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Breaking the Rules: The CIA andCounterinsurgency in the Congo1964–1965Jeffrey H. Michaels

Available online: 08 Dec 2011

To cite this article: Jeffrey H. Michaels (2012): Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency inthe Congo 1964–1965, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 25:1, 130-159

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JEFFREY H. MICHAELS

Breaking the Rules: The CIA andCounterinsurgency in the Congo1964–1965

A good deal of recent scholarship and official discourse on the role of UnitedStates intelligence in the area of counterinsurgency has focused on the finerpoints of intelligence analysis in support of large-scale military operations.1

The assumption underlying this perspective is the idea that intelligenceservices will play a subordinate role to the military in the conduct ofcounterinsurgency operations. This assumption is understandable, giventhe level of attention devoted to the ongoing operations in Afghanistanand Iraq, which itself is due in large part to the amount of nationalresources devoted to these two conflicts. One chief consequence of thisfocus is to marginalize the study of cases in which the U.S. governmentwanted to assist a friendly government’s counterinsurgency efforts but hasbeen unwilling to consider a significant military intervention.2 In such

Dr. Jeffrey H. Michaels is a Research Associate in the Department of WarStudies at King’s College London, where he coordinates an Economic andSocial Research Council (ESRC)-sponsored project headed by Professor SirLawrence Freedman titled ‘‘Strategic Scripts for the 21st Century.’’ Earlier,he was a Lecturer with the Air Power Studies Division of the college’sDefence Studies Department. Holder of a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’sCollege, he has served as an intelligence officer attached to the United StatesEuropean Command and the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, consulting for the Officeof Net Assessment of the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.Dr. Michaels’s book, Shock and Flawed: The Discourse Trap From theWar on Terror to the Surge, is forthcoming from Palgrave publishing.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 25: 130–159, 2012Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 onlineDOI: 10.1080/08850607.2012.623018

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cases, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has served as an important‘‘tool’’ of foreign policy. In many respects, its counterinsurgency rolediffers considerably from that which it would perform if subordinate to themilitary. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, the CIA was involved in manycounterinsurgency operations. And in many cases, the Agency rather thanthe U.S. military took the lead. Despite the recent surge of interest incounterinsurgency generally, many of these cases have yet to receivescholarly attention. Instead, the overwhelming focus has been placed onthe one case where large-scale U.S. military intervention occurred, namelyVietnam, most likely because that conflict is viewed as having the most‘‘relevance’’ for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of historical interest and‘‘lessons learned.’’3

But a ‘‘successful’’ case of U.S. counterinsurgency that has yet to receivemuch scholarly attention is the CIA’s effort to counter the ‘‘Simbarebellion’’ in the Congo in 1964–1965. Among historians, interest in theCIA’s role in the Congo primarily concerns its connection to theassassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, as well asthe Agency’s relationship with Joseph Mobutu.4 Although many instancesof CIA activities during the Simba rebellion have been discussed inrelation to other events, such as the role of both pro-Castro andanti-Castro Cubans fighting in Africa, the Agency’s involvement has notbeen studied either as a subject in its own right, or through acounterinsurgency lens.5 This lack of interest is all the more surprisinggiven the increasing amount of declassified material and number ofmemoirs becoming available on the subject.6

Yet this case is noteworthy from a counterinsurgency perspective in severalimportant respects. First, it represented a case where the U.S. governmentwas supporting a weak and diplomatically isolated friendly governmentagainst an insurgency supported by numerous outside powers, includingthe Soviet Union and China. Second, the Congo’s enormous physical sizeand the diverse nature of its population of fifteen million, combined with aweak administrative apparatus, worked against the imposition of centralauthority. Third, the insurgency itself, though rife with internal divisions,nevertheless numbered in the tens of thousands of men under arms, afigure that was at least equal to, if not greater than, the governmentforces, and within a matter of months the insurgents conquered more thanone-third of the Congo. Fourth, the duration of the conflict defiedexpectations of being a long war, with the insurgency effectively defeatedwithin two years. Last, the CIA’s activities in the Congo broke all the rulesoften discussed in relation to the role of intelligence in contemporaryconflicts. Most notably, rather than the CIA being used to enable U.S.military forces to conduct counterinsurgency, the CIA was used to ensurethat the U.S. military would not become involved. Consequently, one of

BREAKING THE RULES: CIA IN THE CONGO 131

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the chief functions of the CIA in the Congo was to support proxy forces whowould fight the insurgency on America’s behalf.

THE SIMBA REBELLION

Among the many reasons an insurgency erupted in the Congo in 1964 weregovernment corruption and incompetence, poor economic conditions, and alack of opportunity. The insurgency itself was not a unified uprising, butinstead consisted of several loosely coordinated components. The firstrebellion, began in January 1964 in Kwilu Province, was led by PierreMulele, who had previously served in Lumumba’s government as Ministerof Education. Following Lumumba’s death, Mulele served as anambassador for the secessionist Stanleyville-based regime of AntoineGizenga, though this had ceased to exist by early 1962. As a political exile,Mulele traveled to China, where he was given instruction in guerrillawarfare, before returning to the Congo in July 1963. Based in KwiluProvince, with a population of roughly one million, Mulele spent theremainder of the year organizing a rebellion. The Kwilu rebellion reflecteda mix of Maoist approaches to guerr i l la warfare , Communistindoctrination, and traditional magic. Mulele’s poorly armed followersbelieved he was invulnerable to bullets, and would rush into battleshouting ‘‘mai Mulele’’ (water of Mulele) in the belief that the bullets firedat them would turn to water.7 Within a month after starting the rebellion,Mulele’s guerrillas controlled an area roughly the size of Belgium.8

Although measuring the size of this insurgency is difficult, estimates fromthat period suggest it numbered between 10,000–20,000 insurgents,supported by about one-tenth of the Kwilu population.9 In the firstmonths of the rebellion, the insurgency scored several notable successesagainst the Congolese National Army (ANC). This prompted theCongolese government to dispatch reinforcements, who subsequentlyproceeded to wage a scorched-earth campaign against the rebels. By April1964, the ANC slowly regained the tactical initiative, although anotheryear-and-a-half would pass before the rebellion was defeated.10

While a significant amount of ANC resources were being committed toKwilu, rebellions broke out in other areas as well. Following the closing ofthe Congolese parliament in 1963, a number of Congolese politicians fledto Brazzaville, across the river from Leopoldville, and formed agovernment-in-exile known as the Comite Nationale de Liberation(CNL).11 Beginning in April 1964, the CNL, headed by ChristopheGbenye, would become the political and diplomatic face of the insurgencybased in the eastern Congo. Among the senior CNL officials were its‘‘Defense Minister’’ Gaston Soumialot and ‘‘Foreign Minister’’ ThomasKanza. Laurent Kabila, then in his mid-20s, was also working for the CNL.

132 JEFFREY H. MICHAELS

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Beginning in May 1964, the CNL was reportedly responsible forconducting a succession of anti-government plastic-bomb explosions inLeopoldville. But their true achievement was to take advantage ofwidespread grievances in the eastern Congo in order to recruit thousandsof supporters to wage an insurgency. From his base in Burundi, Soumialotlaunched a rebellion in the Uvira region of Kivu province. At about thesame time, Kabila organized rebel forces from among the towns on thewestern shores of Lake Tanganyika.12 These two CNL-led rebellions wouldlater merge with the ‘‘Popular Army’’ headed by ‘‘General’’ NicolasOlenga. Initially, Olenga’s ‘‘Popular Army’’ lacked a political organization.Following their capture of Stanleyville in early August, however, Gbenyeand Soumialot simply attached themselves to Olenga’s forces and createdthe ‘‘People’s Republic of the Congo,’’ with Stanleyville its capital.13

Unlike Mulele’s rebellion in Kwilu province, the rebels in the easternCongo were considerably better armed. Numerous accounts suggest thisforce was equipped with a multitude of different weapons, ranging fromspears to automatic rifles, machines guns, mortars, and anti-tank weapons.Due to their geographic proximity to countries that were sympathetic tothe rebel cause, they were able to receive foreign arms shipments.14 FromApril through September 1964, the eastern rebellion would gradually takecontrol of more than one-third of the Congo. Yet, the rapid growth of theinsurgency also meant that the rebel leaders did not have time to form anorganization capable of administering the conquered territory. Havinginitially gained enormous support by exploiting popular grievances, therebellion brought with it ‘‘terror and maladministration far surpassing themisdeeds of past Congolese administrators.’’15

The fall of Stanleyville, and specifically the capture of five U.S. consularpersonnel working there, three of whom were CIA employees, convincedU.S. policymakers that urgent action was required to reverse the situation.The degree to which the situation was viewed as a crisis was evident in a 6August 1964 National Security Council (NSC) memo that stated:‘‘Stanleyville is in rebel hands. All of Eastern Congo may go in nextseveral days; Katanga, Leopoldville, and entire Central Government maycollapse in next several weeks.’’16 From that point on, American andBelgian military assistance would be increasingly forthcoming, and withthe arrival of foreign mercenaries, the rebellion would be gradually drivenback.17

