Insight Turkey 16-1-2014 Falk

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RICHARD FALKCOMMENTARY

6Insight Turkey

COMMENTARIES

Can the U.S. Government Accept anIndependent Turkish Foreign Policy in theMiddle East?RICHARD FALK

The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process Stalled inNeutralMICHAEL M. GUNTER

A Fire in the Minds of Arabs: The Arab Springin Revolutionary HistoryMARK PERRY

International Relations and MigrationManagement: The Case of TurkeyFRANCK DUVELL

From Democracy to Military Dictatorship:Egypt 2013 = Chile 1973AZZAM TAMIMI

The Iran Nuclear Deal: Rewriting theMiddle East Map

JAMES M. DORSEY


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CAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

2014 Wnter7

COMMENTARY

After the Cold War

T

he end o the Cold War markedthe end o adversary patterns oalignment in the Middle East.

It had been easier to interpret thegeopolitics o the region when it wasclear whether a particular govern-ment could be reliably classified as anally o either the United States or theSoviet Union, and most o its specificoreign policy initiatives could be de-duced rom this act alone. Tis over-arching ramework lasted or almosthal a century, and its disappearance

in the early 1990s created an atmo-sphere o uncertainty. In the MiddleEast, two broad endeavors emerged

to fill the void created by the absenceo bipolarity: the first involved anemergent American unipolarity thatexerted hegemonic control over theregion as a whole, and reached a cli-

max with the unified response to the1990 Iraqi conquest and annexationo Kuwait. Te second was more ex-ploratory, involving a series o dis-tinct moves by several states that re-alized that the new regional settingoffered both risks and opportunitiesassociated with the pursuit o moreindependent lines o action. As earlyas 1991, urgut zal voiced the opin-

ion that urkey should leave ormerpassive and hesitant policies and en-gage in an active oreign policy.1

Can the U.S. Government Accept anIndependent Turkish Foreign Policy

in the Middle East?RICHARD FALK*

* Princeton

University

Insight Turkey

Vol. 16 / No. 1 /

2014, pp. 7-18

ABSTRACTTe end of the Cold War marked the end of adversary pat-terns of alignment in the Middle East, and the ebbing dichotomybetween the U.S. and USSR led to vast uncertainty. In response,then-President urgut zal stated, as early as 1991, that urkeyshould seek an active foreign policy. It was not, until the AK Par-ty came to power a decade later, however, that Ankara began toseriously question urkeys acquiescence in Washingtons strategicunipolarity. Ahmet Davutolus appointment as Foreign Ministeremphasized urkeys independence and activism, causing uneasein Washington. Nevertheless, the U.S. has been generally flexibletoward a more independent urkish foreign policy, under the con-dition that it does not threaten vital U.S. interests.


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8Insight Turkey

Te fluidity o the global situation

in the 1990s created strong UnitedStates and Israeli incentives to pursuestrategic interests in the Middle East,by embarking on an ambitious pro-gram o regional restructuring withinthe stability o this presumed unipo-lar moment. Tis was interpreted tomean, above all, ridding the regiono regimes perceived to be hostile tothe West and establishing permanent

American military bases in the hearto the Middle East. Paramount goalso such a move included: ensuringthat Gul oil stayed in riendly hands,that Israels security was saeguarded

against any uture threat, and that noadditional country in the region ac-quired nuclear weaponry. In a post-

Cold War setting, these policies pro-voked urther concerns as to whetherurkey should define its own view othe uture o the Middle East and nolonger deer to American grand strat-egy or the region.

