 7.00 2.50 2.15 0.63

FR . . . . . . . . 2.63 1.35

IE -7.38 -5.11 3.34 3.12 -2.00 -9.19 -0.40 4.32 9.28 15.61

LU 6.52 2.61 11.15 3.93 1.12 5.91 10.06 9.38 8.57 12.29

NL 0.32 0.77 2.01 2.58 1.00 1.87 2.73 1.97 1.72 -1.03UK 1.11 -0.92 -0.57 -0.20 -0.61 0.40 0.39 1.39 2.89 3.59

Scandinavia

DK 0.19 0.20 1.30 0.38 0.21 1.24 2.05 2.98 1.63 2.27

FI -2.49 -4.10 0.26 -1.55 0.85 0.49 1.78 0.81 1.01 1.84

IS -0.77 -1.94 -1.78 -3.57 -0.01 0.34 -0.83 0.25 1.92 14.47

NO -0.18 0.17 0.79 0.98 1.13 1.73 1.86 2.46 2.61 5.81

SE 1.39 3.13 0.86 2.11 0.62 2.86 3.74 1.09 3.09 4.82

Southern Europe

CY -8.30 -3.57 -52.06 -2.20 -0.98 1.94 14.57 7.34 12.07 15.48

ES -3.54 -0.92 -0.92 0.79 0.03 -0.51 1.26 3.25 13.08 14.76

GR -4.97 -4.04 -2.81 6.06 1.84 2.43 8.55 5.76 3.31 3.64

IT -1.81 -1.89 -0.90 0.06 -0.49 -0.05 0.38 0.79 5.59 6.53

MT -17.95 -19.16 -8.50 -0.23 2.55 4.27 2.67 0.85 8.84 4.72

PT -8.72 -19.11 -5.25 9.67 0.63 -3.20 -0.74 2.90 5.65 2.65

Eastern Europe

BG -0.01 -0.21 -0.88 -2.44 0.00 -5.77 -5.69 0.03 -5.32 -0.06

CZ -1.73 -0.04 -2.20 0.21 -0.64 0.23 -0.56 0.98 0.40 5.01

EE 6.68 7.26 5.26 3.61 3.52 2.29 -14.38 -6.17 0.12 0.12

HU 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -3.67 1.76 1.70 1.25 1.74

LT 0.98 1.31 2.66 1.25 1.95 3.47 -5.01 -6.28 -2.35 -1.85

LV 8.08 5.00 4.89 3.48 2.54 4.34 -10.54 -3.52 -1.23 -0.53

PL -0.25 -0.67 -2.24 -1.20 -0.67 -1.09 -0.39 -0.36 -2.43 -0.61

RO -1.05 -0.18 -0.47 -0.47 -0.82 -0.87 -4.82 -0.55 -5.25 -0.20

SI -1.21 1.87 0.66 5.91 0.03 3.14 -1.35 0.14 1.52 4.43

SK 5.48 -1.20 -2.14 -0.63 -1.11 -0.67 -1.42 0.36 -0.60 0.87

When severe economic crisis brought along rising unemployment figures during the early

1970s, policy-makers made attempts to bring immigration flows to a halt by reducingpossibilities to obtain work permits or by meddling with special immigration rights for


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citizens of former colonies. The UK was 10 years ahead of this tendency when the 1962

Commonwealth Immigrants Act subjected citizens of independent Commonwealth countries

to immigration controls (Geddes, 2003: 35). The net migration rates in table 1 show that these

stricter regulations where successful at reducing immigration for a limited period of time. In

some countries that attracted considerable immigration flows, such as the UK, Switzerland

and Belgium, emigration even exceeded immigration in some years. However, the legal

obstacles have not been able to prevent new immigration in the long term. Especially through

the procedure of family reunification, people continued to settle in Europe.

As table 1 indicates, a renewed increase of immigration has taken place from the 1990s

onward. Various phenomena can account for this phenomenon. The start of the collapse of the

Eastern bloc in 1989 set off immigration flows from Eastern Europe to other European

countries. Economic malaise and political instability in the third world combined with

increased availability of means of transportation and communication causes increasing

numbers of people wanting to settle in Europe. Because other paths to legal entrance have

become less accessible, this new immigration wave consists for a substantial part of asylum

seekers and undocumented immigrants.2 Recently, migration has thus not only undergone

quantitative but also qualitative changes. New is also that Western and Central Europe are no

longer the primary destinations of immigration. In Southern Europe, for example, countries

that were until 1975 true countries of emigration now attract the largest amounts of

immigrants. Also in Eastern Europe, immigration has risen sharply during the last decade

(Hooghe et al., 2008). Yet, this fact is masked in the net migration rates given in table 1, as

immigration into Eastern Europe is largely compensated by emigration from this region to

other European countries.

