Integrating Cybersecurity Risk Assessments Into the ... · instrumented systems. A similar approach...

2015 AIChE Spring Meeting __________________________________________________________

Integrating Cybersecurity Risk Assessments

Into the Process Safety Management Work Process

Harold W Thomas

Exida LLC

64 North Main Street

Sellersville, PA 18960

[email protected]

John Day

Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.

7201 Hamilton Blvd

Allentown, PA 18195

[email protected]

Copyright © exida.com LLC 2015

Prepared for Presentation at

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

2015 Spring Meeting

11th Global Congress on Process Safety

Austin, Texas

April 27-30, 2015

UNPUBLISHED

AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained

in papers or printed in its publications


Integrating Cybersecurity Risk Assessments

Into the Process Safety Management Work Process

Harold W Thomas

Exida LLC

64 North Main Street

Sellersville, PA 18960

[email protected]

John Day

Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.

7201 Hamilton Blvd

Allentown, PA 18195

[email protected]

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Process Safety Lifecycle, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability

Assessment

Abstract

Cybersecurity is rapidly becoming something that process safety can no longer ignore. It is part

of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)[8]. In addition, the President’s

Executive Order 13636[6] – “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” has drawn

attention to the need for addressing cybersecurity in our plants as it has been demonstrated that in

our new world, they are now a source of potential process safety incident. IEC 61508[2],

“Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems

(E/E/PE, or E/E/PES)” now has a requirement to address cybersecurity in safety instrumented

systems and ANSI/ISA 84.00.01[3], “Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the

Process Industry Sector” is looking to include this requirement in the next revision. Currently the

industry is playing catch up as there tends to be a gap in understanding between information

technologists, traditionally responsible for cybersecurity, and the process automation and process

safety engineers responsible for keeping our plants safe with help from automated controls and

safety instrumented systems. As a result, guidance is being developed, but much of it continues

to be a work in progress.

ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1[4], “Establishing an industrial automation and control system security

program,” requires a high level risk assessment, a detailed level risk assessment and a cyber-

security vulnerability assessment to be performed. This paper explains the purpose of these risk

assessments and where they fit into the process safety management lifecycle. As the entire cyber-

security lifecycle is described, the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)

Framework[7] for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity is used to better understand the

analysis, design/implement, and operate/maintain phases of the lifecycle. As companies have

relatively recently begun to understand the need to address the issue of potential cyber-attacks on

the process control and protection system, few have a fully implemented work process. Guidance


is provided for existing plants to begin the process and how to fully implement the lifecycle as

well as how to approach new projects.

1 Introduction

With the advent of cyber incidents that have specifically targeted control and protection systems,

it has become clear that the discipline of process safety needs to consider cybersecurity.

Compounding the issue is the gap in understanding between information technologists

traditionally responsible for cybersecurity and the process automation and process safety

engineers whose control and safety systems are at risk. The need to integrate and reduce this

knowledge gap is clear. This paper explains how integration between these disciplines can be

accomplished.

Management of Functional safety and Cyber for ICS encompasses many aspects, however this

can be illustrated in figure 1 below. Beginning with a new grass roots facility or green field site,

each of the major phases are shown and how the process safety work process works in

conjunction with cybersecurity, showing the relative interaction of the two lifecycles.

Figure 1: Safety/Cybersecurity Integration

Although this paper will touch upon the full lifecycle, a more in depth focus will be placed on

the high level risk assessment, detailed risk assessment and vulnerability assessments. For

companies with operating facilities that have previously not considered process safety related

cybersecurity, guidance is provided as to how to begin the process of implementing the full

lifecycle as a sustainable activity.


Safety and Cyber have similar and co-dependent thought processes throughout the lifecycle.

There are specific roles and responsibilities required from Manufactures, Certifying bodies and

Owner Operators. Within the roles and responsibilities, specific standards are utilized to manage

the lifecycle of products, systems, applications and approaches. Policies, procedures, current

industry equipment and software capabilities, level of rigor and useful life attributes all combine

to form the basis for cybersecurity management that provides sustainability. This forms a

management of functional cybersecurity that is akin to the management of functional safety. The

end user is responsible to ensure that the residual risk is commensurate with the level of risk that

the business is willing to tolerate.

ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 1 (IEC 61511-1 Mod)[3], Clause 5, Management of functional

Safety and Functional Safety Assessment, coupled with Clause 6.2, Safety Life-cycle Structure

and Planning are the governing standards for owner operators with respect to safety

instrumented systems. A similar approach to industrial control system (ICS) cybersecurity must

be taken.

The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) [7] has developed a framework that

is the best practice developed for end users to date to aid in the development of the cybersecurity

management systems.

The framework developed by NIST can be used to assist users as they develop the analysis,

design/implement, and operate/maintain management policies, standards and procedures for the

various phases of the lifecycle. It does not provide guidance on how to accomplish the tasks,

rather it is an outline of the things that need to be considered coupled with some level of

performance criteria. It is divided into five functions; Identify (I), Detect (D), Protect (P),

Respond (R), and Recover (R). Functions then have categories that describe specific aspects of

the lifecycle that are relevant to the function. Each category has subcategories that describe

numerous activities and performance criteria that are related to the category and function.

Finally, the framework provides industry references for each subcategory where more detailed

information can be found that an end user might find useful when developing their management

systems.

2 Assessment (PHA) Phase

2.1 Cybersecurity Assessment Phase Overview

Figure 2 shows the work process flow of an integrated lifecycle. As part of any new project

involving process industry hazards, a scope must be formulated. This is just as true for how to

address cybersecurity. One of the requirements in ISA/IEC 62443-3-2[5] is to perform a high

level cybersecurity risk assessment. Its purpose is to help define what scope needs to be

included. Section 2.2 will discuss the high level risk assessment in more depth.

As part of developing the scope, it is essential that zone and conduit drawings be prepared. To

cybersecurity, these are like P&IDs to the process world, and form the basis of what is reviewed

during a detailed cybersecurity risk assessment.


The traditional process hazard review, including HAZOP, LOPA or other applicable

methodologies should be performed prior to the detailed level cybersecurity risk review as

required by ISA/IEC 62443-3-2[5]. This sequence allows the traditional review to identify and

analyze the major hazards that need to be considered when conducting the detailed level

cybersecurity risk assessment. The high level risk assessment will be discussed in more depth in

Section 2.3.

Figure 2: Assessment Phase

Scope Definition & Project Setup

(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Scope Definition & Project Setup

(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Cyber Risk Assessment(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Cyber Risk Assessment(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Document Requirements(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Document Requirements(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Corporate RiskCriteria Met?

Corporate RiskCriteria Met?

Yes

No

High Level Cyber Security Risk Assessment(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

PHA, e.g. HAZOP/LOPAPHA, e.g. HAZOP/LOPA

Corporate / site policies & proceduresProject Specific RequirementsZone & Conduit

Drawings

Regulations(e.g. CFAT, NERC CIP, etc.)

Standards(e.g. IEC 62443)

Tolerable Risk Guidelines

Consequence Analysis

Consequence Analysis

Cyber Threat Analysis

Cyber Threat Analysis

Cyber Security Requirements Spec

Cyber Risk Assessment Report

Any major risks identified may need a more rigorous evaluation. This can involve traditional

consequence analysis techniques and in the future, there will be a push to understand how to

apply more quantitative likelihood analysis techniques, keeping in mind that cybersecurity

countermeasures degrade via different mechanisms versus the random and systematic

mechanisms that have been addressed by safety instrumented systems and functions.

Irrespective, a means to ensure the corporate risk criteria is met is required that addresses both

likelihood and consequence. If the risk criteria is not met, then additional measures need to be

considered until the risk criteria is met. Once the criteria is determined to be achievable, a

cybersecurity requirements specification (CSRS) is documented in a similar manner to the safety


requirements specification (SRS) for safety instrumented system (SIS) and functions (SIF) so

detailed design can begin.

2.2 High Level Cyber Risk Assessment

2.2.1 Purpose

According to ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1[4] the purpose of a high level cyber risk assessment is to help

establish scope. For cybersecurity, a determination of the criticality and consideration of how to

respond to various assets being compromised is quite useful.

2.2.2 Procedure

To accomplish, a list of all the types of cyber assets that will be used needs to be developed.

Typical cyber assets include but are not limited to:

Business servers

Historian

Personal computers

Engineering work station

Operator Consoles for Human Machine Interface (HMI)

Distributed Control System

Programmable Logic Controller

Safety Instrumented System Controller

Smart field instruments

Printers

Etc.