Washingtons adoption o this post-Cold War approach became apparentin the afermath o the First Gul War

in 1991 when a coalition o countries,acting on the basis o a UN mandate,used military orce to prompt Iraq to

withdraw rom Kuwait. As a result,

Baghdad agreed to surrender in amanner that continued to punish theIraqi people indefinitely through theimposition o harsh post-war sanc-tions as administered by the UN.Such a military intervention signaleda new era in the region in at least tworespects. During the Cold War, Sadd-am Husseins regime would not havedared to attack Iraq without prior ap-

proval rom Moscow, which wouldalmost certainly not have been givendue to prospects o retaliation raisingdangerous escalation risks. I, de-spite this, the attack were to happen,Western response would have likelybeen cautious, limited, and even co-ordinated with Moscow. Tere wouldhave been an overriding interest onboth sides to avoid a conrontation

with the Soviet Union without allow-ing Iraqi aggression to succeed in an-nexing Kuwait. In all likelihood, onceKuwaits sovereignty was restored, sowould be a willingness to normalizerelations with Iraq.

During the Cold War aside romthe possible exception o the Cyprusintervention in 1974 urkey was

perceived as an important and reli-able ally, especially in the NAO con-text, and as a state that never seriouslychallenged measures set by Washing-ton. Against this background, it is notsurprising that zals urkey partici-pated in the coalition that challengedIraq in 1991, resulting in a rare mo-ment o global and regional geopo-litical unity with respect to a Middle

East crisis. In the Security Councildebate provoked by Iraqs conquesto Kuwait, Russia (then still the al-

The fluidity of the global

situation in the 1990s created

strong United States andIsraeli incentives to pursue

strategic interests in the

Middle East


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tering Soviet Union) and even Syria

supported the American-led call ora new world order based on Charterprinciples o opposition to aggres-sion and violations o internationallaw. However, once UN interventionorced Iraq to withdraw rom Kuwaitand relinquish related claims, archi-tects o American oreign policy be-came immediately eager to renouncea Charter-based approach to interna-

tional conflict that might tie Wash-ingtons hands in the uture. Ameri-can policymakers made it clear thatuture crises would be approachedpragmatically on a case-by-case basisrom the perspective o hard powergeopolitics. urkey neither objectedto the military operation based onthe UN mandate nor American reluc-tance to endorse such a UN response

to the Iraqi annexation o Kuwait as aprecedent.

The AK Party Era Begins

It was not until the AKP came topower in 2002 that Ankara began toseriously question urkeys acquies-cence in Washingtons strategic uni-

polarity and partnership with Israel.urkish leadership was initially cau-tious, given their precarious positionagainst hostile opposition orces em-bedded in the government bureau-cracy, as well as ears that a militarycoup could nulliy their electoralmandate just as the sof coup haddone to the elected Erbakan coalitiongovernment in 1998.

Te first break with this deerentialpast came in 2003, when the urk-

ish Parliament opposed the US plan

to launch its attack on Iraq partlyrom urkish territory, much to thedistress o the Pentagon. Paul Wol-owitz, then a high official in the U.S.Department o Deense, openly chid-ed the AKP leadership or its inabilityto wield enough influence to over-ride the urkish legislative processand ignore domestic public opinionso as to accede to Washingtons ap-

peal. At the time, the Erdogan lead-ership expressed its willingness togrant Washington the permission itrequested, and explained that ailureto allow it was the result o a parlia-mentary decision that could not beswayed, despite an apparent effort todo so. Te importance o this show ourkish independence should not beexaggerated, as urkey continued to

make the ncirlik Air Base availableor American use during the IraqWar and AK Party leaders never op-posed the invasion and occupationitsel, despite its dubious status underthe UN Charter and its destabilizingimpact on regional security.

Davutolus Proactive Foreign

Policy

When Ahmet Davutolu was ap-pointed Foreign Minister in May2009, afer several years as a highlyinfluential principal advisor to theurkish government, urkish oreignpolicy independence and activismbecame more pronounced. Davu-tolu presided over negotiations

involving Syria and Israel in 2007,with the main objective o resolvingthe issues by encouraging peace and


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maintaining sovereignty over the

Golan Heights. Tis mediation effortseemed on the verge o success un-til Israel launched its major militaryoperation against Gaza at the end o2008, effectively ending the negoti-ations. Since the initiative involvedactive participation on the part oIsrael, it also seemed statesmanlikerom the perspective o the old orderand was welcomed, at the time, by

Washington.