2. Theoretical perspectives: integration policy and its relation to public attitudes

2.1 Dimensions of integration policy

European countries have dealt in very different ways with the consequences of post-war

immigration (Castles, 1995). Policy responses vary with respect to the extent to which

newcomers have access to political, cultural and social rights. Migrant integration policy can

be thought of as a series of measures and interventions developed during the process


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settlement of immigrants (Favell, 2001: 350-351). Integration policy usually contains a great

many of such measures, and can therefore be decomposed into several dimensions. This paper

does not try to give an exhaustive overview of possible dimensions, but instead focuses on

five aspects that are most relevant in the light of our research questions. These dimensions

are: (1) access to nationality, (2) political rights, (3) socio-economic rights, (4) cultural rights

and (5) anti-discrimination legislation.

Access to nationality is perhaps the most crucial dimension of integration policy.

Naturalization entails the recognition of newcomers as citizens, i.e. members of the nation as

a political community. Formally at least, becoming a citizen entails that one is granted equal

political, cultural and social rights. Numerous studies have illustrated how conceptions of

citizenship vary across European countries (Kohn, 1944; Brubaker, 1996; Weil, 2001;

Shulman, 2002). Usually, a distinction is drawn between two archetypical citizenship models.

Ethnic citizenship defines belonging to the nation in ethnic terms: having common ancestry is

seen as a necessary condition to become a citizen. This ius sanguinis approach excludes

immigrants with a different ethnic background as full members of the nation state by

definition. Civic citizenship, the other extreme of the civic-ethnic continuum, is an inherently

political form of citizenship. Rather than common descent, adherence to the political rules and

legal norms is taken as the criterion for granting citizen-status. By consequence, In the past,

Germany and France have often been cited as exemplary for the ethnic respectively civic

model. Brubaker (1996), for example, argues that the distinct German and French conceptions

of citizenship are dependent on the historical conditions in which these nation states

developed. However, recent changes in citizenship rules have resulted in a shift toward the

centre of the civic-ethnic continuum (Geddes, 2003), which makes clear that citizenship

conceptions should not be treated as static.

Integration is broader than access to nationality, however (Marshall, 1964; Entzinger, 2000;

Baubck, 2001). Being a non-citizen does not necessarily mean that one is deprived of all

rights. Hammar (1990) introduced the term denizen to denote persons with a legal and

permanent resident status who enjoy certain rights, but who do not possess citizenship. In

Europe, several millions of first, second and third generation immigrants can be considered as

denizens (Castles & Miller, 2003). The rights that can be theoretically granted to non-citizens

fall apart into three broad categories. A first category deals with the possibility for non-

citizens to participate in political life and decision-making. These political rights self-


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evidently include voting rights at various governmental levels, but could also imply

consultation of representative organs of foreign residents. Socio-economic rights determines

the extent to which non-citizens have access to the labour market and resources of the welfare

system. Finally, cultural rights refer to the possibility for newcomers to maintain cultural

differences and to form ethnic communities.

Of course, granting certain formal rights to immigrants does not yet guarantee that these rights

are also put into practice. For this reason, we also consider the presence ofanti-discrimination

legislation to be an important dimension of integration policy. Such a legal framework could

be a useful tool to enforce equal access to certain resources.

2.2 A typology of integration regimes

Students of integration policy have noticed that in practice, these different dimensions are not

independent of each other, but that instead certain patterns recur. This has made it possible to

construct a typology of ideal-typical integration regimes. Usually, three broad integration

models3 are distinguished in the literature (see, for example: Castles, 1995; Koopmans &

Statham, 2000; Castles & Alastair, 2000; Rex, 2000; Castles & Miller, 2003): differential

exclusion, assimilation and multiculturalism or pluralism.

In the differential exclusionist model, immigrants are incorporated in certain spheres of life,

but are excluded from others. While they are typically given access to the labour market (and

sometimes also to certain social rights that are associated with this position), immigrants are

not considered as full members of the political community. Differential exclusion is based on

a ius sanguinis conception of citizenship, which implies that access to nationality is reserved

for those belonging to the same ethno-cultural group. Immigrants are also denied rights to

political participation. The philosophy behind differential exclusionism is that immigrants are

temporary guests on the labour market. By consequence, little initiatives are undertaken to

facilitate long-term residence or family reunification or to combat discrimination. In the

literature, Germany is regularly cited as the primary exponent of differential exclusionism

(Castles, 1995; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Castles & Miller, 2003). However, it should be

noted that the 1999 and 2001 revisions of German naturalisation law signified a serious shift

away from ethnic citizenship (Geddes, 2003: 95; Castles & Miller, 2003: 212). Guest-worker


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recruiting countries such as Austria, Belgium and Switzerland, but also certain new

immigration countries in Southern and Eastern Europe are generally considered as having

differential exclusionist integration policies (Castles, 1995).