Once the list is complete, the next step is to determine two things; what is the criticality if the

device were compromised, and second, if compromised, what type of responses are appropriate.

What level of response is required depends upon how much risk may exist if the asset is

compromised. Typical responses that can be considered include:

Keep operating and fix when convenient

Isolate the asset from other assets & quarantine until threat has been removed

Shutdown the process

Should something like a Historian server be compromised, it would be more appropriate to

isolate while the rest of the process continues to operate. However, should it be determined a SIS

is compromised, it would be difficult to justify not shutting down the process. A more interesting

question comes about should the basic process control system (BPCS) be compromised. If the

SIS is still functional, a case can be made to try and fix on line if it can be determined that the

threat is not fatal. This last example raises an important point when selecting a control system at

the beginning of a project. As the degree of integration between control systems and safety

systems increases, there is less latitude as to the potential responses. In addition, as the level of

integration increases, common failure resulting from a cyber-attack can lead to a situation where


it is not possible to satisfy corporate risk criteria. Understanding these issues as soon as possible

is the best way to minimize the cost and potential schedule impact to a project. When making the

determination of what system and level of integration to use, it is advised to reference the 7 core

attributes as described in the CCPS Safe & Reliable Instrumented Protection to help make an

appropriate decision based on the relative level of risk inherently posed by the process.

With the potential consequences and ease of propagation information documented, each asset

should be assigned to a zone and the level of protection recommended to prevent propagation

across zones should be established. Using industry recognized and generally accepted good

practice as documented in the ANSI/ISA 62443 series of standards should be the starting point.

Finally, formal zone and conduit drawings should be developed which can be considered

required process safety information input to the detailed cyber risk assessment.

2.2.3 Procedure Summary

List cyber assets

Document potential consequences if asset compromised

Risk rank assets based on potential consequences

Document ease of propagation with open communication

Recommend zone location for each asset

Recommend conduit safeguards for communication between each zone

Document zone and conduit drawing for use in detailed cyber risk assessment

2.3 Detailed Cyber Risk Assessment

2.3.1 Purpose

A detailed cyber risk assessment is intended to rigorously evaluate the instrument and control

system IACS and ensure the proposed design and procedures are capable of satisfying the

corporate risk criteria. This paper is recommending a methodology similar to a HAZOP,

however, the methodology evaluates cyber nodes that represent the cyber assets that are part of

the zone and conduit drawings. Although the concern is with the control and safety systems, the

entire plant network including all internet and wireless access points, including 3rd party

connections, networks, and devices need to be included as these can be pathways to compromise

the IACS.

2.3.2 Methodology Differences

It needs to be understood that the typical process hazard analysis (PHA) has a much greater

degree of granularity than a Cyber PHA. In a PHA, individual control loops are considered as

potential cause of a hazard whereas in a Cyber PHA, the entire basic process control system

would be considered all at once. Non cyber causes are more predictable as the common mode

failure of an entire controller would result in all outputs failing the same way, whereas a cyber-

attack is insidious as it can cause different outputs to fail so as to result in the worst case

consequence.


The final difference is that the PHA will consider safeguards that may or are may not be

vulnerable to cyber-attack, whereas a Cyber PHA generally has no practical means to consider

safeguards that are not vulnerable to cyber-attack during the hazard identification portion of the

Cyber PHA due to the different levels of granularity of what is being reviewed. For instance, if a

control failure resulted in high pressure, a relief valve might be listed as a safeguard in a

HAZOP. In a Cyber PHA it is not practical to consider this as it does not look at individual

loops, but all of the loops, alarms, interlocks contained in a single BPCS. Once the major hazards

have been identified, it would be reasonable to consider some safeguards that are not vulnerable

to cyber attack on an exception basis.

2.3.3 Leveraging the PHA

After the traditional PHA has been performed, a further step is to consider whether initiating

causes and safeguards are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attack. Those that are not vulnerable do

not need to be considered in the cyber risk assessment. For those that are vulnerable, the ultimate

consequence should be noted. These consequences can be ranked into appropriate categories to

be considered in the detailed cyber risk assessment.

The exercise to determine these consequences of concern can be performed by reviewing the

HAZOP or by going through the exercise with the layer of protection analyses (LOPA) if

performed. If an adequate level of LOPA has been performed, it is somewhat more efficient to

use these as they typically cover the hazards. It is not necessary to evaluate every hazard in a

detailed cyber risk assessment as once the BPCS and the SIS are protected against major hazards,

they would also be protected against the lesser hazards. Table 1 shows a more detailed procedure

to leverage the PHA in this manner.