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGO

Unlike President John F. Kennedy, who sought to raise the profile of Africain U.S. foreign policy, President Lyndon B. Johnson sought as best he couldto keep Africa ‘‘off the agenda.’’18 Prior to the rebel capture of Stanleyville,



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the Congo had received significant attention, particularly in the StateDepartment, but had not reached a point of political crisis in which theJohnson administration feared it could have negative connotations for theupcoming 1964 presidential elections.19 Similar to the Dwight D.Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, U.S. policy toward the Congounder Johnson was predicated on the perceived need to maintain apro-Western government in power, fearing that a Congolese governmentthat had close relations with the Communist bloc would have negativerepercussions for the West. This concern over the Congo was not simply afear that its mineral resources could be denied to Western markets.20

Rather, the principal fear was that a ‘‘radical’’ takeover of the Congo,following the rise of other ‘‘radical African’’ governments, would have adomino effect that would undermine Rhodesia and the Portuguese holdover Angola and Mozambique, and isolate South Africa. Similar toVietnam, the Congo was discursively constructed as the key ‘‘domino’’ inAfrica.21

By August 1964, the Vietnam-style domino thinking was quite evident inthe discourse of senior U.S. policymakers. At an 11 August NSC meetingdedicated to the Congo crisis, one of the main concerns expressed wasthat, even if the rebellion were principally rooted in tribal conflict, theChinese and ‘‘Communists’’ would profit from their victory.22 The head ofthe U.S. Strike Command, General Paul Adams, expressed even moreextreme views. He wrote that the Congo’s ‘‘loss to communist controlwould be a political catastrophe. The impact of such a loss couldjeopardize U.S. national interests throughout all of Africa south of theSahara, and could in time lead to a communist dominated black Africa.’’Adams even went so far as to suggest that the Communist backing for theinsurgency ‘‘is evidencing itself as a double envelopment of the Congo.’’23

As CIA paramilitary officer Richard Holm noted, ‘‘The Simbas, a ragtagbunch of illiterate dissidents, certainly weren’t communists. But they poseda threat to the pro-Western [Moise] Tshombe government in Leopoldville.Thus they gained the support of the Soviet Union, China, and theirminions. And that prompted determination from the United States and itsallies to provide all support possible to Tshombe and his government. Itwas that simple . . .’’24 Indeed, despite evidence from the IntelligenceCommunity suggesting that the rebels were not ‘‘Communist-controlled,’’senior policymakers continued to act as if they were.Interestingly, the domino thinking evident in high-level discussions on the

Congo was accompanied by a strong desire by these officials to avoid‘‘another Vietnam.’’ Despite the talk of falling dominoes, U.S. policy tomaintain the stability of the Congo in the early 1960s was limited, andconsisted mainly of CIA political action activities, which in 1963 wereexpanded to include a paramilitary program to supply a handful of pilots



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for the Congolese air force. U.S. policy also consisted of a relatively smallmilitary assistance program aimed at improving the quality of theCongolese Army. By the start of the Simba rebellion, however, the ANCwas not considered fit for that purpose. Whatever value Joseph Mobutumay have later had as President of the Congo, his tenure as ANC chiefwas considered to be somewhat disastrous. The U.S. Army attachedescribed Mobutu as ‘‘doubtfully militarily capable to simultaneouslycommand two platoons.’’25

At this time, the Johnson administration was reluctant to commit U.S.military forces. In August, a request by Congolese Prime MinisterTshombe and ANC head Mobutu to deploy three U.S. airborne battalionsto retake Stanleyville, Albertville, and Uvira, and to dispatch U.S. SpecialForces, was rejected out of hand.26 At the 11 August NSC meeting, onesenior official expressed the view that ‘‘direct American militaryinvolvement in the Congo should be considered only as an extreme lastresort.’’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) General EarleWheeler concurred, noting that was also ‘‘the long held view of the JCS.’’Despite taking serious military action off the table, Johnson neverthelessobserved that ‘‘time is running out and the Congo must be saved.’’27 Indue course, a U.S. military task force was deployed, consisting of fourC-130s, three troop-carrying helicopters, and some fifty paratroopers fromthe 82nd Airborne Division who were mainly used to provide logisticssupport to the ANC.28 Additional military options were also considered,though even in the worst-case scenarios being contemplated, U.S. militaryintervention was to consist of indirect advisory efforts rather than directcombat. For instance, General Adams wrote to Wheeler that ‘‘Thiscommand appreciates current U.S. policy to maintain American supportand assistance in the Congo at a minimum level and to insure that U.S.military personnel do not become intentionally involved in combat andcombat support operations.’’ Yet Adams also believed that dispatching sixto twelve U.S. military teams numbering ten to twelve officers and enlistedmen each ‘‘could rapidly change the current military situation.’’29 In otherwords, from the U.S. military’s point of view, waging counterinsurgency inthe Congo was to consist of a very small military commitment, certainlyin comparison with Vietnam, but not too dissimilar from U.S.counterinsurgency assistance elsewhere.30

In August 1964, the U.S. was still months away from deploying combattroops to Vietnam, though it did have a significant advisory presence atthat time. And yet, even at this early stage, Washington’s policymakers feltthat even the U.S. advisory presence in Vietnam was too great acommitment to be replicated elsewhere. Throughout this period, numerousreferences were made by U.S. officials that the Congo did not constitutean ‘‘African Vietnam.’’31 The shadow of Vietnam hung over U.S. policy



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towards the Congo in two principal ways: first, U.S. counterinsurgencyefforts were to consist of an ‘‘austere program’’ due to the perceivedlimited military resources available for deployment to the Congo.32

Second, U.S. public opinion was hostile to the notion of potentially gettinginvolved in a ‘‘long drawn out indecisive campaign such as we have inSouth Vietnam today,’’ and this had a negative impact on U.S.policymakers who might otherwise have considered military intervention asa legitimate option.33 The upshot of this attitude was that policymakerswere more willing to opt for a covert intervention in which the CIA, ratherthan the U.S. military, took the lead.Given the ANC’s weakness, and not wanting the U.S. to get directly

involved, the Johnson administration was initially quite willing to accept aBelgian military intervention to stabilize the situation. When it becameevident that the Belgians were unwilling to undertake a militaryintervention, the decision was taken to support the creation of a unit offoreign mercenaries. While Washington policymakers realized theinevitable fallout from supporting white mercenaries in Africa, this optionwas still preferable to a U.S. military intervention. As one policymakernoted in early August 1964, the situation ‘‘is basically power vacuum,could probably be retrieved by small security force (ideally white, at aminimum white-led and, if really good, as few as 1,000).’’ He went on tosay that the U.S. should help the ‘‘Congolese in every way to organize amercenary-led force.’’34

THE CIA’S COVERT INTERVENTION IN THE CONGO

From the Congo gaining its independence from Belgium in 1960 to the startof the Simba rebellion in 1964, CIA political action activities in the newcountry can be divided into two distinct periods: the overthrow of PatriceLumumba and the events leading to his execution in January 1961, and theAgency’s efforts thereafter to ‘‘support the legitimate CongoleseGovernment in the hopes of bringing stability to the Congo andfrustrating Communist efforts.’’35 Throughout these years, CIA covertoperations in Africa were still ‘‘relatively new,’’ and because the Congowas a Belgian colony, both a new American Embassy and a new CIAstation had to be developed after independence.36 In due course, U.S.consulates would be opened in Stanleyville and Bukavu, with thevice-consul position being occupied by a CIA officer.37 The CIA’s AfricaDivision was also in its infancy at this time. Although by the 1970s itwould eventually grow into a large organization, in the early 1960s, its‘‘successes’’ in the Congo were the result of a handful of operatives.38

The CIA’s role in the overthrow of Lumumba, including the part played byCIA Station Chief Lawrence Devlin, has been well covered elsewhere, and



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doesn’t need further elaboration here.39 Particularly in the period thatfollowed Lumumba’s death, the CIA established close relations withseveral key figures in the Congolese government, informally referred to asthe Binza Group, and also played an important role in establishing CyrilleAdoula as Lumumba’s successor as Prime Minister.40 The Agency providedcovert funding for Adoula to buy the support of political and militaryleaders.41 In terms of the CIA’s dealings with Mobutu, who was initiallyhead of the Congolese army and subsequently President of the Congo(Zaire) from 1965–1997, the relationship was quite close.42 According toDevlin, ‘‘I met Mobutu almost daily, often over breakfast on the terrace ofhis home.’’43 Even the CIA contract aviator Ed Dearborn had a closerelationship with Mobutu.44 Similarly, the CIA also worked quite closelywith Victor Nendaka, the head of Congo state security. Thus, at the timeof the Simba rebellion, the CIA’s Congo station had direct access and aclose working relationship with the leaders of the Congolese military andsecurity forces.45

Within weeks of the rebel capture of Stanleyville, and at the instigation ofWashington and Brussels, Tshombe began hiring a mercenary force tobolster the ANC’s counterinsurgency efforts. In the course of the followingyear, the CIA would work closely with the mercenaries. Former BritishArmy officer and ex-Katanga mercenary Mike Hoare was hired to leadthis mercenary force, which he named ‘‘5 Commando.’’46 The Congocounterinsurgency campaign that followed can be broken into three phasesin which Hoare’s mercenaries spearheaded ANC attacks against rebel-heldareas, all the while being supported by the CIA. In the first phase, thecounterinsurgents set out to recapture Stanleyville, culminating inOperation Dragon Rouge in November 1964. In the second phase, thegains from the first phase were consolidated, with the mercenaries pushinginto the northeast Congo and capturing towns along the Ugandan andSudanese borders that had been used by the rebels to bring in suppliesfrom abroad. The final phase consisted of the government’s attack on therebel-held Fizi Baraka pocket in the autumn of 1965. The CIA played acrucial role in each of these phases of the counterinsurgency.

