Institute of International Bankers

JJ Mois Année

Oct 2007

Risk Management Implications of Recent Market Turbulence and Liquidity Conditions, Including

Managing Credit and Market Risk

Institute of International BankersSeminar on Regulatory Examination, Risk Management and Compliance

Issues Affecting International BanksOctober 29, 2007

2IIB Seminar on Regulatory Examination, Risk Management and Compliance IssuesOCT 2007

Risk Management Implications of Recent Market Turbulence and Liquidity Conditions

Pre-Crisis Environment

Structural vulnerabilities

What Happened?

Impact on Risk Management Activities


The Pre-Crisis Environment


Commercial and Industrial Loans held by US Banks – Delinquencies

Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (FFIEC 031 through 034 for period from 1985-2000; FFIEC 031 & 041 thereafter)

Overall, the quality of C&I Loans continued to improve through the second half of 2007 Delinquency levels continue below 20 year lows.

Note: Delinquent loans are those past due thirty days or more and still accruing interest as well as those in nonaccrual status. They are measured as a percentage of end-of-period loans; Banks are insured U.S.-chartered commercial banks.

Key drivers – distressed LBO financings, real estate lending

Key drivers – Technology, merchant energy

Corporate delinquency rates at very low levels

0

1

2

3

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7

Dec-86 Dec-87 Dec-88 Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07

C&

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linq

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, % T

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Delinquency Rates, C&I Loans Prior Low Point

Jun 07


Rated CDOs Outstanding as of Beginning of Year

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7,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

G U

SD

Resecuritizations (including RMBS) Arbitrage Cash Flow CLO Synthetic Arbitrage CDO Arbitrage Cash Flow CBO Other

Structured issuance provides liquidity for leveraged transactions of all types

Average annual growth of 72%Source: Moody’s


3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07

% of total

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6

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10

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14

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18

20

Total Delinquency Rate

Sub-prime delinquency rate (RHS)3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07

% of total

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Total Delinquency Rate

Sub-prime delinquency rate (RHS)

A period of low delinquency feeds subprime origination

RMBS securities market is hot, driven by cyclically lowdelinquency and default rates and investor demand

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$ B

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Original issuance

Estimated outstanding

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$ B

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Original issuance


Original issuance


Historical Prime, Sub prime Mortgage Delinquency Rates

(source UBS and SG estimates)

(source Mortgage Banker’s Assoc.)

Subprime RMBS Issuance


US loan market issuance and pricing trends – through 1H 2007

Source for all data: Loan Pricing Corporation Loan Connector Database

Loan market volumes continued to set records in 1H 07, despite small reduction in investment grade issuance.

Spread compression remained a constant across ratings categories, with spreads reaching absolute and relative lows

Average investment grade A / BBB risk premium is 37.25 bps vs. 23.3 bps in 1H07

Average leveraged BB / B risk premium is 68.5 bps vs. 52.1 bps in 1H07

Corporate loan market is also hot with heavy issuance, compressed spreads and weak structural protections

All figures are $ in billions Refinancing New Money since 2002

US Leveraged Loan Issuance and Spread by Rating

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100

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'97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 06 '06 1H '07 1H

Issu

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LIB

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Issuance ($BN) New Money (beg 2003)B Spreads BB Spreads

US Investment Grade Loan Issuance and Spread by Rating

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'97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 06 '06 1H '07 1H

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LIB

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(b

ps)

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50

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250Issuance ($BN) New Money (beg 2003)BBB Spreads (RHS) A Spreads (RHS)


Structural Vulnerabilities


Timeline of Adjustable Rate Mortgage Price Re-settings

TO INSERT

Source: Bianco Research LLC

The ARM Reset Wave (a train wreck in slow motion)


Federal Reserve Funds Target Rate

0.00

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Nov-02

Feb-0

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Aug-0

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Fed Funds Target Rate

Resetting of ARMs into an increasing interest rate enviornment


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Mar-90 Mar-91 Mar-92 Mar-93 Mar-94 Mar-95 Mar-96 Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07-5.0%

0.0%

5.0%

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Index ($ US K) YoY Change

US Home Price Appreciation

Source: National Association of Home Builders Median Sales Price of Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas

Home price (de)appreciation is both cause and effect of the bursting housing bubble

(RHS)


Aggregate delinquency rates trending upward

Residential Mortgage Delinquency Rates (%)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

• Delinquent loans are those past due thirty days or more and still accruing interest as well as those in nonaccrual status. They are measured as a percentage of end-of-period loans

Source: US Federal Reserve

Rising mortgage delinquency rates


A sharp rise in sub-prime delinquencies were the main driver

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

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1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55

Months After Issuance

% o

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ance

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Sub prime Loans 60 or more Delinquent, Foreclosure or REO

(source:Moodys)


Deterioration in Underlying Assets and Market Psyche Reflected in Index Prices

ABX-HE-BBB- 06-2ABX-HE-AAA 06-2

ABX-HE-AAA 07-1 ABX-HE-BBB- 07-1


What Happened?


Chronology of a Liquidity Crisis Late 2006: ABX index begins to decline after a pickup in early default payments on 2006 originations;

sharp drop in profitability of sub-prime mortgage originators which accelerates consolidation in the sector (Merrill Lynch purchases First Franklin for 1,3G USD; Morgan Stanley buys Saxon for 706M USD). Some early closures/bankruptcies (Sebring Capital; Ownit Mortgage).