Assimilationist integration policy is based on the premise that migrants can be socially and

culturally absorbed into the host society through a one-sided process of adaptation. Contrary

to differential exclusion, assimilation is thus embedded in a civic conception of citizenship.

Assimilation aims at incorporating immigrants as fully fledged members of the political

community, irrespective of their ethno-cultural background. Newcomers on the territory ( ius

soli) are given ample access to nationality, as long as they are prepared to accept the political

institutions of the country. Naturalization is thus the corner stone of the assimilation model,

through which access to all other rights is given. No special provisions are made for

immigrants that do not wish to naturalize, because assimilations attempts to prevent the

formation of immigrant groups that are distinguishable from the rest of the population. Within

the European context, France is most often put forward as exemplary for assimilationist

policy. However, one could ask oneself to what extent France still corresponds to this ideal-

typical description after changes in nationality legislation during the mid 1990s (Geddes,

2003).

The assimilationist and the multicultural model share their civic conception of citizenship.

The key difference between these two integration regimes, however, is that the latter

recognizes that immigrant groups form ethnic communities with distinct cultural and social

practices. Furthermore, multiculturalism means that these ethno-cultural groups are given

equal rights and treatment as the majority population in the different spheres of social life.

This implies that multiculturalism scores high on the political, cultural and social rights

dimension, and provides protection of these rights via anti-discrimination legislation. The

multicultural approach also provides ample possibilities for naturalization, although this is not

seen as a condition sine qua non for full participation in public life. In practice, many variants

of the multicultural model exist, ranging from a laissez-faire approach in which difference is

merely tolerated, to a more interventionist policy in which the state actively takes measures

and changes its institutions to guarantee the equality of ethnic communities. In Europe,

Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain are generally considered as examples of

multicultural approach (Castles, 1995; Castles & Alastair, 2000).


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The existing typologies have been criticized for various reasons. First, the ideal-typical

integration regimes have too often been used as static and monolithic categories, thereby

obscuring the dynamic character of integration policies. Above, some examples were already

given of how changing legislation can cause countries to shift gradually in the direction of

other integration models. An adequate account of integration policy should also take into

account a distinct integration approach can be adhered to by different political actors, in

various domains or with respect to diverse target groups (Koopmans & Statham, 2000: 20).

Second, Entzinger (2000) argues that the often-used typologies underestimate complexity of

immigration policies by focussing too much on a limited number of dimensionsuch as

legislation with respect to naturalization or cultural rights for immigrant groupswhile

neglecting other aspects that might be equally important (e.g. the social and economic

domain). Finally, a too exclusive emphasis on integration policy typologies might give the

impression that the national states are the only relevant actors concerning the integration of

immigrants, which is clearly not the case. In the European context, the impact of the European

Union on national policies should not be overlooked, even if harmonization efforts of the EU

have until now focussed on immigrant policies rather than on integration policies. Besides

that, the informality of the economy and the way in which the welfare system is organized can

strongly affect the grip of national states on integration of newcomers in society (Geddes,

2003).

2.3 The relation between integration regime and majority attitudes toward immigration

Various studies scholars have argued that there exists are relation between integration regimes

on the one hand, and immigration-related attitudes that live among the majority population

(Castles, 1995; Castles & Alastair, 2000; Geddes, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Weldon, 2006). Rather

than trying to identify one clear-cut causal path, the connection between policy and attitudes

should be conceived as a dialectical relation, with effects that run in various directions. Here,

we discern three processes through which the link between policy and attitudes can operate.

First, government policies often serve as a reference point for the public debate on integration.

The vocabulary used by policy makers has an impact on the categories that the majority

population uses to frame integration issues. The definitions employed in the official discourse

play a crucial role in the social construction of good and bad types of immigrants (Geddes,


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2003). Policy measures can be seen as institutionalized values with respect to the rights and

duties of newcomers in society. Through processes of socialization that take place in different

spheres of life, individuals internalize these values to a certain extent (Weldon, 2006). In this

sense, policy measures and the discourse that is constructed to justify these measure can be

seen a form of elite-discourse that influences mass opinion (Zaller, 1992). This idea is

supported by the findings of Lahav (2004) that there is some coherence between attitudes of

members of parliament and public opinion with respect to immigration.

