INSURGENCIES IN THE 21st CENTURY: ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE OR

TERRORISM?

Vasu Gounden, ACCORD

11 SEPTEMBER 2015

Presentation to the Pre-Social Sciences Forum Event

INSURGENCIES AND RESPONSES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES

• Political, radicalised ideologies, asymmetrical approach to combat

• Amorphous and opaque organisations: some highly complex and intricate, others with less coherence and strategic alignment

• Question is…Whom do they represent? What are their interests?

• Grievances rooted in historical inequalities, and there are diverse manifestations and motivations for violence

• Regional and global links vis-à-vis ideologies, funding and resources

UNDERLYING FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INSURGENCIES IN AFRICA

• Poverty and illiteracy

• Inequality and unemployment

• Poor Governance and marginalisation

• Government institutional weaknesses, poor control of borders, low and insufficient administrative coverage of large territorial expanses

• Proliferation of transnational organised crime, illicit trade, and human trafficking

Source: Report of the AU Commission Chairperson on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa (2014), P.2

GLOBAL TRENDS IN INSURGENCIES

Source: Global Terrorism Index (2014), P:13

GLOBAL TRENDS IN INSURGENCIES

Source: Global Terrorism Index (2014), P:15

INSURGENT HOTSPOTS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Source: AON Risk Solutions (2015), P.13

URGENT ZONES VULNERABLE TO INSURGENCIES

LIBYA

NIGERIA / LAKE CHAD BASIN AREA

SOMALIA / KENYA

MALI / SAHEL BELT

INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICALibya

• Disintegration of state apparatus, loss of effective control over territories and militias following regime change of Libyan Leader Qaddaffi in September 2011

• Decentralised and localised security forces and armed militias, formed along narrow identity markers, now compete with one another for power, influence and resources (e.g. oil, tax revenue from population), largely unaccountable to political structures

• Deadlocked political negotiations between rival institutions (House of Representatives and General National Congress) detract from State’s administrative capacities and the effective implementation of any security sector reforms

• Consequent decline in human security has contributed to further radicalisation of Libyan youth and provided a fertile breeding ground for foreign terrorist groups to establish foothold on the continent

• Libya as a direct conduit for the spread of of weapons (both small arms and military grade weapons), illicit narcotics and trafficking of humans throughout North Africa and the African Sahel

• Instability in Libya accelerating security challenges in neighbouring countries (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Sahel region) as well as in Mediterranean countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) due to unrestricted movement of weapons, persons and flow of refugees

CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN LIBYAMarch 2015

Source: Internal Displacement (2015)

INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICANigeria / Lake Chad Basin Area

• Emergence of Boko Haram finds roots in ethnic/religious/developmental marginalisation of northern communities of Nigeria, tracing back to early 1800s

• Boko Haram, in its earliest incarnations, emerged in 2002 as an internally-focused movement against perceived Western influence over Nigerian government and society, specifically in terms of social and political issues; early forms of Boko Haram comprised both moderate and radicalised wings

• Following failed diplomatic negotiations with former President Obsanajo in 2009 and heavy-handed security response against Boko Haram sects, movement turned radical and began undertaking conventional terrorist activities, namely through human rights violations against civilians and through destruction of state property

• Severe underdevelopment and unemployment in Nigeria’s northern states, widespread corruption throughout military and Executive Administration of former President Jonathan (including accusations that some officials actively collaborated with factions of Boko Haram), contributed to Boko Haram’s enhanced capacities to mobilise young Nigerians and grow in military strength

• Duration of insurgency has led to massive outflows of refugees into neighbouring countries and placed great strain on administrative and security capacities of Lake Chad Basin region. Current President Buhari has committed to defeating Boko Haram (in collaboration with Chad, Niger) under AU and UN-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

• Boko Haram’s public pledge to ISIL more indicator of ideological overlap, mobilisation strategy, and quest to secure greater resources than explicit commitment to internationalise its conflict

INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICANigeria/Lake Chad Basin Area

ActorTotal deaths attributed since 2011

State Actor 5, 306

Boko Haram 13, 472

Boko Haram or a State Actor

(Unconfirmed)11, 398

Sectarian Actor 5, 259

Other Armed Actor 1, 194

TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2011 = 36, 629

Source: Nigeria Security Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations (2015)

INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICASomalia / Kenya

• Al Shabaab emanates from radicalised remnants of Islamic Courts Union, which controlled south-central Somalia from 2000 until invasion of Mogadishu by Ethiopian-led forces in January 2007

• Al-Shabaab initially focused on eliminating all external influence and interference from Somalia (including the Transitional Federal Government from 2007-2012);

• Al-Shabaab largely adhered to Islamic fundamentalism and committed human rights abuses against Somali population, however was supported to some extent by the Somali population - members of Al Shabaab provided basic services, such as water provisions and basic security, to those under its control; however this support largely evaporated following Al-Shabaab’s decision to prevent the delivery of food aid during the famine in 2011

• AMISOM peacekeeping force, together with the Somali National Army, have actively combatted Al-Shabaab both in Mogadishu and throughout southern Somalia to some degrees of success. However Al-Shabaab’s employ of asymmetric warfare heightens the complexities of permanently defeating its forces. In recent months suicide bombings and assassination attempts have increased in Mogadishu despite progress in liberating other regions of Somalia

• Kenya’s decision in 2011 to actively confront Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia has accelerated the conflict in northern Kenya. Al-Shabaab has capitalised on structural, economic and socio-cultural disparities in northern Kenya to mobilise and radicalise Kenyan nationals of Somali descent to launch attacks inside of Kenya.

