Instructions Counterespionage Units

8/6/2019 Instructions Counterespionage Units

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INSTRUCTIONSFOR THEORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCEOF THE

COUNTER ESPIONAGE SERVICEWITHIN

MILITARY UNITS

SUPERCEDING PROVISIONALCOUNTER ESPIONAGE INSTRUCTIONS

FEBUARY 1916

DECLASSIFIED BY THEAUTHORITY OFTHE SECRETARY OF THE

ARMYODCSMT # 19

3 JUNE 92 M1-92DATE CASE #

M I 3AUGUST 1918


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War Department,August 31, 1918.

The fo l lowing " Ins t ruc t ions f o r the O r g an i za t i o n and Main-tenance of the Counter Espionage Service within Mili taryUnits," prepared in the Military Intelligence Division, GeneralStaff, are p r i n t ed f o r the informat ion and g o v e r n m e n t of theArmy of the United States.Approved by the Orde r of the Secretary of War.


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TABLE OF C O N T E X T S

...........................................NTRODU~OS ........... Banc~;raI. ~Thnctionof th e Canter Espionage Service-Section L Coddent id Nature ................................ .Section 2. Resnlting Problems ................................ Section 3. Nature . of the &mice .............................. Section 4. Enemp Opportunity ................................

Section 5. Counter Organization .............................. Section 5. Pooling of Information ............................. Section 7. Scope of the Service ............................... Section 8. Necessity for Complete Organization .................bmc u c II. Principles of Organization,Section 9. Basic Principles ......................,-............Section 10. Decentralication ................................... Section L1. Secrecy ..............................L.......... Man 12 .. Direct Communication ...............................h m a s I l l PemnqtSection 13. The'Intclligeace Offleer .............................Section 1 4. Echelona of Control ................................ Section 15. Number af Operative8 ............................... $ection 1 6. Number of Echelons ............................... Section 17. Replacement ......................................kncm IV. Selectioq9andTraining of Personnel.Section 18. Qualiflcatians ....................................... Section 1 9. Rank .;........................................... Section 243. Special Operatives .........,....................... Seetion 21 Secnring Personnel ................................ Section 22 Form of Oath ..................................... Section 23. Instruction of Yersonnel ............................h n c ~ ~. Collection of Idormation ..

Section 2 4 Methoda of Operatives .............................Section 25. Operatives' Reports ................................ Ekction 26. X)ocumentary Evidence ............................ 8ection 27 . Cavering Mail .................................... Section 28. Keeping Away from .Sqe&s .................,..... Section 29. Work fo r Executives ................................Section 30. Other Sources of Information .......................~ T I C L EVL Handling and Use of Information.Section 31. Collation of Material ............................... Section 32 Local Action ...................................... Section 33. Transmission of I n f o d o n ...................... .. Section 34- Addressing Comnd e n t s .........................


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A R T I C I XV I I . Kejmrts to I ~ l t e l l i g e n c eControl .Sectiurl 35 . Il irect Corumunicatio~l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 36 K i n d s of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 37 . Irldividual Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 38 . E x amp l e n f IntIividual R e p o r t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 39. Special Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 40. Classification of Cases as to Urgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 41. S i tu at ion Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section 42 Dep artmen t and Special Intelligence Officers' Sumzar ie s

A a n c u V I I I. Code.Section 43. General Remarks ...................................Section 44. * b i t r a r y Signs ............................................................................ection 45. To EncipherSection 46. Care in Enciphering ...............................Section 47. To Decipher ......................................Section si8. Caution ...........................................Section 49. A d d m i n g Telegram!! .............................Section 50. Tele-g-a phic Requests for Information ................ARTICLBIX Continuous Cover.Section 51. Responsibility of Intelligcnee Otiicer ................................. ...............etSon 52. Group OkrvatianSection 53. Following Suspects ................................................................ection 54. Transfer of Troops....................................5. ~ e ~ a r t u r ef Unit .....*............... . . . . . . . . .ection 56. Duty to Succev~or .-.

ARTIC~E I Liaison with Civilian Agencies..............................i o n 57. In General =. ..........................eetion 58 Functions of Department of Justice ................ection 59. Relatiom with Department of Justice.............................extion 60 Internment Procedure .........................eetion 61. American Protective League............................ection 62. Y M C.A.'Lntelligence.......................................ection 63. Local Police%ion 64. Other h e a l B i b ..................................

Amcm XI Handling Civilian Personnel. ..............eetion Establishments Predominantly Military ..............ection 66 Establishments Predominantly Civilian....................................eetion 67 Plant ProtectionArnmxz XI1. Intelligencs Funds. ...............................ection 68 Proper Uw of Funde .................Ion 60. Securing and Acwunting for Fun&


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This pamphlet wii l be cited as the "C. E. Instructions." It explains theinternal counter espionage organization of a militarp unit. The pamphlet enti-tled "Principles of Counter Espionage Organhatior and Control withirr - theMilitary Establishment" explains the interrelation of t h e varioua Connter Es-pionage units ti, each other and to the whole system. It will be cited as the"C. E. Principles." The two pamphlets, taken together, constitute a workinglibrary for the Xegative Intelligence OfEhr.Specid attention is invited to the secret nature of these instructions, and ofall instructions, bulletins, codes, and ciphers pertaining to the Counter m i o n -

age Service. They should be known to no persons other than t h e Comm~lnd ingGeneral or Commanding Officer, the Chief of StafT, the Intelligence Oflicer, andthe As s is ta t Intelligence Officer. Brlien rcot i n w e , t h e y should be kep t i~ safe.PCopies of this pamphlet a re issued only to Intelligence OfExrs of independ-ent units. This numbered copy must be receipted for to Military IntelligenceDivision by the Intelligence OfEcer who receives it m d who thereupon becomesresponsible for its safekeeping and final disposition. I t is issued to the InteLli-gence Officer in his official and not in his personal capacity. Should he at anytime cease to be Intelligence Officer of the putieular un it fo r which the pamphlet

was issued, he must transfer it to his succamr in offik, if such there be, or re-turn i t promptly to Military Intelligence Division. I t will not be turned overunder such circumstances to the Commanding Officer, he Chief of S M , r theAdjutant. Upon t m a f e r r i n i th is pamphlet to a successor, the IntelligenceOfficer will require a receipt and transmit the same promptly to Military Intel-ligence Division, which must know at all times who is responsible for i t s &y.The following abbreviations are used throughout t h i s pamphlet:A-PL-Amer ican Protective m e .C.E, -Counter Espionige.' D.J. -Department of Justice.

1.0. -Intelligenct! Of'ficer.M.I. -hiilit.ary Intelligence.M.1.D.-Military Intelligence Division, Gel~ra lS M .


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1. Co~r / l d en t k z ISa t ure . Positive Intelligence is a development of the e r -vice of seciirit~ nd information familiar to every oEce r as a pa rt of his d i t a r geducation. Its necessity, nature and general functions are well-hewn andunderstood. Negative Intelligence or Counter Espionage is, of necersitg, a ton-fidehtial service; it s existence is known, in a general way, to many offie- b u tthere a re few who realize the scope aod nature of the work, and praeticallp noneouiside the Lntelligence Senice who unde-d its methods.2. - RcsJ l i n g Probknrr. This is as it should be, for secrecy is essential tothe s u m f this service, but seemy carries with it one serious disadvso-which most be overcome before an efficient counter espionage organization canexist. This disadvantage arises from the fact that. th e basic principles of eoanterespionage form no part of general m i l i t a ~raining, and hence the IntelligenetOfEcer mus t educate himself, through his OF& studies, without the aid andadvice of other officers such M may be obtained in nearly every othe r b e fmilitary activity. I t follows aLw from the fact t ha t this service is not g e n e d yunderstad, that the Intelligence Ofticer must inform himself thoroughly inorder that. he may be able to explain clearly to his Commarider th e functionsand needs of h is organization, for he must act by the author ity of t he Com-mander and the suwes of his work depends largely upon the contidenee repoeedin him by that officer. -3. Nattirc of the Serv ice . First of all it mu.* be defiuitely u u d e r s W t h a tCounter Espionage B nit a separate branch of the service, but is a functionwhich each military unit must perform for i t se l f , jnst as i t provides its ownguard. T he Xilitary Intelligence Division, General Staff , is charged with t h edu ty of instruc ting Intelligence Officers and of m-ordina ting their work, b u t i tcannot perform their duties. Nor cm i t provide Intelligence Officers for mili-tary units, for there is no body of officers h m hich such a detail can be made7/It is sometime practicable to have officers who have-been detailed for Lntelli-gence duty ordered to Washington for a brief course of instrnction, but thisbust not obscure the outstanding principle that Intelligence Officers must, inthe main, be detailed by the branch w i t h which they are to serve, and th at i t isa duty of each commander of a n independent unit to aee to it that h is commandis protected by a pmper C. E. s p k m created therein nnder his own authority.(Principles, See 2).4. E n c n i y Oppor lr i r r i ty . The riipItl a;semhlinr?: and hetert~geneous o m psition of our Army have given ample oppo rtunity for espionage activity on thepart of an astute and unscrupulous enemy. The Counter Espionage S e r v k isnow in actual eonflict with the enemy in the United States, and the multifariousactivities of enemy agents mnstitute a most seriouq meaace to the nccomplkhmentof our mission in the war . The enemyk .secret semi= in the United States ishighly o r g anked ; it represents years of preparation by experienced agents andthe expenditure of vas t sums money. Before the en try of the United Statesinto the mar, kflnences of every wrt \rere set to work to stifle legislation lookingtnward n r ~ n a d n w . .and accresive m e a s a m were taken to arevent the manl l -