Second, integration policy can influence attitudes indirectly because it fundamentally shapes

the context in which the relations between majority and minority groups take place, and

therefore also influences the outcomes of such relations. Castles and his colleagues argue that

certain integration policies prevent or conversely just stimulate ethnic minority formation

(Castles, 1995; Castles & Alastair, 2000; Castles & Miller, 2003). In contrast to ethnic

communities, ethnic minorities are not accepted as an integral part of society and therefore

forced into a marginal position. Because differential exclusionism separates immigrants from

the rest of the population in various spheres of life, this integration regime gives rise to the

marginalisation of immigrant groups and to ethnic minority formation. Multicultural

integration policies, on the other hand, recognize immigrant groups as equal but different

parts of society and therefore lead to the emergence of ethnic communities. Although to a

lesser extent than differential exclusionism, the assimilation model would also lead to ethnic

minority formation. Paradoxically enough, policies that set out to assimilate immigrants have

in practice often led to immigrant groups becoming marginalized, thereby leading to less

integration than the multicultural model (Castles, 1995; Weldon, 2006). The formation of

ethnic minorities rather than communities goes hand in and with the occurrence of anti-

immigrant attitudes and racist violence. Besides self-definitioni.e. the development of a

collective identity as an ethnic group, ethnic minority formation also includes an aspect of

other-definition: the dominant group imposes its demarcation of ethnic minorities on

subordinate groups. This process involves stereotyping and the development of negative out-

group attitudes (Castles & Alastair, 2000).

In the two processes sketched above, integration policy is thought to have consequences for

attitudinal dispositions of the majority population. Nevertheless, there are good arguments to

believe that this relationship also runs in the other direction. In countries where anti-

immigrant attitudes are widespread, policy makers can be tempted to introduce integration


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policies that tend towards differential exclusionism, out of fear for losing votes to extreme-

right wing parties with a vigorous anti-immigration programme. In contradiction with this line

of thinking, Freeman (1995) argues that public opinion only has a minor impact on

immigration-related policies.

3. An empirical test of the typology of integration regimes

In the first empirical part of this paper, we test whether the typology of integration regimes

presented above provides a useful analytical tool to understand the integration policies of the

various European countries. For this purpose, data from the Migration Integration Policy

Index (MIPEX) (Niessen et al., 2007) is used. MIPEX gives a comparative overview of

integration policies in 25 EU-member states and 3 non-EU countries. In total, this index takes

over 140 different indicators are taken into account, which makes it possible to sketch a

nuanced and relatively complete picture of the policy measures with respect to the

participation of immigrants in various social spheres.

MIPEX refers to six policy strands: (1) access to the labour market; (2) long-term residence;

(3) family reunification; (4) political participation; (5) access to nationality; (6) anti-

discrimination. Each of these strands is divided into several subcategories, such as the

conditions that need to be fulfilled by immigrants to obtain certain rights or the security of

these rights, once they are granted (see table 2 for an overview). Each of these subcategories

is then operationalized by several indicators, referring to a specific policy measure. For every

indicator, a score between 1 (worst practice) and 3 (best given) was given by a panel of

experts. A complete list of indicators can be found at the MIPEX-website:

http://www.integrationindex.eu.

Thus, MIPEX grasps several of the integration policy dimensions that were mentioned in the

theoretical part above. Unfortunately, two dimensions have not been covered

comprehensively. Labour market access and the rights associated with this cover only one

albeit the most fundamental oneaspect of social rights. Unfortunately, MIPEX does not

consider cultural rights to be a separate policy strand, and therefore pays only little attention

to this topic. The only indicators that refer to cultural rightsbe it only indirectly and very

partiallyare integration conditions to obtain a certain status. Very probably, these aspects


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have been omitted from MIPEX because in these domains it is notoriously difficult to obtain

comparable measurements for this domain.

Table 2. Strands and subcategories included in the Migrant Integration Policy Index

Strand 1: Labour market access Strand 4: Political participation

Eligibility formal political rights

labour market integration measures informal political rights

security of employment consultative and advice bodies

rights associated with status implementation policies

Strand 2: Family reunion Strand 5: Access to nationality

eligibility for sponsor eligibility

eligibility for family members conditions for acquisition of status

conditions for acquisition of status security of status

security of status dual nationality

rights associated with status Strand 6: Anti-discrimination

Strand 3: Long term residence definitions and concepts

Eligibility fields of application

conditions for acquisition of status enforcement

security of status equality policies

rights associated with status

Despite these shortcomings, we believe that the MIPEX data give us the possibility to test

empirically whether the typology of integration regimes is a useful tool to gain understanding

in integration policies that the European countries have adopted. By means of latent class

analysis (LCA) (McCutcheon, 1987), we examine whether it is possible to distinguish a small

number of interpretable types of integration policy. LCA is a statistical method for finding

unobservable subtypes in multivariate data. In this case, for example, we want to distinguish

countries with a similar integration regime. However, the integration regime is not observed

directly, but indicated indirectly via policy indicators. In a certain sense, LCA can be seen as a

confirmatory factor analysis where the latent factor is categorical rather than metric (this is

the Mplus approach, see: Muthn & Muthn, 1998-2006). LCA differs from crisp cluster

techniques because rather than allocating every observation unambiguously to a certain

cluster, the model estimates the probabilities of belonging to the latent classes. This fuzzy

cluster approach provides an answer to the above-mentioned critique that typologies often

obscure the fact that some countries can have elements that belong to more than one

integration regime.