Relationship with Mercenaries

Over the course of the Simba rebellion, both the CIA and the U.S. militaryattache in Leopoldville developed a close, albeit covert, working relationshipwith the mercenaries, especially with Hoare. Throughout the course of theconflict, Hoare’s 5 Commando never amounted to more than severalhundred mercenaries at any one time, the majority of whom were SouthAfricans and Rhodesians. Technically, the unit was subordinate to theANC command structure, with Hoare’s nominal superiors being ANC



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head Joseph Mobutu and Colonel Frederic Vandewalle, a Belgian Armyofficer on loan to the Congolese government.47 In practice, Hoare wasgiven significant leeway to conduct his own operations, though within astrategic framework developed by Vandewalle. A separate French-speakingunit called ‘‘6 Commando’’ was also formed, but its main duties were togarrison captured towns and bolster the ANC’s ranks. While U.S. officialsmaintained contacts with this unit as well, the CIA’s relations with 6Commando ranked considerably lower than its relations with 5Commando, which was at the forefront of the counterinsurgency operation.Officially, the U.S. government wanted to avoid being seen as having any

relationship with the mercenaries. This point was made explicit in anEmbassy cable that stated, ‘‘For public consumption believe we mustcont inue take ‘no comment ’ l ine on al l aspect s of mercenaryproblem . . .Overtly at last, U.S. reps should keep as far away frommercenaries as possible.’’ At the same time, however, a very different viewwas to be held internally. According to the same cable, ‘‘For purposes oforienting our own thinking, it seems to us important to recognize thatsecurity has deteriorated in Congo to [the] point [that] only whitemercenaries or direct intervention by non-African military units can saveday. Perfect but unlikely solution would be for mercenaries to come inquickly and quietly, re-establish peace, and then get out.’’48 Once thedecision was made to support a mercenary force in the Congo, thequestion arose of how to pay for them, given the poor state of Congolesegovernment finances. By Vandewalle’s account, CIA Station ChiefBenjamin Hilton Cushing offered to covertly finance the mercenaries,although the likelihood is that in the end the funds were made availablethrough an overt increase of the military assistance budget.49

The American relationship with the mercenaries that eventually emergedwas a covert and highly effective partnership. This was not predeterminedhowever. Indeed, initial U.S. assessments of the mercenary support to theretaking of Albertville in September 1964 were highly critical of Hoare’scompetence.50 Over time, this view changed completely, and within a fewmonths thereafter, during which 5 Commando conducted a number ofsuccessful operations against the Simbas, culminating in their drive toStanleyville, CIA analysts lavished considerable praise on Hoare. At theworking level, a close relationship emerged, reflected in the fact that theCIA had provided air support to the mercenaries, and later maritimesupport as well, with the U.S. military providing logistical support andstrategic lift. To be effective at providing close air support, for instance, agood working relationship was essential. Significant intelligencecollaboration also occurred, with the mercenaries providing U.S. officialswith intelligence acquired from their operations, as well as supplying themwith captured Soviet and Chinese arms. Hoare personally briefed CIA and



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military officials on numerous occasions.51 Moreover, while the CIA air andnaval assets were placed under Hoare’s command in order to facilitate hisoperations, Hoare in turn also facilitated CIA intelligence collection inareas controlled by 5 Commando.52

This close relationship was not simply a matter of mutual interest.Significant evidence suggests that both sides viewed the relationship inmore personal terms. Both CIA and U.S. military officials based inLeopoldville held Hoare in high regard. In one of his reports, the U.S.military attache in Leopoldville, Colonel Knut Raudstein, observed:‘‘Tshombe supporters most fortunate in having man of Hoare’stemperament, character, and capability in his position. He [is] somewhatamused [at] being tabbed a South African as he claims Brit citizenship andconducts himself as typical upper class Briton proud of Irish extraction.’’53

Larry Devlin, who in July 1965 replaced Cushing as Station Chief, alsoenjoyed good relations with Hoare, whom he referred to as a ‘‘gentlemenadventurer.’’54 In his memoirs, Devlin wrote, ‘‘Well-educated, articulate, aman of tremendous charm, Mike Hoare had proven himself to be a seriousand capable soldier, a far cry from the ‘Mad Mike’ image created by themedia. Mike had dash and pizzazz. He read Christopher Marlowe andShakespeare, he told great stories that made your hair stand on end, andhe was a man of integrity and dignity. We became good friends, afriendship that has lasted over the years.’’55 Following Hoare’s departurefrom the Congo in late 1965 after the rebellion had been defeated, theCIA’s relations with the mercenaries quickly deteriorated. Not only did thepersonal connection between the mercenary leadership and the CIA breakdown, but the Agency’s main objective in the Congo, namely to supportstability generally, and President Mobutu in particular, took priority, withthe mercenaries becoming a source of instability.56

The ‘‘Instant Air Force’’

Arguably the most significant contribution the CIA made to the Congocampaign was the creation of what The New York Times called an ‘‘instantair force.’’57 The air force itself would ultimately include several types ofWorld War II-era aircraft flown mainly by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Theircontribution to the campaign would include providing air reconnaissance,close air support, air interdiction, and psychological operations missions.Although the CIA’s Congo air force did not defeat the insurgency on itsown, that the government forces could have succeeded without it isinconceivable.While little information on the original decision to employ Cuban exile

pilots for the Congo is available, there is little doubt about the date.According to numerous sources, the first Cuban exile pilots were sent to



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the Congo in 1963, months before the start of the Simba rebellion.58 Withinthe CIA, the air branch of the Special Operations Division in the DeputyDirectorate of Plans (DDP) organized this operation. This unit also hadexperience organizing CIA air activities in Asia and against Castro’s Cuba.The Cuban exiles were veterans of the Bay of Pigs, some of whom hadalso served as pilots for the Cuban Air Force under then-PresidentFulgencio Batista, while others had joined the U.S. military after the Bayof Pigs and were then given honorable discharges to fight in the Congo.59

A CIA proprietary company, the Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation(Caramar), was set up in Miami to hire the pilots, initially to fly unarmedT-6 training aircraft that had been donated to the Congo by Italy.60

Hiring the Cubans had two principal advantages. First, they were idealfrom a covert operations perspective since they were not U.S. citizens, andtherefore the U.S. government could claim ‘‘plausible deniability.’’ Second,as it became increasingly apparent, particularly after President Kennedy’sdeath, that the U.S. would not support an invasion of Cuba, and due tothe concern that the Cuban exiles would mount rogue operations againstCastro if left to their own devices, Washington felt that the Congo was anideal place to send the exiles, telling them they would be fightingCommunism there.61

Initially, at least two American pilots were contracted to fly in the Congo.As of June 1964, CIA contract aviators Ed Dearborn and Don Coney wereflying close air support missions for the ANC. Curiously, even though theywere nominally working for the CIA, little attempt was made to keep theirpresence a secret. An article in Time magazine included the real names andbackground of Dearborn and Coney, suggesting they were not providedwith an official cover. The article also noted that after being questioned bynewsmen, the U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville at first denied that Americanswere involved, and then later admitted that no Americans would bedirectly involved in fighting henceforth. Both Americans were reassigned tosupporting the Cuban exile pilots, but not themselves flying. Embassyofficials also disassociated themselves from the Cubans, who they claimedhad been hired by the Congolese government.62 As one Embassy cablenoted, ‘‘Although a lot will be said about Cubans being U.S. mercenaries,we will want to continue to say as little as possible and refer all inquiriesto GOC [Government of Congo], with whom pilots have contracts.’’63

Despite the denials, the foreign press, such as the Soviet TASS, accuratelyreported on the pilots being recruited in Miami and working for the CIA.64