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facturr: an(] shij)lrlc.rit of m1,r1itir,r13. S i n c e war bec3me a reality th e attack h s1)ecome more s111)tlt:bl ~t ~orle h e Icss insistent. Military information is -ugh:for the use of tht: enerny, d~r ec t t tack upon o u r resources is made b r m a s ofacts of sabotage, nrld insidious propaganda is d h m i n a t e d to implant :he seedso f doubt, discontent and disloyalty for the pu- of weakening moraIe. In fo r-mation h a s been received w h i c h indicates the intention of the enemy to place arepresentative in every one of our reg;ments. There will be no lack of oppor-tunity nor wil l it be out of keeping with t h ~ i robserved methods.5. Colrnter Organizatiun. To combat snch activities is the mission of theCounter Espionage Service. I n so doing it must be so organized within eachmilitary unit that every case of disaffection, disloyalty or actual sedition shallbe promptly communicated to headquarters and every suspicious activit? withinthe mil i t a ry establishlnent ahall fall within the constant observation of the In-telligence Officer o r h is agencies. In addition it is necessary that there be aconstant exchange of information by Intelligence Officers among themselves andwith the Military Intelligence Division.6. Poding of Infwma!bn. The central office of the Military IntelligenceDivision at Washington examines, collates, records, and files information re-ceived from Intelligence Oficers, with whom i t works in the closest cx~pera t ion ,It is, furthermore, snpplied with information by Intelligence Officers in theAmerican Expeditionary For- by the Shte Department, the Department ofJustice, the United Sh t e s Secret Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, ourMilitary Attach& abroad, as well as by the Intelligence Departments of theBritiah, French and other allied pverhments. A further vast fund of informs-tion is supplied from miscelIaneous and private sources. Lnformation is a t handcovering the cases of an immense number of persons o rporganizatiom whoseactions or attitude have warranted suspicion. This information is a t the dis-posal of the Intelligence Serrim and should be drawn upon M y . At the sametime it is necessary, in order that the central pool of information shall continueto be useful aa such, that Intelligence Ofl3cers shall promptly report to the Mili-tary Lntelligence Division all cases handled by them m that the informationmay be available to the Intelligence Service generally. ( S m . 35-42).7. Scope of the Seruice. The fmction of the Counter Espionage Serviceis informational and preventative rather than punitive. Positive Intelligencecollects and disseminates the information upon which are based operations inthe &Id, but i t does not conduct wch operatiom. Counter Espionage couectsinformation upon which the proper authorities may act to prevent o r wppressdisloyalty or sedition and to apprehend enemy w e n & or sppath'izera, but i tdoes not m r p he function d executive offierzt in makitrg arrests and directingpunishment or that of the Judge Advocate in preparing evidence for courtsmartid. (Principles, See. 3).8- Necess i ty for Complete Organiurtima. Finally, i t is imperative that an

tffective Counter Espionage Service be establhhed immedistely wherever troopare stationed and that it be constantly maintained a t a high state of eflciency,so that nowhere within our Army can the activities of enemy agents or enemysympathizers be carried on unobserved- (StlrJ. 5136).

It ia not intended, nor is i t dee'n)ed desirable, to lay down hard and fastntles for the interior eamomy of the Counter &pionage Service The problemof creating it l i e within the province of the Inklligence OfBcer, who mnst solveit awrding to conditions and cimmstances which will v+ky according to thelocality and composition of the command- T h e following s w t i o 1 1 6 rua offeredas n Q wmore than an aid or guide to assist the Intelligence Officer in theaccomplishing of his mission.


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ARTICLE 11.PRJSCIFI,ESF OEGASLZATIOS

9. Basic Principla. The internal organinition of a military unit for C. E.purposes is bad upon three generai prineiph, namely:a. Decentralization.b. Secrecy. c Direct communication. 10. Decentralization. The principle of CeentraliLation rest3 upon theconviction that no individnal acting in an executive.capacity can efficiendy%the activities of more than a limited number of persons under his controL menthe number of subordinates e x 4 ight o r ten it h m e s necessary to d m -trdize by creating subdivisions, each under the personal direction of a separateexecutive, the several executives reporting each to hie inrmediate superior. Inlike manner it may pmve'necewry divide and subdivide the main snb-divi-sions, in order that no one person will be obliged to deal directly with mare w b -ordinatea than h e can handle dcient ly .In the Counter Espionage Senice, where mutt01 is complicated by thenecessity of secrecy, mch decentralization is essential to &ciency, and the greater the number of ramifications which the development of the spst.em en-the more echelons of deceutralization is it neceesary 'to create.' It is imposgible to prescribe the degree of decentraliurtion n m r y n the C. E. Semi- of a mil i tary anit. The problem mus t be eolved by the Intelligence Officer on the pmd , having in view the number of men to be covered and the conditions under which they aie grouped. (Seca. 13-17). 11. Secrecy. A n organization snch as that herein outlined ia d u e l e s sunlesa its existence is kept inviolably 8ecret. Counter Espionage mns t never bedimassed by Intelligence Oftlcers except among themselves; the tenn CounterEspionage must not be nsed in public or in any way which might attract at--tion to the system. It is well established that the most w ~ f u lf those organi-zations whose activities are dependent upon eecrecy have been those in which themembers were nnknown, not only to outsiders, but, as f a r as possible, to -4other a s well. I t is, t-herefore, desirable that subordinates know a s little aboutthe general organization and the duties of others aa ia consistent with the fulfill-ment of their own mission, and, for this reson, d e s &odd be drawn with eanso as to tell operatives all they should know withont revding what they shouldnot. These rules of secrecy are no refledion on the loyalty or discretion ofmembers of the organization but are necessary protective azeasurea. No p t m nis infallible and one is always in danger of disclosing nnconscioudy to a cleveragent of the enemy, infwmafion w h d o k m t . One cannot disclose infor-mation which one does not h o w , and ignorance becomes a protection

12 Direct Cmmunicafion by other than mil i ta ry channels is the basisof mocessfnl co-operation among Intelligence Wcers (Pr inc ip lq Sic. 7 )and in like mnnner the comrnnnication within,the C..E.organization of a unieis carried on in disregard of the usual military channels and withont the h o w l -edge of oBcers subordinate to the Commander of the unit. It is inadvisable fort h e Intelligence Officer to communicate personally with his operatives, erceptunder the most extraordinary circumstances, but all operative4 report d i r d yto the Intelligence Officer through t he mafin (k5).


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ARTICLE 111.

13. The I n t e l l i g e n c e Oficer . At th e head of the C. E. system of anp unitis th e Intelligence Officvr, or, in a Division, the h i s t a n t Intelligence Offierfor Negative Intelligence. I t is usuajly desirable that this officer should fraoglybe known as such in order to have the advantage of information v o l u n k n d b ymembers of the command who are not connected with the C. E. Service, Thisrule holds good in dl but the sdlest nnit.8. But the fact that this officxris em-ployed upon Counter Espionage duty ahould not be emphasized and the fwtthat a C. E. organization exists within the comnvtnd must be kept secret. Themethods whereby snch an organization can be m t e d and can function secreurare herein explained.

14. E c h l a n s of Control. hmciated with the Intelligence Officer, but a bsolutely under cover as such, ie -an officer who wi l l be designated ss S o . l,whowill c o d t n t e the point of contact betwen the Intelligence Officer and his or-ganization, but. whose name mas t never a&r in eonneetion with the C. E.workDirectly under the No. 1will be the ekecntives of the firstechelon of decen-tralization whom we will call the N m 2, and, assuming two echelons of decen-tralization, each No. 2 directs personally a limited nnmber of executives of thesecond echelon to whom 'we will refer a s Nos 3. Each No. 3 controls certainoperatives o i agents who seek information by direct contact with the subjects tobe observed.Each No. 2 mnst know and be known to the No. 1 and the Nos.3 under hisimmediate control, but Nos. 2 ahould not know or be h w n o each other.Similarly, each No. 3 mwt know and be known to his No. 2 and the opera-tivea under his immediate charge, but he should not know o r be. known to t h e

other Noa 3, nor ahodd he know anything about No. 1.Likewise, each operative must b o w and;& knovn to his No. 3, but shouldnot h o w o r be known by any other operative, nor ahodd he know anythingabout No. 2.It ia a general rule that- information of vahm to the enemy should not beentrusted to operatives. Their discretion is always to be suspected and theirfal1liilit.yto be expected. Likewise,when an operative becomes known, a substi-tu te should be found for him. (See.11).15. Num ber of .O pe ra t iu u. -It ia not dmirsb1e b lay down hard and f&trnles for the distribution of operativea The organization must be on a scale sothorough as to leave no loophole for undettcted enemy h v i t y . The determina-tion of the number of operatives adequate to ensure protection wiU be affectedby the composition of the particular unit to be protected Where the pmportjonof fo~ign-born oIdiera is relatively high, o r in units recruited from localitieswhere influences such as the I. W. W, r comcientions objector pmp~cganda aveb ctive, it will probably be found wiee to employ more operatives than wherethe men are from homes mom strongly American. Again, subdivisions withinthe unit may differ among themselves in this The final allotment mustbe left to the discretion of the Intelligence Officer-. ~th an &om in m t r P i c ehat each agent in active search of informa-

tion ehonld bt! &e&ed by awther agent whom he does not know as snch and by


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t t ~ ) t : r ; i f ~ ~ . v s1 1 ~ ; t . r J . A ; bat:er>- or tr1,41p, 11 1 u - l ~ ; , - hI ~ I I I I ~ I I I I ~ I I , I I C I . C O I ~ I ~ ~ I I > - ,a 111111llier itre I * c ~ I I I ; I ~ I ~ so t h a t i t is pos..ible for olle ma,,f I I I Y I I ttlr:1\vt1 tn ze tl ~ c rt o I)t! iritll ; I I I ( I ~ll)s(brvr O lie r ~ p e r ~ : l v ~~ ( - ~ l ~ i ; t i ~ ~ i t . ~ i :111y ci.>nlhcr c ~ ft h e mroilp: i l lt ~ r c l ~) I ; t t ~ ~ ) r r!:;;::. IJC hu t sit:,:? r l ~ e o11!1te r-check 1s so i :nporoan;~( tvis;~l , le , noope r a t ive S ~ I O I I ~ I !cr111fi11eis observations ? n his own p l a t m ~ l lorlc : p l n t r ~ \ n sx : + y~ I C~ I . O ~ I ] ) C C : ; ~:: i ; t i j ~r i l l s c ~ ~ ( l .

