Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo factum: Background, Reception, Meaning, and Relevance of the Hypothesis of esse secundarium in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas

by

Eric Andrew Mabry

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Theology of Regis College and the Graduate Centre for Theological Studies of the Toronto School of Theology.

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology Awarded by the University of St. Michael’s College

© Copyright by Eric Andrew Mabry 2018

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Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo factum: Background, Reception, Meaning, and Relevance of the Hypothesis of esse

secundarium in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas

Eric Andrew Mabry

Doctor of Philosophy in Theology

University of St. Michael’s College

2018

Abstract The question of Christ’s esse and whether he has one or two has been a question debated

by Thomists and other scholastic traditions for the better part of 700 years. The consistent answer

of Thomists (even into the present day) has been that there is only one, substantial act of

existence in Christ and that this is none other than the personal, uncreated, and eternal esse of the

Son of God. Such a position regarding Christ’s ontological constitution has not only been

presented as a theological position but also as the standard Thomist interpretation of Thomas

Aquinas’ own opinion regarding the esse of Christ.

Because a single-esse position cannot provide a metaphysically explanatory account for

why the human nature of Christ would still be created without violating in some way the

principle of divine impassibility, I argue against this “standard” interpretation of the Angelic

Doctor and instead argue that for St. Thomas there is one esse of the Son insofar as he is

eternally God, but another esse insofar as he temporally became man. This “other” esse,

therefore, is neither the principal esse of Christ, nor is it an accidental esse but rather an esse

secundarium. This is the explict position of St. Thomas as he presents it in the Disputed

Questions on the Union of the Word Incarnate.

By situating Thomas’ invocation of the term esse secundarium and his various

discussion(s) of Christ’s esse within Christological developments and theological vectors

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emergent from the twelfth into the thirteenth century and by measuring the unique account given

in the QD de Unione against its later scholastic reception and Thomas’ other discussions of

Christ’s esse, I argue that esse secundarium must denote the supernatural, substantial, created

participation of Christ’s human nature in the uncreated communication of the divine esse of the

Word, the Son of the Father. Such an interpretation would suggest that the supernatural reality

denoted dogmatically by the term hypostatic union and systematically by the term gratia unionis

is denoted existentially by the term esse secundarium.

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Acknowledgments Not only is it impossible for me to acknowledge everyone who ought to be acknowledged for the pivotal role they played in helping me to write this dissertation, but it is also impossible for me to offer the kind-of gratitude which is due to so many who have helped me into its completion. All the same, I offer my deep and heartfelt thanks to the following.

First, to the members of my committee as a whole, for their time and attention to be sure, but especially for their questions. Second, to my director(s): to Jeremy Wilkins for inspiring me as an undergraduate and first raising the question of esse secundarium with me as a graduate student. I am where I am today because you taught me to ask the right sort of questions and instilled in me an unquenchable systematic exigence. To Bob Sweetman, who has mentored me from my first semesters as a doctoral student in course work all the way through the final version of my dissertation. Thank you for your generosity in time and conversation. I am a different sort of scholar and teacher for having known you and learned from you. I will never forget what you have taught me.

Third, to my friends, especially to Brian Bajzek. Thank you for so very many conversations: on walks, on car-rides, in the office, in coffee shops, in pubs, and in my home. These conversations have challenged me, shaped me, and changed me. My doctoral experience has been a rich and rewarding one because of your friendship.

I owe a profound debt to my family. To my mother, who put me on this path a long time ago by sharing with me the love of learning and inquiry, and who has made my studies possible in ways that I will never be able to repay. To my wife, Hannah, whose patience, love, and attention have seen me through many arduous days and nights and whose unfailing trust in my abilities has never wavered. I am so very thankful for a life-long companion in this academic journey! Finally, I must acknowledge my children, who have lavishly (but unkowingly) sacrificed so much time with me, but especially to my oldest son, Peter (6), who in the last weeks of the writing process asked me on a daily basis, “Dad, have you finished your dissertation so that we can do something together today?” To him now I can say, “Yes, son, I am finished—let’s go play!”

I must also express my profound gratitude to my institutional family at Christ the King Seminary in East Aurora, NY. I am especially grateful to Fr. John Mack of the diocese of Buffalo and director of pre-theology at the seminary. Thank you for your friendship. You have helped me to deepen my understanding, appreciation, and appropriation of education as formation. It is a deep privilege to serve as assistant professor of systematic theology at Christ the King. I am so very thankful for the opportunity to teach in a seminary context and overjoyed at the abundant theological possibilities for growth and development offered to me each and every day through conversation and collaboration.

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Contents List of Manuscripts Consulted ………………………………………………………………… v List of Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………... vi Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….. 1 Ratio Operis ……………………………………………………………………………... 2

Status Quaestionis ……………………………………………………………………….. 6 Thesis …………………………………………………………………………………... 16 Partitio …………………………………………………………………………………. 16

Chapter 1: The Christology of Gilbert of Poitiers ………………………………………….. 20 Theological Project …………………………………………………………………….. 22 Philosophical Framework ……………………………………………………………… 31 Christology ……………………………………………………………………………... 43 Chapter 2: The Christology of Master Peter the Lombard ………………………………... 56 Two Icons ……………………………………………………………………………… 56 Ordo Rationis ………………………………………………………………………….. 57 Confessing the Mediator of God and Man …………………………………………….. 60 Re-Defining Human Nature …………………………………………………………… 65

Chapter 3: Compositional Developments in Twelfth Century Christology ………………. 90 Simon of Tournai ………………………………………………………………………. 93

Stephen Langton ……………………………………………………………………… 102 Prepositinus …………………………………………………………………………… 113 Chapter 4: Scholastic Reception of the Hypothesis of Esse Secundarium ……………….. 125 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, OP ………………………………………………………….. 126 Francisco Suarez, SJ ………………………………………………………………….. 142 Collegium Salamanticense Carmelitarum Discalceatorum …………………………... 155 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP ……………………………………………………. 166

Chapter 5: The Meaning of Esse Secundarium ……………………………………………. 172 Metaphysical Contours of the Text …………………………………………………… 173 Tentative Theological Meaning ………………………………………………………. 178 The Union considered from the Standpoint of Existence …………………………….. 179 The Union considered from the Standpoint of Grace ………………………………… 183 The Union considered as a Supernatural, Created, Substantial Participation ………… 187 Dubia ………………………………………………………………………………….. 189 Chapter 6: (Re)Reading Thomas’ Other Discussions of Christ’s Esse …………………... 196 Scriptum super Sententiis ……………………………………………………………... 196 QD de Veritate ………………………………………………………………………... 205 Quaestiones Quodlibetales …………………………………………………………… 207 Summa Contra Gentiles ………………………………………………………………. 213

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Compendium Theologiae ……………………………………………………………... 218 Lectura super Ioannem ……………………………………………………………….. 219 Summa Theologiae ……………………………………………………………………. 220

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………… 226

Epilogue ……………………………………………………………………………………… 236

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………. 264

Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………… 270

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List of Manuscripts Consulted

Gilbert of Poitiers, Glossa in Ep. Pauli

Lisboa Alcobac XCVII/178 (14th) Paris, BnF, Ms. Lat. 14441 Bruges, Bibl. Mun., 78

Gilbert of Poitiers, Glossa super Psalterium Valenciennes, Bibl. Municipale, MS 44

Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV Libris Trinity Cambridge B.16.7

Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Ep. Pauli Trinity Cambridge B.4.23 Trinity Cambridge B.16.12

Prepositinus, Summa Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Lat. 14526 Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 71 London, British Museum, 9.E.XIV

Simon of Tournai, Institutiones in sacram paginam Paris, BnF, MS Lat. 14886 Paris, Bibliothèque Arsenal 519 Oxford, Merton College 132

Stephen Langton, Glossa in Ep. Pauli

Paris, BnF MS lat. 14443 Salzburg, MS a.X.19  

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List of Appendices Appendix A: Excerpt from Gilbert’s Glossa in Ep. ad Heb. [11, 1] Appendix B: A Divisio Textus for Lombard, Sententiae, Liber Tertius Appendix C: Non est Communem Speciem Accipere Appendix D: Excerpt from Ps-Peter of Poitiers Gloss on the Sentences Appendix E: Divisio of Institutiones in Sacram Paginam, Distinction 7 Appendix F: A Thematic Divisio of Prepositinus’ Summa, Book 3 Appendix G: Excerpt from Langton’s Exposition of Lombard’s Gloss on Romans Appendix H: Thomas’ Divisio of Book Three of the Sentences Appendix I: Divisio Textus of Book Four of the Summa Contra Gentiles Appendix J: Divisio Textus of the Compendium Theologiae, cc. 185-246 Appendix K: Divisio Textus of Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars

 

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Introduction

In Paris, in the spring of 1272,1 Thomas de Aquino, O.P. (d. 1274) addressed a question

that he had taken up on at least three previous occasions,2 namely, “Whether in Christ there is

only one act of existence?” His answer, delivered in article four of the Disputed Question on the

Union of the Word Incarnate, differs terminologically from his earlier discussions and is not

repeated in the treatment of the same topic just a semester later in the tertia pars of his famous

Summa Theologiae.3 This difference of language led some early commentators, such as Cajetan

(d. 1535),4 to speculate that it was an early and immature work of Thomas. It led other Thomists,

such as Louis Billot (d. 1931), to doubt its authenticity all together.5

The Summa, it would seem, maintains that it is impossible for one thing (res) to have

more than one substantial esse.6 Yet, the De Unione speaks of an “another” esse. This other esse

while clearly not the principal esse of the person of the Word (but “secondary”), nevertheless,

appears not to be an esse in an accidental order.7 This would, then, suggest that it is a substantial

esse. But this position would contradict the position in the Summa. Thus, we have some

illustration of the terminological and apparently conceptual divergence in the two works.

The historical and paleographical work of Jean-Pierre Torrell and others has produced a

strong consensus both as to the De Unione’s authenticity and to its late writing. As Torrell notes,

“the Leonine Commission’s labors no longer leave any doubt about its authenticity, since the text                                                                                                                

1 See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, rev. ed., trans. Robert Royal (DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 205-207, 336-337, & 429.

2 See Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Moos, 3: 237-240); Quaestiones de Quodlibet 9, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 93-95); Compendium Theologiae, lib. 1, c. 212 (ed. Leonina, 42: 165-166).

3 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 222). 4 Cajetan, Comm. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6 (ed. Leonina, 11: 224). 5 L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 7, sect. 4, pp. 125-126, n. 1 (Rome, 1895). 6 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una hypostasis, necesse est quod ea

quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum. Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam: ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo. Est autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid: sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non inquantum est Socrates, sed inquantum est albus. Et huiusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel persona: aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus. Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a).

7 See Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c: “Et ideo, sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi; est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod est, si non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—, non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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of this Question was already transmitted in manuscripts from the end of the thirteenth century

and it is included in the works announced by the booksellers in the taxation lists of the most

ancient catalogues.”8 Hence, there is an established scholarly answer to the basic historical

questions of when this text was written and who wrote this text, but these are not the only

relevant questions; there remain further interpretive questions about the meaning of this text and

the relation of its position with other discussions of the same topic in Thomas’ corpus.

This thesis will argue that the position taken by Thomas Aquinas in his Disputed

Questions on the Union of the Word Incarnate is consistent in meaning and compatible in

doctrine with his discussions of the same question in his other major works. In order to

substantiate this thesis we must (1) examine the kinds of Christological questions asked in the

century preceding Thomas, (2) assess the reception of his hypothesis by Scholastics after him,

(3a) establish the meaning of esse secundarium through a textual comparison of the QD de

Unione and the Summa Theologiae within a wider Christological frame, and (3b) test this

meaning by showing its relevance for the reading of Thomas’s other discussions of the esse of

Christ throughout his corpus. These tasks will constitute the three major parts of the dissertation.

1 Ratio Operis

Although the thesis of consistency is not a new one,9 it has again been recently

challenged in the twenty-first century by J.L.A. West, who has argued that “the two-esse doctrine

of the De Unione is a theological and philosophical aberration.”10 West’s concern over this

                                                                                                               8 See Torrell, The Person and His Work, 206. Cf. Klaus Obenauer, Thomas von Aquin «Quaestio disputata

De unione Verbi incarnati» («Über die Union des fleischgewordenen Wortes») (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, 2011), 467-499, but especially 487, 489, and 496-498. Marie-Hélène Deloffre, Question Disputee L'union Du Verbe Incarné (De Unione Verbi Incarnati), Bibliotheque Des Textes Philosophiques (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 24-25. M. Michele Mulcahey, First the Bow is Bent in Study: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1998), 315-18. R.-A. Gauthier, “Index Scriptorum et Operum in Praefatione et in Apparatu Nominatorum,” in vol. 25.2 of the Opera Omnia S. Thomae de Aquino (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1996), 498. J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works, 2nd ed. (DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 307-312. P. Glorieux, “Les Questions Disputées de S. Thomas et leur suite chronologique,” Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 4 (1932): 30-31. F. Pelster, “La Quaestio disputata de saint Thomas De unione verbi incarnati,” Archives de Philosophie 3 (1925): 198-245. There are slight variations in the precise date proposed by the scholars above, but none of them propose an early dating, that is, none of them propose a date prior to 1270.

9 See for example, Garrigou-Lagrange, de Christo Salvatore, 320 [in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2] and Bernard Lonergan, On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, vol. 7 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 142-155.

10 J.L.A. West, “Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,” The Thomist 66 (2002): 231-50.

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seeming “aberration” in Thomas is also not new,11 but the commentary tradition is surprisingly

silent about the seeming discrepancy.12 There have certainly been recent metaphysical responses

to West,13 but on the whole discussions about Thomas’ position regarding the esse of Christ have

focused on various Scholastics who followed in his wake and who inherited his question.14

Very little attention has been given to the placement of the discussion of Christ’s esse

within diverse textual structures. Which is to say that it has virtually gone unnoticed that the

structurally parallel text for the QD de Unione (in contradistinction to the thematic parallel) in

the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae is not question seventeen but question two regarding the

hypostatic union in itself.15 The ductus of the QD de Unione is governed principally by the

skopos of the hypostatic union, whereas the ductus of question seventeen of the tertia pars is

governed by the broader skopos of “those things which follow upon this [hypostatic] union” and

the narrower skopos of the intelligible character (ratio) of Christ’s unity.16 Consequently, if one

looks to tertia pars, question seventeen for either the occurrence or absence of esse secundarium,

one is looking in the wrong place.

The De Unione is a medieval, scholastic text that situates a relatively novel question

regarding Christ’s esse within a framework of older questions such as whether Christ is one or

two. The metaphysical question Thomas is asking is the product of cumulative developments in

the century of Christological speculation which preceded him.17 Some of these developments

                                                                                                               11 See Cajetan, Comm. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6 (ed. Leonina, 11: 224) and L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato,

thesis 7, sect. 4, pp. 125-126, n. 1 (Rome, 1895). 12 It goes unnoted by Capreolus, Defensiones 3, d. 6, q. 1 (Tours, 1904, vol. 5: 111-124), Banez, Comm. in

ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 (Matriti, 1951, vol. 1: 254-257), and John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 (Cologne, 1711, vol. 7: 278).

13 V. Salas, “Thomas Aquinas on Christ’s Esse,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 577-603. 14 Stephen Brown has analyzed the Dominican response at the turn of the 13th Century to the critiques of

Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Matthew of Aquasparta, see his “Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries on the Unique Existence in Christ,” in Christ among the Medieval Dominicans, ed. K. Emery and J. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998): 220-237. Remarkable in its magnitude and scope, Richard Cross offers a penetrating analysis of late 13th century positions in his, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002). Michael Gorman has clarified the question(s) which Thomas was trying to answer and taken a careful look at the views of Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines, see his, “Questions concerning the Existences of Christ,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages, ed. K. Emery, R. Friedman, and A. Speer (Boston: Brill Academic, 2011): 709-735.

15 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 22a). 16 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q.1, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 6a), q. 16, prol. (11: 197a), and q. 17, prol. (11: 219). 17 This observation is not intended to exclude the external influence(s) of new Muslim and Aristotelian

texts entering the theological curriculum in the early decades of the thirteenth century. It is intended simply to denote the focus of our particular study.

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have been expertly chronicled and analyzed by Walter Principe18 and L.O. Nielsen.19 But there is

still a great need for more work in this area of medieval Christology. There are terminological

and conceptual shifts in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century that if understood, will help

us to recognize with greater precision the contours of the question Thomas is asking and will

help us rule out certain answers.

The De Unione is a text that was received and read by Scholastic philosophers and

theologians after Thomas. Despite the fact that such a wealth of literature exists on later

Scholastic discussions of the question of Christ’s esse, there has been less focus on those

Scholastics who explicitly cite the seeming discrepancy in Thomas’ corpus regarding this issue

of the esse of Christ. For this reason, we feel called to address two such Scholastics, namely,

Thomas de Vio Cajetan (d. 1534) and Francisco Suarez (d. 1617) in order to obtain a wider

viewpoint of the historical dialectic of opinions.

The De Unione is an underdetermined text, that is, it is a text which contains terms or

notions which remain indeterminate in their meaning even when appropriately situated within

their surrounding context. When this happens, an appeal to wider interpretive frameworks must

be invoked. While it may be possible on textual grounds alone to illustrate the consistency of

Thomas’ position on the esse of Christ throughout his career, this is not the same as providing a

positive explanation of what esse secundarium means. Consequently, we will propose a reading

of esse secundarium as a term that denotes the existential aspect of the relation between the

human nature and the person of the Word. This is the same relation, in reality, denoted

dogmatically by the term, hypostatic union.

If this reading is correct, then it would explain why Thomas refers to the hypostatic union

as an esse creatum in the Summa Theologiae.20 In this passage of the Summa (3a.2.7c), Thomas

deploys the principle of extrinsic, contingent predication to articulate the way in which

predicating humanity of the person of the Word in no way effects a change in the Word but only

in the human nature assumed by the Word. Following a strategy proposed by Bernard Lonergan,

                                                                                                               18 Walter Principe, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, 4 vols. (Toronto:

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963-1975). 19 Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s

Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180, trans. Ragnar Christophersen, Acta Theologica Danica 15 (Leiden: Brill, 1982).

20 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: “ratio relationis, sicut et motus, dependet ex fine vel termino: sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

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we argue that this same principle of extrinsic, contingent predication may be used to exposit the

meaning of esse secundarium.21 Implementing the analogy of extrinsic, contingent predication

will open up the possibility of considering esse secundarium as a supernatural, created, and

substantial participation in the uncreated esse of the Word in a way that is analogous to how

Thomas conceives of the habit of charity as a supernatural, created, but accidental participation

in the procession of the Holy Spirit.22

The De Unione is, finally, a theological text, which means that its basic content or object

is a divine mystery, in this case, the union of the Word of God with humanity. Consequently, if

the hypothesis of esse secundarium is true, then as a particular instance of fides quaerens

intellectum it is not of merely historical value or interest. Rather, it offers a penetrating (but not

exhaustive) account of a divine mystery and, therefore, is of relevance to Christological inquiry

today. Implementing an emphasis of Gadamer, Lonergan suggested that “one really grasps the

meaning of a text only when one brings its implications to bear upon contemporary living.”23 For

this reason, our project is not one of mere textual archeology; there is an exigence for this

hypothesis in contemporary Christology, especially as regards questions of Christ’s human and

historical development.

The hypothesis of esse secundarium holds an untapped wealth of theological implications

for contemporary questions about Christ’s human growth and development as well as his

historical consciousness. If it is true that Christ’s human nature was brought into a created,

supernatural, and substantial participation in the divine esse of the Word, then esse secundarium

gives us a term to designate not only this created, supernatural, and substantial participation but

also a notion which indicates that this supernatural participation is the finite, existential horizon

under which Christ’s human consciousness, his abilities, habits, acts and actions, his desires,

affections, and emotions may enjoy the full play of historical development. I will explore this

                                                                                                               21 Bernard Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, vol. 8 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. R.

Doran and J. Wilkins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming), assertio 9. 22 See Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 8: 175b); cf. IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 8:

165b). It should be noted that Lonergan coordinates the supernatural, created participations of esse secundarium, lumen gloriae, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity with the Trinitarian relations of Paternity, Filiation, Active, and Passive Spiration. See Lonergan, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, vol. 12 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 472 and De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum, in Early Latin Theology, vol. 19 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. M. G. Shields, ed. R.M. Doran and H.D. Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 630-636.

23 See Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd Ltd., 1972), 167; cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 274-305.

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implication in the epilogue.

2 Status Quaestionis

We should begin by drawing attention to a distinction of tasks. It is one thing (1) to

propose an interpretation of a text or texts—the primary task to be accomplished in this thesis.

But it is another thing (2) to catalogue, assess, and evaluate opinions in a theological controversy

and still another (3) to advocate and expound a (new) position or approach to a theological

commonplace such as the incarnation or hypostatic union. We would still be greatly assisted by a

thorough review of the history of the scholastic debates regarding Christ’s act of existence,

namely, whether he had one or two.24 But such a history is not identical even with the history of

the interpretation of esse secundarium and certainly not with a contemporary exegetical

argument for the meaning of esse secundarium.

There are a number of Scholastic commentators who very clearly articulate their position

regarding the esse of Christ without adverting explicitly to the question of the meaning of esse

secundarium in the QD de Unione,25 while there are others such as Cajetan and Suarez who not

only state their positions on the esse of Christ but also explicitly advert to the seeming textual

discrepancy in Thomas’ texts and consequently engage the (interpretative) question of the

meaning of esse secundarium.26 For these reasons, in what follows I try to restrict my comments

regarding recent proposals regarding esse secundarium to questions falling within the purview of

interpretation more strictly, though to be sure one’s metaphysical and theological commitments

will either impede or assist a more or less accurate interpretation. Consequently, while my

observations are primarily ordered toward identification rather than to strict critique, I try to note

those interpretations that differ from my own and offer some reasons for that difference. In some

of these instances, I indicate where sustained critiques may be located.

                                                                                                               24 In addition to the literature already noted in fn. 14 above, I would also like to highlight the work of Corey

L. Barnes, who has very helpfully situated Thomas’ position on the esse of Christ in relation to the Angelic Doctor’s confrere and teacher Albert the Great, see his “Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Person, Hypostasis, and Hypostatic Union,” The Thomist 72 (2008): 107-46.

25 See for example, Capreolus, Defensiones 3, d. 6, q. 1 (Tours, 1904, vol. 5: 111-124), Bañez, Comm. in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 (Matriti, 1951, vol. 1: 254-257), and John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2 (Cologne, 1711, vol. 7: 278).

26 See Cajetan, Comm. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6 (ed. Leonina, 11: 224) and Suarez, Comm. & Disp. in IIIa (Paris: Vives, 1860, vol. 18), disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5: 271. For an exposition of Cajetan’s doctrine of a single esse in Christ, see Shawn Colberg, “Accrued Eyes and Sixth Digits: Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Cajetan on Christ's Single Esse and the Union of Natures,” Nova et Vetera (English) 8.1 (2010): 70-86.

7

Around the turn of the twentieth century,27 Louis Billot found the supposed position of

the De Unione so at odds with Thomas’ other discussions that he felt that this disputed question

could only be spurious.28 On the other hand, Garrigou-Lagrange found the De Unione

compatible with Thomas’ other discussions and reads the De Unione as putting forward a

distinction between (1) the eternal esse of the Word and (2) that same esse as communicated to

the humanity of Christ in time. In terms of language, he prefers the nova habitudo of the Summa

Theologiae.29 Erich Przywara also lines the esse secundarium up with the nova habitudo of the

Summa, but in doing so seems desirous of affirming the created character of esse secundarium or

at the least, keen to indicate its analogical character.30 Przywara’s interpretation may have

inspired Hans urs von Balthasar as he sought in his own way to explore questions of Christ’s

being.31

Prompted by the Christological reflections of H. Diepen,32 Jacques Maritain revised his

notion of the “primary effect” of subsistence and posited a distinction between the reception of

existence by an essence and the exercise of existence by the supposit. Subsistence, for Maritain,

is a state “by reason of which the essence so completed faces existence not in order only to

receive it, but to exercise it, and constitute henceforth a centre of existential and operative

activity, a subject or supposit which exercises at once the substantial esse proper to it and the

diverse accidental esse proper to the operation which it produces by its powers or faculties.”33

Although Maritain believes that his “emended position concerning subsistence,” has been

“elaborated from a purely philosophical perspective without depending on any particular

theological thesis,” nevertheless, he seeks “to test” the validity of his philosophical notions

                                                                                                               27 For a survey of the debate regarding the esse of Christ in the early twentieth century, see Jean-Pierre

Torrell, “Le thomisme dans le débat christologique contemporain,” in Saint Thomas au XXe siècle: colloque du centenaire de la “Revue thomiste” (1893-1992), Toulouse, 25-28 mars 1993, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino (Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1994): 379-392, especially 382-387.

28 See L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato (Rome, 1895), thesis 7, sect. 4: 125-126, fn. 1. 29 See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore: Commentarius in Tertiam Partem Summae

Theologicae Sancti Thomae (Turin: R. Berruti & Co., 1945), 320. For a critique of Garrigou’s interpretation, see John Froula, “Esse Secundarium: An Analogical Term meaning that by which Christ is Human,” The Thomist 78.4 (2014): 561-64.

30 See Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics—Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans. J.R. Betz and D.B. Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2014), part 1, section 2, §7: 304-305.

31 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 3, Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1992), 202-203, 220-229.

32 See H.-M. Diepen, “La Critique du Baslième selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 50 (1950): 82-118, 290-329.

33 Jacques Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence: Further Elucidations,” in Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 438.

8

within the theological context of the incarnation and the question of the esse of Christ.34

Consequently, he argues that Thomas’ language of esse secundarium in the De Unione suggests

that there is a created esse “by which the human nature is actuated, as it demands to be insofar as

it is potency in regard to the act of existing.” But adds that “this esse is only received by the

human nature, it is not exercised by it.”35 Despite some textual and metaphysical reservations

that could be raised about this distinction,36 let us focus on its application in the context of

interpreting the meaning of esse secundarium.

Maritain claims that “the created existence of the human nature is integrated or

‘attracted,’ just as that nature itself, to the ens personale, to the subsistent whole. . .”37 Despite

his description elsewhere of this human esse as a “temporal and created echo” of the “uncreated

personal existence” of the Word “in the human substance of Christ,”38 it must be asked whether

the created esse of the human nature is prior in ordo naturae to the human nature’s union with

the person of the Word? The language of “echo” suggests no, but the language of “attraction”

suggests yes. Furthermore, Maritain says that the temporal and created esse is “proper to the

human nature.”39 But is the human nature actuated through its union with the Word or does it

receive its actuation through the same natural line that all created natures receive their

existence?40 If the human nature is to be uniquely the Word’s, must it not be actuated through its

                                                                                                               34 See Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence [2],” in Degrees, 439-440. 35 See Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence [2],” in Degrees, 440. 36 It does not seem manifestly evident that a distinction between existence and subsistence “rests upon the

fundamental principles of Thomistic thought” (430). To be sure, Thomas uses the term subsistentia (e.g., SCG 4.49), but use and meaning are not synonymous. We can also readily acknowledge the language of subsistence (with a meaning closer to that proposed by Maritain) in early Thomist commentators such as Giles of Rome (e.g., in 3 Sent., d. 6, pars 3, a. 2c | Rome, 1623: 258b; for an alternate account of the same question, but one which does not invoke esse subsistentiae, see Giles, Quodl. 5, q. 3 | Louvain, 1646: 272-273). And while the distinction between esse existentiae and esse subsistentiae is a frequent one in the Thomsitic commentary tradition, it would seem that the distinction has a special home in the metaphysics of Scotus (e.g., Ord. 3, d. 6, q. 1, nn. 10 & 31 | ed. Vaticana, 9: 235, 242). While this in no way mitigates the possibility of its truth, it certainly raises questions about its purported foundation in “fundamental principles of Thomistic thought”. Thomistic? Perhaps. But in Thomas’ own texts? This would require further textual interpretation and verification. Maritain insists throughout both iterations of his notion of subsistence that a nature formerly an id quo becomes a quod. Such an assertion does not seem to be easily reconciled with ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c or Compendium Theologiae, c. 212 despite the frequency with which Maritain cites these texts. At one place he speaks of subsistence as a “substantial mode” (431), and indeed his final position suggests that there is something of a modal distinction between reception and exercise, but such a distinction would fall far closer to Suarez than it would to the thought of St. Thomas.

37 Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence [2],” in Degrees, 441. 38 Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence [2],” in Degrees, 442. 39 Maritain, “On the Notion of Subsistence [2],” in Degrees, 441. 40 In momentarily adopting Maritain’s language of “actuation,” I do not intend to invoke the distinction

between act and actuation suggested by Maurice de la Taille, see “Created Actuation by Uncreated Act,” in The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act, trans. Cyril Vollert (West Baden Springs, IN: West Baden College, 1952), 34-35; cf. “Actuation créée par acte incréé,” Recherches de Science Religeuse 18 (1928):

9

assumption by the Word? If so, then is it true to say that the human nature has what is “proper”

to it? How could any finite creature have as its “proper” and proportionate actuation an infinite

and uncreated act?

Bernard Lonergan’s appropriation of esse secundarium in his Christological systematics

presupposes an interpretation of compatibility and offers an explanatory proposal for the

meaning of esse secundarium. He rejects the temptation toward an analogy derived from an

analysis of the metaphysical composition of a finite being and, instead, opts for an analogy

rooted in contingent predication.41 This strategy opens up interpretive possibilities.

Consequently, Lonergan affirms that the esse secundarium is a supernatural and substantial act

received in the human essence of Christ.42 Because it is supernatural, this substantial and

secondary act “is received in the human, substantial, and individual human essence such that [the

secondary esse] excludes from that essence the substantial act or esse which it is naturally

proportioned to receive.”43 This means that esse secundarium is the actualization of an

obediential potency not a natural potency.44

More recently, Richard Cross has argued that the major difference between the De

Unione and the other texts is not so much “the claim that the human nature contributes secondary

esse to the divine suppositum,” (since, as far as Cross is concerned, “this claim in the De Unione

account entails no more than that the human nature is a truth-maker—a claim that Aquinas

always accepted”) but rather consists in Thomas’ “abandoning the claim that the human nature is

a truth-maker precisely in virtue of its sharing in the esse of the suppositum.”45 The shift Cross

sees is one of dependency, “On Aquinas’s standard account, the human nature is a truth-maker in

virtue of its dependence on the divine suppositum; in De Unione, the nature is a truth-maker in

virtue of its communicating esse to the divine suppositum.”46

                                                                                                               260. For an analysis and critique of De la Taille’s theology of the hypostatic union, see David Coffey, “De la Taille on the Grace of Union,” Irish Theological Quarterly 79.3 (2014): 197-218. For an analysis and critique of the distinction between created actuation and uncreated act, see Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), thesis 7, pars 3: 250-51.

41 See Lonergan, Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, CWL 7: 131, 152; cf. De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 7: 247-255.

42 See Lonergan, Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, CWL 7: 146, 154; cf. De Verbo Incarnato, assertio 9: 259.

43 Lonergan, Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, CWL 7: 142. 44 See Lonergan, Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, CWL 7: 112; cf. De Verbo

Incarnato, assertio 9, n. 11: 263. 45 Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford

Uniersity Press Inc., 2002), 64. 46 Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 63.

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While this is a compelling analysis and one which illustrates the need for a synthetic

application of Thomas’ principles (not merely those which are ready-to-hand in a given text),47

nevertheless, it seems that the dichotomy suggested is a false one. If we look to the Summa, we

will find that there is a twofold unity constituted by our soul and body: (1) of nature and (2) of

person.48 This suggests that there are two lines of causality going forward. These two lines are

affirmed in the De unione, for “the soul is united to the body as its form to constitute a human

nature,”49 and “soul and body as united constitute a supposit and hypostasis, if it exists per se,

which is composed from each.”50 These lines of causality explain why both form and supposit

are said to be terms of generation, albeit in different ways, for “generation is brought to term at

the supposit as to what is generated, but to nature as to that which is received through

generation.”51

Now only one of these lines has full play in the incarnation, namely, that of the

constitution of nature, for the intelligibility of nature is determined according to form,52 but as to

the divine supposit, it cannot be constituted simpliciter from the union of soul and body, nor does

it have existence simpliciter through the human nature,53 for even though we say that in the

incarnation Christ is a composite person, we do not say that his person is composed “as though

his existence were constituted by many things (for this is against the intelligibility of an eternal

reality), but because it extends itself to many things which are assumed into that existence.54

                                                                                                               47 By this comment, I in no way intend to eschew the importance of discerning historical development.

Thomas does really change his position on a number of issues. But mere silence is not sufficient evidence for a shift in position, especially if other texts temporally on either side of the text under consideration bear witness to the seemingly absent principle.

48 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2: “ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas: naturae, et personae. Naturae quidem, secundum quod anima unitur corpori, formaliter perficiens ipsum, ut ex duabus fiat una natura, sicut ex actu et potentia, vel materia et forma. Et quantum ad hoc non attenditur similitudo: quia natura divina non potest esse corporis forma, ut in Primo probatum est. Unitas vero personae constituitur ex eis inquantum est unus aliquis subsistens in carne et anima. Et quantum ad hoc attenditur similitudo : unus enim Christus subsistit in divina natura et humana” (ed. Leonina, 11: 23b).

49 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2, ad 13: “anima unitur corpori ut forma eius ad constituendum humanam naturam” (ed. Obenauer, 62).

50 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2, ad 17: “anima et corpus unita constituunt suppositum et hypostasim, si per se existat, quod ex utroque componitur (ed. Obenauer, 64).

51 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2, ad 16: “generatio terminatur ad suppositum quidem sicut quod generatur, ad naturam autem sicut ad id, quod per generationem accipitur. Unde forma dicitur generationis terminus” (ed. Obenauer, 62).

52 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3 (ed. Leonina, 11: 30b). 53 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[5]: “Cuiuslibet enim rei subsistentis oportet esse unam naturam tantum per quam

simpliciter esse habeat. Et sic Verbum Dei per solam naturam divinam simpliciter esse habet: non autem per humanam naturam, sed per eam habet quod sit hoc, scilicet quod sit homo” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a).

54 Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2: "persona non dicitur composita quasi esse suum sit ex multis constitutum (hoc enim est contra rationem aeterni), sed quia ad multa se extendit, quae assumuntur in illud esse" (ed.

11

Elsewhere, Thomas will speak of Christ’s body as being sustained (sustentificatum) or

made substantial by the hypostasis of the Word,55 and in the De Unione he says that the human

nature “exists in another, that is, in the hypostasis of the Word of God.”56 It does not exist

properly “as a part in a whole,” because in the natural order of things a part would in some way

cause or constitute the esse of the whole,57 which in the supernatural instance of the incarnation

cannot be the case.58 Consequently, “it should be said that a body united to a soul is presupposed

for the assumption of human nature, but united, I say, by a union constituting humanity but not

by a union constituting a man.”59

While terminologically speaking Cross is correct to say that “the image of ‘communion

in esse’ does not occur in earlier accounts,” nevertheless, conceptually speaking this is

inaccurate.60 For repeatedly in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas speaks of the Word drawing

(trahere) the human nature into His personal subsistence.61 If a supposit draws a metaphysical

                                                                                                               Moos, 242).

55 Thomas, Quodl. 3, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: “substancia dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim sumitur pro ypostasi, et sic uerum est quod corpus Christi sustentificatum mansit per hypostasim Dei Verbi: non enim per mortem soluta est unio Verbi neque ad animam neque ad corpus; et sic remanet simpliciter idem numero corpus secundum ypostasim siue suppositum, quod est persona Verbi” (ed. Leonina, 25.2: 246b.74-247a.82).

56 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2c: “Sic igitur, quia natura humana in christo non per se separatim subsistit, sed existit in alio id est in hypostasi Verbi Dei — non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem —, ideo humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum, sicut nec persona. — Unde relinquitur, quod in Christo non est nisi una hypostasis vel suppositum, scilicet divini Verbi” (ed. Obenauer, 56).

57 Thomas Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: “ex unione anime et corporis constituitur et homo et humanitas, que quidem duo hoc modo differunt quod humanitas significatur per modum partis, eo quod humanitas dicitur qua homo est homo, et sic precise significat essencialia principia speciei per que hoc indiuiduum in tali specie collocatur, unde se habet per modum partis, cum preter huusmodi principia multa alia in rebus nature inueniantur; sed homo significatur per modum totius : homo enim dicitur habens humanitatem uel subsistens in humanitate, sine precisione quorumcunque aliorum superuenientium essencialibus principiis speciei, qui per hoc quod dico : ‘habens humanitatem’, non preciditur quin habeat colorem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92b.140-155).

58 Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4: “quamvis compositio quantum ad aliquid salvetur in incarnatione Verbi, nullo tamen modo est ibi ratio partis. Divinitas enim pars esse non potest, propter imperfectionem quae est de ratione partis. Humana autem natura similiter non potest esse pars, quia compartem non habet, vel etiam quia non causat esse personae quae dicitur composita” (ed. Moos, 242); cf. SCG 4.49.[10]: “In Christo enim vere quidem fuit haec anima et hoc corpus: non tamen ex eis constituta est persona aliqua praeter personam Dei Verbi, quia sunt ad personalitatem Dei Verbi assumpta” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b).

59 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2: “dicendum quod corpus unitum anime preintelligitur assumptioni humane nature, unitum autem dico unione constituente humanitatem, non autem unione constituente hominem” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 93a.186-189).

60 Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 58. 61 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[4]: “Non autem Verbum Dei subsistentiam habet ex natura humana, sed magis

naturam humanam ad suam subsistentiam vel personalitatem trahit: non enim per illam, sed in illa subsistit;” [6]: “Subsistit autem per naturam divinam: non autem per naturam humanam, sed eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit ut in ea subsistat;” [9]: “Quod autem anima et corpus in Christo ad personalitatem Verbi trahuntur, non constituentia aliquam personam praeter personam Verbi, non pertinet ad minorationem virtutis, ut octava ratio procedebat, sed ad

12

element into its subsistence, surely, this metaphysical element is being brought into communion

with the subsistence of the supposit such that it shares in the subsistence of the supposit. This

would not negate the possibility of the metaphysical element contributing ontologically in some

way to the supposit (without necessarily changing the supposit or its subsistence in a

fundamental way).

The contribution for Thomas, in the case of the of Incarnation, would be participation in a

species, there is no reason to suppose (given the qualifications we enumerated above) that

anything further is meant by: “the eternal supposit is sustained [or made substantial] through the

human nature,” than just what Thomas says: “inasmuch as He is this man.” The eternal supposit

of the Word does not participate in humanity in just any way, but in such a way that he becomes

this man, that is, he assumes humanity as it would be in individuo, which in this absolutely

supernatural case turns out to be the person of the Word. He is not a person because he is

human; he is human because he is a divine person who became incarnate. We must conclude,

therefore, that in the De Unione the human nature is still existentially dependent on the esse of

the Word by sharing in it, and this dependency is in no way compromised by the “contribution”

of the human nature (in an essential order) insofar as by subsisting in the human nature the Word

shares in our species.62

J.L.A. West has suggested that no plausible meaning of esse secundarium can be

advanced that is also commensurate with Thomas’ other metaphysical commitments. Hence, he

concludes that the De Unione is a “theological and philosophical aberration,”63 constituting a

failed experiment which Thomas later abandons.64 West, therefore, regards the discussion of

Christ’s esse in the De Unione as absolutely incompatible with Thomas’ other discussions of the

esse of Christ because “there is no authentically Thomistic sense of esse that would allow Christ

to have a second esse in virtue of his human nature,” without falling into errors regarding the                                                                                                                dignitatem maiorem;” [15]: “dicitur enim hypostasis Verbi humanae naturae supponi prout eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit, sicut aliquid trahitur ad alterum nobilius cui unitur” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156-57).

62 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4: “humanitas non est forma partis que dicatur forma quia informet aliquam materiam uel subiectum, set dicitur forma totius, in qua suppositum nature subsistit; unde non oportet ponere quod ypostasis increata informetur humanitate, set quod subsistat in ea” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 93b.207-212). This text (along with many others) is why we find the language employed by Corey Barnes uncomfortable: “De Unione highlights the esse of the Word as determined by the form of human nature. While Thomas's other treatments more narrowly highlight the one esse of the Word, this is not to the exclusion of the nature's role in forming that esse” (see Barnes, “Albert and Thomas on Hypostatic Union,” 144). No temporal and created entity can determine or form the divine esse. If God is related to no creature as form to matter, then surely He cannot be related as matter to form. Even form is in potency to esse.

63 J.L.A. West, “Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,” The Thomist 66.2 (2002): 237. 64 West, “Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,” 250.

13

incarnation which Thomas explicitly repudiates elsewhere.65 While I wholeheartedly agree with

West that esse secundarium cannot be understood as an esse essentiae,66 nevertheless, I do not

maintain that this exhausts the interpretive possibilities of esse secundarium, and, consequently, I

propose an alternative. Contra West’s epithet “philosophical aberration,” R.E. Houser has

offered a very cogent and helpful reminder that the De Unione in no way presents us with a

change or shift in Thomas’ basic metaphysical principles regarding esse.67 In this way, he echoes

Etienne Gilson’s own convictions about this text, which unfortunately have received little to no

attention.68

In sharp contrast to West, Victor Salas argues that the text of the De Unione is coherent

and compatible with Thomas’ other discussions provided that it is read in light of Thomas’

notion of Christ as a composite person.69 He clearly articulates the principle of contingent

predication and rightly identifies Christ’s human esse with the new created relation which

obtains between the Word and his humanity.70 I cannot, however, share Salas’ conclusion that

“the human esse of which Aquinas speaks is not really something other than the divine esse.”71

Such a conclusion seems to directly contradict article four’s reply to the first objection: “the esse

of the human nature is not the esse of the divine.”72 If Christ’s human esse is the new created

relation which obtains between the Word and his humanity, then it is difficult to understand how

it could not be something really distinct from the divine esse, as the divine esse is uncreated and

(presumably) the esse secundarium is created: there is always a real distinction between creator

and creature. Thus, while Salas’ solution assuages one contradiction, it highlights another: is

there a real or only mental distinction between Christ’s esse secundarium and His divine esse?

John Froula has rightly called attention to the acute textual problems Salas’ solution faces

and has also situated Salas’ solution within a more general interpretative trajectory.73 I have

                                                                                                               65 West, “Metaphysics of Esse in Christ”, 232. 66 West, “Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,” 235-236. 67 See Roland E. Houser, “Avicenna and Aquinas: Essence, Existence, and the Esse of Christ,” The Saint

Anselm Journal 9.1 (Fall 2013): 1-21, especially 16-21. 68 See Etienne Gilson, “L’Esse du Verbe Incarné selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” AHDLMA 35 (1968): 23-

36. 69 Victor Salas, “Thomas Aquinas on Christ’s Esse,” The Thomist 70.4 (2006): 578. 70 Salas, “Thomas Aquinas on Christ’s Esse,” 597, 599-600. 71 Salas, “Thomas Aquinas on Christ’s Esse,” 602; cf. 592, 595. 72 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen

simpliciter dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

73 See John Froula, “Esse Secundarium: An Analogical Term meaning that by which Christ is Human,” The Thomist 78.4 (2014): 557-80, especially 564-68.

14

nothing but praise for Froula’s thorough and sound critique of Salas’ interpretation. I cannot,

however, accept Froula’s own positive exposition of the meaning of esse secundarium as a “by

which” whereby Christ becomes man not simpliciter but secundum quid, without further

qualification.74 The by which of Christ becoming this man is the human nature,75 because it is by

form or essence that there is participation in a species,76 and this is in the order of first act and

according to the causality proper to form or essence. While it is certainly the case that Thomas

sometimes speaks of esse as an id quo77 and even at times puts it in the order of first act,78

nevertheless, the lines of causality proper to essence and existence should be more explicitly

distinguished, for even form is in potency to esse.79 If we are to regard esse secundarium as an

esse existentiae (albeit taken analogically) and not as an esse essentiae, then we should not

expect it to exercise the causality that is proper to an essence, namely, the conferral of

participation in a species. But if we think in terms of efficient causality, what further efficient

causality would be required apart from the causality of the divine esse? Would not any other

efficient causality be superfluous?80

In conversation with these readers of the Angelic Doctor (some of whom are to be

numbered among the greatest Thomists of the twentieth century), I put forward my own modest

                                                                                                               74 See, Froula, “Esse Secundarium,” 573-80, especially 579-80. 75 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae

simpliciter sustentificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter sustentificatur per naturam humanam. . . Sustentificatur autem suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam, inquantum est hic homo” (ed. Obenauer, 86); cf. SCG 4.49.[5]: “Verbum Dei per solam naturam divinam simpliciter esse habet: non autem per humanam naturam, sed per eam habet quod sit hoc, scilicet quod sit homo” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a).

76 See Thomas, ST IaIIae, q. 1, a. 3c: “unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas” (ed. Leonina, 6: 10a).

77 See Thomas, SCG 2.54 (ed. Leonina, 13: 392). 78 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: “Inter essentiam igitur et habentem essentiam non cadit

aliqua potentia media quantum ad actum ipsius essentiae in habentem, qui est esse; sed ipsa essentia dat esse habenti: et iste actus est quasi actus primus. Egreditur etiam ab essentia alius actus, qui est etiam actus habentis essentiam sicut agentis, et essentiae sicut principii agendi: et iste est actus secundus, et dicitur operatio: et inter essentiam et talem operationem cadit virtus media differens ab utroque, in creaturis etiam realiter, in Deo ratione tantum; et talis actus est generare; et ideo, secundum modum intelligendi, natura non est principium ipsius nisi mediante potentia” (ed. Mandonnet, 177). See also, in 1 Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: “Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod est dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de veritate dictum est, dist. 19, quaest. 5, art. 1” (ed. Mandonnet, 766).

79 See Thomas, SCG 2.52.[7]: “omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia antequam esse acquirat” (ed. Leonina, 13: 388a).

80 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 7, pars 4, n. 1: 252; Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, pars 4, sect. 4, §72: 146.

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reading. What I believe my interpretation adds to the conversation as it has progressed thus far is

a wider theological (and historical) frame within which to assess the meaning of esse

secundarium. To be sure, theology can never do without philosophical principles. But a rightly

ordered interpretation of a theological hypothesis requires explicit advertence to theological

principles. The hypothesis of esse secundarium is not simply a metaphysical problem created by

an analogical attempt to foster the understanding of a revealed mystery: it is a properly

theological problem. As such, it demands a theological framework for interpretation. My

interpretation seeks to identify the theological principles at play within Thomas’ texts that can

help us to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of what Thomas may have meant by esse

secundarium.81

This status quaestionis not only illustrates some of the inadequacies of past and current

interpretations of esse secundarium but also identifies at least five major positions that may be

taken with respect to its meaning. First, there is the interpretation that simply regards it as an

“aberration” or error. Advocates of this interpretation regard the account of Christ’s esse given in

the QD de Unione as (1) incompatible with Thomas’ other accounts in the rest of his corpus. We

can see this historically in someone like Cajetan and more recently in someone like West. But on

the side of those advocating compatibility, there are at least four possible interpretations. Those

who advocate only (2) a mental distinction between the esse secundarium and the divine esse;

examples of this interpretation include Garrigou-Langrange and V. Salas.

But even granting a real distinction, there could still be disagreement over whether or not

esse secundarium denoted an esse essentiae or an esse existentiae, insofar as both a created

essence and a created existence would each be really distinct from God. The seventeenth century

Carmelites of Salamanca entertained (3) esse essentiae as a possible interpretation. But if one

accepts that esse secundarium ought to be accepted as an esse existentiae, there could still be

disagreement over whether such an esse existentiae is natural or supernatural. Suarez and Scotus                                                                                                                

81 It may come as some surprise that I do not spend a significant amount of time treating either the Patristic background and its influence upon Thomas’ Christology (e.g., the conciliar decrees of Ephesus or Chalcedon or the issues of Nestorianism and Monophysitism) or the relevance of the “three theories” on the hypostatic union presented by Lombard in distinctions six and seven of the third book of his famous Sententiae. The reason for this is that these contexts and their influences have already been noted and chronicled by others when treating this same issue of Christ’s esse secundarium (e.g., West, Salas, and Barnes), and while I find these contexts indispensible and illuminating, I do not think they are definitive in helping us to solve the fundamental interpretive difficulties this hypothesis raises for Thomas’ Christology. Consequently, I am trying to draw attention to what might be called (although somewhat anachronistically) “systematic” theological principles operative in Thomas, such as the principle of contingent predication, his theology of the divine missions, his deployment of the theorem of the supernatural, etc.

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would each argue that there is an esse existentiae which is (4) natural to every nature, including

Christ’s. In contrast to all of these interpretations, however, this thesis argues that Thomas’

account of esse secundarium in the QD de Unione is compatible with all of his other discussions

of Christ’s esse and in addition also maintains that the esse secundarium is a real, supernatural,

esse existentiae.

 

3 Thesis

Consequently, I argue that esse secundarium denotes a supernatural, substantial, created

participation of Christ’s human nature in the uncreated communication of the divine esse of the

Word, the Son of the Father. The supernatural reality denoted dogmatically by the term

hypostatic union and systematically by the term gratia unionis is denoted existentially by the

term esse secundarium. The term esse secundarium disappears in the Summa Theologiae but the

meaning does not. By reading the De Unione and the Summa Theologiae together within a wider

Christological framework (historically and systematically), we will be able to undertake a more

robust (re)reading of Thomas’ earlier works and obtain a clearer picture of the development in

his consideration of Christ’s esse insofar as he temporally became man.

 

4 Partitio

With such various (and disparate!) interpretations in focus, the dissertation is divided into

three major parts. The goal of part one is twofold. First, to present the Christological context out

of which Thomas’ own project emerges. Second, to show the shift in the meaning of esse

between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as it is deployed in the Christologies of that period.

Esse is used as a technical term in medieval Christologies at least as early as Hugh of St. Victor

(with Latin patristic resonances going back to Boethius and Hilary of Poitiers), but its meaning

seems to be little if not at all distinguished from nature or essence.82 As theological systems

                                                                                                               82 See for example, Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentiis, 2.1.9: “Quid est homo? Si naturam quaeris:

corpus et anima. Bene dico, quia hoc est homo; hoc esse hominis est, quia hoc esse hominem facit” (ed. Berndt, 311) and “Ex humanitate est homo; ex divinitate est deus. Quod homo est ex anima et carne est. Hoc esse eius est quia natura eius est” (ed. Berndt, 314-15). See also, Gilbert, Exp. in Boet. contra Eut., 1.1: “Prius naturam deinde personam ipso tanquam noto nomine ‘nature’ diffinit. Recte utique quia naturalium omnium—ideoque omnium personarum que ex naturis aliquid sunt—secundum philosophos nature sunt esse. Omne uero esse eo, quod est, naturaliter prius est” (ed. Häring, 242); Exp. de Hebd., n. 35: “Ait ergo: DIUERSUM EST ESSE i.e. subsistentia, que est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST i.e. subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo” (ed. Häring, 194); and Exp. in Boet. contra Eut., 3.36: “De quocumque enim dicitur ‘est’, aut est ipsa aliquorum essentia aut est ex essentia” (ed. Häring, 279).

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become more complex around the middle of the twelfth century, we begin to see more advanced

compositional questions asked about Christ, even as we also see some theologians pressing for

greater precision of language and concepts. A notable, if also controversial, exemplar of this

desire is found in Gilbert of Poitiers (d. 1154). For this reason, our first chapter begins with him

because he in large part determines the emergence of the conceptual framework that will come to

dominate Christology by the turn of the twelfth century and certainly by the mid-thirteenth.

Even so, Peter Lombard (d. 1160) is still able to construct one of the most successful

theological projects of all time with little to no explicit invocation of metaphysical principles or

explanations. His famous Sententiae serve as the fertile ground out of which medieval,

theological questions emerge. For this reason, I devote chapter two to his Christology. Yet,

within decades of his death we already begin to see his more theoretical speculations undergo

terminological transpositions in other masters such as Simon of Tournai (d. 1201), Prepositinus

(d. 1210), and Stephen Langton (d. 1228). As inheritors of what is now referred to as the

“subsistence theory,”83 these three medieval masters provide us with some of the most advanced

theological reflections of the twelfth century. We must examine the way in which they employ

esse as a technical term in their Christologies and explore their systematic attempts to account

for the principle(s) of Christ’s unity, for as Walter Principe noted almost fifty years ago,

questions about the existence of Christ arose out of questions about Christ’s unity.84 For this

reason, I devote chapter three to charting the course of such developments among these three

thinkers.

It is not, however, until the thirteenth century that we see esse imbued with its own

distinct meaning and explanatory power, which is to say that it is not until William of Auvergne

in Trinitarian theology and Albert the Great in Christology that ontologically precise questions

                                                                                                               83 In utilizing the terms “homo assumptus,” “subsistence,” and “habitus” to distinguish the three views I

want to note a different strategy and terminological usage employed by N.M. Häring, “The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154),” Medieval Studies 13 (1951): 28-39. Häring tries to remain faithful to the labeling of the three opinions as “first,” “second,” and “third.” This has its advantages, as it allows Häring to reserve terms or phrases such as “habitus theory” and “Christological nihilism” for specific tenants of the third opinion’s Christology. I have chosen, however, to follow the more common designations, not only because of their prevalence in recent literature but also because in later medieval discussions the order of presentation is sometimes altered, and thus the “first opinion” discussed in a given work is not always that of the homo assumptus view, nor will the subsistence theory always be the “second”. For just one example, see William of Auxerre at Summa Aurea 3, tr. 1, c. 2 (SB 18A: 13); cf. Principe, William of Auxerre’s Theology, 72-73, 196, n. 28.

84 See Principe, Theology of the Hypostatic Union, vol. 1: 93-96; cf. 217, fn. 67.

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begin to be raised in theology.85 The illustration of twelfth century developments precipitating

this profound shift in meaning will deepen appreciation for the genuine novelty of the way in

which Thomas understands the meaning of esse and thereby also rule out (3) esse essentiae as a

viable meaning for esse secundarium, insofar as it is a meaning that has been superseded by

metaphysical developments appropriated theologically by Thomas.

Thomas de Vio Cajetan (d. 1534) and Francisco Suarez (d. 1617) are among the most

celebrated luminaries of the high scholastic period. They are also among the few commentators

who advert explicitly to the text of Thomas’ QD de Unione. Their reactions, however, are very

different: Cajetan finds the position contained in the de Unione incompatible with Thomas’ other

treatments, whereas Suarez sees in the de Unione confirmation for his own idiosyncratic reading

of Thomas’ discussion of Christ’s esse in the Tertia Pars. The chronicling and analysis of these

divergent reactions to Thomas’ text will constitute part two of our dissertation (chapter four) and

will provide us with two sets of answers against which we may measure our own analysis of the

text. It will also provide us with crucial insights into the positions advanced within more recent

debates about esse secundarium (as illustrated above), insofar as Cajetan instantiates an

interpretation of (1) incompatibility and Suarez advances a (4) naturalist interpretation. I will

show how each of these interpretations fails. Chapter four will also present an opportunity to

consider an aspect of the position of Garrigou-Lagrange and thereby also show the inadequacy of

advancing only a (2) mental distinction between esse secundarium and the divine esse.

In part three, I undertake a rigorous textual and metaphysical analysis of article four of

Thomas’ De Unione text. The bulk of this foray will consist in exegesis through which I seek to

illustrate the consistency and compatibility of Thomas’ position in the De Unione with his

discussions of the same topic in the remainder of his corpus. A close reading of the De Unione

text in conjunction with careful comparisons to Thomas’ other works, however, can only yield so

much, and if we are to do justice to the genius of this hypothesis of esse secundarium, then we

must also make a positive claim about what it means. I embark on this task in chapter five.

                                                                                                               85 See William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval

Studies, 1976), cc. 1-4: 16-34. For an account of Albert’s doctrine of esse in general, see Rosa E. Vargas, “Albert on Being and Beings: The Doctrine of Esse,” in A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 627-48. For an account of its application within his Christology in particular, see Corey Barnes, “Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Person, Hypostasis, and Hypostatic Union,” The Thomist 72 (2008): 107-46. For discussions of the impact of Muslim philosophy on William and Albert, see R.J. Teske, “William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 153-170 and Amos Bertolacci, “Albert’s Use of Avicenna and Islamic Philosophy,” in A Companion to Albert the Great, 601-11.

19

Our path to this telos will be opened by a demonstration of the integral connection

between Thomas’ use of the terms hypostatic union, gratia unionis, and esse secundarium. This

strategy will direct our attention to two other theological principles: the analogy of contingent

predication and the notion of a supernatural, substantial, created participation. These principles

well help us to articulate precisely what esse secundarium means and set us in a theologically

and metaphysically sound position to address the many interpretive and theological problems

faced by past and contemporary interpreters with respect to the rest of Thomas’ corpus.

Consequently, the last chapter will take up Thomas’ other accounts of Christ’s esse and

demonstrate how they are not incompatible with his account in the QD de Unione.

Having completed the task of interpretation in six chapters, I offer in epilogue form a

sketch of what a systematically constructed account of esse secundarium would look like and try

to situate it among contemporary concerns within Christology today. If the hypothesis of esse

secundarium is a true one, then its theological relevance is not of simply historical value. Rather,

it suggests a systematic development that ought to be appropriated and applied within the present

exercise of the disciplina theologiae.

 

20

Chapter 1 Hec est Mirabilis Nouitas:

The Christology of Gilbert of Poitiers  Narratio 1

The Boethian opuscula sacra provided a fertile ground out of which questions regarding

divine predication, human knowing, metaphysical composition, and the division of the arts and

sciences could emerge and be cultivated by twelfth century masters such as Gilbert of Poitiers,

Thierry of Chartres, and Clarembald of Arras. And while there is absolutely no reason to doubt

the wide influence of the school of Chartres in the twelfth century, it is the Christological

“opinion” influenced by Gilbert that eventually came to be the predominant conceptual

framework under which thirteenth century masters operated in questions regarding the

incarnation of the Son of God.86

This means that an examination of Gilbert’s philosophical and theological commitments

is essential if one is to understand the development of Christology in the late twelfth and early

thirteenth centuries. The influence of Arabic and Greek sources brought untold intellectual riches

to the schools, circles, and universities of the West and changed the shape of western medieval

intellectual life.87 But even prior to the opening of the floodgates for these new sources, there is

                                                                                                               86 Hugh of St.-Cher observes, “secundo modo ab omnibus conceditur” (Scriptum 3, d. 6, n. 4 | ed. Principe,

187); in light of Hugh’s comments, Principe concludes that “by about 1230, at least, theological opinion had definitely solidified with respect to the three opinions and that not only is the note of heresy universally accepted for the third opinion, but the first opinion no longer has any convinced supporters.” See, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, vol. 3 of The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century (Toronto, PIMS: 1970), 59. Marcia Colish comments on the “newly developed consensus” of the thirteenth century that, having been informed by Aristotelian language, “was to make a reformulated version of the subsistence theory. . . the theory of choice” (See her Peter Lombard, 1: 436). See also, Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1c: “secundum opinionem secundam quam Magister in VI distinctione III libri Sentenciarum ponit, que est communis opinio modernorum et aliis multo uerior et securior. . .” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 91b).

87 For accounts of the western reception of such texts, generally, see Charles Burnett, “Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 370-404 and D. N. Hasse, “The Social Conditions of the Arabic-(Hebrew-)Latin Translation Movements in Medieval Spain and in the Renaissance,” in Wissen über Grenzen: Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter, ed. A. Speer and L. Wegener (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006): 68-86. For some examples of particular receptions of particular texts, see Amos Bertolacci, “On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization”, in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics, ed. D. N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 197-223; Martin Pickavé, “On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Theory of Individuation,” in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics, 339-363; and R.J. Teske, “William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 153-170; and D.N. Hasse, Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300 (London / Turin: The Warburg Institute / Nino Aragno Editore, 2000).

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an organic line of development in the lectures, glosses, commentaries, disputations, sententiae,

and summae in which these new sources were implemented and to which they were applied.

My goal in this chapter, therefore, is to illustrate the conceptual beginnings of a particular

development in Christology with respect to the meaning of esse, which although this term is

often equated with essence or nature in twelfth century authors (including Gilbert),88

nevertheless, the systematic exigence in some twelfth century masters compels them to extend

the meaning in suggestive ways. I will follow this line of development with respect to esse from

the twelfth into the thirteenth century in chapter three, charting a course through certain

questions of constitutional Christology.

Despite Thomas’ frequent criticisms of the “Porretani” in his Trinitarian theology, the

importance and prevalence of the quod / quo distinction in his Christology makes a grounding in

the thought of Gilbert indispensible for a developmentally attuned investigation of Thomas’

doctrine on the esse of Christ. As has often been noted by Gilbert’s promoters and

commentators, the quod / quo distinction almost had the status of a first principle in Gilbert’s

complex but highly influential teaching.89

Without in any way wanting to contest this insight, nevertheless, I think it important first

to situate Gilbert’s philosophical framework within his theological project, especially as it

unfolds within his commentary on the Boethian opuscula sacra even as it also frequently

transgresses the textual boundaries of Boethius’ temple precincts. This will lay a surer

foundation for illustrating how Gilbert’s epistemological and metaphysical commitments

                                                                                                               88 See for example, Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentiis, 2.1.9: “Quid est homo? Si naturam quaeris:

corpus et anima. Bene dico, quia hoc est homo; hoc esse hominis est, quia hoc esse hominem facit” (ed. Berndt, 311) and “Ex humanitate est homo; ex divinitate est deus. Quod homo est ex anima et carne est. Hoc esse eius est quia natura eius est” (ed. Berndt, 314-15). See also, Gilbert, Exp. in Boet. contra Eut., 1.1: “Prius naturam deinde personam ipso tanquam noto nomine ‘nature’ diffinit. Recte utique quia naturalium omnium—ideoque omnium personarum que ex naturis aliquid sunt—secundum philosophos nature sunt esse. Omne uero esse eo, quod est, naturaliter prius est” (ed. Häring, 242); Exp. de Hebd., n. 35: “Ait ergo: DIUERSUM EST ESSE i.e. subsistentia, que est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST i.e. subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo” (ed. Häring, 194); and Exp. in Boet. contra Eut., 3.36: “De quocumque enim dicitur ‘est’, aut est ipsa aliquorum essentia aut est ex essentia” (ed. Häring, 279).

89 N.M Häring observes, “A thorough study of the id quo and quod with all its ramification in Gilbert’s writings is as vital as a proper understanding of act and potency in the works of St. Thomas.” See Häring’s, “The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154),” Medieval Studies 13 (1951): 8. See also, John Marenbon, “Gilbert of Poitiers,” in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 328, 340-43; Christophe Erismann, "Explaining Exact Resemblance: Gilbert of Poitiers's Conformitas Theory Reconsidered," in vol. 2 of the Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 4; and Nielson, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century, 47-49.

22

manifest themselves in his Christology, which will in turn promote a clearer illustration of how

Gilbert’s Christology comes to influence later developments.

Finally, by situating Gilbert’s Christology within its wider philosophical and theological

contexts, it is possible to suggest why certain features of his Christology such as the invocation

of “personal property” and habitus lead later twelfth century polemicists such as Gerhoh of

Reichersberg and John of Cornwall to associate Gilbert and the “second opinion” (i.e., the

subsistence theory) so closely with the Lombard and the “third opinion” (i.e., the habitus

theory).90

These polemical associations, albeit based on confusions, already anticipate

Christological problematics in regard to the character of the hypostatic union (accidental or

substantial?), the principle (or principles?) of Christ’s unity, and Christ’s human substantiality

and creaturliness. Such issues will surface clearly in the upcoming discussion of developments

within Simon of Tournai, Stephen Langton, and Prepositinus (ch. 3), which will in turn set the

stage for addressing some of the very same problematics as they arise in Thomas’ Christology

(ch. 5-6) and in his scholatic reception (ch. 4). Such developments, however, must be grounded

in at least their proximate sources. It is for this reason that I begin with a treament of the

Christology of Gilbert of Poitiers and follow with a treament of the Christology of Peter

Lombard (ch. 2).

1 Theological Project

Whereas Gilbert believes that the fundamental problem in the approaches of an Arius or

Sabellius to the mystery of the Trinity is a mixing or confusion of the propriae rationes of

natural matters with theological matters,91 he attributes an ignorance of meaning to Eutyches and

Nestorius.92 This failure of understanding is, curiously, not relegated simply to the realm of faith

or theology but is assigned as a failure in philosophy. Thus, while for Gilbert there is certainly a

division among the sciences, nevertheless a master must possess command of how they are

interrelated so that especially in theology one can understand where principles diverge.

                                                                                                               90 See Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Liber de Novitatibus Huius Temporis, ed. N.M. Häring (Toronto: Pontifical

Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), 4.57-58 (43), 7.4 (50), 13.2-3 (58), and 21.1-2 (76). See John of Cornwall, Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam III, ed. N.M. Häring, in Medieval Studies 13 (1951), cc. 1-2 (260-63).

91 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. I de Trinitate, prol. 2.6: “Quales fuerunt Arriani et Sabelliani et multi alii qui naturalium proprias rationes theologicis communicauerunt et utrisque communes ab inuicem contraxerunt” (ed. Häring, 58)

92 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut., prol., n. 7 (ed. Häring, 234).

23

1.1 What kind of knowledge can we have about God?

Gilbert is deeply aware of the human limitations with respect to the knowledge we can

attain about God, “the intelligible power of the [human] mind in this life is not sufficient to

comprehend the divine substance,” but such a position does not lead to despair or the

abandonment of theology, since Gilbert is convinced that the mind can in some way know the

divine substance,93 and the theological discipline itself receives its name from the principal thing

which it perceives, namely, God.94 Consequently, “God is indeed intelligible, but he is not

comprehensible.”95 Designating the subject matter of Boethius’ project, Gilbert notes that God is

“in magnitude unlimited, in contemplation incomprehensible, and in word inexplicable,”96 while

also simultaneously affirming that God is rightly understood and laudably preached.

In this way, Gilbert articulates the paradoxical but also fundamental, methodological

structure of theology whose task it is to unfold (explicatio) the sacred mysteries according to a

path that always underscorses creaturely limitations while also always exalting the limitlessness

of God. For Gilbert, the via remotionis or via negativa is the principal (perhaps even only)

strategy available to the theologian. But in order for this basic principle of Gilbert’s theological

project to beomce fully manifest, one must first be familiar with his foundational epistemological

commitments and also understand how such commitments are integrated with his notion of faith.

1.2 Proportio inter res, conceptum, et sermonem

Limitation in our knowledge of divine things is not the only limitation noted by Gilbert.

For even our knowledge of created realities is not all-encompassing. There is a hierarchy that

obtains among names and things: “imposition accommodates not so much things to names as it                                                                                                                

93 Gilbert, Gloss. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1, f. 3rb: “Vnde inuisibilia ipsius nec corporea nec imaginaria uisione sed tantum intellecta conspiciuntur, id est, ea ui mentis qui dicitur intellectus quam species intelligibiles sine corpore uel corporis imagine conspici solent nisi quod in hac uita ad conprehendendam diuinam substantiam etiam intelligibilis illa uis mentis non sufficit. Uel aliter dicitus inuisibilia quia quamuis deus ex diuersitate non constet, nobis tamen cum per ea que facta sunt cognoscendi modus est multiplex sicut quod immensus ex quantitate eternus ex perspecuitate elementorum intellectu conspicitur ex quorum gubernatione” (Lisbon, Biblioteca Nacional Fundo Alcobaça, XCVII/178).

94 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2.36: “Ab ipsius autem rei, que percipitur, natura theologica et a proprietate SINE MOTU ABSTRACTA ATQUE SEPARABILIS cognominatur. Recte utique. NAM DEI SUBSTANTIA i.e. Deus uel diuinitas ET MATERIA CARET ET MOTU i.e. nec Deus nec eius essencia potest esse materia” (ed. Häring, 85).

95 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut., 1.26: “Nam [Deus] intelligibilis quidem est: non uero comprehnsibilis” (ed. Häring, 247).

96 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. I de Trinitate, prol. 1.2: “Deus enim, de quo his agitur libris, magnitudine interminabilis, contemplatione incomprehensibilis, sermone inexplicabilis recte intelligitur ac laudabiliter predicatur” (ed. Häring, 53).

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does names to things. . .”97 Similarly, “things are conceived in the intellect, signified in a word.”

Yet, a concept can’t hold all things, nor can whatever a thing is be known in words. Even an act

of intelligence is incapable of showing all that there is in some reality.98 Gilbert believes that “a

word falls just short of a concept, for not even in the signification of a thing does a spoken word

produce as much as the intelligence conceives.”99 This is not to say that there is no relationship

between concept, word, and thing, for a hierarchy is a relationship; it is simply to establish the

primacy of the res: words and concepts do not exhaust realities; they are proportionately related

to realities. For this reason, Gilbert is constantly at pains to maintain a “proportion of reason,”

even in those unique cases where fullness of reason cannot be attained.

1.3 Three Degrees of Knowing

Such limitations in human knowing do not lead Gilbert into skepticism. He affirms that

accidents, subsistents, and subsistences are all objects capable of being grasped by the intellect in

some way, and he presents a three-fold division for the basic operations or motions of the mind:

(1) opinion, (2) imagination, and (3) understanding.100 At their root, each of these acts consists in

some kind of conceptualization or perception, terms which Gilbert mostly uses interchangeably.

When the conceptualization is of that which is not (e.g., fictitious or mythical creatures), such

conceptualization can only have the epistemic status of opinion.101 But things that are may be

perceived with or without assent.

When perception occurs with assent, Gilbert calls this understanding (intellectus). He

notes that the term refers to a power of the mind,102 but he also recognizes that there is an

ambiguity in the application of this term by others.103 Gilbert prefers to reserve its fullest

                                                                                                               97 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trinitate, prol., 1.12: “Sed quia non tam res nominibus quam nomina rebus

accomodat inpositio, quibuscumque res conueniunt, nomina non conuenire non | possunt” (ed. Häring, 55-66). 98 Gilbert, Exp.in I de Trin., prol. 3.21: “Tria quippe sunt: res et intellectus et sermo. Res intellectu

concipitur, sermone significatur. Sed neque sermonis nota, quicquid res est, potest ostendere neque intelligentie actus in omnia quecumque sunt eiusdem rei, offendere ideoque nec omnia conceptus tenere” (ed. Häring, 67).

99 Gilbert, Exp.in I de Trin., prol. 3.22: “Citra conceptum etiam remanet sermo. Non enim tantum rei significacione uox prodit quantum intelligencia concipit. Similiter et scripture significacio ad auctoris sui conceptum se habet. Unde manifestum est quod, qui audit uel legit, oratoris quidem seu scriptoris conceptum ex his, que significacio prodit, perpendit. Sed de re non nisi ex eiusdem oratoris seu scriptoris sensu recte decernit” (ed. Häring, 68).

100 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.14 (ed. Häring, 245). 101 See Gilbet, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1. 15: “Sciendum quod animi motus quandoque in id quod est:

qundoque uero in id quod non est offendit. Et ita uel quod est uel quod non est concipit. Sed eius, quod non est, quicumque conceptus ‘opinio’ dicitur: ut bicorporis centauri uel tricorporis chimere conceptus” (ed. Häring, 245).

102 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., prol., n. 8 (ed. Häring, 184). 103 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.27 (ed. Häring, 247).

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application to the perception of a reality with assent.104 Perception without assent is a kind-of

fore-staging process that Gilbert refers to as imagination.105

Generated realities (nativa) of the natural order can only be conceived through their

causes,106 but what the mind initially intends or considers is mixed and confused; consequently,

it must undertake a process of abstraction by which it separates and distinguishes the various

components and properties constituting the reality to be known.107 In this way, the mind not only

makes a (single) likeness of the reality to be conceived, but also makes a multitude of likenesses

of those properties which constitute the unity of the reality to be known.108

An id quod or subsistens, therefore, is conceived with help or support through the

identification and conception of its various id quos or subsistentiae. Such conception always

involves abstraction, for although Gilbert maintains that a subsistence exists concretely, it is

known abstractly.109 Perfect or complete understanding, therefore, is the perception (or

conceptualization) of a reality through one of its properties with assent, but imagination or

incomplete understanding only involves perception (or conceptualization) through a property

without assent.110

Because a created or generated (nativa) res or id quod can only be known through what

constitutes it, there is no such conceptual support to aid the mind in conceiving of simple and

unmixed realities (genuina) such as God or prime matter. Since God is not composed in any way,                                                                                                                

104 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.22: “Si uero id, quod intra rerum similitudinem aut multitudinem primo perpendit deinde percipit, ab ipsis similibus aut aliter multis delegerit et fixa mentis acie ipsius proprietate notata perceptioni assenserit, ‘intellectu’ uocatur. Recte utique. Tunc enim uere in animo rei similitudo esse dicenda est cum de inter cetera rem amminiculo sue proprietatis selegerit ac per hoc precedenti perceptioni assenserit” (ed. Häring, 246).

105 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.21: “Sed quoniam est eius quod est—cuius tamen ueritatem nondum tenet assensio—per quondam nominis translationem uocatur ‘imaginatio’. Imago nanque res est, non tamen ueritas, illius cuius imago est. Ideoque rei perceptio sine ueritatis ipsius assensione recte dicitur ‘imaginatio’” (ed. Häring, 246).

106 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.16: “Nichil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nichil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potestatem concipi potest” (ed. Häring, 245).

107 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.17: “Sed sicut in sentiendis exterioribus primo hesitat sensus deinde in id, quod sibi subiectum est, certus figitur: ita quoque animus illius, in quod proprio motu intenditur, naturarm primo mixtim atque confuse cogitat: deinde ab aliis, in que simul cum ea offenderat, quadam propria rationis abstractione illam separate et ipsam, sicut est fixa acie notat” (ed. Häring, 245).

108 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.20 (ed. Häring, 246). 109 See Gilbet, Exp. de Hebd., 1.37 (ed. Häring, 195); cf. Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.31: “res uniuersales

intellectus ex quibuslibet particularibus sumit” (278) and 3.35: “uniuersalia, que intellectus ex particularibus colligit, sunt quoniam particularium illud esse dicuntur quo ipsa particularia aliquid sunt” (279).

110 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.35: “De imaginatione quia est unus modus intelligendi—quo scilicet res etiam sue proprietatis nota sed sine assensione percipitur—et de perfecto intellectu, qui et proprietate et assensione constituitur, tacet quoniam explanatio, que fit exemplo, non omnes partes enumerat sed paucis et his maxime, per quas cetere intelliguntur, exemplat, Ut hoc loco satis apparet: perfectum intellectum debere uocari ‘intellectum’ cum etiam imperfecto hoc nomen conueniat” (ed. Häring, 249).

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Gilbert does not regard him as an aliquid: “For God is [his] essence; he is not something. Nor is

he made to be something by a created subsistence.”111 Consequently, only through the removal

of all such components can God come to be known with assent;112 he cannot be understood by

the human intellect in a whole and perfect way.113

An especially arresting application of this apophatic method of remotio may be found in

the affirmation that there are two natures in Christ. For although the operative definition of

nature, according to Boethius, in the Christological affirmation of two natures is specific

difference, Gilbert recognizes that God has no specific difference. Consequently, it is not that

there are two specific differences, one of man and another of God. Rather, what is meant is that

what is ‘specifying’ of man is not ‘specifying’ of God and what is ‘not-specifying’ of God is not

specifying of man.114 The “nature” of God, therefore, does not inform or constitute the humanity

through composition with it, nor does rationality constitute or inform divinity.

1.4 The Meaning of Faith

Out of this apophatic posture of intellectus in the presence of the res genuina divina,

there seems to come Gilbert’s general definition of faith as the “perception with assent of the

truth of anything.”115 He also adds, however, that this term applies in a special way to “the

perception of invisible realities” so that faith is said to be “that by which the rational mind truly

and with assent perceives that which is the esse of all things and he who is to be honored by

all.”116 Not surprisingly, therefore, Gilbert maintains that in theological matters, faith comes

before reason and in believing we come to know. For faith enables us to conceive not only those

realities for which human reasons are insufficient but it even enables us to conceive the

                                                                                                               111 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.24: “Deus enim est essentia: non est aliquid. Nec esse aliquid

fingitur creata subsistentia” (ed. Häring, 247). See also, 1.100: “Non est ergo Deus aliquid uel speciali uel specifica subsistentia” (ed. Häring, 263).

112 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.25 (ed. Häring, 247). See also, 1.33 (249). 113 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.34 (ed. Häring, 249). 114 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 1.101: “Quod igitur auctor ait tam catholicos quam Nestorium secundum

ultimam nature diffinitionem duas in Christo constituere naturas sic intelligendum uidetur: quod quamuis non sit altera Dei altera hominis specifica differentia, secundum hoc tamen dicitur ‘altera’ quod que est hominis specifica, non est Dei: et que est Dei non-specifica, non est hominis” (ed. Häring, 263).

115 Not surprisingly, this definition also appears in his Gloss. in Heb., “hic dicendum quod fides est uertatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione perceptio” (Lisboa Alcobac MS 178, f. 113rb and Bruges MS 78, f. 101va).

116 Gilbert, Exp. de 1 Trin., 1.3: “In religione prima est fides que quidem generaliter est ueritatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione preceptio. Sed ad quorundam maxime perceptionem inuisibilium hoc nomen per excellenciam usus contraxit ut scilicet fides dicatur qua rationalis mens uere et cum assensione percipit id quod est omnium esse et eum, quo ab omnibus honorandus est, cultum et que gratie ipsius premia cultorum unitas sperat” (ed. Häring, 71).

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principles for how such things can be so.117 For Gilbert, then, faith is the precondition for the

doing of theology.

The resemblance between the definition Gilbert gives for intellectus on the one hand and

fides on the other is arresting, as they are each acts of perception with assent. It is helpful,

therefore, to recall that the assent of faith bypasses, as it were, the requisite foregrounding proper

to a full act of intellectus. God has no composition, consequently, there are no properties

according to which an intrinsic (or extrinsic!) or otherwise constitutional cause of God may be

perceived. Our natural cognitional structure, according to Gilbert, is simply not keyed to realities

which lack composition (genuina). Our normal cognitive processes are designed to perceive the

cause(s) of composite and generate things (nativa) and in this way arrive at full knowledge of

them, which is perception with assent.

Based on the texts of the Boethian commentaries alone, however, it still seems reasonable

to press on Gilbert’s definition of faith. Is this really “first in religion,” that is, can it be truly

called a religious faith? Is this religious belief? If not, would it really be necessary as a

prerequisite for theology? Gilbert’s contracted definition of faith in the Boethian commentary

includes reference to worship, grace, and the hope for reward.118 Are these entailed by all acts of

perception with assent?

Gilbert seems to anticipate such a problem in his Gloss on Hebrews, and as he introduces

the same definition of faith which we find in the Boethian commentaries,119 he also

acknowledges that not everyone who exercises an act of perception with assent can be called

faithful or a believer (fidelis). For in some cases, we are deceived about those things which we

perceive with assent, Gilbert gives the example of Jacob’s deception about the death of Joseph

(cf. Gen. 37: 33).120 Yet even in the instance of someone who really attains to the truth of things

through an act of perception with assent, such knowledge (e.g., of the causes of the force and

                                                                                                               117 See Gilbert, Exp. de 2 Trin., 1.9: “In theologicis autem, ubi est ueri nominis atque absoluta necessitas,

non ratio fidem sed fides preuenit rationem. In his enim non cognoscentes credimus sed credentes cognoscimus. Nam absque rationum principiis fides concipit non modo illa, quibus intelligendis humane rationes suppeditare non possunt, uerum etiam illa quibus ipse possunt esse principia” (ed. Häring, 164).

118 Gilbert, Exp. de 1 Trin., 1.3: “fides dicatur qua rationalis mens uere et cum assensione percipit id quod est omnium esse et eum, quo ab omnibus honorandus est, cultum et que gratie ipsius premia cultorum unitas sperat” (ed. Häring, 71).

119 See Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “Est autem fides, etc. Hic dicendum quod fides est ueritatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione perceptio” (Lisboa Alcobac MS 178, f. 113rb; Bruges MS 78, f. 101va).

120 Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “Plurima tamen sunt que siquis aliter quam sint cum assensione percipiat non dicitur tamen fidelis. Non enim Iacob dicendus est infidelis eo quod uiuentem filium a bestia credebat occisum neque petrus qui cum uere educebatur de carcere existimabat se uisum uidere” (LA 113rb; B 101va).

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number of the elements; of the motion, order, and effects of the stars; of the kinds and natures of

creatures) does not render someone worthy of the designation “believer.”121

When an act of perception with assent attains those “invisible things which also belong to

religion” then can it be called “through a certain excellence, faith.” Gilbert enfleshes this claim

through the text he is glossing, “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” (Heb. 11:1)

taking this passage to mean that faith is that “through which the rewards promised to believers

(which are not seen) are already in some way said to subsist in them.”122 Consequently, Gilbert

understands faith to be the way in which the invisible (glory) which awaits us has already laid

claim to us, insofar as it has taken root in us, and thereby altered what we are able to perceive.

Faith, therefore, orients us eschatologically, our way of life is now heavenly (cf. Phil.

3:20), for the invisible has in a certain way made its home in us. Grace is what makes this new

perception possible. Just as it is by grace alone that the elect will receive invisible rewards after

this life, so too is it by grace alone that in this life we have perception with assent of the invisible

(things to come).123 Yet, the invisible (things) attained through faith are not relegated to the

future, as the ensuing text from Hebrews makes clear, for it is also by faith that “we understand

that the worlds (saecula) were prepared by the word of God” (Heb. 11:3). Gilbert adds that by

saecula is meant “those things which began to exist from nothing.” Hence, God’s creation of the

world ex nihilo also falls within the invisibilia attained through faith.124

Each of these facets constituting the unique character of faith is present in Gilbert’s

compacted definition in his exposition of the Boethian opuscula sacra, but it has been fruitful to

flesh these elements out through a foray into his gloss on Hebrews. Such a rich text merits at

least one further observation. It is important not to underestimate the significance of Gilbert’s

                                                                                                               121 Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “In eodem quoque rerum genere siquis prout est etiam cum

assensione rei ueritatem percipiat non ideo fidelis uocatur ut fide ui et numero elementorum, de motu et ordine et de effectibus siderum, de generibus et naturis creaturarum, de spaciis locorum et temporum, de signis euenturorum et postremo siquis rerum potuit cognoscere causas. Vnde tremor terris qua ui maria alta tumescunt obicibus ruptis rursumque inseipsa resident et multa huiusmodi sicut se habent percipiat non ideo a nobis fidelis esse dicitur” (LA 113rb; B 101va).

122 Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “Ex quidem manifestum est rerum inuisibilium et ad religionem pertinentium per quandam ex | cellentiam fidem uocari. Hec ergo quanta sit materia primum demonstrat apostolus dicens, fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, id est, per quam ea que nondum uidentur | promissa fidelibus premia iam quodammodo in eis subsistere dicuntur” (LA 113va; B 101vb).