Prior to the Congo, the CIA already had some experience and anorganizational mechanism that could provide aircraft for this type ofcovert operation.65 As indicated, the unarmed Harvard T-6 aircraft flownby the Cuban exiles were originally donated by Italy. As the rebellion inKwilu Province gained traction in early 1964, a decision was taken to arm



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the T-6s and to fly combat support missions.66 The CIA modified the T-6s tocarry air-to-ground rockets and .30 caliber machine guns. But because thehalf-dozen T-6s were not considered sufficient to counter the rebeladvance, the CIA proprietary firm Intermountain Aviation, in the springof 1964 provided T-28 two-seater fighter-bombers that were animprovement over the T-6s in speed, range (300 miles), and firepower.Though nominally a training plane, the T-28s were equipped with .50caliber machine guns, 500-pound bombs and rockets. FollowingStanleyville’s capture, CIA officials, including Director of CentralIntelligence John McCone and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms,decided to increase the CIA air contingent of T-28s and to add B-26Kbombers to its fleet. The B-26K, a WWII twin-engine bomber, had greaterrange than the T-28, thereby allowing it to reach Stanleyville. At its height,the CIA air force in the Congo would include thirteen T-28s and sevenB-26K bombers, as well as C-47 transport aircraft, two small twin-engineliaison planes, and H-21 helicopters.67

Having provided both aircraft and pilots, the CIA then needed to provideground maintenance crews to service the aircraft. This was achieved bysetting up another proprietary company based in Liechtenstein. This firm,given the name Western International Ground Maintenance Organization(WIGMO), would employ at least 150 European aircraft technicians onone-year contracts. At the height of the rebell ion, the WIGMOtechnicians, based at four or five airfields in the Congo, were overseen byCIA officers. According to a British report, the technicians at one of theairfields were under the supervision of a retired U.S. Air Force colonel.Also stationed at the airfield was a CIA communications man named‘‘Mitch.’’68 Other accounts similarly confirm the presence of CIA airoperations officers at forward bases such as Bunia and Paulis.69

Despite their different backgrounds, nationalities, and languages, theCIA air controllers and their Cuban exile pilots worked remarkably wellwith Hoare’s mercenaries. Apart from a few cases of friendly fire, Hoarenoted that the air–ground coordination was highly effective in supporting5 Commando spearheads.70 Apart from Hoare’s memoirs, which givehigh praise to the CIA air support, a separate analysis of the operationthat led to the recapture of Stanleyville in November 1964 noted that‘‘CIA aircraft terrified the Simbas, who learned that their magic did notprotect them from .50-caliber machine guns or rockets. Both Tshombeand Mobutu grasped the importance of the close air support in theircampaign against the rebels.’’71 That the Cuban pilots were earning theirpay was evident from the fact that, in November–December 1964, someof the pilots had put in 170 hours of flying time in one month, anamount that was expected to increase rather than decrease after DragonRouge.72



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Benefits of Air Support

The importance of the CIA air force to the counterinsurgency cannot beunderstated. First, it provided the counterinsurgents with an airreconnaissance capability, both from a tactical perspective in support ofadvancing columns, as well as being able to supply intelligence from whichto plan operations.73 Second, it gave the ANC and 5 Commando a closeair support capability.74 Without this capability, the counterinsurgencycampaign could not conceivably have succeeded, at least not in therelatively short time period it did. As Hoare makes quite clear in his bookon the Congo campaign, the ‘‘flying artillery’’ provided to 5 Commandoby the Cuban exiles proved a decisive force multiplier in many battles,given his own unit’s modest strength. During Dragon Rouge, the droppingof Belgian paratroopers from U.S. C-130s was preceded by two B-26Ksthat conducted strafing runs on Simba positions.75 In this sense, the airforce facilitated counterinsurgent battlefield successes, and did so in a waythat minimized casualties among the counterinsurgents. Third, the CIAplanes not only conducted psychological warfare through the traditionalmeans of dropping leaflets, but their very presence was a psychologicalweapon in its own right. As the senior NSC official responsible for Africanoted, the ‘‘relatively heavily armed B-26Ks represent such an escalation ofanything ever experienced in this part of Africa that they have caused aprofound psychological shock.’’76 Che Guevara also noted that despite theplanes being ‘‘antiquated,’’ that ‘‘this little air force is sowing terror amongthe Congolese comrades.’’77 Fourth, it allowed the counterinsurgents toconduct interdiction missions against insurgent supply lines.78 For instance,the T-28 that crashed on 17 February 1965 with CIA paramilitary officerRichard Holm on board was conducting an air reconnaissance search forrebel arms crossing the Sudan border.79

Negative Side Effects

Among the ironies of the CIA air force’s ‘‘success’’ against the rebels was itspossible provocation or at the very least exacerbation of the Stanleyvillehostage crisis. Substantial evidence indicates that not only did the rebelsblame the air attacks on the United States, as opposed to Belgium, andthat the Americans captured in Stanleyville were treated worse than theEuropeans as a result, but also that the hostages may have been releasedin exchange for assurances that the air force would be grounded.80 Aninternal NSC memorandum noted that the ‘‘rebel leadership has made itclear that the official Americans are hostage against air attacks onStanleyville (they apparently don’t blame or threaten Europeans).’’81

Michael Hoyt, the U.S. Consul in Stanleyville being held hostage, wasal lowed to send a cable warning Washington that further a ir



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reconnaissance of the Stanleyville area would provoke rebel retaliationagainst the American hostages. Similarly, following air strikes against rebeltargets in October, the rebels repeatedly threatened to kill the hostages,and in some cases did execute European hostages.82 Also noteworthy isthat rebel Foreign Minister Kanza suggested the rebels might free thehostages if the U.S. grounded its air force.83

Clearly, the air attacks had proved a considerable irritant to the rebels, andfor the U.S. leadership, their success was a troubling conundrum. The CIA’sair force was a ‘‘deniable’’ covert operation, and a very successful one at that.To have withdrawn the air force at that time would almost certainly havechanged the course of the conflict, allowing the rebels to regain theinitiative. Yet, continuing the air operations increased the risk to Americanlives. In the end, the U.S. decided that both the Congo and the hostagescould be ‘‘saved,’’ and that a short-term military operation to free thehostages could remove them from the equation and allow the airoperations to proceed.Following Dragon Rouge, the CIA air force continued to increase in size,

adding additional B-26Ks, and they remained an integral part of thecounterinsurgency until the collapse of the rebellion in late 1965. In theaftermath of the rebellion, the air force remained in place, most likely as adeterrent and hedge against the possibility of a resurgence in rebel activity.By mid-1966, the air force had been reduced to approximately twelveCuban pilots and 100 WIGMO personnel. The operation was finally closeddown in mid-1967. By this time, the need for foreign pilots declined asCongolese pilots started returning from European military schools.84

STANLEYVILLE

The capture of Stanleyville created a crisis for policymakers in Washington.Although the rebellion was not initially directed against foreigners,‘‘General’’ Olenga was fixated on the idea that U.S. planes andmercenaries were fighting with central government forces. Consequently,the American consular officials at Stanleyville would be held as hostages.Shortly after their capture, the CIA began contemplating different methodsto secure their release or escape, and the CIA’s former Congo chief, LarryDevlin, was recalled to assist in these efforts.85 The first attempt at arescue, known as Operation Flag Pole, called for the CIA and militarypersonnel based at the Embassy in Leopoldville to participate in ahelicopter rescue mission. To be staged out of Lisala, a T-28 would strafethe area around the U.S. consulate in Stanleyville with machine gun fireand rockets, after which helicopters would extract the consulate staff. But,before it could be put into effect, this operation was canceled. The town ofLisala was about to be taken over by the rebels, making its use as a



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forward operating base untenable. Also, Consul Hoyt informed the Embassythat one of the CIA communications men was not at the Consulate buthiding elsewhere in the city. Furthermore, Olenga had just arrived inStanleyville and demanded a meeting with the consular corps, therebyraising the prospect that Hoyt could negotiate the release of his staff,although it soon became apparent that Olenga had no intention ofreleasing them.86

A more diplomatic method involved the dispatch of Devlin in late Augustto meet with rebel political leader Christophe Gbenye, whom he had knownwhile station chief. Gbenye was traveling abroad at the time. The hope wasthat Devlin could meet him while he was transiting Burundi back toStanleyville. Devlin traveled from Washington to Bujumbura and brieflymet with Gbenye. However, Gbenye was non-committal to the idea ofpushing for the release of the US officials, most likely because he wieldedlittle influence over General Olenga, the man responsible for incarceratingthem.87