1 1 1 special 1111its h e ( l i s t l . i b ~ ~ i i ~ l ~ be va r ie d a c c o r d i ~ ~f npe r i~ t ive s \ - i l l toc:ircutlrstit~~~-w. ii(*(.or(li\r l(*(j. t t ! ~w m e generzl pri1lciplt.s. The ;\:z\jzCt~ i i ti l l w i t ht o be a t ta i l led i : ~general is to c ove r c om ple te ly e a c h g r oup i n the milit\??- ser-vice. ( S e c . S', .In ge ne r a l . it m ay be said that one opera t ive i n each f i f t ~m en is ds I=b l e:llld th;lt ( j i i t2 i : ~ !~lllltlrt-t:1 l l ; r j . ; ~ ; L I ; I I I I I Ue c.,j\.sidered ~ i i r rat,,, cocsisZe:lr.with safetyT h e d i s t r i h : i i i o ~ ~ to t h e s e nriuciples should be f 3 r i l i -f operatives acc~ri!in~ tated by th e exis ting orgitriizatioll of troops i n t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r f i gh t in g units. I n a division camp, of a ppr ox im a te 1~ -40,300 m e n, the C oun te r Esp iona ge Or-ga n iz a t ion tc accomplish its m i s . i o ~ lwill r e qu i r e a minimum of about 400 men-16. lVumbcr of Echelons. Based u p o n t h e a b o v e e s t i m a t e i t is o b vi 'o u s t h a t the sp he re of cont ro l of the members of t he ex ecu t ive eche lon im loedia te l l ; h t o u ch w i t h o p e ra t iv e s s h o ~ i l d p p r o x im a t e a b a t t a l i o n a n d t h a t in 'a d i v i s i o n t h e ne-x t h ig her sphere of co~ l t ro l hould app roxi ma te a b r i g a d e , w h ic h e c h e l o n an,

a whole. be conveniently co lltrolled b r t h e D i v i s i o n a l X o . 1. T h e r e a r e m yc ond i t ions , howe ~ e r , h i e h c a l l f o r a d i E e re n t a r r a n g e m e n t . (Sec. 10).17. R e p k m e n t . Provision should be m a d e by t he I n t e l l i ge nc e O S e r f o r t he r e p la c e m e n t of subordina tes w h o s e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C o u n t e r Es-piona ge Service administe red by h im ma- be s;evel.ed. If a t a n y t im e a n e xec ut ive o r op e r a t ive becomes h o r n as a m e m b e r of :heCouute r Espionage organiza t ion or b m e s n a n y o t h e r w a y , , u n d es i ra b I e, i t isne c e ssa r y a t once to te r m inate h i s c onnec t ion w i th t he o r ga n iz a t ion . Th i s shouldbe done wi th d isc re t ion to the end t h a t injury to t h e s y s te m m a y n o t be workedby dis gru nt l ed ex-operat ives.To replace officers or men lost thus, or by t r a n s f e r o r c a su a rt y , s u i t ab l e sub-s t i t u t e s s h o u ld be picked out by t he i r supe r io r s in eche lon , a d , a f t e r o b s e r v a t i o nto de te r m ine the i r su i ta b il it y , li s te d w i th the I n t e l l i ge nc e Officer, with a viewt o th e i r be ing p r om pt ly t ake n in to the o r ga n iz a t ion shou ld ne c e s si ty a ri s e. Thisshou ld be d one w i thon t d isclosur e of t he C oun te r Es p io na ge o r ga n iz a t ion to t h em en SO listed. The Inte l l igence Officer shon ld ha ve a l i s t , sa fe ly and secretlykept, of a l l the members of h i s o r g a n iz a t io n ; a n d w i t h t h i a a n o t h e r li st o f a v a i l -ab le subs t i tu te s . Such provis ion will , in case of the loss of an execut ive , obvi -a t e t h e loss of execut ives and opera t ives nnder h im, a n d wil l enable his Imq u i c k l y to be m a de god.
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18. IZutrlifications: The selection of personnel is the most diEtitult part ofth e task of organizing the Cou~lterEspionage Service. The system s - ~ u d s:,rfalls on the ability of i t s i nd iv id i~a lexecutives and operatives. Since each e l e c q -tive is to be charged with the organization of the echelon of which he is to be incontrol, the greatest care must be exercised in selecting the executi~es, Theymust be officers of ability, common sense, and, above all, unquestionable loyalty.Former experience a s organizers and directors of organized activities is a vdn-able asset; officers of political experience have been found especially a pt . Soofficer should be selected for .amember of one of the-higher echelons concerningthe steadfastness and loyalty of whom there is the least doubt. 3f . I. D. is pre-pared, upon telegraphic request, to furnish within appmximately two weeks acomplete report upon the reputation of any officer in this regard.In selecting operatives, the personal at tr ibutes of the marl ar e more im-portant than his former experience. I n fact, former employment as a policedinan or detective may actually- render a man undesirab!e as an operative, sincehe is likely to be suspected by h is fellows. Moreover, the police methods ofhandling criminals are qlii te out of place in the C.D. ~ervjce, nd he may sacri-fice transmitting information quickly to a desire to secure evidence s&cient toconvict. Operatives, i t must be remembered, are infomronts-not pr ivate police.Operatives should have the faculty of keeping their mouths shut and theireyes open. They should be good listeners, not too talkative, but not so reservedthat they do not make friends easily. They should be' companionable, goodmixera, and not so offensively good in t.heir habits that men who are inclined tobe " p o d fellows" will avoid them. Attractiveness to women may be a posi-tive asaet, since much information may be gained f rom women whom suspectsfrequent; it is a notable fact that onr present enemy h t u an exceptional weak-nesa for lewd women.No type o'f man is more e s s e n t i a l out of place in the Intelligence Servicethan the one who fancies he is a born Sherlock Eolmes or "gum-shoe artist"He a t once l a p himaelf open to nnspicion by his "pussy-foot" manner, and isalwaya tempted to'make a cme tr t the expense of the eervice.19. Rank. The que~tio n f rank mus t be worked out to suit the exigenciesof the situation. On the one hand the nature of the organization de m a n b thenee of olRcera and men wgardletm of rank,with the eole view of flnding the indi-v i d d beat suited to the position. On the other hmd, rank always carries au-thority, and it ia bad policy to i m p e responsibility materially greater than therank warranta On this account, it ia desirable that all erecutivea be of8cera.Expen'aec has proved t.hat, once the enthusimtic .moperation of executives hash a ecured, d i f f e ~ n tmin rank among them are relatively unimportant.

The employment of non-eommtsioned oflleess as operatives is not; as a mle,drnitabls. For the stlcce~efnlperformance of an operative's duties it ig essen-tial &at he be on the m ~ tntimate torms with the men he ie ubseming; he must,lot be deterred frnm nmoci~tionwith hi8 comrades when off duty by the re-


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l i ~ r c ei r l the sclcctior~c b f corpora l s opera t ives ; duty serg?an:s s h o ~ l l dhe e n l p j o ~ - donly i r l IS^. l t f ; \\-hIIe r~orl-cotnmissioned fiicers t , ft r i t I I : I I t o I . F o r t h i s r c ; s n n i t is we11 to be c h a p

r : ~ * ( - ~ s s i t y h i g h e r r ar lk shouldhe e r r ~ p l ~ ) ~ - c d ,f a t all, as s p c ~ i a l p era ti ve s. (Sec . 20) .'I'hc prorn1,tion of an operative, even though it c o m e s p a r t l y ir l r e c o w i t i o nof his slic:ces in t h i s c a p a c i t y , may irnpair his f r l r t h e r us e f u ! ne s s to t h e C . Z.orgar~izat ior l . ! I ] such cases i t is deqirable to retain t he n a n ' s c+operatic.=1, af o r e xa mple . i r i tile selection of a successor. I t is s u g g e t c d t h a t if he is ~ a k e ninto the confidence of his imlnedia te s u p e r i o r i n e c h e l o ~ l:a the e x t e n t of bekggiven a f rar i l ; explanat ioi t of t i le s i tuat ion and of the neces i ty for th e s p ~ p ? - - ~ eof h i < cnnnbxtic>:1 ..cith tihe o c g a r r ization, h i s s y m p a t h y s l i l be kep t . F l l ~ S e r -more, h e way wil l be open f o r the l a te r employment o f his se rv ices , i f oc-ionshould ar 'ise. ,

20. Spc c i a l Opera t ives . I n cer ta in cases the se rv ices o f spec ia l operz:ives may become des i r ab le . F o r the purpose of observing c i \ - i l i ans employed in d l number s , o r t r ans ie n t , ab out a camp, the use of a n e n l i s t e d m a n i n c i v i l h clothes has proved successful . T o cover the mo vem ents of a m i l i t a r y suspect outs ide the limits of a m i l i t a r y r s e r v a t i o n , a s p e c i a l o p e r a t i v e m a y b e used w h e re t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f a r egu la r opera t ive is i m p o ss ib l e. F o r s u c h seeces , non-commissioned off icers m ay well be employed by r e s o n o f th e i r p r e s u m a b l y super ior inte l l igence. The Inte l l igence Off icer should, therefore , be on the a ler t to n o t e m e n v i t h the necessary qual i f ica t ions to bc used for special service . 31en who h ave had prev ious de tec t ive expe r ience will, in except ion to the p r inc ip les s e t f o r th above (Sec. 19 ) , be h igh ly des i r ab le fo r work of t hi s k in d . P r e l i m i n a r y i n f o r m a t i o n as to s u c h m e n may b e o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e files of the Pe r sonne l Of f ice r . The f o r e g o i n g m u s t n o t be c o n s t r u e d as a u t h o r i t y to m a i n t a i n a p r i v a t e d e t e c t i v e force in n e a r b y m m m u n i ti e s a n d t o u su r p th e p ro p e r f u n c t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s c iv il i an agencies which a r e cha rged p r imar i ly wi th the ob se rva t ion and control of civilian suspects (Sees. 5864). 21. Sccun'ng'Personml. T h e greatest discre t ion w il l be necessa ry in p i c k -i n g o u t a n d a p p r o a c h i n g o fijc ers a n d m e n with a v ie w t o t h e i r s e l e c t i o n as execu-t iv e s o r o p e r at i v es . U n d e r no c i r c u m s t a n c e s m u s t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e o r g a n i -zat ion be r ev e al ed . T h e f a c t t h a t th e pe rs on m a k i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t i s con-nec ted wi th a n y organ iza t ion mus t , ther e fore , be ke p t s ec r e t . Enemy a g e n t swiU be especiaUy an& to be em ph j e d . Number 1m u s t c i r c u l a t e f r e e ly aboutt h e c a m p in the process of se lect ing his Nm 2. A ruse m a y f a c i l i t a t e t h e desir-ab le - r e su l t o f enab l ing No. 1 to c i r cu la te freely w i t h o u t e x c i t i n g undue corn-r ne nt . T h u s i t m a y b e f o u n d a d v is a bl e f o r th e No. 1 to be p l a c e d n o m i n a l l yu p o n s om e s p ec ia l d u t y , a t l e as t d u r i n g t h e p er io d o f o m n i z a t i o n , so t h a t his-absence f r o m h i s u s u a l d u t i e s will no t exci te comment .E x p e r i e n c e has s h ow n t h a t a d i r e c t a n d s y m p a t h e t i c appeal to a loya l man 'apa t r io t i sm , made as man t o m a n by his s u p e r i o r in e ch el on , a n d l a y i n g aside forthis purpose d i s t i n c t i o n i n rank, is, when conpled with an e x p l a n a t i o n o f thenecess ity fo r bea t ing th e enem y a t h i s own game , nmia l ly am pl e for e n l i s t i n ghis eag er services . It is e l e m e n t a r y t h a t in such an i n te r v ie w a n explanation ofth e C. E. S y s t e m shall be avoided . Tbe man should be cautioned o r reassartdt h a t "tale-bearing" is not the miss ion des ired of him, but t h a t he h a s banselected for a &ion of th e most serious importan= a n d the -test delicacyi n v o l v i n g t h e s a f e t y of himse l f and his comrades and fo r t h e confounding ofa n u n s c ru p u l o us foe.