123 Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “Sicut enim per solam gratiam electis inuisibilia post hanc uitam ita per solam gratiam eisdem in hac uita inuisibilium cum assensione perceptionem se daturum promisit” (LA 113va; B 101vb).

124 Gilbert, Gloss in Ep. ad Heb., c. 11: “Quod autem fides sit inuisibilium assensio plurimis apparet exemplis fide namque intelligimus secula esse aptata uerbo dei secula uocat que esse ceperunt ex nichilo ut mundum et ea que nascuntur in mundo que omnia deus primo fecisse legitur” (LA 113va; B 101vb).

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language of subsistere, for faith is that by which the invisible (realities promised to us) in some

way already subsist in us. Because faith “skips” what Gilbert calls imagination—the fore-staging

process normally requisite for perception with assent of generated realities (nativa)—it requires

grace, such that grace stands in, as it were, for the cognitive structures that would normally

constitute the principles or properties making knowledge of a res or subsistent possible.

This brief sketch of Gilbert’s meaning of faith suggests a possible structural parallel

between the three “stages” of knowing and the three “kinds” of faith (or perception with assent).

Like Gilbert’s tri-fold distinction for knowledge, so too in his more expanded discussion of the

meaning of fides there can be found a first “level” which is determined by an absence. In the case

of opinio, the res grasped has an ontological status which is strictly fictitious. Likewise, there is a

fides or assent which is misplaced because one has been deceived; one gives their assent where it

is not due. The myriad catena of invisible (created) causes attainable by perception with assent

could be reached ex fide without the requisite intellectus when someone (e.g., a student) takes the

word of another (e.g., a teacher). But such created realities could also be attained through a

perception with assent that does pass through an adequate process of intellectus. In the end,

however, there remain realities and phenomena which can be reached through no upward

intellectus whatsoever; only the perception with assent made possible by grace supplies an

epistemological scaffolding sufficient for the undertaking of the work of religion, and

consequently it is only someone exercising this kind of assent who can rightly be called a

believer (fidelis).

1.5 What is the Proportion between Theology and its Subject Matter?

Gilbert believes that certain principles are common to all genera, no matter what the

discipline or faculty,125 but there are also principles which are unique and proper to each.126

Those who have fallen into Trinitarian error have conflated the common with the proper and in

this way have usurped the proper principles of natural matters into theological matters.127 It is

                                                                                                               125 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. 1 de Trinitate, prol. 2.4: “Similiter et alii in facultatibus suis aut theoremata

mensurarum aut anxiomata ponderum aut aliorum nominum communes multorum | siue proprias aliquorum generum rationes se firma scientia tenere et uigilanter attendere docuerunt: uel serio philosophantes uel inter sophistas sese conficitis similitudinibus exercentes” (ed. Häring 57-58).

126 See Gilbert, Exp. Boet. 1 de Trinitate, prol. 2.1: Omnium, que rebus percipiendis suppeditant, rationum alie communes sunt multorum generum, alie proprie aliquorum” (ed. Häring, 57).

127 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. I de Trinitate, prol. 2.8: “Has igitur naturalium rationes recte sicut uidetur intelligentes Arrius Ethius Eunomius itemque Noetus Sabellius Praxeas Hermogenes et Priscillianus et alii multi sed eorundem naturalium proprias esse minime attendentes, in theologica usurpauerunt” (ed. Häring, 59).

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thus by “a usurpation of reason,” that Arius claimed that the Father alone is God.128 Gilbert reads

Boethius as having undertaken a correction of such errors,129 for the heretics have transgressed

the boundaries between the various disciplines and conflated the principles peculiar to each.130

The relation between words, concepts, and realities is operative in Gilbert’s discussion of

theology and its difference from the other speculative faculties such as natural science (physica)

or mathematics. Each of these disciplines has differing notions of singulars,131 and they are

fundamentally distinguished from one another according to the properties of their subject

matters.132 Hence, the theological discipline itself receives its name from the principal thing

which it perceives, namely, God.133

Gilbert recognizes that terms such as “substance” or “quality,” which we would use to

talk about God, are borrow words from the natural disciplines or in some way derive from our

natural usage. Yet, he is adamant that “although what is predicated of God is named ‘substance,’

or ‘quality,’ or ‘quantity’,” nevertheless, “this is not what is said,” that is, the common meanings

of these words is not what is intended in theology, but by some “proportion of reason,” these

terms are used.134 But such a proportion is not from the “fullness of reason,”135 for it is partial not

                                                                                                               128 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. I de Trinitate, prol. 2.9: “Hunc autem Arrius uocat Patrem de quo uera quidem

ratione dicit: ‘Pater est solus Deus’. Sed rationis usurpatione dicit etiam: ‘Solus Pater est Deus’. Ex quo infert quod neque Christus neque Spiritus sanctus est ueritate essentie Deus” (ed. Häring, 59).

129 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. 1 de Trinitate, prol. 2.19: “Illorum ergo detestabiles errores Boecius uolens destruere et humilium infirmitatem iuuare Symacho et quibusdam aliis sapientibus scribit de trium numero personarum simplici ac singulari essentia et de tribus unius essentie numero diuersis personis” (ed. Häring, 61).

130 Gilbert, Exp. Boet. I de Trinitate, prol. 2.20: “Et utrumque rationibus ostendit sed secundum diuersarum genera facultatum diuersis. Nam primo theologicis essencie singularitatem | atque simplicitatem, deinde naturalibus numerabilem personarum diuersitatem. Unde recte intelligi poterit prenominatos hereticos ex eo quod naturalium proprias rationes theologicis communicauerunt esse deceptos” (ed. Häring, 61-62).

131 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2.9: “Has describit per motum atque separationem et eorum contraria, binas in singularum notionibus differentias ponens” (ed. Häring, 80).

132 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2.3: “Quod quoniam expositis speculationum partibus melius intelligi potest, quot ipse sint, iuxta rerum sibi subiectarum proprietates enumerat et ad quam propria theologicorum pertineat ratio monstrat” (ed. Häring, 79).

133 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2.36: Ab ipsius autem rei, que percipitur, natura theologica et a proprietate SINE MOTU ABSTRACTA ATQUE SEPARABILIS cognominatur. Recte utique. NAM DEI SUBSTANTIA i.e. Deus uel diuinitas ET MATERIA CARET ET MOTU i.e. nec Deus nec eius essencia potest esse materia” (ed. Häring, 85).

134 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 4.22: “quamuis quod de Deo predicatur nominetur ‘substancia’ uel ‘qualitas’ uel ‘quantitas’ uel aliquo naturalium homine appelletur, non tamen est quod dicitur. Sed aliqua rationis proportione ita nominatur” (ed. Häring, 119).

135 Gilbert, Exp. in I de Trin., 5.21: “ut ergo non tam ex rationis plenitudine quam ex eius aliqua, sicut dictum est, proportione intelligatur huius nominis, quod est ‘persona’, a naturalibus ad theologica facta transsumptio, dicendum uidetur que subsistentium qua ratione uocantur persone” (ed. Häring, 143).

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total. Gilbert even suggests that there is never a “property of reason by which God is called

‘substance’.”136

At the same time, however, the intelligible principle grounding the transfer of meaning in

theology is not in every way diverse from that which obtains in natural things.137 Take for

example, existence. Nothing is said to exist by a property of its own essence which it has in and

of itself and not from another. Only he who is not different from but properly is his own essence

can be said to exist in and of himself. Hence, it is only by participation in him that anything is

said rightly to exist. God is the fundamental reference point for the transfer of terms and meaning

in theology,138 even as he is the foundation and principle for the existence of all things.

2 Philosophical Framework

In undertaking an elaboration of Gilbert’s “philosophical framework,” I have no intention

of divorcing it from his “theological project.” The textual evidence that we have from Gilbert is

theological; this means that everything we know about his “philosophical framework” is derived

from how it is deployed within a theological horizon and at the service of theological tasks.

Because of his subtlety, however, it is more useful to isolate some of his terms and principles in

order to recognize them more clearly as they manifest themselves within his Christology.

2.1 Two Kinds of Definition

Because he is cognizant that God and prime matter can in no way share in the same genus

or intelligibility (ratio) as subsistents, subsistences, and accidents,139 yet also recognizing that the

term “nature” is often applied to all of these realities and noting that it is employed in diverse

                                                                                                               136 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 4.27: “Id uero, quo Deus est quod est, non modo in se simplex est sed etiam

ab his, que adesse subsistenciis solent, ita solitarium ut preter id unum proprietate singulare, dissimilitudine indiuiduum, quo est, aliud aliquid quo esse intelligatur prorsus non habeat. Ideoque nec ipsum nec qui eo Deus est, subiectionis ratione aliquibus substat. Quapropter nequaquam rationis proprietate uocatur ‘substancia’” (ed. Häring, 120).

137 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2. 47: “Quod non omnino a naturalium ratione diuersum est” (ed. Häring, 88).

138 Gilbert, Exp. in 1 de Trin., 2.46: “Non enim de quolibet sue essencie proprietate dicitur ‘est’. Sed ab eo, qui non aliena sed sua essencia proprie est, ad illud quod creata ab ipso forma aliquid est et ad ipsam creatam formam et denique ad omnia que de ipsis uere dicuntur—quoniam ex eo tanquam ex principio sunt—dictio ista transsumitur ut de unoquoque diuine forme participatione recte dicatur ‘est’” (ed. Häring, 88). See also, Exp. de Hebd., 1.27 (ed. Häring, 193).

139 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.5: “Multo magis ergo Dei et primordialis materie cum subsistentibus et subsistentiis et accidentibus nulla est generis aut rationis communio” (ed. Häring, 243).

32

ways by diverse faculties and disciplines,140 Gilbert concludes that this is why multiple

definitions of nature are required, for the diversity of things demands a diversity both in word

and meaning. Despite this diversity of use, however, “nature,” cannot constitute the general

topos under which God and creatures are subsumed.141 Consequently, before exegeting Boethius’

various definitions of nature (which are not all definitions in Gilbert’s strict sense),142 Gilbert

distinguishes two different kinds of definition. Some definitions present both (1) that which is

said to be and (2) the to be which is said, but others only present that which is said to be and

never the to be which is said.143

Gilbert gives an example of the first kind in the definition: “man is a rational animal.”

For by this definition there is shown not only the thing (res) which is a man, but even the esse

man. For it is not only the case that he who is man is a rational animal, but also that this is what

it is to be man, namely, “to be a rational animal.”144 In contrast, a definition like “a [specific]

difference is that by which a species exceeds its genus,” reveals the res which is a difference but

does not reveal the esse difference.145 It is perhaps helpful to think of the first kind-of definition

as a quidditative definition, insofar as it gets at what a thing is; whereas the second is merely

designative, since it simply designates a list or set of things which are included within the

referentiality of the term.

With this distinction in definitions at play, Gilbert is quick to note that Boethius’ first

definition of nature (“nature is of those things which when they are can in some way be grasped

                                                                                                               140 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.2: “Natura enim multiplex nomen est adeo quod non solum multis

modis uerum etiam multis significationibus de rebus diuersorum in diuersis etiam facultatibus generum dicitur. Nam et philosophi et ethici et logici et theologici usu plurimo ponunt hoc nomen” (ed. Häring, 243).

141 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.6: “Unde manifestum est quod nomen ‘nature’ nequaquam omnium horum generalis topice i.e. locus potest intelligi. Ideoque nec omnia nominis huius una diffinitione possunt concludi” (ed. Häring, 243).

142 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.3: “Ideoque et hoc loco Boetius non ipsam generaliter naturam diffinit sed eius, que ad suum pertinere propositum uidentur, partes enumerat. . .” (ed. Häring, 243).

143 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.8: “Hic dicendum est quo diffinitionum alie sunt quibus ostenditur non modo quod esse dicitur uerum etiam esse quod dicitur: alie uero quibus tantum quod esse dicitur et nequaquam esse quod dicitur” (ed. Häring, 244).

144 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.9: “Hac enim diffinitione ‘homo est animal rationale’ non solum que res sit homo sed etiam esse homo demonstratur. Non solum enim qui est homo est animal rationale sed etiam hoc est esse hominem: esse uideliciet animal rationale” (ed. Häring, 244).

145 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.10: “Illa uero diffinitione qua dicitur: ‘differentia est qua habundat species a genere’ ostenditur que res sit differentia: non tamen ostenditur esse differentia. Res enim qua species habundat a genere, sine dubio differentia est. Non tamen hoc est eam esse differentiam: ea uidelicet a genere speciem habundare” (ed. Häring, 244).

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by the intellect”)146 is not a definition which reveals the esse nature but instead only designates

those things “which are natures,” that is, which in some way coincide or overlap with natures

compositionally.147 For as it turns out, only the universal affirmative “every nature can be

grasped by the intellect” is true, whereas the universal affirmative every thing which can be

grasped by the intellect is a nature” is false. Consequently, all those things which can be grasped

by the intellect exceeds the number of things which are natures.148 Yet, because of the ambiguity

even in the term “things” (res), Gilbert argues, Boethius has to add that by this definition is

designated both substances and accidents.149

With respect to Boethius’ second definition of nature,150 Gilbert again draws attention to

this important distinction between kinds of definition,151 but in this context, he introduces a four-

fold relationship among terms (nomina): (1) univocal, (2) equivocal, (3) multi-vocal, and (4)

diversi-vocal. (1) A univocal relationship occurs among terms when two (or more) uses of the

same word have the same meaning; (2) equivocal, when the same word is used two (or more)

times but has different meanings in each instance; (3) multi-vocal, when two different words are

used but have the same meaning; and (4) diversi-vocal, when two different words have two

different meanings.152 Here, is clearly illustrated the importance of Gilbert’s earlier distinction

between sermo and conceptum, insofar as it provides the basic and operative distinction between

nomina and diffinitio.

                                                                                                               146 See Boethius, contra Eutychen, 1.63-67: “Nam si de omnibus rebus naturam dici placet, talis definitio

dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere. Erit ergo huiusmodi: ‘natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt’”(ed. Moreschini, 209).

147 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.12: “NATURA EST EARUM RERUM i.e. he res sunt nature QUE, CUM SINT, QUOQUO MODO INTELLECTU CAPI POSSUNT. Hac igitur diffinitione que res sint nature non tamen eas esse naturas monstratum est. Non enim hoc est eas esse naturas: intellectu scilicet capi posse” (ed. Häring, 244).

148 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.29 (248). 149 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.12-13 (244-245). 150 See Boethius, contra Eutychen, 1.78-82: “Sin vero de solis substantiis natura dicitur, quoniam

substantiae omnes aut corporeae sun taut incorporeae, dabimus definitionem naturae substantias significanti huiusmodi: ‘natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit’” (ed. Moreschini, 210).

151 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.60: “Sed hec, que in diuersiuocis est, diffinitionum diuersitas eorundem unam eandemque diffinitionem esse non prohibet. Non enim diuersis tantum sed etiam una diffinitione diuersiuoca declarari minime ambigit quisquis ea que predicta sunt de diffinitionibus recolit: quod uidelicet alie sunt quibus ostenditur non modo quod esse dicitur uerum etiam esse quod dicitur: alie uero quibus tantum quod esse dicitur et nequaquam esse quod dicitur” (ed. Häring, 254-55).

152 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.59: “Cum enim quatuor sint species nominum: uidelicet uniuoca equiuoca multiuoca diuersiuoca: uniuoca quidem et multiuoca una diffinitione, equiuoca uero et diuersiuoca diuersis diffinitionibus demonstrantur” (ed. Häring, 254).

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It is vital to Gilbert’s project to maintain a sharp distinction between substance and

nature,153 but he also feels obligated to explain why Boethius seems to so frequently elide

them.154 Gilbert’s distinction about definitions enables him both to articulate how substance and

nature are distinct, that is, how they are diuersiuoca and not multiuoca but also explain why

Boethius is grouping them together. Consequently, he argues that just as the esse “man” and esse

“risible” are different, yet one and the same substance is truly said to be both “man” and

“risible,” so also the esse “nature” and the esse “substance” differ,155 yet it remains possible to

still predicate them truly of one and the same thing. Such a single description, however, only

indicates that in which nature and substance constitute some kind of unity, it does not manifest

the distinct and diverse esse or qualities of nature and substance.156

Gilbert’s attention to different kinds of definitions and what they include or imply helps

him to identify the ambiguities Boethius is seeking to clarify, such as the overlap in meaning

implied by the terms “nature” and “person” and the need to relate not just the terms but the

realities denoted by the terms. But Gilbert’s attention to definition and his introduction of more

precise technical vocabulary also helps him to isolate pervasive but ambiguous terms that

Boethius seems less concerned to disambiguate, such as “substance.” Consequently, Gilbert

identifies passages wherein Boethius intends by “substance” what Gilbert means by “subsistent”

(subsistens)157 and other passage where “substance” denotes what Gilbert means by

“subsistence” (subsistentia).158

                                                                                                               153 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.57: “Quod uere et sine aliqua dubitatione fatendum esset si

nature atque substantie nomina in eiusdem ‘substantie’ appelatione et ab eadem qualitate essent multiuoca. Quod minime sunt. Nam etsi horum nominum eadem secundum aliquos intelligatur substantia, nunquam tamen eadem qualitas” (ed. Häring, 254).

154 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.59: “Cum igitur a diuersis qualitatibus diuersiuoca nomina sint natura atque substantia, querendum est qua ratione horum eandem dixerit esse diffinitionem” (254).

155 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.58: “Aliud enim est esse naturam, aliud esse substantiam: sicut aliud est esse hominem, aliud esse risibilem quamuis eadem substantia et homo sit et risibilis. Sicut ergo non eadem diffinitio est hominis atque risibilis sic nature atque substantie eadem diffinitio esse non potest” (ed. Häring, 254).

156 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.61: “Unde quamuis natura atque substantia a diuersis rationibus indita sint nomina diuersa, recte tamen illorum una esse descriptio dicitur quia scilicet id, quod est natura atque substantia, non uero esse natura uel esse substantia declaratur. Et sic quidem, qualiter dictum est, natura describitur si uel de omnibus rebus uel de solis substantiis hoc nomen dicatur” (255).

157 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 1.4: “‘Substantias’ hic uult intelligi ea que subsistent: non subsistentias quibus subsistent” (ed. Häring, 243).

158 See Gilbert, Exp. in Hebd., 2.96: “Hic substantiam uult intelligi non id quod est sed ipsum esse i.e. non subsistens sed ipsam subsistentiam quam subsistens in se habendo—quod est ea participando—subsistit” (ed. Häring, 208); cf. 2.140: “substantia, i.e. id quo subsistens est” (218).

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Gilbert believes that “person” and “nature” are diuersiuoca, that is, two different terms

with two distinct meanings,159 but he continues to be haunted by Boethius’ apparent insistence

on acknowledging an ongoing overlap in usage between the terms person and nature. Gilbert’s

integration of his own distinct and technical vocabulary helps him to disambiguate Boethius’

sometimes fluid use of terms, yet while also retaining the integrity of a faithful commentator by

making Boethius’ text more consistent with itself through the expansion of conceptual horizons.

2.2 Basic Terms and Relations: Subsistens, Subsistentia, et Accidentia

As noted in the introduction the distinction between id quod and id quo is a kind of

Grundaxiom for Gilbert, but while this basic proportion running through almost all of created

reality is expressed throughout Gilbert’s corpus according to these grammatical heuristic

structures,160 they are also almost as ubiquitously explicated according to the more dialectically

restricted notions of subsistent (subsistens) and subsistence (subsistentia).161 Accidents too,

however, are in their own way an id quo,162 but these three (i.e., subsistents, subsistences, and

accidents) according to Gilbert, in no way share in a genus.163 This observation indicates that id

quod and id quo are not ontological genera carving up created reality, but rather are ways to

indicate elemental, structural principles of created composites and, thereby, represent distinct but

related orders. As such, an id quod does not come into composition with its id quo, rather their

conjunction (coniunctio) is what makes a thing to be.164

                                                                                                               159 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 2.4: “Nam etsi secundum qualitates diuersas diuersiuoca nomina sunt

natura atque persona et secundum hoc sit nature atque persone multa discretio et ille diffinitiones diuerse, quibus ostendatur non modo quod dicitur esse natura uel persona uerum etiam esse quod dicitur, idem tamen erit quod utroque nomine appellabitur. Et id nulla diffinitio ostendere poterit esse diuersum: sicut id, quod est homo, est risibile et e conuerso cum tamen aliud sit esse hominem, aliud esse risibilem” (ed. Häring, 265).

160 A particularly clear example occurs at Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.45: “Sed in prima affirmatione [‘homo est risibilis’] non id quo est homo—i.e. nominis qualitas—sed is qui ea est homo—i.e. nominis substantia—risibilis esse proponitur. In secunda uero affirmatione [‘homo est indiuiduorum forma’] non is qui est homo sed id quo est homo—i.e. nominis qualitas—indiuiduorum forma dicitur” (ed. Häring, 296).

161 See for example, Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.35: “Ait ergo: DIUERSUM EST ESSE i.e. subsistentia, que est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST i.e. subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo” (ed. Häring, 194) and Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.41: “In quo etiam, quia omnis dictio diuersa significat, quid et de quo diligens auditor attendit. Uerbi gratia: cum hoc nomen, quod est ‘corpus,’ subicimus—quia et id quod est et id quo est corpus designat—supponimus eo siue subsistentiam siue quod ea subsistit et uel alicuius partem, que corpus est, uel id cuius ipsum est pars (350).

162 See for example, Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.67 (ed. Häring, 202). 163 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.5: “Hic diligenter est attendendum quod subsistens cum

subsistentia uel accidentibus nullo prorsus genere seu ratione conuenit” (ed. Häring, 243). 164 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.29: “Esse uero et id, quod est, nec eiusdem generis nec eiusdem

sunt rationis. Et iccirco illorum coniunctio compositio esse non potest” (ed. Häring, 293).

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“Everything that exists,” Gilbert posits, “is either simple or composite.”165 All created

realities are concrete,166 and any created reality which subsists is composite.167 Consequently,

every concrete, created subsistent is composite.168 It is not, however, the conjunction of id quod

and id quo which primarily constitutes the composite character of a subsistent. Rather, there are

two orders of composition corresponding to the composition proper to subsistents (subsistentes)

on the one hand and subsistences (subsistentiae) and accidents (accidentia) on the other. A

subsistent may be said to be composite because it is made up of many other subsistents,169 or it

may be said to be composite because there is diversity amongst the quo by which it exists and the

quo by which it is something (aliquid).170

A subsistent (subsistens), therefore, has many forms or qualities in itself, but it does not

itself inform anything.171 “Subsistent” (in Gilbert’s sense of the word), however, remains a wider

notion than “person” (or “supposit”) because, as just noted, a subsistent can be made up of other

subsistents, as a human is made up of body and soul or bones and flesh.172 The forms or qualities

by which a subsistent exists are subsistences (subsistentiae); for this reason, Gilbert often refers

to subsistentiae as esse,173 and they may be general (i.e., genera), special (i.e., species), or

specific (i.e., specific differences).174 And while Gilbert, following Boethius, acknowledges

                                                                                                               165 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.21: “Omne quod est, aut simplex aut compositum est” (ed.

Häring, 292). 166 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.57: “Nam omnia naturalia non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt” (ed.

Häring, 199). 167 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.64: “Similiter illorum trium [perersonarum Trinitatis] cuilibet idem est

esse et sapientem esse. Item cuilibet illorum idem est esse et bonum esse et huiusmodi. Quod in non simplicibus—quod sunt omnia que creata subsistunt” (ed. Häring, 201).

168 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.68 (ed. Häring, 202). 169 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.65: “Duobus modis compositio accipitur. Unus est quo subsistens aliquod

ex subsistentibus inter se diuersis et a quibus compositum ipsum aliud est dicitur esse compositum: ut homo qui ex carnibus atque ossibus uel ex corpore et spiritu compositus est” (ed. Häring, 201).

170 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.67: “Alius uero compositionis est modus quo non quidem subsistens ex subsistentibus—nam quantum ad hoc simplex est—sed et multis quorum unoquoque est: et multis quorum unoquoque aliquid est, eius constat proprietas: ut hominis spiritus qui—unus et simplex quantum ad hoc quod non ex diuersis subsistentibus constat—et multis subsistentiis est et multis earum accidentibus aliquid est ideoque compositus nec ipsum quod est. Non enim in eo compositionem attendimus quoniam aliud est, quod est, aliud quo est” (ed. Häring, 202).

171 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.94: “Subsistens uero corporeum siue incorporeum predictas quidem, quibus est aliquid, in se formas habet. Ipsum autem nichil informat” (ed. Häring, 262).

172 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.65 (ed. Häring, 201). 173 See for example, Gilbert, Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.35: “Ait ergo: DIUERSUM EST ESSE i.e. subsistentia,

que est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST i.e. subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo” (ed. Häring, 194).

174 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 3.42: “subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. ITAQUE GENERA ET SPECIES i.e. generales et speciales subsistentie SUBSISTUNT TANTUM, non substant. Uere. NEQUE ENIM ACCIDENTIA GENERIBUS SPECIEBUSQUE CONTINGUNT ut, quod sunt, accidentibus debeant. Non enim ipsa genera uel species indigent accidentibus ut sint” (ed. Häring, 280).

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some kind-of natural priority of nature with respect to person,175 nevertheless, he insists on a

mutual interdependence between subsistents and subsistences: corporeality is nothing in act

unless it is in a body, and a body does not exist unless there is corporeality there in it.176

Accidents are related to both subsistents and subsistences, yet differently. Accidents are

in a subsistent (in subsistente) but present to and follow upon subsistences (adsunt

subsistentiis).177 Whereas it is by a subsistentia that a subsistens exists, it is by an accident that a

subsistent is something (aliquid).178 Hence, it is by bodiliness (corporalitas) that a body exists

(as a body) but by whiteness (albidinis) that a body is something white (album). Certain

accidents, therefore, follow upon certain subsistentiae: only a body of some kind can be colored,

hence, the accidentia of color follows upon the subsistentia of bodiliness (corporalitas).179 And

while occasionally, Gilbert will speak as though by a subsistence a subsistent is something,180 he

is clear that no subsistence is in a subsistent the way an accident is present to its subject.181

2.3 Mereology: Universals and Particulars, Wholes and Parts

As already noted above, for Gilbert, universals are abstracted by the intellect from

particulars.182 Metaphysically considered, however, the ontological status of universals within

                                                                                                               175 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 1.1: “Prius naturam deinde personam ipso tanquam noto nomine ‘nature’

diffinit. Recte utique quia naturalium omnium—ideoque omnium personarum que ex naturis aliquid sunt—secundum philosophos nature sunt esse. Omne uero esse eo, quod est, naturaliter prius est” (ed. Häring, 242).

176 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.33: “Quia nanque et esse et id, quod est, cuiusdam consortii ratione sine se esse non possunt—ut corporalitas | et corpus. Actu nanque corporalitas nichil est nisi sit in corpore. Et corpus non est, quod uocatur, nisi in ipso sit corporalitas que est eius esse” (ed. Häring, 278-279).

177 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.14: “HEC ENIM OMNIA i.e. accidentia et substantie tam subsistentes—in quibus accidentia sunt—quam subsistentie—quibus adsunt—INTELLECTU CAPI POSSUNT” (ed. Häring, 245).

178 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.67: “ut hominis spiritus qui. . . et multis subsistentiis est et multis earum accidentibus aliquid est” (ed. Häring, 202).

179 See for example, Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.74: “Recte, cum dixisset QUIA LIGNUM EST, addidit QUOD EST TERRA quoniam, que specialibus subsistentiis dicuntur accidere, non tam ipsis quam ipsarum aliquibus partibus—immo ideo ipsis quoniam ipsarum partibus—addicuntur: ut cum speciali subsistentie, qua homines sumus, adesse dicantur in nobis color sanitas atque scientia, ideo utique hec dicuntur quoniam eius partibus proprietatis ratione—color scilicet corporalitati, sanitas sensibilitati, scientia rationalitati—conueniunt” (ed. Häring, 257-258).

180 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.25: “Natura enim subsistentis est qua ipsum subsistens aliquid est. He uero sunt substantiales forme et, que illis in ipso subsistente adsunt, qualitates et intervallares mensure” (ed. Häring, 319).

181 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.68: “Sed quoniam et ‘subsistere’ et ‘substare’ ex unius subsistentie—diuersis tamen—rationibus id, quod eadem subsistentia aliquid est, uere dicitur: ut homo—subsistit enim homo quoniam subsistentia, qua est et qua dicitur ‘homo’ i.e. humanitas nulli in homine, in quo est, tanquam accidens adest. Substat uero quoniam eidem subsistentie in eodem homine multorum generum accidentia adsunt—nec rerum ueritate nec usu philosophorum dicitur ‘multe substantie’ quod per unam singularem unius speciei subsistentiam substat” (ed. Häring, 286).

182 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 3.31 (ed. Häring, 278).

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Gilbert’s framework is a little unclear.183 At times, Gilbert seems comfortable referring to all

subsistentiae as universals, according to the substantial likeness by which they conform to each

other.184 Yet, he does not seem to allow for them to be mere abstractions insofar as every

subsistentia is singular and concrete (provided that it is really conjoined with its subsistent). He

calls universals such as “man,” “animal,” “wood,” etc. “dividuals” (noting that the term denotes

both genera and species),185 distinguishing them from “individuals” (i.e., particulars) such as

Plato, this animal, or this piece of wood.186

Of first importance, therefore, is to notice that the terms “individual” and “singular” are

not convertible. Every individual is a singular, but not every singular is an individual.187 So

whereas a “dividual” or “universal” is characterized and known by a real and substantial

likeness, an “individual” is characterized and known by a real dissimilarity.188 It seems then that

“dividual” or “universal” is Gilbert’s way to account for how we group (or conceive)

subsistentiae according to a real and substantial likeness.189

Yet the universal, dividual “animal” does not exist on its own, rather a singular

subsistentia exists in its subsistent: this animalitas exists in this animal; this corporalitas exists

in this body. For Gilbert, therefore, a subsistentia cannot exist apart from its subsistens nor can a

subsistens exist apart from its subsistentia. Consequently hec subsistentia considered qua

singular is not a dividual or universal, only when considered or conceived under the substantial                                                                                                                

183 On this, see Erismann, "Explaining Exact Resemblance,” 14-16. I truly believe that Erismann’s treatment of this question and his overal engagement with Gilbert’s epistemology is the best to date, but unfortunately I cannot concur with his conclusions. Gilbert is a realist not a nominalist or idealist, but he is not naïve. Gilbert simply refuses to reduce the real to being aliquid or even a “this”. Consequently, he does not think of universals as res or as subsisting in themselves, yet neither does Thomas Aquinas. It would be a strange intepretation, indeed, to argue that Thomas was a nominalist simply because he denies subsistence per se to universals. A “substantial likeness” for Gilbert is a real likeness, but this in no way requires that it be subsistent. In a similar way (as I will illustrate below), accidental relations for Gilbert are real, but they are not subsistent or substantial.

184 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.119: “Qua similitudinis comparatione omnes ille subsistentie dicuntur ‘unum uniuersale unum diuiduum unum commune unum genus una eademque natura’. Hac itaque communi natura homines, sicut dictum est, bouesque iunguntur” (ed. Häring, 312).

185 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.11 (ed. Häring, 273). 186 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 2.23-26 (ed. Häring, 269-70). 187 Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 2.28: “Diligenter attende quod cum dixerit personam in singularibus dici

adiecit: ‘atque indiuiduis’, innuens utique non omne singulare indiuiduum esse. Sicut enim omnis quidem persona indiuiduum est, non uero omne indiuiduum est persona: ita quoque omne indiuiduum est singulare, non autem omne singulare est indiuiduum. {29} Quicquid enim est, singulare est. Sed non: quicquid est, indiuiduum est” (270).

188 See Gibert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 2.22: “RURSUS SUBSTANTIARUM ALIE SUNT UNIUERSALES substantialis forme similitudine: ALIE sunt PARTICULARES i.e. indiuidue plenarum proprietatum dissimilitudine” (ed. Häring, 269).

189 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.7: “dicendum est quod sicut diuiduum non modo actuali uerum etiam naturali similitudine: ita quoque indiuiduum non modo actuali uerum etiam naturali dissimilitudine dicitur” (ed. Häring, 273).

39

likeness (i.e., by a “comparison of likeness”) which it bears with all other similar subsistentiae

could one then speak of a universal or a dividual, say “animal,” “human,” or “substance”.190 But

how, exactly, can one concrete subsistentia be distinguished from another? Say, hec humanitas

in Peter and illa humanitas in Thomas? For according to Gilbert, it is by one, singular humanity

that there is one, individual man.191

A clear answer is difficult to locate, but I think Gilbert would have to say that it is in

virtue of the really distinct individual, subsistent composites in which the two (different)

subsistentiae inhere that the two subsistentiae can be distinguished, for the union of a humanitas

with a person is a union which integrates such a subsistentia into a subsistent whole. If this is

correct, then it indicates why the principles of knowing a dividual (i.e., similarity) and knowing

an individual (i.e., dissimilarity) are distinct,192 and why an esse or subsistentia may be

conceived immediately according to a substantial likeness, whereas things diverse in both genus

and reason can only be perceived with assent.193

So let’s consider the constitution of a single human person, say Peter. For Gilbert, a

person is a whole not a part,194 an individual not simply a singular,195 and he or she really differs

from all other persons by a real dissimilarity.196 A human person is a subsistent, and since all

created subsistents are composite, all human persons are composite: (1) subsistently, (2)

subsistentially, and (3) accidentally. Thus, (1) a human subsistent is composed of other

subsistents such as the soul and body and (2) the subsistentia humanity by which this person is

human is composed of other subsistentiae. Peter is also the subject of (3) many accidents, both

those which are natural to him and those which although not natural to him are natural to his soul

or body and are therefore truly predicated of him.197

                                                                                                               190 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.119: “Qua similitudinis comparatione omnes ille subsistentie

dicuntur ‘unum uniuersale unum diuiduum unum commune unum genus una eademque natura’. Hac itaque communi natura homines, sicut dictum est, bouesque iunguntur” (ed. Häring, 312).

191 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.69: “Unus enim homo, una singulari humanitate plurimis eidem accidentibus substans, per ipsam non nisi ‘unus homo’ et ‘una substantia’ dicitur. Que uero pluribus eiusdem speciei subsistentiis ‘subsistere’ et ‘substare’ dicuntur, numero plures substantie sunt et dicuntur: ut pluribus humanitatibus plures homines et substantie” (ed. Häring, 286).

192 See Gilbert, Exp de 1 Trin., 5.24 (ed. Häring, 144). 193 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.30: “Quodam tamen rationali habitu interveniente unum

quiddam est siue simplex siue compositum—quod ita mens concipit ut in eo id, quod est, et esse uel quod ei adest, genere et ratione esse diuersa cum assensione percipiat” (ed. Häring, 293).

194 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.64: “persona persone nunquam componitur” (ed. Häring, 300). 195 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 2.28 (ed. Häring, 270). 196 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 2.30 (ed. Häring, 270). 197 See Gilbert, Exp. conta Eut. et Nest., 3.6 (ed. Häring, 272).

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Humanity is a speciel subsistentia, that is, it is a species, which means that it is

constituted by the generic subsistentia animality and the differential subsistentia rationality,

these are “parts” with respect to the subsistentia humanity.198 This seems to correspond with

what Gilbert says elsewhere, namely, that a property of a subsistent is composed of many

natures,199 but whereas he calls rationality a substantial property of humanity,200 he also

recognizes that it is by the singularity of a property that a subsistent, whether “simple” (e.g., the

soul) or composite (e.g., a human) is one.201 Such a singular property is the property of a

subsistent whole.202 So there are properties of subsistences (subsistentiarum) and there are

properties of subsistents (subsistentium). In each case, “property” refers to a subsistentia, but in

one it is a subsistentia that constitutes another subsistentia (e.g., rationality constitutes humanity

through composition with animality) and in the other it is the subsistentia by which a subsistent

is one.

Gilbert is clear that parts of properties are not individuals,203 but somewhat playfully he

also hints that there are properties which are truly individuals because they are constituted by a

constellation of other properties which is not replicated in the composition of any other property

and hence differs from them by a real dissimilarity.204 Such a disjunct would seem to be why

Gilbert distinguishes between personal properties and substantial properties.205 Hence, whereas a

substantial property such as humanitas is constituted by other substantial properties such as

                                                                                                               198 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 4.81 (304), 1.89 (261), and 1.97 (264). 199 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.62: “Sepe etenim alicuius subsistentis proprietas ex multis est

naturis composita” (ed. Häring, 300). 200 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.89: “Qualis est uerbi gratia rationalitas. Hec enim neque

subsistens est neque genus neque species neque accidens subsistentis neque cuiuslibet horum eternum principium. Sed potius specierum, quas cum genere ipsa constituit, uel generis, cuius in subsistente uel subsistentis specie sequitur potestatem, est substantialis proprietas” (ed. Häring, 261).

201 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.67: “Est autem illud unum quandoque simplex ut anima quandoque compositum ut animal et aliquando continuum ut corpus animalis aliquando disgregatum ut aceruus. Tamen sicut simplex ita et compositum sue proprietatis singularitate est unum.” (ed. Häring, 301).

202 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.62: “Nam quandocumque ea, que sunt, aliquod subsistens componunt, et ea, quibus sunt ipsa componentia, totius subsistentis illius proprietatem | componunt. Non autem uniuersaliter conuertitur. Sepe etenim alicuius subsistentis proprietas ex multis est naturis composita. Ipsum tamen subsistens simplex ex nullis subsistentibus constat: ut anime illa specialis subsistentia qua ipsa est et dicitur ‘anima,’ ex diuersis subsistentiis constat. Ipsa uero simplex ex nullis subsistentibus est composita” (ed. Häring, 299-300).

203 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.12: “Ideoque nulla pars proprietatis cuiuslibet creature naturaliter est indiuidua quamuis ratione singularitatis ‘indiuidua’ sepe uocetur” (ed. Häring, 274).

204 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.13: “Illa uero cuiuslibet proprietas, que naturali dissimilitudine ab omnibus—que actu uel potestate fuerunt uel sunt uel futura sunt—differt, non modo ‘singularis’ aut ‘particularis’ sed etiam ‘indiuidua’ uere et uocatur et est. {14} Nam ‘indiuidua’ dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam unumquodque eorum ex talibus consistit propreitatibus quarum omnium cogitatione facta collecito nunquam in alio quolibet alterutrius numero particularium naturali conformitate eadem erit” (ed. Häring, 274).

205 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.111-14 (ed. Häring, 310-11).

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rationality and animality, personal properties are constituted by parts in which accidents play

some kind of constitutive role.206 Not surprisingly, therefore, Gilbert speaks of the “whole form

of Plato,”207 and even of platonitas according to which Plato really and absolutely differs from

Cicero and every other person according to the singular, personal property by which he is

uniquely one and not another.208

2.4 The Meaning of Esse: The Concrete Subsistence of the Whole

These observations set us in a good place to finally make a concentrated foray into the

meaning and role of esse in Gilbert’s framework. Generally, esse may designate any id quo,

whether subsistential or accidental.209 Thus, he sometimes refers to corporeality as the esse of the

body.210 But I can find no evidence that he ever refers to subsistents as esse, rather he insists that

an esse is a subsistentia,211 which is to say that an esse and an id quod or subsistent do not agree

in genus.212 This is but a very concrete illustration of Gilbert’s absolute refusal to violate the

distinction which obtains in created realities between id quo and id quod.213

Gilbert maintains that nothing can be the esse of that of which it is the part.214 This seems

to follow from Gilbert’s insistence that wherever there is a conjunction of an id quod and id quo

there is no composition, strictly speaking, since there can be no composition where there is no

agreement in genus.215 For Gilbert, the esse of species such as humanitas are clearly composed

                                                                                                               206 Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 4.81: “Solent quidem usu nascentium, qui uocatur ‘natura’, in una persona

plurima diuersarum specierum coniungi—ut carnes ossa sanguis colera et huiusmodi—et cum his omnibus anima que tamen inter se aliquo genere et aliqua ratione conueniunt: item subsistentiae generales et differentiales que partes sunt specialium subsistentiarum: et accidentia que etiam numerantur in partibus personalium proprietatum que inter se quandoque aliquo genere, semper aliqua ratione conueniunt” (304)

207 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut et Nest., 3.15 (ed. Häring, 274). 208 See Gilbert, Exp de 1 Trin., 5.25 (ed. Häring, 144). 209 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.25 (ed. Häring, 346). 210 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.33 (ed. Häring, 278-79). 211 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.40 (ed. Häring, 196). There are instances where Gilbert acknowledges

ways in which esse may not only be referred to as form but also as matter but in such cases the esse in question are esse of subsistents and consequently the esse are still subsistentiae. See, for example, de 1 Trin., 2.18, 23 (ed. Häring, 82-83).

212 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.29 (ed. Häring, 293) and Exp. de 1 Trin., 2.64 (92). 213 When Gilbert indicates the difference between saying “est homo” and “est Deus,” he notes in particular

that the id quo / id quod distinction does not apply in God, see de 1 Trin., 4.40-43 (ed. Häring, 123). See also Exp. de 1 Trin., 4.27 (120).

214 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.64: “Nichil enim est esse eius cuius pars est. Esse namque et id, quod eo est, nullo prorsus conueniunt genere. Pars autem et id, cuius est pars, multis generibus etiam singulariter unum sunt. Immo omne genus partis eius, quod ex ea constat, genus esse necesse est. Item: quicquid est alicuius esse, aut est tota substantia illius, cuius dicitur esse, aut pars eius quod est tota substantia” (ed. Häring, 92).

215 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.29: “Simplices quoque subsistentie diuersorum sunt generum: ut rationalitas animatio. Una tamen earum est ratio qua eorum, que sunt, ‘esse’ dicuntur. Ideoque id, quod est totum

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and not simple.216 Generic esse and differential esse constitute speciel esse (i.e., the esse of a

species) and are consequently in some way parts of speciel esse.217 But given the principle about

no esse being a part of that of which it is the esse, it must also be said that generic and

differential esse, although constitutive of the esse of species, are not the esse of speciel esse.218

In order for a subsistentia to be related to something as esse it must be related to it as an

id quo not as a part. Consequently, insofar as a subsistentia such as humanitas comes into

conjunction with a subsistent whole (e.g., this human), Gilbert calls this subsistentia the “whole

esse” of the subsistent. But in other contexts, he also uses the expression “whole form,” insisting

here too that such a form is not simple.219 It would seem that “whole form” (tota forma) and

“whole esse” must be synonyms, especially when Gilbert says things like “the whole form of the

substance by which he is perfect man,”220 or speaks of the “whole form” of the soul.221 And to be

sure, as already illustrated, Gilbert does use forma and subsistentia interchangeably at times.

But given his distinction between personal properties and substantial properties, I do not

think that tota forma and totum esse can be fully synonymous. In at least one place, Gilbert

seems to suggest that “whole form” somehow includes or implies not only subsistences but

accidents as well.222 Such a text offers at least a hypothesis, which further research would have to

verify, according to which Gilbert may sometimes use tota forma to indicate what in other

contexts he calls a personal property and totum esse to indicate a special kind of substantial

property. If such a distinction is sound (even if only as an inference), it could offer a solution as

to how Gilbert accounts for the unity of an individual person insofar as a person is not only

constituted in similarity by subsistences but also in dissimilarity by accidents.

                                                                                                               esse, componunt. Esse uero et id, quod est, nec eiusdem generis nec eiusdem sunt rationis. Et iccirco illorum coniunctio compositio esse non potest” (ed. Häring, 293).

216 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.78: “Itaque esse hominis non simplex aut solitarium est” (ed. Häring, 95). 217 Although “special” is etymologically derivative from the Latin species, nevertheless because of

contemporary, current English usage, I have opted for the somewhat unfelicitous neologism “speciel.” 218 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.65: “Et tota quidem substantia species, que de eo dicitur, est. Pars uero

eius, quod est totum esse, genus est aut differentia que speciem ipsam constituit. Nulla autem pars eius, cuius pars est, species aut genus aut differentia esse potest. Ideoque nulla pars est esse illius cuius pars est” (ed. Harinng, 92).

219 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.57 (ed. Häring, 90). 220 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.57 (ed. Häring, 90). 221 See Gilbet, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.15 (ed. Häring, 274). 222 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.57: “Cuiuslibet enim subsistentis tota forma substancie non simplex est.

Atque illorum, que toti ipsi uel singulis eius partibus adsunt, accidencium multo numerosior est multitudo. Que tamen omnia de subsistente dicuntur ut de aliquo homine tota forma substancie qua ipse est perfectus homo: et omne genus omnisque differentia ex quibus est ipsa composita ut corporalitas et animatio et huiusmodi alie: et denique omnia que uel toti illi forme adsunt—ut humanitati risibilitas—uel aliquibus partibus eius—ut color, qui corporalitati, et scientia que adest rationalitati—et huiusmodi alia infinita” (ed. Häring, 90).

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3 Christology: Explicit, Implicit, and Hypothetical

In this final section, I want to engage a series of questions, some of which Gilbert asked

and answered explicitly, others only implicitly, and some about which I can only speculate an

answer. Such speculation, however, rests on sure principles, insofar as they have been adequately

established above and insofar as they have been shown to be native to Gilbert’s own theological

project.

3.1. What did the Word assume?

Gilbert believes with the Catholic Faith that Christ is one person from and in two natures.

According to his own terminology, therefore, he affirms that Christ assumed a human

subsistence,223 but is not a human subsistent. His human subsistence is composed of a series of

other subsistences (animality, rationality, etc.),224 but his divine essence is not composed but

simple.225 God is his own essence;226 each divine person is the divine essence.227 One divine

person, however, is distinguished from another divine person by a personal property.228 For this

reason it is the Son and not the Father or Holy Spirit who became man because “not a nature but

a person received a nature.” It is the Son, therefore, who was God before the incarnation and who

assumed the human subsistence by which he became man.229 This did not alter him in his

divinity but joined the human subsistence to his divine essence, so that he would be both God

and man.230

                                                                                                               223 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.54: “uidelicet in Christo GEMINAM ESSE SUBSTANTIAM hoc est

diuinam essentiam et humanam subsistentiam SED ipsum esse UNAM PERSONAM” (ed. Häring, 353). See also, 7.43: “Sed quod simul cum humana natura, qua homo est, est etiam diuina, qua Deus est, contingit ASSUMPTIONE qua, cum esset Deus, humanam naturam assumpsit” (351) and 4.90 (306).

224 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.28 (ed. Häring, 84), 2.57 (90), 2.78 (95), and 5.26 (144). 225 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.99: “Dei uero essentia omnino simplex est” (ed. Häring, 263).

See also, 3.61: “Sine principio ENIM et sine fine unus et indiuiduus et simplex Deus EST” (284), and Exp. de I Trin., 2.37 (ed. Häring, 86).

226 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.46 (ed. Häring, 88); see also 54-55 (90). 227 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 2.42 (ed. Häring, 87). 228 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.87: “Pater quoque in ipso est personali proprietate alius ab ipso

sicut et Spiritus sanctus in ipso personali proprietate alius est ab ipso” (ed. Häring, 306). 229 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.37: “Attende quod ait: ‘diuinitas que suscepit’. Et intellige quod

Christus, qui ante susceptionem hanc Deus erat, suscepit: ideoque dictum esse ‘diuinitas suscepit’ quia non natura sed persona suscepit naturam” (ed. Häring, 349).

230 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.90 (ed. Häring, 306).

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3.2 What is one and what is two in Christ? / Is Christ a Composite Person?

The dogmatic answer to this question is of course very straightforward: one person and

two natures. But upon closer examination and in light of Gilbert’s principles above, we can

deepen it by adding qualifications that Gilbert himself might have added, such as the reminder

that in God there is no id quo or subsistentia which differs from a divine person or the divine

essence. Consequently, just as there are not strictly speaking two specific differences in Christ,

so here, too we might be inclined to say that there are not two natures or subsistentiae.

But given the way that Gilbert deploys his principle of apophaticism,231 it remains

imperative to say that there are two: (1) the divine essence by which Christ is God and (2) the

human subsistentia by which he is man,232 keeping in mind that Jesus’ humanitas is itself

composed by many other subsistentiae. But to say that there are two is to emphasize that what is

identical with the person of the Son, namely, the divine essence does not come into composition

with the human nature nor does it inform it in any way. Likewise, the human subsistentia by

which Christ is man does not come into composition with Christ’s divinity or his divine person,

rather it is united to his divine person. This extends by theological analogy, Gilbert’s general

principle for any union between an id quod and id quo.

But beyond this I would like to examine a unique and interesting text where Gilbert

answers the question: “What did Christ become?” To which, he notes, no one would respond that

Christ became God, or the Son of God, or a person, or one. But then he adds that Christ did

become one: “One what?” He says, “one whole, one composite.” Gilbert indicates that the

difference is between the ways in which Christ is “one.” Prior to the incarnation he was one

“without the copulation of diverse natures,” but through the incarnation “he became one by the

copulation of diverse natures,” and “this,” he says, “is a marvelous novelty.”233

                                                                                                               231 See Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 1.101: “Quod igitur auctor ait tam catholicos quam Nestorium secundum

ultimam nature diffinitionem duas in Christo constituere naturas sic intelligendum uidetur: quod quamuis non sit altera Dei altera hominis specifica differentia, secundum hoc tamen dicitur ‘altera’ quod que est hominis specifica, non est Dei: et que est Dei non-specifica, non est hominis” (ed. Häring, 263).

232 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.50: “In ipso itaque diuina essentia, qua Christus est Deus, et humanan subsistentia, qua ipse est homo, recte intelliguntur coniuncte” (ed. Häring, 297).

233 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.80: “Diligenter attende quod ait: ‘fieret copulatione una persona’. Et non intelligas quod naturarum copulatione fieret persona sed quod ‘fieret copulatione una’. Non enim, quod erat, factus est Christus sed quod non erat. Erat autem Deus et Filius Dei et persona et unus: sed sine diuersarum naturarum copulatione. Si quis ergo querat: Christus quid factus est? nemo respondebit quod ipse sit factus Deus uel quod sit factus Filius Dei uel quod sit factus persona uel quod sit factus unus sed quod sit factus diuersarum naturarum copulatione unus. Quid unus? Unum totum, unum compositum. Et huiusmodi. Et hec est mirabilis nouitas” (304).

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This may seem like a strange passage. But if we recall that for Gilbert, there are two

ontological foundations for saying that something is composite, then his meaning becomes plain.

Based on his commitment to divine simplicity, Gilbert is not saying that the person of the Word

is composed of many subsistents. But he has indicated that there is composition with respect to

the subsistences which constitute the humanity assumed. Consequently, just as in a relatively

simple subsistent such as a spirit or soul—which may be truly said to be simple because it lacks

the composition of multiple and diverse subsistents (subsistentes)—the “simple” subsistent may

still be said to be composite according to the composition of subsistences (subsistentiae),234 so

analogically in the case of Christ, although his person is simple and identical with the divine

essence, he may now be truly said to be composite according to the subsistential composition

proper to his human nature (i.e., humanitas).

3.3 Is Christ’s soul a person?

Given Gilbert’s mereology, he can easily side-step an issue that proved a thorny one to

many of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors, namely how the soul (of Christ) is not

a person, for although he readily acknowledges that the soul is in some way a substance of a

rational nature,235 it can never be a person because it is a part not a whole and no part of a person

can be a person.236 Furthermore as a constitutive part, the soul cannot be an individual, hence, it

fails to meet even Boethius’ sometimes troubled definition of a person: an individual substance

of a rational nature.237

So perhaps a better question to ask of Gilbert, then, is how Christ’s humanitas is not a

person. Here again, the answer is relatively simple: subsistentiae and subsistentes differ in kind,

one is not the other. Consequently if a person is a subsistens, then a subsistentia cannot be a                                                                                                                

234 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.62: “Ipsum tamen subsistens simplex ex nullis subsistentibus constat: ut anime illa specialis subsistentia qua ipsa est et dicitur ‘anima’, ex diuersis subsistentiis constat. Ipsa uero simplex ex nullis subsistentibus est composita” (ed. Häring, 300).

235 Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 3.15: “Hac igitur ratione Platonis tota forma—nulli neque actu neque natura conformis—uere est indiuidua. Omnis uero pars eius singularis quidem est: non autem uere indiuidua quoniam multis est saltem natura conformis. Itaque anima eius, cuius tota forma pars est forme Platonis, non uero nomine dicitur ‘indiuidua’. Ideoque quamuis ipsa sit rationalis nature substantia, nequaquam tamen potest esse persona” (ed. Häring, 274).

236 Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 3.16: “Et generaliter, sicut dictum est, nulla cuiuslibet persone pars est persona quoniam partis eius ex omnibus, que ipsi conuenire intelliguntur, collecta proprietas naturaliter est diuidua” (274).

237 Gilbert, Exp. Eut. et Nest., 3.4-5: “Est etiam cuiuslibet hominis anima—sub genere spiritus et anime specie—sua, qua ab omnibus que non sunt illa anima diuiditur, proprietate indiuidua. Sic igitur anima, que hominis est pars constitutiua, uidetur recte esse persona. Hoc tamen impossibile esse per hoc intelligitur quod nulla persona pars potest esse persone” (ed. Häring, 272).

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person. But is a subsistentia an individual? Gilbert would say no, recognizing, however, that due

to its singularity not just a subsistentia but many things are often called “individuals.” Thus,

strictly speaking, a subsistentia is a singular not an individual.

3.4 Was Christ a man during the three days of his death?

The question of Christ’s status during the sacred triduum of his death came to be an

indicator within the twelfth century of just how far a theologian was prepared to press his

Christological principles. While we do not yet currently have explicit textual evidence of what

Gilbert’s answer to this much disputed question might be, I do think he offers us sufficient

evidence to make more than just an educated guess.

Because the union between body and soul which constitutes a human is something

beyond not just body and soul but also beyond the subsistentiae which constitutes each of them,

if this union is dissolved, Gilbert believes, the body remains within the genus body by virtue of

its subsistentia or id quo corporeality and the soul still remains within the genus of spirit in virtue

of its subsistentia or id quo. The union between body and soul, at least for Gilbert, does not

change the body being a body or the soul being a soul.238

There is in fact a passage where Gilbert addresses the question of death in general

(though not Christ’s in particular), in which he applies the principle above with respect to the

dissolution of the union between body and soul. He notes that whenever the union between body

and soul is dissolved there is no man, although there remains body and spirit. In this way, he can

explain why it is true to say that antichrist is in the loins of his parents and also that Phaethon is

in the tomb, because in virtue of their bodies they may be said to be so. Although, strictly

speaking, one is not yet a man and another is no longer a living man but dead.239

With these criteria and these examples, it seems that Gilbert would have easily found his

way to the conclusion that Christ during the three days of his death was not man because there

was no longer a union between his body and soul.

                                                                                                               238 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.33: “Sicut enim anima hominis nunquam desinit esse genere spiritus

neque corpus eius esse genere corpus ita homo etsi, remoto corporis et anime habitu, desinat esse homo atque animal, nunquam tamen desinit esse corpus et spiritus” (ed. Häring, 320-21).

239 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.8: “Nam quicumque—nondum generatus—futurus est homo, iam est corpus: ut Antichristus. Quicumque uero, iam dissolutis anima et corpore, non est homo, adhuc est et corpus et spiritus. Quod probatur per illa corporis atque spiritus propria que solis his generalibus, a quibus hec nomina sunt indita, conueniunt subsistentiis que uere de nondum conceptis et de iam dissolutis dicuntur: ut de Antichristo quod est in lumbis paternis: et de Phetonte quod est situs in sepulchro” (ed. Häring, 342).

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3.5 Is Christ insofar as he is man something?

The question of whether Christ insofar as he is man is something haunts late twelfth

century Christology; it is the defining line in Alexander III’s condemnation, and consequently a

denial of aliquid comes to be associated with Peter Lombard’s personal position about the

hypostatic union.240 Yet Gilbert too is sometimes associated with advocating something akin to

the position condemned.241 The principles delineated thus far provide a scaffolding for

speculating what he might have actually said, even if we do not yet possess explicit textual

testimony.

As already demonstrated, aliquid for Gilbert indicates two lines of composition. (1) It

connotes composition generally speaking,242 so much so that in some places Gilbert stresses that

a creature does not exist apart from existing as something,243 only God most truly and purely

exists, and it is through him that all other things exist.244 (2) Specifically, however, aliquid

denotes the composition proper to or resulting from accidents.

Consequently, with respect to the more general connotation, not even God, according to

Gilbert, is strictly speaking aliquid, for God is his own essence and his esse is not fashioned into

something by a created subsistence.245 God is not composed subsistentially (i.e., according to

subsistentiae) nor is he composed subsistently (i.e., according to subsistentes). He is also not the                                                                                                                

240 See Alexander III, Epistula “Cum in nostra” ad Guilelmum Archiepiscopum Senoniensis (28 May 1170): “Cum in Nostra esses olim praesentia constitutus, tibi viva voce iniunximus, ut suffraganeis tuis Parisius tibi ascitis ad abrogationem pravae doctrinae Petri quondam Parisiensis episcopi, qua dicitur quod Christus secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid, omnino intenderes et efficacem operam adhiberes. Inde siquidem est, quod fraternitati tuae per Apostolica scripta mandamus, quatenus . . . suffraganeos tuos Parisius convoces et una cum illis et aliis viris religiosis et prudentibus praescriptam doctrinam studeas penitus abrogare et a magistris et scholaribus ibidem in theologia studentibus Christum sicut perfectum Deum, sic et perfectum hominem ex anima et corpore consistentem praecipias edoceri” (Denzinger-Hünermann, 749). See also, Stephen Langton, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6: “Hic ponit magister suam opinionem, que iam exspiravit, et hoc auctoritate decretalis epistole Alexandri, que precipit dici, quod est aliquid secundum quod homo (ed. Landgraf, 112).

241 See John of Cornwall, Eulogium, c. 1: “Notandum etiam quod hec tertia sententia commune habet cum secunda quod Christus non est aliqua substantia constans ex carne et anima et quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid” (ed. Häring, 261). See also, Walter of St. Victor, Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae, prol., 1.3, 1.4, & 1.13 (ed. Glorieux, AHDLMA 19: 201, 205, 207, & 212).

242 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.25: “Natura enim subsistentis est qua ipsum subsistens aliquid est” (ed. Häring, 319).

243 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 6.41: “Nichil enim uere et suo nomine ‘materia’ uocatur nisi yle—que est sed non aliquid est—et corpus—quod non est sed aliquid est. Illa itaque omnium corporum et eorum, que sunt in corporibus, est materia: hec uero omnium que primam ac perpetuam subsistentiam eius in ipsa secuntur” (ed. Häring, 335).

244 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.61 (ed. Häring, 284). 245 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.24: “Deus enim est essentia: non est aliquid. Nec esse aliquid

fingitur creata subsistentia” (ed. Häring, 247); cf. 1.100: “Non est ergo Deus aliquid uel speciali uel specifica subsistentia” (ed. Häring, 263).

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result of a union between the two. He has no accidents, and thus there is no diversity among the

id quo by which he is and by which he is powerful, wise, or good—in God they are all one and

the same.246 It seems, therefore—at least according to this sense of aliquid—that for Gilbert,

Christ insofar as he is God, is not something, because insofar as he is God he is the Creator not a

creature,247 and composition of whatever kind only pertains to the creature.

Now with respect to the question at hand, as to whether Christ insofar as he is man is

something, a number of observations are in order. First, Gilbert prefers to refer to subsistents (not

subsistences) as something, for a nature is not an aliquid but that by which a subsistent is an

aliquid.248 According to this use of aliquid, therefore, there could be some hesitation on Gilbert’s

part because as noted above, there are not two subsistents in Christ, but only one.

If there were two subsistents, that is, if there were two persons, Christ could not truly be

said to be something one.249 Hence, there can be no human aliquid in Christ, that is, there can be

no human quod or in this case, qui. There is no human person in Christ, only a divine person—

the Word—and he is uncreated, eternal, unchangeable, etc. Gilbert, however, is not always

consistent with this application of aliquid to mean subsistent (subsistens) and given that both

subsistents and subsistences can be composites in his sense, it is no surprise that he sometimes

refers to a subsistentia (and not just a subsistens) as aliquid.250

Second, with respect to the accidental denotation of aliquid, Gilbert remains clear that

subsistentiae and accidents are distinct, differing both in kind and in reason. Consequently,

Gilbert could not say that the subsistentia humanity by which Christ is truly man is an accident,

for a union between a subject and its accident can produce nothing truly and substantially one,

nor can an accidental union of apposition between two subsistents result in something naturally

                                                                                                               246 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.63: “Ut: si uel de Patre uel de Filio eius uel de utrorumque Spiritu dicat

quis ‘est’ ita ‘Pater est, Filius est, utrorumque Spiritus est’ et postea de eodem Patre uel de eodem Filio uel de eodem amborum Spiritu dicat ‘est aliquid’ ita ‘Pater est potens, Filius est potens, Spiritus amborum est potens,’ nulla ratione intelligi debet aliud esse quo est et aliud esse quo potens est quoniam et Patri et Filio et amborum Spiritui idem omnino est et esse et potentem esse. |64| Similiter illorum trium cuilibet idem est esse et sapientem esse. Item cuilibet illorum idem est esse et bonum esse et huiusmodi. Quod in non simplicibus—quod sunt omnia que creata subsistunt—minime uerum est” (ed. Häring, 201)

247 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.82: “Sed quod omni genere omnique ratione diuersa aliquod unum componerent, nulla unquam consuetude nascentium habuit. Quod tamen in ea persona, que ‘Christus’ uocatur, factum est in qua diuine essentie coniuncta est humana subsistentia que ab ea non modo omni genere uerum etiam omni ratione intelligitur esse diuersa. Illa enim est essentia, ista est subsistentia: illa sine principio, hec ex principio. Illa Creator est, ista creatura aliquid est. Unde harum in Christo facta coniunctio nouitas est” (ed. Häring, 305).

248 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.39-41 (ed. Häring, 250). 249 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.56-58 (298-99). 250 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.82 (ed. Häring, 305).

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one.251 As already illustrated, the union between a subsistentia and a subsistent is different from

the union between an accident and subsistent, so whatever the nature of the union between the

Word and his humanity it cannot be accidental in any appositional sense, for according to

apposition there can be no real transfer of qualities. Yet, Christ really has human properties such

as passible flesh, otherwise he could not be said to have truly and really suffered.

Finally, given the principle by which it may be said that Christ is a composite person, I

see no reason why the same could not be said with respect to aliquid, for it is by a human

subsistentia that Christ is man, that he is composite, that he is aliquid. It is in this sense (and only

this sense), therefore, that Gilbert could affirm that Christ insofar as he is man is aliquid.252

Because the habitus theory and the language of habitus is associated intimately with the

question of aliquid in late twelfth century Christological disputes, it is fitting to address Gilbert’s

technical use of the term habitus in this context. Gilbert knows (and applies) a wider Aristotelian

usage of habitus (as mediated through Boethius), which consequently often occurs

synonymously and concurrently with terms such as qualitas, dispositio, or passiones;253 he also

uses it to mean form,254 virtue,255 participation,256 and even to indicate a figure of speech.257 But

he also deploys it more narrowly to denote the eighth predicamental or category,258 namely, how

one is equipped or outfitted, that is, what one has (G. ἔχειν; L. habere).259 Although predictably

confusing to many of his contemporaries, 260 Gilbert’s precision in this more narrow usage is

                                                                                                               251 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.19: “Sed in his omnibus attendendum est quod non fit aliquod

unum ex eo quod apponitur et ex eo cui apponitur. Non enim est aliquid unum naturaliter ex appositis sibi lapidibus albo et nigro neque ex ligno et ferro uel ex ligno et auro neque ex homine et eius uel ueste uel armis neque ex pomo et manu” (ed. Häring, 291).

252 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.42: “Itaque de Christo aliquid predicaturi, aliquod nominum eius quo ipsum supponamus prius eligimus: ut—cogitantes eum hominem—hoc nomine, quod est ‘homo,’ illum supponimus et diuinitatem—que eiusdem est essentia—de illo predicamus. Recte utique” (ed. Häring, 350).

253 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 1.68: “Sed et alteratio non solum corporalibus sed etiam incorporalibus substantiis conuenit. Fiunt enim etiam in anima quedam qualitates quas Aristotiles uocat ‘habitus’ et ‘dispositiones’ atque ‘passibiles qualitates’ et ‘passiones’” (ed. Häring, 256).

254 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 3.7: “Quicquid enim confert habitus, tollit priuatio” (273). 255 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 2.182 (ed. Häring, 227). 256 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.54 (ed. Häring, 199). 257 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.16 (ed. Häring, 291). 258 See Aristotle, Categories, 4: 1b25 – 2a4. 259 See Gilbert, Exp. 2 de Trin., 1.3 (163) and Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.29 (320). 260 Gilbert’s language of “extrinsecus” and “affixus” and its association with accidents (e.g., Exp. contra

Eut., 3.35-36: 279) seem to be an ongoing stumbling block for Gerhoh of Reichersberg. See his De Novitatibus, 7.4: “Respondemus: Proprietas filii, quam conceditis incarnatam, uel idem est quod filius uel aliud. Si est aliud quam filius, ergo secundum uos non est incarnatus filius sed, ut dicere soletis, proprietas eius forinsecus ei affixa est incarnata et filii diuinitas ab incarnatione penitus est aliena. Quod si uerum esse constiterit, non est unde salus hominum sperari possit que in eo maxime consistit quod, ut dicit Gregorius, diuinitas humanitate calciata in

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expert and preserves him from a misapplication of Augustine’s four-fold distinction of

habitus,261 so frequently cited by others.262

Metaphysically, therefore, such precision allows him to recognize that while to be

animated (animatio) and to be embodied (incorporatio) are subsistences (subsistentiae) they are

not related intrinsically and substantially to the subsistents (subsistentes) body and soul but

rather to the composite whole, namely animal.263 Consequently, they are “extrinsic habits” with

respect to either body or soul but subsistentiae with respect to the animal.264

Not surprisingly, therefore, Gilbert designates the union between matter and form with

the term habitus,265 which also opens onto a nexus of other related applications. As the union

between body and soul, such a habitus is the subsistentia that is the cause of the generation of a

subsistent whole,266 for it is by participation in its esse or subsistentia that a subsistent exists.267

Gilbert also seems willing to use habitus to indicate the union of one subsistentia with another,268

as well as the union of components of composites more generally.269 But most telling is his use

of the term habitus to characterize the union by which a subsistence (subsistentia) inheres in a

                                                                                                               Idumeam extendit calciamentum suum. Neque enim secundum uos diuinitas est calciata humanitate si non est incarnata” (ed. Häring, 50). See also, De Novitatibus, 21.1-2 (76); cf. N.M. Häring, “Case of Gilbert,” 27.

261 See Augustine, De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 73 (CCSL 40A: 209). 262 See Peter Lombard, Sent. 3, d. 6, c. 6(22), nn. 2-3 (SB 5: 57). 263 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.30: “Unde animatio corporis et incorporatio anime subsistentie

esse uidentur. Et sunt utique: sed neque anime neque corporis sed illius, quod ex his compositum est, animalis” (ed. Häring, 320).

264 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 5.31: Anima namque preter sui incorporationem perfecte est anima. Et corpus preter animationem perfecte est corpus. Animal uero nec est nec potest esse animal preter anime incorporationem et corporis animationem. Ideoque anime et corporis sunt extrinseci habitus: animalis autem sue generationis et corruptionis subsistentie” (ed. Häring, 320).

265 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.75: “Unio uero semper illorum est que diuersa sunt utriusque numero. Sed hec est modis ex diuersitate rationum diuersis. Aliter namque sibi unita dicuntur materia atque forma ut quodam rationali habitu unum subsistens sit: aliter pars et pars. . .” (ed. Häring, 204).

266 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 8.17: “Itaque homo—qui, ex quo cepit, nunquam desiit perpetuis subsistentiis esse corpus et spiritus—habitu coniunctionis ipsorum, qui ‘generationis et corruptionis animalis subsistentia’ uocatur, diuina potestate atque uoluntate ita statutus est ut primo posse deinde non posse dissolui et non dissolui recte dicatur” (ed. Häring, 358).

267 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.55 (ed. Häring, 199). 268 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.22: “Unde manifestum est unum esse aliquid in quo diuersa sibi

inuicem coniuncta dicuntur. Cui uni sunt esse omnes speciales et he, ex quibus speciales constant, subsistentie illorum que in ipso sibi ex habitu coniunctorum: ut homini, qui ex corpore et spiritu sibi coniunctis unus est, sunt esse omnes corporis atque spiritus subsistentie et alie quedam que in ipso ex eorum fiunt concursu” (ed. Häring, 292).

269 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.7: “Atque de ipsis compositis predicantur—siue simul alia cum aliis siue per se alia sine aliis—quecumque componentium sunt ueri nominis subsistentie et earum illa propria que illius, cuius sunt, generis ‘omnibus semperque conueniunt’. Nec tantum dum manent in illius compositionis habitu componentia sed etiam antequam ipsa iam existentia componantur et postquam a se inuicem fuerint dissoluta” (ed. Häring, 342).

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subsistent (subsistens).270 What underlies all of these examples is the meaning of habitus as a

principle of unity or that by which something is one. Such unions, at least in the examples given

by Gilbert, are almost always cross genera, and in at least some cases those things joined differ

not only in kind but also in reason,271 and this most eminently in the case of Christ.272

While there appears to be little to no sign of Augustine’s fourfold distinction about

habitus in Gilbert’s Boethian commentary,273 he does dutifully reference Augustine’s distinction

in his own gloss on Philippians. It is possible to discern in the same place, however, and in the

very midst of his application of Augustine’s distinctions, Gilbert’s own meaning for habitus.

Here, transferred and transformed insofar as it is deployed in explication of the unique

ontological constitution of Christ: “Yet, rightly [the Apostle] says in habitu because in the unity

of person, rational soul and flesh were added to the divine form. . . for thus rather more

excellently and more conjointly the rational soul and flesh were conjoined to the divine form by

a habit such that the divine form was in no way changed.”274

In such a context, therefore, it is possible to see how Gilbert has applied his distinction

between composition and conjunction in order to give exposition to the mystery of the

incarnation and thereby also extended the meaning of habitus by transferring it from philosophy

into theology,275 for here we have a union that is a “marvelous novelty,”276 the union of Creator

                                                                                                               270 See Gilbert, Exp. de Hebd., 1.100: “He omnes non modo habitu illo quo inherent subsistenti uerum

etiam illo, quo generibus eius predicta potestate atque proprietate adherent, dicuntur haberi. Ac per hoc duplici ratione participantur. Quoniam tamen harum accessione subsistens, in quo habent fieri, generatur et decessione corrumpitur, non tam participatione quam substantia—sicut genera ipsa quibus adsunt uel species de quibus sunt—subsistenti inesse dicuntur” (ed. Häring, 209).

271 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.30: “Quodam tamen rationali habitu interueniente unum quiddam est siue simplex siue compositum—quod ita mens concipit ut in eo id, quod est, et esse uel quod ei adest, genere et ratione esse diuersa cum assensione percipiat” (ed. Häring, 293).

272 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.82: “Sed quod omni genere omnique ratione diuersa aliquod unum componerent, nulla unquam consuetudo nascentium habuit. Quod tamen in ea persona, que ‘Christus’ uocatur, factum est in qua diuine essentie coniuncta est humana subsistentia que ab ea non modo omni genere uerum etiam omni ratione intelligitur esse diuersa” (ed. Häring, 305).

273 There is something of a resonance at Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.35: “Et quare hoc sit, supponit: EO QUOD scilicet homo FUERIT A DEO Filio Dei i.e. Christo ASSUMPTUS. Hoc est quod supra dixerat de humanitate ita: ‘sed quod a deitate fuerit assumpta’. ET e conuerso: QUI DEUS est, HOMO est. Et quare hoc, subiungit: QUONIAM HOMINE hoc est humana natura tanquam bene se habente habitu UESTITUS SIT. | Hoc est quod superius dixerat: ‘quia tamen diuinitati substantia humanitatis naturali unitate coniuncta est’” (ed. Häring, 348-49).

274 See Gilbert, Gloss in Phil., c. 2: “Recte tamen ait ‘habitu’ quoniam in unitate persone rationalis anima et caro diuine forme accesserunt. . . sic enim immo excellentius atque coniunctius anima rationalis et caro diuine forme habitu sunt coniuncta ut ipsa diuina forma nullo modo mutata” (Bruges 78, f. 73vb / Lisboa Alcobac 178, f. 82va).

275 It is helpful to recall Gilbert’s comments at Exp. 2 de Trin., 1.2: “Addit: QUOLIBET quoniam in naturalibus, a quibus ad theologicam huiusmodi uerborum ex alicuius rationis proportione translatus est usus, non unus solus predicandorum est modus” (ed. Häring, 163).

276 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.80 (ed. Häring, 308).

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with creature, of God with man, in Gilbert’s precise terminology: of a divine subsistent with a

human subsistence.277

This is an exquisite example of Gilbert’s application of his own principle for the

analogical extension of meaning proper to the discipline of theology,278 insofar as he recognizes

that the coniunctio between the Word and his humanity bears some likeness (however small) to

the natural union whereby a created subsistentia is united to its created subsistent. Considered as

habitus, the hypostatic union is “intrinsic” neither to the divine person nor to the human nature,

that is, it does not alter either in such a way that changes them into another substance or into

each other.279

Hence, just as body and soul are related in habitu according to embodiment and

animation, yet without altering either essentially, so here in the miracle of the incarnation the

Son of God and his humanity are related such that Christ may be truly said to be man. It is in this

way that Gilbert reads the auctoritas: “as rational soul and flesh is one man so God and man is

one Christ,”280 for he has successively transferred the meaning of habitus from the union

between soul and body, to the union between a subsistence and its subsistent, and finally and

uniquely to the sui generis and absolutely unparalleled case of a divine subsistent joining a

created subsistence to himself.

As in the case of the soul, although, it is in itself (relatively) simple (i.e., lacking any

composition of subsistents),281 nevertheless, it may still be said to be “composite,” insofar as

there is multiplicity on the side of its various subsistentiae and insofar as there is diversity

between its subsistentiae and its accidents, so too with respect to Christ, he is simple in and

according to his divine person, yet because he has joined a humanity to himself, he may be said

to be a whole, a composite, and “one,” not with respect to or by his divinity but in virtue of the

humanity which he has united to his divine person.

                                                                                                               277 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.37: “Attende quod ait: ‘diuinitas que suscepit’. Et intellige quod

Christus, qui ante susceptionem hanc Deus erat, suscepit: ideoque dictum esse ‘diuinitas suscepit’ quia non natura sed persona suscepit naturam” (ed. Häring, 349).

278 See Gilbert, Exp. 2 de Trin., 1.5: “His [predicamentis] et aliis, qui secundum diuisiones alias possunt ostendi, modis de subsistentibus multa dicuntur. Ideo que cum hec ad theologica transferuuntur, ibi quoque ea predicandi modus est multiplex” (ed. Häring, 164).

279 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.32: “Dicit itaque: QUI HOMO EST, APPELATUR DEI FILIUS et hoc NON SUBSTANTIA DIUINITATIS que humanitatis in ipsam conuersione provenerit SED manente substantia HUMANITATIS QUE etsi non est in diuinitatem conuersa TAMEN EST DIUINITATI NATURALI UNITATE CONIUNCTA” (ed. Häring, 348).

280 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.21 (ed. Häring, 345). 281 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.62 (ed. Häring, 300).

53

Although Gilbert refers to the human nature by which Christ is man with the term

habitus,282 it is not the highest unifying principle, rather the overarching principle of unity and

identity in Christ is the individual and personal property of the Son,283 and while Gilbert seems

comfortable calling the coniunctio of the humanity with the Son “accidental,”284 care should be

taken in interpreting such uses of accidentale and accidentaliter (which by later medieval

standards will be deemed inappropriate), insofar as he rejects mere apposition,285 and insofar as

he affirms that Christ is “true God,” because he is of God the Father “according to substance, not

created but begotten,” and affirms that Christ is true man “according to the substance of the

body” which he received from the Blessed Virgin and according to the soul which he received in

her.286 It is important to notice in addition, however, that it is not simply the assumption of body

and soul that makes Christ human for Gilbert, but their mutual union to each other and the union

of the humanity (which results from the union of body and soul) to the Word, for it is by a

human nature that Christ is man.287

It should also be noted that attributes such as “corporeal” and “rational” are also

characterized by Gilbert as “accidental,” depending on the relationship designated. What is

                                                                                                               282 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.35: “Et quare hoc, subiungit: QUONIAM HOMINE hoc est humana

natura tanquam bene se habente habitu UESTITUS SIT. | Hoc est quod superius dixerat: ‘quia tamen diuinitati substantia humanitatis naturali unitate coniuncta est’” (ed. Häring, 348).

283 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.20 and 7.33 (ed. Häring, 345, 348). This position of Gilbert’s could explain the confusion of Gerhoh, expressed at De Novitatibus, 4.57: “Quibus omnibus persuasi carnem deficatam et super omnes creaturas in deo exaltatam adoramus. Quod nequaquam fieri oporteret si, ut noui doctores asserunt, homo in solam personalem proprietatem assumptus unitatis in se ueritatem non haberet. Quod et ipsi fatentur: carnem uidelicet Christi non adorandam. {58} Vnde mihi a quodam discipulorum magistri Gilberti fuit obiectum quasi pro crimine ydolatrie quod carnem Christi adoro et adorandam doceo” (ed. Häring, 43). See also, De Novitatibus, 13.2-3 (ed. Häring, 58).

284 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.34: “Quod uere quamuis accidentaliter dicatur ‘Deus est passus’, ‘homo est Dei Filius’, dixit. Et opinionem qua forte quis hoc uerum esse concederet remouit dicens: ‘non quo ipsa deitas humanitas facta sit’ et ‘non substantia diuinitatis sed humanitatis’. ITEM dicit—accidentaliter quidem sed uere—quod QUI HOMO EST, DEUS EST” (ed. Häring, 348); cf. 7.30: “Ideoque conexio qua dicitur ‘Deus passus est’, quamuis accidentalis sit, uera tamen est” (347) and 7.31: “Cuius coniunctionis ratione recte fit non modo in naturalibus uerum etiam in theologicis accidentalis et tamen uera dictionum conexio” (347).

285 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.21: “Quod nequaquam diceretur si Deus et homo kata parathesin hoc est secundum appositionem sibi inuicem iuncti essent in Christo” (ed. Häring, 345).

286 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.33: “ET CUM HEC i.e. diuinitas et humanitas DISCERNANTUR PERMISCEANTURQUE INTELLIGENTIA cuius potestas est et coniuncta diuidere et diuisa coniungere TAMEN UNUS IDEMQUE personali proprietate ET HOMO SIT sine humane nature corruptione PERFECTUS ET sine diuine nature aliqua transformatione DEUS UERUS: DEUS QUIDEM eo quod ipse SIT EX DEI PATRIS SUBSTANTIA hoc est ex Deo Patre secundum substantiam non creatus sed GENITUS: HOMO UERO EO QUOD EX MARIA UIRGINE secundum substantiam corporis, quod sumpsit ex ea, et secundum animam quam accepit in ea SIT PROCREATUS” (ed. Häring, 348).

287 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.44: “SI UERO eundem Christum prius ratione ipsum subiciendi DEUM INTELLIGAS, IDEM DEUS EST ATQUE HOMO i.e. idem, qui Deus est, homo est QUONIAM NATURA DEUS EST: HOMO uero similiter quidem natura. Sed quod simul cum diuina natura, qua Deus est, est etiam in eo humana, qua homo est, contingit ASSUMPTIONE qua, cum esset Deus, humanam naturam assumpsit” (ed. Häring, 351).

54

primarily at stake for Gilbert in using the term “accidental,” is whether or not we are talking

about propria. Hence, when contrasting the statements “that corporeal being (corporeum) is

colored” and “that corporeal being (corporeum) is rational,” he distinguishes them based on the

fact that color belongs to a body, that is, it is proper for a body to be colored because as

illustrated above the accident of color follows upon the subsistentia corporality by which a body

is a body. Rationality or the power of discernment, however, does not belong to a body properly

speaking but rather to the soul.288

Yet, because both body and soul and their propria are properly predicated of the

composite subsistent which they constitute, it is true to say that this corporeal being (corporeum)

is rational but accidentaliter, insofar as the principle of metonymy being employed to designate

the whole arises from a “part” to which rational does not properly belong. Likewise, it is possible

to say truly that this rational being (quoddam rationale) is white but once again accidentaliter,

insofar as the principle of metonymy being employed to designate the whole arises from a “part”

to which color does not properly belong. What is at work, here, is Gilbert’s principle of

supposition, which he is consciously contrasting with apposition (a strategy he associates with

Nestorius).289 This principle of supposition as applied by Gilbert means that the propria of body

and the propria of soul can be predicated of the individual, subsistent whole.290

Consequently, some terms which designate the whole also include and imply “parts” and

properties of the same whole. In the unique case of Christ, then, the term “man” designates not

only the person of Christ (which is divine) but also the subsistentia by which he is man, namely,

humanitas, as well as the divine essence which is identical with his person.291 Because the

created subsistentia in no way alters Christ’s divine person, Gilbert opts to call the union

connecting them “accidental.” Yet because the union is real, he also believes that it is why

statements such as “God suffered” are true, because it is by the propria of Christ’s humanity that

                                                                                                               288 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.23-26 (ed. Häring, 346). 289 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 4.56-58 (ed. Häring, 298-99). 290 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.26: “Sed quoniam in uno corpus et spiritum esse contingit, de illo

uno quecumque sunt naturaliter corporis atque spiritus, sicut iam sepe dictum est, poterunt uere predicari. Nec ullo modo conexionis ueritatem predicta accidentalitas poterit impedire si et quod predicatur et quo suppositio fit illi uni secundum eandem rationem conueniant” (ed. Häring, 346).

291 See Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.41-42: “In quo etiam, quia omnis dictio diuersa significat, quid est de quo diligens auditor attendit. Uerbi gratia: cum hoc nomen, quod est ‘corpus,’ subicimus—quia et id quod est et id quo est corpus designat supponimus eo siue subsistentiam siue quod ea subsistit et uel alicuius partem, que corpus est, uel id cuius ipsum est pars. {42} Itaque de Christo aliquid predicaturi, aliquod nominum eius quo ipsum supponamus prius eligimus: ut—cogitantes eum hominem—hoc nomine, quod est ‘homo,’ illum supponimus et diuinitatem—que eiusdem est essentia—de illo predicamus. Recte utique” (ed. Häring, 350).

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he may be said to truly suffer, not according to his divinity but according to his humanity.292 It is

in this way that Gilbert makes the traditional Christological principle of the communicatio

idiomatum his own, albeit in a way that terminologically speaking will not survive the criteria of

future Christological reflections.