In the course of the next couple of months, the CIA considered additionalrescue options and ensured that the assets to conduct a rescue would be inplace. As noted, the decision to dispatch the B-26Ks was influenced by theneed to have an aircraft capable of flying to Stanleyville. The CIA alsodispatched a team of seventeen Cuban exiles led by paramilitary officerWilliam ‘‘Rip’’ Robertson. During this period, the Agency developednumerous plans for a rescue attempt, but DCI Helms expressed theopinion that the chances for success were ‘‘lousy.’’88 One of the plans,called Operation Low Beam, envisaged Robertson’s team going up theCongo River in motorboats and conducting a nighttime rescue, but it wasabandoned as impractical.89

The result of these failed attempts at rescue, combined with a lack ofsuccess in negotiating the hostages’ release, led the Johnson administrationto reluctantly support a military operation. In late October, as governmentforces gradually drove back the insurgents, hundreds of Belgians and morethan a dozen other Americans residing in Stanleyville were placed underarrest, joining the U.S. consular officials in captivity. This action led boththe U.S. and Belgian governments to formulate a combined rescue plan.The military operation they devised, codenamed Dragon Rouge, consistedof U.S. C-130s transporting a battalion of Belgian paratroopers toStanleyville who would attempt to rescue the hostages. This airborneoperation was to be coordinated with a ground advance by the ANCspearheaded by 5 Commando. Colonel Vandewalle was given the overallcommand of this force. One of the ANC columns would includeRobertson and the Cuban exiles, whose assignment was to enterStanleyville and rescue the American hostages. By one account, all theCuban exiles had beards and were wearing dark wool caps. Vandewalle



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observed that the Cubans brought their own vehicles, and had an impressiveamount of firepower, with at least three personal weapons for each man.90 Asthey were expected to be among the first in the column to enter the city, theywere placed under Hoare’s command immediately prior to the final advanceon Stanleyville. According to Hoare, ‘‘I stopped to talk to a truckload ofCubans who had just joined me. I called them 58 Commando and theywere proud of the title. They were as tough a bunch of men as I have everhad the honour to command. Their leader was a remarkable man and themost dedicated soldier I have known.’’91

On 24 November 1964, Dragon Rouge commenced. Following airstrikesby the B-26Ks, Belgian paratroops were dropped from the C-130s andsecured the airport before entering Stanleyville. By the time the paratroopshad fought their way into the city, the Simbas had killed some fifty of thehostages, including an American missionary. The ground force thatcontained the CIA unit arrived shortly thereafter. Having secured theAmerican consular officials, Robertson and the Cuban exiles set aboutrescuing other U.S. missionaries in the area. In the aftermath of the rescue,this unit was withdrawn from the Congo.92 Although the risk was presentof American missionaries elsewhere in the Congo being killed by theSimbas, the White House record noted that President Johnson ‘‘doesn’twant to get tied in on the Congo and have another Korea, anotherVietnam, just because of somebody wandering around searching for ‘JesusChrist.’ ’’93 As such, he was unwilling to sanction further Americaninvolvement in rescue operations, apart from the transport of the Belgianparatroops to the city of Paulis as part of Operation Dragon Noir.

MARITIME ASSISTANCE

With 5 Commando and the ANC having closed off the Congo border withUganda and Sudan in the spring 1965, the one major supply route thatremained for the rebels was from Tanzania across Lake Tanganyika. Asthe number of supplies reaching the rebels along this route steadilyincreased, the CIA was determined to interdict the arms flow. To do sowould necessitate creating a maritime patrol for the Congolesegovernment. This task was given to Thomas Clines, the deputy head of theDDP’s Special Operations Division maritime branch. Clines faced twoproblems: how to transport suitable maritime craft into the middle ofAfrica, and to find crews to man them. The first problem was solved whenan idea, proposed by CIA contract agent Edwin Wilson, was to cut theboats into sections, transport them by C-130s to the lakeside city ofAlbertville, and then reassemble them.94 The type of boat that waseventually sent was the U.S. Navy patrol craft called the Swift boat.Several of these boats were being used at the time by Cuban exiles based



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out of Nicaragua. This boat was fifty feet long and was armed with threeheavy machine guns as well as an 81mm mortar. Due to the absence oftrained Congolese to operate the boats, the CIA contracted sixteen Cubanexiles who had previous experience launching seaborne attacks againstCuban targets and also took the boats they were using.95 An additionalthirty sailors from 5 Commando were given training by the Cubans. U.S.Navy SEAL Lieutenant James Hawes was brought from Vietnam andplaced in charge of this unit, which reported directly to the CIA station inLeopoldville.96 In addition to the half dozen or so Swift boats, themaritime patrol included several troop-carrying barges. The CIA alsoprovided radar and armaments for the Belgian steamer Ermans, the shipthat would eventually become Hoare’s ‘‘flagship.’’97

Although the maritime patrol had been constituted nearly a year after therebellion began, it became increasingly effective in preventing Simba trafficon the lake, whereas this traff ic had previously been relativelyunencumbered apart from the occasional air attack.98 Nevertheless, whenattempting to prevent Ernesto (Che) Guevara’s force of Cubans and otherSimbas from crossing into the Congo from Tanzania, the maritime forcewas clearly inadequate to the task, though Che noted that the maritimepresence did cause them some difficulties in making the crossing.99 Inaddition to the lake patrol, the maritime force played a critical role in thelast months of the war, when operations were conducted to eliminate theSimba mountain bastion known as the Fizi-Baraka pocket, which wasdefended by some 5,000 rebels plus more than 100 Cubans under CheGuevara.100 Because its excellent defensive location made a land operation‘‘impracticable,’’ Hoare decided to launch a combined air, amphibious,and land operation, in which the maritime force boats, including theErmans, would be employed for an amphibious landing of 200 mercenariesto the enemy’s rear, with the B-26Ks providing air cover.101

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Apart from the reconnaissance carried out by its ‘‘air force,’’ CIA intelligencecollection in the Congo was reliant mainly upon its intelligence relationshipswith senior Congolese officials such as Mobutu and Victor Nendaka, thusgiving it access to intelligence collected by the ANC and the CongoleseSurete. The CIA also worked closely with Vandewalle and the Belgianmilitary mission, and with Hoare and 5 Commando. Prior to the captureof Stanleyville, the CIA chief there, David Grinwis, had a close workingrelationship with the ANC’s intelligence section. He also appears to havehad a number of agents reporting to him, but with the city’s fall, thisnetwork collapsed.102 No evidence indicates that the CIA was able torecruit any spies within the Simba ranks, or that this constituted a high



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priority for the CIA station. Indeed, as a station priority, intelligencecollection seemed to rank below the paramilitary operations beingconducted, or put slightly differently, intelligence collection was oftentreated as being necessary to support operational activities rather than toenhance policymakers’ understanding of the conflict.103

The recruiting and running of agents does not seem to have been asignificant function of the Station, almost certainly because the AgencyStation was itself quite small and its officers were preoccupied mainly withhandling the burgeoning paramilitary operations. To the extent that agentswere run, they were officials in the Congolese government, rather than inthe rebellion.104 Moreover, many of the CIA officers assigned to theCongo in 1964–1965 had little or no experience working in Africa. RichardHolm, assigned in late 1964 to replace Grinwis as the CIA chief inStanleyville and tasked with collecting intelligence on the ‘‘presence,activities, and supply lines of the Simba units,’’ had just returned from aparamilitary posting in Laos and Thailand, after which he served a shortperiod of time working on North Africa issues.105

This lack of Africa background was true, not only for the operationsofficers assigned to the Congo, but also for the analysts working on theCongo at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. For instance, the leadanalyst working on Congo issues during the rebellion was Sam Adams, ajunior intelligence officer with no Africa background. Fortunately for theCIA, Adams proved to be a first-rate analyst who was able to keeppolicymakers regularly informed of Congo developments.106 Immediatelyafter Stanleyville’s fall, the Congo desk was tasked with producing a dailysituation report, although this later changed to a weekly report.107 Thesereports covered a full range of topics, such as Congolese politicaldevelopments, the Congo’s relations with other countries and with theOrganization of African Unity (OAU), updates on military operations,information on the rebels both inside the Congo and abroad, informationon the Congolese military and mercenaries, and reporting on armsdeliveries to the rebels, among many other issues. In addition to providinganalysis of developments inside the Congo, other country desks were alsotasked with providing intelligence on outside support to the rebels.