Table 1: Procedure for Leveraging the PHA

Major Procedural Step Detailed Step Comments

Perform traditional PHA 1. Use company HAZOP / LOPA

procedures

Excerpt high risk

Initiating Events

2. Filter worksheet data to only

include high risk consequence

severities

3. Export the following data fields:

Initiating event (IE)

Consequence

Severity

Safeguards

PHA Recommendations

Comments

4. Sort the report by descending

Consequence Severities

There is no credit for any

safeguards at this point

Discard those initiating 5. Review each initiating event.


Major Procedural Step Detailed Step Comments

events not susceptible to

cyber influence

a. If it can be caused by a

cyber-attack indicate “yes”

b. If it is not vulnerable to

cyber-attack, indicate “no”

6. Filter the report to only show

those cause consequence pairs

that are susceptible to cyber-

attack.

Identify safeguards not

susceptible to cyber

influence

7. Review the safeguards for

remaining initiating events as to

susceptibility to cyber-attack

a. If it can be manipulated

by a cyber-attack

indicate “yes

b. If it is not vulnerable to

cyber-attack, indicate

“no”

8. Filter the report to only show

those safeguards that are not

susceptible to cyber-attack

Perform revised risk

ranking

9. Update likelihood of event in the

column of the PHA Data Export

template.

10. Update risk ranking in the

column of the PHA Data Export

template.

11. Sort revised worksheet by risk in

descending order.

Only take credit for

safeguards not

susceptible to cyber-

attack

Risk ranking is based

on likelihood of cyber

threat being perpetrated

and failure of the

safeguards not

susceptible to cyber-

attack for the specific

risk receptor category.

Provide sorted

worksheet to cyber risk

assessment team

The risk ranked

worksheet is to be used

by the cyber risk

assessment team to:

o Improve estimate of

actual consequences

and severity.

o Achieve improved

granularity of risk

when credit for

cyber safeguards is

assessed.


2.3.4 Risk Assessment Procedure

In preparation for the cyber risk assessment key process safety information needs to be available.

This mostly includes what was leveraged from the traditional PHA (Table 1) and the zone and

conduit drawings that show:

Zone location for each cyber assets

Means of communication protection between zones.

Prior to performing the review, the tool/worksheet being used to conduct the review should be

organized to list the zones and assets within each zone. Figure 3 shows a conceptual example

taken of a Zone and Conduit drawing using the hierarchy approach from ISA 95.

Figure 3: Zones & Cyber Nodes

Excerpted from

CCPS Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes[10]

(Peer Review Copy)

A HAZOP type approach is recommended to perform the cyber risk assessment. This is a

qualitative risk assessment method that identifies potential for cyber-attacks that can cause an

incident with the potential to result in harm to human life, the environment, property or loss of

operating capability. A summary of the method is included below:

Select zone

Select cyber node

Select threat (smart selections based upon type of cyber-attack)

Identify & record causes


Identify & record qualitative cause likelihood (without any credit for counter measures)

Identify & record consequences (without any credit for counter measures)

Determine & record qualitative severity of consequences

Identify & record counter measures applicable to the cyber threat and cause

Determine & Record qualitative likelihood (with existing counter measures)

Determine if risk is tolerable per risk criteria. If not make recommendation(s)

Figure 4 shows an example worksheet following review.

Figure 4: Example Cyber Risk Review Worksheets


Figure 4 Continued

2.3.5 Procedure Summary

In summary, the steps needed to complete the detailed level cyber risk assessment are listed

below:

Determine major hazards vulnerable to cyber-attack from the HAZOP or LOPA

Document cyber nodes from the zone and conduit drawing

Perform a Cyber PHA on the zone and conduit drawings

Make recommendations whenever risk criteria not met

3 Design and Implement Phase

Figure 3 shows the various activities during the design and implement phase. Once the CSRS is

provided, an iterative design process between network, IACS, and process safety personnel will

take place to ensure that the planned layers of cybersecurity protection including policies,

procedures equipment, software capabilities, and level of rigor are appropriate for the

cybersecurity performance expectations. Once it has been ascertained that the conceptual design

has been validated, detailed design can begin. In parallel with the detailed design, the procedures

to test and validate the cyber countermeasures need to be developed.