Peroratio 1

No theologian of the twelfth or thirteenth century appropriates Gilbert’s framework

wholesale and certainly not verbatim. But many of the conceptual tools he brings to bear on

difficult and recurring theological problems manifest themselves continually in Christological

disputation leading into the thirteenth century (and beyond). As such, clarity about his principles,

will help us to recognize them whenever they surface in later thinkers. Gilbert’s framework and

Lombard’s questions come to constitute the formal and material elements respectively of

Christological developments in the twelfth and thirteenth century. If we are to understand how

such developments came to culminate in Thomas’ own theological horizon, we must obtain clear

insights into Gilbert’s method and Peter’s synthesis.

In Gilbert, it is possible to see just how difficult it is to obtain a clear theological

determination about how to characterize the hypostatic union metaphysically, while also

remaining faithful to conciliar judgments. His attempts with the term habitus and

experimentation with the term “accidental” can help us to appreciate just what a break through

the Christological achievements of later medieval theologians prove to be and in particular, just

what is at stake for Thomas, when he affirms that the hypostatic union is substantial (as opposed

to accidental) in question two of the tertia pars.

     

                                                                                                               292 Gilbert, Exp. contra Eut. et Nest., 7.31: “Cuius coniunctionis ratione recte fit non modo in naturalibus

uerum etiam in theologicis accidentalis et tamen uera dictionum conexio. Quam quia Nestorius uere fieri posse non putat cum iam hoc exemplauerit hac accidentali et uera conexione que est ‘Deus est passus’—in qua scilicet Christi persona hoc suo a diuinitatis essentia | nomine, quod est ‘Deus’, supposita predicatur passio que non diuinitatis sed animalis sensibilitatis est propria—ITEM exemplat idem alia accidentali et tamen uera conexione in qua eadem Christi persona—illo suo ab humanitatis subsistentia nomine, quod est ‘homo’, subiecta—predicatur esse Filium Dei: quod non est secundum humanam generationem sed secundum diuinam” (ed. Häring, 347-48).

 

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Chapter 2 Ut Samaritanus ad Vulneratum:

The Christology of Master Peter the Lombard Narratio 2

The principal text which textures virtually all Christological discourse in the twelfth and

thirteenth centuries is the Lombard’s famous Sententiae. For this reason, a careful consideration

of his Christology is required if one is to stand in a strong position to evaluate the theological

itineraria of Christological disputations leading from the Lombard’s time into Thomas’s own.

For although it is Gilbert’s conceptual apparatus (albeit modified) that eventually comes to

dominate responses in twelfth and thirteenth century Christology, especially regarding the

hypostatic union, it is the Lombard’s great work which largely determines the scope of old

questions and midwifes the emergence of new ones.

 

1 Two Icons: The Widow and the Samaritan

Peter Lombard opens his famous Sentences with two arresting images: that of the poor

widow (Mk. 12:41-44; Lk. 21:1-4) and the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10:25-37). He seeks to imitate

the poor widow in his desire to put something into the offertory of the Lord from his own

scarcity and smallness of means. Peter presumes to scale the arduous and undertake a “work

beyond his powers.” He places his trust, however, in the Good Samaritan who makes good on his

promises and cares for the infirm. The Lombard tells his readers that “the truth of the one who

promises” delights him, but the “immensity of the labor” terrifies him. The desire of finishing

beckons him, but the infirmity of failing discourages him, nevertheless, “zeal for the house of

God” overcomes all such fears.293

The icon of the Samaritan again appears as the principal image which the Master sets

before us as he commences his Christological discourse “with the whole consideration” of his

mind. The rhetorical appropriation of the Samaritan indicates that a significant bulk of book

three (dd. 1-17) is but the requisite mental ascesis needed before one can appreciate the

redemption undertaken by the God-man (dd. 18-20), the crisis of his death (dd. 21-22), and the                                                                                                                

293 Peter Lombard, Senentiae, prol., n. 1: “Cupientes aliquid de penuria ac tenuitate nostra cum paupercula in gazophylacium Domini mittere, ardua scandere, opus ultra vires nostras agere praesumpsimus, consummationis fiduciam laborisque mercedem in Samaritano statuentes, qui, prolatis in curationem semivivi duobus denariis, supereroganti cuncta reddere professus est. Delectat nos veritas pollicentis, sed terret immensitas laboris; desiderium hortatur proficiendi, sed dehortatur infirmitas deficiendi, quam vincit zelus domus Dei” (SB 4: 3).

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way in which he shows us how the (re)created order is to be used in the service of salvation (dd.

23-40). This might come as a bit of a methodological surprise, for a magister who does not

hesitate to drive out philosophical arguments where he thinks faith is more appropriate.294

And while to be sure, when a question cannot be determined by his auctoritates, it seems

that the master struggles to find his way, nevertheless, this should not prevent us from noticing

that fifty-three chapters are dedicated to establishing what precisely it means to speak of “the

Mediator of God and Man,” who is a reality (res) that is to be both used and enjoyed (fruitur et

utitur).295 The lack of philosophical ingenuity should not impede our ability to see the rhetorical

acuity with which he assigns and orders meanings (i.e., exercises the art of grammar) through the

selection and organization of authoritative texts.

2 Ordo Rationis: The Theological Project of the Sentences

In the proglogue of the work as a whole, Peter identifies three tasks: (1) to fortify “our

faith” against errors (munire), (2) to open the hidden things of theological inquiry (aperire), and

(3) to hand on knowledge of the Church’s sacraments (tradere).296 In what follows, I attempt to

illustrate how the fundamental meaning the Lombard assigns to “human nature” opens a

trajectory of inquiry that charts a course throughout the first half of his Christological treatise

and that culminates in the Lombard’s contemplation of the mystery of the sacred triduum.

 

2.1 Sign and Thing

As frequently noted in the standard introductions,297 the Augustinian commonplace of res

et signa constitutes the primary divisions of the Lombard’s great undertaking. The Parisian

                                                                                                               294 See Sent. 3.22.70.3: “Illae enim et huiusmodi argutiae in creaturis locum habent, sed fidei sacramentum

a philosophicis argumentis est liberum. Unde Ambrosius: ‘Aufer argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur. In ipsis gymnasiis suis iam dialectica taceat. Piscatoribus creditur, non dialecticis’.” (SB 5: 136).

295 It will be noted that for my interpretation and analysis I rely primarily on the Lombard’s own division of his text into books and chapters, as the division into distinctions is a later interpolation by Alexander of Hales, see Ignatius Brady’s comment at SB 5: 23. For this reason, I cite chapter numberings as sequential within books (Brady indicates this sequence in his edition within parentheses) not distinctions. For example, I would cite a passage from book 3, distinction 17, chapter 5 as Sent. 3.17.54, not as Sent. 3.17.5.

296 See Sent., prol., n. 2: “Quo inardescentes, « fidem nostram adversus errores carnalium atque animalium hominum » Davidicae turris clypeis munire vel potius munitam ostendere, ac theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire, necnon et sacramentorum ecclesiasticorum pro modico intelligentiae nostrae notitiam tradere studuimus; « non valentes studiosorum fratrum votis iure resistere, eorum in Christo laudabilibus studiis lingua ac stylo nos servire flagitantium: quas bigas in nobis agitat Christi caritas »” (SB 4: 3).

297 See Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vols., Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), vol. 1: 78-79; Philip Rosemann, Peter Lombard, Great Medieval Thinkers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 57-61; and G. Silano’s introduction to his translation, The Sentences: Book 1: The Mystery of the

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master adverts to this structure in the opening chapters of his first and fourth books,298 and

reiterates the content of the structure(s) in the opening chapter of book three.299 He thereby

divides the res into: (1) things to be enjoyed, (2) things to be used, and (3) things to be enjoyed

and used, which correspond to the (1) mystery of the Trinity, (2) the order of the constitution of

things and the fall of man, and (3) reparation through the grace of the mediator of God and man;

consequently, (4) the sacraments of human redemption correspond to a discussion of signs.

One can of course understand the rebus quae fruuntur et utuntur to demarcate the major

divisio of book three between the Son of God and the Virtues,300 but it seems just as likely that to

the Lombard Christ in himself is a reality which is both to be enjoyed and employed, for

although insofar as he is God he is to be enjoyed alone, insofar as he is human he is a reality

which is to be both enjoyed and employed,301 since it is according to his human nature that he is

mediator302 and according to his human nature that his divine nature is revealed.303

2.2 A Rhetorical Note

The Master frequently tells the “pious reader” that he will be enlisting the testimonia of

the saints and fathers; for some, this suggests an overarching canonical tone in the work, as

                                                                                                               Trinity (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2007), xxxi. Ignatius Brady’s own observation of the same structure should not go unnoticed, see the first footnote at SB 5: 231. See also, Alexander of Hales, Glossa in 1 Sent., introitus, n. 2: De rebus fruendis est primus liber, scilicet Trinitate et unitate. De rebus utendis, scilicet creatis, est secundus liber. De utrisque tertius, scilicet de christo, virtutibus et praeceptis. Quartus est de signis, scilicet ecclesiasticis sacramentis” (ed. Quaracchi, 1).

298 See Sent. 1.1.3: “De his ergo nobis, adytum ad res divinas aliquatenus intelligendas Deo duce aperire volentibus, disserendum est; et « primum de rebus, postea de signis disseremus »” (SB 4: 55) and Sent. 4.1: “His tractatis quae ad doctrinam rerum pertinent quibus fruendum est, et quibus utendum est, et quae fruuntur et utuntur, ad doctrinam signorum accedamus” (SB 5: 231).

299 See Sent. 3, prol. “Huius voluminis continentia sub compendio perstringitur. Sic enim rationis ordo postulat, ut qui in primo libro de inexplicabili mysterio summae Trinitatis irrefragabili Sanctorum attestatione aliquid diximus, ac deinde in secundo libro conditionis rerum ordinem hominisque lapsum sub certis auctoritatis regulis insinuavimus, de eius reparatione per gratiam Mediatoris Dei et hominum praestita, atque humanae redemptionis sacramentis, quibus contritiones hominis alligantur ac vulnera peccatorum curantur, consequenter in tertio et quarto libro disseramus: ut Samaritanus ad vulneratum, medicus ad infirmum, gratia ad miserum accedat” (SB 5: 23).

300 See Sent. 1.1.3.11: “et inter eas quibus utendum est, quaedam sunt per quas fruimur, ut virtutes et potentiae animi, quae sunt naturalia bona” (SB 4: 61).

301 See Sent. 1.1.2.2: “« Res vero quae fruuntur et utuntur, nos sumus, quasi inter utrasque constituti », et Angeli sancti” (SB 4: 56); cf. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 1.3.3 (CCSL 32: 8).

302 See Sent. 3.19.61.1: “Unde et mediator dicitur secundum humanitatem, non secundum dvinitatem” (SB 5: 123).

303 It is interesting, therefore, that through John Damascene and Augustine, the Lombard finds his way to the explanatory conclusion that Christ’s humanity is to be worshiped because of it’s union to the person of the Word, that is, only because it inexorably refers to something else, may it be worshiped, see Sent. 3.9.28 (SB 5: 68-71).

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though the Lombard is assembling a kind of theological case.304 This seems more than plausible,

and to some medievalists, perhaps, indubitable. But I would like to emphasize a slightly different

tone, especially given the structural work the Augustinian res et signa is put to by earlier

medieval thinkers such as Hugh of St. Victor.305

There is a narrative weave in the Lombard’s project: it is a tapestry of human redemption.

The testimonia, therefore, are the many witnesses (and beneficiaries) to this story of human

salvation. The Lombard’s text is one that prepares the reader to speak (utrum dici debeat) with

these ancient witnesses about the mystery of salvation and consequently one that is a textual

pedagogy for theological grammar. It is not an accident that the figure of the Samaritan appears

at the beginning of the Lombard’s work and at the initiation of books three and four. It is also no

accident that the great test case for divine willing (i.e., that good is achieved even in the face of

great evil) is exemplified not so much in us but among us in Christ.306 The Cross is the supreme

triumph of good (i.e. the Divine Will) even in a human (cosmic?) history where use and

enjoyment has seemingly been hopelessly distorted into abuse and profligation. It is in this

context that the Lombard foreshadows the redemptive center of book three at the conclusion of

book one: Christ’s passion was good and the cause of our salvation.307

At the end of both books one and two, we find dark meditations on the divergence of the

human will from the divine and the question of the origin of our capacity for evil.308 But book

one ultimately transitions into what our attitude toward the cross and the suffering of Christ

should be,309 and how this should inform our attitude to our own suffering,310 and book two

                                                                                                               304 See Silano’s introduction to his translation of book 1, xix-xxvi. 305 See for example, Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Christiane Fidei, ed. Rainer Berndt (Monasterii

Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 2008), prologus: 33-34. 306 See Sent. 1.48.208.1: “Illud quoque non est praetermittendum, quod aliquando Dei voluntas bona per

malam hominis voluntatem impletur, ut in crucifixione Christi factum est: quem Deus bona voluntate mori voluit, Iudaei vero impia voluntate eum crucifixerunt. Et volebant Iudaei mala voluntate quiddam quod Deus bona voluntate volebat, scilicet ut Christus pateretur, moreretur; sed volebant et aliquid alius, quod Deus non volebat, scilicet occidere Christum, quod fuit mala actio et peccatum” (SB 4: 326).

307 See Sent. 1.48.208.3: “dicimus simpliciter concedendum esse quod Deus voluit Christum pati, mori, quia eius passio bonum fuit et causa nostrae salutis. Cum autem dicitur: ‘Volebat eum pati vel occidi a Iudaeis’, hic distinguendum est. Si enim intelligitur sic: Volebat eum sustinere passionem sive crucifixionem a Iudaeis illatam, verus est sensus. Si vero intelligitur sic: Volebat ut Iudaei occiderent eum, falsum est; non enim volebat Deus actionem Iudaeorum, quae mala erat, sed volebat passionem bonam, et haec voluntas per malas Iudaeorum voluntates impleta est” (SB 4: 326).

308 See Sent. 1.48.207 (SB 4: 325) and 2.44.268 (SB 4: 577-79). 309 See Sent. 1.48.209: “Debuit enim eis placere intuitu nostrae redemptionis, sed non intuitu eius cruciatus.

Voluerunt ergo ac vehementer cupierunt Christum mori propter liberationem hominis et impletionem divinae voluntatis, sed non voluerunt delectatione ipsius afflictionis. De eodem ergo laetabantur et tristabantur, sed ob aliud gaudebant, et propter aliud dolebant” (SB 4: 327).

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suggests a resolve to resist the domination of our capacity for sin and evil, even or especially

when it takes on socially systemic forms.311 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that book

three opens with a reminder of the “promise made from old,” concerning our redemption,312 and

that in his focused treatment of the mediator, the Lombard identifies Christ as the arbiter for

whom Job longed.313

3 Confessing the Mediator of God and Man: An Itinerarium for Book Three

Immediately following his recapitulation of the contents of his four books, the Lombard

opens his foray into the mystery of Christ with the fourth chapter of Galatians: “In the fullness of

time, God sent forth His Son” (Gal. 4:4). This is a significant textual shift from the Romans text

(1:3) with which he opened his earlier Tractatus de Incarnatione and is of the utmost methodical

advantage insofar as it allows him to table the question of Christ’s predestination until he has

sufficient terminology and distinctions in place to resolve this much disputed query.

The primacy of missio should recall attention to the significant treatment the Lombard

gives to the mission of the Son in distinction fifteen of book one (cc. 49-55), in particular it

opens up an insight into the primary division of book three which undergirds the divergence in

thematic content, namely, the incarnation (dd. 1-22) and the virtues and gifts (dd. 23-50). This

division is partially explained by the res quae fruuntur et utuntur that governs the content of

book three, and there can be no doubt about Philip Rosemann’s insight that the Lombard situates

his most extended treatment of the virtues in light of Christ the exemplar of virtue.314

Yet, I believe we can push for a deeper (albeit implicit) foundation for the main division

of book three by invoking the “two ways” in which the Son is sent,315 namely, (I) according to

the incarnation (cc. 1-73), which took place only once and the missio (II) according to which he

comes daily into the hearts of the saints and faithful by faith (cc. 74-164).316 When the Lombard

                                                                                                               310 See Sent. 1.48.210 (SB 4: 327-28). 311 See Sent. 2.44.269.2: “Potestati ergo diaboli vel hominis tunc resistamus, cum aliquid contra Deum

suggesserit; in quo Dei ordinationi non resistimus, sed obtemperamus: sic enim Deus praecepit, ut in malis nulli potestati obediamus” (SB 4: 580).

312 See Sent. 3, prol. “quia per Christi adventum exhibetur atque perficitur humanae redemptionis sponsio facta ab antiquo” (SB 5: 24).

313 See Sent. 3.19.60.1: “Hic est arbiter quem Iob desiderat: Utinam esset nobis arbiter” (SB 5: 122). 314 See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 61, 139-43. 315 See Sent. 1.15.54 (SB 4: 135). 316 See Sent. 1.15.55.1: “Ecce distincti sunt duo modi missionis Filii, et secundum alterum semel tantum

missus est Dei Filius, secundum alterum saepe missus est et mittitur quotidie. Nam secundum alterum missus est ut sit homo, quod semel tantum factum est; secundum alterum vero mittitur ut sit cum homine, quo modo quotidie

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treats of these two missions in book one, he not surprisingly cites a passage from book four of

Augustine’s, De Trinitate.317 Such terminology (percipere et concipere) is repeated via other

Augustinian passages in book three, distinction twenty-four, regarding the cognitive object of

faith.318 Also significant is the Augustinian appropriation of the Pauline, “Christ dwells in our

hearts by faith” (Eph. 3:17), cited by Lombard as he unpacks the different meanings of fides in

distinction twenty-three.319 Thus, at the outset of his discussion of the virtues and gifts, the

Lombard is citing Augustinian language that recalls the daily (quotidie) mission of the Word in

the hearts and minds of the saints and faithful.

Within the treatment of the (I) incarnation itself (dd. 1-22, cc. 1-73), Alexander of Hales’

suggestion of a twofold descent finds deep support in the text, as chapter fifty-four (d. 18) marks

a pivotal shift of focus from (IA) the descent of the Son into the fullness of time to the embrace

of (IB) the descent of the Cross.320 The Lombard even shifts into the first and second person

form of address when he asks, “For what, therefore, did he will to suffer and die. . ? For you, not

for himself! How for me? In such a way that his passion and death would be form and cause for

you: form of virtue and humility, cause of glory and liberty. . .”321

Further divisions are difficult to discern with certainty, but I propose the following, based

on the Lombard’s pedagogically steady introduction of terms and meanings and significant shifts

in the subject of predication. The prominence of the image of the Samaritan and the immediate

invocation of the theological term missio at the beginning of book three, invites us into the first

series of the Master’s chapters (d. 1, cc. 1-3), namely, who is the Samaritan? More precisely,

                                                                                                               mittitur ad sanctos, et missus est etiam ante incarnationem ad omnes sanctos qui ante fuerunt, et etiam ad angelos” (SB 4: 136.9-14).

317 Augustine, De Trinitate, 4.20.28: “Ab illo ergo mittitur dei uerbum cuius est uerbum; ab illo mittitur de quo natum est. Mittit qui genuit; mittitur quod genitum est. Et tunc unicuique mittitur cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur quantum cognosci et percipi potest pro captu uel proficientis in deum uel perfectae in deo animae rationalis. Non ergo eo ipso quo de patre natus est missus dicitur filius, se due eo quod apparuit huic mundo uerbum caro factum unde dicit: A patre exii et ueni in hunc mundum, uel eo quod ex tempore cuiusquam mente percipitur sicut dictum est: Mitte illam ut mecum sit et mecum laboret” (CCSL 50: 198).

318 See Sent. 3.24.85.4 (SB 5: 152), where the Lombard cites Augustine, De Trinitate 8.4.6 (CCSL 50: 275). 319 See Sent. 3.23.76.3 (SB 5: 142). 320 See Alexander, Glossa in 1 Sent., introitus, n. 6: Est autem duplex descensus, secundum quos

distinguuntur duae partes huius libri. Primus erat in uterum Virginis. Unde 64 Is., 1: Utinam disrumperes caelum et descenderes. Et est descensus in passione, ut 8 Ioan., 36: Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis” (ed. Quaracchi, 4).

321 Sent. 3.18.54.1: “Ad quid ergo voluit pati et mori, si ei virtutes ad merendum illa sufficiebant? Pro te, non pro se. Quomodo pro me? Ut ipsius passio et mors tibi esset forma et causa: forma virtutis et humilitatis, causa gloriae et libertatis; forma Deo usque ad mortem obediendi, et causa tuae liberationis ac beatitudinis. Meruit enim nobis per mortis ac passionis tolerantiam quod per praecedentia non meruerat, scilicet adytum paradisi et redemptionem a peccato, a poena, a diabolo” (SB 5: 116).

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which member of the Trinity is the one who comes to us as the Samaritan to the wounded?

Consequently, as the Lombard traverses the life of Christ from descent to descent, that is, from

incarnation to Cross, there is a trajectory from agent to act, from physician to healing.

Even as he lays down his definition of human nature in distinction two (c. 4), the Parisian

Master stresses that it is a whole human nature which Christ assumes, “soul and flesh, and their

properties and accidents.”322 This theological position suggests, consequently, the primary

division in the chapters concerning the assumption generally (cc. 1-73) between (A1) the

treatment of the assumption proper (dd. 1-12, cc. 1-37), which concludes with a series of

chapters discussing (1e) other possibilities for the assumption (cc. 35-37), and (A2) those

endowments which are included in the assumption of a human nature (cc. 38-53), namely, (2a)

Wisdom, Grace, and Knowledge (cc. 38-40); (2b) Defects (cc. 41-46); (2c) Acts of Prayer and

Will (cc. 47-49); and (2d) Merit (cc. 50-53).

Focusing attention, therefore, on (IA) the specific treatment of the assumption (dd. 1-12,

cc. 1-37), it is possible to discern first a discussion of (1a) the divine agent, namely the Son (cc.

1-3), (1b) the meaning of human nature (cc. 4-13), (1c) the meaning of divine nature (cc. 14-16,

26-27), and (1d) problems arising regarding adoption and sonship (cc. 29-34), which is

introduced by a discussion of the multifaceted meaning of secundum (d. 10, c. 29).

It should be noted, therefore, that the subdivisions for (A1) the particular treatment of the

assumption (cc. 1-37) are divided according to the progressive introduction of meanings for key

terms, namely, (a) the divine agent of salvation, (b) human nature, (c) divine nature, and (d) the

way in which it is possible to indicate a trajectory of Christological meaning according to nature,

person, habit, or cause with the term secundum.323

The first distillation, however, of the Tradition’s terminology of person and nature is

focused in chapter fourteen (d. 5) by the composite question: “If a person or nature assumed a

person or nature, and if the nature of God is incarnate?” As the Master breaks down this

composite into its constituent parts, he believes that according to the witness of sacred

authorities, the answers to most of the questions are “explicit and open,” and consequently

                                                                                                               322 See Sent. 3.2.4.4: “Totam igitur hominis naturam, id est animam et carnem, et horum proprietates sive

accidentia assumpsit Deus: non carnem sine anima, nec animam sine ratione, ut haeretici voluerunt, sed et carnem et animam cum sensibus suis” (SB 5: 29).

323 See Sent. 3.10.29.3: “‘Secundum’ enim multiplicem habet rationem: aliquando enim exprimit onditionem vel proprietatem naturae divinae vel humanae, aliquando unitatem personae; aliquando notat habitum, aliquando causam. Cuius disitinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae recondat, ne eius confundatur sensus cum de Christo sermo ocurrerit” (SB 5: 73).

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affirms the well attested: “A person assumes the nature” and rejects that a nature assumed a

person or that a person assumed a person.324 Peter, therefore, focuses his attention on the more

perplexing article, namely, whether the divine nature assumed a human nature, which in turn

ultimately holds the answer to whether the divine nature was incarnate.

A perceived answer in the negative had earned for Gilbert of Poitiers a heresy tourney

with Bernard of Clairvaux at Rheims in 1148.325 Unlike Peter Abelard, however, Gilbert seems

to have been successful in deflecting the charges.326 The Lombard along with a number of other

magistri were present at the trial,327 so the question of the incarnation of the divine nature is not

only familiar to the Lombard but one upon which he would have had over a decade to meditate.

A qualified but definitive affirmation,328 leads the Master into terrain haunted by the specter of

Eutychianism and largely lacking in textual resources. The text, itself, indicates signs of

modification and the Ps.-Peter of Poitiers gloss gives some exterior confirmation of the later

addition by the Lombard.329

Despite such idiosyncrasies, what is clear is that there are two questions that each have as

their subject the divine nature, namely, (i) whether the divine nature is incarnate and (ii) whether

the divine nature ought to be said to have become flesh, which constitute chapters fourteen and

fifteen, respectively. Just around the bend in chapter seventeen (d. 6) will be the introduction of                                                                                                                

324 Sent 3.5.14.2: “His aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur non naturam personam, nec personam personam, sed personam naturam accepisse” (SB 5: 42).

325 See John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1956]), c. 8: “EVOCATVS apparebat in curia uir etate nostra litteratissimus magister Gislebertus episcopus Pictauorum, responsurus clarissime opinionis et eloquentissimo uiro abbati Clareuallensi, super quibusdam questionibus que anteriori anno Parisius mote quidem sed in hoc tempus dilate fuerant” (15). See also, N.M. Häring, “The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers,” Medieval Studies 13 (1951): 26-27.

326 There is some discrepancy among the historians: Geoffrey would have us believe that Gilbert was convicted, but his verdict is suspect not only because he was the secretary of Bernard but also because such a condemnation cannot be located in any papal records (Pope Eugenius presided over the council at Rheims) and is not confirmed by either John of Salisbury or Otto of Freising. Furthmore, Gilbert seems to have retained his episcopate until his death in 1154, an unlikely outcome for someone formally condemned for both Trinitarian and Christological heresies. See N.M. Häring, “Notes on the Council and the Consistory of Rheims (1148),” Medieval Studies 28 (1966): 45-49, 53-55, & 58-59. See also, Häring, “The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers,” Medieval Studies 13 (1951): 1-2.

327 See John of Salisbury, Historia, c. 8: “Sed cum obloquerentur multi, in eum tamen acrius insurgebant Sigerius abbas SanctiDionisii, uir litteratus et eloquens, et Pictauensis ecclesie canonici, Calo qui postmodum eiusdem ecclesie episcopus factus est, et magister Ernaldus, cui cognomen est Non Ridentis; magistri quoque scolares, Petrus Lumbardus, postea Parisiensis episcopus, et Robertus de Meliduno, postmodum Herefordensis presul, suas et aliorum linguas in eum acuebant” (ed. Chibnall, 16).

328 See Sent.3.5.14.10: “Nos autem, omnis mendacii et contradictionis notam a sacris Paginis secludere cupientes, orthodoxies Patribus atque catholicis doctoribus nulla pravae intellgentiae suspicione notatis consentimus, dicentes et personam Filii assumpsisse naturam humanam, et naturam divinam humanae naturae in Filio unitam, eamque sibi unisse vel assumpsisse; unde et vere incarnata dicitur” (SB 5: 45).

329 See the note at SB 5: 46.

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the famous “three opinions,” but it should be noted that after the completion of this excursus (dd.

6-7, cc. 17-25), the first question again has as its subject the divine nature: (iii) “whether it ought

to be said that the divine nature is born of the Virgin?” (d. 8, c. 26). There are, therefore, three

questions that each in their own way introduces the divine nature into the matrix of meaning

surrounding the interpretation of assumption and incarnation.

It should, therefore, not be surprising that the Lombard introduces his foray into the

opinions with the question of whether phrases such as “God became man,” or “ “God is man,” or

“man is God” implies that “God became something or is something,” or that “something is said

to be God,”330 since he has already introduced the primary terms of the controversy (i.e., “God”

and “man”), now adding only aliquid. Irrespective of whether one maintains that the Lombard

embraced the so-called habitus theory or not,331 one must concede that none of the theories

emerge entirely unscathed from the Lombard’s treatment. In sharp contrast with other

discussions around disputed matters, the Lombard does not express a determination, instead he

reiterates that the disputation has not been resolved and leaves the reader only with the

(authoritative) assurance that the two natures of Christ remain integral, unmixed, and

unchanged.332 Returning, therefore, to his series of questions about the divine nature, he

concludes with a kind of coda by broaching the question of whether adoration should be given to

Christ’s humanity, an action that should (normally) only be accorded to divinity (d. 9, c. 28).

The problematic term, aliquid, emerges again in chapter twenty-nine (d. 10), on the

predicate side of the question: whether Christ insofar as he is man is a person or is also

something? The conspicuous addition of aliquid does not seem to be an accident, for as Ignatius

                                                                                                               330 See Sent. 3.6.17.1: “Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio plurimum continens utilitatis, sed nimium

difficultatis atque perplexitatis. Cum enim constet ex praedictis et aliis pluribus testimoniis, omnesque catholici unanimiter fateantur Deum esse factum hominem, et Christum verum Deum esse et verum hominem, quaeritur an his locutionibus: ‘Deus factus est homo’, ‘Filius Dei Factus est filius hominis’, ‘Deus est homo’ et ‘hmo est Deus’, dicatur Deus factus esse aliquid vel esse aliquid, vel aliquid dicatur esse Deus; et an ita conveniat dici: ‘Homo factus est Deus’ et ‘filius hominis factus est Filius Dei’, sicut e converso dicitur; et si his locutionibus non dicitur Deus factus esse aliquid vel esse aliquid, quae sit intelligentia harum locutionum et similium” (SB 5: 49-50).

331 Colish provides a helpful list of interpreters on either side of this question, see her Peter Lombard, vol. 1: 427, fn. 53 & 54. I find her own position and discussion, however, untenable.

332 Sent. 3.7.25.3: “Satis diligenter, iuxta diversorum sententias, supra positam absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad agnoscendum difficili, putare lectorem istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia melius forte considerate atque tractata, et ea quae hic movere possunt vigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat: « Deus hominem assumpsit, homo in Deum transivit, non naturae versibilitate, sed Dei dignatione: ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in divinam glorificatus in Deum, quia mutatio vel versibilitas naturae diminutionem et abolitionem substantiae facit »” (SB 5: 66).

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Brady notes,333 the very same question when asked in the Lombard’s gloss on Romans is simply:

Whether Christ insofar as he is man is a person?334 Allowing the three opinions to stand

unresolved affords the Lombard the opportunity to introduce his own four-fold distinction into

the conversation and equips him to address a series of customary questions (solet etiam quaeri),

not the least of which is whether the person or nature is predestined? (d. 10, c. 31) Somewhat

impassioned, the Master tells the reader that the four-fold meaning of secundum must be held in

the sinews of the memory in order to avoid confusion regarding sayings about Christ.335

This suggests that the Lombard believed that his own distinction(s) could show the way

forward for Christological speech without becoming entangled in dialectical or philosophical

brambles. Indeed, it is just before we see the multi-fold meaning of secundum emerge again (c.

71), as the Lombard considers the implications of Christ’s descent into death and his state during

the triduum, that the Lombard expresses some frustration with the inappropriateness of certain

forms of philosophical sophistication. It is as though standing on the threshold of the sacred site

of Christ’s tomb, housing the temple of the Lord’s body, the Lombard feels the need to chase

away the money changers, so that there is room for the pious reader to attain a prayerful

understanding. It is here too, in the shadow of Christ’s death, that the Lombard invokes his

definition of human nature and appeals to the unique way in which Christ is human in order to

maintain that even in the darkness of the valley of death, Christ remains fully human.336

4 “The Error of Some”: (Re)Defining Human Nature

Having given some expression to the overall structure of book three, focusing in

particular on the chapters regarding the assumption proper, it is now possible to provide a

focused examination of the Lombard’s anthropological commitments and the way in which these

commitments shape his discussion of the incarnation.

                                                                                                               333 See the note on SB 5: 72. 334 See Coll. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “Quaeri etiam solet utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit persona”

(PL 191: 1311A). In addition to the text contained in the PL and the two Vatican manuscripts (Vat. Lat. 144 and 695) consulted by Brady, we can also add (in a somewhat random and cursory way) the witness of Trinity Cambridge B.4.23 (see, f. 5rb) and B.16.12 (see, f. 5v), which also simply read: “Queri etiam solet utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit persona.”

335 See Sent. 3.10.29.4: “Cuius distinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae recondat, ne eius confundatur sensus cum de Christo sermo occurrerit” (SB 5: 73). This four-fold distinction is in the Tractatus de Incarnatione and in his gloss on the Pauline epistles (see PL 191: 1311).

336 See Sent. 3.22.70.3 (SB 5: 136).

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4.1 Preliminary Definition (d. 2, c. 4)

The Lombard’s introduction of the meaning of human nature in chapter four (d. 2) has a

soteriological horizon: “because in man, the whole human nature was corrupted by vice, he

assumed the whole, that is soul and flesh, so that he might cure and sanctify the whole.”337

Clearly, the Master has made his own the patristic axiom: “what is not assumed is not healed.”

He anchors his preliminary definition of humanity in an authoritative text that he associates with

Jerome,338 and thereafter reiterates the meaning which he deems so crucial, “by the name of

humanity, soul and body are to be understood; which two it is understood that the Son of God

assumed where it is read that he received man or humanity or human nature.”339

The meaning of “soul and body” or “soul and flesh” as a definition for human nature or

humanity may seem relatively innocuous given the frequent invocation of this definition by

others in the early part of the twelfth century,340 but the Lombard has some particular errors that

he is concerned to correct, principal among which seems to be a misunderstanding of Gilbert of

Poitiers’ position regarding the human nature of Christ,341 namely, that “by the name of

humanity not a substance, but a certain property, by which man is named,” is intended whenever

the humanity of Christ is mentioned.342

                                                                                                               337 Sent. 3.2.4.1: “Et quia in homine tota humana natura vitio corrupta erat, totam assumpsit, id est animam

et carnem, ut totam curaret et sanctificaret” (SB 5: 27). 338 See Pelagius, In Libello Fidei ad Innocentium Papam, n. 4 (PL 45: 1717); cf. SB 5: 27, n. 5. 339 Sent. 3.2.4.1: “Ecce aperte ostendit humanitatis nomine animam et corpus intelligi; quae duo

assumpsisse Dei Filius intelligitur, ubi hominem sive humanitatem vel humanam naturam accepisse legitur” (SB 5: 28).

340 See for example, Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei, lib. 2, pars 1, c. 9 (PL 176: 393D); Isagoge ad Theologiam, lib. 2, c. “De Persona Christi” (ed. Landgraf, 162-65); and Sententiae Florianenses, c. 36 (ed. Ostlender, 18).

341 See Gilbert, Exp. Boeth. contra Eut. et Nest., c. 4, nn. 31-51. We cannot really fault the Master for this misunderstanding as it seems that there were few in the Twelfth Century who understood the meaning of Gilbert’s texts other than Gilbert. Nevertheless, based on the reading presented in the first chapter, it is possible to suggest at least one possible source for the Lombard’s confusion, namely, the elasticity of the term “property.” For Gilbert, “property” is a term that can denote either substantial or accidental properties, not to mention the more difficult “personal property.” But whereas for Gilbert such meanings of “property” are distinct, it seems that for the Lombard accidents and properties are synonymous. We could, however, read the Lombard’s confusion another way. If Erismann’s reading of Gilbert's metaphysics is correct, then perhaps the Lombard is more perceptive then one might at first imagine. For it may be that a particularist metaphysics such as that assigned to Gilbert by Erismann, cannot bear the weight required by a theology seeking to explicate the mystery of the incarnation and the universal efficacy of the work which the Son of God came to accomplish. If all that connects the particular humanity of the Word incarnate with the particular humanity of a Peter or John is an exact resemblance, why would the work he accomplishes in that humanity effect anything in other human natures?

342 Sent. 3.2.4.2: “Errant igitur qui nomine humanitatis non substantiam, sed proprietatem quondam, a qua homo nominatur, significari contendunt, ubicumque Christi humanitas memoratur” (SB 5: 28).

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The Lombard corrects this “error” with a citation from John Damascene, which affirms

that the terms “deity” and “humanity” denote substances or natures.343 This would seem to be

sufficient for the “error” Peter perceives in Gilbert, but Peter proceeds immediately to introduce

a further clarification of meaning via another passage from John Damascene. The target of this

(presumably) new clarification is ambiguous. The Lombard introduces the text from John with

the simple but enigmatic claim that “nature is not received in Christ as when it is said there is

one nature of all humans.”344 The citation culminates in the claim that “in our Lord Jesus Christ

there is not a common species to receive.”345

In the context of the Damascene’s own work, John is refuting the heresy attributed to

Eutyches, whereby nature and person are not distinguished and there is affirmed only one nature

in Christ after the incarnation.346 He is, consequently, observing that as “compared to each

other” (ad invicem comparata), body and soul do not share a nature. But the Lombard does not

seem to read it this way. Peter is not trying to answer the question of how many natures there are

in Christ. Subsequent strands of commentary tradition find in this text, proof that the Lombard

thought “man” was predicated equivocally of Christ and Peter.347 Before reaching for this

conclusion, however, it is important to try and isolate the meaning the Lombard intended to

communicate.

Having just refuted a definition of human nature that is too narrow, it would make sense

for him to eliminate a definition (or reality) which is too broad. Hence, the Lombard could be

rejecting the claim that Christ assumed human nature in the abstract or as a whole. But this

reading is unlikely, since if he had wanted to rule out the assumption of an abstracted human

                                                                                                               343 See Sent. 3.2.4.2: “Ait enim Ioannes Damascenus: « Sciendum quidem quod deitatis et humanitatis

nomen substantiarum, scilicet naturarum, est repraesentativum »” (SB 5: 28); cf. John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 48, n. 1: Sciendum igitur quod deitatis quidem et humanitatis nomen substantiarum scilicet aut naturarum est repraesentativum” (trans. Burgundio, 180).

344 Sent. 3.2.4.3: “Natura enim non sic accipitur in Christ out cum dicitur una natura esse omnium hominum” (SB 5: 28).

345 Sent. 3.2.4.3: “In Domino autem Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim factus est, nec est, nec aliquando fiet alius. Sed Christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus est, idem et homo perfectus” (SB 5: 28.25-26); cf. John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 37, n. 6: “In Domino autem nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem suscipere. Neque enim generatus est, neque st, neque unquam generabitur alius Christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus idem et homo perfectus. Hinc non est dicere unam naturam in Domino nostro Iesu Christo” (trans. Burgundio, 176).

346 See John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 47, nn. 4-5: “Quando autem et duarum susceptivum Christum dicent naturarum, unius compositae naturae ipsum post unitionem dicentes? Quoniam enim unius Christus naturae ante unitionem, omni utique manifestum. | Sed hoc est quod facit haereticis erorem, ‘quod idem dicunt naturam et hypostasim’” (trans. Burgundio, 175-176).

347 See Stephen Langton, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2 & d. 6 (ed. Landgraf, 105 & 110).

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nature or the assumption of the whole species, there would have been a much simpler citation

from the Damascene to invoke, namely, that Christ assumed human nature as it was in atomo.348

One could try to argue that this later portion of the Damascene’s text was not included in the

Cerbanus translation consulted by the Lombard, which is true, but it seems that the Lombard had

ample access to the Burgundio translation of the Damascene,349 which does include the text

affirming that Christ assumed human nature in atomo. Hence, despite the fact that the Lombard’s

own citation of Damascene differs from both the translations of Cerbanus and Bergundio,350

nevertheless, it is certain that he had some kind of access to the Bergundio translation which

would have offered him a superior text for showing that Christ did not assume an abstract human

nature or the entirety of the human species.

The gloss formerly attributed to Peter of Poitiers notes the ambiguity in the terms “man,”

“humanity,” and “human nature,” for to say: Christus assumpsit hominem could imply that he

assumed a person and to speak of him having humanity could refer simply to a property.351 The

problem about the ambiguity of person is not an immediate concern of the Lombard’s in chapter

four (d. 2), but this problem will be addressed directly in chapters sixteen (d. 5) and twenty-nine

(d. 10). This is an interesting departure from other twelfth century strategies, which tend to

immediately address the problem of the union of body and soul constituting a person or the

assumption of body and soul entailing the assumption of a person,352 but in the Lombard’s

introduction to what is assumed in the incarnation, he is primarily concerned about the ambiguity

in the term “humanity” or “human nature.”

                                                                                                               348 See John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 55, n. 1: Deus igitur Verbum incarnatus, neque eam quae nuda

contemplatione cogitatur naturam assumpsit: non enim incarnatio | hoc, sed deceptio et fictio incarnationis; neque eam quae in specie consideratur: non enim omnes hypostases assumpsit, sed eam quae in atomo, quae eadem est in specie: primitias enim assumpsit nostrae massae, non secundum seipsam iam subsistentem, et atomum existentem prius, et ita ab ipso assumptam, sed in ipsa sui ipsius hypostasi existentem” (trans. Bergundio, 203-204).

349 See N.M. Häring, “The First Traces of the So-Called Cerbanus Translation of St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa III, 1-8,” Medieval Studies 12 (1950): 214-216.

350 For a comparison of the three texts, see Appendix C. 351 See Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossa in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4], “Nota diuersitatem nominum: Christus assumpsit

hominem, humanitatem, humanam naturam. Caue ergo ne nomine hominis personam intelligas uel nomine humanitatis proprietatem set quodlibet horum trium intellige animam et carnem” (Naples VII.C.14), f. 40vb.

352 See Summa Sententiarum, lib. 1, tr. 15: “Et quia in homine utraque corrupta erat natura, scilicet anima et corpus; utramque suscepit ut utrumque liberaret. Nec tamen personam hominis suscepit; naturam suscepit et non personam” (PL 176: 70C); Sententiae Pariensis, pars 1: “Anima nostra, quando erit separata a corpore, erit persona, quia tunc erit substantia rationalis individua; individua : non unita corpori. Sed quamdiu est coniuncta corpori, non est persona. Similiter anima Christi, quia semper fuit unita Verbo, ex quo facta fuit unio ; et unita est nature humane in unam personam” (ed. Landgraf, 30).

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So what clarification does Peter offer? As we saw in our discussion of Gilbert, there are

different realities which can act as an id quo: accidentia and subsistentiae are each in their own

way a “by which” and can each be taken as a property, quality, or form that exercises causality

upon an id quod or subsistens in some way. As noted above, the Lombard would seem to restrict

his meaning of property to accident,353 but if in the Lombard’s additional clarification about the

term humanity he is still thinking of Gilbert, then there is a further causality to be accounted for,

namely, that of subsistentiae in the order of genus or species.

Within this frame of reference, the Lombard might conclude that an individual would be

causally subject to human nature as a common species or universal.354 We could call this line of

causality a downward causality. But it is also possible to consider the problem from the other

direction. The union of body and soul constitutes an individual, which is to say that they exercise

an upward line of causality such that the union of this body and this soul constitutes this

individual which participates in the common species “humanity.”355 Or to put the problem a

third way: the union of body and soul causes our participation in the human species through the

constitution of a reality that would not be identical with body or soul.

I believe that the Lombard is at pains to mute or soften such causality (whatever its

modality) in Christ, for as he will note later, “God is said to be man or man God for another

reason than Martin or John.”356 Martin and John are human because each of them subsisted from

the union of soul and flesh, but this is not the case for Christ.357 Christ is human because he

joined body and soul to himself. The priority of causality, therefore, even at the level of

participation in the human species, is on the divine side—at God’s own initiative through the

miracle of the hypostatic union.

                                                                                                               353 See Sent. 3.2.4.4 (SB 5: 29). 354 As noted in the chapter on Gilbert, his position on universals is disputed, see Christophe Erismann,

"Explaining Exact Resemblance: Gilbert of Poitiers's Conformitas Theory Reconsidered," in vol. 2 of the Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 1-24.

355 The Lombard’s citations of certain Patristic authorities such as the Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, suggest themselves as support for this line of reasoning, see Sent. 2.19.109.3: “Sed dicimus corpus tantum per coniugii copulam seminari, creationem vero animae solum Creatorem nosse, eiusque iudicio corpus coagulari in vulva et compingi atque formari, ac formato iam corpore animam creari et infundi, ut vivat in utero homo ex anima constans et corpore, et egrediatur vivus ex utero, plenus humana substantia” (SB 4: 421).

356 Peter, Sent. 3.22.70.3: “Alia enim ratione dicitur Deus homo vel homo Deus, quam Martinus vel Ioannes. Homo enim dicitur Deus, et e converso, propter susceptionem hominis, id est animae et carnis” (SB 5: 136).

357 Peter, Sent. 3.22.70.3: “Non autem sic erat homo, ut ex anima et carne simul iunctis subsisteret: ex qua ratione dicitur aliquis alius homo; et ipse forte ante mortem hoc etiam modo erat homo, et post resurrectionem fuit. In morte vero homo erat tantum propter animae et carnis secum unionem, et mortuus propter inter illa duo divisionem” (SB 5: 29).

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In the Regula Caelestis Iuris, Alan of Lille denies that the union of body and soul in

Christ was such that they constituted a person, simply.358 But he does affirm that there is a union

between body and soul that is like a personal union insofar as it “works for this: that Christ be

man,” which union Alan calls “pro-personal.”359 But this is not the whole story, for body and

soul must also be joined to the Word according to a “con-personal” union in order for him to be

man. Unlike the Lombard, however, Alan is prepared to say that if the union between body and

soul is severed, as in death, then Christ is not man.360 Alan is also careful to note that all

intelligent persons maintain that “Christ insofar as he is man is something.”361 Despite these

differences from the Lombard, Alan provides some insight into what may be at stake for the

Lombard in the text under consideration and in Peter’s enigmatic invocation of the Damascene.

Alan addresses a line of argumentation that seems to have its origin in the homo

assumptus theory (the “first opinion,” which the Lombard presents in his Sentences): There are

indeed some who “propagate the fable that there was a certain man assumed by the Word who

began to be the Word. And so they say that a certain creature began to be the creator and so God

and thus deity. And so something made in time began to be eternal.”362 Such proponents try to

support this line of argument with the following: “risibility is in Christ and not according to the

divine nature, therefore according to the human. Therefore either according to body or according

to soul or according to the composite of both.” Alan counters that risibility is in Christ according

to none of these but according to body and soul as united to Christ, “for he did not assume

                                                                                                               358 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 102, n. 1: “Personalis unio est que rem facit esse personam que in

pura creatura attenditur ut in puro homine. Ex eo enim quod homo fit unum ex unione corporis et anime incipit esse persona i.e. res per se una. Talis unio non fuit in Christo homine. Non enim Christu sin eo quod incepit esse homo, incepit esse persona” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 208).

359 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 102, n. 2: “Propersonalis uero unio fuit in Christo. Vnio enim corporis et anime, que fuit in eo, similitudinem personalis unionis habuit. Vnde propersonalis dici potuit. Et illa specialiter operata est ad hoc ut Christus esset homo” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 208).

360 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 102, n. 4: “Conpersonalis uero unio fuit unio corporis et anime ad Verbum. Iste ergo uniones concurrunt ad Christi incarnationem nec alia fuit sufficiens sine alia. Si enim corpus et anima non fuissent ipsi unita nec anima corpori, ipse non fuisset homo. Vnde non dicimus ipsum in triduo fuisse hominem. Simliter si anima fuisset unita corporis et illa non fuissent unita Verbo, Christus non fuisset homo” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 208-209).

361 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 34, n. 1: “Generalis ut ab omnibus intelligentibus recipiatur ut Christum esse aliquid secundum quod homo” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 148).

362 See Alan, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 101, n. 3: “Sed per assumptionem corporis et anime est ipse homo, non tamen aliquis homo quem assumpserit, quamuis quidam fabulentur quondam hominem assumptum esse a Verbo qui incepit esse Verbum. Et ita dicunt quod quedam creatura incepit esse creator et ita deus et sic deitas. Et ita aliquid ex tempore factum incepit esse eternum” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 207).

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something composed of body and soul but only body and soul as united to himself. For by

assuming he united and by uniting he assumed.”363

Alan’s counter-argument could be understood as strictly a temporal point: there was no

composite of body and soul prior to the assumption but body and soul were joined to each other

in the very same instant that they were joined to the Word. While Alan certainly maintains this

position, he is actually arguing something further: body and soul do not constitute a distinct

composite at all. In the lines that immediately follow, Alan says that “body and soul when they

were united to him, composed Christ, that is, they made him to be composite, for he began to be

a composite (conpositus) of body and soul. Not that they composed something other from Christ

nor something which began to be Christ or which was united to Christ but Christ himself.”364

Here again, there is a divergence from the Lombard’s position with respect to Christ

becoming a composite person,365 but Alan rejects the production of a composite of body and soul

that would be distinct from Christ. Was the Lombard concerned about the same? The number of

conceptual divergences and the distance of almost thirty years between the texts of these two

thinkers make a firm conclusion difficult.366 But what Alan’s text illustrates is that even if one

rejects that the union of body and soul does not produce a human person, this is not the only

production that would be a concern. Any composite resulting from the union of body and soul

has to be accounted for within Christ’s ontological constitution. Would such a composite

exercise any causal force on Christ’s person?

Whether the Lombard would identify an individual reality constituted by the union of

body and soul with an individual human nature (as opposed to common) or with an individual                                                                                                                

363 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 101, n. 4: “Hoc tamen sic conantur asserere : Risibilitas inest Christo et non secundum diuinam naturam. Ergo secundum humanam. Ergo aut secundum corpus aut secundum animam aut secundum conpositum ex utroque. Ad quod dicimus quod secundum nullum istorum sed secundum corpus et animam sibi unitam. Non enim aliquid conpositum ex corpore et anima assumpsit sed tantum corpus et animam sibi unitam. Assumendo enim uniuit et uniendo assumpsit” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 207).

364 Alan of Lille, Regula Caelestis Iuris, 101, n. 5: “Corpus ergo et anima sibi unita Christum conposuerunt i.e. eum conpositum esse fecerunt. Incepit enim esse conpositus ex corpore et anima. Nec illa aliquid aliud a Christo conposuerunt nec aliquid quod inciperet esse Christus uel quod esset unitum Christo sed ipsum Christum. Et ita aliquid incepit esse conpositum ex corpore et anima, secundum quod homo, quod erat simplex et ab eterno secundum quod deus” (ed. Häring, AHDLMA 48: 207).

365 See Sent. 3.5.16.1: “Non ergo accepit Verbum Dei personam hominis, sed naturam, quia non erat ex carne illa et anima illa una composita persona quam Verbum acceperit, sed accipiendo univit, et uniendo accepit” (SB 5: 47).

366 For the dating of the Regula see Françoise Hudry, “Métaphysique et Théologie dans les Regulae Theologiae d’Alain de Lille (1202),” in Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century: On the Relationship Among Philosophy, Science, and Theology, ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora, and Andreas Niederberger, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 19 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 201-203.

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person is difficult to determine. His position on the status of universals is unstated and his

account of why humankind was constituted as a composite of body and soul in creation is largely

tropological not philosophical.367 As already noted, the Parisian master will deal with the

question as to why a person was not constituted by Christ’s body and soul later in his text, but in

chapter four (d. 2) his focus is on the meaning of man, humanity, or human nature when

predicated of Christ. It should be noted, therefore, that the text the Lombard cites from John

Damascene to correct the perceived error regarding deity and humanity as substances (not

properties) immediately follows a text in Damascene regarding universality and particularity in

the Trinity. Peter engages this text in his reflection on what is common and individual in the

Trinity in book one of the Sentences.368

Following this textual trail reveals the Lombard’s familiarity with Augustine’s account of

the problem in book seven of the De Trinitate and the twofold conclusion that the divine essence

is not a genus, nor the divine persons species; the divine essence is not a species nor the divine

persons individuals.369 On the surface, there is a discrepancy between Augustine and John’s

account,370 but the Lombard believes that the pious reader can see his way through the verbal

superficiality, and he offers the solution that whereas John is emphasizing the similarity between

eternal and temporal realities, Augustine is more attentive to the greater dissimilarity.371

What the citations from both Augustine and John indicate is that the Lombard would

have theological frames of reference that would enable him to say that the union of body and

soul constitutes an individual reality that while in some way constitutive of the person would not

necessarily be identical with the person. For this reason, Augustine can say that Abraham, Isaac,

                                                                                                               367 See Sent. 2.1.6 (SB 4: 334-36). 368 See Sent. 1.19.80.3 (SB 4: 167-68); cf. John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 48, n. 1: “Igitur quoniam

quidem aliud est substantia, aliud hypostasis multoties diximus, et quoniam substantia quidem communem et circumplectivam speciem homoidon (id est earum quae unum sunt specie) hypostaseon (id est personarum) significant, utputa Deus, homo; hypostasis autem atomon (id est individuum) demonstrat, scilicet Patrem, Filium, spiritum Sanctum, Petrum, Paulum” (trans. Burgundio, 180).

369 See Sent. 1.19.78.1: Hic adiciendum est quod tanta est aequalitas trium personarum atque indifferens magnitudo quod, cum dicamus tres personas unam esse essentiam vel substantiam, neque ut genus de speciebus, neque ut speciem de individuis praedicamus; non enim essentia divina genus est et tres personae species, vel essentia divina species et tres personae individua” (SB 4: 165); cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, 7.6.11 (CCSL 50: 263-64).

370 See Sent. 1.19.80.5: “Haec autem quae hi cdicuntur, licet in sermonis superficie aliquid a fide alienum resonare videantur, sane tamen intelligi queunt, piumque lectorem act intellectorem plurimum efflagitant. In quorum explanatione mallem silens alios audire, quam loquendo malevolis detrahendi occasionem praestare” (SB 4: 168).

371 See Sent. 1.19.80.6: “Hanc ergo similitudinem inter res sempiternas et res temporales perpendens Ioannes, universalitatis et particularitatis nomina, quae rebus temporalibus proprie conveniunt, ad res aeternas transtulit. Augustinus vero, maiorem videns dissimilitudinem quam similitudinem inter res praedictas, ab excellentia Trinitatis praedicta nomina removit” (SB 4: 169).

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and Jacob are not one man but three men,372 and John can distinguish human nature considered

in atomo, in specie, and in contemplatione.373 All that can be said, however, is that these

frameworks are available to Peter; it remains unclear to what extent he applied them in his own

analysis.

In the Lombard’s initial summary of his Patristic solutions to problems regarding

Trinitarian predication, he observes that the three persons are said to be one divine essence, “not

as a genus is predicated of species or as species [are predicated] of individuals, that is, as that

which contains with respect to what is contained and the greater with respect to the lesser.”374

Here, Peter provides an analogy that sheds light on his understanding of the relation between an

individual and its species. The example of contained to container and the comparison of lesser to

greater suggests a vertical causal relation. For Lombard, a species in some way determines,

governs, or contains its individual members.

Looking to a text closer to the Lombard’s own, the Ps.-Peter of Poitiers gloss picks up

this language of “contained” when commenting on the phrase “common species” and alludes to

the Lombard’s Trinitarian discussion by writing that “only the divine nature in Christ is not

received as when it is said that there is one nature of every man, namely, this species man.”375

The author of the gloss, however, goes on to add, “For it is impossible to say that the body and

soul of the Lord are of one nature or contained under some species or to accept that there is one

nature of both in the Lord.”376 The author of the gloss clarifies by way of anticipating a question:

“how when each man is made something (efficiatur aliquam) through the conjunction of body

and soul, why for Christ does he not become something (sit factus aliquid) through the

conjunction of the same?”

                                                                                                               372 See Augustine, De Trinitate, 7.6.11 (CCSL 50: 263). 373 See John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, c. 55, n. 1: “Natura vel nuda contemplatione cogitatur: secundum

seipsam enim non subsistit; vel communiter in omnibus homoidesi (d est eiusdem speciei) hypostasibus, has copulans, et dicitur in specie considerate natura; vel totaliter eadem in assumptione accidentium in una hypostasi, et dicitur in atomo considerate natura” (trans. Burgundio, 203).

374 See Sent. 1.19.80.2: “Ex praemissis patet quod tres personae dicuntur divina essentia nec secundum materialem causam, ut tres statuae unum aurum; nec secundum complexionis similitudinem, ut tres homines unius naturae; nec ut genus praedicatur de speciebus vel ut species de individuis, id est continens de contentis, maius de minoribus” (SB 4: 167).

375 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “tantum diuina natura enim in Christo non sic accipitur ut cum dicitur una natura esse omnis hominis, scilicet hec species homo” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 40vb.

376 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “Inpossibile est enim unius nature dicere Domini corpus <et> animam uel sub aliqua specie contineri uel unam utriusque esse naturam in domino accipere etc.” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 40vb.

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He answers that the conjunction of body and soul cannot be something which did not

already exist, for this would imply that something came into existence which did not exist in

Christ. But it can also not be something which already existed; rather, the conjunction of body

and soul is an existent by the divine existence.377 The author goes on to add that Christ’s body

and soul are not assumed so that he would exist or so that he would be something [aliquid], “but

so that he would be of some nature.”378 He, then, says that the Lombard proves “that a common

species is not predicated of Christ because he does not become other [alius], nor was he other

[alius], namely another substance than he now is and was, namely divine.”379

While there are certainly opaque aspects to this text, it can, nevertheless be noted that the

author rejects two alternatives: (1) there is not an existent (constituted by the conjunction of body

and soul) prior to the assumption and (2) there is also not some existent constituted after the

assumption which did not exist prior, since this would imply an individual existential unity

separate from Christ and therefore not existing in him. The author offers a third possibility: (3)

there is a dependent existent, namely one that exists by the divine existence.

Following the Lombard’s own lead, the author is insinuating that the individual members

of the Trinity are not related to the divine nature as individual humans are related to the human

species but also adds that Christ’s body and soul are not “contained under some species.” This

addition regarding the body and soul of Christ at least suggests that even according to his

humanity, Christ is related to the human species in a way that is distinct from other members.

The author of this gloss, therefore, is faced with a profound problem: “For we do not say that

some species is predicated of Christ, otherwise the definition of “man” would be predicated of

him and in the rest differently, which we do not concede.”380

  This is the problematic which I believe haunts the Lombard’s own text and can explain

why he selects the text he does from the Damascene, namely, “in our Lord Jesus Christ there is

not a common species to receive.” If a human property or attribute from which the term                                                                                                                

377 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “Ad quod dicimus: malus | hec sumitur ad non existens ut scilicet existat quod non erat in Christo uero non ad existens set a diuina existens” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 40vb – 41ra.

378 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “Hec assumpta sunt non ut ex eis esset uel aliquid esset set ut alicuius nature esset enim factus est” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 41ra.

379 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “Probat quod communis species de eo non predicatur: quia non factus est alius, nec erat alius, scilicet alia substantia quam modo est et fuit, scilicet diuina” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 41ra.

380 Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: Non enim de Christo predicari speciem aliquam dicimus, alioquin definitio hominis de illo predicaretur et in cetera aliter, quod non concedimus” (Naples, VII.C.14), f. 40vb.

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humanity is derived is too weak a meaning for humanity and therefore insufficient to safeguard

the full human reality of Christ, perhaps the implications for positing a complete and integral

substance as the meaning of humanity is too strong. If to say that Christ is man, means that he is

an individual member of the human species, then the normal conditions that would make this the

case, would subject the Word to causal forces that the Lombard finds inappropriate.

Consequently, in order to satisfy the soteriological exigence for Christ assuming a full human

nature, the Lombard advances the definition of humanity as body and soul or soul and flesh, “not

flesh without soul, nor soul without reason, as the heretics would have it, but both flesh and soul

with their senses.”381

4.2 Applying the Definition: Why not a person? (d. 5, c. 16)

As noted above, in the chapters that come to constitute distinction five, the Lombard

deals with a series of interconnected questions, some aspects of which he believes to be explicit

and open and others that he finds implicit and perplexing.382 His introduction suggests that his

approach to this nested set of questions serves to deepen the legitimacy of the meaning for

humanity or human nature that the Parisian master has already proposed. For this reason he

writes, “since from the foregoing it stands that the Word of God simultaneously assumed flesh

and soul into the unity of person, which of these should be more readily conceded, namely that

[1] a person assumed a person, or [2] a nature a nature, or [3] a person a nature, or [4] a nature a

person; and whether it is appropriate to be said that the divine nature is incarnate as it is well said

that God is incarnate and the Word is incarnate.”383 Within a somewhat standard question,

therefore, we can see the Lombard applying his definition for human nature (i.e., flesh and soul)

and in a certain way measuring its explanatory vitality within the conciliar language of person

and nature, for he knows very well that soul and flesh could stand-in, as it were, for either person

or nature.

                                                                                                               381 Peter, Sent. 3.2.4.4: “Totam igitur hominis naturam, id est anima et carnem, et horum proprietates sive

accidentia assumpsit Deus: non carnem sine anima, nec animam sine ratione, ut haeretici voluerunt, sed et carnem et anima cum sensibus suis” (SB 5: 29).

382 See Sent. 3.5.14.1: “Haec inquisitio sive quaerendi ratio, iuxta sacrarum auctoritatum testimonia, partim implicita atque perplexa, partim vero explicita est et aperta” (SB 5: 41).

383 See Sent. 3.5.14.1: “Praeterea inquiri oportet, cum ex praemissis constet Verbum Dei carnem et animam simul assumpsisse in unitatem personae, quid horum potius concedendum sit, scilicet quod persona personam, vel natura naturam, vel persona naturam, vel natura personam assumpserit; et an ita conveniat dici divinam naturam esse incarnatam, sicut Deus incarnatus et Verbum incarnatum sane dicitur” (SB 5: 41).

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In the closing of his original determination of these questions, he writes that “the person

of the Word, or the [divine] nature assumed the nature of a man, namely flesh and soul, but not

the person of a man.”384 Consequently, in the following chapter (c. 16), the Master takes on the

question: Why [the Word] did not take on the person of a man, when he took on man?385 As in

the conclusion of the previous chapter, so too in the opening of chapter sixteen, the Lombard is

careful to insert his definition of “human nature” or “man,” namely, soul and flesh. What is

instructive in the context of the question of personhood, however, is the particularization, for the

Word did not assume the person of a man, “because that flesh and that soul were not united into

one person which he assumed.”386 Here, the Lombard is prepared to grant that at least in the case

of the incarnation, there is an individual human nature (i.e., a unified soul and flesh) distinct

from the person, for there was not a (human) person already constituted by that soul and that

flesh when the Word united them to himself, but rather at the same time as that soul and that

flesh were united to each other, they were also simultaneously united with the Word.387

This position prompts the Lombard to make a clarification: the union between soul and

flesh is different from their union with the Word, which is to say that there are at least two

unions operative in the incarnation.388 The Lombard’s phrase, “accipiendo univit, et uniendo

accepit” emphasizes not simply the simultaneity of the unions but also the causal priority of the

Word, for it is the Word who receives soul and flesh and the Word who unites soul and flesh.

The Lombard’s solution to a somewhat standard twelfth century objection regarding the

soul as person (which seems in part to be based on a very unfortunate paraphrase of Boethius’

definition of person by the Summa Sententiarum),389 while not original to the Lombard,390

                                                                                                               384 See Peter, Sent. 3.5.15.1: “Ex praemissis indubitabiliter constat quod persona Verbi, sive natura,

hominis naturam, scilicet carnem et animam, assumpsit, sed non personam hominis” (SB 5: 46). 385 See Peter, Sent. 3.5.16.1 (SB 5: 47). 386 See Sent. 3.5.16.1: Ideo vero non personam hominis assumpsit, quia caro illa et anima illa non erant

unita in unam personam quam assumpserit” (SB 5: 47, ln. 3-4). 387 See Sent. 3.5.16.1: “Quia non ex illis constabat persona quando illis unitum Verbum est; nam sibi

invicem sunt unita simul cum Verbo unita sunt” (SB 5: 47, ln. 4-6). 388 See Sent. 3.5.16.1: “Altera tamen unione invicem unita sunt illa duo, scilicet anima et caro; alia unione

Verbo unita sunt; quia alia est unio animae illius ad carnem, alia est unio Verbi ad animam illam et carnem. Non ergo accepit Verbum Dei personam hominis, sed naturam, quia non erat ex carne illa et anima illa una composita persona quam Verbum acceperit, sed accipiendo univit, et uniendo accepit” (SB 5: 47).

389 As Brady and others have noted, Boethius’ definition is: “naturae rationabilis individua substantia,” (ed. Moreschini, 214), whereas the definition given by the Summa Sententiarum is: “rationalis substantia et individuae naturae” (PL 176: 70D), which is the definition employed by the Lombard in this text.

390 The Master’s solution is effectively a paraphrase of the Summa Sententiarum, see 1.15: “Sed tamen potest opponi quod anima est rationalis substantia et individuae naturae (quae diffinitio est personae), Igitur si assumpsit animam, etiam personam. Quod utique sequeretur si prius esset anima quam assumeretur. Est nam que

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nevertheless, provides a point of departure. If the principle is: “if it is a rational substance

existing on its own (per se est), then it is a person.” Then it would seem that if the human nature

(and not simply the soul) existed on its own, then it too would be a person. While the Lombard’s

focus in this text is the question of the soul existing on its own, which he denies, it also sheds

some light on his motivations for insisting that the union of soul and flesh and their union to the

Word took place simultaneously, such that the human nature of Christ never existed on its own

but always as joined to the Word.

Illuminating this further step, albeit only implicit within the text itself, illustrates the

commitments at work in his solution to the Augustinian backed objection marshalling authorities

that employ the language of “that man” (ille homo) or “some man” (quidem homo). Rather than

conclude that such authorities intend that a person was assumed by the Word, the Lombard

insists that these phrases (locutiones) must be understood as referring to the particular soul and

flesh assumed and united to the Word, “in which the person of God and man subsists,” and

consequently refer to the nature of a man not a person.391 By the conclusion of his solution to

these questions, therefore, the Lombard has achieved an impressive fortification of the identity

between soul and flesh and human nature that in Christ, by virtue of the hypostatic union,

excludes the possibility of implying a person.

4.3 Introducing Controls for Meaning: Aliquid (d. 10, c. 29)

Chapter twenty-nine (d. 10) takes up the line of speculation already anticipated by the

questions examined in chapter sixteen (d. 5), but here that trajectory is modified by the addition

of a new term (aliquid) and a new context: no longer the subject or object of assumption

(whether nature or person) but a question of constitution or identity given the incarnation,

whether Christ insofar as he is man is a person or even is something? As noted in the divisio

                                                                                                               anima persona, sicut angelus, Quid enim est homo nisi anima habens corpus? Sed ideo non assumpsit personam; quia non erat persona quod assumpsit. Animam namque creando assumpsit; et assumendo creavit” (PL 70D-71A).

391 See Sent. 3.5.16.4: “Sed quia hoc nefas est dicere aut sentire, praemissae locutiones, eisque similes, secundumhanc intelligentiam sane accipi debent: ut homo Christus, sive homo ille, sive quidam homo, dicatur assumptus a Verbo sive unitus Verbo, non quia hominis persona sit assumpta vel unita Verbo, sed quia anima illa et caro illa assumpta sunt et unita Verbo, in quibus subsistit persona Dei et hominis: ut ad hominis naturam, non ad personam respicias, cum assumptum vel unitum, vel quondam vel aliquem in huiusmodi locutionibus Scriptura memorat” (SB 5: 48).

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above, it is no accident that the very same term with which the Lombard introduces the three

“opinions” also serves here as one of the principal terms of predication.392

Chapters twelve and thirteen had as the subject of prediation, Christ. The intervening

chapters (i.e., cc. 14-15, & 26) have as their subject of predication the divine nature. But, here, in

twenty-nine the subject of predication shifts back to Christ. This is significant not only because

of the introduction of the Master’s multi-fold meaning of secundum but also because the

immediately subsequent chapters (cc. 30-34) have as their focus questions and concerns

generated by the problem of adoptionism. If we follow the suggestion of Ignatius Brady and look

to the testimony of Peter Manducator, we can see why the discussion of adoptionism follows the

question of whether Christ insofar as he is man is a person or something, for to the mind of the

Lombard, it was more common for aliquid to designate person than nature.393

Since, therefore, Christ insofar as he was man was not a person, the Lombard (when

speaking to his students) would deny that Christ insofar as he was man was something.394 Yet, if

he conceded that Christ insofar as he was man was something, then the Lombard intended that

Christ was “of some nature” (alicuius naturae). Consequently, it is not suprising that in the

course of rehearsing a well traversed argument, the Lombard introduces a tri-fold possibility for

the meaning of aliquid: (1) person, (2) substance, (3) or something else. Person or substance is

the real disjunct, but if one says that Christ insofar as he is man is a substance, then it may be

asked whether rational or irrational. Certainly not irrational, so if rational, then we meet the

definition of person given earlier, namely, a person is “a rational substance of an individual

nature.”

                                                                                                               392 See Sent. 3.10.29.1: “Solet etiam a quibusdam inquiri utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit persona,

vel etiam sit aliquid” (SB 5: 72). 393 See Ignatius Brady, “Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard,” Antonianum 41

(1966): “Quod queritur, utrum Christus inquantum est homo est aliquid, Magister, inquit, non semper negabat, immo quandoque concedebat extraneis. Cum autem negabat, tutis auribus loquebatur, id est illis quos instruxerat. Dicebat enim, quia quamvis nomina neutri generis soleant accipi in designatione nature, plerumque tamen accipiuntur in designatione persone. Ideo quoque concedebat: ‘Christus in quantum est homo est aliquid’, id est, alicuius nature. Negabat tamen, quia ‘aliquid’ ibi videtur accipi in designatione persone. Christus enim non, in quantum est homo est aliqua persona” (473). Brady cites BnF lat. 18108, f. 100v and Troyes lat. 964, f. 142r.

394 The epithets “Christological nihilism” or “Christlogical nihilianism” are most unfortunate. They dog the scholarly accounts of Häring, “Case of Gilbert,” (37-39), Colish (1: 429-36), Rosemann (131-33), and Nielson (171-72, 264-79, 282-86), although each in their own way expresses some dissatisfaction with the phrase. But such a characterization or association with the habitus theory and its proponents obscures the great care which some of them take to distinguish nihil (and its cognates) from non aliquid and consequently also distorts what is most at stake in this controversy, namely, whether aliquid denotes person or nature. See for example, Peter of Poitiers, Sent. 4, c. 10 (PL 211: 1178D) and the passage from Peter Manducator just cited by I. Brady above.

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So if Christ insofar as he is man is a rational substance, then insofar as he is man he is a

person. But because the Lombard is running arguments on “either side of the question,” he adds

the consequent problem: if insofar as Christ is man he is a person, then either is a person in the

Trinity or another. But it is not another, so Christ insofar as he is man would be a person in the

Trinity and therefore insofar as he is man he would be God. In his earlier gloss on Romans, the

Master extrapolates the inconvenientia of this conclusion, namely, that inasmuch as Christ is

man, he is not begotten by the Father nor is he the Son of the Father.395 In the Sententiae,

however, the Lombard is more reserved and notes simply that on account of this inappropriate

[conclusion] and others, some say that Christ according to the humanity (secundum hominem) is

not a person or something, unless perhaps “according to” (secundum) is expressive of the unity

of person.396

The Lombard can now introduce a fourfold meaning for secundum: (1) a condition or

property of the divine or human nature, (2) the unity of person, (3) a habit, (4) or cause. In the

Sententiae, the Lombard gives no immeadiate examples, but in the gloss, he gives two. When it

is said that Christ insofar as he is man forgives sins, this expresses the unity of person, and so we

should interpret it as: “the very man who is Christ or the very person which is man.” Whereas

when it is said that according to divinity Christ judges, this expresses causation, and so we

should interpret it as “by the power of divinity” Christ judges.397 Noticeably absent from the

“list” given in the gloss is the third meaning of secundum, a habit.

The Lombard quickly dismisses the thrust of the initial argument pro by attacking the

inference drawn from rational substance to person, appealing to the argument already offered

about why the soul is not a person: because it is joined to something else.398 Consequently, if

there is a rational substance joined to the person of the Word, then it would not be a person. The

                                                                                                               395 See Peter, Coll. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “Ideo in quantum homo non dicitur persona, quia non est in

quantum homo personali proprietate discretus a Patre et Spiritu sancto, quia in quantum homo non est genitus a Patre, vel Filius Patris” (PL 191: 1312B).

396 See Sent. 3.10.29.3: “Propter haec inconvenientia et alia, quidam dicunt Christum secundum hominem non esse personam nec aliquid, nisi forte ‘secundum’ sit expressivum unitatis personae” (SB 5: 73).

397 See Peter, Coll. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “secundum enim aliquando conditionem humanae naturae vel divinae exprimit, aliquando unitatem personae, conditionem naturae, ut cum dicitur, secundum quod homo, id est in quantum homo, vel secundum quod Deus, id est in quantum Deus, unitatem personae exprimit, ut cum dicitur, Christus secundum quod homo dimittit peccata, id est ipse homo, qui est Christus, vel persona ipsa quae est homo. Aliquando etiam, secundum notat causam, ut cum dicitur, secundum divinitatem judicabit, id est ex virtute divinitatis. Hae distinctiones suis locis diligenter animadvertendae sunt” (PL 191: 1311D).

398 See Sent. 3.10.29.4: “Illud tamen non sequitur, quod in argumentaitone superiori inductum est: quod si Christus secundum quod homo est substantia rationalis, non tamen persona, quia non est per se sonans, immo alii rei coniuncta” (SB 5: 73).

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Lombard adds, curiously, that the definition of person advanced does not apply to the persons of

the Trinity.399 Perhaps, once again illustrating his discomfort with the subordination implied by

relating the divine persons to the divine essence as individual members to a species.400

The Master entertains a final argument, based on the operning verses of Romans. As

noted above, this is a well-known and oft debated passage in the twelfth century,401 but in sharp

contrast with its deployment at the opening of his Tractatus de Incarnatione and its conspicuous

appearence within the examination of the “three opnions,” here, the Lombard levels his four-fold

distinction both to extract and exclude certain interpretations of the passage in question. The

argument is that whatever Christ is predestined to be he will be. But insofar as he is man, he is

predestined to be the Son of God; therefore, insofar as he is man, he is the Son of God [and

therefore insofar as he is man, he is a person].402

Rather than countering with the Trinitarian inconveniens he noted earlier, the Lombard

concedes the premise(s) but denies the conclusion: “For it is predestined that Christ be the Son of

God, and he truly is the Son of God. But according to the humanity (secundum hominem), it is

predestined that he be the Son of God, because according to the humanity (secundum hominem),

he has this through grace; yet according to the humanity (secundum hominem), he is not the Son

of God. With respect to Christ being the Son of God, it is no surprise that the Lombard affirms

that Christ is predestined to be the Son of God and that he is the Son of God. But with respect to

the qualifying secundum hominem, he sees a divergence: (1) according to the humanity, Christ

has that he is Son through grace, which means it cannot be simply conceded that (2) according to

the humanity, Christ is Son. Consequently, Peter affirms one meaning of secundum and excludes

another. Secundum cannot denote cause, because that by which Christ is man is not the same as

that by which he is the Son of God. Secundum could, however, denote the unity of person, “such

that the sense would be: he who is man, is the Son of God; but also, so that he, being man (ens

homo), has through grace that he is the Son of God.403

                                                                                                               399 See Sent. 3.10.29.4: “Illa tamen personae descriptio non est data pro illis tribus personis” (SB 5: 73). 400 There is a conspicuous absence of Boethius’ and the Summa Sententiarum’s definition of person in the

Master’s discussion of the meaning of “person” in the Trinity, see Sent. 1, dd. 23-25, cc. 95-104. 401 “. . . qui prædestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione

mortuorum Jesu Christi Domini nostri. . .” (Rom. 1, 4). 402 See Sent. 3.10.29.5: “Sed adhuc aliter nituntur probare Christum secundum hominem esse personam:

quia Christus secundum quod homo praedestinatus est ut sit Dei Filius. Sed illud est, quod ut sit praedestinatus est; ergo si praedestinatus est secundum quod homo ut sit Filius Dei, et secundum quod homo est Filius Dei” (SB 5: 74).

403 See, Sent. 3.10.29.5: “Ad quod dici potest christum esse id, quod ut sit praedestinatus est: est enim praedestinatus ut sit Filius Dei, et ipse vere est Filius Dei. Sed secundum hominem praedestinatus est ut sit Filius

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We see similar grammar (ens homo) to the clause set off by autem above, when Peter

asks about the object of the predestination (cf. Rom. 1:4): Is it of a person or a nature? The

Lombard delineates the way in which both may be said, for the person of the Son (which was

always) is predestined according to the humanity assumed (secundum hominem assumptum), so

that he, being man (ens homo), would be the Son of God. The human nature is predestined so

that it would be personally united to the Word of the Father.404 Although, there is no mention of

grace with respect to the predestination of the person in this passage, nevertheless, a meaning of

secundum is definitely operative, and it seems that the Lombard would have us interpret it

according to the rubric he has already laid out for us: according to the unity of person.

This rubric fits perfectly when applied to person as the object of predestination, but when

the object of predestination is shifted over to the human nature, it is at least reasonable to ask: Is

it still possible for secundum to denote the unity of person? Has the Lombard introduced another

meaning of secundum? Cause would not be appropriate in this context, for there is nothing in the

human nature that can be the cause of its predestination. Likewise, it seems that there is no

(natural) condition of the human nature “by which” the predestination takes place, for it is by

grace alone that the soul and flesh are assumed by the Word.405

The intervening chapter (c. 30) introduces a standard question which also acts as a

clarification of terms: Whether Christ is an adoptive son insofar as he is man or in some other

way? The Lombard’s determination of this question is illuminating because it compels him

(following Augustine) to distinguish between the grace of adoption and the grace of union.406 He

wants to avoid the language of adoption both when speaking of Christ as the Son of God and

                                                                                                               Dei, quia per gratiam hoc habet secundum hominem; nec tamen secundum hominem est filius Dei, nisi forte ‘secundum’ unitatis personae sit expressivum, ut sit sensus: ipse qui est homo, est Dei Filius; ut autem ipse, ens homo, sit Dei Filius, per gratiam habet. Sed si causa notetur, falsum est; non enim quo homo est, eo Dei Filius est” (SB 5: 74).

404 See, Sent. 3.10.31: “Deinde, si quaeritur utrum praedestinatio illa, quam commemorat Apostolus, sit de persona an de natura, sane dici potest et personam Filii, quae semper fuit, esse praedestinatam secundum hominem assumptum, ut ipsa scilicet ens homo esset Dei Filius; et naturam humanam esse praedestinatam, ut Verbo Patris personaliter uniretur” (SB 5: 77).

405 See Sent. 3.12.35.2: “Ad quod sane dici potest ipsum et aliam animam et aliam carnem potuisse assumere, quia gratia tantum assumpta est anima illa et caro a Verbo Dei” (SB 5: 81).

406 See Sent. 3.10.30.5: “Ex his evidenter ostenditur quod Christus non sit filius gratia adoptionis. Illa enim gratia intelligitur, cum Augustinus eum non esse gratia filium asserit: gratia enim, sed non adoptionis, immo unionis, Filius Dei est filius hominis et e converso” (SB 5: 76).

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when speaking of Christ as the son of man, for even as son of man, Christ is the natural son of

Mary through grace.407

These trajectories open onto issues of predication regarding terms like “made,” “created,”

and “creature.”408 The Lombard is well-attuned to the error of Arius and the Patristic responses,

from which he distills the principle: “it ought not to be simply confessed that Christ is made or a

creature,” but it can be said rightly with an added qualification, so that if it is said that he is made

according to flesh or according to humanity (secundum carnem vel secundum hominem), then the

making, becoming, or creatureliness is attributed to the humanity not to God.409 Peter intensifies

this conclusion, through his reading of passages where Augustine says things like, “through

Christ all things were made, inasmuch as he is the Word; but insofar as he is man, he is made and

glorified,” noting that if the reference is to the person, then one may confidently say that “that

man was always,” but if the reference is to the nature of man, then it may be said “that he began

to be.”410

The introduction of the fourfold meaning of secundum gives the Lombard a high degree

of grammatical control in statements and sayings regarding Christ, especially when addressing

familiar questions of his time. But the application of this rubric reveals that secundum can

designate not only the (divine) person of Christ “being man,” (ens homo), but also the human

nature itself as a site of attribution. This applies in contexts where creation, beginning, or

creaturliness are in view, but also (and perhaps more importantly) with respect to the grace of

incarnation itself, for it is the humanity (i.e., soul and flesh) which is assumed by the Word and

united to the Word, not according to some natural condition in the human nature nor due to some

cause in the human nature, but insofar as the human nature is related to the Word as that which is                                                                                                                

407 See Sent. 3.10.30.3: “Ad quod dici potest Christum filium Virginis esse natura vel naturaliter et gratia; nec tamen adoptivus filius Virginis est, quia non per adoptionem, sed per unionem filius Virginis esse dicitur. Filius enim Virginis dicitur eo quod in Virgine hominem accepit in unitatem personae; et hoc fuit gratiae, non naturae” (SB 5: 75).

408 Sent. 3.11.32.1: “Solet etiam quaeri utrum debeat simpliciter dici atque concedi Christum esse factum vel creatum vel creaturam. Ad quod dici potest hoc simpliciter et absque determinateione minus congruenter dici; et si quandoque, brevitatis causa, simpliciter denuntietur, nunquam tamen simpliciter debet intelligi. . .” (SB 5: 77).

409 See Sent. 3.11.33.2: “His aliisque pluribus testimoniis instruimur non debere fateri simpliciter ‘Christum esse factum vel creaturam’; sed addita determinatione recte dici potest, ut si dicatur factus secundum carnem vel secundum hominem, ut factura humanitati, non Deo attribuatur” (SB 5: 78); cf. Sent. 3.11.33.2: “Ex his evidenter traditur qua intelligentia accipiendum sit cum dicitur Christus factus vel simpliciter, vel cum additamento, ut factura scilicet vel creatura non ad assumentem Deum, sed ad assumptum hominem referatur” (SB 5: 79).

410 See Sent. 3.12.34.3: “Nam et ipse Augustinus huiusmodi utitur distinctione in pluribus locis, dicens per Christum omnia esse facta, in quantum Verbum est; secundum id vero quod homo est, ipsum esse factum et glorificatum. Si igitur ad personam respicias, confidenter dici hominem illum semper fuisse; si vero ad naturam hominis, concede eum coepisse” (SB 5: 81).

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the Word’s own. This relation accrues to the human nature through no merit of its own but only

through grace.

If we read chapter thirty-eight,411 as suggested in the divisio above, as commencing a

discussion of properties belonging to the human nature assumed by Christ, then, the appearnce of

the phrase secundum hominem in the first question (regarding whether Christ received the

fullness of grace from conception) is no accident of speech but a calculated application of the

multi-fold meaning of secundum. For this reason, the Lombard first deploys the meaning of

secundum that best explicates scriptural passages such as “the spirit is not given to measure” (Jn.