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Rather than the individual indicators, we use average scores for each of the six policy strands

as input variables for the LCA.4 These averages were rescaled so that all scores range between

0 (maximal exclusion) and 10 (maximal inclusion).5 Mplus 4.0 (Muthn & Muthn, 1998-

2006) was used to estimate the model. A model with three latent classes provides the best

solution, judging by statistical criteria as well as in terms of interpretability.6

The interpretation of the latent classes can be derived from the estimated class means on the

six policy strands. These means are represented graphically in figure 1. The first class scores

high on all variables, meaning that the countries in this class have adopted inclusive policies

with respect to all measured domains of integration policy. These countries havecompared

to the other countries in the study at leastgenerous procedures for naturalisation. At the

same time, non-nationals have relatively easy access to the labour market, political

participation, family reunification and long-term residence. Indeed, this latent class bears a

strong resemblance to the multicultural integration regime. Not surprisingly, countries that are

often referred to as exponents of multicultural policy, such as Sweden, the UK and the

Netherlands (Castles, 1995; Geddes, 2003) are most likely to belong to this first latent class.7

Also Belgium, Norway and Finland and three new immigration countries in Southern Europe,

namely Portugal, Spain and Italy, are strongly connected to the first latent class (see figure 2).

As figure 1 makes clear, the second class is the very opposite of latent class 1. With respect to

all policy dimensions, class 2 has a significantly lower average than class 1, meaning that

immigrants are given are given access to far less rights. This second latent class shows certain

similarities with the differential exclusionist integration regime. The restrictive naturalisation

procedures and the very low levels of political participation reflect the conception of

immigrants as temporary guests that should not be granted full citizenship. However, there

also exists a remarkable contradiction between latent class 2 and differential exclusion. The

countries in latent class 2 have a low score on the labour market dimension, while the model

of differential exclusion precisely predicts that labour market is the key domain to which

immigrants are given access. Rather than differential exclusion, the countries in latent class 2

have adopted policies aimed at full exclusion. One could argue that this contradiction between

latent class 2 and the theoretical model of differential exclusion is related to the specific

operationalization of the labour market dimension in MIPEX. After all, not only the

possibility to enter in the labour market, but also rights and security associated with this are


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measured. But even when eligibility for access to the labour market is analysed separately, the

same pattern is retrieved: class 2 scores significantly lower than class 1.

All Eastern European countries in the study are most likely to be members of latent class 2.

This is in line with the literature that states that an ethnic conception of citizenship is typical

of Eastern European countries (Castles, 1995). It is striking to see that these countries have

adopted a very different approach to migrant integration compared to other countries that only

have become countries of immigration very recently, such as Portugal, Italy and Spain. Apart

from the Eastern European countries, also Austria, Denmark and Greece and Malta are close

to latent class 2. This makes the exclusionism the most widespread integration regime among

the countries under study.

Figure 1. LCA solution estimated class means on the 6 policy strands (with 95%

confidence intervals)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Labourmarket

Acces

Familyreunion

Longterm

residence

Political

participation

Accessto

nationality

Anti-

discrimination

Class1 Class2 Class3


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Figure 2. LCA solution most likely latent class membership for 27 European countries

The third and smallest latent class takes a position in between the two previous ones. Alike

class 2, this policy type only offers limited access to the labour market and to family reunion.

Yet at the same time latent class 3 shares high average scores on the nationality and political

participation dimension with class 1. Only with respect to long-term residence, class 3

occupies an extreme position: this integration type includes the most restrictive procedures for

long-term residence of all countries. At first sight, the low scores on the long-term residence

dimension combined with generous naturalisation legislation might show resemblance to

assimilationist policy. After all, assimilation is based on propositions that integration should

be conveyed through naturalization and that no special provisions should be made for

immigrant groups. Yet, the high score on political participation contrasts sharply with the

assimilation model. A more accurate interpretation of latent class 3 can perhaps be given by

identifying which countries have the highest probabilities of belonging to this class: Germany,


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France, Ireland, Luxemburg and Switzerland. Historically, these countries adhered to very

different conceptions of nationhood. Nevertheless, they have in common that they figure

amongst the countries with the largest foreign born populations in Europe. Apart from Ireland

that has only started to experience sizeable immigration flow more recently (Hooghe et al.,

2008), these countries belong to the classic European immigration countries. Being

confronted with relatively large immigrant populations, the governments of these countries

were compelled to give access to nationality and to provide some opportunities for political

participation. This is even the case for Germany, a country that has often been considered as

the typical example of differential exclusion. At the same time, these countries have

apparently tried to contain further immigration by limiting labour market access, long-term

residence and family reunification.