CIA Priorities

A key intelligence task was to track arms shipments to the rebels. Intelligenceon this subject was used not only for assessments of rebel strength, butperhaps more importantly, to target the supply convoys. By knowing whenarms shipments had arrived in neighboring countries, the CIA’s air forcecould be given warning and directed to intercept them once they enteredthe Congo.108 But the Agency’s success in tracking these shipments is



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questionable. For instance, as of late February 1965, a senior StateDepartment official attached to the Congo Working Group requestedintelligence from Britain on arms supplies arriving via Tanzania andUganda, complaining that U.S. intelligence on this subject was thin.109

Ultimately, the arms shipments ceased, not because of any CIA action, butafter 5 Commando and the ANC closed off the border with Uganda andSudan. Having closed off this main supply route, rebel supplies had to beferried across Lake Tanganyika from Tanzania.110

Several additional collection and analysis priorities should be mentioned.Tracking diplomatic support for the rebels and the negotiations that werebeing brokered by the OAU were topics that feature prominently in CIAanalyses.111 Prior to Dragon Rouge, another top collection priority was toascertain the location and condition of U.S. consular personnel inStanleyville, as well as to collect intelligence on Simba defenses in thatarea.112 A number of intelligence reports generated on this topic were usedin the planning of various rescue operations, including Dragon Rouge.113

Finally, throughout the course of the conflict, another of the CIA’s mainintelligence collection priorities was to determine whether or not foreignadvisors were assisting the Simbas. Numerous intelligence reportssuggested the presence of Chinese, Algerian, and other advisers operatinginside the Congo or in one of the neighboring countries, although thesemostly proved false.114 The fear among U.S. officials was that the rebels’single disadvantage related not to the quality of their armaments, butinstead to the absence of any formal training in guerrilla warfare. Thebelief was that only a small number of advisers would be needed totransform the Simbas into an effective military force that could defeat thegovernment forces. Therefore, CIA collectors and analysts tracked thisissue closely.

Shortcomings and Failures

Despite the CIA’s best efforts to accurately assess the conflict, several notableintelligence failures occurred. First, policymakers were apparently caughtunprepared when rebel forces captured Stanleyville. Agency analysts werealso overoptimistic prior to Dragon Rouge, believing that the rebellion wason its last legs, whereas in fact it would continue for another year, not forthe least of reasons that the U.S.–Belgian intervention had resulted inincreased diplomatic and military support for the rebels from abroad.115 Inthis regard, the intelligence failure most often associated with the Congowas the CIA’s inability to learn of the presence of the contingent of Cubanadvisers led by Che Guevara.116

Following an official trip on behalf of the Cuban government, in whichGuevara visited eight African countries and also traveled to China from 17



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December 1964 to 14 March 1965, he subsequently disappeared from publicsight.117 Despite growing evidence of the presence of Cubans in the Congo inthe summer 1965, such as the acquisition of the diary of a Cuban killedduring a raid against the mercenaries, the idea that a large number ofCubans were operating in the Congo found few supporters in Washington.Not until September 1965, shortly before the start of operations againstthe Fizi-Baraka pocket, did the evidence become overwhelming, and thisview changed.118

Regardless of the improved military performance enabled by the Cubanadvisors, the rebels were quickly defeated in the Fizi-Baraka pocket. Thismilitary defeat, combined with a newfound desire on the part of theCongo’s neighbors to drop their support for the rebels, particularlyfollowing the 13 October replacement of Tshombe—who was disliked bymost African leaders because of his use of white mercenaries—effectivelyended the insurgency. In late November, Mobutu would launch a coupd’etat and assume the presidency. He would remain president, backed bythe U.S., until himself overthrown in 1997 by the former Simba leaderLaurent Kabila.

RELUCTANT INTERVENORS

Simultaneous to Washington policymakers’ consideration of augmentingthe U.S. military’s advisory presence in Vietnam with combat troops wasthe perceived need to respond to the deteriorating situation in the Congo.The concern about falling dominoes in Asia led to similar concern aboutAfrica. With a key ally on the brink of being overthrown, threatened byan insurgency supported by the Soviet Bloc, China, Cuba, Egypt, Algeria,and the ‘‘radical African’’ states, a costly and potentially open-ended U.S.military intervention may have seemed the only plausible option of‘‘saving’’ the Congo. Instead, despite facing such a grave situation, U.S.policymakers from the start ruled out American military intervention.Wary of taking on too many military commitments, they also feared beingtarnished with the ‘‘neo-colonialist’’ brush. Consequently, less overt meanswere required to achieve the policy objective of maintaining a friendlygovernment in Leopoldville. Opting for a covert CIA paramilitaryoperation, rather than an overt U.S. military intervention, allowed theJohnson administration to not only limit U.S. liability from a political,diplomatic, and military perspective, but also ensured that the costs of thecounterinsurgency mission would be minimized. Moreover, avoiding overtU.S. military intervention was predicated on the fear that countries such asthe Soviet Union or China would respond to this escalation by alsobecoming heavily involved in the conflict, thus creating a quagmire. As ithappened, only following the U.S. airlift of Belgian paratroopers during



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Operation Dragon Rouge did foreign powers begin to make the Congo amajor political issue and to radically increase their previously modestsupport to the rebels.The Congo venture represents only one of many ‘‘successful’’ CIA-led

efforts designed to bolster a pro-U.S. government faced with an insurgencywithout committing a large American military force. Admittedly, the Congo‘‘success’’ can be attributed in large part to a combination of the militaryvictories achieved by 5 Commando and the ANC, and to the ineptitude ofthe insurgents in securing their gains. Yet, without CIA assistance,conceptualizing how the insurgency could have been defeated is difficult.The CIA provided critical force multipliers that would have beenunavailable to the counterinsurgents, short of a large military intervention.From the perspective of Western counterinsurgency theory, the Congo casebreaks many of the rules that were considered the norm, in both the early1960s and the current context of Afghanistan and Iraq. This theory ispredicated on several principles, such as the need to ‘‘win hearts and minds’’by ‘‘protecting the population’’ in the face of insurgent ‘‘intimidation.’’These principles were scarcely, if at all, in evidence in the Congo.

The Relevance of Counterinsurgency Theory

Counterinsurgency theory is also predicated on the idea that large numbersof security forces are required. In the early 1960s, the ratio of 10–20counterinsurgents for every insurgent was often touted as the baseline forsu c c e s s . More r e c en t l y , t h e o f f i c i a l me t r i c ha s be en 40–50counterinsurgents per 1,000 people. Again, the Congo proved an exceptionto the rule, with the counterinsurgents numbering in the tens of thousandsrather than the hundreds of thousands. Then as now, counterinsurgencywas believed to be a process that took many years. Yet, in the Congo, theinsurgency lasted less than two years before it was defeated.By the logic of counterinsurgency theory, the ‘‘success’’ achieved in the

Congo would seem unthinkable. How then to account for it? Can theresults be attributed merely to the fact that the contest occurred inAfrica rather than Southeast Asia, and that perhaps a culturalcomponent to counterinsurgency exists that means that there are no ‘‘onesize fits all’’ approaches? Likewise, can geographic or technologicalfactors be said to have played a role? Did the lack of an overbearingbureaucracy mean that the CIA officers in the field could ‘‘innovate’’faster than could a large military organization, or at least not behamstrung by a complex chain of command? Were the counterinsurgentsmerely lucky?Rather than seeking to answer these questions the main purpose here has

been to show that counterinsurgency theorists must first ask these questions



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before suggesting that large-scale U.S. military intervention is the only meansby which ‘‘success’’ in counterinsurgency can be achieved, or that ‘‘success’’ isimpossible if the intelligence services play a leading role as opposed to asubordinate one.As with any large-scale intervention involving the U.S. military, theorists

must account for the problems created, rather than solved, by taking suchan approach. The cases of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan havedemonstrated that large military commitments not only increase thenational financial burden, risk significant casualties, and make the‘‘winning of hearts and minds’’ at home and in the host-nation a majorissue, but also create otherwise artificial credibility issues and timepressures. By contrast, in cases such as the Congo, where the CIA hastaken the lead and worked with proxy forces, the U.S. limited its liability,thereby ensuring that many of these self-generated problems never arose.

REFERENCES1One of the most important examples of this trend is Major General Michael T.Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprintfor Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New AmericanSecurity, January 2010. For a discussion of FM 3-24’s approach tointelligence, see General David H. Petraeus, Lt. General James F. Amos, LTCJohn A. Nagl, Sarah Sewall, The U.S. Army=Marine Corps CounterinsurgencyField Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 79–135.

2For a discussion of this point, see my article ‘‘Agents for Stability or Chaos:Conceptualizing Intelligence ‘Relevance’ in Counterinsurgency,’’ Studies inConflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 2011, pp. 212–227.

3This is particularly true for official histories. See Michael Warner, ‘‘U.S.Intelligence and Vietnam: The Official Version(s),’’ Intelligence and NationalSecurity, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2010, pp. 611–637.

4Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974); Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant:The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire (Washington, DC: The American UniversityPress, 1993).

5Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo: The Confrontation of CubanMilitary Forces, 1960–1967 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,2009); Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, andAfrica, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,2002).

6Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone(New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: MyLife in the CIA (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 2003). Unfortunately, the ForeignRelations of the United States (FRUS) volume dealing with the Congo from1960–1968 remains classified.



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7Mulele would shoot himself with blank cartridges to achieve this effect. Hisfollowers were mostly armed with spears and poisoned arrows, although theydid also employ captured ANC small arms. Because of its isolation, theMulele rebels were unable to receive arms shipments from abroad.

8Stephen L. Weigert, Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa(London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 57.