3:34) and “the fullness of divinity dwelt bodily” (Col. 2:9). These passages apply to Christ

insofar as he is the head,412 and consequently they refer to his fullness according to essence and

(divine) identity, not according to likeness or adoption.413 This application is clearer in the gloss,

and the Lombard insists that the assumed humanity’s identity and unity with the Word is the

principal meaning of this passage from Colossians.414

With this meaning of secundum firmly in place, the Lombard transitions to address

Luke’s testimony regarding the young boy Jesus being “full in wisdom and grace” (Lk. 2:40).

This transition from one meaning of secundum to another, albeit implicit, is highlighted by the

juxtaposition of Jesus’ “perfection” in the womb of his mother, “not only on account of soul and

flesh, but even on account of the wisdom and grace with which he was full.”415 This

juxtaposition calls to mind the language of chapter four between “soul and flesh,” and “their

properties.”416

                                                                                                               411 Sent. 3.13.38.1: “Praeterea sciendum est Christum secundum hominem ab ipsa conceptione gratiae

plenitudinem recepisse, cui spiritus datus est non ad mensuram, et in quo plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter habitat” (SB 5: 84).

412 See Sent. 3.13.28.2: “ita et in Christo habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis, quia ille est caput, in quo sunt omnes sensus; in sanctis vero quasi solus tactus est, quibus datus est spiritus ad mensuram, cum de illius plenitudine acceperunt” (SB 5: 84).

413 See Sent. 3.13.28.2: “Acceperunt autem de illius plenitudine non secundum essentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, quia nunquam illam eandem essentialiter, sed similem acceperunt gratiam” (SB 5: 84).

414 See Peter, Coll. in Ep. ad Col., c. 2: “Ita in Christo habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis, quia ille est caput, in quo sunt sensus, in sanctis vero quasi solus tactus est, quibus datus Spiritus ad mensuram. Praeterea est aliud quo intersit plane inter illud caput, et cujuslibet membri excellentiam, quia singulari quadam susceptione hominis factus est homo ille una persona cum Verbo. De nullo enim sanctorum dici potuit vel potest, vel poterit: Verbum caro factum est (Joan. I). Nullus sanctorum qualibet praesentia gratiae Unigeniti nomen accepit (ibid.). Ut quod est ipsum Verbum ante secula, hoc simul cum assumpto homine diceretur, et est summa omnis intelligentiae talis : In ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, id est veraciter et solide” (PL 192: 273B).

415 See Sent. 3.13.38.3: “Puer ergo ille plenus sapientia et gratia fuit ab ipsa conceptione. Unde Ieremias recte dicit: Novum faciet Dominus super terram: mulier circumdabit virum, quia in utero Virginis perfectis vir exstitit, non solum propter animam et carnem, sed etiam propter sapientiam et gratiam qua plenus erat” (SB 5: 85).

416 See Sent. 3.2.4.4 (SB 5: 29).

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Through Patristic guidance, especially that of Ambrose, Peter eventually leads the reader

to the affirmation of two wisdoms in Christ, but again deploys the unitary meaning of secundum

in order to safeguard the unity and identity of Christ’s person. The Lombard’s ultimate solution

to the question of Jesus growing in wisdom (cf. Lk. 2:52), however, is an appeal to a property of

the human nature. He struggles with the implications of Ambrose’s language, namely, that Christ

grew according to human perception (secundum humanum sensum) and so opts for the more

reserved (and common) position that Christ’s human perception grew according to its

manifestation to others (secundum ostensionem).417 Hence, despite the Lombard’s ability to

distinguish human nature from its properties and discern the relevance of a phrase’s referent to

person or to nature, nevertheless, he does not always follow through on the implications and

often retreats into the meaning of secundum expressive of the unity of person, which

occasionally puts him into the awkward position of treating Christ’s human nature or soul as if it

had agency in its own right.418

These textual explorations, however, have illustrated that the meaning of secundum that

denotes the unity of person often opens onto attributions which demand a shift of focus from the

person of Christ to his human nature. Some of these texts in which shifts of attribution to the

human nature occur present themselves as cases where secundum would denote a habitum, since

the other meanings of secundum enumerated by the Lombard would not apply. The most striking

examples are in those cases where Christ’s whole human nature is considered as something

united or joined to the Word. The mere process of elimination, however, is only suggestive not

conclusive. But in keeping with this suggestion, it could be argued that the Lombard leaves the

reader to draw his or her own inference in regard to this meaning of secundum because he is

aware that it is not customary to speak this way (non solet dici), and in his Sentences, he is

concerned to establish what may be said rightly (recte), confidently (confidenter), and well

(sane). He, therefore, refrains from presenting his personal opinion as the Church’s (public)

opinion, even if he believes that it has Patristic (i.e., authoritative) support.

                                                                                                               417 See Sent. 3.13.38.9: Aperte enim videtur Ambrosius innuere quod Christus secundum humanaum

sensum profecerit, et quod infantia eius expers cognitionis fuerit, et patrem et matrem ignoraverit: quod nec Ecclesia recipit, nec praemissae auctoritates patiuntur sic intelligi. Sed ita sane potest accipi, ut quantum ad visum hominum et sui sensus ostensionem, Christus profecisse dicatur. Proficiebat ergo humanus sensus in eo secundum ostensionem et aliorum hominum opinionem. Ita etiam patrem et matrem dicitur ignorasse in infantia, quia ita se habebat et gerebat ac si agnitionis esset expers” (SB 5: 89).

418 See for example, Sent. 3.14.40.3 (SB 5: 92) [on Christ’s power] and Sent. 3.12.36.2 (SB 5: 82) [on Christ’s capacity to sin].

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4.4 Testing the Definition: Triduum

The Lombard’s definition of humanity buckles under the weight of Christ’s death, burial,

and descent. Peter feels a great Patristic burden to maintain that once the Word takes on flesh and

soul, he never ceases to be man. Yet he must also affirm with the creed that Christ truly died. In

the Master’s attempt to maintain both of these positions, he is compelled to clarify the relation

between body and soul and their relation(s) to the Word. By the time he addresses the question

of whether Christ was man during the three days of his death, Peter has already established that

“in death the soul was separated from the flesh: whence Christ is truly said to have died; but

neither was separated from the Word of God.” For this reason, he maintains that in the

resurrection Christ conjoined soul and body anew and that in those two as conjoined anew, he

lived truly according to the humanity (secundum hominem), just as before his death.419

The Lombard is aware of those who maintain that Christ was not man during the triduum,

for a dead man is not a man. And if someone were to say that he was man, he would have to be

either mortal or immortal. But since he’s dead, he can’t be mortal, and he will not be immortal

until after the resurrection.420 Peter appears more than frustrated with what he takes to be

philosophical games and with the support of Ambrose says impassionedly: “sophistry of this

kind may have a place among creatures, but the sacrament of faith is free from philosophical

arguments.”421

Subsequently, the Master rejects both alternatives, arguing that in the death of Christ,

God was truly man, although dead; neither a mortal man nor an immortal man, because “he was

united to soul and flesh as separated [from one another].” Peter unpacks this claim by adverting

to the different reason for why God is said to be man and Martin or John would be said to be

man: the assumption of soul and flesh is why God can be said to be man and the converse, which

is to say, because God was united to soul and flesh, he is man; because his soul was divided from

his flesh, he died. This has interesting consequences, and the Lombard is aware that he needs to

                                                                                                               419 See Sent. 3.21.68.7: “Ideo illum maledicit qui non confitetur totum hominem denuo assumptum

resurrexisse, id est Christum animam denuo corpori coniunxisse, et in illis duobus denuo coniunctis in resurrectione vere secundum hominem vixisse sicut ante mortem. Nam in morte separata est anima a carne: unde vere dicitur Christus mortuus; sed neutrum separatum est a Verbo Dei” (SB 5: 132).

420 See Sent. 3.22.70.2: “Quod non videtur quibusdam, quia mortuus erat, et homo mortuus non est homo. Addunt etiam quod si tunc erat homo, vel mortalis, vel immortalis; sed mortalis non, quia mortuus; nec immortalis, quia tantum post resurrectionem” (SB 5: 136).

421 Sent. 3.22.70.3: “Illae enim et huiusmodi argutiae in creaturis locum habent, sed fidei sacramentum a philosophicis argumentis est liberum” (SB 5: 136).

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clarify: “But God was not man such that he subsisted from soul and flesh at the same time that

they were joined (for which reason someone else is said to be man). And perhaps he was man in

this way before his death and after the resurrection. But in his death, he was man only on account

of the union of soul and flesh with himself and dead on account of the division between the two.”

It is initially tempting to seize on the phrase, “subsisted from soul and flesh,” as

characterizing the ontological constitution of other humans and to contrast this with Christ’s

constitution as a subsistent “in soul and flesh,” which the Lombard uses elsewhere.422

Unfortunatley, it is not possible to draw too much from this contrast, because the Lombard also

describes the person of Christ as “a subsistent from soul and flesh.”423 To be sure, this is in the

context of affirming the unity of his incarnate identity, but it still makes it difficult to lean too

heavily on distinguishing the modality of Christ being human as subsistit in anima et carne from

the modality of other humans as subsistit ex anima et carne.

The Lombard’s qualifying “perhaps” (forte) also makes it difficult to say with certainty

whether he is giving a definitive (or personal!) opinion or not.424 It should be noted, however,

that the “perhaps” cuts both ways. Peter is granting the possibility that before and after his death,

the union of body and soul might contribute in some way to the Word being man, but this does

not necessarily mean that he believes this to be the case. It seems strange that he would feel the

need to clarify the difference between the Word being man and Martin or John being man, only

to say that this difference is operative during his death alone but not during any other time. It

seems more plausible to me to read the “perhaps” as a potential concession not a statement of the

Lombard’s actual position.

Peter’s consistent and repeated position in this text (and the surrounding texts) is that

Christ is living because soul and flesh are joined, but he is human because soul and flesh are

joined to him (whether flesh and soul are joined to each other or not). He believes that the union

of soul and flesh to the Word remains the same, even in death, and therefore even when they are

separated from each other.425 What changes in Christ’s death is only the union between soul and

                                                                                                               422 See for example, Sent. 3.18.52.2: “Hoc igitur per gratiam accepit, ut ipse, ens homo vel subsistens in

forma servi, id est in anima et carne, nominetur et sit Deus” (SB 5: 114; cf. 3.5.14.6: “Formae enim nomine natura significatur,” SB 5: 44) and Sent. 3.5.16.4: “in quibus subsistit persona Dei et hominis” (SB 5: 48).

423 See Sent. 3.13.38.8: “subsistens ex anima et carne” (SB 5: 88). 424 See Nielson, Philosophy and Theology, 279. 425 See, Sent. 3.22.71.3: “Ad quod dicimus quia Christus utique verus homo non fuisset, si carnem et

animam non assumpsisset; sed tamen, quia ex quo assumpsit, neutrum deposuit, sed cum utroque eandem unionem indesinenter tenuit quam assumendo contraxit, ideo non incongrue ubicumque animae vel carni vel utrique unitus

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flesh, which is reestablished in the resurrection. During his death, he is human because the union

established with soul and flesh in the incarnation continues unchanged and unbroken.

If these are the causal lines operative during Christ’s life, then such a position makes the

union of body and soul incidental to the Word being human. All that is required for the Word to

be human is that soul and flesh are joined to him, irrespective of their union to each other. The

union of soul and flesh means that Christ is living, but this vivifying union is only peripherally

related to the Word being human. The hypostatic union is the reason why the Word is human.

For the Lombard, these two unions are really distinct from one another.426 Ultimately, this means

that even as the divine persons of the Trinity are related to the divine nature differently than

human persons are related to human nature, so too in the Incarnation Christ as a man is related

uniquely to the human species, for whereas other humans are constituted as human by the union

of soul and flesh, only the unmerited grace of (the hypostatic) union is the cause for why Christ

is human: he is not contained by the human species but freely joins himself to it so that he may

save it in its entirety.

Peroratio 2

I have, above, frequently tried to follow the Lombard’s own usage, identifying human

nature with soul and flesh. But given his analysis of Christ’s state during the triduum, we are

forced to now ask whether it makes sense to talk of an ontologically integral human nature in

Christ during the triduum, if soul and flesh are not united. To be sure, the Lombard’s answer is

that because soul and flesh are still united to the Word, then he is still human, but is it still

possible to say that he is joined to a human nature? If so, then the human nature of Christ is not a

production of the union of soul and flesh but only the result of their association through the

union of each (separately) to the Word.

This situation sheds not a little light on why later commentators such as St. Thomas

believed that the Lombard denied a union between body and soul, not because there was

                                                                                                               est, ibi homo esse dicitur, quia ibi humanatus est. Ergo et in sepulcro erat homo, et in inferno erat homo, qui utrobique humanatus erat Christus, et unam eandemque cum anima et carne, licet separatis, habebat unionem” (SB 5: 137-38). It should be noted that the language of “made human” (humanatus) only occurs elsewhere in the Sentences, when the Lombard is discussing the habitus theory (see, Sent. 3.7.23.17 and 3.7.24.4).

426 See Sent. 3.5.16.1: “Altera tamen unione invicem unita sunt illa duo, scilicet anima et caro; alia unione Verbo unita sunt; quia alia est unio animae illius ad carnem, alia est unio Verbi ad animam illam et carnem. Non ergo accepit Verbum Dei personam hominis, sed naturam, quia non erat ex carne illa et anima illa una composita persona quam Verbum acceperit, sed accipiendo univit, et uniendo accepit” (SB 5: 47)

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absolutely no union, but because the union between body and soul affirmed by the Lombard is

ultimately only a vivifying union and therefore not a substantial union, truly constitutive of a

human substance, namely an individual, human nature. Thomas is well aware that this was by no

means the intention of the Lombard, but rather a conclusion from his principles.427 Earlier

commentators, as we will see below, picked up on this implication and consequently accused the

Lombard of equivocation.428

The reason that I have focused on the Lombard’s Christological anthropology and almost

entirely avoided a discussion of the “three opinions” and the question of the Lombard’s relation

to the habitus theory is because the questions we have examined in the Lombard’s text, such as

his deployment of the Damasence’s language of “common species” and his approach to Christ’s

status during the triduum, is the textual soil out of which emerges the fruits of twelfth century

reflections regarding Christ’s unity. I will examine these developments in Simon of Tournai,

Stephen Langton, and Prepositinus in the following chapter.

To be sure, the “three theories” serve as overarching thematic structures against which

Medieval masters measure their various questions regarding Christ,429 but as will be clear in

what follows, these masters while attentive to these “opinions,” nevertheless deploy their own

structures for asking and answering Christological questions, and the “novel” (i.e., Porretan)

conceptual tools they apply to old questions are the impetus for new answers and new questions.

Despite the efforts of figures such as Gerhoh of Reichersberg, William of St. Victor, and

John of Cornwall, the so-called homo assumptus theory had fallen out of favor by the mid-

thirteenth century,430 while never incurring a Papal condemnation like the habitus theory.

Consequently, around the same time, we see clear attestations to a theological consensus about

the (formerly contentious) “third opinion” or subsistence theory.431 For these reasons, I have

                                                                                                               427 See Thomas, in Sent. 3, d. 6, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1, n. 109: “non fuit intentio Magistri dicere quod per naturam

humanam in Christo significentur corpus et anima non unita. Non enim quantum ad hoc assignat differentiam, sed quantum ad hoc quod natura humana in aliis consurgit ex omnibus quae substantialiter in ipsis sunt; in Christo autem non, sed solum ex anima et corpore” (ed. Moos, 245).

428 See for example, Stephen Langton, Commentarius in Sententias, lib. 3, [d. 2]: “Dixit ergo magister occasione huius auctoritatis, quod hec species homo non est communis Christo et Petro, id est quod hoc nomen homo non predicatur univoce de illis” (ed. Landgraf, 105).

429 We will see this instantitated most poignantly in Prespositinus below in chapter three. 430 Hugh of St.-Cher notes, “Prima opinio non sustinetur in scholis nisi per petitionem. . .” (Scriptum super

Sententiis, l. 3, d. 6, n. 4 | ed. Principe, 187); Robert Kilwardby remarks, “Non video quod sane teneri possit, et ideo hodie pro falsa penitus habetur haec [prima] sententia” (Quaest. In 3 Sent., q. 11, resp. | ed. Gössmann, 56).

431 See, for example, Hugh of St.-Cher, “secundo modo ab omnibus conceditur” (Scriptum 3, d. 6, n. 4 | ed. Principe, 187); in light of Hugh’s comments, Principe concludes that “by about 1230, at least, theological opinion

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focused on the texts of Gilbert of Poitiers and Peter Lombard in chapters one and two in order to

establish, as it were, the formal and material elements of Christological conversation in the

middle of the twelfth century. These are the conceptual and textual horizons out of which

thirteenth century Christological disputation arises, even as these horizons come to be

increasingly permeated by Aristotelian fronts.

   

                                                                                                               had definitely solidified with respect to the three opinions and that not only is the note of heresy universally accepted for the third opinion, but the first opinion no longer has any convinced supporters.” See, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, vol. 3 of The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century (Toronto, PIMS: 1970), 59. Colish comments on the “newly developed consensus” of the thirteenth century that, having been informed by Aristotelian language, “was to make a reformulated version of the subsistence theory. . . the theory of choice” (See her Peter Lombard, 1: 436).

 

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Chapter 3 Nichil Aliud Est Esse quam Ipsa Natura:

Compositional Developments in Twelfth Century Christology Narratio 3

  Peter Lombard produced one of the most influential works of theology in the Western

Middle Ages with little to no advertence to questions (whether philosophical or theological)

regarding existence. Even the term and its cognates seldom appear.432 Yet, certain questions

about Christ’s composition would prove to be fertile ground for questions of existence to

emerge. There can be no doubt about the deep perhaps even revolutionary impact of the new

Muslim and Aristotelian texts which poured into Europe during the late twelfth and early

thirteenth century.433 We see their mark upon questions regarding the Trinity in the work of

William of Auvergne, but the emergence of such questions in William is still largley governed

by a Boethian framework.434

Curiously, however, questions about existence seldom find their way into his

Christology, which still largely resembles the Cur Deus Homo of an Anselm, despite William’s

somewhat critical edge. The new Aristotelian and Muslim sources constituted a unique

intellectual ferment out of which could emerge the unprecedented theological synthesis of

Thomas Aquinas and others. But the welcome (and recent) wealth of scholarship on these

(especially) Muslim streams of influence have perhaps prevented us from identifying more

                                                                                                               432 A cursory examination of a few of the exceptions in book three reveals that such language is not the

Lombard’s own. Hence, we find it within citations of John Damascene, e.g., Sententiae, lib. 3, dist. 3, c. 1(6), n. 3 (SB 5: 33) or among characterizations of the subsistence theory, e.g., Sent. 3.6.3(19).1 (5: 53) & 3.7.1(23).9 (5: 63).

433 For accounts of the western reception of such texts, generally, see Charles Burnett, “Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 370-404 and D. N. Hasse, “The Social Conditions of the Arabic-(Hebrew-)Latin Translation Movements in Medieval Spain and in the Renaissance,” in Wissen über Grenzen: Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter, ed. A. Speer and L. Wegener (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006): 68-86. For some examples of particular receptions of particular texts, see Amos Bertolacci, “On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization”, in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics, ed. D. N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 197-223; Martin Pickavé, “On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Theory of Individuation,” in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics, 339-363; R.J. Teske, “William of Auvergne's Debt to Avicenna,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 153-170; and D.N. Hasse, Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300 (London / Turin: The Warburg Institute / Nino Aragno Editore, 2000).

434 See William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1976), cc. 1-4: 16-34.

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organic lines of theological development within the Sententiae and Summae of the twelfth

century.435

Simon of Tournai (d. 1201), Prepositinus (d. 1210), and Stephen Langton (d. 1228)

produced some of the most advanced theological reflections to emerge from the latter part of the

twelfth century, yet their theological works have still received insufficient attention and little to

no theological analysis.436 Although this unfortunate lacuna in medieval theological scholarship

is gradually beginning to be rectified,437 especially through the focused production of critical

texts, nevertheless, there remains a great need for theological “mapping,” as so much of the

textual landscape of these exquisite masters remains uncharted and largely unexplored.

I have already undertaken such an exercise with respect to the well-known but often

misunderstood projects of Gilbert of Poitiers and Peter Lombard in order to establish what I

judge to be the material and formal elements which constitute the theological horizon of the last

half of the twelfth century. This rich if sometimes awkward theological synthesis is clearly

discernable in the works of Simon, Stephen, and Prepositinus, insofar as they ask and treat many

                                                                                                               435 I am reminded here of Ignatius Brady’s observations, albeit uttered in a slightly different context,

“Slowly but surely our knowledge of the nascent Scholasticism of the mid-twelfth century increases in depth and detail. Yet we might well ask if such progress is not sometimes impeded by certain hazy generalizations, by too much reliance on earlier accounts without solid historical basis, and above all by our failure to examine and exploit to the full contemporary documents, both scholastic texts and historical testimonies (necrologies, charters, etc.).” And along similar lines, “We know precious little indeed of the schools surrounding the cathedral of Paris in this period. Yet have we not perhaps neglected or misinterpreted some contemporary witnesses to the ferment of those schools even before Lombard's election as Bishop of Paris (1159) and his death the following year?” See his “Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard,” Antonianum 41 (1966): 454, 456.

436 It should be noted, that since my primary aim in this chapter is to establish an overarching line of development, I will be prescinding from particular questions of development among the individual works of each of the authors I am exploring. For the relative dating for Stephen Langton’s works, see the introduction to Stephen Langton, Quaestiones Theologiae Liber I, ed. Riccardo Quinto and Magdalena Bieniak, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 22 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 5-11. See also Bieniak’s introduction to her critical edition of Langton’s question De Persona and the literature she cites at 86, fn. 7 & 10. Also instructive is Riccardo Quinto’s, “Stephen Langton,” in Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 39-49. For the relation between Simon’s Institutiones and Disputationes as well as suggestions about dating, see Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai, ed. Joseph Warichez, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense Études et Documents 12 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932), xliii-lii and Maitre Simon et Son Groupe De Sacramentis, ed. Henri Weisweiler, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense Études et Documents 17 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1937), ccxii-ccxiv. For the dating of Prepositinus’ Summa, see G. Lacombe, Prepositini Cancellarii Pariesiensis (1206-1210), vol. 1 La Vie et Les Oeuvres de Prévostin, Bibliothèque Thomiste 11 (Kain, 1927), 179-81.

437 With respect to Langton, I think of the work of Riccardo Quinto and Magdalena Bieniak in their recent edition of the first book of Stephen’s Quaestiones Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). With respect to Peter Comestor and his “school,” I think of the pioneering work of Mark J. Clark, The Making of the Historia Scholastica, 1150-1200 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2015). With respect to the Gloss and to the School of Laon, I think of Alexander Andree’s recent edition of Anselm of Laon’s Glosae super Iohannem (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014). Magdalena Bieniak’s exquisite study, The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010) should also be noted.

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of the same questions put forward by the Lombard but answer and solve them through a

conceptual apparatus (albeit modified) that has its origins in Gilbert. When this synthesis is

brought to bear on naturally occuring dialectics of Christological positions, new questions

emerge and new principles for their solution are forged.

Consequently, for a project claiming to understand a thirteenth century hypothesis about

the esse of Christ, one must situate it within the theological developments preceding it in order to

appreciate both the fullness of its achievement and the limits of its aim. This chapter, therefore,

visits some of the significant questions that constituted sites of continual theological inquiry, so

as to trace the meaning of esse and related terms within Christological disputations from the mid-

twelfth into the early thirteenth century.

The Lombard’s question regarding a common species in Christ presents a unique record

of terminological development from the substantialia of Simon of Tournai to the totum esse of

Stephen Langton, who seems to have appropriated the meaning of esse illustrated in the complex

framework of Gilbert of Poitiers. Yet, one also finds this meaning of esse operative in questions

asked and sifted by Prepositinus, and it is in his Summa that one discovers (perhaps for the first

time) the expression that there are two esse in Christ, or more precisely that “Christ is a twofold

esse.”438 Stephen’s magisterial deployment of Gilbert’s terminology, however, pushes this

impressive conceptual framework to its limits: If the most concrete esse in a human person

would normally be humanity as the subsistence (or esse) of the whole by which this subsistent is

man, what is to be said about the God-man? Can he be said to have an esse or form of the whole?

If he has two natures (humanity and divinity), can either be said to be the whole esse of the

individual Christ? It is this Christological problematic of composition that drives Prepositinus

just beyond the position of Gilbert.439 For Prepositinus, the propria existentia of a Peter is

distinct from the humanity by which he is man.440 It must be asked, therefore, whether Christ has

a propria existentia and whether it is created or uncreated, temporal or eternal?

                                                                                                               438 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 10: “ergo aliud est eius esse secundum quod homo et aliud est esse

secundum quod est deus, ergo Christus duplex est esse unum istorum cepit esse set aliud non” (BnF 14526, f. 44ra). 439 See Gilbert, Exp. de I Trin., 5.25: “Restat igitur ut illa tantum sint indiuidua que, ex omnibus composita,

nullis aliis in toto possunt esse conformia: ut ex omnibus, que et actu et natura fuerut uel sunt uel futura sunt Platonis, collecta platonitas” (ed. Häring, 144). See also, Exp. de 1 Trin., 2.57 (90) and 1.29 (76-77). See Erismann, “Explaining Exact Resemblance,” 11. The precise relationship between a personal property and the totum esse of a subsistent within Gilbert’s framework is still an open one.

440 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 11: “Non autem eo quo est homo est Petrus. Hec enim humanitas facit hominem set non facit hoc hominem set potius propria existentia que ex hac humanitate et aliis proprietatibus que in hoc homine sunt habet consistere” (BnF 14526, f. 44rb).

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  What I attempt to do, here, then is to illustrate a line of development with respect to the

term esse and other terms connoting existence by examining the gradual shift in meaning and

context from Gilbert of Poitiers to Prepositinus. My argument, therefore, is that the

Christological fields of theological reflection were already tilled and ready to receive the seeds of

Aristotelian and Muslim metaphysics, so that by the middle of the thirteenth century it is possible

for a Thomas Aquinas to specify what precisely is at stake when we speak of the existence of

Christ. This in no way intends to mitigate the indisputable influence of Muslim sources. But it

does seek to complexify developmental explanations concerning the achievements of thirteenth

century theological speculation by looking closely at a series of recurring questions in

Christology emergent within and from the twelfth century.

1 Simon of Tournai (d. 1201)

Unlike Peter Lombard and Hugh of St. Victor, Simon does not invoke the traditional

Augustinian signum et res as an explicit structural principle for his major theological project, the

Institutiones in Sacram Paginam. Instead he opts for the distinction between sermo et res. This

distinction acts as a structuring, genetic principle for a series of divisions of meaning, for what is

primary for Simon is not simply the word (sermo) but meaning itself (significatio). The character

of meaning is twofold, for not only can words (voces) signify things (res) but things can signify

other things.441 What primarily has Simon’s attention, therefore, is the various ways that meaning

or understanding is transferred (transumptura nominum), not just between words, or between

words and things, but even things and things.442

Such distinctions regarding various carriers of meaning ultimately yield for Simon the

fourfold sense of scripture: “There are four rules for sacred scripture: history, which speaks

things done; allegory, in which something else is understood; tropology, that is, moral speech in

which are treated ethical structures (de moribus ordinandis); anagogy, that is, the spiritual

understanding through which is treated the highest and celestial things.”443 As Simon pivots,

                                                                                                               441 See Simon, Inst. 1: “Sermo autem duplex est. Duplex est enim significatio. Una uocum ad rem de qua

dicit Aristotiles: uoces sunt note passionum que sunt in anima ut hoc nomen homo significat hominem et simon simonem et est uox proprie sermo que instituta est ad significandum. Est et alia siginificatio rei ad rem quoniam res significatur alia re” (Oxford, Merton, 132, f. 105ra; BnF, MS lat. 14886, f. 1ra).

442 See Simon, Inst. 1: “Est aliud genus significandi ut dictum est rei ad rem ut nullo loquente circulus significat uinum uenale et serpens in palo et botrus in lingo: Christum in cruce” (Oxford, Merton 132, f. 105rb; BnF, MS lat. 14886, f. 1rb).

443 See Simon, Inst. 1: “Quatuor sunt regule scripture sacre: historia que res gestas loquitur allegoria in qua aliud intelligitur; tropologia, id est, moralis locutio in qua de moribus tractatur ordinandis; anagoge, id est, spiritualis

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however, from words about God to God’s existence, questions of composition become

immediately central, for since God’s existence in itself cannot be investigated, we must begin

with those things of which he is the highest cause.444

Simon’s Institutes is divided into eight parts. The first, as we have already hinted, deals

with meaning, in particular, the meaning of the word “theology.” Parts two and three treat God

himself, both the divine nature (2) and the divine persons (3). Parts four through six treat “divine

things which are from God,” namely spiritual creatures such as angels (4), corporeal creatures

such as heaven and earth (5), and creatures composed of body and soul such as humans (6). It is

in part seven that Simon takes up the incarnate Christ, who reshapes fallen man. In part eight,

Simon treats the sacraments, through which Christ reforms our deformity.445

As we turn now to examine some aspects of Simon’s Christology, it is important to

recognize just how important principles of composition are to Simon, even in his doctrine of

God, for in seeking to reach the esse of God, Simon simultaneously establishes that God is not

composed. Consequently, from the outset of the Institutes, it is clear that the distinction between

God and creatures is at least in part determined by the presence or absence of composition.

Over the course of his discussion of the incarnation, Simon addresses over a hundred

theological questions of varying length and complexity. Like the Lombard’s own Christological

approach, Simon’s entrance into the mystery of the incarnation is thoroughly soteriological,

seeking principally to ascertain why God would come, especially if the remission of sins was

already available? This inaugurates a series of other soteriologically invested questions, which

help Simon to identify precisely who became incarnate and provide some account as to why it

was the Son and not the Father (q. 3) or the Holy Spirit (q. 4).

The third and largest part of his investigation into the incarnation is focused around

questions regarding what was assumed, in general and in particular, both with respect to the

whole (i.e., nature) and the “parts” (i.e., soul and body). The general treatment of the assumption                                                                                                                intellectus per quem de summis et celestibus tractatur ad superiora ducimus.” (Paris, BnF, MS lat. 14886, f. 2ra; Oxford, Merton 132, f. 106ra).

444 See Simon, Inst. 2, prol. “Quia uero inuestigari esse non | potest per causas precedentes cum ipse sit causa suprema. Per consequentia philosophi cum inuestigantes usi sunt anagogica intelligentia per ea que facta sunt unicam eorum causam esse aduertentes hoc modo” (Paris, BnF, MS lat. 14886, f. 2ra; Oxford, Merton 132, f. 106rb).

445 See Simon, Inst. 8, prol. “Hactenus prout diuinitus inspiratum est persecuti sumus primo de sermone telogico, secundo de deo id est de diuina natura, tercio de rebus diuinis que sunt ipse deus id est de personis, quarto de rebus diuinis que sunt a deo spirituali ut angelo, quinto de corporali ut terra et celo, sexto de composita ex anima et corpore ut homine, septimo de Christo incarnato pro homine lapso reformando, octauo super est de sacramentis Christi per que sit reformatio hominis deformati nobis pro sequendum” (Oxford, Merton 132, f. 147vb).

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(qq. 7-14) is set off from the particular (17-48), by a short excursus regarding Christ’s

conception (15-16) and the particular treatment of the whole which was assumed (17-31) is set

off from the parts assumed (34-48) by an excursus regarding questions of Christ’s nativity (32-

33). The penultimate section examines Christ’s passion and death (49-66), and the final section

takes up questions regarding the law (67-102),446 in which Simon seeks to establish that the

whole of the law and the prophets depend upon charity,447 thereby instantiating his claim that

Christ’s offering of himself does not destroy the law.448

1.1 What did the Word Assume?

Simon opens his treatment of what the Word assumed by defining nature: When we say

that Christ assumed a nature, what do we mean? Simon notes but passes over the definition of

human nature as simply body and soul,449 indicating that such advocates deny that “nature”

refers to species in the case of Christ. Simon, on the other hand insists that when we say Christ

assumed man, “man” refers to species.450 When defining “species” in his Institutes,451 he invokes

the authority of Boethius, “the species is the whole substance of individuals.” The reason for this,

Simon explains, is that “there is nothing of the definition of a species which is not substantial in

individuals [of that species].”452

Simon, therefore takes a very strong position about the union of body and soul. When

there is a union, then there is a human, but when there is not, there is no human.453 Consequently,

when Christ died, he was not man during the triduum, because the union between his body and                                                                                                                

446 For a full divisio textus of Simon’s treatment of the incarnation, see Appendix E. 447 See Simon, Inst. 7.102: “Constat igitur ex predicis legem et prophetas ex caritate pendere” (Oxford

Merton 132, f. 147vb). 448 See Simon, Inst. 7.67 (Oxford, Merton 132, f. 144rb). 449 See Simon, Inst. 7.7.54-55: “Redditur a quibusdam: Nomine ‘humane nature’ intelligitur corpus et

anima” (ed. Evans). 450 Simon, Disp. 17, q. 1: “Sic quoque nomen hominis facit in substantiam, cum dicitur : homo est animal;

quandoque facit in natura, cum dicitur : homo est species ; facit quoque in naturam, cum dicitur : Christus assumpsit hominem, id est, humanam naturam : non enim assumpsit aliquem hominem, id est, aliquam personam : persona enim non assumpsit personam” (ed. Warichez, 59).

451 See Simon, Inst. 7.7.89-112. For all of Simon’s questions on Christology I am relying on a draft edition prepared by Dr. Christopher Evans of the University of St. Thomas in Houston, TX. I am very grateful to Dr. Evans for making his edition available to me prior to its publication.

452 See Simon, Inst. 7.7.100-102: “Item quia nichil est de diffinitione speciei quod non sit indiuiduis substantiale, ideo inquit idem Boetius quod ‘tota species est substantia indiuiduorum’” (ed. Evans). See also, Gilbert, Exp. de 1 Trin., 2.64-65: quicquid est alicuius esse, aut est tota substantia illius, cuius dicitur esse, aut pars eius quod est tota substantia. Et tota quidem substantia species, que de eo dicitur, est” (ed. Häring, 92).

453 Simon, Inst. 7.7.60-63: “Redditur quoque ab aliis: Nomine ‘humane nature’ intelligi medianum habitum, scilicet coniunctionem corporis et anime, qua quilibet homo subsistit homo, sicut eius contrario, idest dissolutione anime a corpore, homo desinit esse homo” (ed. Evans).

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soul was severed.454 Simon is aware, however, that in natural situations, a human person (and not

just a species or nature) is also constituted from the union of soul and body, so why if Christ

assumed a nature did he not also assume a person. Simon affirms that Christ assumed body and

soul while also simultaneously joining them to each other, but he denies that body and soul

constituted any person prior to the incarnation and also denies that they constituted any person in

the assumption itself.455

Hence, no new person is constituted by the union of Christ’s body and soul, and thus

while he became man he did not become a person, for he did not cease to be the person that he

was, nor did he become some other new person. The reason for this, in part, is because a person

cannot be a part of another person,456 but more precisely whereas someone is human by a

species, someone is a person by an individual or personal property.457 Christ’s personal property

is his eternal filiation; it is according to this, therefore, that he is understood to be a person; all

other created, individuating elements (such as accidents) would have to be in some way sublated

by this higher, uncreated and unifying principle.

1.2. Is there a common species in Christ?

Christ as an individual of the human species, however, presents a variation on Simon’s

rule for the relation between species and individuals, for there are substantialia in Christ which

are not comprised or encompassed by his humanity, namely, his divinity.458 Yet, it remains

possible for the species “man” to be predicated truly of Christ, because all that is proper to the

definition of man is substantial in Christ and thus “the whole species is the substance of Christ. .

                                                                                                               454 Simon, Inst. 7.64.1201-08: “Sed Uerbum prius fuit quam esset homo. Ut autem fieret homo, necessaria

fuit unio anime ad carnem et utriusque ad Uerbum. Si enim utrumque separaret a se, sed non animam a carne, Uerbum desineret esse homo. Tamen homo subsisteret coniunctione carnis et anime, quia coniunctione corporis et anime quilibet subsistit homo; qua soluta desinit esse homo. In triduo uero anima fuit separata a corpore, quare nec tunc fuit homo, licet caro et anima disiuncta tunc fuerint Uerbo unita” (ed. Evans).

455 Simon, Inst. 7.18.234-40: “Licet homo constet ex anima et corpore, que simul iungendo Christus assumpsit, non tamen personam hominis assumpsit. Neque enim ante assumptionem ex illis constabat persona hominis, nec in assumptione ex illis cepit quasi recens quedam persona subsistere. Sed Filius Dei, prius simplex persona, assumendo corpus et animam eorum coniunctione cepit esse homo, non tamen persona. Prius enim erat persona, nec desiit esse ea, nec cepit esse alia recens persona” (ed. Evans).

456 Simon, Disp. 17, q. 3: “nunquam enim persona manens persona est pars persone : persona enim dicitur quasi per se una, non pars alicuius, sed ab omni alia re discreta” (ed. Warichez, 61).

457 Simon, Disp. 17, q. 3: “Petrus modo est persona individuali proprietate, | et homo genere” (ed. Wariechez, 60-61); cf. Inst. 7.23 & 30.

458 See Simon, Disp. 48, q. 3: “Cum enim homo dicitur de Symone, complectitur omnia substantialia Symonis : nichil enim est substantiale Symoni quod non sit de diffinitione hominis. Cum vero dicitur de Christo, non complectitur omnia substantialia Christi, licet quedam. Divinitas enim substnatialis est christo, que non est de diffinitione hominis” (ed. Warichez, 140).

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. but the species is not the whole substance of Christ.”459 This is how Simon understands the

dictum of Damascene, that there is no common species, for there can be no definition of a

species which comprises all the substantialia operative in the constitution of Christ, yet it also

enables him to continue to affirm statements such as “Christ assumed man,” because “man” in

such statements denotes a nature not a person.460

These texts of Simon illustrate how he has found a way out of the Lombard’s impasse, by

being able to express the surplus of substantialia in Christ which is not hedged in, as it were, by

his humanity. Humanity and divinity are each substantial in Christ, but they are also distinct;

they are not the same. Part of what motivates Simon, here, is his commitment to affirming that

just as we say that “Christ is true God with God,” so too we ought to be able to say that he is

truly human like other humans. Which is to say that just as Christ is consubstantial with God, so

is he consubstantial with us. To fulfill this criteria on the human side, however, Simon believes

that the formal cause by which every other human subsists as human must also be the same sort

of formal cause by which Christ subsists as human, namely “the conjunction of rational soul and

human body.”461

1.3. Is Christ Composite?

Although Simon rejects the inference that since Christ assumed and simultaneously

joined a body and soul, he must have also assumed a person, nevertheless, he does accept that

prior to the incarnation the person of Christ was simple, but afterwards he is rightly said to be

composite,462 consequently it may be said that Christ is simple and composite.463 The reason for

this, Simon argues is that “Christ constands from soul and body and is composed of them. Truly

                                                                                                               459 See Simon, Inst. 7.7.103-106: “Tota autem species est substantia Christi (nichil enim est de diffinitione

hominis quod non sit substantiale Christo), sed species non est tota substantia Christi (aliquid enim ut deitas est substantiale Christo, quod non est de diffinitione hominis)” (ed. Evans).

460 See Simon, Disp. 17, q. 1: “Nomen quandoque facit in substantiam, ut cum dicitur : album est corpus; quandoque facit in qualitatem, ut cum dicitur : album est accidens. Sic quoque nomen hominis facit in substantiam, cum dicitur : homo est animal; quandoque facit in naturam, cum dicitur : homo est species; facit quoque in naturam, cum dicitur : Christus assumpsit hominem, id est, humanam naturam : non enim assumpsit aliquem hominem, id est, aliquam personam : persona enim non assumpsit personam” (ed. Warichez, 58-59).

461 See Simon, Inst. 7.7.81-85: “Quod enim formali causa quilibet alius subsistit homo eiusdem generis causa et Christus, scilicet coniunctione anime4 rationalis et corporis humani. Item si species non predicaretur de Christo, nec Christus esset de genere uel numero hominum, ergo nec uerus homo, nomine “hominis” sumpto quo sensu dicitur: ‘Petrus est homo.’ Quod absurdum est” (ed. Evans).

462 Simon, Inst. 7.18.242-44: “Persona tamen prius simplex tantum ex eis cepit esse composita, sed non esse persona” (ed. Evans).

463 See Simon, Disp. 48, q. 4: “Concedo tamen, quod Christus est simplex et compositum” (ed. Warichez, 140).

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of parts inasmuch as he is man, yet simple inasmuch as he is God.”464 To say that Christ is

simple is to say that he is a thing without parts, which is to say that he is divinity, that is, the

divine nature. In this way, when we say that Christ is simple, “simple” is taken substantially not

adjectively.465 Yet it remains true (but not for the same reason) to say that he is composite,

because he is human in virtue of the union of the body and soul which are really his own.

The principle that makes this so, seems to be the same which is at work in the claim,

“Christ became,” for this is understood (determinately) to be so insofar as he became man.

Likewise, although it is absolutely true to say that Simon or Peter is colored, we say this

according to the body which is his.466 What is at work, here, is the same principle we saw in

Gilbert, whereby certain attributes are rightly and truly predicated of the whole but in virtue of

one of its “parts.” And while this rule buckles a bit when it is over-extended analogically to

apply to the unique case of the incarnation, nevertheless, body and soul as united, really are

substantial in Christ, but as noted above, they cannot be totalizing substantially, precisely

because he is God and consequently bears within himself an infinite surplus of substantialia.

1.4 Is Christ insofar as he is man something?

Since, Christ insofar as he is man is composite, Simon naturally asks whether this means

that he is also aliquid insofar as he is man? To answer this, Simon distinguishes two meanings of

secundum: (1) one which implies the order of nature and (2) the other, which implies the order of

understanding.467 In the order of nature, genera (and differentiae) are the cause(s) of species as

well as accidents, and species and certain “formal” accidents are the causes of individuals. Thus

according to the order of nature, it is true to say that “insofar as I am an animal I am human and

insofar as I am human I am Simon,” or Eric, or Peter, or Edith.468 In the order of understanding,

                                                                                                               464 Simon, Inst. 7.22.441-43: “Secure igitur affirmamus Christum constare ex anima et corpore et esse ex

eis compositum. Uere ex partibus inquantum est homo, simplex tamen est inquantum est Deus” (ed. Evans). 465 See Simon, Disp. 48, q. 4: “Si nomen simplex sumatur adiective, non est verum : Christus est simplex, id

est, res sine partibus, quia divinitas ; tamen est compositum vel compositus, quia homo constans ex anima et corpore” (ed. Warichez, 141).

466 See Simon, Disp. 48, q. 5: “Verbum Patris dicitur factum; sed licet dictio sit absoluta, intelligentia tamen est determinate. Intelligitur enim secundum quod homo factus; nichilominus ergo, secundum quod Deus, est eternum : quo modo Symon absolute dicitur coloratus, intelligitur tamen determinate secundum corpus” (ed. Warichez, 141).

467 See Simon, Inst. 7.23; cf. Disp. 56, q. 3 (ed. Warichez, 161). 468 See Simon, Inst. 7.23.465-66: “Nature ut hic: Ego secundum quod animal sum homo et secundum quod

homo sum Symon” (ed. Evans)

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however, it is true to say that “insofar as I am Simon, I am human,” or “insofar as I am human I

am an animal,” because the lower implies or includes the higher.469

Simon, then applies this distinction to the question at hand and affirms that when we say

“Christ insofar as he is man is this, that is, Christ,” then secundum denotes the order of nature.470

According to this sense of secundum, therefore, Christ is aliquid because he unites to himself the

causally indviduating principles proper to the member of a species. Now this would seem to be

just the sort of top-down causality, which Lombard sought to remove from Christ. But Simon

seems to be aware of this problem and quickly adds that although the species is the cause of the

individual, this individual, is prior to his species, and consequently this is a unique and

unparalleled case.471

For Simon, therefore, there is not simply a surplus of substantialia with respect to nature,

but also a surplus with respect to personhood, insofar as Christ’s eternal personhood precedes all

temporal and created indiuidualia proper to him as this man. I think it is this strategy, which

enables Simon to find his way into extended meanings of aliquid that go beyond the denotation

of composition and as such can refer to both temporal and eternal realities.472 He notes, however,

that such extension is equivocal, whenever it concerns God and creatures.473

1.5 Is Christ One or Two?

Even though Simon affirms that Christ insofar as he is man is something and insofar as

he is God he is also in some way something (although, aliquid is used equivocally), nevertheless

Simon remains hesitant to say that Christ is two.474 For there is a difference between saying that

Christ insofar as he is God is other than (aliud quam) man and saying that Christ insofar as he is

God is another from man (aliud ab). For the preposition “from” implies a difference of subjects,

not simply the difference of subject and its form. Consequently, Simon concludes that it may be                                                                                                                

469 See Simon, Inst. 7.23.474-77: Notat uero ‘secundum’ ordinem intelligentie, ut hic: Ego secundum quod Symon sum homo, secundum quod homo sum animal. Est enim ordo intelligentie, ut in inferioribus intelligantur superiora, in indiuiduo species, in specie genus” (ed. Evans).

470 Simon, Inst. 7.23.477-78: “Igitur Christus secundum quod homo est hoc, idest Christus, ut prepositio ‘secundum’ notet ordinem nature” (ed. Evans).

471 Simon, 7.23.78-82: “Species enim causa est indiuidui, licet hoc indiuiduum prius fuerit sua specie, quod in isto dumtaxat est speciale. Si uero ‘secundum’ notat ordinem intelligentie, Christus secundum quod Christus est homo, et secundum quod homo est aliquid” (ed. Evans

472 See Simon, Disp. 102, q. 5: “Hoc nomen aliquid significationem suam impertit temporalibus et eternis : nomen uero hominis residet circa temporale” (ed. Warichez, 297).

473 Simon, Inst. 7.25.525-57: “Christus secundum quod homo est cepit esse aliquid, tamen ab eterno est aliquid. Dicitur enim ‘aliquid’ equiuoce de creatura et Creatore” (ed. Evans).

474 See Simon, Inst. 7.24.497-519 (ed. Evans).

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said that Christ is “one and other” (unum et aliud), yet not two, for he is not two subjects because

he is not two persons.475

1.6. In What Sense is Christ a Person?

If we compare this question with a related but strictly hypothetical question (i.e., whether

Peter would be Christ, if Christ had assumed Peter?), some further constitutional principles

emerge. In this question, Simon notes that Peter is a person by an individual property, but human

by a kind. And thus, if Christ had assumed Peter there would have ceased to be a person but not a

nature.476 Now, clearly, Christ did no such thing: he assumed only a nature and not a person and

as noted above no new person was constituted before, during, or after the assumption.

But the invocation of “individual property,” recalls Gilbert’s framework and elsewhere,

Simon claims that divinity and humanity belong to the personal property of Christ, “which

constands from all his properties, the collection of which is repeated in no other, both the natural

and the accidental which are said of Christ.”477

This statement occurs within the context of the question whether Christ insofar as he is

God or man is a person? As seen above, Simon solves a similar question in his Institutes by

invoking the distinction between the order of nature (i.e., the order of cause) and the order of

understanding (i.e., the order of knowing). But in his Disputationes, something slightly different

is going on, and he says that “Christ insofar as he is this person is God, or man, or a person

insofar as secundum denotes the order of nature.478 The orientation here is (seemingly) from

individual to nature, so we should expect Simon to say that the order of understanding is being

implied by secundum, but this is not the case. Rather, he says that secundum here implies the

order of nature. Consequently, it is according to some priority of cause that the uncreated person

of the Son may be said to be man. What is primary in this order is the uncreated personhood of

the Son. His divine personhood cannot be derived from his humanity.                                                                                                                

475 See Simon, Disp. 48, q. 1 (ed. Warichez, 139); cf. Inst. 7.24. 476 Simon, Disp. 17, q. 3: “Petrus modo est persona individuali proprietate, et homo genere. Assumptus

autem a Verbo, desineret esse persona, sed non desineret esse homo. Persona desineret esse, quia esset de alio, id est, de persona sumentis; nunquam enim persona manens persona est pars persone : persona enim dicitur quasi per se una, non pars alicuius, sed ab omni alia re discreta” (ed. Warichez, 61); cf. Inst. 7.28 & 30.

477 Simon, Disp. 56, q. 3: “Nam divinitas et humanitas est de personali proprietate Christi, que constat ex omnibus proprietatibus, quarum collectio in nullo alio reperitur, tam naturalibus quam accidentalibus que de Christo dicuntur. Est enim personalis proprietas uel indiuiduum, ut ait Porfirius, quod constat ex omnibus proprietatibus quarum collectio in nullo alio reperitur (ed. Warichez, 161); cf. Inst. 7.23

478 Simon, Disp. 56, q. 3: “A simili quoque Christus secundum quod est hec persona, est Deus, || vel homo, vel persona, ut secundum notet ordinem nature” (ed. Warichez, 161).

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The Word was a person before he became man. And insofar as he is God, by divine

power (i.e., as the efficient cause), he creates the human nature which is to be his own.479 But

formally it is joined only to himself; consequently, all that is true of his human nature,

substantially and accidentally is predicated of him on the basis of his personal identity. With this,

Simon has put the final piece into place in order to guarantee the Word’s primacy with respect to

cause, for as a divine person he creates his human nature, but kenotically he not only assumes

and joins it to himself but also allows the concomitant causal vectors to have their full play with

respect to all that is proper to the human species, both substantially and accidentally. But with

respect to his singularity, such created causes cannot produce his infinite personhood. Rather,

they are taken up into his personal unity.

What Simon has achieved is a partial transposition of the conciliar and patristic claim that

the union of humanity and divinity takes place on the basis of the person, which is why it is

referred to as the hypostatic union. But Simon has taken Gilbert’s framework, which recognizes

that a personal property (as an id quo) is required to account for the personal and highest unity of

a subsistent whole and has applied it within his own Christological context.

If within Simon’s Trinitarian theology, we take the position that the personal property of

the Son and the person of the Son are identical,480 then what we have here in his Christology is

the same dogmatic claim of the councils inherited from Cyril and Leo but transposed into a new

theoretical framework that to be sure has its foundations in Gilbert but which Simon has made

uniquely his own.481 The very same personal property (i.e., filiatio) by which the Son is distinct

                                                                                                               479 Simon, Disp. 102, q. 3: “Item, Christus auctoritate divina incarnavit se, ergo auctoritate divina

incarnatus est, ergo auctoritate divina factus est homo, ergo secundum quod Deus est homo. Redditur. Cum dicitur Christus auctoritate divina incarnavit se, istud complexivum auctoritate divina, potest significare efficeientem causam, et tunc est verum quod proponitur; vel formalem causam, qua significatione concepta non est verum quod propositum est” (ed. Warichez, 296).

480 Simon leaves this question open in his Institutiones, noting two opposed positions. It does seem, however, that he gives slightly more weight toward favoring a distinction between person and personal property, see Inst. 3.28 (ed. Schmaus, 191-93). Operatively speaking, however, there are other places where he seems to affirm the identity of person and personal property, see Inst. 3.4: “Tres autem personae, licet sint unus spiritus et idem sit sanctus, tamen haec iunctura dictionum spiritus sanctus transsumitur ad significandam tertiam personam in Trinitate et eius personalem proprietatem, qua persona est quis alius a Filio et Patre” (ed. Schmaus, 63).

481 To cite just one example, Simon makes some advancements in clarity with respect to the question of aliquid, both as it applies to the question of whether Christ insofar as he is man is something (Inst. 7.23) and whether Christ insofar as he is God is something (Inst. 7.24), but perhaps most arresting is Simon’s recognition that aliquid is said equivocally of God and of creatures (Inst. 7.25).

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from the Father and the Spirit is the personal property which guarantees the ontological unity of

Christ.482

2 Stephen Langton (d. 1228)

Few if any theologians in the twelfth century fail to affirm that Christ assumed a nature

not a person, and Stephen is no exception.483 As we have seen, however, the difference among

theologians in the twelfth century lies not so much in their confession but in their meaning and

explanation of their confession. Stephen illustrates this clearly when he presents the “three

opinions” in his Questiones, wherein he distinguishes them based on an interlocking set of

questions, namely, what was assumed, whether Christ insofar as he is man is something, and

whether he is two.

2.1. Is Christ Two?

Consequently, Stephen says that the habitus theory denies that Christ insofar as he is

man is something, which suggests that advocates of this theory would only say that Christ is

one.484 The homo assumptus theory on the other hand, affirms that Christ insofar as he is man is

something and also says that Christ is two, but curiously denies that when it is said “that man,”

(iste homo) with respect to Christ there is supposited the Son of God.485 Such an observation

could suggest why this theory ultimately comes to be associated with affirming two subjects in

Christ.486 It is the subsistence theory which Stephen believes to hold the truth, “because when

                                                                                                               482 See Simon, Inst. 3.2: “Nomen quoque personae transsumptum est ad Patrem et Filium et Spiritum

Sanctum. Nam ut homines inter se individualibus distinguuntur proprietatibus, sic et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus quamquam ineffabiliter suis tamen proprietatibus sigillatim sunt distincti” (ed. Schmaus, 61).

483 See, Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homine Assumpto, et utrum Christus sit Duo, n. 10: “Sed persona non est assumpta, nec persona assumpsit personam, sed persona naturam, et natura naturam” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 233); see also, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 5: “In hac forma ergo verborum due vere sunt hec: persona assumpsit naturam, natura assumpsit naturam; et due false hec: persona assumpsit personam, natura assumpsit personam” (ed. Landgraf, 108).

484 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homine Assumpto, etc., n. 1: “Super hoc est triplex opinio. Una, quae asserit, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod est homo. Haec opinio interimit mediam propositionem. Sed haec opinio relegata est per decretalem Alexandri, quae praecipit, quod Christus dicatur aliquid secundum quod homo” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 229).

485 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homine Assumpto, etc., n. 1: “Alia opinio concedit conclusionem et dicit, quod Filius Dei assumpsit illum hominem. Et sicut divina essentia est Filius Dei, non tamen supponit essentiam, qua supposita supponitur Filius Dei, ita iste homo est Filius Dei, non tamen supposito isto homine supponitur Filius Dei” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 229).

486 See Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4.38 (ed. Leonina, 15: 134-36). See also, Peter the Chanter, Summa de Sacramentis et Animae Conciliis, lib. 3, c. 54, §353, ln. 60-63: “Dicunt enim Deum assumpsisse

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that man (illo homine) is supposited, there is supposited the Son of God. This position,

consequently, maintains only a single subject in Christ, because it denies that Christ is two.487

Stephen confirms at least this last conclusion, for he maintains that “although Christ is of

two natures, yet he is not two. . . because he is only one person.”488 For Stephen, therefore, (at

least among created realities) there is a real distinction between person and nature, since a person

is not a nature,489 but a res of a nature,490 that is, an individual member of a species.491 He

accepts Boethius’ definition for person, and consequently for the same reasons as Gilbert rejects

any possibility of the soul being either an individual or a person.492

Getting a clear definition of nature from Stephen, however, is a little more difficult. In his

Lectura,493 Summa,494 and Quaestiones,495 he follows the standard four-fold comparison between

Greek and Latin terms and puts natura and persona into orbit with essentia, subsistentia, and

substantia. In his Lectura he says that the term “essence” signifies the nature of an existing thing

most generally (per se generalissime),496 and when commenting on the Lombard’s interpretation

of a line from Augustine,497 Stephen observes that there is a twofold meaning of “nature”: (1)

                                                                                                               quemdam hominem determinate de quo est ita loqui quod non de Verbo. Sed ille homo est eadem persona que Deus, nec sunt in Christo due perone sed sunt duo subiecta” (ed. Dugauquier, 474).

487 See Stephen, in 3 Sent., d. 6: “Alii dicunt, quod Christus constat ex tribus: carne et anima et divina natura et est aliquid secundum quod homo, non tamen est duo” (ed. Landgraf, 109).

488 See Stephen, in 3 Sent., d. 7: “Licet sit Christus diversarum naturarum, non tamen est duo. Sicut ‘nec alium’ etc., id est non est alius secundum quod homo et alius secundum quod Deus, quod una tantum persona” (ed. Landgraf, 113).

489 See Stephen, in 3 Sent., d. 7: “Persona enim non est natura, set et nature humane et divine” (ed. Landgraf, 113).

490 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6: “Non enim factus natura, quia non est natura, set est res nature”(ed. Landgraff, 111).

491 For more on this, see section 2.3 below. 492 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 5: “Individuum enim hic dicitur, quod in partes sui similes non dividitur et

quod non venit in constitutionem alterius. Si ergo anima esset persona, non veniret in constitutionem alterius” (ed. Landgraf, 109). See also, Quaetiones, q. de Persona, n. 2: “hoc nomen 'indiuidua' potest sumi dupliciter, scilicet ut dicatur 'indiuidua', idest incomunicabilis compositione ita quod nihil aliud notatur per illud nomen, et secundum hoc diuina essentia est indiuidua, idest incommunicabilis compositione, uel potest sumi 'indiuidua', idest incomunicabilis compositione; et singulari proprietate ab aliis rebus et personis discreta et distincta, et secundum hoc diuina essentia non est indiuidua, quia nulla proprietate distinguitur” (ed. Bieniak, 101); cf. Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 26 (ed. Landgraf, 27).

493 See Stephen, Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 26 (ed. Landgraf, 25). 494 See Stephen, Summa, q. de Persona (ed. Ebbesen & Mortensen, 125). 495 See Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona, (ed. Bieniak, 95). 496 See Stephen, Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 26: “Hoc nomen essentia naturam rei existentis per se generalissime

significat; sine nota forme alicuius convenit satis proprie essentie divine” (ed. Landgraf, 25) 497 See Peter Lombard, Sent. 1, d. 29, c. 2 (126), n. 3: “‘Cum vero audimus omnia esse ex Deo,’ ut ait

Augustinus, De natura boni, ‘omnes utique naturas intelligere debemus, et omnia quae naturaliter sunt. Non enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant sed vitiant, quae ex voluntate peccantium nascuntur.’ Omnium ergo quae naturaliter sunt, unum principium est Pater cum Filio et Spiritu Sancto, et hoc esse coepit” (SB 4: 216). See Augustine, De Natura Boni, c. 28 (CSEL 25: 868).

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any res that has its existence from God and (2) that which preserves a res,498 in similar contexts

he re-affirms the first meaning, but adds that a nature is a res of the first predicament.499

In his Summa, he acknowledges that the term res can refer to either person or essence,500

both of which fall rightly within the first predicament,501 and also notes two meanings of

essence, when applied among creatures: The first and wider meaning is nature, which is how he

understands statements such as “genera and species are essences.” The second and narrower

meaning of essence is the singular property of something.502 In his Quaestiones, he

disambiguates the term subsistentia by using Gilbert’s id quod and id quo and notes according to

the latter that a subsistentia is the substantial property of an id quod, yet he does not identify or

relate subsistentia directly and explicitly to nature,503 but rather to substantial form.504 Although

there are places where Stephen seems to understand nature as an id quo when he affirms

statements such as “by humanity Christ is this man,”505 his preference seems to be the term quid

by which he regularly dispels ambiguities with respect to “substance” and res in order to

maintain a clear distinction between person (quis) and nature.506

                                                                                                               498 Stephen, Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 29: “Natura dupliciter, id est res a Deo habens existentiam, et ita secundum

illos mala actio non est a Deo. Similiter in secunda significatione mala actio non est natura, quia non est rei conservativa” (ed. Landgraf, 36). See also, Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 38: “Hoc nomen natura restringitur ad supponendum pro substantia. Vel dicuntur hic peccata non actiones deformate, set deformitates ipse, que a Deo non sunt. Quod autem actio non dicitur peccatum, hoc est propter deformitatem” (50).

499 See Stephen, Lect. in 2 Sent., d. 35: “ ‘Omnis natura bonum est,’ id est omnis res primi predicamenti” (ed. Landgraf, 101)

500 See Stephen, Summa, q. RES: “Sit hoc nomen ‘res’ commune ad essentiam et personam” (ed. Ebbesen & Mortensen, 66).

501 See Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona, n. 1: “Ad hoc dicimus quod hoc nomen ‘substantia’ || ponitur in predicta descriptione pro hoc nomine ‘ypostasis’, nec tamen hoc nomen ‘ypostasis’ equipollet huic nomini ‘persona’, immo est superius. Pertinet enim hoc nomen ‘ypostasis’ in creaturis ad omnes res primi predicamenti, quia omnis res primi predicamenti est ypostasis” (ed. Bieniak, 98) and “Set in predicta descriptione restringitur hoc nomen ‘substantia’ per hoc adiunctum ‘rationalis nature’ tantum ad rationalia primi predicamenti” (100).

502 See Stephen, Summa, q. utrum Deus Misericordia sit Iustus: “in creaturis hoc nomen ‘essentia’ dupliciter dicitur: secundum quod dicitur natura, unde dicitur ‘genera et species sunt essentiae’; uel secundum quod ‘essentia’ dicitur singularis proprietas alicuius. Et sic in larga acceptione erit haec vera ‘deus essentia est iustus’, in stricta vero falsa” (ed. Ebbesen & Mortensen, 42).

503 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona: “Ista enim sic accipiuntur in creaturis, ut ‘usia’ siue ‘essentia’ dicatur ‘natura’ intellecta ut natura. ‘Subsistentia’ uero equiuoca est ad ‘id quod substat’ siue subsistit et ad ‘id quo subsistit’. ‘Id quod subsistit’ est ipsa res forme subiecta; ‘id quo res subsistit’ est eius substantialis proprietas” (ed. Bieniak, 95).

504 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona: “Set hoc nomen ‘usiosis’ iuxta aliquam similitudinem non est translatum, quia nihil est in trinitate quod substet forme substantiali, nec aliqua est ibi forma substantialis, nec habemus respectum ad humanitatem Christi. Non ergo utimur in trinitate hoc nomine ‘usiosis’, tamen eius equipollens, scilicet ‘subsistentia’, transferimus ad idem ad quod hoc nomen ‘ypostasis’” (ed. Bieniak, 96).

505 Stephen, Summa, q. de Persona, “Christus humanitate est iste homo” (ed. Ebbesen & Mortensen, 126). 506 For some examples, see Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 10 (ed. Landgraf, 116); Questiones, q. de Persona,

n. 4 (ed. Bieniak, 102); and Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 6, n. 3 (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 266).

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If we integrate the texts above, then what we get is a recurring division of meaning: in the

Lectura between (1) nature as the most general res of the first predicament and (2) that which

preserves a res; in the Summa between (1) nature taken as genus or species and (2) as a singular

property; and in the Quaestiones between (1) nature as substance or essence and subsistentia as a

substantial property or substantial form.507 We may safely infer, therefore, that according to the

first or wider meaning of nature, Stephen tends to instantiate this meaning with the terms quid or

species,508 especially in Christological contexts. Consequently, it is no surprise that with respect

to the question of a common species in Christ, we find that Stephen has such a meaning of nature

or species clearly deployed. It is in this Christological question, therefore, that one may discover

not simply the meaning of nature as species but of species as esse, for “in pure humans the

species is the whole esse of the individual. For the whole esse of a human is from the

conjunction of her body and soul, such that from these, there arises a third, differing from each, a

composite, and this is human nature.”509

The twofold distinction with respect to the meaning of nature occurs in another place in

his Quaestiones, wherein he is arguing that nature and property, while each in a subject, are not

in a subject in the same way. This seems to suggest a further characteristic of Stephen’s meaning

of nature, namely, that nature is not a subject,510 but rather inheres in a subject in some way.511

The fact that nature does not denote a subject distinguishes two possible meanings of substance,

                                                                                                               507 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, I am not trying to make any sort of developmental claims

with respect to the texts of Stephen as compared to one another, rather I am focused more on common doctrines which emerge from his corpus as a whole. This is not to say, to be sure, that there are not developments between his individiual texts. There are many, but I am prescinding from such inter-textual developments, here.

508 Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 3, n. 1: “Item, nullum nomen ditum de deo in quantum deus significant predicabile, et hac ratione quia si significaret, ergo hoc nomen ‘pater’ significaret sumptum ab aliqua specie (ab hac specie paternitas); set omnes species et omnia genera predicantur in quid; ergo esse paternitatem est esse quid, et ita paternitas et innascibilitas sunt due res, et ita duo principia, et ita pater est tria principia” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 256). See also, Summa, q. de Notionibus: “Item queritur utrum ‘paternitas’ designet speciem. . . Quod negamus, quia si significaret speciem, esset natura, et si esset natura, esset quid; et si hoc, divina essentia esset plura, cum divina essentia sit plures notiones” (ed. Ebbesen & Mortensen, 103)

509 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2, c. 4: “In puris hominibus species est totum esse sui individui. Totum enim esse hominis est ex coniunctione corporis et anime eius, ita quod ex illis duobus surgit tertium, differens ab utroque, compositum. Et hec est natura humana” (ed. Landgraf, 105).

510 Stephen, Questiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 3, n. 3: “Diuersimode sumitur hec prepositio ‘in’ secundum diuersa supposita. Cum enim dicitur ‘diuina essentia est in filio’, hec dictio ‘in’ notat naturam esse in subiecto. Cum uero dicitur ‘paternitas est in filio’, hec dictio notat proprietatem esse in subiecto, et ideo falsa est” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 256).

511 Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 1, n. 3: “ITEM. Licet eadem sit rationalitas Sortis et anime Sortis, tamen a quibusdam conceditur quod Sortes et anima Sortis sunt duo rationalia; ergo, licet eadem sit deitas patris et filii et spiritus sancti, tamen ab eis concedendum est ‘pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt tres dii’. DICIMVS quod non est simile. Hoc enim nomen ‘rationalia’ significat formam inherentem, hoc autem nomen ‘deus’ non significat deita<te>m inherentem” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 237).

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insofar as one denotes a subject for accidents and the other does not but rather means the same as

essence.512 The term “substance,” however, is not the only term that carries with it an ambiguity

with respect to nature and person but so too the term aliquid. Consequently, in Christological

statements, such as “Christ insofar as he is man is something (aliquid),” Stephen must explain in

what sense this statement is true, since following Alexander III’s decree(s),513 every Catholic

theologian must affirm this statement.

In such contexts, Stephen utilizes the distinctions illustrated above to explicate the true

sense of this Christological claim. It is true that Christ insofar as he is man is something

(aliquid), because insofar as he is man he is a substance, but not insofar as such terms apply to

the definition of person, but rather to the definition of human, that is, according to the most

general meaning of the category of substance. Consequently, in such Christological claims,

aliquid and “substance” denote not quis but quid and, therefore, a statement like “Christ insofar

as he is man is a person,” is false. But “Christ insofar as he is man is something,” is true because

aliquid denotes a quid not a quis.514 Such clarity about the meaning of aliquid, may be why

Stephen finds his way beyond Gilbert and Simon into affirming a meaning of aliquid applicable

to both God and creatures, insofar as essence or nature also enjoys this analogical extension.515

                                                                                                               512 Stephen, Quaestiones, de Persona: “Cum enim in creaturis dicatur ‘substantia’ res que accidentibus

substat, ibi [sc. in Trinitate] sumitur inproprie hoc nomen ‘substantia’ ad significandum idem quod hoc nomen ‘essentia’, et ita supponit diuinam essentiam que nullis accidentibus substant. . .” (ed. Bieniak, 96).

513 See Alexander III, Epistula “Cum in nostra” ad Guilelmum Archiepiscopum Senoniensis (28 May 1170): “Cum in Nostra esses olim praesentia constitutus, tibi viva voce iniunximus, ut suffraganeis tuis Parisius tibi ascitis ad abrogationem pravae doctrinae Petri quondam Parisiensis episcopi, qua dicitur quod Christus secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid, omnino intenderes et efficacem operam adhiberes. Inde siquidem est, quod fraternitati tuae per Apostolica scripta mandamus, quatenus . . . suffraganeos tuos Parisius convoces et una cum illis et aliis viris religiosis et prudentibus praescriptam doctrinam studeas penitus abrogare et a magistris et scholaribus ibidem in theologia studentibus Christum sicut perfectum Deum, sic et perfectum hominem ex anima et corpore consistentem praecipias edoceri” (Denzinger-Hünermann, 749).

514 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 10: “Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid, quia substantia, set non secundum quod ponitur in descriptione persone, sed secundum quod ponitur in descriptione vel diffinitione hominis, scilicet secundum quod generalissimum in predicamento substantiae, quia secundum quod ponitur in descriptione persone, hoc nomen substantia significat quis et non quid. Secundum vero quod ponitur ut generalissimum in predicamento substantie, significat quid. Hec autem falsa: Christus secundum quod homo est persona vel non persona. Set hec vera: non secundum quod homo est persona” (ed. Landgraf, 116)

515 See Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 1, n. 7: “ITEM. Quorundam est opinio quod iste terminus ‘aliquid’ aliam habet significationem secundum quod dicitur de creatore et secundum quod dicitur de creaturis; unde secundum eos hec est falsa ‘aliquid est deus’ in uno sensu; | et ita opportet quod hec sit uera ‘nichil est deus’, cum sit eius contradictoria. Quod quia absurdum est dicere, DICIMVS quod iste terminus ‘aliquid’ in eadem communi significatione dicitur de creatore et creaturis” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 239).

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2.2 Is there a Common Species in Christ?

When Stephen lectures on the question of a common species in Christ, he is deeply

concerned about the way in which the Lombard explicates this question, for Stephen thinks that

the Master understood the term “man” as applied to Christ to denote a habit,516 and consequently,

that it was said equivocally of Christ and Peter.517 Citing the decree(s) of Alexander III, he notes

that such a position must be condemned as heresy. Yet, Stephen goes onto observe the grounds

for this supposed position of the Lombard, arguing that the Master interpreted the authority of

Damascene to mean that “this species man is not common to Christ and Peter, that is, that this

name man is not predicated univocally of them.”518 Stephen recognizes, however, that this

statement of John’s is in reference to the error of Eutyches not to the constitution of a real human

species,519 because the two natures (humanity and divinity) in Christ do not come together to

constitute a third nature.520

Stephen’s own reading utilizes the authority of Boethius, which we have already seen in

Simon and which reveals esse as a meaning of species: “In pure men, the species is the whole

esse of the individual. For the whole esse of man is from the conjunction of his body and soul, so

that from those two there arises a third, differing from each, a composite; and this is human

nature.” What is curious, however, is that Stephen immediately acknowledges that this cannot be

the case in Christ, “for the esse of Christ is not from the conjunction of his body and soul.”521

Nevertheless, rather than shift into the language of substantialia, he retains the language of totum

esse.                                                                                                                

516 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2, c. 4: “Hoc dicit magister, quia hoc dixit, quod hoc nomen homo dictum de Christ copulat habitum et non dicitur eodem modo de Christo et de Petro” (ed. Landgraf, 105). 517 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 7: “Alii dicunt, quod, | cum dicitur: Christus est homo, hoc nomen homo copulat habitum et ponitur equivoce de Petro et Christo” (ed. Landgraf, 109-10).

518 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2, c. 4: “Dixit ergo magister occasione huius auctoritatis, quod hec species homo non est communis Christo et Petro, id est quod hoc nomen homo non predicatur univoce de illis” (ed. Landgraf, 105). See also Stephen, Exp. in Ep. ad Phil., c. 2: “ex hoc loco uoluit habere lumbardus quia hoc nomen homo dictum de Christo predicat habitum” (BnF 14443, f. 375ra).

519 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6 (ed. Landgraf, 111) and d. 7 (113). See also, Stephen, Exp. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “Nota quod paulo ante dictum est, scilicet, non ex duabus una facta est conposita natura. Per hoc, enim, solutur quod dicit Iohannes Damascenus, scilicet, quod non est communem speciem dici de Christo homine, id est, due nature in persona ipsius existentes non conponunt terciam speciem sicut aurum et argentum simul conflata terciam faciunt speciem, scilicet, electrum” (BnF 14443, f. 255vb; Salzburg, a.X.19, p. 3b).

520 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2, c. 4: “Sunt enim in Christo due nature, set ex illis duabus naturis non est tertia natura, sicut in puro homine est ex corpore et anima una tertia natura ab utraque illarum” (ed. Landgraf, 105).

521 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 2, c. 4: “In puris hominibus species est totum esse sui individui. Totum enim esse hominis est ex coniunctione corporis et anime eius, ita quod ex illis duobus surgit tertium, differens ab utroque, compositum. Et hec est natura humana. In Christo autem non est ita. Esse enim Christi non est ex coniunctione corporis et anime eius, sicut et in puro homine surgit” (ed. Landgraf, 105).

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When considering how Stephen addresses the question of Christ’s state during the

triduum, we may confirm that Stephen understands the humanity of Christ as also the humanity

of any other to be constituted by the union of body and soul. Morever, he understands this

humanity to be one in some way.522 We may also add that Stephen thinks of this composition of

body and soul as “philosophical composition,” in contrast to physical and mathematical

composition, all of which, however, Stephen readily acknowledges, have no place in God and

which lead him to conclude that “if [God] is life, he does not have esse from the conjunction of

two, because every conjunction naturally receives separation.”523 Clearly, this is simply another

way to affirm that God’s esse (i.e., the divine essence) lacks any composition, but it also allows

us to affirm without doubt that the esse humanity is composite.

If, however, Stephen doesn’t think body and soul produce the totum esse of Christ, but

they do produce a humanity, what, then, is the totum esse of Christ? Does he have a totum esse?

It may be that according to Stephen’s meaning of esse as species or nature, there is no totum esse

of Christ. Certainly there is no esse which results from the union of the human and divine

natures, this would be a version of Eutycheanism and as already noted Stephen rejects this as

heretical. But it is also not possible to say within this framework that the divine esse is the esse

of the human esse, for this would be like saying the divine nature is the human nature, which is

false and heretical, insofar as it violates the real distinction between Creator and creature.524

But there is a further implication. Even though the esse of the Son is the divine esse, and

the Son is said to be “of a human nature” or “of humanity” because he is a res of the human

                                                                                                               522 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 22: “Hec ratio non valet, quia unio Verbi cum carne et anima non facit

hominem, set unio carnis et anime. Quod sic est videre: Possibile fuit Deo, quod ab initio univerit sibi carnem et animam, sicut fuit in triduo. Nichilominus tamen non foret homo, quia ex carne et anima eius non foret unum. Si enim hoc corpus non vegetatur anima, non est homo ex illa anima et illo corpore” (ed. Landgraf, 128); see also, Quaestiones, q. Utrum Christus fuerit Homo in Triduo Passsionis, “Sic dicendum, quod in triduo illo non fuit homo, cum numquam recessit deitas a carne nec ab anima. Si anima tamen separata est a carne, non est dicendus homo, quia non constat ex corpore et anima, sicut non dicitur, quod aliquis habeat domum, licet habeat diversas partes, nisi illae partes sint compositae” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 246).

523 See Stephen, Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 8 (ed. Landgraf, 9) 524 Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 1, n. 11: “Item. Notandum quod hec locutio ‘Christus est

deus et homo’ proprie intellecta est falsa, quia termini copulati supponunt pro eodem; set recipitur sub hoc sensu: ‘Christus est deus et homo’, idest ‘diuine et humane nature’. Item. Bene sequitur ‘si aliquis est homo, ipse est humane nature’; set non sequitur ‘si aliquid est homo, ipsum esse humane nature’. Diuinia enim essentia est homo, nec tamen est humane nature” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 240). See also, Stephen, Summa, q. de Persona: “haec appellatio ‘ipsum esse’ cum dicitur de qualibet re etc. diversorum generum supponit essentialia, quia ratione esse supponit convertibile cum hoc ‘istum esse’. Et non mirum, quia idem alias contingit, ut hic ‘de quolibet lapide vel cive est enuntiabile ‘ipsum esse’” (Ebbesen & Mortensen, 133).

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species,525 nevertheless, it may not be said that the divine esse is the esse of the humanity; not

simply because this would be a category confusion but also, Stephen says, because in such

statements no “existence of a subject” is posited.526 This distinction between esse (as nature) and

the existentia of a subject is a little cryptic, but elsewhere Stephen observes that even if the Word

had assumed another body and soul, nevertheless he would have been the same redeemer, the

same man, and the same individual that had the same singular existence which he had prior to the

incarnation.527

In his Questiones, Stephen addresses a related issue but in the context of the question

whether Christ insofar as he is man is a person. Here, Stephen says that for a pure human to be a

person there is required that the soul is united to the body “by a mediating rationality,” and that

this also takes place in Christ. The difference, however, in us and in Christ is that this created

rationality is not in Christ as the highest or most excellent nature. In us, such a created rationality

would be why dignity or eminence is attributed to our persons. But in Christ, since his

(uncreated) person is of infinite worth and dignity, such a created rationality could not confer

anything intrinsically more valuable upon the person of Christ, much less exclude the infinite

value which is his according to his divinity.528

In one of the arguments to which the above is a response, the objection says that for a

pure human to be a person, it is sufficient for three things to concur: body, soul, and

                                                                                                               525 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6: “Non enim factus natura, quia non est natura, set est res nature” (ed.

Landgraf, 111). 526 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homine Assumpto, etc., n. 14: “Sit, quod hoc nomen ‘A’ imponatur ratione

illius humanitatis, sicut hoc nomen ‘Ihesus’ ratione illius, quam habet. . . Item, A non est, et ipsum esse est verum, quia ipsum esse est istum esse demonstrato Filio Dei, de quo est verum dicere A. Ergo de A est verum ipsum esse. Ergo A est. Haec ultima argumentatio non valet, quia cum dico ‘De A est verum ipsum esse,’ non ponitur existentia subiecti, quia de C est verum C non esse” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 235).

527 Stephen, in 3 Sent., d. 12: “Set, licet aliam animam et aliud corpus assumpsisset, nichilominus tamen idem foret redemptor et idem homo et eamdem quam prius haberet singularem existentiam et idem individuum” (ed. Landgraf, 119).

528 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona, n. 8: “Ad sequens dicimus quod re uera aliquot sola concurrunt ad hoc quod iste purus homo sit persona que non concurrunt in Christo, uel eadem in specie concurrunt, non tamen penitus eodem modo. Ad hoc enim quod iste homo purus sit persona, exigitur quod anima sit corpori unita mediante rationalitate, et ista concurrunt in Christo; propterea in isto puro homine exigitur excellentia, siue quod rationalitas sit in eo excellente, ita scilicet quod in eo nulla sit excellentior natura. Et ideo diximus quod persona nomen est iuris siue dignitatis, et non seruitutis. Set ista excellentia non est in Christo homine, nec rationalitas creata est in eo predicto modo, scilicet excellenter. Ex hoc patet quod hoc nomen ‘persona’ in illa speciali significatione, in qua dicitur tantum de personis creatis, non dicitur de Christo, quia connotat quondam excellentiam que non conuenit Christo secundum quod est homo siue, ut ita dicam, habet intellectum articuli notantis excellentiam et excludentis superioritatem siue maiorem dignitatem ab eadem persona” (ed. Bieniak, 108).

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rationality.529 Elsewhere, we get a similar claim: an individual arises from soul, flesh, and a

quality.530 Stephen’s response above would seem to indicate that he concedes the concurrence of

these things in Christ but obviously denies that this constitutes a new person, rather it simply

renders him a res of our species.

The phrase “mediating rationality,” should call to mind Gilbert’s language of “mediating

habit,” but this does not necessarily help us to identify what the immediate referent of “mediating

rationality,” is in this context. Certainly, Stephen regards “rationality” as the specific difference

of humanity. And it might be tempting to try and argue that rationality as the specific difference

somehow mediates the union of body and soul such that the species humanity is the result. But

this seems an unnecessarily cumbersome leap, and the surrounding context would commit such a

theory to also adopting the position that the specific difference and not the species is the

overarching form of a human. This seems problematic. So I would like to offer a different

solution.

Because rationality is a specific difference, Stephen thinks that it is convertible with a

species of the first category, namely, humanity.531 Consequently, here the convertibility would be

going the other way, according to some principle of metonymy and thus “rationality,” here

means “humanity.” Read in this way, perhaps the clause mediante rationalitate should not be

interpreted instrumentally (as above) but instead taken as some kind of result clause, denoting

the higher composite unity (i.e., humanity) which is the result of the union of body and soul but

which precisely because it is communicable and taken up into another,532 does not constitute a

                                                                                                               529 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona, n. 8: “Item. Aliquot sola concurrunt sufficienter ad hoc quod iste ||

purus homo sit persona, scilicet corpus, anima et rationalitas. Set eadem in specie concurrunt in Christo secundum quod est homo, ergo est persona secundum quod homo” (ed. Bieniak, 108).

530 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homo Assumpto, etc., n. 15: “Item, dicunt, quod haec species ‘homo’ ponitur de christo, sed nullum eius individuum, quia oporteret, quod illud surgeret ex anima et carne et qualitate” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 236).

531 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. utrum Christus fuerit homo in Triduo mortis, n. 4: “Rationalitas est substantialis differentia, ergo convertitur cum aliqua specie primi praedicamenti. Sit illa species A. Illa continet sub se tantum angelos et homines et Christum. Sed non concedent, quod esset homo vel angelus. Quare non debent concedere, quod illa proprietas animae fuit tunc in Christo (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 249). See also, Quaestiones, q. de persona, n. 1: “Set in predicta descriptione restringitur hoc nomen ‘substantia’ per hoc adiunctum ‘rationalis nature’ tantum ad rationalia primi predicamenti. Set quia non omne rationale est persona, additur ‘indiuidua’, ut per hoc excludantur illa rationalia, scilicet anime que non sunt persone” (ed. Bieniak, 100).

532 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Persona, n. 2: “hoc nomen 'indiuidua' potest sumi dupliciter, scilicet ut dicatur 'indiuidua', idest incomunicabilis compositione ita quod nihil aliud notatur per illud nomen, et secundum hoc diuina essentia est indiuidua, idest incommunicabilis compositione, uel potest sumi 'indiuidua', idest incomunicabilis compositione; et singulari proprietate ab aliis rebus et personis discreta et distincta, et secundum hoc diuina essentia non est indiuidua, quia nulla proprietate distinguitur” (ed. Bieniak, 101); cf. Lect. in 1 Sent., d. 26 (ed. Landgraf, 27).

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new individual or person.533 Whatever the precise interpretation of this text, at the very least it

illustrates what is at stake for Stephen when he denies that the union of body and soul constitutes

the totum esse of Christ, for no such totalizing created principle is possible in the incarnation.