Too m u c h stress k n o t b e l a i d o n t h e fact tha t b r each- o f dimipline, ex-c e p t as t h e y reveal dis loya l ty , a r e no t o f in te res t to the C. B. Serv ice .22. Potm of Oa th . In o rgan iz ing the In te l ligence Serv ice , a f o r m of oaths e t f o r t h b el ow has of tc n been p u t to the ope-mt ives. The modi f ied name of the


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. .r v : ' I f ' 1 I i I l I I ! , W;&S ; ~ t i " j ) ( e c l LO ,nirkc ;ne ~ ; l t htrlorc rc;rtliJy c:t~mj)rcltct~sil)lc.,itit! t o ~n;kkc t l ~ c p c r a t iv c s ' d l rt ic s , e m m or e. .;~ttr;iclivc. 1'11t: V ~ L ~ I I C !j f t11is O ; ~ : ~ I 11;1? bc SC;? grc,,: ;: t i l e p ~ ~ s ~ , ~ lig,...,g ,L 1properly irnprcssnl, as sl~ggestctl kbovc!. tv i t l l t he f a c t t ha t t i l e prtrpoe oE t h eservice is to p r c v e ~ l t e t r a y al of llimself arltl h is comrades . I t s 11s~s recorn-n~cnded . The oa ths should be p i t to tile men by t h e 1s t eclielon of executives.S K R V I C U F O R P R O T E C T I O N AC,, . iII . \IST SPIES.

To pr0tcc.t my cumrades an d my cotrntry f r o m t h e prare p?ril of secret encmica w i t h i l lou r Army anti our nation I do hereby e n r o l l mraclf i n t h e Scrrice f o r Protection AgainstSpies, m id (lo aolcmnly a w a r to he dw a p ! , on th e alert in t h a t Service; to obaerre a n d reportt o all c i r c u m s t ~ n c e swhich should arouse suspiciont h a t secret enemies are seeking to betray th e Army of th e United States, to spread Jirraen-s io n among o u r people, to i n j u r e our campe,.equipment or supplies, to cripple our industries,or otherwise to hinder and clelay our prrparatlon f o r and cnntfuct of this war.1 do fur ther swear t h a t I wi l l nerer. u n d e r any circ~irnst-ancea;directly o r indirect]?, byword, act or sign, reveal to any person o t h e r t h a n , Le Intelli-'genw Officer, or the Commanding General, or p e m n s designated by them, the exidencs ofthe Service for Protcetion Againat Spim, or any l ike eewicc, nor tbe fact t h a t I zm in anyway engaged in or connected r i t h such service, uor any secret t h a t m a y be confided b mein the wrviee, wel l knowing t h a t o d y by the stricteat ailcnea axid s e c r q u n prtdene myusefulness to the nation in this work.

All t h i s I do solernl~ly wear u p o n my h o n o r and before Almightp God, and may He keepm e steadfast.

Iu some Divisiolls t h i s oath 11a.sbeen m i m e ogr a phe d and each opera t ive re -qui red to sign a copy which is t h e n r e t ~ ~ r n e do the In te l l igence Off icer fo r sing.In others , the oath is memorized a nd pu t o r a l ly to the opera t ive . In e i the rinstance the opera t iv e should be requi red to repea t the o a t h a- t is put to him.23. Insinxiion of P e r s o n n e l . The Intelligence Off icer mu st en sure th e ade-quate instr uctio n in th eir duties of the memb eri of his org anizat ion. He & o d dprepare a n d i ssue through No. 1 imple m im eogra phe d in s t r uc t ions f o r t h e gu id -ance of the executives, em bod j-ing in his own wor ds the ideas of t h e precedingparagraphs. In one division t h e following method was p u r s u e d w i t h success.Mimeographed sheets were prepared for iguance t h r o u g h t he - c ha nne i s to th elast echelon of executives. O n each sheet wtrs pr in ted a c a u t i o n t h a t t h e i n st ru c -tions were to be safeguarded under Iock and key and burned by th e last execu-tive aa so011 the operat ives were a l l proper ly instructed. The in s t r ue t ioosexplained in s inrple language t l ie desired tactful method of approaching pros-pec tive opem tives ; the manr re r of saear i l ig them in, and of proper ly i rnpress iagthem with their mission of high t rus t and sec recy; th e device of ass ign ing themf ict i tious nam es; the f ic t i t ious ]lame and P. 0. box to which opera t ives were torepor t ; a n d t h e i s su i ng o f postage. T h e i n s t r u e t i o n s f u r t h e r 'explnined wha twere to be the subsequent re la t ions of the last echelon of executives w i t h t he i ropc ra t ive s o n - th e one ha nd , and with th e I. 0. n the o the r. The y wenc ufEeinlcommunications, bear ing the authori ty of the Commanding Genernl , m d d ~ l y

authent ica ted . Each copy of the instructions w as a c c o m p a n i d w i t h the neces-sary num be r o f mimeographed blank fo rma of the Oa th of Enrol lm eot . Th e las techelon of &ecutives were instructed to read t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o r t i o n - o f theins t ruc t ions to each operat ive , at the time he was swor n in, and to requi re h imto r e pe a t t he substance hereof in his own words. In the p r m b of issoanee,ora l ins t ruc t ions were t ransmit ted tha t snper ior eche lons of execntives should,for their information, study th e miineograylied she ets befo re p-ing th em on totheir subordinates.


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Short lists of suspects m ay in similar fashion be furnished to S o . 1 for dis-tribution to the executives concerned. These l h should group W t h e r sas-pects who will fall under the observation of thz same operatives. They s h d dstate unmistakabl~the precise course of action desired with reference to eachsuspect or group oi suspects (as, after a list of names, "To be observed c a r e m yand reported. ") .In no instance should such instructions or lists carry information other thanthat which is necessary to be known by the last echelon of executives. (Sec. 11).


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ART ICLE V

24. dlct l tot ls of Operal iues . Operatives may ini tia te investigations of sus-pected pcrsnrls or be ctirectetl to investigate or keep under surveillance subjectsto whom their attention is directed. The funda menta l necessity th at operativesshould avoid revealing by word or act the duty npon which they 8re engagedbaa been emphasized. (Sec. 11).This.caution is par ticularly applicable to the ordinary operatives who obtaintheir information through constant association with the groups wherein they areplaced It mnnot always be followed completely in the case of special opera tivesworking directlyennder the Intelligence Officer (3ec. 20), but the very fact t ha ta few of such special operatives are identified may s e n e in a measure to dis-tract attention from the gel~er alC . E. System.As to the operatives of the former class the ir dut y is simply to proceedabout their routine duties, keeping eyes and ears open and seeking to becomeintimate with a11 members of the p u p s which are unde r their observation. Th eywill par t ic~~lar lyeek the intimacy of those un der sumeillance, if this can bedone withollt exciting suspicion, and wil l in general be on the alert to know allthat occ~rrswithin the ir respective groups.Operatives of the l att er class, that is, special op era tidk, are more often en-trusted with special missions and it is these who should be "planted" a t placeswhere particular acts of sabotage or the like are expected. The discovery ofsuch an operative does not necessarily destroy his usefulness, since he is rarelydetailed for duty among men by whom he is personally well-known and he canbe promptly shifted to another scene of activity.Operatives of this class may occasionally be hidden in hangars or at otherpoints where especially destructive sabotage is anticipated in oqler to observewhat occurs du ring the absence of the men ordinarily on duty t h e n . Pr op erarrangements with the p a r d mu s t be made under such eircumstaneen F o r thispurpose it may be feasible to-make use of a man of known loyalty who is no tconnected with the C. E. System and who acts in the capacity of an operativefor but one occasion. Such a one need know nothin of the general system andmay be employed through his immediate superiors if this course is deemed ad-visable As a m le i t is more satisfactory to employ special operatives npon casesof particular importnrlce

25. Opernt ives ' Reports . Operatives will be instructed to report promptlyall cir tumsta~wes f importance wbich fall within th ei r observation and to reporta t least weekly even if there is "nothing to report. "Except under extraordinarp cireumstanees all reports will be w r i t k nWritten reports are to be mailed to a fictitiom addressee aa arranged fo r by theI. 0. In cases of extreme emergency oral repom may be made thmngh theexecutive echelons bu t t h i s practice i. not to be encoura,oed as it tends to revealthe ~ystem. The executives will ueed to have private conferences with opera-tives from time to time and the number of these shauld not be unnecessarily in-creased, Olle I. 0.believed he was promoting efficiency by requiring frequent~ n f e r e n c e sbetween the members of each echelon from No. 1 down to operatives.