Early 2007: Many small sub-prime mortgage originators are shutting down after delinquencies rise and early payment defaults (EPD) accelerate sharply; some larger originators are closing down their sub-prime lending operations (Fremont Financial). investors begin pulling out of the market.

Early February 2007: New Century Financial Corp. announces delay in Q4 earnings due to reclassification of treatment of EPDs and loan repurchases (Market Capitalization of approx. 1.1 B USD)

February 27, 2007: Sub-prime concerns trigger re-pricing of risk in mortgage markets.

March 2007: ABX index stabilizes, markets recover in belief the worst is over.

April 2007: New Century files for bankruptcy.

June 1: First Data launches 16B USD loan (part of total 25B USD LBO financing), the largest “covenant lite” transaction seen yet, and immediately meets investor resistance.

Mid June: Sub-prime concerns re-emerge after surge in long term rates; ABX slide deepens.

June 15: Two Bear Sterns sponsored hedge funds concentrated in RMBS are forced to liquidate assets after sub-prime losses.

Sources: SG Eco Insight | The 2007 crisis in confidence and liquidity, AKA the sub-prime crisis ; SG Risk Management


Chronology of a Liquidity Crisis Late June: US Foodservice 4B USD LBO financing pulled from market after unsuccessful revisions to

bond and loan deals. Alliance Boots £9B LBO financing is launched and also meets significant investor resistance.

July 10: Ratings agencies downgrade a large pool of RMBS deals, revise ratings criteria for new deals.

July 18-20: Contagion spreads to other parts of the credit markets; credit markets begin to shut down, CDS spreads widen sharply.

July 20: Financial stocks begin a slide after $20 bln Chrysler LBO offering fails to attract investors. Attention is then focused on LBO market including distribution failure of other mega-LBO’s such as First Data, US Foodservice, Alliance Boots,TXU.

July 24/25: Sale of Chrysler debt is postponed, banks forced to absorb the loans on their balance sheets; financial shares slide. Alliance Boots syndication is postponed.

July 30: German banks IKB and Commerzbank warn that exposure to sub-prime loans would hurt results.

August 1: Citigroup research report estimates 300B USD of LBO financings in the pipeline in the US and another 100B USD in Europe; allocates exposures amongst major underwriting banks.

August 2: IKB sub-prime positions are taken over by a state-owned German bank in a first bailout.

Sources: SG Eco Insight | The 2007 crisis in confidence and liquidity, AKA the sub-prime crisis ; SG Risk Management


Chronology of a Liquidity Crisis August 7-8: CP spreads widen after American Home Mortgage, Luminent Mortgage and Alladin Capital

exercise extension options on CP. Traditional conduit funding is already becoming difficult, with investors demanding higher rates and extremely short maturities.

August 9: BNP Paribas halts redemptions in two asset-backed funds due to inability to price securities.

August 9/10: Interbank rates under pressure; ECB, Fed and others offer temporary liquidity injections. ABS markets in general globally have seized up. Interbank funding becomes more and more difficult.

August 13: Coventree declares a general market disruption event in Canadian ABCP market, to induce funding under liquidity lines as they are unable to roll ABCP. Certain banks are reluctant to fund, triggering a liquidity crisis in the Canadian markets. Goldman Sachs announces a 3B USD investment in its Global Equity Opportunities Fund after it lost 30% of value in the prior week. Goldman also acknowledges its Global Alpha fund has lost 27% ytd.

Mid-August: Bankruptcy of American Home Mortgage; Countrywide bankruptcy rumors emerge after company experiences funding difficulty. Countrywide taps $11.5 bln backup credit facility after funding problems in CP; Citigroup research estimates JP Morgan LBO loan loss exposure at 1.4B USD.

August 16: Fed report shows a $91 bln drop in commercial paper, implying 4.2% of total CP outstanding could not be rolled over.

August 17: Fed cuts discount rate by 50 bps and eases lending terms at the discount window.

August 20: Investors begin to shun money market funds fearing sub-prime exposure via CP and CDOs.

August 23: Lehman Brothers shuts down its subprime lending unit (BNC Mortgage), purchased in 2004, bringing the total of mortgage companies that have halted operations, sought buyers or filed for bankruptcy protection since the start of 2006 to at least 100. Sources: SG Eco Insight | The 2007 crisis in confidence and

liquidity, AKA the sub-prime crisis ; SG Risk Management



Market Risk

Credit Risk (Corporate Banking & Structured Finance)

Credit Risk (Capital Markets)

Risk Operations & Control


What have we learned (or been reminded of) so far?

Market risk can quickly transform into credit risk.

Products need to be evaluated not only for their sensitivity to market risk, but credit risk in the event of illiquidity. As we have brought a market discipline to some credit products, we need to bring a credit risk evaluation to market products.

Portfolio Concentration Limits do matter (and help in times of stress).

When interim warehousing turns to permanent financing.

Renewed sensitivity to financing long term assets with short term liabilities.

Can we still be comfortable relying on “market terms” and conditions (i.e. the least common denominator)?

Need to keep regulators in the loop as market conditions evolve.

Institute of International Bankers

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