When Davutolu tried to integrateHamas in the political process aneffort strongly resisted by Washing-ton and el Aviv, which alternative-ly insisted on several conditions thatwere unacceptable to Hamas theurkish approach began to raiseconcerns in the West. It was slowly

becoming evident that independenturkish oreign policy moves coulddiverge rom US regional priorities.

Parallel to this, many journalists and

urkish think tank experts in Ameri-ca were secular undamentalists whowere deeply opposed to and threat-ened by the AK Party ascendancy.Tey took measures to warn the Westabout the true nature o the politicalorientation o the AK Party, and tocast doubt as to whether urkey stillbelonged in the Western camp. Teyused their influence and access to U.S.

lawmakers and leaders to suggest thatthe new urkish leadership had anundisclosed agenda to displace secu-larism with political Islam, and thusmove in directions sharply opposedto American and Israeli interests inthe region. Te Hamas initiative wasespecially targeted as a justificationor this view. Although urkish or-eign policy was critically observed,

especially by the Bush presidency, itshould be noted that there also exist-ed some support or a countervailing

Turkish Foreign

Minister Davutolu

and Iranian Foreign

Minister Javad Zarifat P5+1 negotia-

tions in Geneva on

October 15-16.

AA


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view based on an acceptance o this

new show o urkish independence.Tere were influential observers whoperceived the Erdoan government asmoderate, efficient, market-oriented,and popular. Tis view created an op-

portunity or Washington to demon-strate throughout the region, by way

o urkey, that the United States waswilling and able to work construc-tively with an Islamically-inclinedgovernment in the post-9/11 setting,even i it pursued an independentstrategy that diverged rom its or-eign policy positions on occasion.

Davutolus initiation o the zeroconflicts and problems with neigh-

bors approach garnered a similarmixture o suspicion and acceptance.It was, at first, seen as a stabilizingmove that did not threaten the overallU.S. grand strategy, centered on Isra-els security, nonprolieration, andoil. Tere were, to be sure, qualmsin conservative American strategicdiscussions about urkish effortstoward regional and extra-regional

peacemaking (including the Balkans,Central Asia, and the Caucasus). Itwas only Ankaras abrupt embrace o

Assads Syria that raised questions as

to the overall urkish regional vision.

When urkeys relationship with Is-rael took a turn or the worse, Ameri-can concerns deepened. Tis becameclear afer the Davos moment onJanuary 30, 2009, in which Erdoganangrily conronted the Israeli presi-dent, Shimon Peres, on the sensitivematter o Israels behavior during the

Gaza military operations launchedin December 2008. A negative trendin bilateral relations culminated a-ter the May 1, 2010 attack by Israelinaval gunships and commandos ona urkish vessel, Mavi Marmara, ininternational waters. Te ship waspart o a global civil society flotillacarrying humanitarian aid workersand supplies to Gaza, thereby boldly

challenging Israels blockade. In theincident, nine urkish nationals werekilled several o whom in execu-tion style suggesting an Israeli in-tention to warn Ankara that it wouldpay heavily i it continued, even in-directly via civil society activists, tochallenge Israels occupation policieson behal o Palestinian rights. TeMavi Marmara incident led to a seri-

ous breakdown o relations betweenAmericas two most stalwart allies inthe Middle East, posing a dilemmaor Washington. Te White House,however, displayed an unexpectedwillingness to balance its special re-lationship with Israel against the rec-ognition that urkey was too valuablean ally to alienate in any severe way.