These test procedures need to support the cyber portion of the factory acceptance test (FAT), the

site acceptance test (SAT), pre startup safety review (PSSR) and the initial validation of the


cyber countermeasures. This work parallels and should be conducted as part of the SIS validation

during its various stages.

Figure 5: Design & Implement Phase

Perform/Verify Conceptual Design (ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Initial Validation of Cyber Security

(ANSI/ISATR84.00.09)

Detailed Design

Develop Inspection & Test Procedures


Develop Inspection & Test Procedures


Cyber Security FAT(ANSI/ISATR84.00.09)

Cyber Security FAT(ANSI/ISATR84.00.09)

Installation / Commissioning


Installation / Commissioning


Cyber SAT(ANSI/ISATR84.00.09)

Tolerable Risk?

Pre Startup Safety Review

(CFR19.10.119 Sub Part H)

No

Yes

Design Validation(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Cyber Security Requirements Spec

Cyber Assess Phase

Tolerable Risk Guidelines

Inspection & Test Procedures



Cyber Security Checklist Questions


Prior to start-up, it is a process safety management requirement to perform a Pre Startup Safety

Review (PSSR). As part of this PSSR, audit questions to assure the quality assurance of the

cyber countermeasures being ready needs to be included as a subset of the overall PSSR.

4 Operate and Maintain Phase

4.1 Purpose

Unlike traditional process safety risks, cybersecurity threats continue to evolve, or new

vulnerabilities are discovered, potentially making the countermeasures that have been

implemented inadequate to maintain an adequate level of safety relative to the corporate risk

criteria. As such, it is the end users responsibility to ensure the continued useful life of the cyber

protective system, i.e. its technology currency. Procedures need to be in place to measure

performance capability and make improvements should they be determined to be necessary.

4.2 Operation and Maintain Phase Overview

Figure 4 shows the various activities during the operation and maintain phase, beginning with

startup. Following this, the plant is operated to make product. Periodically, cybersecurity

countermeasures need to be revalidated. This is the equivalent of inspecting and testing safety

instrumented systems and functions. Vulnerability assessment techniques are the backbone of

this exercise and should have been developed and documented as part of FAT, SAT and initial

validation.

Any time there is a management of change, potential impacts on cybersecurity needs to be

considered. Just as the PHA needs to be periodically revalidated, this revalidation needs to

account for cybersecurity as part of the lifecycle work process. The cybersecurity vulnerability

assessment is a key part of this revalidation. Finally, if a portion of the facility is being

decommissioned, it is recommended that the full lifecycle be employed to ensure that the

remaining plant and equipment are not adversely impacted.


Figure 6: Operation & Maintain Phase

Startup

Operation

Cyber Security Countermeasure Maintenance

(Mechanical Integrity Program)


Required MOCdue to change?

Periodic Assessment?

Decommission?

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Vulnerability Assessment Report(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Cyber Assess Phase


4.3 Vulnerability Assessment

A vulnerability assessment is intended to provide a review of the cybersecurity environment for

the control and instrumented safety systems at the facility. It identifies vulnerabilities and then

develops recommendations for possible improvements. It is best done in concert with a detailed

cyber risk assessment per the lifecycle. During a vulnerability assessment, the following is

accomplished:

Existing facility cybersecurity practices and policies reviewed versus current industry

practice, including current industry based alerts;

Control & instrumented safety system network architecture reviewed and validated

versus cybersecurity requirements specification (CSRS);

Sample configuration data for facility network equipment and control system devices is

collected and compared against documented expectations;

Penetration testing is performed when the plant is offline;

Findings are documented and compared against CSRS and with current industry best

practices;

Gaps that show corporate risk criteria not being met must be further evaluated in

accordance with company policies.

5 Getting Started with an Existing Facility

5.1 Purpose

In today’s world, not that many existing facilities have had the benefit of going through the

lifecycle as previously described. In this section, the method to implement the lifecycle will be

covered.

5.2 Overview

In order to implement the lifecycle, the starting point is during the operation and maintain phase

of the lifecycle. A seven step process has been documented in the course titled, 7 Steps to

Industrial Control System (ICS) Security[9]. These steps are as follows:

Perform Vulnerability Assessment

Develop & document policies and procedures

Train personnel & contractors

Segment the network

Control access to the system

Harden system components

Monitor and maintain system security

Figure 5 shows how these 7 steps ultimately allow a facility to ultimately be fully integrated with

the lifecycle described above, achieving a sustainable solution.