Christ’s singular existentia precedes any created esse.534

2.3 Person: Created or Uncreated?

As illustrated above, Stephen is clear that with respect to Christ, “there is not except one

person.” But he also says somewhat frequently, albeit enigmatically, that “Christ is a created and

uncreated person,” yet clearly for him there is some difference, for he immediately adds, “yet he

is not a person in this that he is man, because to be man is not to be a person.”535 Here, we could

readily invoke his distinction between quis and quid, insofar as one does not entail the other and

therefore to become man is not necessarily to become a person.536 But Stephen pushes further

than this and as already illusrated above maintains that “Christ is not a person insofar as he is

man,” because when he became incarnate he did not become a person.537

Part of what is at stake, once again, is the causal reach of the predication of terms. Hence,

Stephen recognizes (much as he did with the term “humanity” above) that the term “person”

does not pertain to all created persons in exactly the same way.538 Thus, even though Stephen

                                                                                                               533 Here, it should be noted that in the same context where Stephen invokes the meaning of individual as

“what does not come into the constitution of another,” he also notes that the term “unites” or “united” can imply a created property (see, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 5: 109), at least in statements such as the “human nature was united to the divine,” (see, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 14, n. 2: 337) and by “created property,” he sometimes means the composite, i.e., the human nature of Christ (see, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 10: 117-18).

534 Stephen, Quaestiones, q. de Homine Assumpto, et utrum Christus sit Duo, n. 5: “Et factus est iste homo, non tamen factus est iste, quia ‘iste’ est personale” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 230-31).

535 See Stephen, Summa, q. de Persona, “Christus est persona creata et increata, et tamen non est persona in eo quod est homo, quia esse hominem non est esse personam. Christus autem non est nisi una persona” (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen, 128).

536 Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 6, n. 3: “Vnde cum hoc nomen ‘homo’ non contineatur sub hoc nomine ‘quis’, quia sequeretur quod | filius dei esset factus quis, immo continetur sub hoc nomine ‘quid’, et ita | ad minus significatione sit essentiale et supponat quid, et suum infinitum similiter erit essentiale” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 266).

537 Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6: “Et ideo hec falsa: facta est hominis persona, si is est sensus: Deus factus est homo, qui est persona. Ideo igitur hec falsa: facta est persona hominis, quia non est facta persona. Set hec vera: factus est substantia secundum quod hoc nomen substantia significat predicamentum primum; secundum vero quod significat ypostasim, falsa est. (ed. Landgraf, 111).

538 Stephen, Questiones, q. de Persona, n. 4: “Set nota quod licet in quadam significatione dicatur hoc nomen ‘persona’ tantum de personis creatis, non tamen in illa significatione conuenit omni persone create. Christus enim est persona creata, non tamen conuenit ei hoc nomen ‘persona’ secundum quod dicitur tantum de personis creatis, quia Christus non est persona secundum quod homo; unde in nulla significatione conuenit ei hoc nomen persona, in qua non conueniret ei cum uerbo presentis temporis ante incarnationem. Vnde hec descriptio ‘substantia rationalis nature indiuidua’, prout parificatur huic nomini ‘persona’ secundum quod dicitur de personis creatis non conuenit Christo, quia Christus non est substantia secundum quod homo, secundum quod hoc nomen ‘substantia’ ibi

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says that Christ is a created person, what he means is that the res implied by the verb “created” is

properly attributed to Christ’s person,539 even though it remains distinct from his person, because

a nature is of a person not a person. Thus, in Stephen’s sense, Christ is a created person, but “he

is not created inasmuch as he is a person.”540

We could illustrate this a different way by once again adverting to his reading of the

sacred triduum. Stephen argues that because Christ was not a man during the three days of his

death, he was also no longer a res of a created nature.541 Not, however, because he ceased to be a

res (i.e., a person) but because there was no longer an intact and unified created nature of which

he was the proper subject.

For the same reason, Stephen can affirm that Christ is a creature, “because he became

what he was not.”542 He was already a person, however, so he did not become another person.

But he did become a person to a human nature, that is, a human nature now belongs to him

which did not exist prior to the incarnation. His person did not change, but there is a new

relationship insofar as when it is said that the human nature is joined to the divine, a created

property is implied.543 This seems to be the same reading that he gives to affirmations deriving

from John Damascene that before the incarnation Christ was a simple person, but after the

                                                                                                               ponitur, et supponit ‘ypostasim’, siue ‘quem’ et non ‘quid’. Set Christus secundum quod homo non est ‘quis’, set ‘quid’” (ed. Bieniak, 102).

539 Stephen, Questiones, q. utrum Christus sit Filius Adoptivus, n. 4: “Item, haec est vera ‘Christus fecit se et creavit se,’ quia creavit humanam personam in se. A simili assumpsit se vel hominem, quia assumpsit naturam hominis. Respondeo. Non est simile, quia haec est propria et vera ‘Haec persona est creata,’ non ideo quia in se creavit humanam naturam, sed quia res huius verbi ‘creavit’ proprie attribuitur personae” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 242).

540 Stephen Langton, Exp. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “Reuera hoc nomen persona significat personas creatas et dicitur de personis creatis set hec falsa: in illa significatione supponit omnes personas creatas, non tamen in illa supponit Christum qui est persona creata set non est creatus inquantum persona” (BnF 14443, f. 256va; Salzburg, a.X.19, p. 4b).

541 See Stephen, Quaestiones, q. utrum Christus fuerit Homo in Triduo Mortis, n. 3: “Ad hoc dicimus, quod aliquam habuit Verbum unionem ante triduum, quam non habuit in triduo, quia inter alias uniones ante triduum erat ibi unio naturae creatae et increatae naturae. Illa unio non fuit in triduo, quia Christus non fuit tunc res alicuius naturae creatae, sed rediit illa in resurrectione. Unde ille homo totus est assumptus” (ed. Nielsen & Ebbesen, 248).

542 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 10: “Et dicitur inde Christus creatura, quia ipse incepit esse, quod ipse prius non fuit” (ed. Landgraf, 117).

543 Stephen, Quaestiones Theologiae, lib. 1, q. 14, n. 2: “Vnionis humane nature ad diuinam est predestinatio, quia ipsa proprie dicitur predestinari. Quod enim filius dei uel persona dicitur esse predestinata, ratione unionis hoc dicitur. Cum ergo dicitur quod preddestinatum est quod homo sit filius dei, ratione unionis hoc dicitur; set hec falsa ‘unio diuine nature ad humanam est predestinata’, quia illa unio est deus quia cum dicitur ‘humana natura unitur diuine’, hoc uerbum ‘unitur’ copulat proprietatem creatam, cum uero dicitur ‘diuina unitur humane’, copulat diuinam essentiam” (ed. Quinto & Bieniak, 337).

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incarnation he was a composite person. Not because of any change with respect to the Word’s

person, but with respect to what was joined to the Word.544

3 Prepositinus (d. 1210)

The opening vista of Prepositinus’ prologue for his Summa is at once both cosmic and

redemptive, startling Christian memory with the Psalmists recounting of the power of God that in

striking down the firstborn of the Egyptians brought salvation to the people of Israel.

Prepositinus immediately connects the one “who commands the winds and sea to obey him” with

the one “who produces winds from his treasures,” and in this way, implicitly establishes a unity

between the redemptive work of the two testaments, old and new.545 The winds pouring from the

divine treasures are sevenfold, which blow over the terrain of our minds.546 Four of these gifts

are intellectual (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) and three are affectional

(fortitude, piety, and fear).

Every treasure is four-fold, and the riches of sacred scripture are no exception, for they

are hidden in four treasuries, the four-fold sense of scripture. Prepositinus connects each of the

four senses with the four cardinal directions: (1) the historical with the West, (2) the tropological

or moral with the North, (3) the allegorical with the East, and (4) the anagogical with the

South.547 He notes that “through history we say what was done, through tropology we know what

must be done, through allegory we understand what was prefigured in things, through anagogy

we gaze upon the invisible things of God, which having been accomplished are afterwards

understood.”548 In the historical treasury there is found the sliver of eloquence, in the moral the

                                                                                                               544 See Stephen, Lect. in 3 Sent., d. 6 (ed. Landgraff, 110-11). 545 Prepositinus, Summa, prol. “Qui producit uentos de thesauris suis qui percussit egypti primogenita ab

homine usque ad pecus. Dominus ille magnus qui imperat uentis et mari et obedient ei, qui et uolat super pennas uentorum, qui uult et prout uult producit uentos de thesauris suis et percutit primogentia egypti usque ab homine ad pecus” (P 2ra; T 70ra; L 143ra).

546 Prepositinus, Summa, prol. “Set qui sunt isti uenti isti sunt septem uenti per flantes totam terram mentis nostrae, scilicet, spiritus sapientie et intellectus, scilicet scientie et pietatis, scilicet, concilii et fortitudinis, et spiritus timioris Domini. Horum quatuor pertinent ad intellectum, scilicet, spiritus sapientie et intellectus, consilii et scientie” (P 2ra; T 70ra; L 143ra).

547 Prepositinus, Summa, prol. “Omne genus thesauri in quattuor constat, scilicet, in auro, in argento, in lapide precioso, et uariis ornamentis. Haec in quattuor gazophilatiis que in sacra scriptura reperiuntur recondita sunt. Primum gazoph<il>acium fabricatur ab occidente et sensu historico, secundum ab aquilone et sensu tropologico, tertium ab oriente et sensu allegorico, quartum a meridiem et sensu anagogica” (P 2ra; T 70ra; L 143ra).

548 Prepositinus, Summa, prol. “Per historiam quid factum sit dicimus, per tropologiam quid faciendum sit cognoscimus, per allegoriam quid rebus prefiguratum sit intelligimus, per anagogen inuisibilia dei postea que facta sunt intellecta conspicimus” (P 2ra; T 70ra; L 143ra).

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gems of various virtues, in the allegorical the sacraments of the church, and in the anagogical the

gold of heavenly wisdom.

From this tapestry depicting divinely ordered forces, we must see the sanctification of

humanity: textually, morally, intellectually, and spiritually. The perfection of the human person

in her intellectual and affectional capacities, therefore, is at the center of this work. In the briefest

line of a preface, Prepositinus reveals the connection he sees between the primary subject matters

of the second and third books of his Summa, “having spoken concerning vices and virtues, now

we must speak concerning him through whom vices are destroyed and virtues conferred, it

should be seen concerning the Word incarnate.”549

3.1 Thematic Structure of Book Three

It is possible to divide the forty-three some questions of book three of Prepositinus’

Summa thematically into three major sections: questions regarding (I) the assumption of the

human nature (qq. 1-23), questions regarding (II) the paschal mystery (qq. 26-33), and (III)

questions regarding the assumption of properties, powers, or operations (qq. 37-43).550 The first

major thematic division may be broken down into three subdivisions based on major shifts in

predication from the (IA) homo assumptus (qq. 1-9) to (IB) Christ (qq. 10-19) to the (IC) divine

essence or nature (qq. 20-23). In a way, these three subdivisions explore just what the

ramifications of the incarnation are for what was assumed, who assumed, and the divine nature

of the one who assumed.

There follow two questions regarding Christ’s person (qq. 24-25), which in a way focus

and integrate the three previous discussions and also serve as the transition into Prepositinus’

exploration of the mysterium salutis, wherein he discusses (IIA) Christ’s status during the sacred

triduum (qq. 26-30) and (IIB) Christ’s merit (qq. 31-33). There follows three questions which all

treat of our relationship to the incarnate Word (qq. 34-36), which suggests something of a

                                                                                                               549 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, prol. “dictum est de uitiis et uirtutibus nunc dicendum est de illo per quem

tolluntur uitia et uirtutes conferuntur, uidendum de uerbo incarnato” (P 42va; T 119rb; L 175rb). 550 I use Lacombe’s division of individual questions to establish the question numbers only for the sake of

ease of reference alone. I believer, however, that there is good reason to doubt that such divisions will hold once all extant manuscripts are collated and a critical edition is produced. Sometimes Lacombe divides one question off from another in a way that obscures how Prepositinus nests them together. See Lacombe, Prepositini Cancellarii Pariesiensis (1206-1210), vol. 1 La Vie et Les Oeuvres de Prévostin, Bibliothèque Thomiste 11 (Kain, 1927), 175-76. For a thematic divisio textus of book three, see Appendix F.

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rhetorical pause for the reader or listener to reflect on what our appropriate response ought to be

to the one who destroyed our death by his death.

These responsorial questions serve as a transition into an exploration of Christ’s own

cognitive and affectional life, insofar as the final section concerning Christ’s assumption of

powers and operations treat of his knowledge (IIIA), infirmities (IIIB), and love (IIIC). This final

section is perhaps a reminder of how Christ himself responded to the will of the Father and

thereby also an invitation for us to do the same.

3.2. The Structuring Role of the “Three Opinions”

There is, however, another structuring principle deeply embedded within book three of

Prepositinus’ Summa. His discussion of the assumption of human nature is dominated by the

three theories on the hypostatic union. It is as though Prepositinus has taken the Lombard’s

excursus and made it into a catalyst for his own Christological disputations. Read in this way,

Prepositinus treats advocates of the homo assumptus position as the primary protagonists,

allowing them to make the primary set of arguments,551 before he introduces a variation on the

subsistence position,552 adding arguments of his own in order to develop an initial set of replies

to the many objections (seventeen).553 The habitus theory, however, is not introduced explicitly

until question ten.554 And it is, here, that there is a marked shift in language, for we see the term

                                                                                                               551 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 1: “Et illa questio proponenda est primo: utrum aliquis homo assumptus

uerbo et ille sit uerbum? Quod quibusdam uera dicentibus quod sicut tres persone sunt una substantia, scilicet pater et filius et sanctus spiritus, ita due substantie in uerbo diuina, scilicet et humana sunt una persona. Et hoc nituntur ostendere per simile. Dicunt enim quod quilibet homo est due substantie, scilicet anima rationalis et caro, sed anima essentialiter, caro per applicationem et tamen nec anima caro nec caro anima. Ita una filii dei persona est due substantie, diuina substantia essentialiter et humana per unionem. Nec tamen diuina est humana nec humana diuina et hanc similitudinem auctoribus et rationibus nituntur probare” (BnF 14526, f. 42va; Todi 71, f. 119rb; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 175rb).

552 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 1: “Nunc attendenda est aliorum sententia et que supradictis et qualiter respondeant. Dicunt ergo alii quod anima et caro sunt partes eius et non constituunt aliquem hominem qui sit unitus uerbo set hominem qui est uerbum et filium dei qui est simplex persona secundum diuinitatem et faciunt esse compositam secundum humanitatem personam” (BnF 14526, f. 43ra; Todi 71, f. 119vb; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 175va).

553 For just one example see Prepositinus, Summa, q. 1: “Item ille homo demonstrata persona non est predestinatus ut sit filius dei quia ab eterno fuit filius dei nec alius homo predestinatus est ut sit filius dei quia homo assumptus non est alius homo ergo nullus homo predestinatus est ut sit filius dei. Possumus ergo sic exponere: ‘predestinatus est,’ etc. id est, hoc predestinatum est ut illa persona in humanitate sit filius dei non tamen predestinatum est ut illa persona sit filius dei” (BnF 14526, f. 43rb; Todi 71, f. 120ra; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 175vb).

554 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 10: “Aliorum opinio est quod Christus dicitur homo, id est, habens hominem, id est humanam naturam sibi unitam. humanam naturam animam et carnem appellabant tamen non constitutum ex anima et carne || quia ex hiis nil constituitur nec substantiale proprietas que dicitur humanitas. hii dicunt quod unio animae et carnis ad uerbum facit hominem et unio anime ad carnem facit uiuentem. Vnde in triduo quando soluta fuit illa unio que est anime ad carnem mortuus fuit tamen illa unio que est anime et carnis ad deum non fuit soluta et fuit tunc homo. Set de hoc inferius dicemus. Ipsi dicunt etiam quod Christus seucndum quod homo

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solutio occur with far more regularity than in any of the previous questions, wherein Prepositinus

allows the homo assumptus theory to present its arguments and questions almost without

interruption.555 This, perhaps, indicates that questions one through ten present questions and

arguments that are native to the homo assumptus position, whereas questions ten through thirteen

present questions and arguments more native to the habitus theory.556

If this is the case, then it is no surprise that at the end of question thirteen, Prepositinus

offers a summary of the three positions: (1) “According to the first opinion, from flesh and soul

there is constituted some man who is assumed by the word and is the word.” (2) “According to

the second, from [flesh and soul] there is constituted some man who is the Word, which is not

assumed by the Word.” (3) “According to the third from [flesh and soul] there is not constituted

some man but because they are united to the Word, the Word is called man.”557 And while this

summary does not take the three theories off the scene,558 it does seem that Prepositinus more

frequently offers solutions in his own voice and without invoking the assistance of the

subsistence theory. Consequently, question seventeen (quare negetur hec: persona assumpsit

personam?) is almost certainly Prepositinus’ response to the position presented in question five

(utrum Filius Dei assumpsit personam?).559

3.3 Christological Positions

The structuring role that the three opinions play in Prepositinus’ Christology sometimes

makes it difficult to isolate what Prepositinus’ own position or contribution is with respect to a

particular issue or question. Nevertheless, it still remains possible for us to sketch some of his

more prominent Christological commitments, especially insofar as he rejects hallmark positions

of the homo assumptus and habitus theories. First, he denies that some man (aliquis homo) was                                                                                                                non est aliquid ut proprie aliquid accipiatur set secundum quod homo est alicuius modi. Non enim predicatur species set habitus cum dicitur Christus est homo. . .” (BnF 14526, f. 44ra; Todi 71, f. 120vb; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 176va).

555 Note, for example, that the introduction to question 2 is prefaced by: “item queritur ab eis. . .” (BnF 14526, f. 43rb; Todi 71, f. 120rb).

556 This would explain why when Prepositinus presents his own take on the question of a common species in q. 12, it is far more specific and thorough than when he takes it up in q. 4.

557 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 13: “Iuxta primam sententiam ex carne et anima constituitur quidam homo qui est assumptus a uerbo et est uerbum. Iuxta secundam ex illis constituitur homo quidam qui est uerbum, non quod assumptus a uerbo. Iuxta tertiam ex illis non constituitur aliquis homo set quia illa unita sunt uerbo, uerbum dicitur homo” (BnF 14526, f. 45ra; Todi 71, f. 122ra; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 177rb).

558 See for example, Summa, lib. 3, q. 15: “An Christus sit Deus et homo a secunda et tercia sententia?” 559 Indeed, what appears to be the homo assumpus’ preference over a “person assumed a person” (which

would have been considered heretical by all) is the phrase persona consumit personam and this same phrase recurs again in question seventeen, not necessarily with Prespositinus’ approval but with his own explanation of what is at stake anthropologically and with respect to the constitution of Christ.

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assumed by the Word, because what was assumed by the Word was not a person but a nature and

a nature is not a person but rather belongs to a person.560 Like Stephen, Prepositinus recognizes

that a term like quid denotes a nature not the res of a nature and citing Hilary, he concludes that

we must take “nature” as the humanity by which a man is, but understand that the res of a nature

is the man himself.561 Consequently, Christ is not his human nature because he is not his soul and

body, but rather constands from them insofar as he is man.562

This seems to indicate that with respect to unity, a nature is of a person, but with respect

to membership in a species, it is correct to say that a person is of a nature. Hence, we can say

Christ’s human nature is his own and belongs to him, because it is united to him. But we can also

say that Christ is of human nature, insofar as he is a res of the human species. In regards to the

question of a common species in Christ, we find him recapitulating Simon’s solution, namely,

that the human species does not comprehend all the substantialia in Christ, and drawing

Stephen’s conclusion, that there is not one common species arising from the union of divinity

and humanity in the way that there is one arising from the union of body and soul.563

But in the context of rehearsing one of the arguments for saying that Christ is two (which

Prepositinus will ultimately reject), we find Prepositinus indicating a meaning for esse that is

similar to that of Gilbert’s and Stephen’s, “insofar as he is man he is other, therefore insofar as

he is man he is, therefore one thing is his esse insofar as he is man and another is his esse insofar

                                                                                                               560 Prespositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 17: “Ad hoc respondemus quod hec discriptio sic debet intellegi:

persona est substantia rationalis indiuidue nature, id est, nature in nullius constitutione posite et nulli suo maiori unite. Vnde anima que est in hominis constitutione non debet dici persona nec human natura uerbi que suo maiori unita est nomine persone censetur. . . non potest esse quod alia res in alicuius persone constitutione sit uel suo maiori uniatur et habeat nomen persone set potest esse quod natura nature coniungatur et utraque retineat nomen nature quia natura nomen est communis, id est, significat rem in genere suo consideratam ita quod eius dignitatem non ostendit” (BnF 14526, f. 45rb; Todi 71, f. 122rb).

561 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 11: “Solutio ad primum argumentum dicimus quod uocabulum quid querit naturam non rem nature. Aliud enim est natura ut ait hilarius aliud res nature. Natura ut humanitas qua homo est. Res nature ut ipse homo” (BnF 14526, f. 44rb; Todi 71, f. 121rb).

562 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 1: “Ergo hec est danda: ‘Christus est humanae nature,’ sed hec non est danda: ‘Christus est humana natura,’ quia non est anima et corpus sed constat ex illis secundum quod homo” (BnF 14526, f. 43ra; Todi 71, f. 119vb; London, 9.E.XIV, f. 175vb).

563 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 12: “Ad auctoritatem non est communem speciem accipere in domino nostro Iesu Christo, id est, non est communiter quia in quolibet alio homine hec species || homo conprehendit omnia eius substantialia set in Christo non quia non conprehendit eius diuinitatem uel aliter dicas ipse non dixit non est hanc speciem hominem set non est communem, id est, non est ex diuinitate et humanitate una communis species, id est, una communis natura sicut ex anima et carne est unus homo et hic ipsius uere posse haberi ex littera precedente et sequente et est dictum contra euticem qui dicebat una esset composita natura ex diuinitate et humanitate uel contra nestorium qui dixit quod duo erant Christi unus dei filius alius filius hominis quod si esset hoc nomen Christus quodam uniuersale esset, id est, quandam speciem communem illorum duorum significaret quod non est dicendum” (BnF 14526, f. 44va; Todi 71, f. 121va).

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as he is God, therefore Christ is a twofold esse, one of them began to be but the other not. . .”564

Stephen’s meaning of esse is confirmed in Prepositinus’ later response to this same objection,

wherein he says, “esse is nothing other than nature,” and so other is Christ’s nature insofar as he

is man and other insofar as he is God because he is of two natures.565

With respect to the conclusion drawn from this, namely, that Christ began to be,

Prepositinus offers a number of possible qualifications. One of them is simply to note that in

such contexts to treat nature in each statement as if they meant the same is to commit the fallacy

of equivocation. Consequently, “began to be” applies truly to the human nature but not to the

divine nature. The other possible qualification is that when it is said “Christ began to be,” what is

meant is that he began to be of some essence of which he previously did not belong, not because

he was not of something else or did not already exist himself, but because the created esse or

essence itself began to be.566 This too is similar to some of the solutions offered by Stephen

above.

So with respect to the question of aliquid in particular, Prepositinus notes that in all such

arguments which try to move from statements like “insofar as he is man he is something,

therefore,” etc. or “insofar as he is man he is a substance, therefore,” etc. these fail because there

is no relation of identity (i.e., no logical distribution of the middle term) by which you can go

from one res of a nature, to the nature, to another res of a nature. Because this would be like

trying to argue that since Peter by humanity is man, therefore he is this or that man or he is the

man who is Socrates or not. This is why Prepositinus thinks that arguments which try to argue

that Christ insofar as he is man is something, therefore he is something which is the Father or not

                                                                                                               564 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 10: “Item secundum quod homo est aliud, ergo secundum quod homo est,

ergo aliud est eius esse secundum quod homo est aliud est eius esse secundum quod est deus ergo Christu duplex est esse unum istorum cepit esse set aliud non ergo ipse incepit esse qui ab eterno fuit” (BnF 14526, f. 44ra; Todi 71, f. 121ra; London 9.E.XIV, f. 176va).

565 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 12: “Ad illud quod obicit Christo est aliud esse secundum quod homo et aliud secundum quod deus. Respondemus quod nichil aliud est esse quam ipsa natura et alia est natura ipsius secundum quod homo et alia secundum quod deus quia ipse est duarum naturum quod concludit ergo incepit esse” (BnF 14526, f. 44va; Todi 71, f. 121va).

566 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 12: “Posset dari hec: Ipse incepit esse et ipse ab eterno fuit et idem dicendum de hoc uerbo ‘incepit’ quod dictum est de hoc nomine ‘simplex,’ ut uere concluditur incepit esse ergo non fuit semper secundum quod incepit esse uel potest dici quod in omnibus his est sophisma equiuicationis quia hoc uerbum est duobus modis dicitur natura significat quodam predicabile omnibus creaturis commune et significat diuinam naturam. Vnde hoc est duplex incepit esse, id est, ei conuenire illud uocabulum uerum est incepit esse diuina natura falsum uel potes aliter distinguere propositionem: incepit esse, id est, alicuius essentie incepit esse cuius prius non fuit uerum est set cepit esse alicuius essentie et nullius prius falsum est. Ita de hac incepit esse substantia dicendum est et non consimilium ut recipias aliquam hic sine distinctione quia hoc uerbum incepit et similia suspecta sunt” (BnF 14526, f. 44va; Todi 71, f. 121va).

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the Father are false in principle because aliquid or similar terms are not sufficiently distributed,

which is to say that there is not a sufficient overlap in meaning.567

Linguistically and logically this seems sufficient, but clearly there are ontological

principles at stake here as well. Sensing this, Prepositinus immediately adds that “Peter by

humanity is not this man but only man,” rather it is by his propria existentia that Peter is this

man. He may be thinking of Gilbert, when he somewhat jovially refers to the term Petreitas as a

“fabricated name.” But surely he has Gilbert or Simon’s “personal property” in mind when citing

Porphyry,568 he argues that Peter’s propria existentia is constituted from this humanity and

Peter’s other properties.569 What is arresting here is that Prepositinus distinguishes “this

humanity” from Peter, from his properties, and from his propria existentia. This is a more

developed (or at least more explicit) compositional structure than one finds in Gilbert and it

seems also than in Simon or Stephen, although certainly it is consonant with those indications in

Stephen that he assigns existentia to the subject or supposit.

Elsewhere, when answering the question whether there can be a proper name for the Son

of God and in particular what is the referent of the name “Jesus,” Prepositinus affirms that

“Jesus,” is the proper name of the Son of God insofar as he is man and even adds that the

statement “the Son of God began to be Jesus because he began to be this man,” is true. Yet he

reminds us that although the Son began to be Jesus and this man, he did not begin to be this,

                                                                                                               567 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 11: “Eodem modo dicimus de hoc uocabulo aliquid et de similibus positis

post hanc circumlocutionem secundum quod est homo est aliquid, secundum quod est homo est substantia uel cum ablatiuo notante causam ut humanitate est homo et idcirco post illud nulla potest sequi relatio quia distributio uel relatio facit transire de natura ad rem nature. Vnde non sequitur secundum quod est homo est aliquid ergo secundum quod est homo est deus uel aliquid nec sequitur secundum quod est homo est aliquid uel substantia ergo est aliquid quod est pater uel quod non est pater uel substantia que est pater uel que non est pater. Sicut si dicam petrus humanitate est homo ergo humanitate est hic homo uel aliud homo uel sic est homo qui est Socrates uel qui non est Socrates” (BnF 14526, f. 44rb; Todi 71, f. 121rb).

568 This is the same text cited by Simon at Disp. 56, q. 3: “Nam divinitas et humanitas est de personali proprietate Christi, que constat ex omnibus proprietatibus, quarum collectio in nullo alio reperitur, tam naturalibus quam accidentalibus que de Christo dicuntur. Est enim personalis proprietas uel indiuiduum, ut ait Porfirius, quod constat ex omnibus proprietatibus quarum collectio in nullo alio reperitur (ed. Warichez, 161) and at Inst. 7.23.470-72: “Est enim ‘indiuiduum,’ idest indiuidualis proprietas, ‘que constat ex omnibus proprietatibus, quarum collectio in nullo alio repperitur’” (ed. Evans). See Boethius, Dialogus in Porphirium 1 (PL 64: 47), cit. Warichez, 161.

569 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 11: “Non enim petrus humanitate est hic homo set tantum homo set sua propria existentia est hic homo que ficto nomine dicitur petreitas eo enim quo est hic homo est pertrus et eodem non autem eo quo est homo est Petrus. Hec enim humanitas facit hominem set non facit hoc hominem set potius propria existentia que ex hac humanitate et aliis proprietatibus que in hoc homine sunt habet consistere ut dicit porphirius, “Indiuiduum est quod consistit ex talibus proprietatibus quorum collectio in alio reperiri non potest. Idem respondemus ad secundum argumentum et ad quintum” (BnF 14526, f. 44rb; Todi 71, f. 121rb). Compare Simon, Inst. 3.2: “Est et alia, quae. dicitur forma dissimilitudinis, ut qualitas, quam proprium nomen significat, quae a Boethio ficto nomine dicitur socratitas vel platonitas, quae ideo dicitur forma dissimilitudinis, quia sic est causa differendi, quod nequaquam uniendi” (ed. Schmaus, 60).

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because he did not become a person.570 In this context, he again invokes the term propria

existentia to refute the argument that since “Jesus” is the proper name of a person, therefore from

eternity the Son was Jesus. Prepositinus says that this argument is false because “Jesus” is not

the proper name of the Son insofar as he is a person but insofar as he is man, and he adds that

this name “signifies his propria existentia by which he is this man.”571

3.4 A Christological Hypothesis

There is no small difficulty here, for Prepositinus has just argued that in becoming man

the Son did not become this, yet he has also claimed that it is by Christ’s propria existentia that

he is this man. How are we to understand Christ’s propria existentia? Is it created or uncreated?

Since Prepositinus does affirm that Christ began to be this man, and that he is this man by his

propria existentia, perhaps his propria existentia ought to be understood as created and this

might even correspond analogically to Peter’s structure, insofar as there is a distinction between

Peter (i.e., the person) and his propria existentia. In Christ too, therefore, we could say that his

propria existentia by which he began to be this man remains distinct from his divine and

uncreated person. But if this is the case and we grant that there is an uncreated propria

existentia,572 namely, filiation by which the Son is distinguished from the Father (but which is

not really distinct from the Son),573 then there will be a conflict with respect to the highest

principle of unity in Christ.

                                                                                                               570 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 12: “Quod querit utrum aliquid possit esse proprium nomen eius

secundum quod est homo, concedimus ponatur quod hoc nomen ihesus sit illud et dicimus nos quod hec est uera: dei filius incepit esse ihesus quia incepit esse hic homo et tamen non incepit esse hic sicut dicit Cassiodorus quod Christus factus est humanatus deus et tamen non est factus deus et ipse factus est humanata persona non tamen factus est persona” (BnF 14526, f. 44va; Todi 71, f. 121va).

571 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 12: “Et illud argumentum est falsum: ihesus est proprium nomen persone ergo ab eterno fuit ihesus quia hoc nomen ihesus non est proprium nomen eius secundum quod persona set secundum quod est homo et significat propriam existentiam eius qua ipse est hic homo. Instantia: hoc nomen ‘petrus’ est proprium nomen istius iusti ergo quando incepit esse hoc iustum, incepit esse uerum aliquid esse petrum” (BnF 14526, f. 44va; Todi 71, f. 121va).

572 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 10.4: “Sunt tamen quidam qui non recipiunt quod hoc nomen pater significet personam cum proprietate; sed, sicut in aliis facultatibus dicitur quod nomen aliud significat aliud appellat, ita hic dicunt. Verbi gratia, hoc nomen Socrates appellat socratem et significat propriam existentiam eius; hoc nomen pater appellat patrem et significant paternitatem que est eius proprietas. . . Hec autem proprietates variis nominibus significantur. Dicuntur enim proprietates, quia per eas distinguuntur persone; relations, quia per eas referuntur persone ad invicem; notiones, quia per eas innotescunt nobis ydiomata, quod est idem quod proprietates” (ed. Angelini, 269).

573 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 12.2: “Dicimus ergo quod cum dicitur: paternitas est in patre, vel: pater paternitate distinguitur a filio, modi loquendi sunt, et est sensus: paternitats est in patre, i.e., pater est pater./ Sicut cum dico: diligo dilectionem tuam, i.e. te dilectum./ Et in similibus similiter” (ed. Angelini, 277) and “quelibet persona proprium modum existendi possidet, i.e. quelibet persona it est una substantia, quod non est alia” (279).

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As noted above, for Prepositinus there can be only one principle of the Son being this or

being a person and that is the fact that he is the uncreated person of the Son from all eternity. But

in the fullness of time the Son became this man, according to Prepositinus, by his propria

existentia. But if Christ’s person is already sufficient for the ultimate principle of unity, wouldn’t

a created propria existentia be superfluous? Perhaps so, and I have not yet been able to find a

place where Prepositinus deals with this problem directly.

But based on the principles above and given the development from Gilbert to

Prepositinus so far traversed, an argument in favor of a created propria existentia in Christ could

be formulated in the following way. A created propria existentia is that which consists from a

humanity and all other properties but is also in some way distinct from the person. Christ has a

humanity and many attributes and properties, which although his, remain distinct from his

person. The Son’s person does not come into composition (strictly understood) with either his

humanity or his many properties. The Son, however, does unite humanity and its properties to

himself and makes them his own.

On this basis, therefore it does not seem inconveniens to grant a created principle of unity

with respect to the humanity and its properties (both necessary and accidental), provided that we

understand that it is sublated in some way to the Son’s own divine person. It would seem odd to

say that in his humanity Christ is distinct from other humans by his divine person, for while it is

true that Christ is not Peter, it is not true (formally speaking) that Christ’s body is not Peter’s

body only because Christ is not Peter. For two bodies would be distinct no matter whose they

were. Likewise, it seems that given two concrete human natures, they would be distinct based on

their differing properties, no matter what two people they belonged to. On this line of

argumentation, perhaps we could see how Prepositinus might grant a created propria existentia,

as a created principle of unity, consisting of Christ’s humanity and his human properties, by

which he is this man but not by which he is human, a person, or a this.

But if we look to his Trinitarian theology of missio, a slightly stronger argument may be

available to us. Prepositinus argues that the term “to be sent,” signifies the divine nature and

consignifies the grace by which God is understood to be in us in a way that he was not in us

previously. It also consignifies the person who is sent and who is said to be in us.574 Prepositinus

                                                                                                               574 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 15.2: “Similiter hoc verbum mittitur significat divinam naturam et

consignificat gratiam ex qua deus intelligitur nobis inesse nunc primo, quodam modo quo prius non fuit. Et preterea consignificat quod persona, de qua dicitur ipsam mitti, ab alio sit” (ed. Angelini, 289).

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considers the missio of the Son to be twofold: (1) insofar as he was sent to be human and (2)

insofar as he is daily and invisibly sent to be with humans.575 But the first kind of mission (i.e.,

the incarnation) is unique, as Prepositinus illustrates by comparison with the Holy Spirit’s

manifestation as a dove at Jesus’ baptism, for the Holy Spirit was not in the dove in a way that

differed from the way he is in any other creature, but the Son “was in man through union. For the

two natures, namely deity and humanity are united in the unity of the person, so that the same

person is said to be truly God and truly man.”576

Elsewhere, Prepositinus seems to grant that the union is a kind of grace, the “grace of

union,”577 and given that all temporal terms predicated of God signify not only the divine nature

but also consignify the relation which is in the creature,578 and given that such a relational

consignification in the case of a mission would be the grace by which God is in the creature in a

new way, this would seem to indicate a created meaning for “union” in the unique case of the

incarnation. If we integrate this with our question about Christ’s propria existentia, then it could

be argued soundly (albeit tentatively) on Prepositinus’ own principles that the propria existentia

by which the Son is this man is the created relation of Christ’s humanity (with its properties) to

the Word and is thereby what is consignified when it is said that “the Son is this man through

union with the human nature.” Notice that this statement is different from “the Son is man by a

human nature,” because “by a human nature” only signifies the human nature by which Christ is

man. By adding the terms “this” and “through union” there is introduced the third formal element

which would be distinctive of Prepositinus’ meaning for propria existentia, namely, that by

which the Son is this man.

                                                                                                               575 See Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 15.3 (ed. Angelini, 289). 576 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 15.5: “Ad hoc respondent quod, sicut dictum est, in columba non fuit

spiritus sanctus aliter quam in alia creatura; sed in homine est filius per unionem. Nam due nature, scilicet deitatis et humanitatis, sunt unite in unitate persone, ita quod eadem persona vere deus et vere homo dicitur” (ed. Angelini, 290-91).

577 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 3, q. 16: “Magistri nostri non recipiunt quod sit adoptius filius et faciunt uim in uerbo quia adoptiuus filius dicitur qui prius erat non filius et de non filio efficitur filius sicut nos qui prius fuimus filii ire et per gratiam adoptionis facti sumus filii dei. Dicunt autem quod ipse est filius secundum quod homo non gratia adoptionis set gratia unionis” (BnF 14526, f. 45rb; Todi 71, f. 122rb).

578 Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 15.1: “Patet ex premissis quod cum dicitur: deus creat hanc rem, ibi predicatur divina natura, et consignificatur relatio que est in creatura; ut sit sensus; deus creat hanc rem, i.e. deus vult hanc rem nunc primo esse ab eo” (ed. Angelini, 288).

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Peroratio 3

While Prepositinus’ propria existentia is clearly not the esse of Thomas Aquinas,

nevertheless, the itinerarium of questions inaugurated by the Lombard illustrates an organic path

of development from within the twelfth century’s own Christological discourse which suggests

that it is the Church’s own ongoing conversation about Christ that readies her for the reception of

new intellectual frames and the emergence of further questions. What plays out illustratively in

Simon, Stephen, and Prepositinus is the material and formal relation between the questions of the

Lombard on the one hand and Gilbert’s metaphysical framework on the other, which suggests

something of a theological synthesis out of which twelfth century disputations and conversations

unfolded into those of the thirteenth.

In particular, we have seen how constitutional questions of Christology coalesced into a

nested set of issues regarding Christ’s unity and singularity by illustrating how Gilbert’s

framework was appropriated, altered, and applied by Simon and Stephen and how it thereby

came to a kind of developmental head in Prepositinus’ proposal for a propria existentia by which

Christ is this man. The question of Christ’s propria existentia, however, seems to suggest that

such a framework, dependent as it is on formal questions of unity, can only go so far. For even as

the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics illustrates, the introduction of efficient causality opens

up horizons of questions that tower above those of Plato’s Parmenides. This is not to say that

Prepositinus (or other twelfth century theologians) are unaware of the distinction between

efficient and formal causality—that’s not the point. Prepositinus even adverts to something like

the notion of causal participation, when he makes queries about the analogical relation between

God and creatures.579 But such distinctions appear very seldomly in his Christology,580 and they

don’t typically govern his solutions to the Christological questions which we have traced through

the better part of six decades. It remains indisputable that a real distinction between essence and

existence changes the theological landscape of the thirteenth century and following.

                                                                                                               579 See for example, Prepositinus, Summa, lib. 1, 8.2: “Unde concedimus quod petrus est iustus iustitia

creata et increata. Et ita duabus: increata tamquam efficienti causa, creata tamquam causa formali. Ut: iste albedine est similis, et similitudine est similis; albedine ut efficienti causa, similitudine ut formali. Similiter cum dico: deus est substantia, et homo est substantia. Utrobique divina substantia predicatur, licet dissimiliter. Nam divina substantia ostenditur esse causa existentie illius, quia facit eum existere. Et ita de similibus” (ed. Angelini, 248).

580 A fascinating exception should be noted at Summa, lib. 3, q. 25: “Ad hoc dicendus quod hec syncategorema ‘secundum,’ uii modis accipitur uel pluribus. Notat enim causam meritoriam, efficientem, formalem uel quasi formalem, naturam, conditionem nature, unitatem persone” (BnF 14526, f. 45vb; Todi 71, f. 123ra).

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But even as the thirteenth century is witness to the emergence of a new meaning of esse

due to the influx of new texts and conceptual frameworks, nevertheless, esse as form, essence, or

nature retains a place among thirteenth (and fourteenth!) century masters as esse essentiae. While

there is still much textual desiderata with respect to the early thirteenth century, nevertheless, the

literature that we do have is still thick and rich,581 at least with respect to the question of esse and

so it seemed superfluous to rehearse those narratives here. But it should be noted that the

incorporation of the new meaning of esse was a slow process. I cite just one prominent example

in William of Auvergne, who despite his access to new texts, nevertheless only brings the

distinction between essence and existence to bear on his Trinitarian work,582 and even as he does

so, its introduction is still largely governed by a Boethian framework of questions.583 In contrast

to the more speculative approach found in his Trinitarian theology, his treatment of Christ

remains a revised (if somewhat critical) cur deus homo.

As I will illustrate below, even the young Thomas catalogues the older meaning for esse

in his first treatment of Christ’s esse, namely, in his commentary on the Sentences. But in none

of the remaining four treatments of this question does Thomas retain this older meaning of esse.

And given the development traversed in the previous three chapters, it is at least plausible that

retaining esse essentiae as a primary meaning for esse would be somewhat retrograde or at least

a maintenance of a somewhat outdated status quo. The shift not only in concept but even in

terminology from Albert to Thomas indicates that the younger Dominican confrere has broken

new ground,584 through a more rigorous application of principles to which many of his

contemporaries and immediate predecessors had access but not the insight.

 

                                                                                                               581 I think, here, of the still unparalleled studies undertaken by Walter Principe, The Theology of the

Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, 4 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963-1975), in particular, his discussion of esse @ 1: 20-30, 2: 30-40, & 3: 31-33. See also, Etienne Gilson, “The Concept of Existence in William of Auvergne,” in Medieval Essays, trans. James G. Colbert (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 84-123.

582 See William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1976), c. 2: 21-22.

583 See William, De Trinitate, c. 1: 17. 584 See Corey Barnes discussion of Albert’s language of unum duplex esse, in his “Albert the Great and

Thomas Aquinas on Person, Hypostasis, and Hypostatic Union,” The Thomist 72 (2008): 109, 130-33, 141, 145-46.

 

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Chapter 4 Scholastic Reception of the Hypothesis of Esse Secundarium

Narratio 4

It is important, now, to shift from the (roughly) historical sequence I have pursued thus

far in order to address two of the principal interpretations of esse secundarium proposed by the

inheritors of St. Thomas’ texts. As noted in the status quaestionis in the introduction, there are

many authors in the Thomistic commentary tradition who argue for a particular position about

the esse of Christ and many who understand their positions to be that of St. Thomas; few

commentators, however, advert to the textual discrepancy in St. Thomas’ corpus with which we

began our project. Thomas de Vio Cajetan and Francisco Suarez, however, are two outstanding

exceptions to this trend.

By analyzing these highly divergent readings of St. Thomas on the esse of Christ, the

evaluative criteria I can bring to bear on my own subsequent interpretation will be greatly

enhanced. This foray, therefore, not only exemplifies an awareness of historical situation, but

also prevents a mere repetition of past experiments. For this reason, after looking at Cajetan and

Suarez, I will also examine the seventeenth century Salamancan commentators.

I’ve selected Cajetan and Suarez principally because they advert to the discrepancy

between the De Unione and Thomas’ other texts, but they also act as signposts. For as Suarez

rightly notes, Cajetan’s position is the one followed by the majority of Thomist commentators,

and although Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange responds to Suarez almost two-hundred years after

the Jesuit’s death, Garrigou is no exception to the consensus among Thomistae, which Suarez

deemed exemplified in Cajetan. As John Froula has noted, contemporary authors such as Victor

Salas follow Garrigou,585 who is himself following a venerable line of Thomist commentary,

which finds its beginning perhaps not in time but in exemplarity in Cajetan’s own work.

The primary purpose of this chapter, however, is to raise a question sometimes addressed

but not dissolved by the Scholastic commentary tradition: how can a finite essence receive an

infinite act of existence? Garrigou provides an especially distilled, clear, and highly developed

response to this question; it is with him, therefore, that I will share a final word.

                                                                                                               585 See John Froula, “Esse Secundarium: An Analogical Term meaning that by which Christ is Human,”

The Thomist 78 (2014): 561-64.

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1 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, O.P.

In his commentary on article two, question seventeen of the tertia pars, Cajetan has two

principal questions in focus. He refers to the first as a “domestic” question, insofar as it asks

what is the “intention and meaning” of St. Thomas? Does St. Thomas intend to teach that in

Christ there is no esse actualis existentiae in the genus of created substance, but only an

uncreated existence? The second is whether it is actually the case “that in Christ there is no

substantial existence except the divine.”586 Although the answers to these questions mutually

determine one another, I will focus on the first insofar as Cajetan has the interpretation of the

texts of St. Thomas clearly delineated. Before turning to Suarez, however, it will be

advantageous to advert to some of the reasons for Cajetan’s own position about this matter.587

1.1 Cajetan’s Interpretation of the Teaching of St. Thomas

  Shawn Colberg has produced a marvelous distillation of Cardinal Cajetan’s commentary

on this portion of the Summa and provided an acute and adroit sampling of the various arguments

Cajetan engages.588 He has also expertly compared Cajetan’s commentary with one of Cajetan’s

unedited sermons, illuminating subtle features (and pastoral applications) of Cajetan’s position

regarding the single existence of Christ. For theses reasons, I will be relatively brief in my

exploration of many aspects of Cajetan’s commentary, but judicious and focused with respect to

those areas that are apropos to the question of the meaning of esse secundarium and especially

Cajetan’s reading of the QD de Unione, for on these matters my reading of Cajetan diverges

from Colberg’s.589

                                                                                                               586 Cajetan, Comm. in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: “Haec sunt in corpore articuli. In quibus multae sunt

quaestiones Prima domestica est, de intentione et sensu Auctoris: an scilicet Auctor intendat docere quod in Christo nullum est esse actualis existentiae de genere substantiae creatum, sed sola existentia increata. Secunda quaestio: an ita sit in veritate, quod in Christo nulla existentia substantialis sit nisi divina” (ed. Leonina, 11: 223b).

587 Perhaps the most comprehensive study of Cajetan’s Christology in recent decades has been Marcel Nieden’s Organum Deitatis: Die Christologie des Thomas de vio Cajetan (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

588 See Shawn Colberg, “Accrued Eyes and Sixth Digits: Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Cajetan on Christ's Single Esse and the Union of Natures,” Nova et Vetera (English Edition) 8.1 (2010): 55-87.

589 Colberg reads Cajetan as illustrating “that the admission of an aliud esse could be regarded either as an insight or a mistake” (81). Colberg, therefore, believes that Cajetan “regards the opinion [expressed in the QD de Unione] as potentially consonant with the rest of Thomas’s writings if one but grasp the quo est versus quod est distinction” (82). This seems an imprecise reading of Cajetan. Cajetan has actually set up a kind of disputed question regarding “the intention and meaning of” St. Thomas. Consequently, what Colberg regards as an argument for aliud esse as an insight is simply Cajetan using 3a.17.1.ad1 as his “third objection” out of a total of four, prior to a line that reads just like a sed contra: “in oppositum autem est processus articuli secundum planum illius sensum,” which is in turn followed by a quasi respondeo: “ad hoc dicitur quod procul dubio sensus litterae huius, et doctrina Auctoris est in Christo non inveniri aliquod esse actualis existentiae substantiale nisi esse existentiae divinum” (see

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Cajetan stages a kind-of disputed question with respect to the “meaning and intention” of

Thomas as to whether he “intends to teach that in Christ there is no esse actualis existentiae in

the genus of created substance, but only an uncreated existence.”590 Consequently, Cajetan offers

four arguments that oppose this reading. The latter three are based on variant readings of the

corpus, ad 1, and ad 3 of article two of question seventeen in the tertia pars, but the first

“objection” provided by Cajetan centers on the QD de Unione: “For in the Disputed Questions,

On the Union of the Word Incarnate, the Author clearly says that in Christ there are found two

existences (duo esse): one eternal, which is the principal existence of the supposit; and one

temporal, inasmuch as the Word became man, and this existence is the secondary existence of

the supposit.”591

In his reply, Cajetan says that the opinion posited in the De Unione is to be judged as

retracted, unless someone is so senseless as to reduce the teaching expressed in the Summa, the

Scriptum, and the Quodlibetal Questions to a tiny question “hardly known among the works of

the Author,” and written long beforehand. Cajetan regards Thomas’ treatment in the De Unione

as “most incomplete” and dissonant with his treatment of the same subject in other disputed

questions.592

Before looking to Cajetan’s own determination of whether there is in Christ no

                                                                                                               11: 224a, n. 4). Cajetan, then, replies to each of the four “objections” and concludes definitively: “est igitur indubie tenendum, secundum Auctoris doctrinam, in Christo nullum esse actualis existentiae substantialis inveniri nisi esse actualis existentiae Filii Dei, quod est aeternum, et ipse Deus.” Only the first “objection” addresses the De Unione, the remaining three are based on the corpus, ad 1, and ad 3 of article two, question seventeen in the tertia pars. It is therefore, a misinterpretation for Colberg to read Cajetan as though the Cardinal presents an explicitly positive reading of the QD de Unione. Cajetan only expresses one opinion about the De Unione: “ut retracta censenda est” (n. 6), which is cited by Colberg (82). To be sure, one can take some of Cajetan’s arguments and apply them to the De Unione, but this is not the same as arguing that Cajetan himself does so.

590 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: “Haec sunt in corpore articuli. In quibus multae sunt quaestiones. Prima domestica est, de intentione et sensu Auctoris: an scilicet Auctor intendat docere quod in Christo nullum est esse actualis existentiae de genere substantiae creatum, sed sola existentia increata” (ed. Leonina, 11: 223b).

591 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: “Nam in Quaestionibus Disputatis, de Unione Verbi Incarnati, Auctor clare dicit in Christo inveniri duo esse: unum aeternum, quod est esse principale suppositi; et unum temporale, inquantum Verbum est factum homo, et hoc esse est esse secundarium illius suppositi” (ed. Leonina, 11: 223b).

592 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6: “Ad obiecta autem in oppositum respondendo, ad primum dicitur quod opinio illa, posita in Quaestione illa de Unione Verbi, ut retractata censenda est: nisi quis adeo desipiat ut putet doctrinam in hoc ultimo libro traditam, et in authenticis libris etiam prius probatam, scilicet in III Sent., dist. VI, qu. II, et in Quolib. IX, qu. II, reducendam esse ad quaestiunculam vix cognitam inter opera Auctoris, et longe ante factam. Quae rationabilius creditur colligendo condita inter schedulas disputationum inventa, quam unquam edita a divo Thoma. Constat enim quaestionem illam de tanta re, hoc est de unione Verbi incarnati, imperfectissime materiam unionis tractare, et per hoc dissonare ab aliis Quaestionibus Disputatis eiusdem; et rationibus multum debilibus uti, ut patet conferenti illos articulos similibus in hoc opere; et quinque tantum articulis rem tantam absolvere. Prae se ferunt siquidem haec quod diximus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

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substantial existence except the divine, it will be helpful to assess how his metaphysical

commitments play out in his reading of St. Thomas. Ultimately, Cajetan finds the position

expressed in the tertia pars to be beyond doubt. To him, the teaching of St. Thomas is that in

Christ there is no substantial esse of actual existence except the divine esse existentiae.593

Cajetan believes that the argumentation of the article itself rests upon several principles: (1)

Whatever looks to or regards the personality (whether form, matter, part, or nature), such

metaphysical elements do not bear their own esse.594 This presupposes (2) the distinction

between those “forms” which pertain to the personality and those which do not. Cajetan adds that

(3) in contrast to “personal forms,” “non-personal forms” each have their own individual and

distinct esse.595 Thus, accidents (non personalia) have their own esse, but personalia are bereft

of their own esse.

Cajetan, therefore, sets out two alternatives: Either (1) the human nature does not fall

under the ambit of the personality of Christ or (2) the human nature does not bring to Christ the

esse it would have given to the human person which it would have constituted if it had not been

assumed.596 So if we take nature as a res personalis (that is, as pertaining to or dependent upon

personality), then the human nature is bereft of its own esse even as a principium quo.  597 Even

though Cajetan understands St. Thomas to locate the humanity of Christ among those

metaphysical elements which are related to the personality, and for this reason accepts the

consequences of the second option, he nevertheless makes a telling observation about the first

alternative. It would be the same to say that the humanity in Christ has its own existence but that

it is not the absolute (simpliciter) or principal existence of Christ but rather the secondary or

                                                                                                               593 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Ad hoc dicitur quod procul dubio sensus litterae huius, et doctrina

Auctoris est in Christo non inveniri aliquod esse actualis existentiae substantiale nisi esse existentiae divinum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

594 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Fundatur enim vis rationis litterae super hoc quod, sive forma sive materia sive pars sive natura quaecumque sit spectans ad personalitatem alicuius, non affert suum esse” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

595 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Ad hoc namque fundavit se Auctor super pertinentia vel impertinentia formae ad personalitatem alicuius, ut pertinentia ad personalitatem alicuius privata fore singulis propriis esse, ex hoc ipso quod ad alterius personalitatem spectant, monstraret. Quoniam in hoc differunt personales a non personalibus formis, quod non personales habent singulae singula propria esse, ut patet de albedine, dulcedine, quantitate, etc.; personalia autem carent singulis esse” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

596 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Et propterea oportet alterum duorum dicere: aut quod natura humana non spectet ad personalitatem Christi; aut quod non attulerit Christo esse quod dedisset personae humane quam constituisset si non fuisset assumpta” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

597 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Et propterea si, pro qui, humanitas in Christo personalis res est, oportet quod careat suo proprio esse, quod constat vocari esse actualis existentiae, natum prncipiari ab humanitate, seu natum esse humanitatis ut principii quo” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

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relative (secundum quid) existence (in as much as he is man) as it would be to place the

humanity among those metaphysical constituents which do not pertain to the personality.598

By invoking the language of the QD de Unione, Cajetan highlights what he finds so

fundamentally flawed about the position presented therein, for it amounts to saying that the

human nature could have an esse which does not pertain to the personality. In contrast, Cajetan

argues that the humanity is among those elements which relate directly to the personality.

Consequently, the humanity cannot bear its own esse, for it if had its own esse, then in one and

the same person there would be multiplied the esse personale, which cannot be the case, since

the esse proper to a human nature is the esse personale, for it is the esse of Socrates or Plato.599

Not surprisingly, therefore, Cajetan argues that although there is a real distinction between nature

and person there is not a real distinction between the esse of nature and the esse of person, for it

is one and the same esse, although it belongs to the person in a primary way and to nature in a

derivative way.600

 

1.2 Cajetan’s Personal Determination of the Question

As to how the matter stands “in truth,” Cajetan believes that the conclusion: there is no

substantial existence in Christ except the divine finds ample and sufficient foundations for its

demonstration in the text of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, he offers his own distillation of principles

(6) before addressing a host of objections. Cajetan initiates his determination of the question by

acknowledging that when we prescind from the (real) distinction between nature and person,

then we say that esse is the actuality of each created nature. But when we advert to the

distinction, then we will also distinguish between the different ways in which nature and person

                                                                                                               598 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “Unde perinde esset dicere humanitatem in Christo habere

propriam existentiam, sed illam non esse simpliciter aut principalem existentiam Christi, sed secundariam aut secundum quid, puta inquantum est homo; et collocare humanitatem Christi in ordine formarum seu naturarum non pertinentium ad personalitatem, quibus convenit aferre secum sua singula esse, et propterea multiplicare illa in una et adem persona” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

599 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: “in littera clarum sit humanitatem Christi locatam esse inter spectantia ad personalitatem, et ideo non afferre proprium esse; quia, si afferret illud, multiplicaretur in una et eadem persona esse personale, quoniam esse proprium naturae humanae est esse personale est enim esse Socratis aut Platonis, etc. (ed. Leonina, 11: 224a).

600 See Cajetan, Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 7: “In iis enim in quibus persona et natura secundum rem differunt, sicut persona est aliud a natura, ita esse personae debitum est aliud ab esse naturae. Aliud autem, non per positionem duorum esse quorum unum sit aliud ab alio, sed per alietatem, ut ita dixerim, naturalem: quia alterius naturae est esse quod non debetur naturae nisi per personam, cui primo convenit; et alterius naturae esset esse quod convenit naturae absque expecatione a persona, quod in solo Deo invenitur” (ed. Leonina, 224b).

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are related to the very same esse, for (1) “esse is the act of a nature as a principle by which,” but

esse is the act of a person “as of a subject or that which has esse.”601

This means that “the nature is the immediate principle by which of its esse, but it is not

the immediate receptacle of its esse, but only by the mediating person.”602 Consequently, Cajetan

adds that (2) a nature is never a quod est but is always a quo est. Nature, therefore, is an existent

but not as what exists but as that by which someone exists.603 These first two principles lead him

to two subsequent corollaries. The first is (3) that for a nature to exist it is not required that it be

actuated by existence in the way that a subject is actuated by a form; it suffices simply for the

nature to be that by which someone exists. Cajetan goes on to observe that “there are many

modes of being,” and consequently it just so happens that the mode of being consonant with

natures and forms is that they exist as quo est not as quod est, “nothing more is owed to

them.”604

The second is that (4) person is more intimate to nature than existence, which is to say

that a nature is “impersoned” prior to it constituting its own existence.605 This principle echoes

Cajetan’s earlier observation that the unity of esse follows upon the unity of person, that is, the

unity of esse is an effect of the unity of person.606 It also reiterates the fact that although nature is

a principium quo of existence it only actually originates existence as really joined to a supposit

or person. Being joined to a supposit, therefore, is the precondition for a nature fulfilling its own

proper mode of being as an id quo, not through any deficit on the originating nature’s part, but

because a nature is not the primary receiver (susceptivum primum) of its esse.607 (5) Hence, if a

                                                                                                               601 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “Quamvis enim, dum non curamus de distinctione inter

personam et naturam, dicamus esse actualis existentiae, de quo est sermo, esse actualitatem naturae cuiusque creatae: cum tamen exacte discernitur persona a natura, dicimus, ut in hac littera habetur, quod esse est actus naturae ut principii quo, personae autem ut subiecti, seu quod habet ipsum esse” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

602 Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “Ita quod natura est principium quo immediatum ipsius esse: sed non est receptivum immediatum ipsius esse, sed mediante persona” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a

603 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “natura nunquam est quod est, sed semper est quo est: invenitur siquidem natura existens non ut quae existit, sed ut qua aliquis existit” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

604 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “quod ad hoc quod natura existat, non exigitur quod ipsa actuetur per existentiam ut subiectum actuatur per formam in eo; sed sufficit quod ipsa sit qua aliquis existit. Nec mirum est scientibus quod non omnia uno eodemque modo sunt, sed sat est unicuique entium esse modo sibi convenienti. Sunt enim multi essendi modi. Et naturis quidem ac formis consonus essendi modus est, non ut sint tanquam quod est, sed ut sint tanquam quo est: nec plus eis debetur” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

605 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “Aliud est quod, quia prius natura personatur quam existentiam propriam constituat, intimior est persona naturae quam existentia” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

606 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6: “Unitas enim personae et dualitas naturae sunt causae: unitas vel dualitas esse est effectus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224b).

607 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “Ita quod natura est principium quo immediatum ipsius esse: sed non est receptivum immediatum ipsius esse, sed mediante persona. Ita quod oportet naturam personari ad hoc ut

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nature were drawn into the personhood of another (as happens in the incarnation), how much

more so would it be drawn into the existence of another, since the production of existence

follows upon the constitution of personhood.608 Cajetan, therefore, insists that the first

substantial subject of existence is the person.609

Cajetan commences the enumeration of his final argument with an observation about why

there is only one real relation of filiation, namely, because there is only one real subject of

filiation, the (uncreated) person of the Word. This carries over in the case of the question of

existence, because as Cajetan has emphasized continually, a nature is only related to existence as

an id quo, whereas the person is related as the proper and primary subject of existence.

Consequently, if there is only one person, then there is only one foundation or subject for an act

of existence. But since (6) a created existence would be repugnant to the divine person both

because (6a) a divine person cannot receive something created in himself and (6b) because to

one person there only belongs one substantial esse, therefore the humanity of Jesus is assumed to

the personality of the Word and thereby made to share in the divine esse of the Word. This

sharing, however, although it abrogates the need for a created esse, nevertheless, does not

eradicate the mode of being (essendi modum) proper to a nature, for the humanity of Christ exists

as a by which. 610

1.3 Some Observations

Cajetan exemplifies his typical familiarity with rival scholastic positions regarding the

question of esse in Christ, and while it is not possible to explore all of the many objections he

entertains, I do want to single out those replies which amplify Cajetan’s personal position about

                                                                                                               ab ea principietur actualiter ipsum esse: non ex defectu naturae principiantis ut quo; sed quia deficeret susceptivum primum ipsius esse, si non esset personata; persona enim est cui primo convenit esse ut subiecto, seu quod habet esse, seu quod est” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

608 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: “natura carens propria personalitate quia praevenitur ab aliena, oportet consequenter quod careat propria existentia. Si enim existentia propria non provenit ab ipsa actualiter nisi in propria persona, ex hoc ipso quod ad alienam trahitur personam, sequitur quod ad alienam trahitur existentiam, illius scilicet personae praevenientis ipsam” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

609 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 14: “Primum enim substantialis existentiae subiectum est persona” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226a).

610 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 14: “Repugnat autem divinae personae existentia creata, duplici ratione. Prima est ex divinitate: quia divina persona non potest recipere in se creatum aliquid. Secunda est ex communi ratione personae: quia personae unius non est nisi unum esse substantiale. Et haec ratio in littera ponitur. Quocirca, quia humanitas Christi praeventa est in mysterio incarnationis ut propriam non sortiretur personalitatem, sed ad personalitatem Verbi assumpta est; ideo quasi impedita est a proprio esse, et est sortita esse personae divinae, ex hoc ipso quod est divinae personae natura, dicta de illa in quid Habet enim ex hoc suum essendi modum, scilicet esse ut quo. Natura enim personae est ut quo: nec plus sibi debetur” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226).

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this matter, constitute points of departure for later scholastic development, and illustrate certain

lacunae in argumentation. Cajetan organizes the many “doubts” regarding whether “in Christ,

there is no substantial existence except the divine,” under four major headings: (1) doubts about

the premises, (2) a challenge to the textual thesis that only a new relation accrues to the Word

according to the human nature (not a new esse), (3) arguments against the conclusion (that the

incarnate Christ only has a divine esse), and (4) arguments for the contradictory of the

conclusion.611

In Cajetan’s first set of responses to Scotus, we can again see the emphasis on the

diversity of modes according to which the very same esse is of a nature as a by which and of a

person as a that which.612 His engagement with Scotus, however, leads him to clarify his

mereology, for the second premise under attack is that the esse of a part and the esse of the

person are the same. Cajetan rejects the inference drawn by Scotus that a part is contained by the

esse of the whole because it is perfected by the form of the whole and instead says that a part is

contained by the esse of the whole because it pertains to the integrity of the whole.613

This clarification yields for Cajetan yet another way to emphasize the different way

nature is related to esse than person is related to esse. For an essential part (or personalia) like

nature is not informed by the esse of its whole the way a subject would be, but rather the nature

is integral to the esse of the whole or supposit. It is helpful here to recall St. Thomas’ own

observation about the two aspects of a whole: (1) that “the esse of a composite whole belongs to

all its parts, since the parts do not have their own esse but exist through the esse of the whole,”

and (2) that the parts which compose the whole “cause the esse of the whole.”614

                                                                                                               611 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 8: “Circa secundam autem quaestionem multiplex dubium occurrit.

Nam primo, dubitatur de praemissis; deinde de modo quo ponitur Christus existentiam humanam habere; tertio, de ipsa conclusione; quarto, de sua contradictoria” (ed. Leonina, 11: 225a).

612 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: “Ad primo ergo obiecta contra fundamentum processus, quia idem est esse naturae et personae, respondetur: praemittendo tamen quod fundamentum Auctoris est quidem identitas ipsius esse respectu naturae et personae, sed non sola identitas; sed, adiuncta modi diversitate respectu utriusque, quia scilicet illud idem esse est naturae ut quo, personae ut quod. Ex identitate enim esse cum hac modi diversitate, procedit littera, ut patet. Sed Scotus, contra, solam identitatem affert pro causa” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226b).

613 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: “Ad obiecta vero eiusdem contra unum esse parties et personae, respondetur quod, si vis fiat in verbis, assumitur non-causa ut causa. Non enim ideo pars est contenta ipso esse totius quia perficitur per formam totius; sed quia spectat ad integritatem totius. Ex hoc enim fit ut sit contenta modo essendi congruo ac debito integrantibus personam: scilicet, ut existant per existere totius, ex hoc ipso quod totius integrativa sunt” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226b).

614 See Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, n. 94: “ad rationem totius duo pertinent. Unum scilicet quod esse totius compositi pertinet ad omnes partes; quia partes non habent proprium esse, sed sunt per esse totius, ut dictum est. Aliud est quod partes components causant esse totius (ed. Mandonnet, 241); cf. ST IIIa, q. q, a. 2c: “Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in

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Now, Cajetan clearly understands that only one of these existential lines (the first) is

operative in the sui generis case of the incarnation (for the human nature supplies no lack in

Christ), but Cajetan also maintains that although the human nature does not cause the esse of the

Word, simply speaking, nevertheless, the humanity still retains in some way its proper mode of

being, insofar as it is the nature of Christ, which is to say that only this composite of body and

soul is joined to the Word and is the Word’s own humanity.615

In his reply to the fourth set of arguments (again having their origin in Scotus), Cajetan

continues to affirm that the humanity of Christ is “as though a certain part of the person of the

Word,” but presses further to argue that the esse of the Word is sufficient to constitute the

humanity as existing “outside its causes,” (a) without the humanity’s own (created) existence and

(b) without the humanity being actuated by the existence of the Word according to an “informing

which inheres” in the subject informed, for such an actuation is not owed to a humanity except

through the person to whom it belongs, and in the unique case of the incarnation, this person is

the eternal and uncreated person of the Word.616

So while the rejection of the humanity as a subject for or receiver of existence persists

throughout his replies to the objections, this is not the case when considering operations, for the

humanity of Christ (as distinguished against the supposit) is the proper subject of operation, and

for this reason the human nature originates its own operations.617 This is why in the life of Christ

we can always discern a twofold operation, but this does not apply to esse because the humanity

of Christ does not originate the esse of Christ.

                                                                                                               compositis ex materia et forma natura non predicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas” (ed. Leonina, 11: 25a).

615 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: “Et proportionaliter in proposito dicitur quod, quia humanitas Christi pertinet ad personalitatem Christi quia est assumpta quasi ad integritatem personae Christi; non quasi suppleat defectum aliquem in persona Christi, sed ut sit persona Christi persona illius humanitatis: ideo humanitas Christi non dat novum esse Christo, sed contenta est consono sibi essendi modo, ut scilicet existat ex hoc ipso quod est natura Christi” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226b); cf. Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2, n. 97: “persona non dicitur composita quasi esse suum sit ex multis constitutum—hoc enim est contra rationem aeterni—sed quia ad multa se extendit quae assumuntur in illud esse” (ed. Mandonnet, 242).

616 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 19: “ideo humanitas Christi, quae quasi pars quaedam est personae Verbi, quia ad personalitatem propriam Verbi assumpta est, invenitur sufficienter posita extra causam suam existens absque propria existentia, et absque hoc quod actuetur per informationem inhaesivam ab existentia Verbi: sibi enim non debetur existentia nisi per personam cuius est” (ed. Leonina, 11: 228b).

617 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 21: “Quia natura, ut distinguitur contra suppositum, est non solum principium, se etiam susceptivum proximum operandi: sed existentiae est solum principium, et non est susceptivum proprium. Natura enim humana est principium existendi personae propriae ut proprio subiecto: quae in Christo non est. Et ideo non principiat existentiam in Christo. Sed operandi est principium sibi ipsi ut proprio subiecto, distinguendo naturam contra suppositum, ut dictum est. Et ideo in Christo principiat proprium operari. Et propterea operari multiplicatur secundum naturas: esse autem non” (ed. Leonina, 11: 228b).

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Cajetan sets aside a separate reply for the Scotist challenge to the textual thesis that there

is only a new relation of the Word to the humanity not a new esse. The argument of Scotus (as

rehearsed by Cajetan) shows familiarity with the framework laid out in question two, article

seven of the tertia pars which is but a particular application of the general rule for predications

involving creatures and the creator, namely, that relations between creature and creator denote a

real relation inhering in the creature but only a relation of reason in God.618 From this very

Thomist position, Scotus argues that if there is only a relation of reason from the Word to the

humanity, then it is not possible for the human nature to be something (aliquid) formally, for a

relation of reason alone cannot constitute a subject formally as something, and consequently it

cannot be said that the Word insofar as he is man is formally something, which is contrary to the

papal decrees of Alexander III (which were understood to be directed against the so-called

habitus theory),619 and therefore is heretical.620

The human nature of Christ is an individual in the genus of substance; a relation of reason

alone cannot constitute the humanity of Jesus as a substance existing in reality. Only a real

relation could constitute the human nature as an aliquid and therefore as a really existing

substance or individual essence. Consequently, if a real relation is lacking, then Christ insofar as

he is man is not something, because the humanity is not something formally constituted, i.e.,

existing in reality.

Cajetan’s reply is a little disappointing, and while he accuses Scotus of an impoverished

understanding of the text of St. Thomas, it would seem that it is the good Cardinal who has

missed a few steps.621 Cajetan receives the Scotist objection as though Scotus has overlooked the

                                                                                                               618 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c: “omnis relatio quae consideratur inter Deum et creaturam, realiter

quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis relatio innascitur: non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum, quia non nascitur secundum mutationem Dei” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40). See also ST Ia, q. 13, a. 7c; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.

619 See Denzinger-Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 749-50. 620 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 9: “Contra modum quo ponitur Christus habere esse secundum

naturam humanam, scilicet quod Verbum novo modo relative se habet secundum illam, arguit: ‘Si Verbum tantum habeat respectum novum ad naturam illam, et ille est respectus rationis tantum; cum per respectum rationis non dicatur subiectum formaliter esse aliquid, ergo Verbum, inquantum homo, non erit formaliter aliquid. Consequens est contra illud, Extra, de Haeret., Cum Christus. Ergo’, etc.” (ed. Leonina, 11: 225a).

621 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 16: “Ad obiecta deinde eiusdem Scoti contra modum respondetur quod ex malo intellectu litterae procedit. Interpretatur siquidem arguens Auctorem dicere inter Verbum et naturam humanam non ese coniunctionem nisi relativam relatione rationis ex parte Verbi: et ideo arguit, Si tantum habet relationem, etc. Hic autem sensus longe est a nobis plus quam terra a caelo. Quoniam secundum | doctrinam Auctoris, saepe repetitam, inter Verbum et humanitatem assumptam est coniunctio substantialis, quam comitatur unio relativa. Sed quia coniunctio ista substantialis non est secundum novum esse ipsius humanitatis, sed secundum aeternum esse ipsius Verbi, ideo Auctor, ad excludendam acquisitionem novi esse, dicit quod solum advenit sibi

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substantiality of the hypostatic union and mistakenly understood St. Thomas to have advocated

only a relative (i.e., accidental) relation of reason between the Word and his humanity. But the

problem of substantiality is not so much a premise in Scotus’ argument as the conclusion, and

what the objection has clearly in focus is the problem of the constitution or foundation of

substantiality, namely, a real relation. Cajetan does not address this problem in his reply and

simply repeats precisely what is in dispute. But how can a relation of reason be the (causal)

ground for the substantiality of a created individuum in the genus of substance?

If it is according to the person of the Word that we say that the relation (of hypostatic

union) is substantial, but that relation on the side of the Word is only a relation of reason, then

how can it be said (truly) in re that the humanity is substantial? To be sure, Cajetan’s response is

that the esse of the person of the Word is sufficient cause and the Person of the Word himself is

sufficient ground or foundation for the substantiality of the humanity, but this still fails to

address the question. So to clarify this issue, let us look at Cajetan’s own assessment of St.

Thomas on the created character of the hypostatic union.

With alarming regularity, Cajetan systematically qualifies (almost to the point of

resistance) the conclusions drawn by St. Thomas in question two, article seven of the tertia pars.

For Cajetan, there is a fundamental divide between the meaning of the union taken as a relation

in the genus of relation (and therefore as an accident) and the union as signifying the conjunction

of the human nature with the person of the Word. Understood as a relation, the union is a “real,

created being.” But understood as the unity constituted between the human nature and the person

of the Son, “it is in the genus or order of substance: and is not something created, but the

Creator.”622

This distinction in meanings is absent from the text of article seven. There is no

indication that Thomas intends for us to understand the hypostatic union as an accident in the

                                                                                                               nova relatio : et non dixit hoc ad excludendam coniunctionem substantialem secundum personalitatem et illius esse, ut clare patet in littera. Quin potius, cum dictio exclusiva non excludat a concomitantibus, nec fundamentum a relatione, ponendo solum novam relationem acquiri, intelligitur praeacquiri fundamentum illius, quod est personalis coniunctio, super qua fundatur relatio nova personae ad naturam. Unde patet argumentum totaliter ruere” (ed. Leonina, 11: 226-27).

622 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, n. 3: “In hoc articulo cautissime adverte distinctionem praedictam de unione: vel quantum ad relationem, quam significant; vel quantum ad coniunctionem in persona, ad quam consequitur. Quoniam plus differunt haec duo quam caelum et terra. Unio enim pro relatione est in genere relationis, et est ens reale creatum, ut in littera dicitur. Unio autem pro coniunctione naturae humanae in persona divina, cum consistat in unitate quae est inter naturam humanam et personam Filii Dei, est in genere seu ordine substantiae: et non est aliquid creatum, sed Creator” (ed. Leonina, 11: 41a).

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genus of relation when he says that it is something created,623 and as he insists in the reply to the

third objection, the hypostatic union is not the Creator or God.624 The Angelic Doctor expends a

great deal of energy in the previous article (a. 6) to establish that the union between humanity

and divinity is not an accidental union, because humanity is not predicated of the Word

accidentally but substantially. To be clear, this is not the same as determining whether the union

is an accident (or in a genus of accident) but the union is obviously not a substance. Article six,

however, does open a trajectory for asking whether the union is substantial and that question is

answered in the affirmative, so it should at least produce caution about too readily placing it

within the accidental genus of relation.

What has happened here is an unwarranted reduction of an accident to a categorical or

predicamental sense without sufficient exploration of other possible meanings of accident.625 In

the unique case of the hypostatic union, we have something like a (quasi) predicable meaning of

accident, insofar as it does not flow directly from the essence of its subject.626 Yet while

pertaining to its subject substantially,627 the hypostatic union is not causally dependent on the

humanity in a formal or an efficient way. The hypostatic union is substantial, and as substantial it

cannot be placed within the accidental category of relation simply speaking.

Cajetan’s strategy of making the union into something in the “genus or order” of

substance and then identifying it with the Creator himself is equally problematic. For on the

                                                                                                               623 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, s.c. “Quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio illa non fuit ab

aeterno, sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40a). 624 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 3: “homo dicitur et est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur

ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit Creator vel Deus: quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

625 Daniel DeHaan has explicated at least eight operative meanings of accident in the metaphysics of Avicenna, see his Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing: On the Function of the Fundamental Scientific First Principles of Metaphysics, Phil. Diss. (University of St. Thomas and Catholic University of Leuven, 2014), ch. 8. And while it would be irresponsible to assume that these are also present in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, it at least illustrates that there are other metaphysical possibilities for the assigning of accidents. On this point and many others, I am very grateful to Dan for his metaphysical observations and expertise.

626 See Thomas, Quodl. 12, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1: “Et ad id quod Hylarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essencie, et sic est esse in rebus creatis, quia in solo Deo esse est eius essencia” (ed. Leonina, 25.2: 404). See also, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 12c: “Gratia igitur Christi, sive unionis sive habitualis, non potest dici naturalis quasi causata ex principiis naturae humanae in ipso: quamvis possit dici naturalis quasi proveniens in naturam humanam Christi causante divina natura ipsius. Dicitur autem naturalis utraque gratia in Christo inquantum eam a nativitate habuit: quia ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita, et anima eius fuit munere gratiae repleta” (ed. Leonina, 11: 51b); cf. QD de Unione, a. 3, ad 14 (ed. Obenauer, 82).

627 Given Cajetan’s own example of the relation between soul and body, it is good to recall that St. Thomas regards this relation as a substantial perfection (not an accidental perfection), see ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6, ad 2: “anima est perfectio substantialis corporis: gratia vero est perfectio animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b).

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divine side, the only distinction is of person, and whether we consider the divine according to

person or nature neither is to be properly understood within the genus or order of substance: God

is not in a genus. I am not trying to insinuate that Cajetan is unaware of the uncategorical

character of God, but I am trying to indicate that a failure to adhere to the sense of St. Thomas in

this text, produces severe and grave ambiguities in his language and implementation of otherwise

sound philosophical and theological principles.

When it comes to the question of esse, Cajetan again relativizes the basic thrust of the

text. Thomas explains that while the intelligibility of a relation depends upon its end or term, a

relation’s esse depends on its subject. Consequently, he concludes that the hypostatic union has

an esse creatum, because its (real) subject is a created human nature.628 But once again Cajetan

injects his distinction of relative and substantial so that he can redirect the emphasis back to the

term of the relation and therefore assert that the esse is really the divine esse.629 This, however,

fundamentally undermines the rationale presented by Thomas, which is that to determine the esse

of a relation, one must look not to the end or term, but to the (real) subject of the relation.

Cajetan would have the reader look in the wrong place!

Ultimately, Cajetan concludes that there is “nothing created” intervening between the

human nature and the Word “except a passion by which the human nature is drawn to the esse of

the Word.”630 It is good to recall Thomas’ own remark that the hypostatic union does not take

place as through a medium, whether on the divine side or the created side,631 and if this were the

only implication of “intervene,” Cajetan’s comment could be conceded without qualification.

But to say that “there is nothing created”? This is the most disconcerting of Cajetan’s

interpretations, for it deprives the human nature of its created status before the divine essence,

which is to say, if Cajetan is correct in his reading, then the human nature of Christ is not related

to the divine essence as to an efficient cause; this would mean that it is not created, which is not

only absurd but heretical.

                                                                                                               628 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: “ratio relationis, sicut et motus, dependet ex fine vel termino: sed

esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

629 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, n. 6: “Et quamvis esse aliquid, in communi loquendo , propter terminum relationis praecise , sit esse relativum; esse tamen aliquid ratione talis termini, scilicet personae divinae unius personaliter cum natura humana, non est esse relativum, sed esse divinum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 42b).

630 Cajetan, In ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, n. 3: “Ubi patet nihil creatum intervenire nisi passionem qua natura humana trahitur ad esse Verbi” (ed. Leonina, 11: 41a).

631 See ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c et ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b).

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If this seems like a leap in argumentation, it will be helpful to address another one of

Cajetan’s replies to Scotus in order to verify the implication I have drawn. The objection

addressed is the fourth in the third series, which pertains to the conclusion excluding any created

esse from the humanity of Christ. The Scotist objection begins with the claim that the humanity

of Christ is produced and conserved by the whole Trinity. Its conclusion is that the humanity

must therefore have a created esse, for it could not have the divine esse, since nothing produces

itself.632

Cajetan seems remarkably untroubled by this objection, concedes the premise: “the

humanity of Christ is effectively conserved and made by the whole Trinity,” but adds the

qualification: “according to the uncreated esse existentiae communicated to it.” He then, attacks

the implication that God would cause himself: “It does not follow, therefore, that God produces

himself or his own esse, but that he produces and conserves himself and his own esse as

communicated to the human nature personally.”633

But this does not sufficiently address the attack. What is produced is not the person of the

Son even as incarnate (this would be to speak most imprecisely), but rather the human nature is

produced insofar as at the moment of conception it is simultaneously joined to the Word.634 It is

consequently the union which is created and conserved, and this is just what St. Thomas says,

“the union is produced through grace, not as through a medium, but as through an efficient

cause,”635 for it is the whole Trinity which unites the human nature to the Word, but only the

Word may be truly said to have been united to the humanity.636

                                                                                                               632 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 10: “Humanitas Christi est effecta et conservata a tota Trinitate.

Ergo secundum existere creatum. Probatur consequentia. Quia non secundum existere increatum. Probatur: quia nihil efficit se” (ed. Leonina, 11: 225a).

633 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 17: “ad quartum dicitur quod humanitas Christi effective conservatur et facta est a tota Trinitate, secundum esse existentiae increatum communicatum sibi. Nec sequitur quod Deus efficiat ideo se, aut suum esse: sed quod effecerit et conservet se et suum esse communicatum humanae naturae personaliter” (ed. Leonina, 11: 227a).

634 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 12c: “ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita” (ed. Leonina, 11: 51b)

635 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: “Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem” (ed. Leonina, 104b); cf. IIIa, q. 2, a. 12, ad 3: “gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum humanam naturam, quasi ex principiis humanae naturae causata. Et ideo non oportet quod conveniat omnibus hominibus. Est tamen naturalis ei secundum humanam naturam, propter proprietatem nativitatis ipsius: prout sic conceptus est ex Spiritu Sancto ut esset idem naturalis Filius Dei et hominis. Secundum vero divinam naturam est ei naturalis, inquantum divina natura est principium activum huius gratiae. Et hoc convenit toti Trinitati: scilicet huius gratiae esse activum principium” (ed. Leonina, 11: 52).

636 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, ad 2: “Nam persona Patris univit naturam humanam Filio, non autem sibi” (ed. Leonina, 11: 43).

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And if the principles of Thomas are adhered to, then one must discern the character of

this substantial relation insofar as it regards its production and conservation according to its

subject, which is the human nature. Hence (in this theologically exceptional case), it is more

precise to say that the nature is produced and conserved by the whole Trinity, even though a

nature is normally only the formal term of generation not the material term (i.e., that which is

received in generation not that which is produced by generation).637 It remains misleading,

however, to say that the Word produces or preserves himself, even if the qualifiers “as incarnate”

or “as communicating himself and his esse to the human nature” are added. Indeed, precisely

because in the natural order of things, the material term of creation or generation is the

supposit,638 in the supernatural case of the incarnation (where a supposit is not generated or

created), such language ought to be avoided.639

Consequently, the real trouble with Cajetan’s solution is that there is no longer any

metaphysical reason for him to say that the human nature of Christ is created. Saying that the

humanity exists by the uncreated existence of the Word is to say that it is not related to the

Trinity as to an efficient cause, but every created reality is related to God as to an efficient

cause,640 for everything which exists in any way exists by God,641 according to a limited or

participated esse,642 for a created esse is the proper effect of God as ipsum esse.643 And whereas

normally the proper subject of creation or generation would be the supposit, in the unparalleled

case of the incarnation, the human nature is a created individual before God, not existing per se,

but in another, because it is really joined to and assumed by the person of the Son.644

Yet some account of the humanity’s creatureliness needs to be extrapolated, for it is not                                                                                                                

637 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2, ad 16: “generatio terminatur ad suppositum quidem sicut quod generatur, ad naturam autem sicut ad id, quod per generationem accipitur” (ed. Obenauer, 62)

638 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 45, a. 4c (ed. Leonina, 11: 468). 639 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 16, a. 10c et ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 215). 640 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 8, a. 3c et ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 4: 87). 641 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 1c: “necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse” (ed.