9Ibid., p. 60.

10Stephen L. Weigert, Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in ModernAfrica, pp. 54–61; Renee C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and Jean-MarieRibeaucourt, ‘‘ ‘The Second Independence’: A Case Study of the KwiluRebellion in the Congo,’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 8,No. 1, October 1965, pp. 78–109; Claude E. Welch, Jr., ‘‘IdeologicalFoundations of Revolution in Kwilu,’’ African Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 2,September 1975, pp. 116–128; Mark Traugott, ‘‘The Economic Origins of theKwilu Rebellion,’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 21, No. 3,July 1979, pp. 459–479.

11Leopoldville was the capital of the Belgian Congo and Brazzaville was thecapital of the French Congo. Consequently, the two states would be referredto as Congo (Leopoldville) and Congo (Brazzaville).

12M. Crawford Young, ‘‘Post-Independence Politics in the Congo,’’ Transition,No. 26, 1996, p. 39.

13Major Thomas P. Odom, ‘‘Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo,1964–1965,’’ Leavenworth Papers No. 14, Combat Studies Institute, 1988; ‘‘TheCongo: With Magic Juice and Lucky Grass,’’ Time, 12 June 1964.

14Memorandum for the President from Brubeck, 15 June 1964. Referring to therebel victories in the eastern Congo, Brubeck observed, ‘‘well-armed troopsare being routed by Pygmies carrying spears and machetes.’’ For more detailson the composition of the ‘‘Popular Army,’’ see M. Crawford Young,‘‘Post-Independence Politics in the Congo,’’ p. 40.

15Keith Wheelock and M. Crawford Young, ‘‘The Congolese Rebellion of 1964,’’June 1965, in Ernest K. Lindley Files 61–69, Box #4, Lot 71D273, RG #59,MLR 5441, National Archives, College Park, MD. As this study notes, theGbenye regime was a ‘‘phantom government, replete with titles, but lackingthe ability and resources to administer the rebel held areas.’’

16Memorandum for the President from Brubeck, 6 August 1964.

17‘‘The Congo: Elation for Moise,’’ Time, 11 September 1964.

18Terence Lyons, ‘‘Keeping Africa off the Agenda,’’ in Warren I. Cohen andNancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: AmericanForeign Policy 1963–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994),pp. 245–277.

19By one account, the White House was very cautious about the effect of theCongo crisis on the 1964 election. Due to the fear of American diplomats andmissionaries being killed in reprisal attacks resulting from the CIA air attacks,they ordered all air activity stopped in October. The Stanleyville operation



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was also planned to occur after the U.S. election. See Sean Kelly, America’sTyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, pp. 129, 152.

20In 1959, the Congo produced 9 percent of the ‘‘Free World’s’’ copper, 49 percentof its cobalt, 69 percent of its industrial diamonds, and 6.5 percent of its tin, aswell as a number of specialized metals used in the nuclear and electrical industry.See Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964,p. 28.

21Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism,Crisis and Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.51–77. Throughout this period, there was considerable tension within the U.S.government about supporting African nationalists as opposed to the interestsof the colonial and ex-colonial powers.

22Memorandum from Brubeck, 11 August 1964. This document, and allsubsequent documents that are not otherwise labeled, were acquired via theDeclassified Documents Reference System.

23Message from CINCSTRIKE to JCS, 9 September 1964.

24Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: My Life in the CIA, p. 14.

25U.S. Army attache Leo message, 10 September 1964.

26Major Thomas P. Odom, ‘‘Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo,’’p. 8; and Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, p. 115.

27Memorandum for the files from Brubeck, 11 August 1964.

28Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, p. 112.

29Message from CINCSTRIKE to JCS, 9 September 1964.

30In the mid-1960s, the U.S. was involved in at least a dozen counterinsurgenciesin countries such as Thailand and Colombia. Beginning in 1962, the U.S.Overseas Internal Defense Policy, which served as the U.S. government’scounterinsurgency doctrine, laid out an inter-agency approach tocounterinsurgency in which the U.S. military’s role was mainly limited toindirect supply and advisory functions.

31Martin Staniland, ‘‘Africa, the American Intelligentsia, and the Shadow ofVietnam,’’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 98, No. 4, Winter 1983–1984,pp. 602–603; Lloyd Garrison, ‘‘Another Vietnam Feared in Congo,’’ The NewYork Times, 13 December 1964; ‘‘Tshombe Employs Mercenary Pilots: WillFly Bombers Supplied by U.S.,’’ The Irish Times, 18 August 1964.

32‘‘The military chiefs were looking at the growing involvement in Vietnam inthe context of their overall resources and their ability to deal with troublespots around the world. That is why they were not very interested involunteering to commit any forces in a place like the Congo.’’ Interview ofJonathan Dayton Stoddart, the Association for Diplomatic Studies andTraining Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 19 January 2000. In 1964,Stoddart was serving as Deputy Director of the Near East, South Asia andAfrican Region, Office of International Security Affairs in the Office of theSecretary of Defense. See also cable from Godley to SECSTATE, 30October 1965.



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33Piero Gleijeses. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa,1959–1976. The quote referencing Vietnam is from General Adams, 9September 1964.

34Memorandum for the President from Brubeck, 6 August 1964.

35FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol. XXIV, Africa, Document 191.

36Ibid.; Prior to independence, the U.S. maintained a Consulate General inLeopoldville. For more information on this period, see interview ofAmbassador Owen W. Roberts, the Association for Diplomatic Studies andTraining Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 11 February 1991.

37Due to the presence of American mining interests in Katanga, the U.S. hadmaintained a consulate in Elizabethville before independence.

38According to The New York Times, at the time of the Simba rebellion, the CIAstation in Leopoldville had ‘‘mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy andminiature war department.’’ See Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel,and E.W. Kenworthy, ‘‘How CIA Put ‘Instant Air Force’ Into Congo,’’ TheNew York Times, 25 April 1966. Upon his return to the Congo as the newstation chief in July 1965, Devlin noted that ‘‘The CIA office wasconsiderably larger than the one I had left two years previously. Paramilitaryoperations inevitably mean expansion.’’ Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo,p. 227. By the 1970s, the Africa Division was said to have included 300officials and would continue to expand as a result of its operations in Angola.Rene Lemarchand, ‘‘The CIA in Africa: How Central? How Intelligent?,’’ TheJournal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1976, pp. 401–426; JohnStockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd.,1978).

39Devlin covers this period in his memoirs, although numerous other books havefocused squarely on this topic. See, for instance, Ludo de Witte, TheAssassination of Lumumba (New York: Verso, 2002).

40These figures included Joseph Mobutu, Victor Nendaka, and Albert Ndele.See also Tom Wicker et al., ‘‘How CIA Put ‘Instant Air Force’ IntoCongo.’’ Although figures such as Mobutu had been involved with the CIAprior to Lumumba’s overthrow, these ties became increasingly close in itsaftermath.

41Tom Wicker et al., ‘‘How CIA Put ‘Instant Air Force’ Into Congo;’’ VictorMarchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 117–118; FRUS, Document 191.

42Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire; Jerry Puren,Mercenary Commander (Alberton: Galago Press, 1986), pp. 196, 206.

43Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, p. 232.

44Christopher Robbins, Air America: The True Story of the CIA’s MercenaryFliers in Covert Operations from Pre-War China to Present Day Nicaragua(London: Corgi Books, 1979), p. 100.

45As Lewis Hoffacker, the Chief of the Embassy’s Political section during1962–1963, later noted, ‘‘the CIA was running most of the show’’ in the



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Congo. Interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training ForeignAffairs Oral History Project, 17 July 1998.

46Several years earlier, when Tshombe ran the newly formed independent ‘‘state’’of Katanga, Hoare’s mercenary unit was called ‘‘4 Commando.’’ See MikeHoare, The Road to Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary’s Personal Memoir(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2008).

47Vandewalle’s time in the Congo ended following Dragon Rouge.

48Cable from Embassy Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 27 August 1964.


50CIA memorandum on Congo situation, 4 September 1964.

51See, for instance, Message from U.S. Army attache Leopoldville, 2 December1964; Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: My Life in the CIA, p. 18;Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, pp. 165, 228–229, 249, 255.

52See, for instance, Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: My Life in the CIA,p. 18.

53Message from U.S. Army attache Leopoldville, 2 December 1964.

54Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, p. 165.

55Ibid., p. 229.

56Ibid., pp. 253–255; Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries (London: Sidgwickand Jackson, 1985), pp. 111–161.

57Tom Wicker et al., ‘‘How CIA Put ‘Instant Air Force’ Into Congo.’’

58Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo, p. 37. Richard Holm notes that theCuban exile pilot Juan Peron had been sent to the Congo in November 1963after receiving training on the T-6. During his Congo service, he also trainedin the T-28 and the C-46. See Richard L. Holm, ‘‘A Plane Crash, Rescue, andRecovery—A Close Call in Africa,’’ Center for the Study of Intelligence,Historical Perspectives, Washington, D.C., Winter 1999–2000. In 1963, theCIA also hired Wallace Moessmer to supervise and train pilots in the Congo.‘‘Obituary, Wallace Moessmer, 70; Pilot for CIA, Retired Navy Officer,’’St. Louis (Missouri) Post-Dispatch, 24 October 1992. Ed Dearborn arrived inthe Congo in October 1963. See Christopher Robbins, Air America: TheTrue Story of the CIA’s Mercenary Fliers, pp. 99–100.

59Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo, pp. 39–51; Sean Kelly, America’sTyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, p. 115.

60Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,p. 136.

61Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo, p. 38. The process of hiring Cubanexile pilots for the Congo would continue until 1967.

62‘‘The Congo: Is Anyone in Control?,’’ Time, 26 June 1964; Major ThomasP. Odom, ‘‘Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo,1964–1965,’’ Fn 11; Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutuof Zaire, p. 100.

63Cable from Embassy Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 27 August 1964.



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64CIA, The Congo Situation, 25 August 1964.

65Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,pp. 137–153.

66Belgian Army Colonel Vandewalle attributed the idea to arm the T-6s to theCIA station chief in Leopoldville. See Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIAand Mobutu of Zaire, p. 96.

67Adams, in Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 13, 16; Larry Devlin, Chiefof Station, Congo, p. 225; Stephen R. Weissman, ‘‘CIA Covert Action in Zaireand Angola: Patterns and Consequences,’’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94,No. 2, Summer 1979, pp. 263–286. According to Jerry Puren, MercenaryCommander, p. 200, the CIA also supplied napalm bombs to the air force,although this is the only source for this information.

68FO 1100=12. Note on meeting with aircraft maintenance men.

69According to Holm, the air operations officer at Bunia was a former WWIIPolish fighter pilot named ‘‘Big Bill’’ Wyrozemski. His unit consisted of a‘‘couple of Cuban pilots, two mechanics, a radio operator, and a logisticsofficer.’’ See Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: My Life in the CIA,pp. 25, 27.

70Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, pp. 96, 133–134.Two cases of friendly fire are referred to in Mike Hoare, The Road toKalamata, pp. 140, 201.

71Major Thomas P. Odom, ‘‘Dragon Operations,’’ p. 40.

72CIA Situation in the Congo, 16 December 1964.

73See, for instance, Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, pp. 87, 246, and MikeHoare, Congo Warriors (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2008), p. 37. Prior to theFizi-Baraka operation, Hoare made a personal reconnaissance in one of theB-26Ks in order to select a beach for the amphibious landing, The Road toKalamata, p. 255.

74See for instance: Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire,p. 128; Mike Hoare, Congo Warriors, pp. 170–171; Lloyd Garrison,‘‘Mercenaries Leading First Big Drive on Stanleyville,’’ The New YorkTimes, 6 November 1964; Lloyd Garrison, ‘‘Congo Mercenaries GetSupplies, Food and Pay,’’ The New York Times, 10 November 1964; ‘‘CongoPlanes Hit Albertville in Softening Up,’’ The Washington Post, 27 August1964; ‘‘3 Congo B-26’s Attack Besiegers of a Column,’’ The New YorkTimes, 11 February 1965.


76Memorandum for Bundy from Brubeck, 5 October 1964.

77Ernesto ‘‘Che’’ Guevara, The African Dream: The Diaries of the RevolutionaryWar in the Congo (London: The Harvill Press, 2001), pp. 184, 229.

78CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 30 December 1964; CIA Situation in the CongoReport, 21 April 1965.

79Richard L. Holm, ‘‘A Plane Crash, Rescue, and Recovery: A Close Call inAfrica.’’



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80A detailed account of the treatment of the U.S. consular personnel in Stanleyvillecan be found in: Michael P. E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo: A Consul’s Return tothe Heart of Darkness (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

81Memorandum for Bundy from Brubeck, 5 October 1964.

82CIA Congo Situation, 6 October 1964.

83CIA Congo Situation, 3 November 1964.

84Stephen R. Weissman, ‘‘CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns andConsequences,’’ p. 272.

85Michael P. E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo, p. 60. Shortly after the city’s capture,Hoyt quotes Grinwis as saying ‘‘I notice Devlin is back . . .That means theyrealize this is really serious.’’

86Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, pp. 110–111; LarryDevlin, Chief of Station, Congo, pp. 211–212.

87For details, see Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, p. 212; Sean Kelly,America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, p. 136; Michael P. E.Hoyt, Captive in the Congo, p. 159; and CIA intelligence cable, 14 October1964.

88Sam Adams, quoted by Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 18–19.

89Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, pp. 141–142. Aplan put forward by U.S. Strike Command, known as Operation GoldenHawk, that would involve a rescue attempt by U.S. Green Berets wassimilarly rejected. See ibid., pp. 123–124.

90Ibid., pp. 141–142, 148.

91Mike Hoare, Congo Warriors, p. 118.


93White House record, 25 November 1964.

94Edwin Wilson would later gain notoriety as a rogue agent working for Libya’sMuamar Qaddafi.

95Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo, p. 171; David Corn, Blond Ghost:Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994),pp. 115–116, 137, 319; Felix I. Rodriguez and John Weisman, Shadow Warrior(New York: Pocket Books, 1989), p. 147; Peter Maas, Manhunt (London:HARRAP, 1986), pp. 28–29; and Joseph C. Goulden, Death Merchant: TheRise and Fall of Edwin P. Wilson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984),pp. 39–40.

96Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 134–135; and Mike Hoare, CongoWarriors, p. 242.

97Ibid.; Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire, p. 162; CIAsituation report, 14 April 1965; Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, pp. 33–45.The exact number of Swift boats sent varies depending on the source, but rangesfrom six to eight.

98See, for instance, CIA Intelligence Memorandum—Situation in the Congo, 1July 1965.



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99Descriptions of these crossings can be found in Ernesto ‘‘Che’’ Guevara, TheAfrican Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. On thedifficulties caused to the rebels by the maritime force, see pp. 186, 229.

100According to Mike Hoare, this ‘‘pocket’’ was roughly twice the size of Wales.

101Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, pp. 246–262.

102Michael P. E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo, pp. 30–31, 36–37.

103In October 1964, INR specialist Keith Wheelock was dispatched to the Congo toconduct a study of the Simba rebellion. In early 1965, M. Crawford Young of theUniversity of Wisconsin joined him. The preface to their classified report notesthe CIA provided ‘‘significant assistance to this INR project.’’ See KeithWheelock and M. Crawford Young, ‘‘The Congolese Rebellion of 1964.’’

104To give two examples: CIA cable, 29 August 1964 includes detailed informationon a hit squad run by the Congolese Surete. A separate cable discusses coupplanning by ANC officers. See CIA cable, 31 August 1964.

105Richard L. Holm, The American Agent: My Life in the CIA, pp. 7, 24.

106After his stint at the Congo desk, Adams was assigned to do Viet Cong order ofbattle estimates, during which time he gained notoriety for challenging theestimates produced by Westmoreland’s headquarters in Saigon.

107Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton, VT:Steerforth Press, 1994), p. 14.

108CIA Memorandum, 14 September 1964; CIA: Situation in the Congo, 17 March1965.

109DO 216=55–25 February 1965 Memo from the UK embassy in Washington toForeign Office. The official referred to here is Curtis C. Strong.

110In addition to the Swift boats, the CIA’s air force also patrolled the Lake andattacked suspected rebel transports. See, for instance, CIA Situation in theCongo, 21 April 1965.

111Some examples include: CIA Intelligence Memorandum—Tanzanian Supportfor the Congo Rebels, 7 April 1965; CIA Special Report—Tanzania Takingthe Left Turn, 21 May 1965; CIA Intelligence Memorandum—The SouthernSudan Problem and Its Relationship to the Congo, 28 May 1965; CIAIntelligence Memorandum—Ugandan Prime Minister’s Congo Policy, 17March 1965; CIA Memorandum, 31 December 1964.

112CIA intelligence cable, 14 October 1964.

113See, for instance, CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 16 October 1964; CIAintelligence report, 20 November 1964; CIA Congo Situation, 29 September1964.

114Memo from Denney Jr. to Harriman, 11 August 1964; CIA Memorandum, theCongo situation, 14 September 1964; CIA Memorandum, 31 December 1964;CIA Situation in the Congo, 5 January 1965.

115CIA intelligence report, 17 November 1964.

116Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,p. 125.



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117Research Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, 10 April 1965.

118Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 136. Sam Adams recalled the head of theCongo Desk, upon learning of the Cuban presence, remarking: ‘‘This was once aperfectly respectable Cold War confrontation. Now it’s the goddamn West SideStory.’’ Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, p. 21. See alsoCIA report, 4 October 1965.



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Inte rna tio na l J o u rna l o f Inte llige nc e a nd C o u nte rInte llige … · 2012-04-19 ·...

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