Figure 7: Existing Facility Implementation

Operation Phase

Implement CyberSecurity Decision

No

YesVulnerability

Assessment Report(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

Assessment Phase

Develop Policies and Procedures

Train Personnel & Contractors

Segment the Network

Control Access to the System

Harden System Components

Monitor and Maintain System Security

Status Quo

Design Phase

Start

Perform Vulnerability Assessment

(ISA/IEC 62443.3.2)

The first step is to perform a vulnerability assessment. When performed for a facility that has not

implemented the lifecycle yet, it is somewhat different than what was described in section 4.3.

When the first item performed is the vulnerability assessment, all it can do is test and assess the

system versus recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).

Once the vulnerability assessment has been performed, it provides valuable feedback to the

company, helping them to develop appropriate policies, standards, and procedures. With the

policies, standards, and procedures in place, training for employees and contractors may begin.

In addition, segmentation of the network, access control and hardening of the assets can also

begin based upon recommendations that come out of the vulnerability assessment.

There is still the need to perform the cyber risk assessment, which in turn, will most likely fine

tune initial recommendations that emanated from the vulnerability assessment. After the

recommendations have been fully implemented, the plant needs to monitor and maintain the


system security. At this point, the facility should be fully following the lifecycle as described in

sections 2, 3 and 4.

6 Conclusion

As described in this paper, the most effective and efficient means to achieve cybersecurity is to

adopt a lifecycle approach, addressing analysis or assessment, design and finally operation and

maintenance that is fully integrated with the process safety work process. It is only when the

purpose built security countermeasure layers augmented with the performance and lifecycle

management (NIST Framework[7]) of functional cybersecurity are followed, does an end user

have a comprehensive strategy. As part of this lifecycle, it is important to conduct cyber risk

assessments and vulnerability assessments. As the effectiveness of cybersecurity

countermeasures may degrade over time due to increasing sophistication of the threat, on-going

performance measurements and periodic reassessments are essential to meet the performance

level and to judge the effective useful life of any cybersecurity system.

For existing facilities that have not had the benefit of the lifecycle, they can begin

implementation via performance of a vulnerability assessment against RAGAGEP and recycle

back to the beginning of the lifecycle, performing a cyber-risk assessment and fully integrating

the cyber and process safety lifecycle work processes.

7 References

[1] ISA-TR84.00.09-2013, Security Countermeasures Related to Safety Instrumented

Systems (SIS); 2013.

[2] IEC 61508, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-

related Systems, 2010.

[3] ANSI/ISA-84.00.01 Part 1 (IEC 61511-1 Mod), Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented

Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 1: Framework, Definitions, System,

Hardware and Software Requirements, 2004.

[4] ANSI/ISA 62443-2-1 (99.02.01)-2009, Security for Industrial Automation and Control

Systems Part 2-1: Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security

Program, 2009

[5] ANSI/ISA 62443-3-2, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Part 3-3:

Security Risk Assessment and System Design, Under Development.

[6] Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Feb 12, 2013.

[7] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical

Infrastructure Cybersecurity, February 12, 2014.

[8] 6 CFR, Part 27, Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism

Standards (CFATs).

[9] exida.com LLC training course; 7 Steps to Industrial Control System (ICS) Security

[10] CCPS, Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes, Peer Review Copy.


[11] CFR19.10.119 Sub Part H, Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals.

Additional references not cited:

[12] CCPS, Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems, May 2007

[13] ANSI/ISA 95.00.01, Enterprise-Control System Integration Part 1: Models and

Terminology, 2000.

[14] ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1 (99.01.01)-2007, Security for Industrial Automation and Control

Systems Part 1: Terminology, Concepts, and Models, 2007.


Implementation Guidance for and IACS Security Management System, Under

Development.


Patch Management in the IACS Environment, Under Development.


Requirements for IACS Solution Providers, Under Development.

[18] ANSI/ISA 62443-3-3 (99.03.03)-2013, Security for Industrial Automation and Control

Systems Part 3-3: System Security Requirements and Security Levels, Aug 12, 2013.

[19] ISO/IEC 27002, Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for

information security management

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