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A s a result t h e ~ ~ o ~ ~ - c om r n i s s i n l l e dfficcr nf h i s u n i t discovered a German plotand reported to t h e Commanding Officer the names of t h e conspirators. T h ereport proved to be 3 rather complete rwter of the C . E. service in that unit,I n order to p rever~tthe identification of an operative by the interception ofhis reports, a fictitious name should be assigned to each one. To fac ili htt theidentification of reports, all operatives in one regiment may be assigned n am ebeginning with A, arranged, for Illstance, alphabetically in convenient order,e. g., Abbott, Xdams, Ahearn, Allen, etc. Operatives in the next regiment sou ldsimilarly be as.igned names beginning with B, and SO on. Many variatiolls ofth i s pian ma? be used. The .secret riie of t h e &aisgmnt inteiiigence Uccer s n o u acontain a complete roster of the Division Intelligence +mice, and this r-rdshould give the fictitious name assigned to each operative.The transmission of reports mus t be accomplished in a matter-of-fact ;Fay,and the letter embodying the report shodd be written in a usual place (as, inthe Y. 51. C. A.), an d mailed a t a time when the operat ive would ordinarily maila letkr.As little mystery as possible in writing a report on the pa rt of the ope rati veis to be desired. It may be written like any other letter, and supposing the &ti-tiom name to which the report is to be rendered to be!James Black, and the ficti-tious name of the operative to be Fred Bnnsen, a model report might read asfollows :"Dear Jim:Received your letter la& week and I wm r n i g h e glad to get it. franrsehmidt baa been sending a lot of registered letters from tom lately. Theweather in rotten.

L e t me bear from yon m n , Your friend,Fred Bunsen.It will be observed that proper names reported are b e g u n with mad letters,and that information conveyed is surrounded with matter of a purely trivialnature. Wi th such precautions, a person looking over the writer 's shoulder isnot likely to have his attention attracded.Operatives should be required to give the full name of persons reported o rotherwise to indicate the subject with such particularity that there can be nodoubt as to the identity of the person reported.A t the time of the organization of the Intelligence Service, postage mu& befurnished to the operatives to cover reports for a t least a number of w e e h Thbpoetage should be issued to the operatives in ca& by t h e last echelon of exem-tives, who will then hold their men. accountable. These disbursements will becertified through the channels to the Intelligence Of3cer, who will reimburse theexecutives concerned, also through the channels, h m ntelligence fun& .The plan for sending and miking maiIed reports mnst necessarily vary,but it is usual for the Intelligence Officer to rent a P o s t O 5 a box under an as-sumed name or under the name of a fictitious corporation (e . g., "The Southeru

Novelty Co."), to which such reports may be sent. This must be done by a-ment with the Postmaster in moet instances,The Post O&e box retained as snegested above s h o d d preferably be in thePost Ofltlce of the nearest village or town, rather than m the Camp Post me,so tha t the fictitioui name given may not eeem to be c o w & wi th the militaryestablishment. The Intelligence Ofticer should cause this box to be emptied atfrequent intervals by No. 1 or by his confidential o rderl y o r clerk He s h o d dnevir empty the box in person26. Documentary Etdemx. Letters and other docnments found in thepossession of suspects frequently have a value not sppreciated by an inesperi-e n d person -Aninnocent looking document may contain a d e essage which


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can t)e dcc11)ltc.rctlo r ~ l ~ e s j , c r t , o r ~riterlirie:itrons In syniy,;ittlrtlc Ink , which) _ \ . 4 \ 1 1can be detcetecl ;~ rld ieveloped only bv laboratory m e t h d ~ . A1. I . D. is pm-pii~.ecio handle mrtttcrs of these k ind s It is highly desirable, therefore, that,whenever practic:;lblt*, original documents be forwarded to J I . I. D. for examina-tion. When it is inlpracticrible to forward originals. photographic copies shouldbe sent. Amateur attempts to bring out invisible writing shoultl be avoided, fo rthey are ~~s li a ll y ant1 fr qu en tl y destroy the writing so that ir~~i t less c3nnot &decipherell a t n later time by expert...hiessiiges obviously i n code or in cipher, whi ch defeat local at tempts st Ze-ciphement, shotlld be transmitted immediately to 31. I. D. for th e purpclse. Th esame disposition is to be made of messages in foreign languages which cannot &translated on the spot.Exact notes should be made of the time, place, and circumstances undzrwhich each document was seized and the documents should be initialed o r other-wise marked for identification by the seizing officer so that he may be able aidentify them late r in court, if aec ssa ry. A t a recent trial for circ ulat ing s&tiom literature in camps, very little of the rast amount of printed matter seizedand sent in by the Intelligence OEcers was available a s evidence for the reasonthat it could not be identified a s coming from any particular camp.

27. Cwering .Wail Atotter. Information of the greatest importance is of-derivable from the intercepting of mail matter. The question of exsminiqmail is, however, one of great delicacy. No legal righ t exists for the open ing ofsealed mail traveling within the United States. Mail matter is rrnder the jdiction of the Postal authorities so long as it remains in the custody of any P-office employee. It seems to become subject to the military jurisdiction as soonas it is delivered to the military authorities Thus, mail in the hands of a maiiorderly is under military control, but soldiers delegated to assist in a campbranch of a post office are to be regarded as postal emplo~ees nd not as mailorderlies, The actual disrihution of the mail to the enlisted men is usually at,complished by soldier mail orderlies or m ~ n p a n y lerks, who are clear ly no t em-ployees of the Post Office. This suggests that an intelligent use of mail order-lies o r company clerk.. may solve the problem of the occasionally desirable inspec-tion of military suspects' mail. In some divisions many or all of the mail order-lies are Intelligence operatives.

It is possible th at the bulk of the mai l which it is desired to examine willpass thm ugh the camp Post Office. But tbe shrewder suspects may have mailsent to other addresses, necessitating m p e r a t i o n with the general Post WceIn these cases, the Post Office should invariably be approached through the localagents of D. J. A11 D. J . agents have the rights of Postal Lnspectom with regardto mail mgtkr, and most of them have had experience in the collection of infor-mation from mail. To secure their co-operation will not only be in accord withthe desiree of the Post Office Dept., but will facilita te greatly the work of -t heAssistant Intelligence Officer.A Post Office lkpeetor or D. J. agent has no authority to open mail b u t hemay inspect it and take t ra cin e of the envelope f or record and comparison, A

not infrequent device for locating a fugitive is to take tr ac in g of the mail de-livered to someone to whom he is expected to write and to follow up t he cluesfurnished by handwriting and pos t -wka28. Keeping Away Prom Suspects. Experience has proved that it is usual-ly undesirable fo r I. 0 . ' ~o come into personal amtact with suspectg. Many ofthese men are so clever and plausible that if allowed to plead their own casesbefore the I. 0.the effect might be to nullify important work done by o per ati vesPersonal interviews would have the f urt her unfortunate effect of identifyingthe I. 0. too closely with t5e system of which i t is desired to keep sspects in


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ignorance. I t isbest .as a rule to keep the re la t ions of the I. 0 . with suspectsent ire ly impersonal , but c ircumstances maF mnder this course impractiuble- I fi t becomes necessary to interrogate a suspec-t the Judge Advocate may b n apa4 tion to render valuable assistance.29. Wwk for Ezecut ives . I t is to be n o t e d that the duties of members o fexecutive echelons, after the organization has been pu; into opera t ion , are large-S U ~ ~ N ~ S O V .here is da nge r t ha t t he y will, o n thi i account, lose intenst inthe i r work. The w i g n m e n t to them of any t a sb which may s e r v e to 6 t h - d a *the i r ac t iv i ty and make them fee l tha t they are i n d i s p e n s a b l e - may have thed e c t of keeping m a n y an efficient executive h m e g e n e r a t i n g i n to an indzer-ent a u toma ton . T h e n o fficers a re t o be p h a d under snrveillance mch dutywill fa l l na tn ra l l y on th e executives, who wilI function practically ss oper~t ives ,o r i t m a y be fo lmd des i rable under such circumstances to appoint officers as pe ci al o p e ra t iv e s f o r t h e p a r t ic u l ar o w u i o n30. Other Sources of Infornuation. Besides the i n f o r m a t i o n g a in e d fromt h e tuxtociation of operat ives with the groups to be h m e d (Seen 24, 23), andthe i n f o r m a t i o n furnished by other intelligence agencis, (See33), the CoenmEspionage Service m u s t a r r a n g e to cover special cases wch as tourista and other

persons visiting camp, o r persons no t in o r around the camp but conneckd withsuspects o r suspected activities. It m u s t have the -peration of and m p e mwith the local agents of the Department of Justice (this by the channel of theIntelligence Officer and the D.J. agent). It must cover the elassea of maiI corn-ing to camp. It mu st watch the newspapers and o t h e r publiestiom in c h d a t i o namo-ngthe men and i t is well to establish a waste paper baaket ceneofip. (-58-64).Much i n fo rma t ion is der ived from vo lun te e r informants-o r t h e h a i l policcThe hope of rewards for the eaptm of d m n , gentrally keeG t h e local policeon the alert an d the i r co-opera tion ah o d d be sought.


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ARTICLE VI.HANDLINGAND UBE OF INFOBMATION.