Leonina, 4: 455a). 642 See Thomas, QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1c: “Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit

suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum | in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam” (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 13b-14a).

643 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 8, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 4: 82a). 644 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 2c: “Sic igitur, quia natura humana in Christo non per se separatim

subsistit, sed existit in alio, id est in hypostasi Verbi Dei—non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem—, ideo humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum, sicut nec persona” (ed. Obenauer, 56).

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as though the human nature can be exempted from creaturehood. Yet if no explanation of how it

can be related to God as to an efficient cause can be offered, because there is “nothing created”

intervening between it and any of the persons of the Trinity, then it is difficult to understand how

one can maintain both Cajetan’s conclusion excluding any created esse whatsoever and hold (on

metaphysical grounds) that the humanity of Jesus is created. In order for it to be true that the

humanity of Jesus is created, then there must be a real relation of creari which has as its real,

ontological subject the humanity of Jesus.

The final reply to an objection I want to note is the tenth in the third series of objections

surrounding Cajetan’s conclusion excluding a created, substantial esse from Christ’s humanity.

This objection is associated with Peter Aureol and John of Naples, the foundation of which is

that the divine esse does not actuate a human essence, because the divine esse does not take the

place of a formal, inhering cause. Consequently, this leaves only two possibilities in the case of

the incarnation: (1) either the humanity of Christ is actuated by its own esse or (2) the natural

potency the humanity has toward being actuated by its own (created) esse is retained.645

In reply, Cajetan distinguishes between two ways of taking “actuate.” According to a

strict meaning, actuation takes place according to the mode of inherence. Implementing the

principles he has already enumerated, Cajetan argues that existence does not actuate an essence

except as having reached its term, that is, as having been supplied with a person,646 for a nature

is not properly speaking the subject of existence, only the supposit. Consequently, existence does

not ever inhere in a nature as in a subject but only in the supposit.

Cajetan, however, is open to a wider meaning of actuate and offers an example. In the

case of the beatific vision, the divine essence actuates the created intellect which sees it. In this

way, the divine essence could be said to actuate a created essence. By extension, in the

incarnation, the human nature in Christ could be said to be actuated in some way through the

                                                                                                               645 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 10: “Aureolus etiam, et Ioannes de Neapoli, apud Capreolum, in VI

dist. III Sent., arguunt: ille quidem, quia esse existentiae est actus quo formaliter essentia est. Esse divinum non actuat essentiam humanam. Ergo humanitas Christi vel est actuata suo esse, vel adhuc perseverat potentialis ad esse: nam esse divinum non supplet vicem causae formalis inhaerentis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 225b).

646 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 18: “Ad aureolum dicitur quod esse existentiae non actuat essentiam nisi terminatam, hoc est personatam, seu per se subsistentem. Et quia humanitas Christi non est terminata propria personalitate, sed personalitate Verbi, ideo non convenit sibi actuare per existentiam. Et haec intellige, loquendo de actuare et actuare per modum inhaesionis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 228a).

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personality and esse of the Word,  647 not as inhering in the human nature but as drawing the

human nature into the divine perfection and completing it.

The Cardinal doesn’t extrapolate on the character of this second kind of actuation, other

than to offer the example of beatific vision. A strikingly similar objection and reply, however, is

offered by Garrigou-Lagrange in the twentieth century, and he designates the second kind of

actuation with the phrase “a term terminating intrinsically,” which is to be distinguished from a

“form inhering intrinsically.”648 For this reason, I will reserve an examination of this objection

and reply until the final section of this chapter, so that I can properly situate it within the

historical trajectory of disputation coming through Suarez and the Salamancans.

I will, however, offer this question, which I will again take up in the examination of

Garrigou below: Is the analogy drawn from the beatific vision based on a sufficient likeness?

The constitution of the possible intellect is unique, insofar as “in a certain way it becomes all

things,”649 and for this reason it does not limit the actuation it receives through the intelligible

species which inform it. Yet in the order of being(s), even if one accepts Cajetan’s claim that

esse is only received by the supposit, nevertheless, this does not change the fact that esse is also

always contracted and limited through a nature or species, even if its proper subject is the

supposit.650

As regards the reception of an actuation, the two orders of being and knowing are not the

same, for in the order of knowing there is reception without limitation but in the order of being

there is never reception without limitation. This difference between the two orders, consequently,

calls into question the appeal to the order of knowing in order to justify a claim about the order

of being. In the case of reception, therefore, there is an insufficient likeness between the two

orders to substantiate the argument.

                                                                                                               647 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 18: “Nam si de actuare et actuare infra totam latitudinem suorum

modorum sermo sit, non est remotum a philosophia divina Deum posse actuare rem creatam. In cuius signum, divinam essentiam esse actum cuiusque intellectus videntis ipsam, et theologi et philosophi fatentur. Cum ergo naturam humanam in Christo ex divina personalitate et esse divino perfici fateamur, non est absonum fateri etiam quod actuatur aliquo etiam modo per personalitatem et esse divinum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 228a).

648 See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, 302. 649 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 79, aa. 2-3; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 3.5: 430a10. 650 See Thomas, QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1c: “Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus

est, est actus infinitus utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis uel specei; unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui nature que non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam : unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse” (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 13b).

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2 Francisco Suarez, S.J.

  In recent years, there has been an increase both in literature and appreciation for the

metaphysical sophistication of Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).651 My purpose here, however, is

not so much to explore his tremendous metaphysical edifice but to engage him as an interpreter

of the QD de Unione, assess his own position on the esse of Christ, and extract what I judge to be

the most significant (and challenging) question leveled by him at the Thomist commentary

tradition.

As Suarez commences his thirty-sixth disputation on the tertia pars he notes a number of

different issues that merit further explication in the second article of question seventeen: (1)

What does Thomas mean by the phrase esse personale? (2) How does he affirm that the esse

personale is one? (3) How is it that the humanity exists through the esse personale? He follows

the inverse order of Cajetan’s commentary and seeks first to establish the truth of the matter

regarding the existence of the humanity of Christ and then to explicate the “mind and opinion” of

Thomas.652 Suarez nests these two issues under two major questions: (1) Through which

existence does the humanity of Christ exist in the nature of things? (2) Whether and how the esse

existentiae of Christ is one? Suarez also notes the relevance of Thomas’ discussion of the

existential status of the hypostatic union earlier in question two (a. 7, ad 2) to the issues he is

undertaking to discuss in disputation thirty-six.653

                                                                                                               651 I think in particular of four recent compilations: Suarez’s Metaphsyics in its Historical and Systematic

Context, ed. Lukás Novák, Contemporary Scholasticism 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). A Companion to Francisco Suárez, ed. Victor M. Saas and Robert L. Fastiggi, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 53 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez, ed. Bengjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Interpreting Suarez: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Also instructive is the entry on Suarez in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia (Albany: SUNY, 1994).

652 See Francisco Suarez, Commentaria ac Disputationes in Tertia Pars Divini Thomae, q. 17, a. 2, comm. “In hoc articulo, non solum est quaestio de modo loquendi, sed etiam de re ipsa. Et quoniam mens D. Thomae in toto articulo obscura est, prius res ipsa disputanda videtur, et deinde sensus D. Thomae, et vera ejus mens ac sententia explicanda; ipse enim simpliciter docet, in Christo esse tantum unum esse personale. Quid autem intelligat nomine esse personalis, quomodo etiam illud affirmet esse unum, non satis declarat, neque etiam exponit quomodo per illud esse humanitas ipsa existat; omnia ergo haec ex sequenti disputatione constabunt” (ed. Berton, 18: 260a).

653 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, prol. “Duo breviter in hac disputatione tractanda sunt. Primum est, per quam existentiam humanitas Christi in rerum natura existat; alterum vero est an et quomodo esse existentiae Christi unum sit; quae disputatio, quod ad rem ipsam attinet, et praesertim quoad primam ejus partem, ad questionem secundam D. Thomae pertinebat, ubi mysterium ipsum et unio incarnationis explicata est. Ibi enim videndum erat an haec unio sit in ipsa existentia increata, necne; tamen in hunc locum remissa est, ut hoc consuetudini daremus, et quia maxime videtur haec disputatio necessaria ad ea intelligenda, quae D. Thomas in hoc articulo tradit” (ed. Berton, 18: 260a).

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2.1 Reading of the QD de Unione and interpretation of esse secundarium

Because the interpretation of the QD de Unione is situated within Suarez’s second

question about the unity of Christ’s esse, it will be helpful to first explicate his answer, which he

believes has in some way already been substantially determined by his preceding treatment of the

(created) existence by which Christ’s humanity exists in the nature of things. Thus, for Suarez,

all that remains to be treated is the manner of speaking: Should it be said simply that Christ has

one esse or many?654

As to how things stand in reality, since the divine and human natures in Christ are distinct

realities (res), so too do they each have a distinct esse which belongs to them.655 Yet, it should

still be said simply that there is only one esse in Christ which is substantial, complete, and

perfect.656 This is the uncreated esse of the Word, and it is according to the unity of this esse that

Suarez understands the meaning intended by Thomas in article two of question seventeen.

Consequently, Suarez notes that “what is simply one being, simply has one esse by which it is

constituted; but Christ is simply one being. . . therefore, he also has one esse.”657 In this, as

Suarez himself notes, he is in agreement with the reasoning of most Thomists. But he does not

believe that this one, simple, and constitutive esse personale of the Word excludes a created esse

from the humanity assumed.658 For on his reading, even in the natural constitution of a created

supposit, the created nature of that supposit “has in some way its own esse.” This is because

                                                                                                               654 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 1: “Solum ergo videtur relinqui

quaestio de propositionibus ipsis, an, simpliciter loquendo Christus dicendus sit habere plura esse propter naturas, vel unum esse propter suppositum; et hunc existimo esse sensum quaestionis a D. Thoma hic propositae, quidquid Caejtanus dicat, quod ex sequentibus constabit” (ed. Berton, 18: 270a).

655 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 1: “nam in re constat, suppositis quae diximus, sicut natura humana et divina in Christo distinctae res sunt, ita etiam habere existentias distinctas prout ad naturas pertinent” (ed. Berton, 18: 270a).

656 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 3: Unde breviter dico primo: simpliciter dicendum est esse in Christo tantum unum esse substantiale, completum et perfectum. Hanc existimo esse mentem D. Thomae hic, et potest confirmari verbis Sophronii supra citatis” (ed. Berton, 18: 270a).

657 Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 3: Et optime probatur ratione D. Thomae, nam ens in actu constituitur per ipsum esse, ut ostensum est; ergo quod est simpliciter unum ens, simpliciter habet unum esse quo constiuatur; sed Christus est simpliciter unum ens, ut dictum est articulo primo; ergo et habet unum esse” (ed. Berton, 18: 270).

658 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5: “non ergo sine causa divus Thomas tam caute semper loquitur, sed ut indicet hoc unum esse personale, non excludere existentiam ipsius naturae, quae ad componendum ipsum esse totius personae concurrit, quia ita unitur supposito, ut ex illa unione resultet unum esse simpiciter totius personae compositae” (ed. Berton, 18: 271a).

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according to Suarez’s metaphysical principles, a nature is not able to be the principle of its

supposit’s esse unless it itself exists in some way.659

Suarez, therefore, ascribes to any integrative part its own “partial esse.”660 This is how he

interprets Thomas’ remark about those aspects of Socrates which are integrative of or pertain to

Socrates as a whole.661 In Christ, then, the created esse of the humanity is partial and incomplete,

which is why it is able to be joined to the uncreated esse of the Word (which is whole, perfect,

and unchanging) and yet still not compromise the simple unity of the Word’s divine esse,

anymore than the two natures overrides the simple unity of the divine person. Considered as

incarnate, however, it is necessary to say that Christ’s esse as the God-man is one in (or

according to) composition not one in (or according to) simplicity.662

Here, Suarez is at least implicitly building on Thomas’ commitment to saying that after

the incarnation Christ is a composite person.663 For just as Thomas notes two ways in which the

person or hypostasis of Christ may be considered (either in itself or insofar as it subsists in a

nature),664 so too does Suarez first maintain that according to itself, the esse of Christ is one and

                                                                                                               659 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5: “habet ergo natura aliquo modo

suum esse, quo concurrit ad esse totius suppositi. Neque enim verisimile est quod Cajetanus hic et alii Thomistae dicunt, naturam esse quo aliquid est, quia est principium ipsius esse; quia, ut supra ostensum est, non potest natura esse principium ipsius esse, nisi ipsa existat” (ed. Berton, 18: 271b).

660 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5: “et postea adhibet [Thomas] exemplum de parte integrante, quae advenit supposito jam constituto; quam dicit non afferre novum esse, sed trahi ad unum esse suppositi, cum tamen evidentissimum videatur, partem integrantem habere suam existentiam partialem, licet ex omnibus his partibus unitis resultet unum esse totius, non simplex, sed compositum” (ed. Berton, 18: 271b).

661 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Esse autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum pertinet ad unam personam Socratis: et ideo ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

662 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 4: “hoc esse Christi Domini, quatenus Deus et homo est, non est unum per omnimodam simplicitatem, sed per admirabilem compositionem et substantialem unionem naturae humanae cum persona Verbi, et naturalis existentiae humanitatis cum personali existentia seu subsistentia Verbi Dei. Haec conclusio sequitur evidenter ex dictis; constat enim esse existentiae Verbi Dei secundum se, esse unum omnino simplex; diximus autem, praeter hoc esse increatum, esse in humanitate Christi suum esse existentiae creatum, non omnino perfectum, sed quale esse potest esse solius naturae; et rursus addidimus in Christo Deo homine simpliciter dari unum esse; ergo necesse est esse unum compositione, non simplicitate” (ed. Berton, 18: 270b).

663 This implicitly operative line of argumentation may be confirmed by a quick glance at the Metaphysical Disputations, see disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 25: “Unum autem ens dicitur Christus propter unum esse completum et per se unum; Christus autem ut Christus non est unum ens simplex, sed compositum (est enim persona composita), et ideo non oportet ut habeat unum esse simplex, sed compositum, juxta doctrinam superius demonstratam” (ed. Berton, 26: 290).

664 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 4c: “persona sive hypostasis Christi dupliciter considerari potest, Uno modo, secundum id quod est in se. Et sic est omnino simplex: sicut et natura Verbi. — Alio modo, secundum rationem personae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in aliqua natura. Et secundum hoc, persona Christi subsistit in duabus naturis. Unde, licet sit ibi unum subsistens, est tamen ibi alia et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur persona composita, inquantum unum duobus subsistit” (ed. Leonina, 11: 31b).

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simple, but insofar as it is the esse totius of Christ as incarnate then it is related as the highest,

overarching existential principle of Christ’s incarnate constitution. In this second way is the esse

of the incarnate Christ to be understood as one compositely.665

Given these principles and commitments, it is not surprising that Suarez finds in the QD

de Unione his own opinion about the created existence of the humanity of Christ, which he

believes St. Thomas expressly teaches therein and “never openly retracts.”666 Suarez is adamant

that there is no place in which Thomas teaches that the humanity of Christ exists through the

uncreated existence of the Word, for even in article two of question seventeen Thomas’ focus is

on the unity of Christ’s esse not the esse (created or otherwise) of the humanity.667 Suarez

remains confident that he has given sufficient account of this unity of esse both considered in

itself according to the eternality and simplicity of the Word in his divinity and insofar as it

remains the substantial, constituting principle of (a composite) unity for the incarnate Word.

2.2 Suarez’s Position with respect to the esse of Christ

  Suarez’s determination of his first question regarding the existence of Christ’s humanity

is that “it is impossible for the humanity to exist in the nature of things through the uncreated

existence of God or of the divine Word,” consequently, the only other alternative is that the

humanity exist through its own, created existence.668 He is very familiar with the contrary

                                                                                                               665 Curiously, St. Thomas’ gives a different reason for using the language of composition, then does Suarez.

Thomas rejects the connotation of composition which has to do with parts and grants only the connotation having to do with number, see ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2: “illa compositio personae ex naturis non dicitur esse ratione partium, sed potius ratione numeri: sicut omne illud in quo duo conveniunt, potest dici ex eis compositum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 31b).

666 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5: “Juxta doctrinam hanc existimo posse convenienter explicari sententiam D. Thomae in hoc articulo. Primo quidem, quia nunquam ipse docuit, humanitatem Christi existere per existentiam increatam Verbi, sed solum esse in Christo unum esse personale, quod juxta doctrinam positam optime intelligi potest. Secundo, quia ex principiis ab eodem D. Thoma positis, aliis locis, aperte intulimus nostram sententiam de existentia creata humanitatis. Terti, quia divus Thomas, quaest. De Unione Verbi incarnati, art. 4, hoc diserte docuit, et nunquam aperte retractavit” (ed. Berton, 18: 271a).

667 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 6: “Respondetur forte D. Thomam non movisse specialem quaestionem de creata existentia humanitatis, quia ut evidens supposuit hanc esse actualem et realem entitatem creatam, quae sine creata existentia neque mente concipi potest. Ideo vero movit quaestionem de unitate ipsius esse Christi, quia haec consequens erat ad quaestionem de unitate ipsius Christi” (ed. Berton, 18: 272a).

668 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 2: “Dico primo: impossibile est humanitatem existere in rerum natura per existentiam increatam Dei, seu divini Verbi, unde necesse est ut existat per existentiam | propriam et creatam” (ed. Berton, 18: 260-61).

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conclusion drawn by Thomists due to their commitment to the real distinction between existence

and essence,669 but rejects both their metaphysical foundation and their theological conclusion.

He, subsequently, enumerates a series of medieval, contemporary (to him!), Conciliar,

and Patristic authorities in support of his own position,670 prior to clarifying his own

metaphysical commitments. The two most salient of which are his definition of existence as (1)

that mode or actuality by which something intrinsically and formally is constituted outside

nothing,671 and the corollary he draws from this definition, namely, (2) that existence belongs to

the formal concept of a being in act insofar as it is conceived as an actual entity, for it is

impossible to conceive of a being in act apart from it actually existing.672

Suarez believes that his metaphysical commitments lead to the theological conclusion

that the humanity of Christ (as distinct from the Person of the Word) exists by its own, created

existence, which it does not formally receive from the Word.673 He supports this conclusion by

seven major theological arguments. In the third argument, Suarez claims that the humanity as an

actual entity in the order of nature is presupposed for the assumption. On the surface, this

principle seems to be derived from the text of Thomas himself, which Suarez cites, “that which is

assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed for the assumption.”674 Suarez

also cites a text wherein St. Thomas affirms that the human nature is prior in nature than its

union to the word.675

                                                                                                               669 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 1 (ed. Berton, 18: 260b). 670 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 2 (ed. Berton, 18: 261a). 671 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 3: “Ego enim per existentiam

intelligo id, quo unaquaeque res formaliter habet, ut sit actualis entitas in rerum natura, et extra nihil, seu extra causas suas; ut, verbi gratia, anima Christi, vel humanitas priusquam crearetur, actu nihil erat, sed solum in potentia; cum primum ergo intelligitur exire ex illa potentia in actum, et desinere esse nihil, intelligitur actu existens; et existentia illius erit ille modus, vel illa actualitas quo intrinsece et formaliter constituitur extra nihil” (ed. Berton, 18: 261a).

672 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 4: “Ex ratione vero existentiae sic explicata, colligitur primo, fieri non posse ut aliquid sit ens in actu, seu ut concipiatur tanquam actualis entitas, quin in suo conceptu formaliter et intrinsece includat existentiam, ita ut nec per abstractionem praecisivam intellectus, possit unum ab altero separari, manente vero conceptu utriusque” (ed. Berton, 18: 261b).

673 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 6: “Ex his principiis metaphysicis demonstratur Theologica conclusio a nobis posita, quia humanitas Christi, ut condistincta a Verbo, intelligitur esse quaedam actualis entitas, quam ipsa secum affert, et illam a Verbo formaliter non recipit; ergo intelligitur esse existens per existentiam propriam et creatam, omnino a Verbo distinctam” (ed. Berton, 18: 262b).

674 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 8: “humanitas ut actualis entitas ordine naturae supponitur assumptioni” (ed. Berton, 18: 263a); cf. Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 3c: “id quod assumitur non est terminus assumptionis, sed assumptioni praeintelligitur” (ed. Leonina, 11: 81a).

675 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 8: et ideo apertius q. 6, art. 4, ad 3, dicit, carnem Christi non prius natura esse ens quam sit a Verbo effecta, prius autem natura esse ens quam sit Verbo personaliter unita” (ed. Berton, 18: 263a). This summary differs slightly from Thomas’ text: “Verbum Dei per prius intelligitur unitum carni quam anima per modum communem quo est in ceteris creaturis per essentiam, potentiam et

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Suarez’s interpretation, however, hinges on the meaning of the phrase, “prior in nature.”

The affirmation of a “priority in nature” is juxtaposed with a negation a “priority in time.” For

both St. Thomas and for Suarez, there is absolutely no temporal priority between the existence of

the humanity and its union to the Word; they are simultaneous. But Suarez thinks that the phrase

“prior in nature” indicates that the humanity is a being in act, really existing and, therefore, not in

potency.676 For this reason, Suarez maintains that the humanity is not constituted in the esse of

an actual entity through the assumption,677 because the assumption presupposes an already

existing subject, namely the human nature as an actual being.678 If there is not an actual being to

be assumed, then there can be no assumption.

Thomas does use language that could support this existential interpretation of priority in

nature. When Thomas discusses the twofold meaning of prius in natura, he notes that something

can be prior in nature (1) on the part of the agent and (2) on the part of the matter, “for these two

causes preexist the reality.”679 As he extrapolates each of these, he notes that on the part of the

matter, there is something which exists prior than the change in the matter. These remarks could

lead an honest interpreter to conclude that actual existence is intended by the phrase “prior in

nature.” But this is not the only language operative.

When he extrapolates on the side of the agent, Thomas notes that what has absolute

priority is what falls first in the intention of the agent and that which initiates the operation has

relative priority, “because intention is prior to operation.”680 It is clear from what follows that at

least with respect to the order of the assumption, Thomas places a greater emphasis on priority                                                                                                                praesentiam: prius tamen dico, non tempore, sed natura. Prius enim intelligitur caro ut quoddam ens, quod habet a Verbo, quam ut animata, quod habet ab anima. Sed unione personali prius secundum intellectum oportet quod caro uniatur animae quam Verbo: quia ex unione ad animam habet quod sit unibilis Verbo in persona; praesertim quia persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura” (ed. Leonina, 11: 100).

676 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 8: “quod assumitur, oportet ut sit aliquod ens in actu, quia Verbum non assumit essentiam humanitatis, prout intelligitur esse in potentia objectiva, sed prout intelligitur esse in actu” (ed. Berton, 18: 263b).

677 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 8: “humanitas ut actualis entitas ordine naturae supponitur assumptioni; ergo non constituitur in esse actualis entitatis per ipsam assumptionem, et consequenter nec per existentiam increatam, nam terminus assumptionis non potest illi supponi” (ed. Berton, 18: 263a).

678 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 8: “quia esse, ordine naturae, prius est quam uniri, quia, quod assumitur in hac unioe, est subjectum unionis, et ideo supponitur illi, ut actuale ens” (ed. Berton, 263b).

679 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 5c: “Est autem aliquid prius in natura dupliciter uno modo ex parte agentis, alio modo ex parte materiae; hae enim duae causae praeexistunt rei” (ed. Leonina, 11: 101).

680 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 5c: “Ex parte quidem agentis, est simpliciter primum id quod primo cadit in eius intentione, sed secundum quid est primum illud a quo incipit eius operatio: et hoc ideo, quia intentio est prior operatione. Ex parte vero materiae, est prius illud quod prius existit in tranmutatione materiae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 101b).

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on the side of the agent,681 and in this way he highlights the central significance of the

intentionality of the agent.682 This would indicate not an existential but mental priority, although

at this point the existential implications cannot be entirely ruled out.

In question seven of the tertia pars, however, there is again a question of order (between

habitual grace and the grace of union), and the order of time and nature are again juxtaposed. But

there is something additional in this text, for the grace of union “precedes the habitual grace in

Christ, not in the order of time, but of nature and understanding.”683 Comparing the (temporal)

missions of the Word and Spirit in this same text, Thomas says that the mission of the Son

“according to the order of nature” is prior than the mission of the Holy Spirit and for this reason,

“the personal union, according to which is understood the mission of the Son, is prior in the

order of nature than the habitual grace, according to which is understood the mission of the Holy

Spirit.”684 At the close of the body of his response, Thomas concludes, “the grace of union,

according to understanding, precedes the habitual grace.”685 Consequently, despite Thomas’

language of existence in some texts where he juxtaposes priority in time with priority in nature,

there is solid textual evidence from which to infer that priority in nature is only a mental priority

not an existential priority.

Suarez, however, wants to maintain “in nature” as a halfway house between “in time” and

“in understanding.” He does this in part because of his belief that a nature cannot be the principle

of a supposit’s esse unless it first exists in itself in some way.686 Which is to say that Suarez

cannot conceive of a constitutive part or principle as contributing to or modulating the esse of a

whole without that part or principle already being constituted (partially) in the order of existence.

                                                                                                               681 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 5c: “In incarnatione autem oportet maxime attendere ordinem qui est ex

parte agentis: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in Epistola Ad Volusianum, in talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Manifestum est autem quod secundum intentionem facientis prius est completum quam incompletum: et per consequens, totum quam partes” (ed. Leonina, 11: 101b).

682 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 5, ad 1: “Et sic assumptio partium prior est in via operationis intellectu, non tempore. Assumptio autem naturae est prior in via intentionis: quod est esse prius simpliciter, ut dictum est” (ed. Leonina, 11: 101b).

683 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “unio humanae naturae ad divinam personam, quam supra diximus esse ipsam gratiam unionis, praecedit gratiam habitualem in Christo, non ordine temporis, sed naturae et intellectus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b); cf. ST Ia, q. 42, a. 3, ad 2.

684 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “Missio autem Filii, secundum ordinem naturae, prior est missione Spiritus Sancti: sicut ordine naturae Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio et a Patre dilectio. Unde et unio personalis, secundum quam intelligitur missio Filii, est prior, ordine naturae, gratia habituali, secundum quam intelligitur missio Spiritus Sancti” (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b).

685 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “Et ideo gratia unionis, secundum intellectum, praecedit gratiam habitualem” (ed. Leonina, 11: 125a); cf. Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 3c.

686 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 5 (ed. Berton, 18: 271b).

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Existential priority, therefore, is fundamental to Suarez’s metaphysics, even if this is ultimately

parsed out according to modal distinctions of one kind or another.

This metaphysical divergence of Suarez from Thomas can be illustrated by another

textual example. In question thirty-three of the tertia pars, Thomas insists that the human nature

of Christ did not preexist its reception by the Word, and for this reason the humanity could not

have been conceived prior to the assumption, for had it been conceived prior to being assumed it

would have had its own supposit distinct from the supposit of the Word.687 It is inconceivable to

Thomas that a nature complete in the order of its species could exist in any way apart from a

supposit, save abstractly and mentally alone (but not in reality).688

For Thomas, existence in a supposit is a precondition for the existence of a nature, but for

Suarez, a nature has existence in its own right as natural and proper to it, not as per se subsistens

but in alio (for it is ordered to attain completion in a supposit). For these reasons, Suarez

recognizes that the created esse of Christ’s humanity is not complete or perfect in the genus of

substance, and consequently has more the character of inexistence than existence.689 The term

“inexistence” seems to provide a way for Suarez to say that the humanity exists in the Word

insofar as it is the nature of the person of the Word but not insofar as it has the same esse as the

Word. The humanity of Christ really lacks its natural ultimate term, which would be a created

subsistence or personality, but it is not ultimately personless, since it is also joined to the Word.

Considered on its own as a nature, however, it has its own existence as a nature, which

for Suarez would be distinct even from a natural, created subsistence,690 in contrast to the views

of Capreolus and Cajetan.691 But in the case of the incarnation, the human nature of Christ has its

own esse existentiae that as most intimate to this being in act cannot be violated or eliminated

                                                                                                               687 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 33, a. 3c (ed. Leonina, 11: 343); cf. Thomas, SCG 4.43.[4]. 688 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 4 (ed. Leonina, 11: 82). 689 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 17: “creata existentia humanitatis

Christi non est omnino perfecta et completa in genere substantiae, et ideo habet potius rationem inexistentiae, quam existentiae simpliciter. Haec conclusio colligitur ex auctoribus supra citatis, et ipso mysterio; nam per hanc existentiam non habet humanitas Christi ut in se existat, seu per se, et independenter ab alio, existit enim in Verbo a quo pendet; unde caret ultimo termino et complemento suo, et habet modum existendi in alio, sicut supra, disp. 9, explicatum est; habet ergo rationem inexistentiae” (ed. Berton, 18: 266b).

690 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 2, a. 9, disp. 9, sect. 1, n. 6 (ed. Berton, 17: 376b). 691 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 16: “Sed haec responsio imprimis

fundatur in opinione Capreoli, quam pauciores Thomistae sequuntur, scilicet, subsistentiam seu personalitatem naturae creatae esse illius existentiam, quae opinio falsa est, ut in disp. metaph. de hac re latius tractavi, et ex dicit supra, circa q. 2 D. Thom., et hic, non obscure intelligi potest, quia, naturam substantialem existere, nihil aliud est quam esse actu ens extra nihil et extra causas suas; subsistere vero aut personari pertinet ad modum per se et complete existendi” (ed. Berton, 18: 266a).

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even by the nature’s union with the Son of God. The esse existentiae of the human nature

remains intact, even though in some way incomplete or partial when compared with a supposit,

but not insofar as it is considered in itself as the existence of a nature.692

In a natural case, there would be a kind of composition of the mode of existence proper to

a nature and the mode of existence proper to a person so as to constitute one, complete and

absolute, substantial existence.693 But there can be no such existential composition in the

supernatural case of the incarnation; the overarching, constitutive, substantial existence of the

incarnate Christ is the divine esse, which considered as a subsistence is absolutely independent

from the esse existentiae of the human nature.694

The created esse existentiae of the humanity and the uncreated subsistence of the Word

do not come together to constitute a third substantial esse, rather there is a union of the

humanity’s esse existentiae with the divine subsistence such that the esse existentiae is left

integral and intact, as that created mode by which the humanity exists in the nature of things.

What is absolutely impossible to Suarez is that an uncreated existence could come into

composition with a finite essence; this would violate the most intimate existential center of a

finite being in act,695 but as incomplete and partial, the created esse existentiae of a finite nature

can be united with an uncreated subsistence,696 and this is what takes place supernaturally in the

incarnation.

                                                                                                               692 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 18: “Existentia igitur solius naturae,

comparata cum hac completa existentia, dicitur imperfecta et incompleta; nam, sicut ipsa natura seu humanitas, praecisa a persona, est incompleta substantia, ita ejus existentia praecise sumpta incompleta est, et hoc modo dicimus existentiam humanitatis Christi esse incompletam, et capacem modi inexistendi in Verbo; quia, licet nihil illi desit de existentia naturae, tamen hoc totum est de se incompletum praecise sumptum, et carens ultimo suo termino, ut explicatum est” (ed. Berton, 18: 266b).

693 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 18: “quidquid actu est, eo modo quo est, habere aliquid existnetiae; unde fit ut personalitas creata, eo modo quo est aliquid distinctum a natura, ita suo modo habeat propriam existentiam, qua conjuncta cum existentia naturae, ex utraque conflatur una absoluta et completa substantialis existentia” (ed. Berton, 18: 266b).

694 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 2, a. 9, disp. 9, sect. 1, n. 5 (ed. Berton, 17: 376a). 695 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 18: “Ostensum est enim, existentiam

non ita distingui ab essentia, ut possit res aliqua existere per existentiam alterius, sicut non potest esse entitas per entitatem alterius; quia, sicut nihil est magis intrinsecum, et (ut ita dicam) magis idem cum unaquaque re, quam ipsa ejus entitas, ita nullus quasi effectus formalis requirit actum magis intrinsecum et proprium ipsius rei, quam ipsum existere; et propterea illa compositio ex essentia creata et existentia increata, et in universum ex essentia propria, et existentia aliena, impossibilis est” (ed. Berton, 18: 267a).

696 See Suarez, See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 25: “tota vero humanitas licet in ratione naturae completa sit, tamen in ratione substantiae adhuc est incompleta et caret ultimo termino, et ideo substantialiter uniri potest subsistentiae Verbi, ut cum illa componat unum suppositum ac personam humanam” (ed. Berton, 18: 269b).

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Looking at Suarez’s fourth theological argument in support of his conclusion further

solidifies a number of the positions enumerated above. Here, he claims that the creation of

Christ’s soul (and by extension the creation of the humanity) and its union to the Word are

distinct and separate acts, “of which,” he adds,” the first is presupposed for the second,” drawing

a parallel to the way in which the soul’s union to the body presupposes the creation of the

soul.697

In the course of extrapolating this position, Suarez identifies two ways in which the

creation and union differ: (1) according to the kind of act and (2) according to character and

order. With respect to the kind of act, the creation of the soul is a production from nothing, but

the union is a change which presupposes the subject in which the change occurs. With respect to

the difference of order, the creation of the soul is natural and of the very same order and

character as the creation of any other soul, whereas the union is supernatural, in every way

unique and distinct in its character and order.698

Again, Suarez argues that the subject of the union cannot simply be presupposed in

potency. For this reason, the individual human essence of Christ must exist in act. What is

conferred in creation is not an esse essentiae (which Suarez thinks is eternal) but an esse

existentiae; this is a “new esse” which comes about through creation. The actually existing

humanity’s created esse cannot be destroyed by the assumption, for it must remain simultaneous

to the assumption in time.699

 

2.3 A New Problem

Suarez is committed to saying that the esse existentiae of the humanity of Christ is not

only created but natural and proper to the humanity. He understands this esse existentiae not just

                                                                                                               697 See Suarez, See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n.10: “nam creatio animae

Christi, et unio illius ad Verbum, sunt actiones distinctae, quarum prima secundae suponitur, sicut creatio ejusdem animae distincta est ab unione ad corpus, et illi supponitur; sed per creationem recipit anima aliquod esse, ergo existentiam creatam” (ed. Berton, 18: 263b).

698 See Suarez, See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 10: “Nunc breviter declaratur, tum quia creatio animae est productio ex nihilo, unio vero est mutatio vel actio ex praesupposito subjecto: tum etiam quia creatio animae Christi est actio naturalis ejusdem ordinis et rationis cum creatione alterius animae; at | vero unitio est actio supernaturalis distinctae rationis et ordinis” (ed. Berton, 18: 263-64).

699 See Suarez, See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 10: Prima vero et secunda consequentia probantur, quin per illam creationem fit aliquod esse in ipsa anima; et non fit esse essentiae, ut condistinguitur ab esse existentiae, quia ut sic non est esse novum, sed aeternum, quia revera tantum est esse in potentia; est ergo esse existentiae creatum, cum per creationem fiat; quod manet in ipsa anima Verbo unita; non enim potest perdere per assumptionem illud esse, quod per creationem habuit; alias non possent creatio et assumptio simul esse in eodem instanti” (ed. Berton, 18: 264a).

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to be presupposed in intellectu but even in natura, that is, as a being in act, for otherwise the

humanity would not be an actual entity and consequently it would be incapable of being assumed

by the Word.700 To be clear, he does not reject the simultaneity of the created esse and the

assumption,701 which protects him from the great weight of the patristic authorities which he

marshals in defense of his own position, for no Patristic authority or Council maintains that the

human nature existed prior in time to its union with the Word.

But he does want to insist that the humanity has existential priority in its own right. In

this way, the esse existentiae of Christ’s humanity is not causally dependent on the hypostatic

union, for as two distinct acts of different kinds and different orders, only one presupposes the

other. For Suarez, the incarnation is no exception to the general rule that “grace presupposes

nature,”702 and while only a substantial grace is sufficient to order the soul to a union of this

unparalleled kind,703 nevertheless, such a substantial grace still presupposes nature insofar as the

union presupposes a naturally constituted and really existing subject, namely, a distinct human

nature as an actual entity in its own right.

With the exception of just a handful of arguments,704 most of Suarez’s discourse in the

first section of disputation thirty-six regarding the esse of Christ is constituted by positive

arguments for his own conclusion about a created esse. But in his Metaphysical Disputations, he

offers four arguments ad absurdum against the Thomist position,705 which do not occur in this

section of his commentary on the tertia pars. The first is that the humanity of Christ is not a

created being.706

There are two basic presuppositions operative in this argument. The first is that a being is

created or uncreated according to the act of esse by which it is constituted a being in act.

                                                                                                               700 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 25: “unio naturae cum supposito

substantialis est, et hujusmodi est haec unio, ut Concilia tradunt, quae nunquam dixerunt hanc unionem esse essentiae cum existentia, sed naturae realis cum supposito increato; cui unioni tantum abest, ut repugnet existentia creata ipsius naturae, ut sine illa potius nec intelligi possit; quia sine illa non esset natura realis in actu, et consequenter neque assumptibilis” (ed. Berton, 18: 269b); cf. n. 23: “Et ideo impossibile est ut essentia creata sua propria existentia privata assumptibilis maneat, quia non assumitur ens in potentia, sed ens in actu” (268b).

701 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 6, a. 4, disp. 16, sect. 1 (ed. Berton, 17: 347). 702 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 4: 30b) and QD de Veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8 (ed.

Leonina, 22.2.2: 464b.199-200). 703 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b). 704 See for example, Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 16 (18: 263b). 705 See Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 18: “Quapropter ex opposita sententia

sequi videnter haec absurda” (ed. Berton, 26: 288b). 706 See Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 18: “Primum, humanitatem non esse ens

creatum, quod est aperte falsum” (ed. Berton, 26: 288b).

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Consequently, for Suarez, if the humanity of Christ existed by the uncreated esse of the Word,

then it would be an uncreated being not a created being, in the same way that Christ is an

uncreated person because he subsists simply by an uncreated personality.707 The other

presupposition is that an essence according to its esse essentiae is not strictly speaking created or

temporal but eternal and possible. Abstracted from the esse existentiae, therefore, an essence is

in itself nothing, but considered in its cause, it is identical with the essence of the Creator.708

In the course of demonstrating the fourth ad absurdum argument, Suarez highlights a

problem latent within the first, namely, that the humanity lacks a relation of efficient cause, that

is, it is not related to God as to an efficient cause. The principle of this argument is that the

humanity’s (obediential?) capacity to be united to the Word must be produced by God.709 This

capacity cannot be rooted in the essence of the humanity alone, for the esse essentiae (considered

in itself and only in potency) is not related to God as to an efficient cause (but as to an exemplar

cause). But if it is posited that the capacity is actually produced by God, then there is some line

of efficient causality, and therefore some created existence.710 Suarez uses this wedge to pry his

way into claiming actual existence for the human nature prior in nature to its union with the

Word, for how else could there be a capacity for union if there were not an already existing

subject of the capacity?711

                                                                                                               707 See Suarez, Disp. Meta., disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 18: “Probatur sequela, quia ens dicitur ab esse, et

constituitur ens actu per esse; ergo si humanitas constituitur ens actu per esse increatum, non est ens creatum, sed increatum, sicut, qui Christus non constituitur in esse personae per creatam personalitatem, sed per increatam, non est persona creata, sed increata” (ed. Berton, 26: 288b).

708 Suarez, Disp. Meta., disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 18: “interrogo an illud esse essentiae sit tantum in potentia, et ita non est creatum, sed creabile, et in se revera est nihil, in sua vero causa est ipsa creatrix essentia” (ed. Berton, 26: 288b); cf. Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 23: “essentiam creaturae, ut abstrahit ab actuali existentia, solum significare rem possibilem, quae ut sic nihil actu est, neque habet entitatem actualem, sed in potentia tantum objective; unde ut sic distinguitur ab actuali existentia seu entitate, sicut res in potentia a re in actu” (18: 268b) and n. 3: “esse essentiae, quod a D. Thoma aliquando distinguitur ab esse existentiae in creaturis, dicitur esse aeternum et immutabile, et inseparabile ab essentia; et propterea distingui dicitur ab ipsa existentia; at vero hoc esse novum, quod habet res, cum primo producitur, seu per ipsam productionem, est temporale, et separabile ab essentia; potest enim res amittere hoc esse, quamvis rei essentia semper eadem maneat” (18: 261b).

709 See Suarez, Disp. Meta., disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 21: “Quarto inferri potest ex illa sententia, humanitatem non habere a Deo per efficientiam ejus proximam capacitatem, ut uniatur Verbo, quod est etiam absurdissimum in doctrina fidei” (ed. Berton, 26: 289a).

710 See Suarez, Disp. Meta., disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 21: “Sequela patet, tum quia illa capacitas non est in humanitate secundum aliquod esse existentiae, sed tantum secundum esse essentiae aeternum, secundum quod essentia humanitatis non est effective a Deo. Tum etiam quia, si illa capacitas est in humanitate per actualem efficientiam Dei, ergo existit ex vi illius efficientiae; ergo habet aliquam existentiam factam et creatam; ergo haec est existentia ipsiusmet humanitatis” (ed. Berton, 26: 289a).

711 See Suarez, Disp. Meta., disp. 31, sect. 12, n. 21: “Et haec ratio etiam probat humanitatem illam prius natura habuisse existentiam, quam fuerit unita Verbo, quae non potuit esse nisi existentia creata, ut per se constat. Et sequela patet, quia illa humanitas prius natura fuit capax unionis, quam actu unita; proxima autem capacitas non est nisi in entitate jam effecta, et existente extra causas suas” (ed. Berton, 27: 289).

154

I have added these two objections from Suarez’s Metaphysical Disputations because they

reflect aspects of the objections I raised above to Cajetan’s position. What I want to single out,

however, is that these objections need not lead to the conclusion that Suarez advocates, namely

that the human nature must exist in nature as existentially prior to the hypostatic union in order

for the union to take place. While I grant that in mente a relation presupposes its terms, such

intelligibility in no way necessitates or requires a priority of actual existence among the terms. In

the singularly unique case of the incarnation, it must be insisted that the human nature is causally

dependent on the hypostatic union because it is due entirely to the divine initiative that the

human nature is brought into existence through its union to the Word.

All three members of the Trinity join the humanity to the Word; as a contingent result ad

extra this union takes place in re simultaneously with the generation of Christ’s body and the

creation of his soul, and the union of each to the other. As noted above, Thomas’ emphasis on

the intentionality of the union highlights a kind-of teleological priority in the assumption, which

is why he says that the parts (of the human nature) are assumed through the whole. The whole

has an intentional priority, even as the soul over the body. But no aspect of the incarnation is

existentially prior to another, save the eternal preexistence of the Word Himself.

What is sound in Suarez’s objections is the attention drawn to the problem of efficient

causality, which as I noted above must be understood within the order of existence not essence. It

is proper and intrinsic to no individual essence that it exist. Existence follows necessarily upon

no finite essence. Participated existence is novel, temporal, and contingent. Consequently, in

order for an essence to be created, it must be related to God as to an efficient cause; this means it

must have its existence from God. If there is no real (substantial!) relation of creari (or generari)

inhering in a subject, then there is no efficient relation on the side of the creature to the creator,

and it cannot be truly said that the individual is created. Esse and Creari are the same really, but

differ only according to intelligibility.712

At an interpretative level, however, the real problem with Suarez’s position is that the

created esse of Christ’s human nature is natural and proper to it, whereas an interpretation

faithful to the theological and metaphysical principles of Thomas will insist that the esse

secundarium must be absolutely supernatural and redound to the humanity as the contingent

result of the divine act of uniting. If the goal is an interpretation of Thomas, I do not think

                                                                                                               712 See Giles of Rome, Quaest. in 2 Sent., d. 1, pars 1, q. 3, a. 2: 34-37 (Venice, 1581).

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Thomas’ commitment to the supposit as the naturally primary subject of existence can be

dismissed so easily as Suarez imagines. Thomas’ existential commitments about this principle

are operative both in the Summa and in the QD de Unione.

For this reason, whatever one’s conclusions about the meaning of esse secundarium they

must include that it is not natural to an individual essence to be the primary subject of existence.

Framed in this way, two supernatural aspects of esse secundarium emerge: (1) insofar as it is not

natural or proper to an individual nature to be the (real) subject of existence and (2) insofar as it

is beyond the proportion of any created individual to be joined substantially to a divine person.

For Suarez, there is still something supernatural on the side of the humanity with respect to the

second, and consequently the humanity has an “obediential proportion” with respect to the

uncreated subsistence to which it is united,713 but the esse existentiae of the nature is natural and

would have belonged to this humanity regardless of its supposit.

3 Collegium Salamanticense Carmelitarum Discalceatorum

There is another significant strand of the commentary tradition, which adverts to the

textual inconsistency presented by the QD de Unione. Over the course of the late seventeenth

century Discalced Carmelites of the College of Salamanca produced an impressive commentary

and catalogue of accompanying disputes and questions regarding the Summa Theologiae. They

do not shy away from difficult issues and often provide insightful distillations of various

positions surrounding a given topic or debate. The question of Christ’s esse is no exception to

this trend, and in their introduction to this problem they cite no less than twenty other medieval

and scholastic authors who have treated the same question.714

3.1 Reading of the QD de Unione and interpretation of esse secundarium

The Carmelites of Salamanca propose three interpretations of the QD de Unione. Their

primary proposal is that esse in article four does not signify existences but the very essences

                                                                                                               713 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 2, a. 9, disp. 9, sect. 1, n. 6: “inter materiam et formam esse

majorem proportionem naturalem, quam respicit naturalis unio; at vere humanitas habet proportionem obedientialem respectu subsistentiae Verbi, quam respicit supernaturalis unio quae altioris ordinis est, et hoc sufficit ut unio possit esse major” (ed. Berton, 17: 376b).

714 Collegium Salamanticense Carmelitarum Discalceatorum, Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens, vol. 14, ed. Charles-Amable de la Tour d’Auvergne Lauraguais (Paris: V. Palmé and Brussels: J. Albanel, 1879), tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 72: 54.

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themselves, namely, the divine and human.715 But they reinforce this first interpretation with

what I think must be understood as a second possible interpretation. For in this second

movement, they begin with the principle that “each nature exists through the same existence,

which is one in abstraction.” But taken in the concrete, it can be said that the natures have one

and another esse. The reason for this qualification is that the very same esse belongs to the divine

nature “primarily, both through identity and essence,” but to the human nature “secondarily and

by communication alone.” In this way, they insist, a real distinction may be retained.716

The Carmelites have Thomas’ reply to the first objection in mind,717 wherein he asserts

rather boldly that “the esse of the human nature is not the esse of the divine,” but also adds that it

cannot be said simply “that Christ is two according to esse: because each esse is not related to the

eternal supposit equally.”718 Consequently, the Carmelites have presented an extrapolation of

what this could mean by fleshing out how the natures are related to the supposit of the Word

according the different ways they have the same eternal esse, that although one in abstraction is

somehow two in the concrete. In doing so, however, I think they commit themselves to an

interpretation that is distinct from the first. But if this second movement is in fact about how two

natures (really distinct) in some way have one and the same existence, and this is the very

existence by which each of them exists, then it is no longer possible to maintain that esse here

denotes essence, for we are now clearly talking about that by which an essence (or nature) exists.

It is not possible, however, to maintain both of these interpretations simultaneously.

Either Thomas is talking about existence as distinct from essence or he is only talking about

essence(s). Given that in the QD de Unione Thomas treats of the natures in article one and

determines the question of whether Christ is one or two and on what basis in article three; it

seems textually improbable that article four is still about essences. The conversation has shifted,

and Thomas’ language leaves little room to justify a claim about ambiguity, at least with respect

                                                                                                               715 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 77: “Quae vero ipse ex D. thom. Loco

citato nobis opponit, non urgent, sed facile possunt explicari, si dicamus, quod per esse naturae divinae, et esse naturae humanae non significavit existentias, sed ipsas essentias, quae esse quandoque appellantur in usu S. Doctoris” (14: 59a).

716 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 77: “Praesertim quia licet utraque natura existat per eandem existentiam, quae est una in abstracto; potest tamen dici, quod habent aliud, et aliud esse in concreto: quatenus illudmet esse convenit naturae divinae primario, et per identitatem, et essentiam; sed naturae humanae convenit secundario, et per solam communicationem, retenta distinctione reali” (14: 59a).

717 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 76 (14: 57b). 718 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen

simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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to esse essentiae vs. esse existentiae. The sed contra of article four states that in Christ there is

one esse.719 The previous articles have established that there are two natures. Article four is

about esse taken as existence and therefore as a metaphysical principle really distinct from

essence or nature.

But the second interpretation is not without textual difficulties of its own. The

comparison drawn in article four’s reply to the first objection is not between two natures’

different ways of having esse, but rather between the esse of one nature to the esse of another

nature and the different way in which each esse is related to a single supposit.

This problem can be intensified by developing the position presented in article one of

question seventeen in the tertia pars. The divine nature can be predicated truly both in

abstraction and in the concrete of the person of the Son but the human nature only in the

concrete.720 Likewise, of the Son (insofar as He is God) we can both say that he is existence and

that he exists, but insofar as he is man only that he exists (or is an existent) not that he is

existence. The Word only assumed a human nature as it is in the concrete (not in the abstract),

that is, as it would be in an individual,721 and this nature can only be predicated truly of the Son

in the concrete not in the abstract (e.g., the Son of God is man). Consequently, according to this

nature, it is only true to say that he exists as human in the concrete.

It remains possible to say that it is according to one and the same (divine and uncreated)

esse that the Son exists as God and exists as man, but this is not what the Carmelites have

presented. In the concrete, they argue, the natures have “one and another esse,” and they proceed

to conclude that there is a real distinction between the two esse. But their argument only

describes two different ways (or modes) that each nature is related to one and the same esse. The

one “primarily, both through identity and essence,” and the other “secondarily, and through

communication alone.” But this does not establish the ground for two different esse but only for

                                                                                                               719 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, s.c. “Quidquid est unum simpliciter, est unum secundum esse. Sed

Christus est unum simpliciter, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in eo est unum esse” (ed. Obenauer, 84). 720 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 1c: “natura, secundum se considerate, prout in abstracto significatur, non

vere potest praedicari de supposito seu persona nisi in Deo, in quo non differt quod est et quo est, ut in Prima Parte habitum est. In Christo autem cum sint duae naturae, divina scilicet et humana, altera earum, scilicet divina potest de eo praedicari et in abstracto et in concreto: dicimus enim quod Filius Dei, qui supponitur in hoc nomine Christus, est divina natura, et est Deus. Sed humana natura non potest praedicari de Christo secundum se in abstracto: sed solum in concreto, prout scilicet significatur in supposito” (ed. Leonina, 11: 219b).

721 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 4 (ed. Leonina, 11: 82); praesertim, ad 3: “ natura humana, quamvis non sit assumpta in concreto ut suppositum praeintelligatur assumptioni: sic tamen assumpta est in individuo, quia assumpta est ut sit in individuo” (83b).

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two really distinct modes of two really distinct natures existing (presumably) by one and the

same existence.

If their argument is not interpreted this way, then I think one must face the reality of two

esse in the concrete, which given that this is the only way existence can be predicated truly of

Christ insofar as he is man, then that leaves two distinct esse truly, but the divine esse is only one

both in the abstract and in the concrete; consequently, if the humanity of Christ does not exist by

a created existence, then it only exists by one existence both in the concrete and in the abstract,

which is the divine and uncreated existence. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Carmelites add

that if someone does not find these answers satisfactory, then they can look to Cajetan, who (as

illustrated above) rejects the position presented in the QD de Unione entirely.722

3.2 The Salamancan Position with respect to the esse of Christ

In continuity with the Thomist consensus that has preceded them, the Carmelites of

Salamanca maintain that the humanity of Christ does not exist through a created existence of its

own, but through the divine and uncreated existence of the whole supposit of the Word.723 After

laying a foundation for this conclusion in Patristic authorities and the texts of St. Thomas, they

fortify their position with two principal arguments: (1) a created existence would be superfluous

and (2) a created existence would compromise the unity of Christ.

This first argument relies in part on the commitment to a real (modal) distinction between

existence and subsistence.724 This is not a universally held position among Thomists, as the

Carmelites readily acknowledge,725 and while I believe that this position has some shortcomings

as an interpretation of St. Thomas, it will be best to bracket this issue momentarily so as to

facilitate a more focused examination of the Carmelite’s first argument.

                                                                                                               722 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 77: “Cui autem haec minus satisfaciant,

respondebit cum Cajet. . .” (14: 59a). 723 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 72: “Dicendum est Verbum divinum

communicasse humanitati existentiam increatam, atque in Deo humanitatem Christi non existere per existentiam creatam, aut sibi propriam; sed existere per existentiam divinam totius suppositi. Sic docet D. Thomas, ut evidenter constabit ex testimoniis ipsius statim referendis” (14: 54a).

724 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars. 2, disp. 8, dub. 1, sect. 4, n. 12: “Quae differentia liquet in his propositionibus, Petrus est suppositum, aut substantia per se subsistens, et Petrus est existens: prima enim est essentialis, et aeternae veritatis, secunda vero contingens et aliquando falsa. Ergo subsistentia, et existentia non sunt eadem realitas; sed distinguuntur realiter modaliter. Quod addimus, quia existentia est entitas, subsistentia vero modus, ut diximus num. 8 et 11” (14: 10b).

725 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 72 (14: 54b).

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The argument reasons from the sufficiency of the Word’s uncreated subsistence, by

which the humanity of Christ may subsist as joined to the Word without any created subsistence,

to the sufficiency of the uncreated existence of the Word, by which the humanity may exist

without any created existence.726 The Carmelites rightly advert to the central expression of the

mystery of the incarnation, namely, that a divine person assumed a human nature. But this

highlights a fundamental oversight in the argument; their conclusion cannot be established by an

appeal to sufficiency, for this is not a question of sufficiency but actuality. There is only one

person who became incarnate, and only one person who died for our sins, this is Jesus Christ, the

Word of God, Son of the Father. By definition, therefore, there is only one subsistent, and

consequently there can only be one subsistence. The real reason that there is only one subsistence

is not that it is sufficient without a created subsistence but that there is only one person. There

are, however, two natures. So a derivative argument moving from person to nature(s) must take

into account the shift from unity to duality. This is absent from the Carmelite’s appeal to

sufficiency.

Arguing that the divine existence suffices for the existence of the human nature is like

arguing that a primary cause is sufficient for x to take place, so there is no need for a secondary

cause, or like arguing that the divine love is sufficient to cause us to love God and neighbor,

therefore, there is no need for a created habit of charity. Absolutely, speaking, yes, God’s

causality and his loving contain all created causes and all created loving most eminently, and he

has no need of anything further to accomplish what he wills, but it turns out to be the case that

God did will that their be secondary causes, and he willed that we have a created principle of

merit whereby we can love him cooperatively and meritoriously. The God revealed to us in

Salvation history does not appear to have as his modus operandi sufficiency but subsidiarity;

consequently, there is no reason to immediately suppose that just because the divine existence

would be sufficient that this is in fact the way the humanity exists.

They strengthen their initial argument with an appeal to the supreme excellence and

perfection of the mystery of the incarnation.727 To which, indeed, it must be said (with St.

Thomas) that the union of the human nature to the Word is the most excellent and perfect union,

                                                                                                               726 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 78: “Secundo probatur conclusio

ratione, quae declarat superfluum esse, addere humanitati existentiam creatam praeter illam, qua existit persona Verbi: quoniam subsistentia Verbi unita humanitati sufficit, ut humanitas subsistat absque alia subsistentia creata: ergo existentia Verbi humanitati unita sufficit, ut humanitas existat absque alia existentia creata” (14: 58a).

727 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 78 (14: 59b).

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and that it is unparalleled among other created unions.728 But this is as the union stands in fact.

Conjuring up what would or could be the most perfect or excellent is not appropriate. The via

convenientiae is the path rigorously pursued by Thomas in his explication of the mystery of the

incarnation at every step. One establishes first (in response to the Faith) what is the case, and

then explains why it is fitting. The theologian does not first establish what is best, and then apply

it to the incarnation. This twofold argument for the superflousness of a created existence based

on appeals to sufficiency and excellence is inadequate because it is entirely hypothetical,

presupposing the conclusion the Carmelites want to establish, namely, that there is only an

uncreated existence.

The second argument, however, is based on the unity of Christ. This has more

demonstrative force, for it argues that a created existence would in some way compromise the

unity of Christ; this puts the presence of a created existence in direct conflict with the mystery

itself and also redresses lacunae in the first argument with respect to the duality of the natures in

Christ. The Carmelites judge this argument to be a distillation of arguments in the texts of St.

Thomas and believe that it establishes definitively the impossibility of the humanity of Christ

existing by any other existence except that of the Word.729

It is not possible for this man Christ to be one being per se or to have unity absolutely and

for there to be multiple existences, one divine and uncreated and another created and belonging

to the humanity.730 Since the person of the Word is really identical with the divine existence,

there can be no doubt about the unique presence of the divine existence of the Word.731 It is also

not possible to say that this man Christ is somehow less one or a being than any other person,

                                                                                                               728 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 1c: “Sed tamen omnia huiusmodi exempla sunt deficientia: quia unio

instrumenti est accidentalis, sed hic est quaedam unio singularis supra omnes modos unionis | nobis notos. Sicut enim Deus est ipsa sua bonitas et suum esse, ita etiam est ipsa unitas per essentiam; et ideo, sicut virtus eius non est limitata ad istos modo bonitatis et esse, quia sunt in creaturis, sed potest facere novos modos bonitatis et esse nobis incognitos, ita etiam per infinitatem suae virtutis potuit facere novum modum unionis, ut humana natura uniretur Verbo personaliter, non tamen accidentaliter, quamvis ad hoc in creaturis nullum sufficiens exemplum inveniatur” (ed. Obenauer, 34, 36).

729 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 82: “Secundo probatur assertio alio fundamento desumpto ex D. Thom. Locis relatis § praecedent. Quod declarat impossibile esse, quod humanitas Christi existat alia existentia, quam Verbi, et potest ad hanc formam reduci. . .” (14: 63a).

730 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 82: “nam fieri non valet, quod ex una parte in Christo reperiantur existentia divina, et existentia creata humanitatis : et quod ex alia parte hic homo Christus sit unum ens per se, vel habeat simpliciter unitatem : sed hic homo Christus est unum ens per se, et habet unitatem simpliciter : ergo in Chriso non reperiuntur plures existentiae, alia increata propria personae divinae, et alia creata personae humanae : ergo solum invenitur existentia increata, per quam existit humanitas” (14: 63a).

731 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 82: “nam certum est, quod in Christo invenitur existentia increata, quae ab ejus persona realiter non distinguitur : atque ideo si in Christo non reperiuntur plures existentiae; opus est, quod in eo sit sola existentia increata, et quod humanitas per eam existat” (14: 63a).

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such as Peter or John.732 But if the person of the Word existed through his divine existence and

through the existence of the Word he would be constituted by two beings, and so Christ would

not be one being but two.733

The Carmelites rule out the metaphysical possibility suggested by Suarez that there are

partial or incomplete esse.734 Consequently, they are able to exacerbate the initial problem with

two existences by showing that if the humanity of Christ had its own existence it would have to

be complete, and consequently his human nature would be a being in its own right.735 This is

why there would be two beings constituting the incarnate Christ, which is impossible and would

lead to some variation of Nestorianism because the only kind-of union possible between two

complete beings is an accidental one, for it would be a union that changed neither of the terms

substantially.

3.3 Development(s)

The Carmelites of Salamanca deepen the Thomist analysis of the problem of reception

and limitation by adverting first to the fact that in created beings, both subsistence and existence

involve limitation in reception, so whether we speak of informing or termination, some kind of

reception and limitation is implied.736 This limitation in reception, however, is the result of an

imperfection in created existence and is why created existence has the character of an informing

act, but such reception and informing are not proper to the meaning of existence taken more

generally,737 and consequently the divine existence can be united to the humanity according to

                                                                                                               732 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 82: “hic homo Christus non minus est

unum, et ens, ac hic homo Petrus, aut Joannes et aliae personae” (14: 63a). 733 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 82: “quia ex pluribus entibus in actu

nequit fieri, aut constitui unum ens per se : sed si persona divina Christi existeret per existentiam propriam increatam, et humanitas existeret per existentiam propriam creatam; Christus constitueretur ex pluribus entibus in actu, nempe ex persona divina, et natura humana existentibus in actu ultimo per suas existentias : ergo fieri non valet, quod in Christo reperiantur plures illae existentiae, et quod Christus sit unum ens per se, habeatque unitatem simpliciter” (14: 63a).

734 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 83 (14: 63-63). 735 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 3, n. 84: “sed si humanitas in Christo haberet

propriam existentiam creatam, compositio Christi ex humanitate, et persona divina fieret ex pluribus entibus in actu completis: ergo hic homo Christus ex praedictis extremis coalescens non posset esse unum ens per se” (14: 65a).

736 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 80: “nam si loquamur de subsistentia; et existentia creatis; neutra unitur naturae absque sui in eadem natura receptione, et limitatione” (14: 62a).

737 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 80: “Sic ergo quod existentia creata recipiatur in natura, et habeat rationem actus informantis, provenit quidem ex peculiari ratione, et imperfectione existentiae creatae; non vero ex generali conceptu existentiae, secundum quem solum dicit constituere rem ultimate extra nihil, sive praestare ultimam simpliciter rei actualitatem : quod ab informatione, aliisque imperfectionibus

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the mode of a pure term without any informing or reception.738 The Carmelites also note the

frequent appeal to beatific vision but do not develop this point any further in this context.739

Their argument, however, only establishes that there would be no violence done to the

meaning of existence if the Word supplied his own esse to the human nature; this is not the same

as a positive argument for it actually being the case that the humanity has the Word’s esse for its

own or an explanation of how this could occur without any reception (and therefore limitation)

on the humanity’s part.

In addition, the more general meaning of existence supplied by the Carmelites is

inadequate. For as applied to God, it would only yield an ex tempore attribute along the lines of

“Creator” or “Lord,” for to say that God is actuality itself is to presuppose God as cause and

consequently presuppose effects caused by him, for he is not the cause of himself. It should,

however, be insisted that existence is predicated of God eternally in the same way that we would

predicate love or joy, because his essence is his existence. So it is a mistake to make the primary

meaning of existence actuality, as though God being his own existence is dependent on him

being a cause, even the primary one.

There is at least a twofold meaning of limitation when Thomas speaks of an esse being

limited or contracted. To be sure there is the contraction or limitation through reception in a

species,740 but as received, there is a further meaning whose surplus is the ground for the

distinction between first and second act, insofar as an individual and finite essence (or supposit)

cannot actuate all of its potencies at once.741 Christ most certainly performs human operations,

and sometimes he is performing certain operations and at others times he is not. He, therefore, is

not actualizing all his human potentialities all at once. This means that according to this second

                                                                                                               abstrahit: quocirca videmus salvari in Deo proprium conceptum existentiae, per hoc, quod sit ipsissima ejus actualitas” (14: 62a).

738 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 80: “Quinimmo si subsistentia divina potest uniri per modum termini; inde sumitur argumentum, ut dicamus posse etiam divinam existentiam per modum puri termini uniri absque ulla informatione, seu receptione” (14: 61-62).

739 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 80: “Idemque communiter dicitur de unione sub conceptu speciei intelligibilis, et Verbi, ut explicuimus tract. 2, disp. 2, dub. 2, et 10” (14: 62a).

740 See Thomas, QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1c: “Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum | in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam” (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 13b-14a); see also, Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5 (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 203).

741 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; d. 8, q. 2, a. 1c; in 2 Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; in 4 Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 2c; SCG 2.59.[16]; 2.60.[2]; ST Ia, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; QD de Veritate, q. 5, a. 8, ad 10; QD de Potentia, q. 1, a. 1c; Exp. in Lib. de Causis, prop. 4, lect. 4, n. 109.

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meaning of limitation with respect to operation, the divine esse would be contracted or limited

according to duration or time if it is the only esse of the humanity, but no such limitation is

admissible for the divine existence.

Focusing on the first kind of limitation (according to nature or species) brings us back to

the question of the humanity’s creation. On this point, it should be noted that for Thomas,

“nothing is able to receive beyond its measure,” and since each created thing is finite, “each

created thing receives a finite esse;” the existence of a creature, therefore, cannot be the divine

esse.742 The Salamancans are clear that the creation of Christ’s soul and the generation of his

humanity are acts distinct from their assumption by the Word.743 They root this claim in the

same textual basis that Suarez rooted his argument for a “priority in nature” distinct from a

priority in time or intellect, arguing that Christ’s soul and humanity are presupposed as produced

in the order of nature prior to their assumption or union with the Word.744 And while the

Carmelites are successful in avoiding Suarez’s particular misinterpretation of Thomas, they

nevertheless fall into a similar error.

What is presupposed for the assumption is not an esse existentiae, but an esse essentiae

“actually tending toward existence.”745 Consequently the lines of creation and generation do not

communicate existence de facto to their terms, but rather subject them to another action, namely,

the assumption or union, whereby they are drawn into the uncreated existence of the Word.746

Because this assumption takes place in the very same moment as the creation and generation, the

union impedes these natural lines from communicating existence to what they would otherwise

communicate in a full way; they only communicate an esse essentiae not an esse existentiae.

                                                                                                               742 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2: “nihil habet esse, nisi inquantum participat divinum esse,

quia ipsum est primum ens, quare causa est omnis entis. Sed omne quod est participatum in aliquo, est in eo per modum participantis : quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensuram suam. Cum igitur modus cujuslibet rei creatae sit finitus, quaelibet res creata recipit esse finitum et inferius divino esse quod est perfectissimum. Ergo constat quod esse creaturae, quo est formaliter, non est divinum esse” (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 197).

743 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 1, disp. 5, dub. 2, sect. 1: “Dicendum est actionem assumptivam fuisse diversam a creatione animae, et productione humanitatis Christi” (13: 500b).

744 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 1, disp. 5, dub. 2, sect. 1: “Probatur primo ex divo Thoma qui perpetuus est in significando, quod anima Christi, e ejus humanitas praesupponuntur ordine naturae productae pro priori ad assumptionem, sive unionem cum Verbo. . .” (13: 501a).

745 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 5, n. 99: “nam licet verum sit prius esse, quam esse assumptum, illud tamen esse, quod assumptioni praesupponitur, non est esse existentiae, sed est esse essentiae actualiter tendentis ad existentiam” (14: 77a).

746 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 5, n. 99: “ergo partiter quamvis actio creans, et actio generans humanitatem Christi per se loquendo communicarent his terminis existentiam, illam tamen non communicaverunt de facto : sed praecise attigerunt entitatem actualem eorum terminorum, illam subjiciendo existentiae per aliam actionem communicandae” (14: 77b).

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This means that they constitute the humanity as an actual entity (or subject of existence) but not

as an existent.747

It is important to keep in mind that the Carmelites do not think that the soul and humanity

have different existences: the existence of the soul is the same as the existence of the

humanity.748 They are also committed to the principle that a rational soul would normally

receive existence through the act of creation.749 But in the case of Christ’s human soul, such a

natural act of creation is impeded by a supernatural act, namely, the assumption or union of the

humanity to the Word.750

Yet, when fielding objections rooted in the hypothetical possibility of the Word laying

aside the humanity, they attempt to argue that since the act of creation still remains formally in

God, this same relation of creation would be reactivated once the impediment of the hypostatic

union was removed.751 For as formally remaining in God, the line of creation/generation

preserves the substance or entity of the humanity, which seems to be a different way of saying

that it preserves the esse essentiae of the humanity, since were the Word to lay aside the

humanity, it’s identity would remain the same as an “actual entity” in the nature of things, but its

existence (esse existentiae) would be different, since now the (full) natural line of

                                                                                                               747 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 5, n. 99: “licet actio productiva termini

tendat per se ad communicandum ei existentiam, et illam per se loquendo communicet; nihilominus fieri absolute potest, quod solam entitatem actualem, quae est subjectum existentiae, producat in termino, et non communicet ipsi existentiam : quia impeditur, et praeoccupatur per aliam actionem, quae in eodem momento existentiam tribuit termino per priorem actionem producto. . .” (14: 77b).

748 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 6, n. 106: “subsistentiam et existentiam humanitatis non esse aliam, quam subsistentiam, et existentiam animae rationalis : nam anima suam subsistentiam, et existentiam humanitati communicat, quin opus sit aut possibile sit alias addere” (14: 84a).

749 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 6, n. 106: “anima rationalis subsistentiam, et existentiam habet ex vi actionis, qua producitur, et quae creatio est” (14: 84a).

750 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 5, n. 99: “Unde licet creatio animae, et generatio humanitatis Christi sint actiones aliquo ordine naturae praecedentes actionem assumptivam, et per se loquendo deberent existentiam terminis sibi correspondentibus communicare : de facto tamen solam eorum entitatem, quae est subjectum existentiae, produxerunt communicando existentiam : quia alia actio superioris ordinis eo momento concurrit, quae id impedivit; assumendo humanitatem, ad existentiam divinam in persona Verbi : quo supposito, superfluum, et impossibile fuit, quod existentia creata, et connaturalis humanitati per alias actiones fieret, aut communicaretur, ut supra ostendimus” (14: 77b).

751 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 6, n. 106: “cum actio creans animam Christi, debuerit efficere ipsius subsistentiam, et existentiam; et actio Dei producentis humanitatem Christi debuerit animae subsistentiam, et existentiam ipsi communicare; et cum ab hoc effectu fuerint impeditae propter supervenientem actionem Incarnationis, quae ad subsistentiam, et existentiam Verbi humanitatem assumpsit; et denique cum praedictae actiones creandi animam, et producendi humanitatem maneant adhuc formaltier in Deo, et conservent humanitatis substantiam, sive entitatem : ad ipsas pertinet se extendere ad efficiendum, et uniendum humanitati subsistentiam, et existentiam creatas eidem connaturales, ubi ablatum fuerit impedimentum assumptionis ad subsistentiam, et existentiam divinas” (14: 84).

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creation/generation (formerly impeded by the assumption) would come into play and supply the

humanity with a connatural and created existence of its own.752

If this solution of the Carmelites is pressed, it reveals that the only causal line preserved

in the humanity of Christ is an exemplar one, whereby the human nature (as all essences) are but

an imperfect likeness of the primary exemplar, God.753 But as noted above, such exemplarity, if

it is to be anything more than intellectually presupposed potency, must be realized in an actually

and efficiently produced finite essence, which would involve a real, created esse existentiae. The

humanity of Christ is not really a creature or created, if there is not an active line of efficient

causality whereby it is related substantially to God as to its principal efficient cause.

Relation to a cause is not included in the definition of a being which is caused, but it does

follow upon those things which belong to its intelligibility.754 Consequently, given anything that

is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. The humanity is not identical

with its esse (whether created or uncreated), for it is against the character of anything produced

that it be identical with its own esse.755 But if the humanity is not identical with its own esse,

then it is part of a composite and is a being (as an id quo not an id quod) by participation and not

by essence.756 Still, nothing has existence unless it participates in some way in the divine

existence, who is the cause of every being. If the humanity exists by participation, then it

receives existence, and nothing is able to receive beyond its measure. But the humanity is finite

and limited; consequently, it must receive a finite existence.757

                                                                                                               752 See Cursus Theologicus, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 6, n. 104: “licet enim eadem entitas actualis

humanitatis dimissae a Verbo conservaretur in rerum natura; nihilominus illa entitas actualis non haberet eandem existentiam, quam prius habuerat in Verbo : sed loco existentiae divinae reciperet existentiam creatam, et sibi propriam (14: 82b).

753 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 3c (ed. Leonina, 4: 460. 754 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1: “licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est

causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius ratione: quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risible. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum” (ed. Leonina, 4: 455b).

755 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 1: “hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum: unde contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest acere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter” (ed. Leonina, 4: 74b).

756 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 1c: “Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse” (ed. Leonina, 4: 455b). See also, ST Ia, q. 3, a. 8c: “Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma participata: sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens simpliciter” (ed. Leonina, 4: 48b).

757 See, Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2: “nihil habet esse, nisi inquantum participat divinum esse, quia ipsum est primum ens, quare causa est omnis entis. Sed omne quod est participatum in aliquo, est in eo per

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If this consequence is denied, it must be argued that the humanity exists in another way.

If this other way is an appeal to the divine existence of the Word communicated through the

hypostatic union, such that a created existence “by participation” is muted, impeded, or wiped

out, then there is no longer a real relation of creari on the part of the humanity to God. This

means that on metaphysical grounds the humanity cannot be said to be actually or really created,

because the contingent conditions of a created and finite existence have not been fulfilled.

4 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

The response of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange to Suarez orbits mostly around the question

of the real distinction between essence and existence, which he perceives Suarez to deny. But

Garrigou has also anticipated the objection preserved by Cajetan and deepened by the Carmelites

of Salamanca, namely, that a finite essence always limits the esse it receives. Therefore, if the

created human nature of Christ receives the divine esse, it would limit the divine esse, which is

impossible.

Since John Froula has produced a fine analysis of Garrigou’s interpretation of esse

secundarium,758 I will focus only on Garrigou’s response to this objection about limitation.

Garrigou frames the objection in the following way: “No divine perfection is able to actuate a

created nature, for in this very act it would be limited, for it would be received in a created

nature, and with it would constitute a composite more perfect than its parts.”759

To field this objection, Garrigou introduces a distinction, genetically related to the ones

illustrated in Cajetan and the Carmelites, distinguishing between an actuation by way of “a form

informing intrinsically” and “a term terminating intrinsically.”760 If the objection is appealing to

the first mode, then Garrigou concedes that God cannot actuate a created nature in this way, for

this would entail God entering into composition with a creature. Were this to be affirmed in the

case of Christ, this would result in the heresy of monophysitism.

                                                                                                               modum participantis : quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensuram suam. Cum igitur modus cujuslibet rei creatae sit finitus, quaelibet res creata recipit esse finitum et inferius divino esse quod est perfectissimum. Ergo constat quod esse creaturae, quo est formaliter, non est divinum esse” (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 197).

758 See John Froula, “Esse Secundarium: An Analogical Term meaning that by which Christ is Human,” The Thomist 78 (2014): 562-64.

759 Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, 302: “Nulla perfectio divina potest actuare naturam creatam, eo ipso limitaretur, nam reciperetur in natura creata, et cum ea constitueret compositum magis perfectum quam partes ejus.”

760 Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, 302: “Nulla perfectio divina potest actuare naturam creatam per modum formae intrinsece informantis, concedo; per modum termini intrinsece terminantis, nego.”

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Again in genetic relation to the texts explored above, Garrigou presents an example of the

second mode of actuation according to a term that terminates intrinsically: “thus, the essence of

God when it is seen clearly terminates the act of beatific vision.” He immediately applies this

analogically to the incarnation, “so the eternal existence of the Word is the ultimate act

terminating the humanity of Christ.” He subsequently makes a further parallel, approving of

those who say that “in Christ there is not only an ecstasy of contemplation and love, but an

ecstasy of existence, as the humanity of Christ exists through the eternal existence of the Word,

as though raptured to it, as an ardent lover to the object loved.”761

First, it should be pointed out that a form which informs intrinsically, wouldn’t actually

apply in the case of existence even if we were talking about a created existence. Neither essence

nor existence are forms which inform intrinsically. Existence is not a form (in the strict sense),762

for even form is in potency to existence.763 And while essence can be considered as a form,

Thomas regards it not as a form of a part (like the soul) but a form of the whole, and

consequently it does not inform its supposit the way the soul informs a body, but is that in which

the supposit subsists.764 It is for this reason that Thomas can affirm that there is a union between

the person of the Word and the human nature, because a human nature does not, strictly

speaking, inform its supposit, although it remains causally related to its supposit in important

ways (some of which apply to us and Christ, and others which only apply to us). So it is not

especially helpful to make this concession, for it only excludes the informing relationship that                                                                                                                

761 Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore, 302: “Sic essentia Dei clare visa terminat actum visionis beatificae. Ita existentia aeterna Verbi est actus ultimus terminans humanitatem Christi, ut culmen pyramidis terminat novas lineas quae tendunt ad ipsum. Unde quidam merito dixerunt: in Christo est non solum extasis contemplationis et amoris, sed extasis ipsius esse, prout humanitas Christi existit per esse aeternum Verbi, quasi rapitur ad illud, sicut ardens amor ad objectum amatum.”

762 I am aware that St. Thomas sometimes refers to esse as an id quo (see SCG 2.52) and even obliquely as a form (see in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1c); and that he speaks of it as formerly related to other metaphysical elements (see, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).

763 See Thomas, Quodl. 12, q. 4, a. 1c: “Sciendum ergo, quod unumquodque quod est in potentia et in actu, fit actu per hoc quod participat actum superiorem. Per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu quod participat per similitudinem primum et purum actum. Primus autem actus est esse subsistens per se; unde completionem unumquodque recipit per hoc quod participat esse; unde esse est complementum omnis formae, quia per hoc completur quod habet esse, et habet esse cum est actu: et sic nulla forma est nisi per esse. Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, sive sine materia sive cum materia” (ed. Leonina, 25.2: 404a). See also, QD de Anima, q. 6, ad 2: “ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus; ipsum autem nichil participat. Vnde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse subsistens, sicut de Deo dicimus, nichil participare dicimus. Non est autem similis ratio de aliis formis subsistentibus, quas necesse est participare ipsum esse et comparari ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Et ita, cum sint quodammodo in potentia, possunt aliquid aliud participare” (ed. Leonina, 24.1: 51b.268-277).

764 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4: “humanitas non est forma partis que dicatur forma quia informet aliquam materiam uel subiectum, set dicitur forma totius, in qua suppositum nature subsistit; unde non portet ponere quod ypostasis increata informetur humanitate, set quod subsistat in ea” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 93b).

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obtains between matter and form, which all (scholastic) parties, whether Scotist, Suarezian, or

Thomists, believe to be impossible for God, because he is not the form of any matter,  765 which is

to say that no creature is related to him as matter to form.

Second, as the Carmelites note, even if we are not talking about the inherence of a form

in the proper sense, but a term reaching its completion, such termination still implies limitation.

Thomas refers to the reception and limitation of esse as a termination, explicitly citing the

reception of existence in a supposit as the primary example.766 Consequently, there is still a

problem even in the case of a “term terminating intrinsically,” for no supposit exists apart from a

nature,767 and thus any existence received in a supposit is received concomitantly through a

determinate nature or a species and in this way is limited or contracted.768 Whenever a creature

is distinct from its existence, there is contraction and limitation.769

Third, for Thomas, a created individuum is related in the natural order to God in two

ways: (1) according to efficient causality and (2) according to exemplar causality.770 These two

causal relations indicate the two ways in which every creature falls short of the Creator, for they

equal the divine essence neither in species or genus nor in purity of act. In all created beings,

therefore, there is a twofold limitation or imperfection: (1) according to nature or species,771 and

(2) according to its mode of having existence.772

                                                                                                               765 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 3, a. 8c: “neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius

venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale” (ed. Leonina, 4: 48a). 766 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1c: “Respondeo dicendum, quod aeternitas dicitur quasi ens extra

terminos. Esse autem aliquod potest dici terminatum tripliciter: vel secundum durationem totam, et hoc modo dicitur terminatum quod habet principium et finem; vel ratione partium durationis, et hoc modo dicitur terminatum illud cujus quaelibet pars accepta terminata est ad praecedens et sequens; sicut est accipere in motu; vel ratione suppositi in quo esse recipitur: esse enim recipitur in aliquo secundum modum ipsius, et ideo terminatur, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, quae de se communis est, et secundum quod recipitur in aliquo, terminatur ad illud; et hoc modo solum divinum esse non est terminatum, quia non est receptum in aliquo, quod sit diversum ab eo” (ed. Mandonnet, 202).

767 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 1, a. 1c: “Non enim potest esse actu in rerum natura aliquid non specificatum, ad diuersas species indifferenter se habens” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 89).

768 See Thomas, QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 13b). 769 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 7, a. 2c: “Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se

subsistentes, ut quidam de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahunter per aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter” (ed. Leonina, 4: 74b).

770 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2c: “Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse creaturae in similitudine sui imperfecta : et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat” (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 198). See also, ST Ia, q. 3, a. 8, ad 1: “deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter: non autem per essentiam” (ed. Leonina, 4: 48b) and Ia, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3: “Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia” (ed. Leonina, 4: 199b).

771 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 3, a. 8c: “Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma participata: sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est posterior eo

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Fourth, Garrigou’s example of a “term that terminates intrinsically” is the essence of God

as attained in the beatific vision. But this analogical appeal seems to give insufficient attention to

the difference between knowing and being.773 For in knowing, the intellect does not limit the act

of understanding which it undergoes (pati) and this is why the intellect in a certain way becomes

all things and why in the beatific vision we can be said to understand God perfectly (but not

comprehensively, since comprehension is on the side of conception not understanding).774 But in

the ordo essendi, essence always limits the act of existence which it receives. Hence, this

analogy to beatific vision fails because essence is related to existence differently than the

intellect to understanding, even though both relationships are instances of potency/act.775 In the

case of beatific vision (and understanding more generally), the reception (in the possible

intellect) is the act (of intelligere) and consequently the act is not limited by reception because

they are one and the same; the union of an intelligible species with the possible intellect is

intelligere as pati; the possible intellect undergoes reception. But in the case of existence,

reception in an essence/supposit is to be limited by that essence/supposit, whereas the possible

intellect does not limit the intelligible species it receives.

Lastly, if Garrigou’s argument is conceded, what would be the character of the

ontological exstasis to which he refers? Would it be created or uncreated? Garrigou says that the

ecstasy would be of the existence, which on his reading would be the divine existence. But esse

is not a subject, so he must mean (given the immediately following prout humanitas) the ecstasy

of the humanity. But surely, this ecstasy must be created; it cannot be the divine ecstasy itself, for

                                                                                                               quod est per essentiam” (ed. Leonina, 4: 48b). See also, ST Ia, q. 15, a. 2c: “Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem” (ed. Leonina, 4: 202a).

772 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5: “Est etiam quaedam imperfectio quantum ad modum habendi, sicut omnis creatura habet imperfectum esse” (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 203). See also, Exp. in Lib. de Causis, prop. 4, lect. 4, n. 109: “Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum et tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra XVI propositione. Sed si sit aliquid quod habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat, est finitum: quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem, sed particulariter. Intantum igitur Intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, inquantum natura Intelligentiae, infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi et ipsum esse quod recipit est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse Intelligentiae multiplicari possit, inquantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito” (ed. Pera, 29).

773 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 3, ad 3: “licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo, quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universals a particularibus conditionibus: non tamen oportet quod universalia praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria” (ed. Leonina, 460b).

774 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 12, a. 7c (ed. Leonina, 4: 127b). See also, Compendium Theologiae, 1.106 (ed. Leonina, 42: 121).

775 There is a legitmate analogy to be made between these orders, see Thomas, SCG 1.45, but it is improperly applied in this context.