Tis was reinorced on PresidentObamas visit to Israel in 2013, duringwhich he tried to persuade Benja-

With the appointment

of Davutolu as

Foreign Minister in2009, Turkish foreign

policy independence

and activism became

more pronounced


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min Netanyahu to apologize or the

deaths caused by the attack on theMavi Marmara, and to offer compen-sation to the amilies o those killed.Te apology was transmitted to ur-key by means o a phone call betweenthe three leaders on March 22, whileObama was still in Israel. Erdoganresponded positively to Netanyahuseffort, and announced a readinessto restore military cooperation and

ull diplomatic relations with Israel.Following the talk, concerns reced-ed, although normalization has beengradual at best.

Obamas efforts on this occasion wasexpressive o the real perceptionsheld by his administration, as evi-denced by the ollowing statement:Te United States deeply values our

close partnerships with both urkeyand Israel, and we attach great im-portance to the restoration o posi-tive relations between them in orderto advance regional peace and securi-ty, adding, I am hopeul that todaysexchange between the two leaderswill enable them to engage in deep-er cooperation on this and a range oother challenges and opportunities.

As such, the Obama presidency madeit clear that security in the region re-quired the shared cooperation oboth Israel and urkey. Tis was theonly alternative available to Wash-ington other than siding with Israel,which would have been a risky repu-diation o urkey as well as signaledto the entire region that the contin-uation o diplomatic riendship with

the United States was conditional onthe approval o Israel. It should alsobe observed that Netanyahu on his

own initiative though quite pos-

sibly at the back channel urging oWashington was reported monthsearlier to have been ready to extenda peace offering to urkey, but wasinhibited by internal pressures romNetanyahus domestic rival, the Is-raeli extreme right wing then headedby Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieber-mann. As such, Israel as well as theUnited States sought the restoration

o a cooperative relationship withurkey, and the phone call offered aconvenient way to circumvent severecriticisms o any restoration o nor-mal relations in both countries.

Washingtons Misgivings andTurkish Diaspora Critics

Although this process o mutualunderstanding has continued andhelped to reduce tensions betweenthe two governments, there has beenreluctance rom both sides to ullyendorse a diplomacy o normaliza-tion. Tere were widespread eelingsthat the Israeli move was insufficient,given the gravity o the Mavi Mar-mara affront alongside Israels reus-

al to moderate its approach to Gaza,which urkey made clear was part oits overall concern. On the Americanside, pro-Israeli civil society elementsremained hostile to the urkish AKParty leadership, and clearly wel-comed every sign o opposition anddiscord within the country, includingthe view that Washington should takeaccount o the degree to which ur-

key has been suffering rom growingregional isolation over the last ewyears.


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urkeys break rom Israel ollowing

the Gaza War was also accompaniedby closer economic and diplomaticties with Iran, then the arch-enemy oIsrael, Saudi Arabia, and the UnitedStates. urkish oreign policy inde-pendence seemed especially appar-ent in 2010 when urkey and Brazil

jointly brokered an arrangement inehran involving the storage o Irani-an enriched uranium, thereby seem-

ingly deusing a dangerously brewingconflict that threatened to turn theMiddle East into one large war zone.Tese moves collided with the U.S./Saudi/Israeli/European commitmentto a more coercive diplomacy whichrelied on mounting pressures by stiff-ening economic sanctions and rein-orcing military threat to keep Iranrom becoming the second nuclear

weapons state in the region. It was aconusing and controversial allingout. Tere are convincing indicationsthat Washington had previously en-couraged urkey and Brazil to takeprecisely this initiative, evidently be-lieving it would ail and thereby beuseul to bolster the argument that di-plomacy had been given every chance(yet ailed). It would then ollow that

coercion and threat diplomacy wouldbe the only way to prevent Irans ac-quisition o nuclear weapons. Clearly,urkey did not see the policy issues inthis way, voting against the intensifi-cation o sanctions on Iran in the UNSecurity Council. As beore, Amer-ican advocates o the pre-AK Partypolitical approach stridently insistedthat urkeys attempts to pursue an

independent oreign policy should bestrongly opposed in relation to Iran,an issue which was within the exclu-

sive policy domain o the Westernpowers and Israel.