31. CoUutwn of Mater ia l . The enemy's clandestine operatione in theUnited States are organized on such a large and gpstemetic scale that it is n-sary to gain a comprehensive "bird'seye" view of s imul taneous activitiesthroughout the country to understand and control them.I t is manifestly i m p i b l e for any local or branch Intelligence office to&ect such comprehensive collation and it is equally evident that do r t a k, do mwould only involve nseless time and labor and regelt in the duplication of workIt is essential that information be forwarded promptly for collation as wellas for reference to such branches of the Intelligence Service as it may affect. Itshould be noted that the bearing of information from one locality on the si tustion in another may not be apparent locally but becomes evident when seen fromthe point of view of the central office of collation.Department, Division, and local Intelligence Oficere are responsible forthe collection and verification of information, each within hia p r o v i n q and for-warding it to the Military Intelligenca Diviaion in time to be of value. Theyshould examine the information available and make wch collation as is n e a ssary in the cases of persona, parties, or activities w i t h i n their respective Departmen& Divisions, or localities, but &odd not nndertake the general collationwhich lies, more properly, within the province of the Military IntelligenceDivision.Information from the operatives r n d be transmitied aa promptly as prsc-ticable to the Intelligence Officer, -in whom office the information is.extracted

and forwarded and the original reporb burned.The &ion of the rreveral echelons of executives is solely that of inguringthat the operatives get the information and send it in. They are in no way re-sponsible for the culling or collation of information and n d ot see the infor-mation which goes through them if such examination delaya or jeopardizestm mm kion . Their duty is one of organization.I t is the Intelligence mcer who is responsible for the warnination, culling,summarizing and forwarding of hformation and the linea of investi-gation which his secret sel-via will carry out, and it is he who ia the oonnedionbetween the secret and the known organizations, and between the Counter Ee-pionage Service and the Commander of hia unit.I t is essential that the I. 0.of any large onit have a private &ce, whichshall be large enough to accommodate the oface eqnipment and an adequateoBce force. He will need the assistance of mveral confidential clerka, non-com-mhioned oillcera and privates, of whom one a t least ahodd be an expert &en-ogmpher, and another, if possible, aeqnaintd with ofice gpgtems and %gmethods. The oBce must have the m a 1 equipment of de& typewriter, tele-phone, fllhg apparatus, ete., including a d e nd a loeldng steel filing cabinetThis equipment should be obtained from the Quartermaster.The I. 0.should install a completc filing system, affording facilities forcomprehensive and cross-indexed records of soapeets and the members of theorganization. A card-sptem "tickler" will be found useful for keeping track


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of perio(7ic;if I r ~ c lv i t 1 11 ; i l 1tcpot.t~; t i l t 1 oi h*r 111atterswh i c h need a t t en t i on atperiodical or irrcgrllar fr~t~lrc .\ sinlple d i a ~ desk memors3dumrltcrvals. o rcalenclar may be t~sccl f o r this pllrposc i i the I . 0 . prefer-. hiany DirisionI. O.'s have f o u n d alphabetiail filing rnom pl-aeticablc than the decimal s p t e m ;it should be reinforced by cross-files for each separate u i t , (e. g . , a crossfile forall the suspects i n a certain brigade or battalion) in ord er th at a comprchensiueview of the situation i l l ally particular unit ma y be gained at any time.A card for operatives' records wh i ch has been ;wed with success b y someI. 0 . ' ~s described as follows:Under a space wherein is entered the aperative's tnle name, fictitiol~sn a m eaud organization, the card is ruled v er ti cd _r into thirty-one columns, represent-ing days of the month, and horizontally into twenty-four lines, giving two l inesfor each day of each month of the year . I n the uppe r space is checked th e dateof receipt of ordinary reports and in the lower the date of receipt of special re-ports. On the reverse of the card may be entered data of da te of appo intmenftime and amount of polrtage issued, nature of reports returned, and estimate ofthe ability of the operative. A simplerdmay be used in the ame of execmitives, with lists of the executives or operatives of th e next echelon controUed bythe executive concerned. One of the chief merits of some w ch system is t h a tupon the transfer of executives or operatires from one C.. E. organization toanother the I. 0. of the first organization can simply forward the cards of therexecutives and operatives concerned, thus pntting the aecond I. 0.in i m m e d i a epossession of necessary data, without labor to the first I. 0.

32. Loco1 Action. The methods of co-operation with the C. E. system gen-erally and of keeping in touch with 31. I. D. necessarily occnpy a large p& ofthis pamphlet, but this must not obscnn the fact that the primary duty of t h eT. 0. is to report promptly to his own commander mch cases aa require local:action and aid him in deciding npon the proper action by furiiiehing all avail-able information upon the subject. In t h i s regard the C. E. Service functionsexactly as doe8 the Positive Intelligence Service of a combat unit in the field-I n such matters, M. I. D. is much more interested in what has been done thanin the f a d that something should be done about it.

The ides of aysternatic precaution is a, new in our Army that then is needfor explanation and constant insistence on i t s value. In some Divisions memo-randa have been issued with the aut hor ity of th e Commanding General, to beread by officers to their men or to be made the wbject of informal. tal& d i eing attention to the necessity for both o h m nd men to refrain from d i d g i n qinformation of value to the enemy. Men must be warned againat writing lettershome about troop movements, sending *-car& from ports of embarkation indi-cating dates of sailing, discussing army matters in public places or with strang-ers, revealing in a hundred careless wa-n detaih inkresting to hostile ears andeyes. An I. 0.by the exercise of a little ingenuity m a y adapt this suggestiontq his needs.

The use of poetem on company bulletin boards offera pibilities. Theyshould be used with discretion, not so frequently as to blunt their novelty, andnot left on the board 80 long as to grow stale.33. Trammission of I n f o n n n t k n . Foll advantage should be taken of theprivilege of direct communication to transmit promptly to the point w h e n i tmay be of use, all information gained by one Intelligence )ficsr regard ing matters of interest to f i e I. 0.a t another station. A t the same time every I. 0.

should feel free to ask directly of any other I. 0.such cooperation and assistancea s he may need. (See Principles, Secs. 7, 3, 9) . Copies of all such lateral eom-munications will be transmitted sinlultaneously to the proper "intelligence con-trol." (Principles, Sec. 6 ) .


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When enli3tefl lncn o r of icem under suspicion or investigation bv theCounter Espionage Oficer are transferred to an organization outside that of t h tIntelligence Officer previo~~slyandling the matter , i t is considered important that all records and information concerning the man so t rac~fer rcdbepromptly .sent to the Intelligence Officer of the organitation to which the t-feris made. ( S e c . 5 3 ) .To enable this to be done, it is suggested that the Counter Espionage or-ganization keep in s u c h t o u ch with all men under suspicion ss to be able prompt-ly to report any prospective transfer, or at least a transfer actually made. .I n reporting transfern the number and paragraph of the S ~ i a lOrderuhould be given in e a c h case. This will enable the Intelligence Officerto who=station the transfer has been made to locate the rmrn quickly by reference to t h efile of orders a t headquartera.

T o make a further check on such transfers and to keep a constant watchon a11 of the men, co-operation of the Personnel OfEce, which has the cards ofeach man, s advisable. I t frequently happena th at information is received ofmen who have not yet reported. In such cases, dummy can3a are placed in thcfile9 of the Personnel Office so that as won as the men report the IntelligenceOAcer is notified.Facta having any Counter Espionage significance should be h o w n only t6the Intelligence Officer, but a confidential arrangement may be made w i t h thePersonnel W6cer by which any change in the etatns of men w h w names aregiven the ereo on riel Ofeoer by the Intelligence Officer wi l l at once be reported tothe latter. Better to effectuate this plan, it is well to have an operative stationedin the Personnel Ofice. (Sec. 53).

Ln transmitting information can must be taken to include aU data neces-sary to a full andemtanding of the crrae by t$e ofl3cer receiving the w e , w e t h e rwith all available information as to h h personality, anficodents and physicaldescription. The data upon the classification card of an officer or aoldier ishelpful.Reporta f rom the Department of Jnstica, OfBce of Naval Intelligence, Ameri-can Protective League, and eirnilar murcq and letters from private informants,should in all cases be treated as r t r ict ly mwntd. When these arc aent to1. 0 . k for their assistance in investigation of a case, the a o m of the informa-tion should not be divulged, except to commigsioned ofRccrs of the IntelligenceServiee, who should be carefully instructed aa to the ir abeolnte secrecy. (Sec.59).34. Addressing Cowcspondcncc. The direct communication authorizedfor nae: by the Intelligence Service k subject to the following rules:a. All communications to I. O.'s am indoeal in two envelop&, the icnerone being addres sd to " I b t e l l i g e n a O i B a r 4 d d e n t i a . L"b.. The outer envelope will be addreseed to the "Chief of S W " f Divi-sions and Porta of Embarkation ; to the "Commanding General" ofGeographic Departments ; and to the "Commanding Offleer" of allother units except as indicated in Rule c.c Communications addressed to Camps from which a Division haa moved

will be addressed to the " Commanding General" of that camp.d. Communications to M.I. D. will be addressed to "Director of MilitaryIntelligence, Washington, D. C."e. Communicatione to M. I. D. that indicate dates of movements of t r o o pshould be inclosed in au inner envelope a d d r d o "Chief, M. I. 3-Confidential. "


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ARTICLE \'TIREPORTSTO INTELIJGESL'E C ~ S T R O L

35 . Direct C'ot~tntrtnlc~twn.The Intelligence &ntml of every mdstation which reports to the commander of a gecrgraphical Department theDepartment I. 0. The Intelligence Control of all other units, including Dt p ec -ment Headquarters, is M. I. D. (See Principles, Sec 7) . 811 Intelligence mersreport directly to their Intelligence Control on aLl cases of other t h an t d h gimportance and send to the Lntelligence Cantrol copies of all communicatio~lspddressed to other Intelligence Ol5cera and individuals In addition, Lntelli-gence OfEem who report to Department Intelligence Officers will sirnnltan~~uslpaend copy to M. I. D.; and Intelligence Officers within Departments, but not re-porting thereto, will, on reporting to M. I. D., e n d to the Department L 0.copies of all reports concerning mattem which map be of interest to him in main-taining his current estimate of the situation within the Department. (See 6).This last means that carrea which concern the unit exclusively and are not likely to d e c t the situation outside, need not be mported to the Depart ment I. 0.by Intelligence Officers who are not nnder Department contrd, but that all awes which in any way d e c t the general aituation or are likely t6 have m d c a t i o n s within the Department outside of the unit invo1v"ed shodd be re-ported both to the Department I. 0. and ta 36. I. D. If i t k difficult to decide which cases should be so sent, give the Department I. 0. the benefit of t h e doubt. (See Principles, Sec. 12). 36. Kin& o f Reports. Four quite difTerent aorta of reports a n indicatedand attention is directed to the distinctions clearly to be d x w n between t h e mThey ar e :a. Individual Reports.b. Special Reporta c Situation Surveys. d. Summaries.Each of these reporta m I a h to a different class of information and it mhighly undesirable to mingle matter of two o r more clasaee in the same dom-men& for the m u on that each class of information rea iv es special tre atm entin M. I. D. and if the same document must parrs thn,ugh aeveral procesees thereis much unnecessary delay and in the end there is difacnlty in properly filingthe paper. The nature of each of these r e p o h Is explained in the f o l l o h gsections. (Secs. 37-39).37. I n d i v i d d Reports. Every specific case ia made the mbject of anindividual report, that is , a report of that individual case. T h k permits prompthandling of the case and accurate filing of the report with other papera in thesame matter. Individual Reporta will be rendered in the form p m r i b e d formilitary correspondence. They should carr_p. aa their subject the name of thesuspect reported, his rank and organization ( i f a member of the Military Estsb-lishment) or his known a d d m ( if a civilian). Such Individual Reports Bhonldbe rendered immediately upon the discovery of faeta tending to indicate enemyactivity or disloyalty to the United Statea Subsequent Individual R e p *should thereafter be rendered, as hereinaftzr prescribed, for the pu r po s e of