• Despite Al-Shabaab’s public allegiance to ISIL, there is no indication that Al-Shabaab would internationalise its own activities beyond Somalia/Kenya. Somalia presents more of a concern to international peace and security as it is a channel for the free movement of illicit goods, weapons, and human trafficking.

AMISOM SITUATION UPDATESJanuary 2014 vs October 2014

Source: AMISOM (2014)

INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICAMali / Sahel Belt

• Current dynamics in Mali rooted in decades- long contestations by Tuareg communities for greater autonomy and development focus (2012 coup d’etat was fourth Tuareg rebellion since 1960). Massive influx of arms from Libya between 2011-2012 contributed to more aggressive posturing by Tuareg communities and has been considered amongst the sparks of the uprising.

• Between 2012-2015, the Malian government and a number of the armed groups in northern Mali have strived to negotiate an all inclusive peace agreement that addressed the northern communities’ long-standing grievances– Agreement was signed on 15 May 2015 with a number of groups based in northern Mali– Criterion for inclusion in the peace talks was that they did not renounce the territorial integrity of Mali and did not

commit any acts of terrorism

• International forces have been in Mali since late 2012, starting with France (Operation Sérval), AFISMA (AU-mandated Peace Support Operation) and MINUSMA (UN-mandated Peacekeeping Force). MINUSMA’s mandate enables the mission to use “all means necessary” to ensure the restoration of state authority and the protection of civilians

• Insurgent groups operating in Mali and the Sahel belt include: Ansar al-Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Arica (Mujao).

• Groups are increasing involved in violent attacks that target civilians, local authorities, UN peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations, active throughout the Sahel region and are linked with continental and global routes for transnational organised crime

SECURITY DYNAMICS IN MALI AND THE SAHEL REGIONMarch 2015

Source: Clingendael Institute (2015)

POTENTIAL AND EMERGING INSURGENT THREATS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

• Central African Republic/Uganda

• Egypt

• Sudan

• Western Sahara

Source: AON Risk Solutions (2015), P.8

GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

SOUTH AFRICAN NORMATIVE AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF INSURGENCIES

• 1998 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities & Regulation of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Bill (amended 2006)– Intended to regulate mercenary activities of South Africans in armed conflict, as well as

regulation of issues that might foster armed conflict, such as financing mercenaries and selling of arms (nationally or internationally)

• 2004 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and related Activities Act 33– Intended to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities, to legislate criminal

penalties for offenses connected with terrorist activities, to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, and to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities

CONTINENTAL NORMATIVE AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO INSURGENCIES

• 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism

• 2002 AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism

• 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism

• African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) and the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

• African Anti-Terrorism Model Law

• African Mechanism for Police Cooperation - AFRIPOL

• AU Peace and Security Council Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism (Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa)

• SADC, in cooperation with CAERT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre is in the process of developing a Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Southern Africa

PROCESSES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RESPOND TO INSURGENCIES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

• Military-based responses

• Dialogue-based responses

CONTINENTAL MILITARY INITIATIVES TO RESPOND TO INSURGENCIES

• Nationally-driven responses– Tunisia: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation throughout the country– Egypt: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation in the North Sinai– Kenya: targeting of Kenyans of Somali descent in Northern Kenya as means of disrupting

Al-Shabaab’s networks

• Continental peacekeeping forces with ‘enforcement’ based mandates– AMISOM: Somalia– MINUSMA: Mali– African Capacities for the Immediate Responses to Crises (ACIRC) - currently deployed in

the DRC with South African troops– Multi-National Joint Task Force (Chad, Niger, Nigeria) combatting Boko Haram in the Lake

Chad Basin region

• International contributions to military responses– French military operations in Central African Republic and Mali– United States counterterrorism activities through proliferation of drone activities, military

support bases and special task force activities

Dialogue-Based Responses to Insurgencies on the African Continent

• How to engage in dialogue with radicalised non-state actors– Diametrically–opposed world views and ideologies– Incompatible demands– Asymmetrical warfare

• To whom in radicalised non-state actors does one speak?– Are there moderate branches with the willingness to dialogue?– Do they have a mandate to represent the organisations?– Do they have influence over the insurgent wings of their

movements? And if they reach agreements, to what extent can they keep their adhere and enforce their commitments?

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO DATE

• Comprehensive national and continental legal frameworks to restrict broad range of ‘terrorist activities’. However challenge is ensuring that all countries ratify, domesticate, and implement these frameworks

• Lack of coordination and coherence between national initiatives and continental frameworks. Slow development of regional frameworks to combat insurgent– Need for greater intelligence sharing and collaborative efforts, especially

through Continental Early Warning Systems and National and Regional focal points to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT)

– Positive example of the 2013 Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region

– SADC only now undertaking efforts to develop a regional strategy

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO DATE• Domestic legal responses to date are important steps forward but also possess negative

externalities (e.g. immigration policies and remittance legislation in South Africa)

• Complexities inherent in issues in preventing and ending insurgencies– Deep seated grievances in local communities, originating from long-term imbalances in

economic development and political inclusion, are at the root of forces that lead to radical mobilisation

– Overemphasis on promoting military-driven counterterrorism responses versus building local police capacities (who are frontline of day-to-day engagements) and promoting trust between communities and military structures

– Traditional military responses are often aimed at promoting immediate and short-term changes without addressing the underlying forces

– Forces of globalisation (free movement of ideas and information, people, goods, capital) challenge efficacy of state-centric responses to insurgent activities

• Need for balance of comprehensive solutions: – multi-faceted security capacities to mitigate immediate threats; – improved policing efforts to build stronger trust and relations with all communities and

promote more positive security environment; – long-term systematic efforts by government and private sector to promote equitable

development and reduce unemployment rates that underlie shifts towards radicalisation