This latent class analysis has yielded several interesting insights. First, it has become clear

that despite attempts to harmonize European policies, very different integration regimes can

be discerned within Europe. While some countries have adopted relatively inclusive

integration policies, othersespecially in Eastern Europehave taken an exclusive stance on

all measured policy dimensions. A third integration regimes scores high on political

citizenship (naturalization and political participation), while more restrictive procedures are

employed for other dimensions such as labour market access and family reunification.

Nevertheless, migrant integration policy in practice does not correspond fully with the

theoretical integration models that are proposed in the literature. Instead of differential

exclusion, undifferentiated exclusionist policies (i.e. restrictive policies on all dimensions) are

found to be quite widespread in Europe. Furthermore, there is little evidence for the existence

of the assimilation policy model in contemporary Europe. Instead, a latent class that stresses

political citizenship is found. These countries have generous naturalization procedures and

offer non-nationals opportunities to participate in political life, but score low on the other

dimensions. It is also interesting to see how Germany and Francetwo countries that are

often presented in the literature as having antipodal integration regimesare most likely to be

members of the same latent class, namely the one with political citizenship. Recent changes in

the legislation of these countries (Geddes, 2003; Castles & Miller, 2003) have apparently

resulted in a convergence of integration policy. To account for these findings, certain aspects

of theory on integration models need to be qualified.


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17

Finally, it is very interesting to see how new immigration countries have developed very

different responses to the rising immigration flows they are confronted with. While most

Southern European countries, such as Portugal, Spain and Italy have adopted a more

multicultural integration regime, Eastern European states have reacted rather uniformly with

exclusionists policies. Explanations for these different approaches might be sought in the

tradition of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe or in the experience of mass emigration that

Southern European countries lived through in the post-war period, although the case of

Greece contradicts this latter explanation.

4. An empirical test of the relation between policy and attitudes

The typology of integration regimes that was derived in the previous paragraph renders it

possible to perform an empirical test of the relation between integration policy and attitudinal

variables, such as attitudes toward immigration or the perception of ethnic threat. For this

purpose, we make use of data of the first round (2002-03) of the European Social Survey

(ESS).8 The ESS is an academically-driven survey project that was fielded in 21 European

countries that are also present in the MIPEX data. These countries and their respective

effective sample sizes are: Austria (AT) (2,257), Belgium (BE) (1,899), Czech Republic (CZ)

(1,360), Denmark (DK) (1,506), Finland (FI) (2,000), France (FR) (1,503), Germany (DE)

(2,919), Great Britain (GB) (2,052), Greece (GR) (2,566), Hungary (HU) (1,685), Ireland (IE)

(2,046), Italy (IT) (1207), Luxemburg (LU) (1552), Netherlands (NL) (2,364), Norway (NO)

(2,036), Poland (PL) (2,110), Portugal (PT) (1,510), Slovenia (SI) (1,519), Spain (ES)

(1,729), Sweden (SE) (1,999), and Switzerland (CH) (2,037). The data were taken from the

website http://ess.nsd.uib.no.

ESS round 1 contains an elaborate module of over 50 items dealing with various aspects of

attitudes toward immigration. In this part, we will mainly focus on three different scales

measuring the perception that immigrants form a threat to economic (ECOTHREAT) or

cultural prerogatives (CULTHREAT) and the rejection of new immigration into the country

(REJECT). Question wordings for these items are given in table 3. By means of multi-group

confirmatory factor analysis, the quality and the cross-cultural measurement equivalence of

these scales was tested.


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Table 3. Question wordings of the items

Question wording Answer categories

To what extent do you think [country] shoud allow people

D4. ... of the same race or ethnic group from most [country] people tocome and live here?

D5. ... of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people tocome and live here?

D7. ... from the poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?

D8. ... from the richer countries outside Europe to come and live here?

D9. ... from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here?

D10. ... have good educational qualifications?

D11. ... have close family living here?

D12. ... be able to speak [country language]?

REJECT

D16. ... have work skills that [country] needs?

1 (many), 2 (some), 3(a few), 4 (none)

D. 19 People who come to live and work here generally harm the

economic prospects of the poor more than the rich

D21. If people who have come to live and work here are unemployed

for a long period, they should be made to leave.

1 (agree strongly) to 5(disagree strongly)

D25. Would you say that people who come to live here generally takejobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create newjobs?

0 (take jobs away) to 10(create new jobs)

D26. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more

than they put in or put in more than they take out?

0 (generally take outmore) to 10 (generally

put in more)

ECON

D27. Would you say that it is generally bad or good for [country]economy that people come to live here from other countries?