Tere is little doubt that current in-ternal political troubles in urkey,emerging rom the Gezi Park demon-strations in the summer o 2013 andintensified by the corruption scandaland parallel government fight towardthe end o last year, have emboldened

American critics o urkish leader-ship and oreign policy. Te Wash-ington Post, or example, publishedan editorial on January 1, 2014 thaturged U.S. oreign policymakers toassume a more critical stance to-ward urkey, emphasizing Erdogansincreasingly authoritarian style andthe existence o human rights abuses,such as the jailing o more journalists

than in any other country. Te timingo such an editorial in a publicationwhose ties to the CIA have been re-cently disclosed suggests that theUS administration may have decid-ed to throw its weight on the side oanti-Erdogan orces as a reprisal ororeign policy activism in relation toIran and Israel.

Te claim is requently made thatthe supposedly ideological oreignpolicy in the Davutolu Era has been

Davutolu has consistentlymade a special effort to

preserve the basic continuity

of Turkish foreign policy,

which includes a more Western

alignment


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14Insight Turkey

nationally and regionally discredit-ed, and now compares unavorably

with urkeys earlier, more pragmat-ic and loyal approach throughoutthe Cold War. However, support orDavutolus approach as a blendo principled and pragmatic ratherthan ideological may persevere. Itshould be noted that Davutolu hasconsistently made a special effort topreserve the basic continuity o urk-ish oreign policy, which includes a

more Western alignment particularlyin relation to NAO and Washington,and proven it tangibly by such stepsas supporting the controversial de-ployment o missile deense systems.

Responding to the Arab Spring

Te Arab Spring created a new set o

dynamics in the Middle East that putthe United States on the deensive, asit had been previously accepting o

authoritarian governments that be-came the targets o the popular up-

risings. During the first hal o 2011,urkeys regional standing was neverhigher, and Erdogan was by ar themost popular and respected leaderin the region. urkish oreign policyseemed more clearly than any othermajor state to be positioned on theright side o history.

As such, there was widespread specu-

lation that the new political order incountries such as Egypt and unisiawould look to urkey or inspira-tion, although there was an unwill-ingness to subscribe to the urkishmodel. Despite this disavowal, thewidespread aspiration was close towhat the AK Party had achieved inurkey: a robust economy based ona neoliberal ideology, a stable politi-

cal environment, a governing processthat was sympathetic to Islamic val-ues, and constitutionalism centered

Turkish ForeignMinister Davutolu

meets with U.S.

Secretary of State

John Kerry in

Washington, DC.

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on periodic ree elections. Tese de-

velopments were received with mixedreactions in the United States. On theone side, it was preerable that na-tions that seemed poised to controlthe Arab uture were oriented towardurkey, a major NAO member withan essentially Western-oriented polit-ical outlook, than with the more radi-cal Iranian ideology or even China tofinally sever any post-colonial links

to the West. In this regard, Davutoluwas a strong asset, as he was widelytrusted and liked in the region duringhis tenure as Foreign Minister. How-ever, American policy hawks dis-proportionately represented in boththink tanks and among academicMiddle East specialists in Americanuniversities were ar less apprecia-tive o urkeys oreign policy, per-

ceiving Ankara as an obstacle in re-lation to the regions post-Cold Wardesign in which the United Stateswas a dominant presence, a designstrongly avored in el Aviv. Fur-thermore, criticisms o urkish or-eign policy indicated a deeper acet:strong distrust and dislike o Erdoganand his AK Party policy agenda.