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even in beatific vision, although the divine essence acts as an uncreated intelligible species, the

act of receiving the divine essence in the possible intellect (which is the very act of intelligere

whereby the intellect attains blessedness) is created.776 On Garrigou’s analogy, therefore, how

much more so would the ontological ecstasy (whether of existence or the human nature) also be

created? What is this ontological, created ecstasy?

Peroratio 4

In closing, it is perhaps helpful to heed Cajetan’s own warning to novices regarding this

topic. He says, “Attend diligently and be careful, Novices, because this decision depends on two

common questions. One is whether existence and essence are really distinguished. The other is

whether substantial existence is of the person as of a proper subject, or whether it is of person or

nature mutually.”777 The Cardinal goes onto explain that the doctrine of a single, uncreated

existence in Christ presupposes that existence is really something other than essence and that

existence is owed to the person as to a proper subject. But he adds that “there are various

opinions about these questions,” and they are not to be understood as though they are of the faith,

so he exhorts the novices not to be obstinate in the theological conclusion drawn from the

answers, unless they have carefully weighed the evidence.778

As I turn now to present my own reading of St. Thomas on this Christological issue, I

want to stress that I maintain both the real distinction between essence and existence and that the

supposit is the primary or proper subject of existence. It is out of fidelity to both of these

principles that I develop my own interpretation of esse secundarium (although it differs with

Cajetan’s). I remain convinced that the question posed to the standard Thomist interpretation of

                                                                                                               776 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 12, a. 7c: “Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato

receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat” (ed. Leonina, 4: 127b). See also, Compendium Theologiae, 1.106 (ed. Leonina, 42: 121); ST IaIIae, q. 1, a. 8c (ed. Leonina, 6: 16b); IaIIae, q. 3, a. 1c: “ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi” (ed. Leonina, 6: 26b); q. 3, a. 4c: “Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit : sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens” (ed. Leonina, 6: 29b); q. 3, a. 8, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 6: 36b).

777 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 22: “Attende diligenter et caute, Novitie, quod ista decisio pendet ex duabus quaestionibus communibus. Altera est: An existentia et essentia distinguantur realiter. Altera: An existentia substantialis sit personae ut proprii susceptivi, an communiter sit personae vel naturae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 229a).

778 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 22: “Praesupponit enim doctrina ista et esse aliam rem esse ab essentia: et esse deberi personae ut proprio subiecto. Et quoniam variae sunt opiniones circa haec, cum de Christi existentia humana quaestio est, noli haec intelligere quasi sint fidei; noli pertinax esse in conclusione, nisi evidentiam prius habeas de communibus quaestionibus; sed ut rationabilia ac consona haec amplectere” (ed. Leonina, 11: 229a).

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the esse of Christ is sound: How can the divine esse be the actuation of a finite, created,

individual? As demonstrated in the exploration of Cajetan’s text above and the developments

produced by the Carmelites of Salamanca, this is not a new question, but in the twentieth

century, Garrigou-Lagrange offers a finely distilled and exemplary answer.

In exploring some of the textual receivers of the QD de Unione, above, I have sought to

illustrate some of the shortcomings in the Thomist commentary tradition’s response to this

question of actuation. An appeal to the analogy of beatific vision fails because an actuation of the

intellect in the cognitive order is not the same as an actuation of an individual substance in the

order of being. Furthermore, it does not seem that a position maintaining that the divine esse is

the esse of the human nature can still say that the human nature is related to the divine essence as

to an efficient cause, and consequently lacks sufficient metaphysical wherewithal to explicate

how the humanity of Jesus is truly and really created.

The position of Suarez, however, has identified another extreme which is to be equally

avoided: whatever the character of the created esse of Christ’s humanity, it cannot be natural and

proper to the humanity nor can the hypostatic union be said to be dependent on it, except as

presupposing it in ratione. Rather the created esse must be understood as the contingent result of

the Trinity’s uniting of the human nature to the Word. This means that the esse secundarium is a

dependent esse because it is a contingent esse. Understood as a grace (i.e., gratia unionis) it is

absolutely supernatural, for not only is there no preceding merit, but it is also absolutely beyond

the natural proportion of a created nature to be the nature of the Son of God. A human nature

does not possess a natural potency for union with a divine person. Consequently, the actuation of

a human nature which results from the divine uniting is the actuation of a substantial, obediential

potency.

   

 

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Chapter 5 The Meaning of Esse Secundarium

Narratio 5

The central task of this dissertation is largely exegetical and, hence, falls squarely within

the purview of interpretation. What is the best way to express the meaning intended by St.

Thomas when he spoke of a secondary act of existence in Christ? Thus far, I have established the

twelfth century Christological context out of which theological questions emerged into the

thirteenth and have examined and critiqued Scholastic receptions and interpretations of esse

secundarium. Two alternative meanings have thereby been ruled out.

First, the proposal of esse essentiae as a meaning of esse secundarium is not a textually

coherent one as illustrated by our examination of the Salamancan proposal for reading the De

Unione in chapter four. But it is also not a historically likely one, given that esse as species,

essence, or nature is the older meaning of esse and as we will see in chapter six, simply does not

remain among Thomas’ primary meanings for esse as he comes to deploy it in his most mature

theological writings. This is not to say that such a meaning is not retained among philosophers

and theologians immediately following Thomas such as Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, or

John Duns Scotus. Rather, it is simply to reiterate that it is not a meaning that Thomas retains as

primary. Consequently, if someone is claiming to interpret Thomas, then great care should be

taken to avoid importing or retaining a meaning of esse which for Thomas ultimately comes to

be subsidiary.

Second, based on our critique of Cajetan, we must also rule out the possibility that esse

secundarium is just another way to talk about the divine esse, not so much because this is what

Cajetan argues, but because any position which advocates only a mental distinction between esse

secundarium and the divine esse (e.g., Garrigou-Langrange or V. Salas) would have the same

metaphysical problem(s) as Cajetan’s own position which insists on one esse in Christ, namely,

the divine esse and thus compromises the metaphysical foundation for affirming that the human

nature of Christ is created.

Following the lead of Bernard Lonergan,779 I will now argue that esse secundarium

denotes a supernatural, substantial, created participation of Christ’s human nature in the

                                                                                                               779 See Bernard Lonergan, On the Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, vol. 7 of the

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 142-155.

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uncreated communication of the divine esse of the Word, the Son of the Father. The term esse

secundarium expresses this supernatural, substantial participation existentially, but other facets

of the same supernatural reality may be expressed dogmatically by the term “hypostatic union”

and systematically by the term “grace of union.” Hence, the terms esse secundarium, hypostatic

union, and gratia unionis overlap in their connotation while remaining distinct in their

denotation.

The dogmatic and systematic terminology are those preferred by Thomas in the Summa

Theologiae, but they do not abrogate the meaning expressed by the existential terminology in the

De Unione, rather they confirm that Thomas sought to utilize various frames of reference in his

attempts to provide an analogical understanding of the very same divine mystery, namely, the

supernatural but created substantial relation which obtained between Christ’s human nature and

his divine person.

After defending this interpretation, I suggest that the theological hypothesis of esse

secundarium provides a metaphysical foundation for the claim that Jesus “lived his own life

within the unfolding of a historical process.”780 Jesus experienced growth and development (Lk.

2:40, 52). Thomas’ hypothesis of a contingent being in Christ offers us a metaphysical notion

whereby we may better understand how a divine person with a divine and eternal existence

became man and embraced a historically conditioned experience of his human and temporal life.

1 Metaphysical Contours of the Text

A divisio of article four into three principal sections will facilitate an ordered reading of

the De Unione: (1) Terms and Relations, (2) Application to Christ, (3) Conclusion about Christ’s

esse. After drawing special attention to the preceding article, Thomas advances the claim that

“existence properly and truly is said of a subsistent supposit.”781 The “properly and truly” recurs

textually in the parallel discussion of Thomas’ Quodlibetal Questions: “esse, therefore, properly

and truly is not attributed except to a thing per se subsistent.”782 In the Quodlibetal passage,

                                                                                                               780 See the International Theological Commission’s “Select Questions on Christology” (1979), 1.1. 781 Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c: “Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito

subsistente” (ed. Obenauer, 84). 782 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Vno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et uere habet esse uel est; et sic

attribuitur soli substancie per se subsistenti, unde quod uere est dicitur substancia in I Phisicorum. Omnibus uero que non per se subsistunt set in alio et cum alio, siue sint accidencia siue forme substanciales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quod ipsa uere sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in esse subsistat, set quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et uere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94.48-59).

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Thomas alternates between the terms “substance” and res followed by the qualifier “per se

subsistent.” In another passage recapitulating the same principle (namely, that substance can

denote that which has esse and that by which something has esse), Thomas uses the term

hypostasis,783 and still elsewhere we find person.784 The proposition as articulated in the QD de

Unione is followed by a list of other metaphysical elements which can be said to exist: accidents,

non-subsistent forms, accidental forms, and “forms by which a subsistent thing has esse

simply.”785

We should treat (1) accidents and (2) non-subsistent forms as the basic division and

understand (2a) accidental forms and (2b) “forms by which a subsistent thing has esse simply” as

a subdivision of non-subsistent forms. While, certainly, accidents and accidental forms can be

treated as synonyms, this seems unlikely here, given that prior to introducing the (sub)division

between (2a) accidental forms and (2b) forms by which a subsistent thing has esse simply,

Thomas gives a concrete example of an accident, namely, whiteness and then adds, “It should be

considered, moreover, that there are some forms,” etc. wherein he introduces accidental forms.

Furthermore, although he does not provide an example of an accidental form in article four of the

QD de Unione, he does give one in the Tertia Pars, namely, the form of a house.786 Such an

accidental form (we might say artificial form) would be distinct from the various accidents of the

house.

More problematic, however, is the claim that (2b) “forms by which a subsistent thing has

esse simply” is a subdivision of (2) non-subsistent forms. For if this denotes a substantial form

such as the human soul, then it seems that this contradicts Thomas’ assertion elsewhere that the

human soul is subsistent.787 Yet, if we look at the list of non-subsistent elements given in the

                                                                                                               783 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam: ad hypostasim

quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo.”

784 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1: “esse consequitur naturam, non sicut habentem esse, sed sicut qua aliquid est: personam autem, sive hypostasim, consequitur sicut habentem esse. Et ideo magis retinet unitatem secundum unitatem hypostasis, quam habeat dualitatem secundum dualitatem naturae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

785 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Accidentia enim et formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse, inquantum eis aliquid <est>: sicut albedo dicitur ens, inquantum ea est aliquid album. Considerandum est autem, quod aliquae formae sunt, quibus est aliquid ens non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut sunt omnes formae accidentales. Aliquae autem formae sunt, quibus | res subsistens simpliciter habet esse, quia videlicet constituunt esse substantiale rei subsistentis” (ed. Obenauer, 84, 86).

786 See, Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 11: 23a). 787 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 75, a. 2c; cf. QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1, ad 6 (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 15b).

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Quodlibetal discussion we find: accidents, substantial forms, and any part.788 Thomas certainly

regards the soul as a metaphysical part.789 So how are we to solve this seeming contradiction? If

we look to the immediately preceding Quodlibetal article we find: “what is simply one and per

se subsistent, contains nothing in act per se subsistent, but perhaps in potency.”790 Thus, the soul

considered as a part is subsistent but only in potency not in act because it is part of the

metaphysical composition of the whole, namely, the supposit who alone is per se subsistent in

act.

This Quodlibetal text, however, leads us to ask whether Christ’s human nature is per se

subsistent in act? The answer appears to be no, for “it cannot be said that the human nature in

Christ or any part is per se subsistent.”791 The Summa Contra Gentiles leaves us with a similar

conclusion, for although a substance in the sense of a nature or quod quid est may be particular,

nevertheless, it is not per se subsistent insofar as it is joined to the whole as a part.792 Even in

“Socrates or Plato, human nature is not a hypostasis, but that which subsists in it is the

hypostasis.”793

In the second divisio of our text, Thomas takes the metaphysical principles he has laid

down and sees how they hold up under the weight of the incarnation. Thus, Thomas

distinguishes between the substantiation which takes place simpliciter through the divine nature

but non simpliciter through the human nature. This position is echoed in other texts794 but

                                                                                                               788 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94.52-54). 789 See Thomas, QD de Anima, q. 6, ad 15: “anima proprie non est in genere quasi species, set sicut pars

speciei humane” (ed. Leonina, 24.1: 53a.362-364); cf. Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4 (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 93b). 790 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1c: “Quod enim est simpliciter unum per se subsistens, nichil continet actu

per se subsistens, set forte in potencia” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92.120-121). 791 Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1c: “Non autem potest dici quod humana natura in Christo uel aliqua pars eius

sit per se subsistens: hoc enim unioni repugnaret, nisi poneremus unionem secundum quid et non simpliciter, sicut uniuntur lapides in aceruo uel duo homines per affectum amoris uel per aliquam imitationis similitudinem, que omnia dicimus esse unum secundum quid et non simpliciter. Quod enim est simpliciter unum per se subsistens, nichil continet actu per se subsistens, set forte in potencia” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92a.112-121).

792 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[13]: “Quod autem substantia sit et particularis, non secundum illam significationem dicitur qua hypostasis est particularis substantia. Substantia enim, secundum Philosophum, dicitur dupliciter: scilicet pro supposito in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis; et de eo quod quid est, quod est natura rei. Sed neque partes alicuius substantiae sic dicuntur particulares substantiae quasi sint per se subsistentes, sed subsistunt in toto. Unde nec hypostases possunt dici: cum nulla earum sit substantia completa. Alias sequeretur quod in uno homine tot essent hypostases quot sunt partes” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b-157a).

793 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[12]: “Nam humana natura etiam in Sorte vel Platone non est hypostasis: sed id quod in ea subsistit, hypostasis est” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b).

794 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[15]: “Neque etiam hypostasis Verbi dicitur esse suppositum humanae naturae quasi subiiciatur ei ut formaliori, sicut duodecima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim esset necessarium si hypostasis Verbi per naturam humanam simpliciter constitueretur in esse. Quod patet esse falsum: dicitur enim hypostasis Verbi humanae naturae supponi prout eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit, sicut aliquid trahitur ad alterum nobilius cui unitur” (ed. Leonina, 15: 157b).

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through the term constituere,795 rather than sustentificare or substantificare. The reason Thomas

gives for the distinction in lines of substantiation is that “the person of the Son of God existed

before the humanity was assumed, nor was He increased or made more perfect in some person

through the nature which was assumed.”796 This leads Thomas to a determination of what exactly

the non simpliciter substantiation of the human nature entails: Sustentificatur autem suppositum

aeternum per naturam humanam, inquantum est hic homo.797

If the Word had not assumed a human nature, then we could not say that He is this man,

for even though the human nature did not exist prior to its assumption by the Word798 and, hence,

in this way it is caused efficiently by the divine esse, nevertheless, its union to the Word is the

reason why the Word is formally or essentially human. For in this act of assumption, the Word

comes to subsist in the human nature and “that which subsists in a human nature is this man.

Whence, the Word Himself is supposited when this man is said.”799

The terms sustentificare, substantificare, or subsistentificare imply that something has

been brought into existence and that it exists as a this, a singular or individual of some kind.

Strictly speaking, these terms imply that a supposit or hypostasis has come about because a

hypostasis is what has existence, whereas a nature is only a principle by which a hypostasis or

supposit has existence. Nevertheless, a nature, precisely as an id quo contributes in some way to

the causal substantiation or subsistence of the supposit. Now only one nature in something

subsistent can contribute existentially in this way, and thus “the Word of God simply has esse

only through the divine nature.”800 Yet, it remains the case, as we just noted, that Thomas uses

the term sustentificare to characterize a relation between the eternal supposit and the human

                                                                                                               795 See, Thomas, SCG 4.49.[7]: “Hypostasis autem Verbi non constituitur simpliciter per humanam

naturam, ut per eam sit: sed per eam solum habet Verbum quod sit homo. Non igitur oportet quod natura humana sit simplicior quam Verbum inquantum est Verbum: sed solum inquantum Verbum est hic homo” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a).

796 Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c: “persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam, nec in aliquo persona est augmentata seu perfectior per naturam humanam assumptam” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

797 Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86). 798 See Thomas, SCG 4.43 (ed. Leonina, 15: 144-145). 799 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[11]: “Manifestum est enim quod hic homo qui est Christus, substantia quaedam est

non universalis, sed particularis. Et hypostasis quaedam est non tamen alia hypostasis quam hypostasis Verbi: quia humana natura ab hypostasi Verbi assumpta est ut Verbum subsistat tam in humana natura quam in divina. Id autem quod in humana natura subsistit, est hic homo. Unde ipsum Verbum supponitur cum dicitur hic homo” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b).

800 Thomas, SCG 4.49.[5]: “Cuiuslibet enim rei subsistentis oportet esse unam naturam tantum per quam simpliciter esse habeat. Et sic Verbum Dei per solam naturam divinam simpliciter esse habet: non autem per humanam naturam, sed per eam habet quod sit hoc, scilicet quod sit homo” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a).

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nature such that the eternal supposit is this man. Although this line of sustentifcare does not

function “simply,” but secundum quid, we should try to work out the character of the quid.

In one of the places where Thomas endeavors to work out the status of Christ’s body

during the triduum of his death, he notes that Christ’s body is sustentificatum by the hypostasis

of the Word in one way and by the soul in another. In death, the line of sustentificare provided

by the soul as the body’s form is dissolved. Hence, there is no longer an actually existing

concrete, individual human essence.801 But the line of sustentificare provided by the hypostasis

of the Word continues throughout the days of Christ’s death.802 This use of sustentificare helps

us to confirm some of the features we have illustrated above, namely, when something is

sustentificatum (1) it has a share in existence (Christ’s body did not evaporate in the tomb) and

(2) is in some way one or a this (it never becomes someone else’s body, but remains the body of

Jesus). Christ’s body certainly has both of these characteristics without acquiring the status of a

supposit or person. But the relation of sustentificare denoted, here, inverts our terms so care and

clarification are needed.

The hypostasis of the Word sustains or substantiates his body, soul, or nature because He

is the sole cause of their existence; the union of the human nature to the Word is the reason why

the human nature exists in the Word. Yet the human nature is also the reason why the supposit

of the word is essentially this man Jesus and the reason why whenever we talk about Jesus or

that man from Nazareth we are talking about the Word incarnate, Who is the Son of God.

This brings us to Thomas’ conclusion: “as Christ is one simply on account of the unity of

the supposit and two secundum quid on account of the two natures, so does he have one esse

simply on account of the one eternal esse of the eternal supposit. But there is another esse of this

                                                                                                               801 Thomas is clear that the human nature Christ assumes is assumed in concreto and as it would be in

indiviuduo and not in abstracto as it would be in mente or in nuda contemplatione or in sola consideratione intellectus (see ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 5, ad 2; q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; q. 4, a. 3, ad 2; q. 4, a. 4, ad 3), he is more than comfortable designating the human nature as an “individual” (see, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; in 3 Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, n. 39; d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, ad s.c., n. 34; d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2, n. 53), and readily acknowledges that the assumed human nature is a particular (see SCG 4.49.[12-13], ed. Leonina, 15: 156-157).

802 Thomas, Quodl. 3, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: “substancia dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim sumitur pro ypostasi, et sic uerum est quod corpus Christi sustentificatum mansit per ypostasim Dei Verbi: non enim per mortem soluta est unio Verbi neque ad animam neque ad corpus; et sic remanet simpliciter idem numero corpus secundum ypostasim siue suppositum, quod est persona Verbi. Alio modo accipitur substancia pro essencia uel natura, et sic corpus Christi sustentificatur per animam sicut per suam formam, non autem per Verbum, quia Verbum non unitur corpori ut forma: hoc enim est hereticum, secundum heresim Arrii et Apollinaris, qui posuerunt Verbum esse in Christo loco anime. Sequeretur etiam quod esset unio Dei et hominis facta in natura, quod pertinent ad heresim Euticis. Sic igitur corpus Christi post mortem est simpliciter idem secundum substanciam que est ypostasis, non autem secundum substanciam que est essencia uel natura. Vniuocatio autem et equiuocatio non respicit suppositum, set essenciam uel naturam, quam significat diffinitio” (ed. Leonina, 25.2: 246b-247a).

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supposit, not inasmuch as he is eternal, but inasmuch as he temporally became man.”803 Thomas

immediately excludes the possibility of interpreting this aliud esse as an accidental esse, because

the Word did not become man according to an accident but according to nature, and hence the

Word substantially became man. This aliud esse, however, is also not the esse supplied or given

by a substantial form, for this would be the principal esse of any supposit,804 yet Thomas insists

that this aliud esse is not the principal esse of the eternal supposit but the esse secundarium of

this supposit.805

So what work is this esse secundarium doing? What does it explain? It doesn’t explain

the formal unity of the humanity, for the human soul is sufficient for that.806 Nor do we need it

to explain the truth that Christ is human essentially, for Christ is a supposit subsisting in a human

nature, that is, He is a supposit having a human nature and hence a member of the human species

because his participation in the human species is constituted by the nature not the supposit.807

The divine esse is the sole sufficient cause for each of these being actually the case (and not

merely so in potency), so we need not search for any other efficient cause.

2 Tentative Theological Meaning

On the whole, the text of article four of the De Unione yields for us a largely apophatic

meaning of esse secundarium: (1) it is not the principal esse of the supposit of the Word, (2) it is

not an accidental esse, (3) it does not abrogate the integral and substantial unity of the Word

made flesh, and (4) it is not eternal. A positive explanation of the meaning of esse secundarium

remains difficult to obtain from the text of the De Unione alone, so let us now address the

                                                                                                               803 Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c: “Et ideo, sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter

unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi; est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

804 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3. 805 Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c: “Quod est, si non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non

praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—, non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

806 See Thomas, Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4: “anima in Christo dat esse corpori inquantum facit ipsum actu animatum: quod est dare ei complementum naturae et speciei. Sed si intelligatur corpus perfectum per anima absque hypostasi habente utrumque, hoc totum compositum ex anima et corpore, prout significatur nomine humanitatis, non significatur ut quod est, sed ut quo aliquid est. Et ideo ipsum esse est personae subsistentis, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad talem naturam: cuius habitudinis causa est anima, inquantum perficit humanam naturam informando corpus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222-223).

807 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3: “in rebus creatis res aliqua singularis non ponitur in genere vel specie ratione eius quod pertinet ad eius individuationem, sed ratione naturae, quae secundum formam determinatur: cum individuatio magis sit secundum materiam in rebus compositis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Christus est in specie humana ratione naturae assumptae, non ratione ipsius hypostasis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 30b).

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question of what happens to the language of esse secundarium in the Summa Theologiae. In this

way, we may arrive at evidence from within Thomas’ own text and according to the Angelic

Doctor’s own theological principles.

3 The Union considered from the Standpoint of Existence

The soteriological emphasis is absolutely unmistakable in the tertia pars of Thomas’

great theological project, the Summa Theologiae. In the short prologue, Thomas refers to Jesus as

“savior” four times, being careful at the beginning to identify the savior with “our Lord Jesus

Christ” and at the end with “God incarnate.” Throughout, the telos of salvation and immortal life

is clearly in focus. The tertia pars is divided into three major sections: (I) the Savior, (II)

Sacraments, (III) and immortal life.808

The treatise on the savior is not divided thematically into Christ’s person and work,

although it is perhaps tempting to read it that way. Thomas’ explicit division is between (A) the

mystery of the incarnation and (B) “those things done and suffered by our Savior Himself, that

is, God incarnate.”809 The treatise on the mystery has a threefold division: (1) the convenientia of

the incarnation, (2) the manner of the union of the Word Incarnate (qq. 2-15), and (3) the things

which follow upon this union (qq. 16-26).810

The text which is of immeadiate concern falls in (a) the first division of (2) the manner of

the union. Following the via doctrinae, Thomas divides his discussion of (2) the manner of the

union into (a) the union itself (q. 2), (b) the Person who assumes (q. 3), and (c) the nature

assumed (qq. 4-15).811 Consequently, question two of the tertia pars constitutes the discussion

(2a) of the union in itself. Article seven of this question asks: “Is the union something created?”

Thomas has already addressed the site of the union (in a person, not a nature) (aa. 1-2), clarified

the meaning of person (a. 3) and discussed some of the unique features of Christ’s incarnate

person (a. 4). He has also made it clear that the union is not accidental (a. 6). This rejection of

accidentality is especially worthy of mention as we move into an examination of article seven,

for it is a shared feature both in Thomas’ characterization of the hypostatic union and of esse

secundarium.

                                                                                                               808 See Thomas, ST IIIa, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 5). 809 See Thomas, ST IIIa, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 5b). 810 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 1, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 6a). 811 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 22a).

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If we compare the frame of the question asked in article seven with its parallel in

Thomas’ Sentences Commentary,812 we will find that the terminology varies, for in the Scriptum

the objections are prefaced by “it seems that the union is not some creature,” whereas in the

Summa Thomas prefaces the objections with: “it seems that the union of divine and human

nature is not something created.” This variation in terms does not necessarily signify a

substantive difference in content, however, the addition of aliquid should suggest something of

significance to us, especially given the question Thomas asks of the soul in the prima pars,

namely, whether the soul is something (aliquid) subsistent813 and considering his answer to the

preceding article in the tertia pars regarding the accidentality of the union. Thomas is clearly

indicating that this union occurs in a substantial order, provided that we understand “substantial”

here as “according to subsistence” and not “according to essence or nature.”814

The sed contras of the Summa and the Scriptum each take as their basis the principle that

what has a beginning in time is created. The bodies of the responses, however, vary significantly

while in no way contradicting each other. The Scriptum focuses on the three foundations for a

relation (quantity, quality and action/passion) so that it may provide a way of clarifying exactly

what kind of relation this union is.815 The response of the Summa invokes the principle of

extrinsic, contingent predication,816 a strategy it shares with the reply to objection three in the

Scriptum. The Summa concludes from the principle of contingent predication that since this

union is really in a creature, namely, the human nature, then it is right to say that the union is

something created (quoddam creatum). This conclusion differs only slightly from the conclusion

of the Scriptum: “the union according to reality is a certain creature (creatura quaedam).”817

The first objections and replies of the Summa and Scriptum are almost identical. It is not

until we consider the second and third objections and replies that we see a radical shift in

content. In the Scriptum, the content of the second objection regards a definitional principle that

a union is a relation between equals. The reply to which, it should be noted, bears a curious (but

                                                                                                               812 See Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1 (ed. Moos, 185). 813 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 75, a. 2. 814 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 6c: “Fides autem Catholica, medium tenens inter praedictas positiones, neque

dicit esse unionem factam Dei et hominis secundum essentiam vel naturam; neque etiam secundum accidens; sed medio modo, secundum subsistentiam seu hypostasim” (ed. Leonina, 11: 37a).

815 See Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, nn. 22-24 (ed. Moos, 187). 816 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c (ed. Leonina, 11: 40); cf. ST Ia, q. 13, a. 7; Augustine, De Civ. Dei, 12.15-16

(CCSL 48: 369-372). 817 Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, n. 24 (ed. Moos, 188).

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inverted) resemblance to the reply to the first objection in article four of the De Unione.818

Thomas, simply acquiesces to this principle in the case of a union among created things, but

denies that it applies to a union between creature and Creator. The third objection in the Scriptum

tries to employ a process of elimination in order to rule out the possibility of the union being

something created (quid creatum) by excluding all the different ways in which something created

may be predicated of God (according to cause, assumption, or likeness). Thomas responds by

showing that as predicated of God the union is neither Creator or creature and invokes the

principle of contingent predication to reorient the predication because it is founded upon a real

relation of a creature (namely, the human nature) to the Creator.819

Turning attention to the Summa, the second objection tries to show that the union is not

something created (aliquid creatum) because the telos of the union is in the divine hypostasis of

the Son in whom the union finds its completion.820 Thomas counters that the “intelligibility of a

relation, as also of a motion, depends upon the end or term: but its esse depends upon its subject.

And because such a union [as the hypostatic union] does not have its esse really except in the

created nature (as was said), it follows that it has a created esse.”821 If we attempt to be faithful to

the pedagogy Thomas has led us through thus far, we can immediately rule out the possibility of

this esse creatum being an accidental esse, because the union does not take place in an accidental

but substantial order. We must also add, according to the body of this article, that such an esse

creatum is temporal because it has a beginning in time. Both of these features (i.e., non-

accidentality and temporality) are shared with Thomas’ enigmatic characterization of esse

secundarium, which we saw in article four of the QD de Unione. This language of esse creatum

is also something that is entirely lacking from the discussion in the Scriptum. If we were to

regard the language of esse secundarium in the De Unione as a step in development rather than                                                                                                                

818 Compare in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2: “unio potest esse relatio aequiparantiae in rebus creatis, sed non in Creatore et creatura; quia non eodem modo se habent ad unionem” and QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

819 Thomas, in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3: “unio quae de Deo praedicatur non est neque Creator neque creatura; quia prout in ipso est, non est aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum. Non tamen ratio est falsa, quia fundatur super relationem creaturae ad Creatorem; sicut est etiam de aliis relativis quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, ut Dominus et hujusmodi” (ed. Moos, 188).

820 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c, obj. 2: “finis est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed finis unionis est divina hypostasis sive persona, ad quam terminata est unio. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi unio maxime debeat iudicari secundum conditionem divinae hypostasis. Quae non est aliquid creatum. Ergo nec ipsa unio est aliquid creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40a).

821 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c, ad 2: “ratio relationis, sicut et motus, dependent ex fine vel termino: sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

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as an “aberration,” it could serve to explain why the language of esse creatum emerges in this

question in the Summa, whereas it did not emerge in Thomas’ discussion of the same topos in the

Scriptum.

So if the hypostatic union is a substantial relation, what does it mean to speak of the esse

of that union if we cannot be talking about the esse of an accidental relation? Does a substantial

relation have an accidental esse? This seems highly unlikely. If a substantial relation has an esse,

it must be a substantial esse. But if this is the case, what is the subject of the esse creatum in

question? For a relation, strictly speaking, cannot be a subject but is in a subject. For this reason,

St. Thomas deduces the character of the esse creatum from the subject of the relation, which is

the human nature. Is the human nature as a finite reality capable of being the subject of a

substantial relation immune from the principle that every being is a being by participation?822

Do we have any other examples of a created, finite, being having a substantial relation? I

think we do, but the example will be a step removed and therefore analogical. Normally, only in

the case of supposits do we have what must be considered to be a substantial relation, namely,

the relation of creari between a created individual and the creator: “creation is the production of

a being” and “all things are produced in esse by God,” but it is redundant to speak of the creation

of the relation of creation.823

In the case of Christ, there can be no created supposit.824 St. Thomas regards the human

nature of Christ as an individuum without conceding that it is a supposit.825 If as just indicated,

the primary substantial relation of any created being (in the order of act and not in the order of

potency) is that of existence itself, then in the extraordinary, unparalleled, and absolutely

supernatural case of a created, individual, human nature that actually exists as joined to the

second person of the Trinity, how are we to distinguish the union from the esse of the union? Are

there two substantial relations? Is the status of actually existing as inhering in the individual

human nature of Christ really distinct from what we call the hypostatic union?

                                                                                                               822 See Thomas, SCG 2.15.[5]: “Deus autem est ens per essentiam suam: quia est ipsum esse. Omne autem

aliud ens est ens per participationem: quia ens quod sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi unum, ut in Primo ostensum est” (ed. Leonina, 13: 295b).

823 See Thomas, SCG 2.18.[4]: “Cum enim effectus creatus realiter dependeat a creante, oportet huiusmodi relationem esse rem quondam. Omnis autem res a Deo in esse producitur. Est igitur in esse a Deo producta. Non tamen alia creatione creata quam ipsa creatura prima quae per eam creata dicitur. Quia accidentia et formae, sicut per se non sunt, ista nec per se creantur, cum creatio sit productio entis: sed, sicut in alio sunt, ita aliis creatis creantur” (ed. Leonina, 13: 305b).

824 See Thomas, ST ST IIIa, q. 16, aa. 10-12 (ed. Leonina, 11: 214-18). 825 See Thomas, QD De Unione, a. 2c (ed. Obenauer, 56).

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What is happening, here, is the convergence of two different ways of talking about the

very same substantial relation. A distinction is necessary: The union (as a relation) receives its

designation “hypostatic” from the term of the union, namely, the person of the Word, whereas

the esse creatum receives its designation from the subject of the relation, namely, the human

nature. The esse, therefore, would be the esse of a nature not a supposit and as with all other

created individuals it would exist per participationem, but not as in a similitude or likeness but

as joined uniquely and supernaturally to the Person of the Word.

A brief note should be added about the reply to objection three. This objection argues that

since the man [Jesus] is said to be Creator on account of the union, how much more so should the

union be regarded not as something created but as the Creator.826 Thomas concedes that the man

is called even God on account of the union, but he corrects the inference drawn by pointing out

that this is so because the union finds its completion or term in the divine hypostasis. There is no

reason to conclude from this that the union is itself the Creator or God. He then goes on to add

that whenever something (aliquid) is said to be created, this more regards its esse than the

relation.827 Such a reply in no way abrogates Thomas’ characterization of this union as a “certain

relation” in the body of the response. But I do believe that it suggests a shift in focus in this

article in the Summa from that of the Scriptum.

A relation is between two terms, and when there is a relation between created and

uncreated terms, there is going to be an acute ambiguity about the implications of that relation

for the uncreated term. This problematic is clearly in focus in the Scriptum, but the emphasis is

on trying to parse the kind of relation that this union denotes. What comes to take precedence in

the body of the response in the Summa, however, is the deployment of the rule for extrinsic,

contingent predication, which immediately clarifies the issue of relations obtaining between

created and divine terms. This rule serves as the backdrop for all the replies to objections in the

Scriptum, but clearly in the Summa Thomas opts for answers that deepen this understanding

through explicit recourse to metaphysical principles regarding existence.

                                                                                                               826 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, obj. 3: “propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis [Aristotle, Anal.

Poster., 1.2]. Sed homo dicitur esse Creator propter unionem. Ergo multo magis ipsa unio non est aliquid creatum, sed Creator” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40a).

827 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 3: “ homo dicitur et est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit Creator vel Deus: quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

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4 The Union considered from the Standpoint of Grace

Appealing to another frame of reference, Thomas asks whether the union of the

incarnation takes place through grace? He invokes the twofold distinction he advanced in the

prima secundae,828 namely, between grace considered (1) as the very will of God freely giving

something and (2) as the very gratuitous gift of God.829 Thomas clearly accords causal primacy

to the will of God (God as the giver of all good things), for human nature is in need of this

gratuitous, divine will in order for it to be elevated unto God, an elevation which exceeds the

capacity of its own nature.830 The divine initiative, then, is absolutely prior and constitutes the

sole condition of possibility for the elevation of human nature.

We may also consider the elevation as concretely received in the human nature, that is, as

given. This leads Thomas to distinguish two ways in which human nature is elevated unto God:

(2a) “through operation, by which the saints know and love God” and (2b) “by personal

existence, which mode is unique to Christ.”831 Thomas further distinguishes these elevations by

noting that the perfection of an operation requires that its power be perfected through a habit,

whereas a nature may have existence in its own supposit without some mediating habit.832

Turning, then, to apply these three distinctions to the question at hand, Thomas concedes

that both the union of the incarnation and the union of the saints to God by knowledge and love

occur by grace (1) understood as the will of God. But the very fact that the human nature is

united to the divine person, may be called a grace (2) in the sense of gift only insofar as this

takes place due to no preceding merit; it may not be called a grace in the sense of gift, if by this

is meant a habitual gift by the mediation of which the union of the incarnation takes place. The

union of the incarnation is not a mediating habit, nor does it take place by a mediating habit.833

                                                                                                               828 See Thomas, ST IaIIae, q. 110, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 7: 311). NB: Thomas actually delineates a threefold

distinction in the prima secundae, but only two of the meanings of gratia are immeadiately relevant in the context of this question in the tertia pars.

829 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “gratia dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, ipsa voluntas Dei gratis aliquid dantis; alio modo, ipsum gratuitum donum Dei” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48a).

830 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Indiget autem humana natura gratuita Dei voluntate ad hoc quod elevetur in Deum: cum hoc sit supra facultatem naturae suae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48a).

831 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Elevatur autem humana natura in Deum dupliciter. Uno modo, per operationem: qua scilicet sancti cognoscunt et amant Deum. Alio modo, per esse personale: qui quidem modus est singualris Christo, in quo humana natura assumpta est ad hoc quod sit personae Filii Dei” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48).

832 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Manifestum est autem quod ad perfectionem operationis requiritur quod potentia sit perfecta per habitum: sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo, non fit mediante aliquo habitu” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b).

833 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si gratia accipiatur ipsa Dei voluntas gratis aliquid faciens vel gratum seu acceptum aliquem habens, unio incarnationis facta est per gratiam, sicut et unio sanctorum ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Si vero gratia dicatur ipsum gratuitum Dei donum, sic ipsum quod

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Such a distinction (between two different senses of grace as gift) really constitutes the

pinnacle of Thomas’ analysis of the union of the incarnation in question two, for the next article

(a. 11) addresses his comment about “no preceding merit” and the final article can now pose a

question with a “new” technical term, whether the grace of union was natural to the man

Christ?834 The solution to which, Thomas already has ample principles at his disposal.835

We find that this distinction between the “grace of union” and “habitual grace” emerges

again in article six of question six in what could be counted as a kind-of parallel text to the above

(keeping in mind Thomas’ distinction between union and assumption),836 insofar as it inquires

into whether the human nature is assumed by a mediating grace. In the body of his response,

Thomas immediately posits the distinction between gratia unionis and gratia habitualis, but he

also excludes the possibility of either grace acting as a medium in the assumption: “for the grace

of union is the very personal existence which is freely and divinely given to the human nature in

the person of the Word, which indeed is the term of the assumption. But the habitual grace,

which pertains to the special sanctity of that man is an effect consequent upon the union. . .”837

Habitual grace, then, is excluded as a medium for the assumption because it is an effect

of the union—it does not precede the union.838 It is also excluded because the union does not

take place according to an accident but according to subsistence;839 habitual grace, however, is

                                                                                                               est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae, potest dici quaedam gratia, inquantum nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc est factum: non autem ita quod sit aliqua gratia habitualis qua mediante talis unio fiat” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b).

834 By “new,” here, I do not intend to suggest that Thomas has coined a neo-logism. Certainly, this term was in use long before Thomas. What should be noted is the fact that Thomas does not employ the term gratia unionis in question two until article twelve. Which is to say, that he does not use this technical term until he has clearly illustrated its meaning in artcle 10. The apogee, then, of Thomas’ answer to the question what is the union beomes: it is a gift divinely bestowed. It is a grace.

835 Thomas deals with this question quickly through an advertence to some of the meanings of “nature” which he has already delineated in article one of question two.

836 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 8c (ed. Leonina, 11: 42). 837 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: “in Christo ponitur gratia unionis, et gratia habitualis. Gratia ergo non potest

intelligi ut medium in assumptione humanae naturae, sive loquamur de gratia unionis, sive de gratia habituali. Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona Verbi: quod quidem est terminus assumptionis. Gratia autem habitualis, pertinens ad specialem sanctitatem illius hominis, est effectus quidam consequens unionem: secundum illud Ioan. I: Vidimus gloriam eius quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; per quod datur intelligi quod hoc ipso quod ille homo est Unigenitus a Patre, quod habet per unionem, habet plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104).

838 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13, ad 2: “Humana autem natura in Christo unita est personae Verbi a principio absque successione. Unde gratia habitualis non intelligitur ut praecedens unionem, sed ut consequens eam, sicut quaedam proprietas naturalis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 125b). NB: this is not a temporal precedence, see ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b).

839 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6, s.c. “gratia est quoddam accidens animae, ut in Secunda Parte habitum est. Unio autem Verbi ad humanam naturam est facta secundum subsistentiam, et non secundum accidens: ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo natura humana non est assumpta mediante gratia” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104a).

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an accident and constitutes an accidental perfection of the soul;840 thus, it cannot be a medium

for the assumption. Thomas clearly believes that the union of the human nature to the Word of

God takes place according to the personal esse of the Word, and as we have just seen Thomas

identifies the gratia unionis with the personal esse of the Word as given. But the personal esse

considered as the gratia unionis does not act as a medium “because it does not depend upon

some habit, but immediately upon the nature itself.”841 This is reminiscent of Thomas’ earlier

observation that a nature has its esse in its own supposit apart from the mediation of some

habit.842 Consequently, if the Word has communicated his own esse to the human nature, that is,

if he has united the human nature to Himself in his Person, then there is no “buffer,” as it were,

between the human nature and the divine person of the Word. It is simply a matter of denoting

the new relation that accrues to the human nature insofar as it has been brought into communion

with the divine esse of the Son.

We should examine more closely, however, the rather extraordinary claim that the gratia

unionis is the very personal esse that is freely and divinely given to the human nature in the

person of the Word. The text does not permit us to read this as if Thomas were saying that the

gratia unionis is the divine being itself (without qualification), for he is clearly recapitulating the

distinction he made above,843 between gratia understood as a created donum and gratia

understood as the uncreated Divine Will itself.844 Consequently, Thomas must be thinking of the

human nature as participating in the personal esse of the Word. Such participation would be a

donum creatum, which he designates with the term gratia unionis. This is what it means to say

that the divine esse is freely and divinely given to the human nature in the person of the Word. It

                                                                                                               840 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6, ad 2: “anima est perfectio substantialis corporis: gratia vero est perfectio

animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b).

841 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6, ad 1: “unio nostra ad Deum est per operationem, inquantum scilicet eum cognoscimus et amamus. Et ideo talis unio est per gratiam habitualem: inquantum operatio perfecta procedit ab habitu. Sed unio naturae humanae ad Verbum Dei est secundum esse personale: quod non dependet ab aliquo habitu, sed immediate ab ipsa natura” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b).

842 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b). 843 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b); cf. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 7: 311). 844 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: “Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel

donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104b).

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is helpful to keep in mind that gratia unionis is not something over and above the union itself,

for Thomas explicitly identifies the gratia unionis with the union.845

If we integrate this with Thomas’ claim that the union is an esse creatum, then, we are

presented with a problematic not between the language of the QD de Unione and the Summa

Theologiae but with a problematic that arises within the text of the Summa itself: how can the

personal esse of the Word be an esse creatum? Strictly speaking, it cannot. But as given to the

human nature, the relation that accrues to the human nature may be understood as the actuation

of a substantial, obediential potency and, therefore, characterized as a created, supernatural,

substantial, participation of the human nature in the divine esse of the Son.

5 The Union considered as a Created, Supernatural, Substantial Participation

At the end of question seven in the tertia pars, Thomas compares the habitual grace in

Christ with the grace of union. This leads him to a comparison of the missions of the Spirit and

Son whereby he associates habitual grace and charity846 with the mission of the Holy Spirit and

the personal union or assumption with the mission of the Son.847 This opens up an illuminating

analogy, for if sanctifying grace and charity are to the Spirit what the gratia unionis is to the Son,

then a reflection on the way Thomas characterizes charity may help us to better articulate the

meaning of gratia unionis.

When asking whether charity is something created in the soul, the first objection Thomas

entertains bases its claim on two Augustinian texts from which it draws the conclusion that

“charity is not something created in the soul but is God himself.”848 Thomas concedes the basic

                                                                                                               845 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “unio humanae naturae ad divinam personam, quam supra diximus esse

ipsam gratiam unionis, praecedit gratiam habitualem in Christo, non ordine temporis, sed naturae et intellectus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b).

846 The ambiguity about whether habitual grace or charity is to be more properly or primarily associated with the mission of the Spirit is echoed in other texts, see ST Ia, q. 43, a. 5, ad 1 & 2. Thomas appears untroubled by this ambiguity.

847 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “Principium enim unionis est persona Filii assumens humanam naturam, quae secundum hoc dicitur missa esse in mundum quod humanam naturam assumpsit. Principium autem gratiae habitualis, quae cum caritate datur, est Spiritus Sanctus, quis secundum hoc dicitur mitti quod per caritatem mentem inhabitat. Missio autem Filii, secundum ordinem naturae, prior est missione Spiritus Sancti: sicut ordine naturae Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio et a Patre dilectio. Unde et unio personalis, secundum quam intelligitur missio Filii, est prior, ordine naturae, gratia habituali, secundum quam intelligitur missio Spiritus Sancti” (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b).

848 Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, obj. 1: “Videtur quod caritas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII de Trin.: Qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est. Consequens est ergo ut praecipue Deum diligat. Et in XV de Trin. dicit: Ita dictum est, Deus caritas est, sicut dictum est, Deus spiritus est. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse Deus” (ed. Leonina, 8: 164a).

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principle of divine simplicity invoked by the objector, namely, that the divine essence is itself

charity, as also wisdom and goodness and grants that we are indeed said to be good by the

goodness which God is and wise by the wisdom which God is. But Thomas adds that the reason

for this is because the goodness by which we are formally good is a certain participation of

divine goodness and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a certain participation of

divine wisdom. Consequently, the charity by which we formally love our neighbor is a certain

participation of divine charity.849 Although he does not make the distinction explicit until his

reply to objection two,850 nevertheless, Thomas is distinguishing between the divine charity

identical with the divine essence as efficient cause and charity as the created participation of

divine love as formal cause.

Elsewhere, Thomas deepens his analysis of this participation in divine love, when he asks

whether charity is caused in us by infusion. Charity is founded upon the communication of

eternal beatitude and since this communication is not according to natural goods but according to

gratuitous gifts, such charity exceeds the capacity of nature.851 Consequently, charity is neither

something naturally occurring in us nor can it be acquired through natural powers. Thus, it can

only come through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, “which is the love of the Father and the Son,

whose participation in us is created charity itself.”852 Here, we see that Thomas characterizes the

charity in us as created and identifies this participation with the Holy Spirit. Thus, charity is a

created participation in the supernatural communication of the Holy Spirit.

Because of the analogy of the missions, we may suggest this language of participation to

explicate the gratia unionis: the union of the human nature to the Person of the Word is the

created participation of the human nature in the uncreated communication of the personal esse of

                                                                                                               849 Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1: “ipsa essentia divina caritas est, sicut et sapientia est, et sicut

bonitas est. Unde sicut dicimur boni bonitate quae Deus est, et sapientes sapientia quae Deus est, quia bonitas qua formaliter boni sumus est participatio quaedam divinae bonitatis, et sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est participatio quaedam divinae sapientiae; ita etiam caritas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quaedam participatio divinae caritatis. (ed. Leonina, 8: 165b).

850 Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2: “Deus est vita effective et animae per caritatem et corporis per animam: sed formaliter caritas est vita animae, sicut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae” (ed. Leonina, 8: 165b).

851 Thomas ST IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 2c: “caritas est amicitia quaedam hominis ad Deum fundata super communicationem beatitudinis aeternae. Haec autem communicatio non est secundum bona naturalia, sed secundum dona gratuita: quia, ut dicitur Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Unde et ipsa caritas facultatem naturae excedit. Quod autem excedit naturae facultatem non potest esse neque naturale neque per potentias naturales acquisitum: quia effectus naturalis non transcendit suam causam” (ed. Leonina, 8: 175a).

852 Thomas ST IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 2c: “Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales est acquisita, sed per infusionem Spiritus Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii, cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata, sicut supra dictum est” (ed. Leonina, 8: 175b).

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the Son. We may add to this the requisite qualifications that the created participation of the

human nature is substantial (not accidental) and a relation (not a habit), which may in no way be

construed as a medium or “buffer” between Christ’s humanity and divinity. This union

expresses the real, substantial relation of the human nature to the Incarnate Word.

6 Dubia

There remain some further issues that merit some attention. First, if esse secundarium is

the substantial, created, and absolutely supernatural participation of the Word’s humanity in his

divine esse, then why doesn’t Thomas use the language of participation to describe esse

secundarium, hypostatic union, or the grace of union? Second, what are we to make of Thomas’

remark in the Tertia Pars that the eternal existence of the Son of God becomes the existence of

the man?853 Finally, something must be said about the possibility of Nestorianism or a two-

person Christology.

I believe we will find a clue to the first in Thomas’ lectures on the gospel of John, for

there Thomas notes that the grace of union (which is not a habitual grace) is a gratuitum donum,

given to Christ, so that in the human nature he is the true Son of God, not by participation, but by

nature, inasmuch as the human nature of Christ is united to the Son of God in person.854

This observation of St. Thomas illuminates the interpretation we have proposed for esse

secundarium in a number of important ways. First, it very clearly designates the gratia unionis

with the term gratuitum donum, which as we noted above in our discussion of the Summa is

Thomas’ term for a created grace. Second, Thomas again very clearly characterizes the

hypostatic union as a grace. Lastly, while it may be tempting to read this passage as counter to

our interpretation insofar as it seems to reject the language of participation, nevertheless, the

meaning and intention of this text constitutes no such refutation.

                                                                                                               853 ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2: “illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis,

inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b). 854 Thomas, Lect. super Ioan., c. 3, lect. 6, n. 544: “Sed notandum, quod in Christo est triplex gratia, scilicet

unionis, singularis personae, quae est habitualis, et capitis, quae est influentiae; et quamlibet istarum recepit Christus non ad mensuram. Nam gratia unionis, quae non est habitualis, sed quoddam gratuitum donum, datur Christo, ut scilicet in humana natura sit verus filius Dei non per participationem, sed per naturam, inquantum scilicet humana natura Christi unita filio Dei in persona sit: quae quidem unio gratia dicitur, quia nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc habuit. Natura autem divina infinita est: unde ex ipsa unione accepit donum infinitum” (ed. Aquinas Institute, 205).

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It is important to recall that filiation is something principally said of the person not

nature.855 Hence, divine filiation is a feature of the Word’s divine personhood; it is not an effect

either of the human or divine nature but is what is proper to his own unique divine supposit. And

when Thomas notes that Christ is the true Son of God in the human nature not by participation

but by nature, the “by nature” is referring to the divine nature insofar as it is really identical with

the divine person of the Word.

So the question of participation in this text really regards the person, and consequently

Thomas has some version of Adoptionism in mind. But my argument about the meaning of esse

secundarium in no way suggests that the person of Christ is divine by participation, but rather

that the human nature participates in the divine esse. Christ the Word as a divine person does not

participate in the divine esse but is the very divine esse. The same may be said of the Word as is

said of the Father or the Spirit: He is ipsum esse subsistens. He has existence absolutely, totally,

and perfectly—not according to participation. The human nature of Christ cannot be a Son

because it is not a person, it is brought into union with the Person of the Son but it is not identical

with the Son anymore than it is identical with the divine nature.856

The spectre of adoptionism with respect to Christ’s person may have made Thomas

reticent to use the term participation in other Christological contexts, especially those

surrounding the hypostatic union. But the absence of a term does not necessarily imply an

absence of meaning. Consequently, I have argued that the term participation best expresses the

meaning Thomas sought to convey in the texts we have examined above, even if for rhetorical

reasons he chose not to employ the term himself.

As to the second issue, many have found justification for maintaining that there is no real

distinction between the divine esse and the esse secundarium in Thomas’ remark that “the eternal

esse of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the esse of the man, inasmuch as the

human nature is assumed by the Son of God into the unity of person.”857 Can this statement be

reconciled with an interpretation arguing for esse secundarium as a created, supernatural,

substantial participation?

                                                                                                               855 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 23, a. 4c: “filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae” (ed.

Leonina, 11: 267a). See also, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3c: “Nunc autem filiatio est talis relatio que non potest habere pro subiecto nisi ipsum suppositum” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 96b-97a).

856 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2: “esse Filium Dei non convenit humanae naturae: est enim haec falsa, Natura humana est Filius Dei” (ed. Leonina, 11: 269b).

857 ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2: “illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

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Clearly, this text cannot be understood as some kind of transmutation, a kind-of

existential monophysitism. The divine esse cannot become a human esse anymore than the

divine nature can become a human nature. But it also does not seem open to the interpretation

that the divine esse stands-in, as it were, for what would otherwise be the esse hominis. There are

a number of problems with such an interpretation, especially for one who is arguing that the

position in the De Unione is compatible with that articulated in the Summa and other texts. In

the reply to the first objection of the De Unione, Thomas says that the “esse of the human nature

is not the esse of the divine.”858

This cannot be understood as a mental or notional distinction, for as the objection itself

notes: “existence is not said univocally of God and creatures.”859 A mental distinction is simply

insufficient to denote the real distinction that must obtain between a creaturely esse and the

divine esse. One must also be careful not to read too much into the “becomes” (fit). Thomas says

elsewhere that the soul of Christ “becomes divine” but adds “by participation.”860 To be sure,

this qualifer is not present in the text referring to Christ’s esse, but is it necessary? Why should

we regard the “becomes” as suggesting anything more than what it does in the text regarding

Christ’s soul?

When an individual essence receives esse, it limits and determines that esse.861 Despite

the claim of some,862 this can in no way happen with respect to the divine esse.863 It cannot be

determined, limited, or formed by any finite and created essence. The divine esse or subsistence

may be communicated to a creature but the communication entails only a real change on the side

of the creature; there is no real change in God, for God as ipsum et summum bonum is of himself

always and eternally self-communicating. The communing creature is said to now participate in

the creator either according to habitual (i.e. sanctifying) grace or according to personal esse. The

                                                                                                               858 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter

dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

859 Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, arg. 1: “In Christo enim est esse divinum et esse humanum, quae non possunt esse unum, quia esse non dicitur univoce de Deo et creaturis. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse, sed duo” (ed. Obenauer, 84).

860 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1: “Sed quia cum unitate personae remanet distinctio naturarum, ut ex supra dictis patet, anima Christi non est per suam essentiam divina. Unde oportet quod fiat divina per participationem, quae est secundum gratiam” (ed. Leonina, 11: 107a).

861 See Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2 (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 197); in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1c (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 202); QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 24.2: 13b-14a); and ST Ia, q. 7, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 4: 74b).

862 See for example, Barnes, “Albert and Thomas on Hypostatic Union,” 144. See also, fn. 46 above. 863 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 3, a. 7c (ed. Leonina, 11: 68a).

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participation is created and is the real change in the creature as the contingent but supernatural

result of the eternal and unchanging divine communication.

The analogy of the missions that I appealed to above can again provide a helpful

clarification. Just as there is a real distinction between the Holy Spirit and charity as a

supernatural, created, operative habit in the will of a sanctified human person, so too is there a

real distinction between the divine, personal esse of the Word and the esse secundarium as a

supernatural, created, substantial act in the human nature of Jesus. Such a position is simply a

reiteration of the more basic and fundamental thesis on the real distinction between God and

creatures. Of the very little that Thomas affirms of esse secundarium, it is clear that he regards it

as temporal. Temporality implies both contingency and creaturehood. The esse secundarium is

the formal, contingent and created term ad extra that results from the divine will to communicate

the personal esse of the Son, but a created and contingent term is in no way really identical with

its divine cause.

Lastly, would an esse secundarium commit Thomas to a two-supposit or two-person

Christology? I believe that the answer to this lies in a brief review of Thomas’ mereology. A

nature is related to the esse of its supposit as an id quo not an id quod. The supposit is that which

has esse and a nature is that by which a supposit has esse.864 Which is to say that a nature is

always a part and a supposit is always a whole.865 Nothing can abrogate this basic, metaphysical

designation. Consequently, even in the sui generis case of the incarnation, Christ’s human nature

never has the status of a whole, it remains an integral part and while contributing essentially

insofar as it is that by which Christ is a member of the human species, nevertheless, it does not

contribute existentially. Thus, arguing that the human nature’s substantial participation in the

divine esse is rightly called an esse secundarium in no way changes its status as an integral,

metaphysical part.

A nature cannot become a supposit. Hence, in the absolutely unparalleled, supernatural

instance of the incarnation, Christ’s human nature cannot be a supposit. But because it is created,

we have a unique case where the human nature has an esse distinct from the principal esse of its

supposit, because the supposit is uncreated, eternal, and divine whereas the human nature is

created and temporal. There is a real distinction between God and every creature. But this real

distinction is also always a relation of real dependence. In the case of Christ’s human nature we                                                                                                                

864 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a); cf. IIIa, q. 35, a. 1c. 865 See Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, c. 211 (ed. Leonina, 42: 163b.6-7, 164b.92-93).

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have a created individuum that as a part and as an id quo is not a supposit, but nevertheless

participates uniquely in the personal esse of the Word and this participation is rightly called an

esse secundarium.

Peroratio 5

By integrating the texts above, I have argued that the esse secundarium of the QD de

Unione indicates an aspect of the very same relation denoted dogmatically by the term

“hypostatic union” but expresses this relation within an existential frame. Thus, we may

understand esse secundarium as a created, supernatural, substantial participation of the human

nature in the uncreated, personal esse of the Word. I have illustrated this connection by looking

at the way Thomas talks about the union in the Summa as a non-accidental but still temporal esse

creatum and the way in which he comes to designate the union with the term gratia unionis that

he in turn identifies with the personal esse of the Son as given to the human nature, that is,

insofar as there is a donum creatum received by the human nature, which is its unmerited,

supernatural, substantial participation in the personal esse of the Son.  This created supernatural participation is really distinct from the divine esse of the Son,

but it remains true to say that the personal esse of the Son is given to the human nature of Jesus

just as we also say that the Holy Spirit as proceeding love is given to an individual believer even

though the created habit of charity is really distinct from the Holy Spirit. Consequently, these

three terms: (1) hypostatic union, (2) gratia unionis, and (3) esse secundarium all seek to

indicate and express aspects of the very same supernatural event: the union between humanity

and divinity, accomplished in the person of Jesus Christ, Son of the Living God, become

incarnate for us and for our salvation.  

This interpretative conclusion offers a systematic implication, for esse secundarium

means, concretely, that everything which takes place according to the human nature takes place

under the horizon of this supernatural, created participation. Christ’s human life can unfold

historically according to this created participation in the personal esse of the Son but only on

account of the divine initiative of joining a human nature to the Person of the Word. Hence, esse

secundarium is not only temporal because it has a beginning in time but also because it perdures

through time. Esse secundarium provides us with a metaphysical foundation for affirming the

genuine historicality of Christ’s human and temporal life.

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If the interpretation I have illustrated and the implication I have suggested are correct,

then two further suggestions may follow: (1) one area of contemporary application and (2) a new

trajectory for textual interpretation insofar as it relates to the question of development in

Thomas’ corpus.

With respect to application: There is an ever-increasing drift away from a traditional

consensus about God’s simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. Such a drift is exemplified

most brilliantly in the work of Robert Jenson, who believes that “Nicene trinitarianism imposes a

heavy burden of conceptual dissonance,” so long as “the definition of deity by impassibility is

overcome only in the logic of certain trinitarian affirmations and not in principle.”866 As a

solution for this conceptual dissonance, Jenson appears to recommend that we conceive of God’s

eternity as a temporal infinity.867

That Nicene trinitarianism presents us with unsolved problems, I grant. But that the

solution to these problems may be found by introducing time, change, or development into God

such that “history occurs not only in him but as his being,”868 I deny. Esse secundarium opens

up an alternate path by which we may affirm that Jesus lived his own life within the unfolding of

a historical process without compromising on the Tradition’s insistence upon the doctrines of

divine simplicity, immutability, or impassibility. I develop this suggestion in the epilogue.

With respect to interpretation generally and the question of development particularly, it is

perhaps very tempting to compare the five places where Thomas asks the question: “Does Christ

have one esse or two?” This immediately creates an apparent dichotomy between the De Unione

and all the other texts, especially Tertia Pars, question seventeen, article two. The method of

reading proposed above has called this strategy of comparison into question. Structurally

speaking, my reading indicates that if one is looking in article two of question seventeen for esse

secundarium, one is looking in the wrong place. For question seventeen falls within the skopos

of the unity of Christ.869 Given such a context, it makes sense that Thomas would focus on the

divine esse as the principle of unity. Question two, article seven, on the other hand, falls squarely

within the skopos of the union of Christ. This text is precisely where we have located the

                                                                                                               866 See Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, The Triune God (New York: Oxford University Press,

2001), 125. 867 Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 1: 214-218. 868 Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 1: 221. 869 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 16, prol. (ed. Leonina, 11: 197a).

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discussion of a substantial, esse creatum. From a structural standpoint, it is question two of the

tertia pars not question seventeen that stands in thematic parallel to the QD De Unione.

The theological themes I have used to explore the meaning of esse secundarium open a

wider range of texts upon which to draw when exploring the possibility of development with

regard to the question of Christ’s esse. Hence, for example, although the question regarding

Christ’s esse is absent from the QD De Veritate, this text does discuss the gratia unionis.870

Likewise, questions such as whether or not the hypostatic union is something created, issues such

as contingent predication, and Thomas’ theology of the divine missions are all textual topoi

which must be examined if one is to have a sufficiently robust theological framework within

which to ask questions about potential points of theological development in Thomas’ ongoing

discussion of the esse of Christ. I pursue some of these textual questions in the following chapter.

   

                                                                                                               870 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 853a).

 

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Chapter 6 (Re)Reading Thomas’ Other Discussions of Christ’s Esse

Narratio 6

In the previous chapter, I alluded to two implications, one for contemporary systematic

Christology (which I will reformulate in the epilogue) and another for the (re)reading of Thomas’

corpus in light of the interpretation for esse secundarium that I have proposed. In this chapter, I

will assess my interpretation of esse secundarium against the other places in Thomas’ corpus

where he discusses Christ’s esse, but in a way that makes frequent recourse to his other

theological principles and Christological commitments to help adjudicate not simply the question

of compatibility but also questions of development. Consequently, in any given text about

Christ’s esse we also need to be asking about his concurrent position(s) with respect to the

Word’s visible mission, the hypostatic union, and grace.

1 Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi (mid 1250s)

Because Thomas regards the first two books of the Lombard’s famous Sententiae as

concerning divine things insofar as they go out (exitus) from their principle, he sees in the third

and fourth books a treatment of those things which are said of the divine according to their return

unto their end (reditus); book three, consequently, regards this reditus on the part of those things

which bring about the return or lead things back to their end, and book four regards those things

which are required on the part of those who are returning. Thomas divides the third book of the

Lombard’s Sententiae into two major parts according to (I) the one who brings about the return

efficiently, namely, God Incarnate and (II) those things which bring about the return formally,

namely the virtues and gifts. Thomas, subsequently, divides the Lombard’s treatment of God

incarnate into (A) a determination of the divine incarnation and (B) the conditions of God

incarnate.871

1.1 Basic Position of the Scriptum regarding the esse of Christ

Thomas’ discussion of the three opinions falls under the skopos of “those things which

pertain to the Incarnate God under the intelligibility of the union,”872 which is the first major

                                                                                                               871 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 1, div. text., n. 7 (ed. Moos, 3: 5). 872 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, div. text., n. 8 (ed. Moos, 3: 217).

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division within the treatment of the conditions of God incarnate. After laying out his divisio for

distinction six, addressing those things in which the three opinions (1) agree and (2) differ, and

(3) summarizing their basic positions, Thomas introduces his questions under the skopos of

determination of the truth: “around the truth of these opinions there is a threefold question.”873

Thomas asks three questions about the second opinion (or “subsistence theory”): (1) Whether

Christ is one? (2) Whether he has one existence? (3) Whether the person of Christ after the

incarnation is composite?874

Looking back to his summary of the positions proper to this theory, one can see that

article one corresponds with position three,875 and article three corresponds with position five.876

This suggests a likely possibility that article two (“Whether in Christ there is only one

existence?”) corresponds with the fourth position of the subsistence theory, which is that the

term “man” (as applied to Christ) signifies according to the mode of a subsistent (because the

human nature does not render something substantial, nor does it subsist except by union to the

Word), and consequently this term denotes not only Christ’s soul and body but even his

divinity.877

Of the five major discussions of Christ’s esse in Thomas’ corpus, the Scriptum is the only

text where the meaning of esse as essence is noted.878 But it is also very clearly rejected: this

question is not about esse as essence, but about esse insofar as it is the act of a being.879 The

other meaning of esse Thomas rules out, here, is esse taken as the truth of a proposition, for “this

                                                                                                               873 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, div. text., n. 11 (ed. Moos, 3: 221). 874 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, prol. (ed. Moos, 3: 233). 875 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, div. text., n. 11: “Et per consequens ponit tertio quod Christus est

unum tantum, et non solum unus” (ed. Moos, 3: 220); cf. d. 6, q. 2, a. 1, n. 61: “Videtur quod Christus sit duo neutraliter” (ed. Moos, 3: 233).

876 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, div. text., n. 11: “Et quia divina persona quae ante incarnationem subsistebat in una natura, postea subsistit in duabus naturis et tribus substantiis, ideo quinto dicit quod persona Verbi ante incarnationem fuit simplex, sed post incarnationem est composita” (ed. Moos, 220); cf. d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, n. 89: “Videtur quod persona Verbi post incarnationem non sit composita” (ed. Moos, 3: 240).

877 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, div. text., n. 11: “Et quia humana natura non substantifacaturut, subsistat, nisi per unionem ad divinam personam, ideo homo qui significat per modum subsistentis, non solum dicit animam et corpus, sed etiam Divinitatem. Et haec est quarta positio”(ed. Moos, 3: 220).

878 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 79: “Aliquando tamen esse sumitur pro essentia, secundum quam res est; quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus” (ed. Moos, 3: 238).

879 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 80: “Loquendo igitur de esse secundum quod est actus entis, sic dico quod secundum SECUNDUM OPINIONEM oportet ponere unum esse tantum; secundum autem ALIAS DUAS oportet ponere duo esse” (ed. Moos, 3: 238).

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esse is not in reality, but in the mind.”880 The next section pivots on the meaning of esse as the

act of a being in order to establish that a subsistent is related to esse as its quod est, whereas

nature or form is related as its quo est.881 This enables Thomas to establish the principle that esse

does not belong properly to the nature of a thing or its parts, nor to accidents, but to a complete

supposit.882

The third section compares the three opinions, and notes with respect to the second that

since it posits only one subsistent and does not think the humanity approaches the Word

accidentally, it consequently maintains that there is only one esse.883 Thomas supports this

position by arguing that it is impossible for something to have two substantial esse, citing the

notional relation among the transcendentals, “one is founded upon being.” He, therefore,

concludes that if there were many esse according to which something was called a being simply,

it would be impossible for it to be called one.884 The final sections qualifies these remarks by

noting that it is not inappropriate that the esse of one subsistent be related to many, “as the esse

of Peter is one, having yet a relation to the diverse principles which constitute it.”885 Thomas,

then, shifts to apply this principle to the unique case of Christ, who has two relations (respectus),

“one to the divine nature, the other to the human.”886

1.2 Solution of Potential or Apparent Contradictions with an Esse Secundarium

The reply to the first objection gives Thomas the opportunity to extrapolate the character

of the relation to the human nature. He begins by clarifying the way in which form gives esse. In                                                                                                                

880 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 79: “Uno modo, secundum quod significat veritatem propositonis, secundum quo est copula; et sic, ut COMMENTATOR ibidem (text. 6) dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale. Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae conjungit subjectum cum praedicato, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in VI Meta. (ε4. 1027b 25-27; l. 4, n. 1230-1231). Unde de hoc non est hic quaestio” (ed. Moos, 3: 238).

881 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 80: “Esse enim subsistens est quod habet esse tanquam ejus quod est, quamvis sit naturae vel formae quasi ejus quo est” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

882 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 80: “Unde nec natura rei nec partes ejus ducuntur proprie esse, si esse praedicto modo accipiatur; similiter autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum est, quod est secundum omnia illa” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

883 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 81: “SECUNDA vero OPINIO, quia ponit unum subsistens, et humanitatem non accidentaliter divinae personae advenire, oportet quod ponat unum esse” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

884 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 81: “Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

885 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 82: “Sed non est inconveniens quod esse unius subsistentis sit per respectum ad plura, sicut esse petri est unum habens tamen respectum ad dversa principia constituentia ipsum.” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

886 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, n. 82: “Et similiter suo modo unum esse Christi habet duos respectus, unum ad naturam divinam, alterum ad humanam” (ed. Moos, 239).

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cases where a composite of matter and form are per se subsistent, then there accrues to the

composite (because it is the subsistent) from the form an esse absolutely and per se. But when

the composite of matter and form is not per se subsistent, there accrues no esse either to the

composite or to the subsistent, but rather a new relation (respectus) according to the esse of the

subsistent to which the composite is joined.887

Thomas gives as an example the addition of a hand to someone who was born without a

hand (also positing that the hand could in some way exist separately, and thereafter be

miraculous joined to the person). As separated, the form of the hand causes the esse of the hand

as something per se subsistent. But once joined to the body, the form of the hand does not

bequeath esse to the hand, but there does arise a new relation of the person to the hand according

to his or her own esse.888 This example is a little awkward, but the same point could be made by

appeal to a muffler, which is manufactured separate from the model of car for which it is

intended. So long as it remains uninstalled, it has its own (artificial) esse. But once installed, the

car has a new relation to the muffler, and the artificial form of the muffler no longer causes the

esse of the muffler.

This principle and example are then applied to the incarnation, in which Christ’s soul

bequeaths no proper esse to the human nature, but there does accrue to the Son of God a relation

to the human nature according to his own (divine) esse. But, Thomas adds, this relation is not in

the divine person according to reality (secundum rem) but according to reason (secundum

rationem), “as was said of the union.”889 Applying the principle of contingent predication

extrapolated in the section on the hypostatic union,890 in this context, yields a real (temporal)

                                                                                                               887 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, n. 83: “forma facit esse; non ita quod illud esse sit

materiae aut formae, sed subsistentis. Quando igitur compositum ex materia et forma est per se subsistens, acquiritur ex forma illi composito esse absolutum per se. Quando autem non est per se subsistens, non acquiritur per formam esse illi composito; sed subsistenti cui hoc adjungitur, acquiritur respectus secundum esse ad hoc quod ei additur” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

888 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, n. 84: “Sicut si ponamus hominem nasci sine manu et manum per se separatim fieri et postea miraculose illi conjungi, constat quod forma manus causabat esse ipsius manus per se subsistentis; sed postquam conjungitur homini, ex forma manus non acquiritur aliquod esse manui, quia manus non habet esse proprium, sed acquiritur homini respectus ad manum secundum suum esse” (ed. Moos, 3: 239).

889 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, n. 84: “Ita etiam dico quod anima in Christo non acquirit proprium esse humanae naturae, sed Filio Dei acquirit respectum secundum esse suum ad naturam humanam, qui tamen respectus non est aliquid secundum rem in divina persona, sed secundum rationem, ut dictum est de unione” (ed. Moos, 3: 240).

890 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art. 1, qa. 1, n. 24: “Cum igitur in incarnatione non sit aliqua mutatio facta in natura divina, sed in humana quae tracta est ad unitatem in persona divina, erit haec relatio, scilicet unio, secundum rem in natura humana, in divina autem secundum rationem tantum. . .” (ed. Moos, 3: 187).

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relation of the human nature to the person of the Word.891 But what is the character of this

relation? It has as its real (ontological) subject the human nature, but if it is to be according to

Christ own esse, then it is also in someway dependent upon the Word.892

Given that a relation between creature and creator does not regard its terms equally,

perhaps it is helpful to ask (beyond the obvious addition of a nature), what’s the difference

between the ontological constitution of Christ and Peter? Thomas finds nothing inappropriate

about affirming multiple relations of the esse of Peter to his constituent and diverse metaphysical

principles. But in Christ there is a further difference: one of the relations is a real relation of a

creature to the creator (i.e., the human nature to the Word). Can the real relation of distinction

between a creature and the creator be rooted in anything other than the act of creation itself? If

not, then there really is a relation of creari (and therefore esse) on the part of the human nature,

insofar as it really depends upon God for its existence.893

And while I maintain that according to the natural order of things, a nature is not properly

the subject of existence, in the extraordinary case of the incarnation, because of the real

distinction between creator and creature, there redounds to the humanity of Christ a participated,

supernatural, created esse which must be said to be substantial, not because it is of a person, but

because it is of an individual, concrete nature, and essence or nature is in a substantial (not

accidental) order. Therefore, it may be rightly said that this esse secundarium is substantial.

But this esse secundarium is not proper to the nature,894 nor does it constitute the unity or

being of Christ, simpliciter.895 It would be secundum quid on both accounts,896 because this

                                                                                                               891 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2: “unio relatio quaedam temporalis est : quae

quidem realiter est in ipsa natura assumpta, sed in persona assumente secundum rationem tantum; sicut et de aliis relationibus ex tempore de Deo dictis, ut Dominus et hujusmodi, in I lib., d. 30 dictum est. Et tamen sicut Dominus realiter dicitur Deus, non propter relationem dominii in ipso existentem, sed propter potestatem coercendi creaturam, ex qua talis relatio causatur; ita etiam dicitur realiter unitus, quia in eo realiter est personalitas, ad quam unio terminatur” (ed. Moos, 3: 83).

892 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, art. 1, qa. 1, ad 2, n. 26: “unio potest esse relatio aequiparantiae in rebus creatis, sed non in Creatore et creatura; quia non eodem modo se habent ad unionem” (ed. Moos, 3: 188); cf. QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est, quod christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed Obenauer, 86).

893 If one looks to another context where Thomas invokes the example of the hypostatic union and again applies the principle of contingent predication, it must be said that there is a real relation of fieri on the side of the humanity, if there is only a relation of reason on the side of the Word, see Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, n. 62 (ed. Moos, 268).

894 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente” (ed. Obenauer, 84).  

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supernatural, created esse is dependent upon the uncreated esse of the Word. In this way, the

divine esse of the Word may still be said to pertain to the human nature,897 but not as though it

belonged to the human nature as its own, as if the human nature could somehow possess,

determine, or limit the divine esse.

Rather, because the Word extends his own esse to the human nature,898 the human nature

may be said to participate in the esse of the Word. But this participation is the only possible

meaning for an esse secundarium, for it is derivative but substantial, created but absolutely

supernatural. And since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, this supernatural esse

actuates this nature in such a way that it remains an id quo; it does not become an id quod, that

is, it does not (and cannot) become a supposit. In these ways, therefore, the positions delineated

in the Scriptum are in no way violated by those of the QD de Unione.

1.3 Other Positions

Having already noted some of the other places in the Scriptum where Thomas adverts to

the created character of the hypostatic union, I will not belabor that point any further. It remains

instructive, however, to look at his discussion of the gratia unionis. The question Thomas asks is

“whether the grace of union is some created grace?”899 He begins by distinguishing two

meanings, for grace can either refer to (A) the one who freely gives (gratia gratis dans) or to (B)

a gift freely given (gratia donum aliquod gratis datum). The first is to be identified with the

                                                                                                               895 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae

simpliciter sustentifcatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter sustentificatur per naturam humanam” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

896 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Et ideo, sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi; est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum” (ed. Obenauer, 86); cf. Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5, n. 67: “humana natura habet similitudinem cum accidente in Christo, inquantum advenit divinae naturae post esse completum. Non enim sequitur : Petrus est factus albus, ergo est factus; quia album diminuit de ratione facti simpliciter. Quod sequitur, si prius non fuit albus, quod non fuerit simpliciter; quia album advenit post completum esse. Et its non sequitur : Deus factus est homo, ergo est factus simpliciter” (ed. Moos, 3: 269).

897 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, n. 95: “Unde esse divinae personae pertinet ad utramque naturam” (ed. Moos, 3: 241).

898 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2: “persona non dicitur composita quasi esse suum sit ex multis constitutum—hoc enim est contra rationem aeterni—sed quia ad multa se extendit quae assumuntur in illud esse” (ed. Moos, 3: 242).

899 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, prol. (ed. Moos, 418).

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gratuitous will of God giving something without any merits on the receiver’s part.900 According

to the first sense of grace, therefore, (1) the grace of union would be uncreated, insofar as the

will of God uniting the human nature to the Son of God in person is due to no merits on the

humanity’s part.901

But if grace is understood as a gift freely given, there are two further possible meanings

for the grace of union: (2) it may be identified with the hypostatic union itself, and according to

this meaning it would be a created grace. Or (3) the grace of union may be understood as a

quality disposing the nature in some way for union to the Word; this too would be created.902

This third meaning of gratia unionis noted by Thomas prompts him to distinguish three ways in

which a subject may be disposed for the reception of a perfection. The first way is instrumental

and occurs when a medium falls between a subject and its perfection, as the attribute of

transparency disposes air to be illuminated by light. This, however, would not be an appropriate

mode of disposition for the hypostatic union, since the human nature is united immediately to the

divine person with respect to esse.903

Another manner of disposing occurs when matter is prepared for the reception of form.

Thomas gives as an example heat disposing something for the form of fire. He distinguishes this

second kind of disposing from the first insofar as no medium falls between form and matter,

rather (in the example of fire) matter is appropriated to the form of fire through the addition of

heat. A related difference is that in the first kind of disposing the accidental form disposing the

subject for reception is an accidental form which belongs to the subject perfected. But in the

second kind of disposing, what disposes the subject for reception is a property on the side of the

perfecting form. For this reason, such a disposing would be inappropriate to characterize the

disposing of the human nature in the union because the human nature, insofar as it is the kind of

                                                                                                               900 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 121: “gratia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo gratia

gratis dans, quod est ipsa gratuita Dei voluntas aliquid sine meritis dans. Alio modo dicitur gratia donum aliquod gratis datum” (ed. Moos, 418).

901 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 121: “Secundum igitur primum modum, gratia unionis dicitur ipsa divina voluntas sine aliquibus meritis naturam humanam Filio Dei uniens in persona; et sic gratia unionis est gratia increata” (ed. Moos, 418).

902 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 121: “Si autem dicatur gratia donum aliquod gratis datum, sic gratia unionis potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo potest dici ipsa unio quae quiddam creatum est, ut supra, 5 d. (a. 1) dictum est. Alio modo potest intelligi gratia unionis, aliqua qualitas ad unionem disponens” (ed. Moos, 418).

903 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1c: Sed aliquid potest disponere ad aliquam perfectionem tripliciter. Uno modo, ita quod cadat medium inter subjectum et perfectionem illam, quasi instrumentum perfectionis illius, sicut diaphaneitas disponit ad lucem. Et hoc modo non potest aliquid naturam disponere ad unioem, quia natura personae unitur immediate quantum ad esse” (ed. Moos, 418).

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nature that it is, is assumable by the divine person.904 A final difference, at least in the example

given by Thomas, is that the first mode of disposing is concomitant with an accidental change,

whereas the second is part of the process leading to a substantial change.

The third kind of disposing noted by Thomas is when some form is especially befitting to

a perfection, as when we say: “that robe is fit for a king,” or “she looks like a queen.” Thomas

offers royal examples as well, citing a line from Porphyry, “the appearance of Priam is worthy of

an emperor.”905 Consequently, any grace or perfection which adorns the human nature, either on

the part of the body or the soul, that in some way uniquely illustrates the union, may be referred

to as the grace of union. And so this third meaning of gratia unionis would also indicate

something created.906 As a final observation, Thomas suggests that the most prominent meaning

of gratia unionis employed by the Saints is the first meaning, referring to the divine will itself

freely giving.907 According to the multifold meaning of gratia unionis, therefore, Thomas may

field the various objections.908

Thomas’ reply to the ninth objection (or the fifth sed contra) could serve as a textual

basis for someone to argue against my suggestion in the previous chapter, namely, that esse

secundarium and the gratia unionis are the same in re, though they differ in ratione, for here

Thomas remarks that “the Son of God is said to be united to the human nature, not through a

change of the Son of God, but through a change of the human nature, or its exaltation, not to

some created gift but to the very uncreated esse of a divine person.”909 A textually grounded

                                                                                                               904 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1c: “Alio modo disponit ad formam aliquid, sicut

praeparando materiam ad receptionem formae, ita quod praeexistat in materia ante formam ordine fiendi, non ordine essendi; sicut calor disponit ad formam ignis, non quia cadit medium inter formam et materiam, sed materia appropriatur ad formam ignis per adventum caloris. Et sic etiam non potest aliquid disponere naturam ad unionem in persona; quia natura humana, secundum id quod est talis natura, assumptibilis est a divina persona” (ed. Moos, 418).

905 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 124: “Tertio modo aliquid disponit aliud ad perfectionem aliquam, sicut quod facit ad bonitatem et decentiam perfectionis illius; sicut decor personae facit ad dignitatem regiam, secundum quod dictum est (a PORPHYRIO in cap. De specie): « Priami species digna est imperio. » (ed. Moos, 419).

906 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 124: “Ex hoc modo gratia unionis potest dici [omne] illud quod decet naturam humanam Deo unitam sive sit ex parte corporis, sive ex parte animae. Et sic etiam gratia unionis est quid creatum” (ed. Moos, 419).

907 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 125: “Tamen, Sancti loquentes de gratia unionis, videntur intelligere secundum primum modum, prout gratia dicitur voluntas divina gratis et sine meritis dans” (ed. Moos, 419).

908 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, n. 125: “Et sic secundum diversas vias, ad argumenta utriusque partis respondere oportet” (ed. Moos, 419).

909 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9, n. 135: “Spiritus sanctus dari dicitur de novo, non secundum mutationem suam, sed secundum mutationem creaturae, quae est in perceptione doni ipsius. Ita etiam et Filius Dei dicitur uniri naturae humanae, non per mutationem Filii Dei, sed per mutationem naturae humanae, sive exaltationem ipsius non ad aliquid donum creatum, sed ad ipsum increatum esse divinae personae” (ed. Moos, 420).

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claim for the reality of a secondary act of existence in Christ must still affirm (in conformity with

the dogma regarding this mystery) that the term of the union is the person and consequently that

it takes place according to person or esse. The Trinity really does communicate the personal esse

of the Son to the human nature in [or according to] the person of the Word.910

In this ninth reply of the Scriptum, the principle of contingent predication is clearly in

play, as Thomas affirms yet again that the change can only be on the side of the creature. But he

is also drawing attention to the difference between the union accomplished through habitual

grace and the union which is the gratia unionis. In the reply to the second objection, he explains

precisely what this difference is: “our union to God is through a habitual, created grace as

through a cause, and as through that in which there is union; because in the very likeness of

grace the soul is conformed and united to God.” But this is not so in the unique occurrence of the

grace of union (if it is understood as something created), for the grace of union is not that in

which there is union, “since the union is in person, not only in some likeness.” Thomas even

goes so far as to say that the grace of union does not make the unity “but follows upon the unity

in person, insofar as the union is itself called the grace of union.”911 We may add to this, of

course, the difference that whereas habitual grace is a medium for the union of the soul to God

according to operation, the gratia unionis is no such medium, for the union in person is a unio ad

esse and between a human nature and the existence which it has in a person there falls no

medium which could be the principle of existence.912

The difference between habitual grace and the grace of union is key in explicating an

accurate interpretation of esse secundarium. For just as Christ’s esse secundarium is not the

principle or cause of his personal esse simply, so too the gratia unionis is not the medium in

which the union of the human nature to the Word occurs, nor can it act as a principle for this

personal union. The gratia unionis does not perfect or dispose the human nature for union with

                                                                                                               910 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: “Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus

datur humanae naturae in persona Verbi: quod quidem est terminus assumptionis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104a). 911 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2, n. 127: “unio nostri ad Deum est per gratiam

habitualem creatam sicut per causam, et sicut per id in quo est unio; quia in ipsa similitudine gratiae anima Deo conformatur et unitur. Sed si gratia unionis dicatur aliquid creatum, ipsa non est id in quo est unio, cum unio sit in persona, non solum in aliqua similitudine; neque etiam facit unitatem, sed consequitur unitatem in persona, secundum quod ipsa unio gratia unionis dicitur; vel est id quod naturam [unitam] decet, si gratia habitualis, grati unionis dicatur. Et ideo non est simile de Christo et de nobis” (ed. Moos, 419).