0 (bad for the economy)

to 10 (good for the

economy)

D28. Would you say that [country] cultural life is generally underminedor enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

0 (cultural life

undermined) to 10(cultural life enriched)

D40. It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same

customs and traditions.CULT

D41. It is better for a country if there are a variety of different religions.

1 (agree strongly) to 5(disagree strongly)

As a first step in this analysis, we test whether the latent class a country (most likely) belongs

to relates to the country-level means on the three attitude scales. The country means used here

are latent means estimated with LISREL 8.7. Because age, gender and education are known to

have an impact on attitudes toward immigration, observed differences in the country means

could be (partly) due to the fact that the distributions of these variables differ across countries.

As this analysis focuses on contextual rather than individual explanations, we decided to

eliminate this part of the country-level variance by controlling for age, gender and education.

All latent presented latent means are thus adjusted for age, gender and education. The relation

between latent class and the attitude scales is tested by means of a non-parametric test,


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namely the Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952).9 This test is essentially a one-way

ANOVA on the rank scores of the countries. For each of the three latent classes, table 4 gives

the mean rank score (mean score), the sum of rank scores (sum of scores), the expected sum

of scores under the hypothesis that the three classes have the same median on the attitude

scale (expected under H0) and the standard deviation of the sum scores (standard deviation

under HO). The last column of the table provides the results of a statistical test for the

hypothesis that the median is equal across the three latent classes.

Table 4. Nonparametric tests for the relation between most likely latent class

membership and attitude scales

REJECT (adjusted for age, gender and education)

Wilcoxon scores (rank sums)

NMean

score

Sum of

scores

Expected

under

H0

Standard

deviation

under H0

Kruskal Wallis

test

Class 1 9 9.00 81.00 99.00 14.06 Chi = 2.6216

Class 2 7 14.00 98.00 77.00 13.40 Df = 2

Class 3 5 14.40 52.00 55.00 12.10 p-value = 0.2696

ECOTHREAT (adjusted for age, gender and education)Wilcoxon scores (rank sums)

NMean

score

Sum of

scores

Expected

under

H0

Standard

deviation

under H0

Kruskal Wallis

test

Class 1 9 8.33 75.00 99.00 14.07 Chi = 5.1889

Class 2 7 15.29 107.00 77.00 13.40 Df = 2

Class 3 5 9.80 49.00 55.00 12.11 p-value = 0.0747

CULTHREAT (adjusted for age, gender and education)

Wilcoxon scores (rank sums)

NMean

score

Sum of

scores

Expected

under

H0

Standard

deviation

under H0

Kruskal Wallis

test

Class 1 9 9.06 81.50 94.50 13.16 Chi = 4.7082

Class 2 7 14.29 100.00 73.50 12.61 Df = 2

Class 3 4 7.13 28.50 42.00 10.58 p-value = 0.0950


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On average, countries with an inclusive integration regime (class 1) appear to have a lower

mean rank score on REJECT than countries in the other two classes. This means that class 1

countries figure more often at the lower end of the country ranking, and consequently that

resistance against immigration is lower among the populations of these countries. However,

the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that these differences are not statistically significant. There

exists stronger evidence for a connection between integration regimes and perceived ethnic

threat. The country-means of both ECOTHREAT and CULTHREAT are significantly

different across the latent classes. Countries that are most likely to be members of the second

latent class have substantially higher mean rank scores on these scales than latent classes 1

and 3. Perceptions that immigration poses serious threats to economic and cultural goods are

thus more widespread in countries with exclusive integration policies. Between the other two

classes, only minor and statistically insignificant differences are present, although latent class

1 scores somewhat higher on cultural threat and slightly lower on economic threat.

Apart from calculating average rank scores for the latent classes, it can be enlightening to

have a closer look at the position of the countries separately. Figure 4 plots most likely latent

class membership against the latent mean scores on the attitude scales. The figure confirms

the conclusion that integration policies are stronger related to perceptions of economic threat

than to the rejection of immigration. Indeed, the location of the latent classes lies clearly

further apart for ECOTHREAT and CULTHREAT than for REJECT. In Norway and

Swedentwo countries with more inclusive integration policies (latent class 1)the

population is least prone to ethnic threat percpetions. On the contrary, perceived ethnic threat

is most widespread in Greece, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary, four countries that have

adopted exclusive integration policies (latent class 2). Nevertheless, there is one clear

exception to the observed relation between perceived ethnic threat and integration regimes,

namely Denmark. While this country has adopted exclusive integration policies, the level of

perceived ethnic threat is among the lowest in Europe.