Tilting West

One turning point in urkeys oreignpolicy came afer the anti-Qaddafiuprising in Libya, leading to the re-gime-changing intervention underNAO auspices in March 2011. An-kara was initially ambivalent, butlater moved toward accepting the

NAO undertaking and eventuallyseemed to welcome the outcome. Bysuch re-positioning, urkeys region-

al role became more critically viewed

by opponents o Western interven-tionism throughout the Middle East,while at the same time somewhatless worrisome to policymakers inWashington.

urkeys break with the Assad re-gime in early 2012 was welcomedby Washington as confirmation thaturkey was standing with the West

in the second phase o the ArabSpring. Te move did not receivewidespread endorsement outside oofficial Washington sources, howev-er, as there were suspicions expressedboth by critics o non-interventionand by those who saw the anti-As-sad uprising as a urkish vehicle orbringing Sunni Islam into a posi-tion o control in Syria. Such a move

would be allegedly dangerous or thesubstantial non-Sunni minorities inthe country, and unwelcome in Israel.As the Syrian conflict worsened, ob-servers eared that political Islam wasspreading its influence in the regionand that urkey was entering into asectarian war, this time on the side oSaudi Arabia. Overall, however, theclose working relationship between

Hilary Clinton and Davutolu, cen-tered on building wide internationalsupport or the Syrian opposition,encouraged a perception o converg-ing interests and an eagerness orstrategic cooperation.

Acting on Principle

Te Egyptian military takeover onJuly 3, 2013 rom the elected Mur-si government produced a new split


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with Washington. Ankara had made

it clear that it did not view the over-throw o the democratically selectedEgyptian president and the crimi-nalization o his political base in theMuslim Brotherhood as either justi-fied or legitimate. ensions deepenedwhen the temporary post-coup lead-

ership in Cairo took drastic measures

to end pro-Mursi demonstrations,killing more than one thousand un-armed demonstrators (according toconservative estimates), jailing lead-ers o the Muslim Brotherhood, re-taliating against any anti-regime ac-tivism, and closing V channels thatwere critical o developments.

Te United States ollowed a much

more cautious line, more or less com-plying with what was happening inEgypt, although expressing somewords o regret about the massacres.In this regard, the U.S. Governmentound itsel, in contrast to the firstphase o the Arab Spring, to be in es-sential agreement with the reactionso the governments o the region, andurkey was the country that seemed

out o step. Davutolu was again ac-cused o being impractical in speak-ing out so strongly against the Egyp-

tian coup, which had, at its inception

at least, the ull backing o the Egyp-tian people as expressed throughmassive demonstrations.

Implicitly, there were divergent viewso whether the Egyptian coup waspro-democratic because it reflectedthe mobilized will o the people, oranti-democratic because it flagrantly

violated the Egyptian Constitution,

repudiated electoral results (which lieat the core o procedural democracy),and engaged in a pattern o atrociousstate crime. urkey certainly meritspraise or taking a principled standin the ace o these outrages by theEgyptian coup leadership, while oth-er political actors who have avertedtheir gaze reinorce the most cynical

views o international relations.

Conclusion

Tis overview offers a ew conclu-sions about the acceptability o urk-ish oreign policy during the years oAK Party leadership in the UnitedStates:

1) It is important to distinguish be-tweengovernmentaland civil soci-etyacceptance and response. Eachsituation has a certain originality,but generally speaking (exceptpossibly the period o the Bushpresidency rom 2000-2008),the U.S. government has reactedpragmatically to urkish policieson a case-by-case basis. Te civ-

il society domain, dominated bysecularist think tanks, media, andexperts, has tended to be more

Turkeys break with the Assad

regime in early 2012 waswelcomed by Washington as

confirmation that Turkey was

standing with the West in the

second phase of the Arab Spring


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dogmatic, especially in the afer-

math o the souring o urkish/Israeli relations. In this respect,political leaders have been moreprepared to accept urkish in-dependent oreign policy ini-tiatives than their civil societycounterparts.