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kccping the h1ilit;rry 1 1 1 e ll ixcr~c-c1)ivisioll apprised of ~rlbsequentdeQlopmenk5.Individual Reports to he rendered trs herein prescribed should, in all casawhere the facts reportetl r o ~ d c rhis possible, adhere as closely as mar be to thefollowing instructions, paragraphs to be nt~mbered s indicated; sub-beds n-1not be lettered :(1) Facts, actions, or strrtcmzllts giving rise to sllspicion of the individualreported.( 2 ) Associates, correspondel~ts, known rela tires, or connectious of the

suspect. 0)In so far as known, a. Character and history of the suspect, including Service Record ifa soldier.b. Suspect's citizenship status, race, and place and date of birth.c. Such facts as may be ascertainable indicating former residences,place.. of employment, and locatiom of relatives, of the suspect;with any other known facts which may be of aid in initiating col-lateral investigation.(4 ) Source or sources of information reported; known reliability of suchSOurce8.(5) Disposition taken, contemplated, or desired ,w ith reference to thesuspectAt the bottom of the sheet will appear a notation indicating copies furnishedto other investigating agencies to whom this report may be of interest and towhich they may have been transmitted. An example of an Individual Reportfollows. (See . 38).Subsequent to an initial Individual Rcport, further such reporta &odd bemndered whenever new developmenta m r . Such wbsequent reports will fol-low the form prescribed above, s~ibjecto the following modificatiom. Aboveparagraph One will be a reference to previom Individual Reports on the samesubject, stating dates when such repo rb were rendered. Subsequent paragraphwill embody new information; and the final paragraph will be resemed for a

statement of action taken, contemplated, or desired in this case.It is the desire of the Mil i ta ry Intelligence Division to be kept constantlyinformed of developments. To thi s end, mn t i ~ u h gaaes of interest will be re-ported at intervals of not more than thirty d a p . Periodical Indiv idual Reportscovering such continuing cases may be brief, and may state merely, first, thatno new developmentti have been ascertained; and second, that snspect is beingcontinned under observation, and the nature of the surveillance being exercised.A case not defhitely disposed-of, where surveillam is being maintained by theIntelligence Officer, should be carried in the manner prescribed in this para-graph, until final disposition.Care should be taken that carbon copies carry all the information shown onthe original so that the officer reoeiuing the same may be fully informed. Car-bons of reports written on let ter heads must reproduce enough of t he l et ter headto enable the recipient to determine the place of origin.38. Example of Individ?tal f ieport .

C A M P H O W A B D Kalamaroo, Miehigna

June 4 , 1918.From: Intslligenca Oilleer, 100th Division. To: Director of Militaq Intelligence. 8nbjett: Hana &hmidt, 8ergeant Battery B, 389th Field hrtLUeq.

1, 8ehmidt soems to make a practice of talking to new ' 'wlects" and to make a breakin tba eonvenation when other noncommissioned o5cam join th e group. Yestsrday anoperative from another regiment uuce in with the new men, and reports that Behmidt says


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that Ilc is "af rai d" th at we cml ncvcr c.ouc1tlc.r Ccr~ncror, ha t th e Fren ch a m a b u t to qoif:inti Germany ia gctting great .stores of focbtl allti a oill ion ex-priso ners from Ru=iA3. A eecret inspection o f his barrncka bag revealed nothing of interest except a -rncopy of "Under Fire," the war- l~orrors jook, a~rcit h e f o l l o ~ i n g ddr- U a memo M-John Keller, "Warchter u. Anzicgcr," St. 1,oais; J!inna Barlehr, 251 State St., at . h i r ;Fri tz von Relhor n, Gc ne r d Deli\.ery, \Vilmio@on, Lklsw are. Ychmidt w,-as riaited by tkRev. Kaltenhach, t r n r e l i n ~ I,uthernn paator, when the h t t c r wazi here, and a e e o r d i r q tbSergean t McGr~gorof his I3nttery, i.s intimatc w i t h Henrp Weibel, 3Wth Field Art*,reportcd by your ofice to l av e been pro-German at his born . Ag ent Brown of the Dcprrt-rrient of Justice, reports that Schmidt frequently r i r i i s two German families , Dette lbach w dLudwig, in town here. lit- ,neb ail nrail at Gerlernl Pelirer iu t o w n post office.3. Schmidt's papers pllo~oh e was born il l I'ienna. Austria, i n 1891, came to th is ~09nt.vAugust, 1900, 3. S . "Presiclcnt Lincoln" a t New Tork. natu rvl ized by n a t u r a l i a t i o r offather , Johann Schmidt, in 1906, a t B lanton, Witwonsin. Xe r t r e l a t i r e , f ath e r at 2801 T;t;rEaotSt., Blanton, Wia, home addre.- same. Worked assembling room Bo osch k Zomb Co., RO&CE-ter, N. Y., f rom 1914 un t i l d ra f ted a t Camp Ja c t wn , Augus t 29, 1 9 1 7 ; t r a n s fe r re d herefrom Camp Jackeon, January 12, 1918.

4. One of our operatives, o f Germau blood, who reported thia man a n d in thorocaghly trustworthy, is becoming inti mat e with Schmidt, and will k a d him on. 5 . Juatiee A g e n t Brown in inve&igat.ing connection Kith DettaIbLeh. and L u d w i g q aad h- arranged with Po st mm te r to inspect all mail addressed to Bchmidt. Lnvestigation at Blanton and Rochester and check o n entry i n t o th in coan tv and na tura l iza t ion of f a t h r ia

c h i re d . Also investigation of permna named in memo-book. J O B S L. WITHLVGTON,

Cap&, Unitod 8tstea Army,A h te l l ig e n e e O 6 m . Carbon eopiea to Captain Britton, at. Louie. Intelligence Officer, Camp Jnckmn, 8. C.

39. Special Reports. Special reports are made of circumstances which cannot properly form the subject of a n individual report. Such reports will bt rendered in a form appropriate to the sub j e c t but approaching 8b f a r as@-ble the form prescribed for indiyidual r ep- - Sudden changes in local con& tions or a new situation involving morale may be appropriate subjects f o r ~pec ial eports, as may an accumulation of minor matters, each not important enough to warrant an individnal report but significant in the aggregate. Any matter of interest to M. I. D. and not appropriate for an Individual Report may properly be sent in a special report. Such reporta should, however, be conf ined to a single subject althonghathat subject may include a number of incidents.

40. CZussiftcation o f Cases /u to Urgency. Cases are subject to classifica-tion as to urgency as follows: C k s A. Matter which rrhould be brought to the attention of the Director of Military Intelligence, immediately. Cases of th i s class should be reported at once by telegraph or cable, using the C. E. code. R e p o h by telegraph or cable should be conBrmed simultar~eouslgby mail. Confirmation should include the usual Lndividual o'r Special Report as well as the quotation of the despatch. Class R . Matter which sho t~ ld ot be delayed, but which can safely a wai t

the course of mail. Caser, of this elass sholild be reported by mail immediately. They may.be in the usual form of Individual or Special Report and may be forwarded w'ithout letter of transmittal, but shol~ld ear on their face in red t he stamp : I mmed i a t e . C h s C. Matter which should be brought to the attention of M. I. D., b u t

,not requiring immediate action. Reports of this kind should be made in t h e o m prescribed for Individual or Special Reports and forwarded in dne course.41. Siiuutwn Surveys. Each I. 0.will render to his intelligence controland to M. I. D. a weekly situatiou estimate (on Monday) for the purpose of informing him of the general conditions a t the station of th e I. 0. Such reporta are primarily a suweg of the military situation and are not handled as individ-ual cases but are fled .for reference with the papers of that particular station,

/ I /


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and aggre~vitewi l l c b ~ i ; t l ) l e thr: oficcm o f 11. 1. D. to f o r m an adequateconception of the circumstanc:es ! ~ r l d c rw h i c h each I . 0.is working M, that pl.omptnrld intelligent action may he t a k c r ~u p o n particular matters as they arise.Each Situation Survey wil l bear at its head t h t following information:Name of Commandir~gGeneral (or Commanding O5cer).Name of Chief of Staff (or Acting Chief of Staff).Name of Intelligence Officer (or Acting Intelligence Officer).Name of Assistant Intelligence Officer.The following items are suggmted as pertinent for a Divisional Same?:Strength of Division an d Auxiliary Units,Status of C . E. organization, Morak,Health, Rations, Conscientious 0bjectors, Enemy or Pacifist Propaganda, Atti-tude of Foreign-born Selectives, Recreational Activities, Relations between onestation and another, and the local sitnation generally.The Survey of fixed posts and other un i t s will naturally differ somewhat

a s o the items included. Only matters of general interest in forming an esti-mate of the military situation will be reported.In addition to th e Situation Survey (Military) required of all IntelligenceO5c e ra , there mhy be required of Department and Special Intelligence Officers

and of Intelligence OBcers at fixed pmts a further report aa to civil and politicalconditions in the vicinity of their station8 which will be forwarded as a aeparatedocument in the form prescribed by M. I. D. This will be known as the Sitna-tion Survey (Civil) and will be m entitled.42. Departnrent and S p e c d In te ll igen ce 0-3' 8ummarict. A fourthvariety of report ie required of Department and Special Intelligence Offirxraonly. This is the monthly nrmnurry of civilian caseq reqnired on the L88t dayof each month for the purpose of giving a general survey of the ~ i tn s t ion s re-gards this class of c a w . Nothing ~ho111d e included in these summaries whichhaa not been reported in an individlial or apecial report and each entry &oddrefer ta the date of the individnal or special report in which the matter is de-tailed. Each entry should be of telegraphic brevity and &ate simply the sub-ject, the nature of the case and its p m n t status. Every current case ahoddbe camed in each succeeding summary until it is finally reported as d d .The cases will be listed in the summaries according to the fol lowhg classification,so far as applicable.