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Figure 3. The relation between integration regimes and attitude scales

AT

BE

CH

DE

DK

ES

FI

FR

GB

GR

HU

IE

IT

LU

NL

NO

PL

PT

SE

SI

CZ

-1.4

-1.2

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0 1 2 3 4

Most Likely Latent Class

LatentmeanonREJECT(adjus

tedforage,genderandeducatio

n)

ATBE

CH

DE

DK

ES

GB

GR

HU

IE

IT

LU

NO

PL

PT

SE

SI

CZFI

FR

NL

-0.80

-0.60

-0.40

-0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

0 1 2 3 4

Most Likely Latent Class

LatentmeanonECOTHREAT(adj

ustedforage,genderandeduca

tion)

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

0

La

tentmeanonCULTHREAT(adju

stedforage,genderandeducat

ion)


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22

As a second step in this analysis, we assess how each of the six policy strands that are covered

in MIPEX relates separately to the attitude scales. For this purpose, the correlation between

the country rank order the attitude scales and the MIPEX policy strand scores is calculated

(Spearman, 1987). Only a limited number of aspects of integration regimes turn out to be

related to the attitude scales. The extent to which third country nationals are given access to

the labour market correlates significantly (=.10) with REJECT and ECOTHREAT.

Resistance against immigration and the perception of economic threat are less prevalent in

countries with inclusive labour market integration policies. It is not surprising that the

correlation with perceived cultural threat is less strong, since labour market is pre-eminently

an aspect of the economic sphere. Besides labour market policies, also the political

participation dimension is correlated with certain attitude scales. In countries that offer third

country nationals relatively open access to political participation, lower levels of both

economic and cultural threat are registered.

Table 5. Spearman Rank Order correlations (p-values between brackets) between the

MIPEX policy strands and attitude scales (adjusted for age, gender and education)

REJECT ECOTHREAT CULTHREAT

-0.44 -0.43 -0.21Labour market access(0.0474) (0.0540) (0.3732)

-0.42 -0.20 -0.15Family reunification

(0.0595) (0.3753) (0.533)

-0.23 -0.19 0.07Long term residence

(0.3229) (0.4203) (0.7574)

-0.37 -0.71 -0.57Political participation

(0.1024) (0.0003) (0.0085)

-0.20 -0.05 -0.19Access to nationality

(0.3831) (0.8447) (0.4277)

0.18 0.13 0.20Anti-discrimination

(0.4299) (0.5747) (0.3995)N 21 21 20

These analyses yield several interesting conclusions. Empirical evidence is presented for a

relation between the integration regimes that countries have adopted on the one hand, and

public immigration attitudes. Inhabitants of countries with exclusive immigration policies

perceive immigrants more frequently as a threat to certain prerogatives such as cultural and

economic goods. Between countries of the other two latent classes, no significant differences

were detected. The relation between policy and attitudes can be predominantly attributed to


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one specific policy dimension, namely political participation. Populations of countries with

ample opportunities for newcomers to participate in political life exhibit lower levels of

perceived ethnic threat. Although political participation is probably not the policy strand with

the largest practical impact on the lives of immigrant populations, this turns out to be a factor

of crucial importance for understanding the attitudes of the majority populations. This is

perhaps the consequence of the fact that granting voting rights to immigrants is a highly

mediatised topic in many countries.

However, the finding that a relation between integration policies and attitudes exists does not

tell us anything about the causal direction of this relation or the specific processes through

which the influence takes place. Unfortunately, the data presented here does not allow us to

discriminate between all possible processes that were made explicit in the theoretical part of

this paper. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence presented here completely contradicts an

often-cited theoretical framework, namely group conflict theory (Blalock, 1967; Quillian,

1995). This theory predicts that inclusive integration policies will increase the level of

competition between minority and majority groups, and therefore also the perception of ethnic

threat among the latter. We, on the other hand, clearly find that countries with more inclusive

integration policies are precisely characterized by lower levels of perceived ethnic threat.

More open policies thus do not necessarily have to lead to a so-called white backlash.

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Endnotes

1 These figures were retrieved from the Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).2 For obvious reasons, movements of undocumented immigrants are not registered and thus cannot be deduced

from the figures in table 1.3

Some authors also mention a fourth type of integration policy, namely total exclusion (Castles, 1995; Rex,2000). However, this integration model is not discussed here as it has not been applied in post-war Europe.4 It would be very interesting to analyze individual indicators rather than strand averages, and see how theybehave across integration regimes. However, due to the small number of observations (27 countries), it isimpossible to include over 100 variables in the analysis.5

25 out of 141 indicators had a missing value for at least 1 country. These variables were excluded from theanalysis. The items with missing values refer to policy measures at regional level (not applicable to all countries)or to specific characteristics of integration assessment as a condition for acquiring a certain status. A side effectof these omissions is that our analyses put less stress on integration tests than the policy strand averages reportedby MIPEX.6 MLR estimation with random starts was used (Muthn & Muthn, 1998-2006). With 26 free parameters, thethree-class model has Loglikelihood value of -274.431. The bootstrapped parametric Loglikelihood ratio testshows that a model with 2 classes has a significantly (p

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