2) Te turbulence o the region, itsoverlapping conflict patterns,and the changing perception o

what is possible and desirablehave produced a variance o out-looks on the urkish side, incitinga certain skepticism about ur-keys broad oreign policy visionson the American side. In thisrespect, zero conflict and prob-lems with neighbors has becomeovershadowed by events with agreater need to be examined by

their unique particularities. Inthis sense the urkish outlook, asarticulated by Davutolu and oth-ers, is that urkish oreign policyis rooted in valuesand principles,which Americans and urkishsecular undamentalists tend tocriticize as ideological or norma-tive, and urge instead an oppor-tunism packaged as realism or

pragmatism.3) Te post-Cold War period de-

prived governments outside theregion o a single uniying theme:supportive o or against Marxismat home and the Soviet Unioninternationally. Te new region-al setting created a wide politicalspace or independent initiatives.urkey took advantage o this

opportunity in the early years oAK Party leadership to encourageconflict resolution throughout the

region and beyond, in the Balkans

and Caucuses. Te breakdowno positive relations with Israel,however, highlighted a sharp di-

vide between U.S. priorities inthe region and those o Ankara.Te Arab Spring then introducedwaves o uprisings against en-trenched authoritarian govern-ments, raising difficult ideologicalchoices between strategic interests

and supposed commitments todemocratic orms o governance.urkey seemed to generally ollowa principled line while the Unit-ed States, with military bases andcounter-insurgency operationsthroughout the region, was moreinconsistent in voicing its inter-ests, as in Bahrain and Yemen.Doubts were raised once again in

civil society spheres as to whetherurkey was now reusing to stayin its lane when it came to oreignpolicy in the Middle East, or putdifferently, whether urkey wasthe sort o real ally that could becounted upon in the manner o Is-rael. Tis has once again suggestedan unconditionalcommitment onthe part o American leaders to-

ward Israeli relations, in contrastto the urkish alignment, whichis at best a conditionalalliance re-lationship. In this respect, there isa growing tide o criticism o theUnited States somewhat exagger-ated engagement with Israel, anda wish or a relationship that moreclosely resembles the U.S.-urkeyalliance.

4) By and large, the U.S. approachto urkeys independent oreignpolicy moves is generally flexi-


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ble enough to agree to disagree

in most instances. However, thisflexibility disappears when itcomes to issues deemed strate-gically vital to U.S. interests, in-cluding: cooperation within theNAO ramework, counter-pro-lieration policy, and conflict withIsrael. urkish oreign policy hasseemed to accept this set o con-straints. For example, urkey

agreed to NAOs deploymento missile deense systems on itsterritory, although the move an-gered Russia and created potentialtargets on urkish territory in theevent o renewed Western-Rus-sian hostilities. Further, urkeyagreed, at least ormally, to repairrelations with Israel at the urg-ing o President Obama. Finally,

afer its seeming contribution toresolving the Iranian nuclear dis-pute was rejected, urkey steppedback and allowed powers led bythe United States handle the di-plomacy o conflict resolution andeventual 2013 interim deal.

5) Assuming that the AK Party sur-vives electoral challenges in thenext two years and that nothing

occurs to change the politicallandscape in the Middle East, it

seems likely that the Davuto-

lu leadership will revive the zeroproblems approach. However,this revival would herald a moresophisticated and selective strat-egy that acknowledges that noblanket doctrine can adequate-ly cover all variations o oreignpolicy challenges. Davutolu hasalready suggested a more nuancedunderstanding o Phase I, and has

been quoted as saying: it is pos-sible to have zero problems i theother actors respect our values. Itdoesnt mean that we will be silentin order to have good relationswith all parties. Zero Problems,Phase II, is instead likely to bebetter understood as minimizingconflicts and seeking accommo-dation wherever possible with

neighbors. As the Syrian shif inAnkara so clearly demonstrat-ed, however, a zero problems ap-proach becomes untenable oncea government engages in massiveand repeated atrocities against itsown people.

Endnote1. Quoted by Alan Makovsky, The New Activismin Turkish Foreign Policy, SAIS Review, (Winter/

Spring, 1999), p. 1.

Insight Turkey 16-1-2014 Falk

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