~LA~~ IP ' I cAT I oNY 'SUBJECT.L CURRENT:A. Enemy Activity. -1. Espionage.a. Government mxrets.b. Military information.

c. General information.2 . 8abo tage .a. Life and Health.I. Civilians.I f . Troop.b. Damage of cmps, factories, sh i p , material , ete., by erpl*sion, arson, e t c3. Propaganda.

a Political.b. Pacifktic.c. Pro-enemy.d. Misrepresentation.


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4. Treason.a. Government or military employees .b. Civilians.5. Industrial.a. Fraudulent contracts.b. Labor agitation.c. Obstruction of manufactnrea

d. Supplying enemy.6. Suspicious Circumstances.a. Character or connections.b. Conduct or activity of unusual nature.c Snl;lpected disloyalty.B. Criminal Activity.1. Cases referable to Department of Justice.2. Cases teferable to other Civil authorities.3. Violations of Military Law,e k , referable to othw Military An-thorities.

11. CuasED.' (Same subheadings a8 I).It ia not intended, of course, to limit, obstruct, or diaconrsge the activities ofthe Intelligence OfEcer along lines not covered by the forms of Summary. On thtcontrary, recommendations are invited aa to amplification or modifleation of theform ao as to meet the requirements which may have been overlosked in ita p r e paration. In csse the subheads prove hufflcient to cover the cases to be noted,

.fflcer.ntzUigenceheyddedeayppropriate subheads


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ARTICLE VI I I .CODE.

43. General Remarks. The code herein promulgated is so simple that itmay readily be memorized and thereafter messages may be enciphered and de-ciphered without resort to this pamphlet. ' I t is, however, very difficult to de-cipher by one who h a s not the key and is considered one of the sa fest of thesimple ciphers in this regard.44. Arbi t rary S igns . To secure accuracy in proper names and preventoccasional doubt in regard to sentence ends, upecial rises are assigned to threeletters in addition to their normal llses in spelling worda: the letter k indicates

that the next letter is a capital; q indicates the end of a word; and z indicatesa period. I t is not necessary to use these signs when no doubt can arise fromtheir omission ; but nome.?o f persons a d krces, however familiar, should alwaysbe definitely indicated by capitalization. The end sign should be used after aproper name when it is followed by a word not capitalized; when the followingword is capitalized, the end sign may be omitted, since the k indicates s di ci en tl ythat a new word is beginning. (Fo r distinction, see Step % below).45. To Enc ipher:a. Prepare your message by writing it out with the necessary indica-tiona of capitals, word-ends, etc.b. ~ u l kon your paper four vertical colllmn~ f six lines each to re-

ceive the message.c. Put a - sign (dash) in the following spaces; in colnmn 1, spaces1, 3, and 5; in column 2, spaces 2, 4, and 6 ; i n column 3, spaces1 and 3 ; in column 4, space 5.d. Now insert the letters of yopr message in the d l e d spaces of thediagram in regular order h o & m t a U y , beginning at the top.e. If the message is too long for a single diagram, make mother andcontinue it. Do this as often aa is necessary to write the completemeasage. But be &re not to begin to write in any diagram untilyou have filled the preceding one.f . If the message does not fill out the last diagram, fill it ou t with suchworda as "period, " "stop, " "end," or with nulls. Always fiU ou tth e diagram complc f e l y .g. Now substitute for each letter in the first two lines of each diagramthe letter which follows it in alphabetical order ; that iq changea to b, b to c , etc.h. Now take out the le tters of each diagram vcrticaUy in regular order;that is, all of colnmn 1 before any of column 2, all of column 2 be-fore column 3, e t ~ .i. Divide into groups of five an d send.k. The code address of this office is "MilstafF, Washington," but a tele-graph operator may properly refuse to accept this a d b . In thisevent, the telegram should be addressed to "Director of MilitaryIntelligence, Wftshington. "


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1. Example :hfilstaff, Washington.>!,. !c!?cr Wz.,- P . . T . I . . ~ - . : . . - . x i ~ iei&r &ay UJ ilirs. 3. Y.~ikd ings , a i ~ a ,e. (Signed) Waters.

Step a : M y etter May seven re k Goldstein q he sent letter today to Mrs.k R k P k Giddiw k Talps k Mo.Steps b, c, d, e, f :

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 41 - h f - Y - N - R - E - S - Y - T - 1 - N2 L - E ' r E - K G E - N T 0 - b f R G - S K3 - T - E - 0 - L - L - E - S - K - T - A4 R - M A D - S T T - T E R - K P L - P A5 -Y s - -E I - - .T- - K G - -KY.-6 E - V E N - Q H 0 - D A 1 - D D 0 - , , - 3 pStep g :

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 - 1 : 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 1 2 3 41 - N - Z - 0 - S - F - T - Z - U - J - 02 M - F U F - L H F - O U P - N S E - T L3 - T - E - 0 - L -L-E - 8 - K - T - A4 R - M A I ) - S T T - T E R - K P L - P A5 - Y S - - E I - - R T - - K G . - - K M -'6 E - V E N - Q H O - D A I - D D 0 - X P

Steps h and i :Mi l s t d , Washington.MRENT YFIldsV FDNOO ELSIQSHLTH FTOFL ROTTD TUElUi P R I Z SKNKGD USKPD HLOST KTPMX O W Waters 27.

46. Care in Enciphetilrg. Remember always that the message h to btwritten into the diagram hmizontaUy and taken from the diagram v e r f ~ y .Also that in preparing the message for eending each d i m hould produceexactly fifteen letters or three code words. If this does not check out go backa t once and find the error. Care in t h i ~egard will save mnch useless delay.

47. To Decipher :a. The number of letters in a rneesage in this cipher ia always a multi-ple of fifteen. If a message when received does not contain the cor-rect number of letters, or cannot be deciphered, ask the telegraphcompany for a "service" on i t Thia cmta nothing. If it is stillunintelligible wire the sender to repeat. T h b must be paid for.b. Prepare a d c i e n t number of diagrams to receive the meaage.

6 Each diagram will receive 15 letters. They a n prepared exactly a8in sending a message. (See To Enciphr, parsgraphs b and c).c. Insert the letters in vertical order in the unfilled spaces of the dia-gram, beginning a t the upper left hand corner; that is, fill firstcolumn 1, then 2, 3, and 4 in succession, then psss to the next dia-gram, and so on.d. Now substitute for each letter in the upper half of each diagram(lines 1 and 2) the letter which precedes it in alphabetical order.e. Read off the message horizonfolly in each diagram. Complek thereading of each diagram before going on to the next.f. Divide the message into words according to the eense, omittiog thesignal letters. / 1


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I f the mclssagc h a s been ~ntltilatedeither b~ the enciphemr or bythe telegraph operator, begin a t the unintell igible spot and try outt h e prottutle supposit.ions: 1-That one or mo r e letters were put inwrong spaces. %T thc encipherer forgct to make the substitu-tions in lines 1 and 2. &That the encipherer made substitutionswhen they should not have been made. &That one or more letterswere incorrectly transmitted by telegraph.I f the message is unintelligible from the ve ry beginning, the enci-pherer may have put i t np vertieall?. ioetead of horizontally.

h. hissage as received :M, . O.,Fort Blank.LTOSA QNENE FLXLV FORJE OORUT EDFCX UDDBL0 JOT 1 SRXNS BNPDE SSLSE IHUER O mBO IEN TDIUR ATXKN BVZXO XDTV5 X JKS O Q m J PChurchilL

Steps a and b (Arrangement of message in diagrams) :1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 41 - - F - - E - B - 8 - 1 - N - 8 - U - B -V-Q

2 L - N L F - O D U - J B B - - 8 H 0 - - F O T - T V X-- J U3 - -A -X -E-F - L - X -E-U - T - I - R - E -H-K4 T - E L 0 - R C D - O N N - L E N - T E D - X T D - K J5 -QN- -0U- -0T- - S- - R N - - A K - - X 8-6 0 - I C V R - T Y D - I S P - 6 1 R k - E N I - N o T O PStep c (Decipherment o f letters in linee 1 and 2) :

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 I t 3 4 l t 3 4 1 e 3 4 - 1 2 8 &1 - R - E - - D - A - R - C - H - DM -A - T - A -U-P2 K - M K E - N C T- I A A - - R G N - E N 8 - S U W - IT3 - A - X -E-P - L - X - E - U - T - I -R-E -E-K4 T - E L 0 - R C D - O N N - L E N - T E D - X T D - K J5 - Q N - -0U- -0T- - 8 3 - - R N - -AX- -X 8 -6 0 - E V R - T M D - I S P - E R M - E N I - H O T - O P

Steps d and e (Division of message into womb, e t c ) :"Re M. LxteI. No evidence for court mart* Do not diechargeunless permsnent internment assured. Taking up with D. J."

4f3. Cauiion. Code memqp must be handled with the greatest care. Afterbeing decoded they should invariably be p a r a p h d before tmmmhsion toany other person whatsoever. A eode measage and its tramlation ah odd be keptas far apart aa p i b l e ; they must never be filed together, o r d t d t t e d o-gether as " e o d m t i a n copiea" AlI papen,d n codbg and decodingshould be burned as soon & they have mmed their parpoe~49. Addrasing Tclcgr-. Telegrams for IntelIigena Mkers, eithercoded ar clear, will be addressed d i d y o the Intelligence Officer and not tothe Commanding OEcer.The number of this pamphlet is iden t id- with the "Station Number" aa-signed to the Intelligence Officer to whom it ie kned, and in sending telegrams,the I. 0. hould add this number to his signature for purpoee of- identification,thus-' 'Bryan 526."50. T&gt-aplru Reqwrts for Znfomroiion. Telegraphic q n e s b for in-formation a r e made by giving the name of the individual or organization andthe word " nswer."The answer for the Military Intelligence Division to a request for informa-tion will be in the same form-In the c a ~ e othing is known of the aubject the telegram in reply will givethe name of the individual or organization and the word "none."


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5 1 . H e s p o ? ~ s i b i l i t yf ln le l l igc?rce Of l cer . The importance of complete andcontiriuous cover of every militdry unit has beer, emphasized, (See Sets. 8, 17,and Princi

Instructions Counterespionage Units

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