Instability in ThailandAshley Crow

Brief History 1932-1992• Bloodless revolution led to constitutional

monarchy in 1932• 1946 King Bhumibol Adulyadej to present– Several regimes, including military

• 1991 coup, Thailand again under military dictatorship– Elections. Majority party invited

coup leader to be Prime Minister. Public protests

• 1992 Bhumibol feared civil war– Televised peaceful intervention

Brief History 1992-2006• 1997 Constitution drafted by elected

Constitutional Drafting Assembly• 2006 Thaksin government overthrown by a coup• US cut $24 million in military aid, humanitarian aid

continued• Kofi Annan condemned gaining power through the

barrel of the gun• Economist accused coup of preventing Thai Rak

Thai party from winning democratic elections– Destroyed a decade of democratic progress– Also criticized lack of international involvement

2010

• Political protests began in March against current Prime Minister Abhisit Veijajiva of the Democrat Party– Led by National United Front of Democracy

Against Dictatorship (known as Red-Shirts)– Demands include dissolving parliament and

holding elections• Ban Ki-moon suggests problem is internal,

should be solved internally

Southern Insurgency• 2001 insurgency groups• Southern Malay states of Pattani,

Narawathiwat, Yala– Islamic influence rather than Buddhist Thai– Siam annexed Malay region in 1902– 1930s ultranationalist dictator Songkhran for “norms of

central Thai culture…with no deviation tolerated”• Local traditional separatist groups and greater

mujahidin groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah– 2003 Riduan Isamuddin, AQ leading operative in SE Asia

• Poverty is falling, but clear economic gap

US Objectives

• Stabilize the state and region• Thailand to remain as an ally for economic and

strategic purposes• “Hush” any takfiri movements that may bloom

a regional or global offensive Islamist movement from an originally defensive insurgency

• Prevent human rights violations

Previous US Foreign Policy• “…US and Australia provided extensive police

assistance against money laundering, counterfeiting, people smuggling, narcotics, sea-lane security, WMD proliferation, and illegal crossborder movement” -Kilcullen

• US assistance under the Department of Justice Office of Oversease Prosecutorial Development and Training

• Military trainers deployed under Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand

• BUT NO overt deployment of US personnel in South

Policy Options

• 1) No US involvement. No pressure to any IGO/NGO

• 2) Limited US involvement. Pressure UN for humanitarian watches and aid

• 3) Direct US military involvement

Policy Recommendation

• Option #2• Realist perspective• Limited US involvement• Pressure for UN humanitarian watches and aid• Emphasizes soft power and importance of

democracy• Multilateralism in issues involving insurgencies• Provide intelligence for Southern insurgency– Whether global terrorist cells are present

Consequences of Policy

• UN support humanitarian assistance to low income areas, help build infrastructure

• No physical intervention will prevent takfiri movement from Islamists such as JI or AQ

• US will not intervene unilaterally– Does not have capability to do so, and cannot afford

international criticism as before• Mahkota of Pattani United Liberation Organization– “There is no interest in taking operations to Bangkok

or Phuket. We do not need to be on anyone’s terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over.”