912 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, ad 7, n. 133: “Sed unio in persona, est unio ad esse. Quia autem inter humanam naturam et esse quod habet in persona non potest cadere aliquod medium quod sit principium illius esse; ideo non potest esse ibi alia gratia quae sit principium illius unionis vel sicut perficiens vel sicut disponens, nisi per modum dictum” (ed. Moos, 420).

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the Word: it is the union itself. This union is unique, for God is in the assumed nature in a way

different from any other way he is in other creatures; he is not present through some disposition,

but “through the very esse of a divine person which is communicated to the human nature.”913

Taking this divine communication of personal esse as a divine act, it must be identical

with the divine essence itself and, therefore, be eternal and uncreated. An eternal procession is

eternal. But if a divine procession is communicated temporally, as in a divine mission, then we

may say that there is a contingent and created term. Such a created and contingent term is

implied and entailed by the divine mission.914 The Son receives existence from the Father

eternally.915 If a created material term is made a participant in this eternal communication (i.e.,

the humanity of Christ), then there must also be in tempore a created, formal, contingent result:

this is the esse secundarium of Christ.916 With respect to the mystery of the incarnation, just as in

God, God’s (1) uniting, (2) being, and (3) good will giving are all the same really and eternally

but may be distinguished intellectually, so too in the humanity of Christ the (1) hypostatic union,

(2) the esse secundarium, and (3) the grace of union are all really one and the same substantial,

supernatural relation, but may be distinguished intellectually.

2 Excursus 1: QD de Veritate (1256-1259)

Question twenty-nine of the Disputed Questions on Truth investigates the grace of Christ.

Article two asks in particular, whether for the human nature to be united to the Word in person

there is required a habitual grace?917 Article one has already established the distinction, based on

the twofold way in which the soul is conjoined to God, between a union “according to esse” and

a union “according to operation.” The first is unique to the soul of Christ, but the second is

common to all those who come to know and love God,918 and requires a habitual grace.919 In the

                                                                                                               913 See Thomas, Scriptum in 3 Sent., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1, ad 8, n. 134: “Deus est in anima Christi vel in natura

assumpta alio modo quam in aliis creaturis, non est per aliquam dispositionem advenientem, sed per ipsum esse personae divinae quod communicatur naturae humanae” (ed. Moos, 420).

914 See Thomas, Scriptum in 1 Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 1c (ed. Mandonnet, 337). 915 See Thomas, Scriptum in 1 Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2 (ed. Mandonnet, 251). 916 The intelligibility of missio includes more than just esse ab alio, see Scriptum in 1 Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 3,

ad 1 (ed. Mandonnet, 355). 917 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 28, a. 2, obj. 1: “Secundo quaeritur utrum ad hoc quod humana natura

Verbo uniretur in persona requiratur habitualis gratia” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 852a.1-3). 918 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 1c: “animae ad Deum duplex potest esse coniunctio: una

secundum esse in una persona, quae singulariter est animae Christi; alia secundum operationem, quae est communis omnibus cognoscentibus et amantibus Deum” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 850b.122-27).

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replies to the objections of the first article one can discern the same distinction advanced in the

Scriptum between a union in person and a union in likeness, but there is added, here, a further

explanatory difference based on the different terms toward which the unions are ordered, for

whereas the union through likeness is ordered to the enjoyment of blessedness, the union

between Christ’s soul and his divinity is ordered toward the unity of his divine person.920

In article two, Thomas begins by distinguishing two senses in which it may be

understood that the hypostatic union requires habitual grace. The first leads to Nestorianism,

insofar as this heresy entails the proposal that the humanity is united to the Word according to a

perfect likeness of grace and therefore through the mode of a principle causing the union. But the

second meaning is through the mode of disposition.921 And, here, Thomas includes two of the

meanings of disposition he noted in the Scriptum: (1) according to necessity and (2) according to

congruity. These correspond to the second and third meanings in the Scriptum.922 Thomas again

invokes the example of combustion to illustrate a disposition of necessity where heat or rarity are

required in order for matter to be properly disposed for fire. He provides a new example,

however, for a disposition of congruity, observing that beauty is a disposition for marriage.923

Subsequently, Thomas notes the position of those who claim that a habitual grace is

required in order for the human nature to be made assumable but rejects this position and instead

proposes that the habitual grace in Christ is better understood as an effect of the union rather than

as a preparation for it. Consequently, the habitual grace in Christ can only be understood as

required according to the disposition of congruity and according to this meaning it may even be

referred to as the grace of union. Thomas continues to insist, however, that it is more fitting and

                                                                                                               919 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 1c: “Nam si loquatur de unione in persona non solum pars

superior animae Christi unitur Verbo sed et tota anima; si autem loquatur de unione per operationem, ad hanc requiritur habitualis gratia, ut dictum est” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 851a.147-51).

920 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2: “ratio illa procedit quando unio per essentiam et per similitudinem ad idem ordinatur: hoc autem non est in proposito, nam realis unio deitatis ad animam Christi ordinatur ad unitatem personae, unio autem per similitudinem gratiae ad fruitionem beatitudinis” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 851). 921 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 2c: “habitualem gratiam ad unionem praedictam requiri, potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo per modum principii unionem causantis, et sic ponere unionem in Christo esse factam per gratiam sonat haeresim Nestorii, qui ponebat non aliter humanitatem esse in Christo Verbo unitam nisi secundum perfectam similitudinem gratiae” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 852b).

922 It would seem that Thomas omits the first kind of disposition (in a medium) noted in the Scriptum because it corresponds to the error he attributes to Nestorius.

923 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 2c: “Alio modo per modum dispositionis; et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum modum dispositionis necessitatis, vel congruitatis; necessitatis quidem sicut calor est dispositio ad formam ignis vel raritas, quia materia non potest esse propria materia ignis nisi intelligatur cum calore et raritate; congruitatis vero, sicut pulchritudo est quaedam dispositio ad matirmonium” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 853a).

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more in accord with “the intention of the Saints” to understand the grace of union as the very

esse in the person of the Word which is brought together with the human nature without any

preceding merits.924

3 Quaestiones Quodlibetales 7-11 (1256-1259); 1-6, 12 (1268-1272)

The ninth quodlibetal disputation has as its stated skopos Christ as head, which Thomas

then loosely divides according to questions pertaining to (1) the divine nature, (2) the union of

the human with the divine, and (3) the species under which Christ is contained in the sacrament

of the altar.925 The second question is subdivided into three articles: (1) Whether in Christ there

is only one hypostasis? (2) Whether there is in him only one esse? And (3) Whether in him there

is only one filiation?926 This article division illustrates that the stated horizon of union has been

in some way subordinated to that of unity. Each article, therefore, identifies how oneness or unity

is to be determined.

This particular constellation of these questions is unique in Thomas’ corpus. To be sure,

he treats each of them in multiple other places, but not in a clustered sequence identical to this

one. The topics of articles one and two are separated by an intervening topic in the QD de

Unione,927 but Christ’s filiation is not given a separate treatment at all. In the Summa Theologiae,

the unity of Christ’s person is established in the beginning of question two, the unity of Christ’s

existence is treated in question seventeen, and Christ’s filiation it treated in question thirty-three.

Perhaps the closest proximity among these questions elsewhere in Thomas’ corpus occurs again

in the Compendium Theologiae, but there the determination of the unity of person and duality of

natures is given pride of place, and is then used as the principle for determining what is one and

what is many in Christ.928

                                                                                                               924 See Thomas, QD de Veritate, q. 29, a. 2c: “Et sic habitualis gratia non intelligitur dispositio ad unionem

nisi per modum congruitatis; et per hunc modum habitualis gratia potest dici gratia unionis, quamvis convenientius et magis secundum intentionem sanctorum gratia unionis intelligatur ipsum esse in persona Verbi, quod humanae naturae absque meritis praecedentibus collatum est; ad quod non requiritur gratia habitualis sicut ad fruitonem, quae in operatione consistit, nam habitus non est principium essendi sed operandi” (ed. Leonina, 22.3.1: 853a.86-96).

925 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, prol. (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 87a). 926 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, prol. (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 90a). 927 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 3: “Tertio queritur, uturm Christus sit unum <neutratlier> vel duo?” (ed.

Obenauer, 66). 928 See Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, c. 212 (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.1-6).

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3.1 Basic Position of Quodlibet 9 regarding the esse of Christ

The governing principle for determining the question of Christ’s esse in quodlibet nine is

expressed in the sed contra: “Whatever things are distinct according to esse, are distinct in

supposit.” Taking this in combination with there being only one (divine) supposit in Christ, it

must be concluded that there is only one esse in Christ. 929

In the body of his response, Thomas again distinguishes different meanings of esse, but

only notes two: (1) Esse insofar as it consists in the act of the soul composing and dividing,

which is not something in the nature of things, but is signified by a verbal copula.930 (2) And esse

insofar as it is the act of a being inasmuch as it is a being, by which something is designated a

being in act in the nature of things. According to this meaning of esse, esse is only attributed to

those things which are contained in the ten categories.931

But within the meaning of esse as an act in the nature of things, Thomas subdivides the

attribution of esse according to those things which subsist per se and those things which do not.

Consequently, esse is attributed properly and truly only to substances per se subsistent,932 but to

accidents, substantial forms, and any part in a different way because they do not have esse such

that they exist truly but only such that by them something exists. Thomas gives the example of

whiteness, which is said to be, “not because it subsists in esse, but because by it something has

that it is white.”933 At the root of this second division of meaning, we can see again the quod vs.

quo distinction clearly delineated in the Scriptum.

The next division of meaning distinguishes the different ways in which esse may be

attributed to a per se subsistent. There is an esse that results from the things which integrate its

                                                                                                               929 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, s.c. “Quecunque sunt distincta secundum esse, sunt in supposito

distincta; set in Christo est unum tantum suppositum; ergo et unum tantum esse” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94a.27-30). 930 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Vno modo secundum quod est copula uerbalis significans

compositionem cuiuslibet enunciationis quam anima facit, unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, set tantum in actu anime componentis et diuidentis; et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, siue sit ens siue priuatio entis : dicimus enim cecitatem esse” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94b.34-41)

931 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura; et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis que in decem generibus continentur, unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera diuiditur” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94b.41-46).

932 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Set hoc esse attribuitur alicui rei dupliciter. Vno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et uere habet esse uel est; et sic attribuitur soli substancie per se subsistenti, unde quod uere est dicitur substancia in I Phisicorum” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94b.47-51).

933 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Omnibus uero que non per se subsistunt set in alio et cum alio, siue sint accidencia siue forme substanciales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quod ipsa uere sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in esse subsistat, set quia ea aliquid habet esse album” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94b.51-59).

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unity, and this esse is the proper and substantial esse of the supposit.934 But there is another esse

“beyond those things” which integrate the supposit; this esse is “superadded” and consequently

an accidental esse. Thomas again offers the example of the way in which white is attributed to

Socrates when we say: “Socrates is white.”935

Having clarified the meaning of esse he intends (and the principles of application),

Thomas can now implement it in the case of the incarnation. For in Christ, there is only one

reality (per se) subsistent, and consequently the substantial esse properly attributed to a supposit

can only be one. There are two qualifications interlaced within this basic claim. The first is that

Christ’s humanity “concurs with the integrity” of the one subsistent, namely, the (incarnate)

Word, because he is the supposit of each nature. The second is that the unity of this proper and

substantial esse does not derive from the natures but from the supposit.936

This latter claim makes sense from a Trinitarian viewpoint insofar as the divine supposit

of the Word, the divine unity, and the divine esse are all really the same. But it also highlights an

inconsistency in Thomas’ attribution of unity in the preceding paragraphs. Sometimes he

references the unity of the supposit and sometimes he references the unity of the esse of the

supposit. This inconsistency is probably most easily reconciled by an appeal to the convertibility

of being and unity, but it seems to me to stand in (at least mild) tension with the argument made

in the Scriptum (that unity follows being) and with the comment here in the quodlibetal

discussion expressed in the reply to the second objection, namely, that “esse is that in which the

unity of a supposit is founded.”937 Ultimately, however, the appeal to convertibility works,

provided that in mente the meaning intended for esse and the meaning intended for unity are both

per se (and not secundum quid).938

                                                                                                               934 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Vnum scilicet esse quod resultat

ex hiis ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod est proprium esse suppositi substanciale” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95a.60-63).

935 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Aliud esse est supposito attributum preter ea que integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale, ut esse album attribuitur Sorti cum dicimus : Sortes est albus” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95a.63-66).

936 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Quia ergo in Christo ponimus unam rem tantum subsistentem, ad cuius integritatem concurrit etiam ipsa humanitas, quia unum suppositum est utriusque nature, ideo oportet dicere quod esse substanciale, quod proprie attribuitur supposito, in Christo est unum tantum, habet autem unitatem ex ipso supposito et non ex naturis” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95a.67-73).

937 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: “operatio suppositi non est de integritate unitatis eius, set consequitur eius unitatem, unde unius suppositi inuenimus multas operatione ssecundum diuersa operationum principia que supposito insunt, sicut homo aliud operatur lingua et manu; set esse est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi, unde esse multiplex preiudicat unitati” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95a.92-b99).

938 There is still something a little strange here. The union of body and soul constitute an essential unity of the nature. Is there an esse convertible with this essential unity? In what esse would this unity be founded? I think

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In the penultimate section, Thomas offers a hypothetical scenario, wherein the humanity

is separated from the Word. He notes that in this situation, the humanity would have its own esse

distinct from that of the divine esse. The rationale behind this seems to be that nothing impedes

the human nature from having its own esse other than the fact that it does not subsist per se. If it

were to subsist per se, then it would have its own esse. Thomas’ example of an arch confirms

this rationale, for if an arch were in some way a natural individual (as opposed to an artificial

one), the whole would have only one esse, but if any one of its parts were separated from it, then

each part would have its own esse.

What is curiously absent from this rationale excluding a proper and per se esse from the

human nature is an invocation of the hypostatic union. This is in contrast with Thomas’ rationale

for why a created personality is excluded from the humanity of Christ, which is impeded directly

by the union with a divine person.939 This contrast confirms Thomas’ argument earlier in

quodlibet nine that the hypostatic union requires that body and soul constitute a humanity, which

is to say, the hypostatic union presupposes the union between body and soul, but the concrete

intelligibility of “man” is not achieved until the union of the humanity with the Word.940

Consequently, the personal unity of Christ is not a created unity, but the unity of his humanity is

created.941 Thomas concludes the quodlibetal discussion of Christ’s esse by noting that for the

“second opinion”, there is in Christ only one substantial esse, “insofar as esse is properly of the

supposit,” although there are many accidental esse.942

                                                                                                               that it is this problem which in part motivates Suarez’s advocacy of a partial esse and the Salamancan strategy of arguing that an esse essentiae confers actuality in some way. Both of these strategies lead to problems. The more prudent reading of Thomas, it seems to me, is to emphasize that such causal lines cannot be efficient; they are only formal, i.e., structural. See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 25. 1: 92b) and ST IIIa, q. 3, a. 7, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 11: 68a).

939 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3: “consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat: sed impeditionem eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet. Et pro tanto dicitur persona consumpsisse personam, licet improprie, quia persona divina sua unione impedivit ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet” (ed. Leonina, 11: 74b).

940 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: “Secundum ergo secundam opinionem predicatam, unioni humane nature ad diuinam presupponitur unio anime et corporis secundum quod constituat humanitatem, non secundum quod constituit hominem. Id enim quod in Christo est constitutum ex anima et corpore tantum, quod unioni presupponitur, non est totum quod per se subsistit, set aliquid eius, et ideo non potest significari ut homo, set ut humanitas. Vnde opportet dicere quod in ipsa unione humane nature ad diuinam quasi in termino assumptionis intelligatur primo in Christo ratio hominis, quia tunc primo intelligitur ut res per se existens completens” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92b.156-93a.168). See also ST IIIa, q. 3, a. 7, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 11: 68a).

941 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 23b). 942 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Et sic patet quod secundum opinionem secundam, oportet dicere

quod in Christo est unum esse substanciale, secundum quod esse proprie est suppositi, quamuis sit multiplex esse accidentale” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95a.82-86).

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As to the objections, this article offers an entirely new set, with the exception of the

fourth, which is the same as the fifth objection in the Scriptum, and Thomas answers it in

essentially the same way, namely, that the objection is based on an intentional or mental esse not

esse as the act of a being in the nature of things but only in an act of the soul composing and

dividing.943 The reply to the third objection is especially worthy of note, for it acknowledges that

there really is a temporal generation.944 This merely inchoate observation is confirmed by the

following article, where although Thomas denies that there are two real filiations, nevertheless,

he insists (as also in the Summa) that there are really two nativities.945

3.2 Potential Contradictions with an Esse Secundarium

With respect to potential conflicts with the hypothesis of esse secundarium, it should be

noted first, that the division of esse adverted to in the conclusion of the quodlibetal discussion is

the last division, between accidental and substantial esse. The conclusion, therefore, does not

advert to those other things which subsist “in another and with another,” such as substantial

forms and (integral?) parts. In the QD de Unione, when Thomas speaks of the esse secundarium,

he notes two aspects: (1) it is not the principal esse of the supposit of the Word. This means that

it cannot be properly attributed to him as his proper and substantial esse nor can it compromise

(or constitute) his unity simply and per se. (2) But it is also not an accidental esse.946 Which at

least suggests that it cannot be said simpliciter that it is “superadded” to the Incarnate Word.

The list given in the QD de Unione of things other than the supposit which are said “to

be” are accidents and non-subsistent forms. In both texts, therefore, there is a further

metaphysical element which is said “to be” that is not excluded by the textually shared principle

that a subsistent supposit is what primarily, properly, and truly exists nor can it be identified with                                                                                                                

943 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4: “obiectio illa procedit de esse quod in actu anime consistit secundum quod etiam ea que sunt tantum secundum animam esse dicuntur, cum per ‘an est’ etiam de cecitate queri possit” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95b.105-109).

944 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3: “generatio temporalis terminatur non ad esse suppositi eterni ut simpliciter per eam esse incipiat, set quod incipiat esse suppositum habens illud, esse suppositum humane nature” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95b.100-104).

945 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3c: “Set in Christo non possumus dicere unam causam esse filiationis secundum quod refertur ad Patrem et ad matrem, cum sint due natiuitates penitus disparate” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 96b.68-71) and ad 1: “dicitur Christus realiter filius propter realem natiuitatem” (97a.106-107). See also, ST IIIa, q. 35, a. 2c: “In Christo autem est duplex natura, quarum unam accepit ab aeterno a Patre, alteram autem accepit temporaliter a matre. Et ideo necesse est attribuere Christo duas nativitates: unam qua aeternaliter natus est a Patre, aliam qua temporaliter natus est a matre” (ed. Leonina, 11: 353a).

946 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Quod est, si non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—, non tamen est esse principale sui supposit, sed secundarium” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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an accident or an accidental form.947 In this way, the (supernatural) act of such a metaphysical

element is not excluded as a meaning for esse secundarium.

The trajectory of the quodlibetal text is to establish a particular meaning of esse, namely

the act of a being inasmuch as it is a being, in the nature of things, properly and truly attributed

to something subsistent per se, not in an accidental way but substantially. An esse secundarium

would violate none of these criteria, for it would be the act of something in the nature of things to

which esse may rightly (id est, sine inconvenientia) but not properly be attributed, namely, as a

quo (not quod). In this way, it is absolutely true that there is only one substantial esse which is

attributed properly and simply to the supposit of the Word, this is the divine esse. Just as the

Word only has unity simply and per se in himself, not from the natures. So too, he only has being

simply and per se in himself, not from the natures. Therefore, the esse secundarium is not

attributed to him properly or per se because it does not constitute him a being properly or per se.

But it is true that the Word is man, that the Word has a humanity, etc. Why are these

statements true? Something in the created order has to have changed. There must be an act “in

the nature of things” which has as its real ontological subject the human nature (for no created

reality can have as its real subject the divine supposit of the Word).948 But such an esse

secundarium can also not be said to be attributed to the human nature properly or per se, insofar

as it is joined to the Word. For as joined to the Word it is not per se subsistent,949 but it is a real

recipient of a created grace, namely the gratia unionis, and consequently derivative and

dependent, that is, it is the contingent result of the eternal and uncreated communication of the

personal esse of the Word.

Perhaps the most challenging principle in the quodlibetal discussion, however, is the one

expressed in the sed contra of article two, but if we compare this to Thomas’ own hypothetical

(and revised) example about a separated humanity, it is curious that this example is supposing

the apparent contrary of the sed contra, namely, that something not a supposit would be distinct

                                                                                                               947 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2c: “Esse ergo proprie et uere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti”

(ed. Leonina, 25.1: 94b.58-59); cf. QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente” (ed. Obenauer, 84).

948 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3c: “In Christo autem non est nisi suppositum eternum, quod quidem non potest esse subiectum alicuius temporalis relationis: quecunque enim relationes temporales de aliquo eterno dicuntur, sunt relationes rationis et non rei”(97a.76-80).

949 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1c: “Non autem potest dici quod humana natura in Christo uel aliqua pars eius sit per se subsistens” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92a).

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in esse from another supposit. Elsewhere, Thomas acknowledges that the humanity of Christ if

not assumed would have had its esse in a created supposit.950

But this is not the hypothetical Thomas is presenting in this quodlibetal discussion, which

parallels the hand example from the Scriptum and is immediately followed by the example of an

arch in the text itself. Thomas is speaking of the humanity as though it were a per se subsistent; if

this were the case, then it would have its own proper substantial esse per se. But the hypothesis

of esse secundarium proposes no such scenario; rather, the esse secundarium is the substantial

supernatural act of a nature that precisely because it is one or unified,951 can be called an

individual or singular.952

But if it is argued that this still violates the more basic operative principle that only per se

subsistents are really distinct in esse, then I say that in this absolutely unparalleled and

extraordinary case of the incarnation, there is a more fundamental law: the real distinction

between creature and creator. How can it be said that the creature and creator are the same in

esse, when the creator is identical with that esse but the creature is not?

4 Excursus 2: Summa contra Gentiles (c. 1264/65)953

Book four of the Summa Contra Gentiles recapitulates the structure of books one through

three. As book one regards God in himself, book two God as the producer of all things, and book

three God as the end and governor of all things, so book four begins with (1) God as Trinity (4.2-

26), continues with (2) the work of God in the Incarnation (4.27-55) and the Sacraments (4.56-

78), and concludes with (3) the resurrection and final judgment (4.79-96).954

Thomas initiates his discourse on the Incarnation at chapter twenty-seven. The above

structure of recapitulation,955 which manifests textually the dramatic shift from only natural

means of knowing to a supernatural knowledge infused by God,956 highlights why Thomas opens

                                                                                                               950 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 (ed. Leonina, 11: 25b; q. 4, a. 2, ad 3 (11: 74b). 951 See Thomas, SCG 4.37 (ed. Leonina, 15: 132-33); 4.39.[1] (15: 137a); 4.41.[2] (15: 140a). See also, ST

IIIa, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2 (11: 23b); q. 3, a. 7, ad 1 (11: 68a); Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 (25.1: 92b); Compendium, c. 211 (42: 164a.52-54).

952 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1c: “Set ipsam humanam naturam in Christo nichil prohibet dicere esse quoddam indiuiduum aut singulare aut particulare” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 92b.125-28). See also, ST IIIa, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 218).

953 For the rationale of dating, see Torrell, The Person and His Work, 101-104, 332. 954 See Thomas, SCG 4.1.[11] (ed. Leonine, 15: 5). 955 For a visual comparison of books one through three and four, see Appendix I. 956 See Thomas, SCG 1.9: “Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad

manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et

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his treatise on the incarnation with the observation that we could think of no divine deed more

marvelous than that true God, the Son of God, would become true man.957 Among all of God’s

works, this is the most wonderful: that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.958 Scripture

verifies that this event did indeed take place (an sit), but the meaning (quid sit) of Scripture has

been distorted and perverted.959 Thomas divides this treatment of the incarnation into two parts:

(I) the possibility of the incarnation and (II) its fittingness.960 This divisio constitutes the twofold

horizon of refutatio under which he defends the mystery: (1) against those who impugn it

because it is impossible and (2) those who impugn it because it seems unfitting to God’s

goodness and other attributes.961

What is initially presented “indistinctly” through the testimony of sacred scripture in

chapter twenty-seven is amplified and clarified through the deployment of Tradition throughout

chapters twenty-eight to thirty-eight, so that by the time we arrive at chapter thirty-nine the

mystery is in much clearer relief.962 Hence, the “tradition of the Catholic Faith” is not some new

                                                                                                               probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et Sanctorum collegimus, per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius convincatur. Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solvents rationes adversariorum, et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes” (ed. Leonine, 13: 22).

957 See Thomas, SCG 4.27: “Quod quidem inter divina opera maxime rationem excedit: nihil enim mirabilius excogitari potest divinitus factum quam quod verus Deus, Dei Filius, fieret homo verus. Et quia inter omnia mirabilissimum est, consequitur quod ad huius maxime mirabilis fidem omnia alia miracula ordinentur: cum id quod est in unoquoque genere maximum, causa aliorum esse videatur” (ed. Leonine, 15: 108).

958 Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, in his commentary, directs our attention to the phrase Thomas uses in his Scriptum: miraculum omnium miraculorum—“the miracle of all miracles” (ed. Leonine, 15: 109); cf. Aquinas, in Sent. 3, d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, n. 97: “praeter unionem duarum naturarum in unam hypostasim quae completa est in conceptione Christi, quae est miraculum omnium miraculorum, est etiam aliud miraculum, ut virgo manens virgo concipiat hominem, necdum hominem Deum (ed. Moos, 117).

959 See Thomas, SCG 4.28: “Quidam autem, Scripturarum sensum depravantes, circa Domini nostri Iesu Christi divinitatem et humanitatem perversum sensum conceperunt” (ed. Leonine, 15: 109).

960  See Thomas, SCG 4.50.[1]: "Ostensum est igitur in praemissis non esse impossibile quod Fides Catholica de incarnatione Filii Dei praedicat. Consequens autem est ostendere quod conveniens fuit Filium Dei naturam assumpsisse humanam (ed. Leonina, 15: 158a); cf. SCG 4.55.[30]: “Sic igitur ex praemissis aliquatenus patet quod ea quae circa mysterium Incarnationis Fides Catholica praedicat, neque impossibilia neque incongrua inveniuntur” (ed. Leonina, 15: 183b). Joseph Wawrykow offers a helpful summary of Thomas’ Christology as it emerges from the pages of the SCG, see “Hypostatic Union” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 223-231. He rightly assesses a number of structural principles operative in Thomas’ treatise but unfortunately overlooks this fundamental division of the text.

961 See Thomas, SCG 4.53.[1]: “Quia vero Incarnationis fides ab infidelibus stultitia reputatur, secundum illud Apostoli (1 Cor. 1:21), Placuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis salvos facere credentes; stultum autem videtur aliquid praedicare, non solum quia est impossibile, sed etiam quia est indecens: insistunt infideles ad Incarnationis impugnationem, non solum nitentes ostendere esse impossibile quod Fides Catholica praedicat, sed etiam incongruum esse, et divinam bonitatem non decere” (ed. Leonina, 15: 170a).

962 It is particularly helpful to compare the scriptures cited in 4.27 (Jn. 1:14, Phil. 2:6-7, Jn. 14, Mt. 26, Jn. 10, & Jn. 16) in order to show that there are two natures (but not how they are related) to the metaphysically pristine description given at the beginning of 4.39: “Ex supra dictis igitur manifestum est quod, secundum Catholicae fidei

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force suddenly being presented but is rather a hermeneutical key that has been operative

throughout the preceding chapters.

This trajectory of clarification continues as Thomas presents both the suitability of the

assumption of humanity (4.42-44) and of Christ’s nativity (4.45-47). Both of these sections,

however, are still within the first part of the treatise, whose aim it is to affirm the possibility of

the incarnation. Chapter fifty will initiate the Angelic Doctor’s attempt to show the fittingness of

why God became man, which will constitute the second part of the treatise (4.50-55).963

Although there is no sustained discussion of Christ’s esse in the Summa contra Gentiles,

there a number of important principles with respect to Christ’s ontological constitution that are

worth noting. Perhaps the most salient is how Thomas characterizes the way in which the

humanity is brought into union with the Word, noting the causal lines operative and inoperative.

In chapter forty-nine, as Thomas systematically dissolves objections advanced against the

incarnation, he is especially insistent that the Word of God does not have subsistence from the

human nature,964 that the Word only has existence simply through the divine nature,965 and that

the hypostasis of the Word cannot be constituted simply by the human nature.966 Instead, the

human nature is drawn to the subsistence or personality of the Word so that he may subsist in

it.967 What the human nature does contribute, however, is that through it the Word is this man.968

This positive and real contribution of the human nature highlights another constitutional

principle important to Thomas in this text, namely, the particularity of the human nature assumed

by the Word, for it is a particular substance (though not a hypostasis or a per se subsistent),969

constituted by this body and this soul,970 which is not joined to the Word accidentally because

                                                                                                               traditionem, oportet dicere quod in Christo sit natura divina perfecta, et humana natura perfecta, ex anima scilicet rationali et humana carne constituta; et quod hae duae naturae unitae sunt in Christo non per solam inhabitationem; neque accidentali modo, ut homo unitur vestimento; neque in sola personali habitudine et proprietate; sed secundum unam hypostasim et suppositum unum. Hoc enim solum modo salvari possunt ea quae in Scripturis circa Incarnationem traduntur. Cum enim Scriptura Sacra indistincte quae sunt Dei homini illi attribuat, et quae sunt illius hominis Deo, ut ex praemissis patet; oportet unum et eundem esse de quo utraque dicantur” (ed. Leonine, 15: 137a).

963 For a visual presentation of the divisio of book four, see Appendix I. 964 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[4] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a.20-21). 965 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[5] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a.29-30). 966 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[7] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a.46-48). 967 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[4], [6], [15] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a.22, 156a.38, 157b.8). 968 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[4] & [11] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a.30-32, 156b.32-36). 969 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[12-13] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b.37-157a.4). 970 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[10] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b.20-21).

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“accidents do not confer substantial esse,” but “to be man is to be in the genus of substance,”971

and “the human nature, since it is in the genus of substance, can be the accident of no one.”972

All of these observations are in accord with the position expressed in the De Unione that

although the eternal supposit of the Son is sustained simpliciter through the divine nature not

simpliciter through the human nature, yet “the eternal supposit is sustained through the human

nature inasmuch as he is this man.”973 The contra Gentiles confirms that this line of

sustentifcare, which makes the Word a member of our species, is “substantial” not personally but

essentially, even though such an essential, causal line is dependent upon its union with the

supposit of the Word in order to be actualized.

Whereas Thomas juxtaposes humanitas and homo in the Quodlibetal question and

focuses upon the constitution of personal esse in the Summa Theologiae, here, in the contra

Gentiles, he adverts to the surplus of those elements and attributes which are beyond the integrity

of a nature and thereby do not come under the strict dictates of the unity of the species. This

surplus is how he can explicate what it means to be united in person, in contrast to what it means

to be united in nature.974 This suggests that in the constitution of a supposit or person there is

always a unity per se of the whole, but also a unity secundum quid of the nature considered in

itself. This principle, too, is echoed in the De Unione, for “Christ is one simply on account of the

unity of the supposit and two secundum quid on account of the two natures.”975

In the quodlibetal discussion, Thomas noted the exception of filiation from the more

generally operative rule of the communicatio idiomatum: unlike other attributes which may be

attributed to the person of the Word according to the assumed humanity, filiation cannot, for it is

                                                                                                               971 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[15]: “Non tamen sequitur quod humana natura accidentaliter Verbo adveniat, ex

hoc quod Verbum ab aeterno praeextitit, sicut ultima ratio concludebat. Sic enim Verbum humanam naturam assumpsit ut vere sit homo. Esse autem hominem est esse in gener substantiae. Quia igitur ex unione naturae humanae hypostasis Verbi habet quod sit homo, non advenit ei accidentaliter: nam accidentia esse substantiale non conferunt” (ed. Leonina, 15: 157b).

972 See Thomas, SCG 4.41.[6]: “Et quidem manifestum est quod non potest inesse Verbo ut accidens: tum quia Deus non est susceptivum accidentis, ut supra probatum est; tum quia humana natura, cum sit de genere substantiae, nullius accidens esse potest” (ed. Leonina, 15: 141a).

973 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86). 974 See Thomas, SCG 4.41.[3]: “Contingit tamen id quod non est de integritate speciei, in aliquo individuo

sub illa specie contento reperiri: sicut album et vestitum in Sorte vel Platone, aut digitus sextus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua uniri in individuo quae non uniuntur in una integritate speciei: sicut humana natura et albedo et musica in Sorte, et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur esse unum subiecto. Et quia individuum in genere substantiae dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona, convenienter omnia huiusmodi dicuntur uniri secundum hypostasim, vel etiam secundum personam. Sic igitur patet quod nihil prohibet aliqua non unita esse secundum naturam, uniri autem secundum hypostasim vel pesonam” (ed. Leonina, 15: 140).

975 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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not simply and properly predicated of a nature but only predicated of a supposit. It cannot have

for its metaphysical subject a nature.976 In the contra Gentiles, following the rule of contingent

predication, Thomas again notes that the change(s) brought about by the assumption cannot be in

the Word but only in the nature assumed by the Word. It is according to the human nature,

therefore, that it belongs to the Word to be generated temporally and born, but not according to

himself.”977

This text goes a bit further than the Quodlibetal discussion insofar as it does not invoke

the temporal cause of birth or generation (i.e., Mary), but indicates a real effect in the human

nature.978 Taking these texts in combination, therefore, it seems that there is grounds for

affirming that the human nature is the “first subject” of birth and generation from a metaphysical

standpoint, albeit improperly.979 It remains absolutely true, however, to say that the Word is the

son of Mary and that Mary is the mother of God because of the intimate, personal union into

which the Word has brought the humanity. It is his own: he is more sublimely and intimately

united to it than the soul to the body,980 and all its attributes belong to him. He was born,

according to the flesh; he suffered, according to the flesh; he died according to the flesh. It is the

Son of God and no other who brought about our salvation in the humanity which is his alone.

                                                                                                               976 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3c: “Vnde filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem non est realis relatio,

set rationis tantum, sicut et cetere que dicuntur de Deo ad creaturas : non enim potest dici quod subiectum filiationis sit suppositum eternum ratione humane nature uel alicuius partis eius, sicut dicitur suppositum Mortis uel Passionis, quia sic ipsa natura humana uel pars eius esset primum subiectum filiationis et denominaretur per ipsam, sicut contingit et de aliis accidentibus que attribuuntur Christo ratione humane nature; filiatio uero nunquam denominat nisi ipsum suppositum nec potest aliud pro subiecto habere” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 97a.80-93).

977 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[3]: “Similiter etiam non consequitur quod Verbum sit substantialiter mutatum per hoc quod naturam humanam assumpsit. Nulla enim mutatio in ipso Verbo Dei facta est, sed solum in humana natura quae est a Verbo assumpta, secundum quam competit Verbo et generatum esse temporaliter et natum, non autem secundum seipsum” (ed. Leonina, 15: 156a).

978 What Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3c does say, however, should not be overlooked: “Nichil tamen prohibet aliquas reales relationes inesse Christo ad Virginem, sicut cum dicimus: ‘Corpus Christi est originatum ex Virgine’; set ista relatio non habet rationem filiationis, nisi poneremus, secundum primam opinionem, suppositum creatum esse aliud in Christo ab increato” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 97a.93-99).

979 The Summa’s solution is to say that the nature is the term and the person is the subject of birth. But notes repeatedly that birth is attributed to the person or hypostasis properly (See ST IIIa, q. 35, a. 1; a. 2, ad 3). This at least leaves the possibility open of saying that it is attributed to the nature as to a subject improperly. If a relation is real, then it has to have a real subject. Temporal birth or generation cannot have for its real subject an eternal person; therefore it must have a temporal subject. But this can only be the human nature. So if nativity is normally only properly attributed to the person, then in the incarnation perhaps it is attributed improperly to the nature.

980 See Thomas, SCG 4.41.[14]: “intelligendum est enim Verbum Dei multo sublimius et intimius humanae naturae potuisse uniri quam anima qualicumque proprio instrumento: praecipue cum toti humanae naturae mediante intellectu coniunctum dicatur” (ed. Leonina, 15: 142).

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5 Compendium Theologiae (1265-1267)981

Not surprisingly, Thomas’ discussion of the esse of Christ in the Compendium

Theologiae is exceedingly brief, occupying barely twelve lines of a column in the Leonine text.

Again, however, this discussion falls under the skopos of unity: “What ought to be called one and

what many in Christ?”982 The principle for the determination of this question is whatever pertains

to the natures must be confessed to be many,983 and whatever pertains to the supposit must be

confessed to be one.984 Consequently, “if esse is received insofar as there is one esse of one

supposit, it seems it should be said that in Christ there is only one esse.”985 Thomas immediately

notes the same principle he presented in the quodlibetal discussion regarding parts separated

from their whole: “parts divided individually, have their own esse, but insofar as they are

considered in the whole, they do not individually have their own esse, but all exist through the

esse of the whole.”986 He quickly concludes, “therefore, if we consider Christ as an integral

supposit of two natures, there will be only his one esse, as also there is one supposit.”987

This abbreviated discussion avoids the language of per se and secundum quid; and while

using the modifier proprium, nevertheless avoids the adverbials “properly” and “truly.” The

discussion is also not framed in terms of subsistence or non-subsistence but of wholes and parts.

The determination of meaning both in the thesis and conclusion are introduced with “if.” The

only other place in this chapter where an introductory conditional occurs in this way is when

Thomas references the homo assumptus theory. There seems to be an invitation for the reader to

ask, what other way could esse be taken?

                                                                                                               981 For the rationale of dating, see Torrell, The Person and His Work, 164-67, 349-50. 982 See Thomas, Compendium, c. 212: “Quia igitur in Christo est una persona et due nature, ex horum

consequentia considerandum est quid in Christo unum dici debeat, et quid multa” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.1-6). 983 See Compendium, c. 212: “Similiter etiam quecumque communiter Deo et homini attribuuntur ad

naturam pertinentia, necesse est plura dicere in Christo” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.13-16). There is actually a further criteria with respect to the natures, insofar as their diversity is itself reason to say that certain things are multiplied in Christ, such as generation and birth: “Quecumque enim secundum nature diuersitatem multiplicantur, necesse est quod in Christo plura esse confiteamur” (42: 165a.4-6).

984 See Compendium, c. 212: “Ea uero que ad suppositum siue ypostasim pertinent, unum tantum in Christo confiteri oportet” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.26-28).

985 See Compendium, c. 212: “Vnde si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius suppositi, uidetur dicendum quod in Christo sit unum tantum esse” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.28-30).

986 See Compendium, c. 212: “Manifestum est enim quod partes diuise singule proprium esse habent, secundum autem quod in toto considerantur, non habent singule suum esse, sed omnes sunt per esse totius” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.31-34).

987 See Compendium, c. 212: “Sic igitur si consideremus ipsum Christum ut quoddam integrum suppositum duarum naturarum, erit eius unum tantum esse, sicut et est unum suppositum” (ed. Leonina, 42: 165a.35-38).

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The term “parts,” can be received in a wide sense, to denote even metaphysically

constituent elements such as a nature. But as we saw in quodlibet nine, Thomas distinguishes

accidents, substantial forms, and parts, and sometimes explicitly distinguishes a nature from its

parts or substances from their parts. These other elements in the Compendium are either missing

or are implicitly grouped under a wider meaning of “parts.” Whatever the reason for this, I don’t

think the cue can be overlooked: “if we consider,” that is, if I am considering Christ as a unit or

as a whole, then the cause for this can only be one esse, as there is only one supposit. The

hypothesis of esse secundarium would not contradict this line of consideratio. For it is not the

cause of Christ’s unity or his being a whole.

The question that esse secundarium answers is not one that revolves around Christ’s

unity. Consequently, if Christ’s unity or integrity is what is under investigation, there is no

exigence to seek out an existential ratio for his humanity. This would strictly speaking be

residual, unless one were to advert to the disproportionate number of divergences in Christ’s

constitution from the normative ontological constitution of a finite being and apply (as a kind of

first instinct) the principle of contingent predication, which inchoately deploys the real

distinction between God and creatures. Only then would a new vista of questioning break in

upon the mind.

6 Excursus 3: Lectura super Ioannem (1270-1272)988

Given the earlier and somewhat labored distillation of different meanings of gratia

unionis which Thomas presented in the Scriptum and the De Veritate, the clarity and confidence

of distinction with which he presents a threefold grace in Christ in his Lectura super Ioannem is

telling. In this context of exposition, Thomas does not deem it necessary to enumerate all the

possible meanings of gratia unionis, but sets what appears to have become the principal meaning

of gratia unionis alongside but distinct from Christ’s habitual grace (which he has as an

individual) and the grace he has insofar as he is head of the Church.989 He also no longer notes

                                                                                                               988 For the rationale of dating, see Torrell, The Person and His Work, 198-201, 339, 431. 989 See Thomas, Lect. super Ioan., c. 3, lect. 6, n. 544: “Sed notandum, quod in Christo est triplex gratia,

scilicet unionis, singularis personae, quae est habitualis, et capitis, quae est influentiae; et quamlibet istarum recepit Christus non ad mensuram. Nam gratia unionis, quae non est habitualis, sed quoddam gratuitum donum, datur Christo, ut scilicet in humana natura sit verus filius Dei non per participationem, sed per naturam, inquantum scilicet humana natura Christi unita filio Dei in persona sit: quae quidem unio gratia dicitur, quia nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc habuit. Natura autem divina infinita est: unde ex ipsa unione accepit donum infinitum” (ed. Aquinas Institute, 205).

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the grace of union’s possible identification with the divine will itself, but refers to it simply as a

gratuitum donum and stresses that it is not habitual.

7 Summa Theologiae, tertia pars (1272)

The tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae is truly unique among Thomas’ personal

Christological treatises. While heresies are periodically noted and refuted, they no longer

constitute the primary governing horizon of Thomas’ discourse. He has truly achieved something

of a “scientific” order, that is, an order according to cause(s). In previous texts, such as the

contra Gentiles and the Compendium, Thomas leans heavily on the rhetorical instrument of

refutatio in order to pursue a modified via inventionis. But in the tertia pars, he frames the why

of the incarnation in such a way that the intelligibility (and actuality!) of the hypostatic union can

have immediate pride of place, prior even to the sustained discussion of the Person who assumes

and the nature assumed. In this way, the hypostatic union becomes the basic created

intelligibility expressing the mystery of the incarnation and explaining the nexus of the mysteries

of Christ’s human life.

In the contra Gentiles the possibility of the incarnation and its meaning are worked out

first and the convenientia along with the problem of sin, second. The Christological chapters in

the Compendium reverse this order and begin instead with a treatment of the fall, sin, and its

effects. For in this way, sin can be situated more appropriately as a kind-of quasi cause of the

incarnation, although it cannot be said to be the cause absolutely, whereas it can be counted as a

ratio for the incarnation. This ratio is of course still operative even in the Summa, but it is

subordinate to the self-diffusive goodness of God and pales in comparison with God’s created

solution for sin, namely, the hypostatic union, which is not worked out (at least structurally) as

clearly in the Compendium; in the Summa, however, it almost has the status of a first principle.

But what is most striking about the opening of the tertia pars is the primacy of the question of

convenientia, which seems to have come into its own as Thomas’ preferred theological method,

which he deploys repeatedly, especially in the mysteria vitae Christi.

7.1 Basic Position of the Summa Theologiae regarding the esse of Christ

As I noted in the previous chapter, the question explicitly regarding the esse of Christ in

the tertia pars falls under the wider skopos of “those things which follow upon this union,” and

more narrowly under the skopos of “those things which pertain to Christ according to the

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intelligibility (ratio) of unity.”990 In all conversations, therefore, about the esse of Christ in

Thomas’ corpus, with the exception of the De Unione, this discussion is subordinated to the

question of unity.

(1) The main operative principle is similar to that of the Compendium, for “since in Christ

there are two natures and one hypostasis, it is necessary that those things which pertain to nature

in Christ are two, but those things which pertain to the hypostasis in Christ are one alone.991 (2)

But Thomas also re-applies the distinction present in both the Scriptum and the Quodlibet

discussions, regarding the different ways in which esse pertains to person and to nature, “to the

hypostasis as to that which has esse, but to nature as to that by which something has esse.”992

(3) Thomas, then, subdivides the way in which esse pertains to person. If some form or

nature does not pertain to the personal esse of a subsistent hypostasis, that esse is not said to be

of that person simply, but relatively. Having cited the example of being white with respect to

Socrates, Thomas adds that there is nothing which prohibits an esse such as this to be multiplied

in a hypostasis or person. Thus, for example, the esse by which Socrates is white is not the same

as the esse by which he is musical.993 But it is impossible for the esse which pertains to the

hypostasis or person according to herself to be multiplied, “for it is impossible that of one reality

there is not one esse.”994 Ultimately, this division of ways in which esse is related to person

seems to result in a distinction between accidental and substantial esse, but unlike the quodlibetal

discussion, Thomas does not say this explicitly. And it seems that he wants to remain focused on

the person as the center of reference no matter what the character of the esse.

(4) Based on the above, distinction, however, Thomas concludes that if the humanity

were joined accidentally to the Word (an error elsewhere assigned to the “third opinion” or

                                                                                                               990 See Appendix K. 991 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una hypostasis, necesse est quod

ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a).

992 See “Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam: ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a).

993 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Est autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid: sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non inquantum est Socrates, sed inquantum est albus. Et huiusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel persona: aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a).

994 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a).

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habitus theory), then there would be two esse: “one insofar as he is God,” and “another insofar as

he is man,” just as in Socrates there is one esse insofar as he is white and another insofar as he is

man, “because to be white does not pertain to the personal esse of Socrates.”995 Since this is not

the way the humanity was actually joined to the Word, (5) Thomas re-directs the reader’s

attention to constitutive aspects or features that because they bear directly upon the completion

of an individual human nature (such as being headed, being bodily, being animate, etc.),996

pertain to the esse of the person in a unique way, and consequently do not have their own esse

but share in the personal esse of the whole.997

In the case, therefore, of constitutional or integral attributes, if a person is born with a

deficiency in one of them, say someone born blind or with an inadequately functioning bodily

organ, and is afterwards given a new organ (or has the organ restored), the organ does not give a

new (personal) esse to the whole but is the cause of a new relation, such that the person “is said

to be not only according to those things which she had before, but even according to those things

which were added to her afterwards.”998 In the case of someone born blind, prior to surgery, it

was not true to say that this person could see, but afterwards, it is true to say that she can see.

There is no new substantial esse constituted on the side of the person due to the surgery, but

there is a new relation that obtains between parts and whole. (6) In a similar way, therefore, since

the human nature was conjoined to the Word hypostatically or personally (not accidentally),

there is no new personal esse which is added to the Word according to the human nature, “but

only a new relation (habitudo) of the personal, preexistent esse to the human nature,” who

already subsisted according to the divine nature, but can now be truly said to subsist according to

the human nature.999

                                                                                                               995 Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Si igitur humana natura adveniret Filio Dei, non hypostatice vel

personaliter, sed accidentaliter, sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse: unum quidem secundum quod est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo. Sicut in Socrate ponitur aliud esse secundum quod est albus, aliud secundum quod est homo: quia esse album non pertinet ad ipsum esse personale Socratis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

996 See ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4 (ed. Leonina, 222b); cf. Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 92b.140-49). 997 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: ““Esse autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum

pertinet ad unam personam Socratis: et ideo ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

998 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: Et si contingeret quod, post constitutionem personae Socratis, advenirent Socrati manus vel pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret Socrati aliud esse, sed solum relatio quaedam ad huiusmodi: quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum secundum ea quae prius habebat, set etiam secundum ea quae postmodum sibi adveniunt” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

999 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c: “Sic igitur, cum humana natura coniungatur Filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non accidentaliter, consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam: ut

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7.2 Potential Contradictions with an Esse Secundarium

Just as in the Summa, we find “according to the human nature there approaches no new

personal esse,” so also in the QD de Unione Thomas affirms that that the human nature does not

sustain or make substantial the person of the Word, simpliciter. The reason Thomas gives is that

the person of the Son of God existed before the humanity was assumed. He also notes the person

of the Son is not created or made more perfect through the assumption of the human nature. But

on account of the human nature really being assumed, it is now true to say that the Son of God is

this man.1000 With respect to these points, therefore, the Summa and the De Unione are absolutely

agreed.

But even if we shift focus (as the De Unione does) from nature to esse, Thomas does not

make the esse secundarium into a personal esse. The esse secundarium, although not accidental,

still does not pertain to the person or esse of the Word in a way that constitutes him simply or per

se, but it does alter the source of an intelligibility in the world, for now the Word subsists both in

divinity and humanity, so it is true to say that the Word became flesh or that the Son of God

became man. The hypothesis of esse secundarium compels one to shift the point of reference in

such a way as to apply the principle of contingent predication. Since we are talking about a

relation between God and creatures, the “new relation” on the side of the divine person is only

according to reason, but what is the foundation for the real relation? It has to have for its real

ontological subject a created individual.

The statement made in the reply to the second objection is an arresting one: “the eternal

esse of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the esse of the man, inasmuch as the

human nature is assumed by the Son of God into the unity of person.”1001 I made some initial

comments regarding the reconciliation of this with the hypothesis of esse secundarium in the

previous chapter, but some further observations are now in order. The term “man,” in the case of

                                                                                                               scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed etiam humanam” (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

1000 See Thomas, QD de Unione, q. 4c: “In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae simpliciter sustentificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter sustentifactur per naturam humanam: quia persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam, nec in aliquo persona est augmentata seu perfectior per naturam humanam assumptam. Sustentificatur autem suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam, inquantum est hic homo” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

1001 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 222b).

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Christ primarily denotes the supposit,1002 consequently this reply amounts to nothing more than

the principle we have seen repeated throughout the corpus, namely, the there can only be one

substantial esse per se and simply of the supposit. In Christ’s case this is the eternal, uncreated,

divine esse with which he is identical according to his divinity.

But as the last line of the body of the response in the Summa emphasizes, in the

incarnation the Son of God can now be truly said to subsist both in the divine and the human

nature. The divine esse, however, is still the principal, proper, and substantial esse of the Son of

God even as incarnate, and as I argued in the previous chapter (but that we also saw emphasized

in the contra Gentiles), the human nature is drawn into the subsistence of the Word. Considered

on the humanity’s side, this would mean a created, substantial and absolutely supernatural

participation. But since this esse secundarium is neither the principal esse nor an accidental esse,

it actually avoids both of the designations in the Summa assigned to differing ways in which esse

applies or pertains to the person. In this way, Christ’s esse secundarium cannot be the proper

esse of the person of the Word, but it also cannot be the proper esse of the humanity simpliciter,

but only secundum quid, since the humanity does not subsist per se, but only in the Word.

Peroratio 6

In the De Unione as in most of the other discussions of Christ’s esse, Thomas reiterates

the same principle: existence is properly and per se of a supposit. If the hypothesis of esse

secundarium violates this principle, then the contradiction is not so much between the De Unione

and the other places where Thomas discusses the esse of Christ, but is internal to the text of the

De Unione itself. But through the explorations of these other discussions of Christ’s esse, I have

illustrated both internal and external consistency. There is no contradiction between these texts,

because the esse secundarium is not the proper or principal esse of the Word, nor does its

reception by the human nature make the humanity a per se subsistent. It is a quo not a quod, but

even Thomas sometimes says that nature is “what has existence in a supposit.” So we should be

careful not to allow this distinction to exclude conclusions which are demanded by the principle

of contingent predication, such as Thomas’ own admission that the hypostatic union is really in

the human nature as in a subject, and also that temporal generation and birth are also in some

way “in” the human nature. The application of this same principle is why it must be said that the                                                                                                                

1002 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 92b); ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 3c (ed. Leonina, 11: 81); q. 16, a. 12, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 11: 217b).

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human nature is the real subject of the esse secundarium, insofar as this is the contingent result

of the human nature being drawn into the eternal existence of the Word.

With respect to the gratia unionis, by the time of the Summa Theologiae, Thomas no

longer feels the need to talk about how habitual grace could in some way be called the grace of

union.1003 The grace of union is the singular and unique created grace on the part of the human

nature which is to be united to the Word.1004 There is not so much a shift in position (the same

variant meanings are still at play), as there is a shift in priority: the primary meaning of gratia

unionis is the created gift which has as its subject the human nature and is the very uniting of that

human nature to the person of the Word.

But there is something further illustrated by this trajectory. The grace of union does not

dispose the human nature for union with the Word. It is, curiously, therefore not so much parallel

with the lumen gloriae but with the created act of beatific understanding itself. Not in the way

that the commentary Tradition claimed, but insofar as both “grace of union” and “beatific vision”

can each denote God himself or the contingent, created effect of the divine communication,

which is to say that just as Thomas distinguishes two different meanings of “end,” as (1)

attainment and as (2) object in the case of beatific union,1005 so too it seems that this twofold

meaning applies in the case of the hypostatic union, for this union is ad esse personale, to the

divine esse of the Word.

But the humanity’s participation in this esse must itself be a created act of participation,

which because this act is beyond the nature’s natural power is supernatural,1006 but because it is

the act of a nature is also substantial. Yet there still remains a difference, for since the beatific

union takes place according to an operation, it requires a habit, but the hypostatic union requires

neither habit nor disposition on the side of the human nature. Christ’s esse secundarium,

therefore, is not a medium, nor a habit, nor some quality disposing for union, but is the very

union itself, understood not from the standpoint of unity but from the standpoint of existence.

                                                                                                                     

1003 There is one exception at ST IIIa, q. 8, a. 5, ad 3 (ed. Leonina, 11: 133b). 1004 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a.10, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b). 1005 See Thomas, ST IaIIae, q. 1, a. 8c: “finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo: idest ipsa res in qua

ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius rei” (ed. Leonina, 6: 16b); q. 3, a. 1c: “ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum : si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum” (ed. Leonina, 6: 26b).

1006 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 4, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 11: 71b).

 

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Conclusion  

I have sought in the above chapters to establish the thesis that esse secundarium denotes a

created, substantial, and absolutely supernatural participation of Christ’s human nature in the

uncreated communication of the divine, personal esse of the Son of God.

I say “created” because while it is false and heretical to say that “there was a time when

the Son was not,” it is not false to say that there was a time when the Son was not human or

perhaps more accurately: there was a time when the humanity of Christ did not exist. The human

nature of Christ, like all created realities, came into being in time: Christ’s body and soul did not

exist from eternity. And thus Paul says, “In the fullness of time, God sent his Son . . .” (Gal. 4:4).

What is different? There is a “new mode of existence” by which a divine person is “in” a

creature,1007 for the Word now subsists in a created nature,1008 which is to say that a finite human

nature is now related temporally to the person of the Son in an absolutely unprecedented way,

namely, as his own.1009 But if temporal, then the “new mode of existing” must be created, and if

created it cannot be uncreated.1010 Since there is a real distinction between God and creatures,

this new mode of existing cannot be the same as the divine esse.

I say “substantial” because this created mode of existence has as its real, metaphysical

subject the human nature of Christ, and as such is truly predicated of his divine person. But since

the intelligibility of esse is determined by its subject and not its term,1011 this “new mode of

                                                                                                               1007 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2c: “Quaedam vero, cum habitudine ad principium, important terminum

temporalem, sicut missio et datio: mittitur enim aliquid ad hoc ut sit in aliquo, et datur ad hoc quod habeatur; Personam autem divinam haberi ab aliqua creatura, vel esse novo modo existendi in ea, est quoddam temporale. Unde missio et datio in divinis dicuntur temporaliter tantum. Generatio autem et spiratio solum ab aeterno” (ed. Leonina, 4: 446a) and q. 43, a. 1c: “Missio igitur divinae Personae convenire potest, secundum quod importat ex una parte processionem originis a mittente; et secundum quod importat ex alia parte novum modum existendi in aliquo. Sicut Filius dicitur esse missus a Patre in mundum, secundum quod incoepit esse in mundo visibiliter per carnem assumptam: et tamen ante in mundo erat, ut dicitur Ioan. I” (4: 445b).

1008 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4: “humanitas non est forma partis que dicatur forma quia informet aliquam materiam uel subiectum, set dicitur forma totius, in qua suppositum nature subsistit; unde non oportet ponere quod ypostasis increata informetur humanitate, set quod subsistat in ea” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95b).

1009 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 1c: “hic est quaedam unio singularis supra omnes modos unionis | nobis notos. Sicut enim Deus est ipsa sua bonitas et suum esse, ita etiam est ipsa unitas per essentiam; et ideo, sicut virtus eius non est limitata ad istos modos bonitatis et esse, qui sunt in creaturis, sed potest facere novos modos bonitatis et esse nobis incognitos, ita etiam per infinitatem suae virtutis potuit facere novum modum unionis, ut humana natura uniretur Verbo personaliter, non tamen accidentaliter, quamvis ad hoc in creaturis nullum sufficiens exemplum inveniatur” (ed. Obenauer, 34, 36).

1010 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, s.c. “Quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio illa non fuit ab aeterno sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40a).

1011 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: “ratio relationis, sicut et motus, dependet ex fine vel termino: sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum” (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

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existence” is substantial not accidental, insofar as a finite essence is not an accident of any

supposit, although it is an id quo of that supposit in some way.1012

I say “absolutely supernatural” for two reasons. First, because to no created nature is it

proper or natural to have an esse, that is, to be the real, metaphysical subject of esse.

Consequently, when this occurs uniquely in the incarnation, the potency realized in the human

nature must be understood as obediential. Yet, since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it,

this realization of a finite nature’s obediential potency does not change the nature into a quod.

The human nature of Christ remains an id quo. It is metaphysically impossible for it to ever

become a supposit because there is a real distinction between nature and supposit. Second, a

share in an infinite and uncreated esse is disproportionate to any finite essence; consequently, the

participation of any finite essence in an uncreated act must be absolutely supernatural.

I use the language of “participation” because Christ’s esse secundarium is not related to

his eternal supposit in the same way as the divine esse.1013 The divine esse is related to the Son

according to identity, that is, he is the divine esse in an unqualified and absolute way. But

Christ’s esse secundarium is related to his divine person not absolutely but according to

participation. In this way, it may be said that Christ’s humanity receives the esse secundarium

because it participates in the divine esse. By recognizing, however, that such participation is the

esse secundarium, we avoid the error of the Thomist commentary tradition, which tries to affirm

that the humanity of Christ receives the divine esse itself. But since every finite essence limits

the esse which it receives, and since the divine esse cannot be limited or changed, such reception

of the divine esse is theologically impossible.

1 Recapitulation

In chapter one, I illustrated the basic metaphysical proportion between id quo and id quod

as it is expressed within Gilbert of Poitiers’ philosophical framework and showed, first, its

application to finite constitution taken generally, that is, as applied to the relation between a

concrete subsistent (subsistens) and singular subsistence (subsistentia). I, then, demonstrated

how such a distinction enabled Gilbert to affirm that there is no composition of a subsistent with

                                                                                                               1012 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4c: “Sustentificatur autem suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam,

inquantum est hic homo” (ed. Obenauer, 86). 1013 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1: “esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen

simpliciter dicendum est, quod Christus sit duo secundum esse: quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum” (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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its subsistence, rather there is a union (coniunctio). This means, for Gilbert, that a subsistence

(subsistentia) is related to its subsistent according to habitus.

When Gilbert uses his regula for theological analogy to extend this metaphysical

principle to the incarnation, it yields a way for him to articulate how no change accrues to the

divine person of the Son in the incarnation, insofar as there is no composition between the person

of the Word and the human nature. But this strategy also offers Gilbert a way to affirm how

statements such as “God suffered” are true according to the union of his created humanity to his

divine person. That is, because the humanity is joined to the divine person it can be a real

principle of true predication. Yet, because Gilbert regards the union as a habitus, this also means

that he thinks of it as “accidental” albeit also real and therefore sufficient to ground the truth of

confessional statements about the Word become flesh.

In chapter two, I drew attention to the Christological sententiae of Peter the Lombard,

insofar as they raise pressing questions of substantiality and causality. I showed that Peter is

uncomfortable with the language of property in regard to the humanity assumed by the Word

because of its potential accidental connotation. And even though he sought to make some sort of

substantial affirmation in regard to the humanity of Christ (following the Damascene),

nevertheless, it seems that the Master was ultimately disconcerted by the causal implications of a

fully constituted human nature/substance, insofar as it might exercise a totalizing effect upon the

divine person of Christ. This concern is echoed by early commentators such as the author of the

Ps.-Peter of Poitiers gloss on the Sentences and later inheritors such as Alan of Lille.

Taken together, these chapters established what I have called the formal and material

elements for the theological ferment out of which most later Christological discussions in the

twelfth and early thirteenth century emerged, insofar as the Lombard’s Sententiae are treated as

the material foundation/source for the questions to be asked but Gilbert’s conceptual framework

is ultimately adopted in order to treat such questions and topics.

In chapter three, therefore, I demonstrated the fruits of such a synthesis by charting the

development of certain Christological questions in the theological projects of Simon of Tournai,

Stephen Langton, and Prepositinus. Hence, we saw that Simon and Stephen each take up the

concern over the constitution of Christ’s human species, insofar as they each (following

Boethius) regard the species as the totum esse of an individual, finite reality. They recognize, just

like the Lombard, that this cannot be the case for Christ. But instead of shying away from the full

constitution of a human nature, because they recognize the disastrous consequence of such a

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decision, instead they simply affirm the surplus of substantialia (Simon) or essentialia (Stephen)

in Christ.

Stephen deepens this reflection insofar as he explicitly identifies the distinction between

esse understood as species and the existence of a subject or res. Christ’s (divine) existence is

independent of the human esse (i.e., nature/species) which he assumes because he is divine res

prior to and independently of the incarnation. But in the incarnation he becomes a res of the

human species. Simon seems to have found his way toward a related position by recognizing that

the Word’s personal property (i.e., filiation) is in some way responsible for Christ’s singularity

and is therefore the overarching principle of unity even in the incarnation. Aware of the positions

articulated both by Stephen and Simon, Prepositinus coins a possibly new phrase to designate

what Gilbert seems to have called a personal property, namely, propria existentia. This

ontological principle is not that by which Peter is man, but that by which Peter is this man.

Prepositinus argues that the same would be true in the case of Christ, insofar as it is by his

propria existentia that Christ is this man. What remained unclear in Prepositinus, however, is

whether or not this propria existentia was created or uncreated.

The three first chapters, thus, illustrated the almost intractable interpretation of esse as

species or nature in the twelfth century. As noted by the studies of Principe, Gilson, and others

this meaning of esse was not immediately eradicated from the scene of the early to mid thirteenth

century by the advent of new Aristotelian and Muslim sources. Rather it endured alongside the

new meaning(s) of esse. Thus, we find the older meaning of esse in Thomas’ first treatment of

Christ’s esse, namely, in his Scriptum. But this is the only time within such a context that it is

noted as a live meaning of esse.

Despite the slow advent of the new meaning(s) for esse over the course of the thirteenth

century, we saw in chapter four the way in which esse essentiae continues to be considered a

viable meaning of esse in the high scholastic period and is even deployed as an explanation for

the position of the QD de Unione by the Carmelites of Salamanca in the seventeenth century, yet

I demonstrated that this was not a coherent interpretation of the text. Cajetan simply finds the

account given in the QD de Unione untenable. For him, there can be only one substantial esse

existentiae pertaining to Christ, and this is the divine esse. This is not only Cajetan’s personal

position but also the position he assigns to St. Thomas.

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Cajetan’s advocacy for a single-esse in Christ, however, comes at considerable cost, for

the “delicate balance of preserving unity without sacrificing the truth of Christ's humanity,”1014 is

broken, insofar as he finds himself unable to grant any created esse existentiae to the humanity of

Jesus. As such, he is unable to identify how Christ’s human nature is related to the whole Trinity

as to an efficient cause. Without such a created line of causality, there is no metaphysical reason

for saying that the humanity is created. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find Cajetan saying that

there is “nothing created” intervening between the human nature and the Word “except a passion

by which the human nature is drawn to the esse of the Word.”1015

Even in regard to his own solution, namely, that the human nature of Christ exists by the

divine esse which is communicated to it, Cajetan recognizes that he has to give an account for

how a finite essence could receive an infinite act. Cajetan’s early formulation of an answer to

this objection, we explored in more depth through the later text(s) of Garrigou-Lagrange. Who,

although unlike Cajetan regards all of Thomas’ discussions of the esse of Christ as compatible,

nevertheless ultimately maintains that there is only a mental distinction between the divine esse

and the esse secundarium, insofar as what accrues to the Word is only a new relation to his

humanity.

In this way, Garrigou’s position is just as metaphysically problematic as Cajetan’s even

though they correlate the texts of St. Thomas differently. This explains, in part, why Garrigou-

Lagrange re-formulates and answers the objection based on finite reception of an infinite act.

The analogical counter-argument given (whether by Cajetan or Garrigou-Lagrange) appealing to

beatific vision, however, fails because it conflates the ordo essendi with the ordo cognoscendi by

neglecting to advert to the different way in which the possible intellect receives intelligible

species and the way in which a finite essence “receives” esse.

Not surprisingly, therefore, a principal Thomist antagonist, namely, Francisco Suarez

(albeit for slightly different reasons) refuses to deny to any human nature (not just Christ’s) a

created esse existentiae.1016 For this reason, he maintains that there is no formal dependence of

                                                                                                               1014 See Barnes, “Person, Hypostasis, and Hypostatic Union,” 130. 1015 See Cajetan, In ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, n. 3: “Ubi patet nihil creatum intervenire nisi passionem qua natura

humana trahitur ad esse Verbi” (ed. Leonina, 11: 41a). 1016 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 4: “Ex ratione vero existentiae sic

explicata, colligitur primo, fieri non posse ut aliquid sit ens in actu, seu ut concipiatur tanquam actualis entitas, quin in suo conceptu formaliter et intrinsece includat existentiam, ita ut nec per abstractionem praecisivam intellectus, possit unum ab altero separari, manente vero conceptu utriusque” (ed. Berton, 18: 261b).

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Christ’s humanity upon the subsistence of the Word.1017 In this way, while he grants that the

hypostatic union is supernatural, he denies that the created esse existentiae of the human nature is

supernatural because it must be presupposed for any change in the human nature to occur; this

includes its union to the Word. Rather, he insists that the created esse existentiae is natural and

proper to the humanity of Christ, as it would be to any other finite essence, if it is to be

understood as a being in act. I showed how a position that sought to remain faithful to Thomas’

metaphysical and theological principles could not accept Suarez’s conclusions, although his

objections to the Thomist position based on finite reception and efficient causality ought to be

leveled with due force.

Having therefore refuted the esse essentiae interpretation and called into question

interpretations advocating incompatibility, a mental distinction, or naturalism in chapter four, I

turned in chapter five to present a positively constructed argument for my interpretation of esse

secundarium as a created, substantial, and absolutely supernatural participation of Christ’s

human nature in the uncreated communication of the divine esse of the Word. I did this first by

drawing attention to parallel metaphysical principles in other texts, which St. Thomas

enumerates at the beginning of his discussion in the QD de unione. This was to establish that the

same, basic mereological principles were at play in the QD de unione as in Thomas’ other

discussions of Christ’s esse. His fundamental metaphysical commitments have not changed.

I next noted the way in which he assigns to the hypostatic union the status of esse

creatum in the Summa and traced how Thomas moves from this account of the union to

ultimately identifying it as a created gift, that is, as a substantial grace, namely, the gratia

unionis.1018 In a culminating passage, Thomas identifies the gratia unionis with the personal

(divine) esse as “freely and divinely given to the human nature in the person of the Word.”1019

Finally, I made an analogical appeal to the gift of charity, based on the analogical similarity                                                                                                                

1017 See Suarez, Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 6: “Ex his principiis metaphysicis demonstratur Theologica conclusio a nobis posita, quia humanitas Christi, ut condistincta a Verbo, intelligitur esse quaedam actualis entitas, quam ipsa secum affert, et illam a Verbo formaliter non recipit; ergo intelligitur esse existens per existentiam propriam et creatam, omnino a Verbo distinctam” (ed. Berton, 18: 262b).

1018 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Si vero gratia dicatur ipsum gratuitum Dei donum, sic ipsum quod est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae, potest dici quaedam gratia, inquantum nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc est factum: non autem ita quod sit aliqua gratia habitualis qua mediante talis unio fiat” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b) and q. 2, a. 10, ad 2: “gratia habitualis est solum in anima: sed gratia, idest gratuitum Dei donum quod est uniri divinae personae, pertinet ad totam naturam humanam, quae componitur ex anima et corpore” (11: 48-49). See also, IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c: “unio humanae naturae ad divinam personam, quam supra diximus esse ipsam gratiam unionis, praecedit gratiam habitualem in Christo, non ordine temporis, sed naturae et intellectus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b).

1019 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: “Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona Verbi: quod quidem est terminus assumptionis” (ed. Leonina, 11: 104a).

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between the missions of the Son and Spirit in order to illustrate how just as we say that charity is

a created, accidental, and supernatural participation of our wills in the uncreated communication

of the Holy Spirit, so we may also say that esse secundarium is the created, substantial, and

supernatural participation of Christ’s human nature in the uncreated communication of the Son.

In chapter six, I showed that there is no contradiction in my interpretation of esse

secundarium with any of Thomas’ other discussions of the esse of Christ. I argued that this was

due in part to the fact that many of his other discussions are governed by a horizon of questions

regarding Christ’s unity, especially as to what is its cause. But in contrast to Cajetan who

believes that esse is an effect of unity,1020 the texts of Thomas indicate that he regards esse as the

cause of unity;1021 consequently, if there is a text like the Summa which is seeking to identify the

those things which pertain to Christ’s unity, then Thomas must insist upon the cause being the

uncreated esse of the Word insofar as he is God. Thomas’ strategy in the Summa, illustrates that

when questions pertaining to Christological unity remain under systematic control, then there

need not arise any ambiguity as to the ultimate cause, namely, the divine esse. There is also little

textual need to discuss an esse secundarium in such a context for it is not the cause of Christ’s

personal unity.

But when Christological unity becomes totalizing, that is, when it becomes the

predominate or only horizon under which questions about Christ’s esse are posed (as in Cajetan

and other Thomists), then such a horizon will occlude an interpreter’s ability to see their way

through to affirming an esse secundarium because they are asking the wrong question. Such a

failure, however, if pushed all the way to its furthest conclusion results not simply in an

interpretive error but in a properly theological error, insofar as no metaphysical account of the

creatureliness of Christ’s humanity can be provided from within a single-esse viewpoint.

                                                                                                               1020 See Cajetan, in ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6: “Unitas enim personae et dualitas naturae sunt causae: unitas

vel dualitas esse est effectus” (ed. Leonina, 11: 224b). To be sure, this text compares the unity of person with the unity of esse and says that the unity of esse is the effect of the unity of person. Linguistically speaking, it is not a strict or direct subordination of esse to unity as effect to cause. But even so, I think the result is the same, because the text from the Quodl. below would rule out Cajetan’s literal formulation even as it rules out the conceptual implication which I have drawn from it. If esse is that in which is founded the unity of person, then this would also mean that the unity of esse is also that in which is founded the unity of person. Cajetan has inverted the cause/effect relationship delineated by Thomas.

1021 See Thomas, Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: “operatio suppositi non est de integritate unitatis eius, set consequitur eius unitatem, unde unius suppositi inuenimus multas operationes secundum diuersa operationum principia que supposito insunt, sicut homo aliud operatur lingua et manu; set esse est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi, unde esse multiplex preiudicat unitati” (ed. Leonina, 25.1: 95).

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If the metaphysical priority given to person with respect to esse and the privileging of

unity over esse causes the Thomist commentary tradition to neglect a metaphysical account of

the creatureliness of Christ’s humanity, the priority given to nature with respect to esse causes a

different error in scholastics such as Scotus or Suarez. Suarez’s metaphysical commitment to

each individual nature having its own esse existentiae produces what I have called a “naturalist”

interpretation of esse secundarium.

It was not possible to address this position fully at the end of chapter four because the

inter-connection(s) between esse secundarium, hypostatic union, and gratia unionis had not yet

been established textually, but since this nexus of meaning was established in chapter five, it is

now possible to rule-out a naturalist interpretation, which at first may only seem to be a

metaphysical divergence based on different views of how essence and esse are related (i.e.,

distinctly, modally, or according to identity). But once again, if such a position is pushed all the

way to its further conclusion, it would result in a profound theological error.

Suarez distinguishes between the created esse existentiae of Christ’s human nature and

the hypostatic union, arguing that the union presupposes the esse existentiae of the nature. This

means that he can maintain that the hypostatic union is supernatural but the esse existentiae of

Christ’s human nature is natural. Taken on its own, such a position would require separate

metaphysical and theological refutations. But considered as an interpretation of St. Thomas, it

cannot be accepted because if the esse secundarium and hypostatic union are the same in re, then

esse secundarium must be supernatural because it is beyond the proportion of a finite nature to

have an esse distinct from the esse of its supposit.

2 A Final Problem

Although the six chapters of my thesis taken together constitute a refutation of the four

alternate interpretations of esse secundarium, there still remains a final problem for my own

interpretation: If esse secundarium and hypostatic union although distinct in mente, are

nevertheless the same in re, how can one and the same real relation have both an efficient and

formal intelligibility? Put another way, if the hypostatic union is what formally relates the human

nature to the Word and only to the Word (and not to the Father or the Holy Spirit), but esse

secundarium expresses the real, substantial relation of the human nature to the Creator as to its

efficient cause, then how can one and the same relation relate its subject both efficiently (i.e. to

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all three members of the Trinity equally) and formally to only one of the three persons, namely,

the Word?

It is not uncommon for one and the same relation to bear multiple intelligibilities. I made

an analogical appeal to the habit of charity in chapter five, and it is possible to do so again, here.

Charity is a perfection of the soul, or perhaps more strictly a perfection of a power of the soul,

namely, the will. Thomas notes that God is the life of the soul “effectively” through charity, yet

charity is the life of the soul formally.1022 This seems to suggest that although charity is strictly

speaking a participation in the procession of the Holy Spirit,1023 and this is its formal

intelligibility, nevertheless, the whole Trinity causes charity and the life of the soul through

charity, efficiently. There is no need to multiply charities due to distinct but related formal and

efficient intelligibilities, rather the single habit of charity as “a new mode of indwelling” is

capable of expressing multiple kinds of intelligibilities that obtain between God and the human

recipients of his love.

This same principle may be analogically extended to the created, substantial,

supernatural relation of the human nature to the Word. The dogmatic term “hypostatic union”

enables us to denote the intelligibility which sets this union apart from unions between natures

and thereby gives us a term whereby we may express why the human nature is only joined to the

Word and consequently pertains to him alone as his own (and not to the Father or the Holy

Spirit). But since we must acknowledge that all three members of the Trinity are equally the

efficient cause of such a union, esse secundarium gives us a specific ontological term whereby

we may denote the intelligibility of Christ’s human nature insofar as it is related to the whole

Trinity as to its efficient cause.

It is not supernatural that a nature has esse in its own supposit,1024 but it is supernatural

that the esse which a nature has in its own supposit is distinct from the esse of its supposit. In the

incarnation, this must be the case because there is a real distinction between God and creatures

and therefore a real distinction between the esse of any creature and the esse of God.

                                                                                                               1022 See Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2: “Deus est vita effective et animae per caritatem et corporis per

animam: sed formaliter caritas est vita animae, sicut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae” (ed. Leonina, 8: 165b).

1023 See Thomas ST IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 2c: “Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales est acquisita, sed per infusionem Spiritus Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii, cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata, sicut supra dictum est” (ed. Leonina, 8: 175b).

1024 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10c: “Manifestum est autem quod ad perfectionem operationis requiritur quod potentia sit perfecta per habitum: sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo, non fit mediante aliquo habitu” (ed. Leonina, 11: 48b).

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Furthermore, no created and finite essence can receive an uncreated and infinite esse in an

unrestricted and unlimited way, that is, every created being (whether an id quo or id quod) exists

by participation not per se. In the unique and absolutely unparalleled case of the incarnation of

the Son of God, the participation of his humanity in his personal, divine esse is his esse

secundarium insofar as he temporally became man.

 

 

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Epilogue Relevance of Esse Secundarium for Christology Today1025

‘There was only one way out of this impasse, namely, that infinite, eternal Being should utter its own self in the form of a relative being’ (Hans Urs von Balthasar).1026 1 ‘He Learned Obedience through what He Suffered’

There is a break-through in medieval exegesis, beginning in the twelfth century with

Robert of Melun and Peter Lombard: What does it mean to say that Christ learned obedience

through the things that he suffered? (Heb. 5:8). It implies that he experienced obedience insofar

as he was man,1027 indeed, if the Son had not become incarnate then ‘he could not have had the

knowledge of experience,’ for ‘in the assumed flesh he experienced our weakness.’1028 The gloss

of learning as experiencing is so firmly established by the time of St. Thomas that he cites this

passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews as an argument for Jesus’ experiential (and

consequently acquired) knowing.1029

The theme of the Son’s obedience is one that was retrieved, appropriated, and

promulgated by Catholic theologians in the twentieth century.1030 Romano Guardini suggests that

                                                                                                               1025 A version of this Epilogue has appeared in print as “In Illo Tempore: Being and Becoming in the

Historical Life of Jesus Christ,” The Heythrop Journal 58.1 (2017): 17-36. 1026 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prayer, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986),

157. 1027 See Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Ep. ad Heb., c. 5: ‘Et quidem. Quasi dicat: Exauditus est, et merito

quidem, quia cum, id est quamvis esset Filius Dei, natura deitatis unus Deus cum Patre, tamen secundum quod homo, didicit, id est expertus est, obedientiam ex eis, id est per ea quae passus est. Vel, didicit, id est voluntariae suscepit obedientiam. Ex, id est, in his quae passus est, usque ad mortem. Quasi dicat: non solum preces et supplicationes obtulit, sed etiam obedivit Patri usque ad mortem’ (PL 192: 438A). Lombard’s source for his exegesis would appear to be Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, 8.14 (CSEL 28: 252). As Ignatius Brady notes, however, the Lombard did not have direct access to a full text of this particular work of Augustine on Genesis, but encountered it mediately through the Glossa and the work of Florus of Leon, so Lombard’s own insight may not be directly linked to Augustine’s text. See Spiciliegium Bonaventurianum, vol. 4, 329.

1028 See Robert of Melun, Questiones de Ep. ad Heb., [V, 8]: ‘Non didicit aliquid quod prius ignoraret. Satis enim antequam carnem assumpsisset infirmitatem et miseriam hominis cognoverat. Sed est duplex cognitio: una conprehensionis, altera experientie. Illam vero que conprehensionis est ab eterno Christus habuit. Illam vero que experientie est habere non potuit nisi hominem assumpsisset: neque enim secundum divinitatem aliquid pati potuit. Assumpta itaque carne expertus est nostram infirmitatem, ut lassitudinem, esuriem et sitim et cetera huiusmodi, ut sic nobis conpati posset. Ex quo manifestum est ipsum istas infirmitates nostras sine culpa suscepisse. Unde quod passus est, non ex aliqua causa fuit que in nobis vel in ipso fuit, sed gratis: quia ipse voluit. Unde et sine culpa in ipso fuit’ (ed. Martin, 299).

1029 See Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, q. 9, a. 4, s.c. (ed. Leonina, 11: 144a); cf. Lect. super Ep. ad Heb., c. 5, lect. 2, n. 259 (ed. Marietti, 2: 392-93).

1030 This is an observation of focus not exclusion. Clearly, there were Protestant theologians adverting to the same theme, the most prominent example, perhaps, being Karl Barth, see his Church Dogmatics, trans. G.W. Bromiley, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2010), vol. 4, pt. 1, ch. 14, §59, 157-210.

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we may define Jesus’ ‘Sonship with reference to its most sensitive point, the point at which

conflict seems to lie just beneath the surface: his obedience is equal in dignity to the command

which he obeys. He is simply the one who obeys as the Father is the one who commands.’1031

Hans urs von Balthasar deepens this basic thesis of Guardini by identifying Jesus’ person

with his mission: ‘The whole person of the Son is involved in his work for the world, and his

whole human nature, in all its phases and aspects, ministers to it. It is for this work that the Son

has been sent.’1032 And yet Jesus’ mission is not something accomplished or completed all in a

single moment, whether of birth or death, for ‘mission can only be carried out within a time

span,’1033 and in every situation of his life, Jesus reveals the Father.1034 As the mission of Jesus

‘unfolds through historical time, it enters increasingly into history. It awaits God’s signal for its

fulfillment not only purely from within: it also awaits it from without, because the mission will

be fulfilled essentially in a fulfillment of history; the Father’s will is encountered in history no

less than in interior inspiration.’1035 Jesus’ mission (and therefore identity), however, is not one

that is totalitized by history and time, for ‘the dramatic dimension that is part of the definition of

the person of Jesus does not belong exclusively to the worldly side of his being: its ultimate

presuppositions lie in the divine life itself.’1036

The affirmation of Jesus’ human obedience especially as intimately associated with his

divine mission while opening our eyes to a dramatic stage of agibilia also and simultaneously

introduces a horizon of possibilia. Human action has limits, encounters impediments, faces

temptations, and is often accused of failure. To affirm obedience in the life of Jesus as something

learned and therefore as something experienced is to affirm the presence of finitude and

contingency.

                                                                                                               1031 Romano Guardini, The Humanity of Christ: Contributions to a Psychology of Jesus [Die Menschliche

Wirklichkeit Des Herrn], trans. Ronald Walls (New York: Random House, 1964), 89; cf. Yves Congar, Jesus Christ, trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 53-58, 60.

1032 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama III: The Dramatis Personae: The Person in Christ [Theodramatik: Zweiter Band: Die Personen des Spiels, Teil 2: Die Personen in Christus], trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 157.

1033 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3: 157. 1034 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3: 173. 1035 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3: 178. 1036 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3: 159.

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2 Christology Today In contemporary Christology, the contingency, historicality, or temporality of the human

life of Jesus of Nazareth is fast approaching the status of a new theological locus communis. A

general (and genuine) concern over whether Jesus may truly be considered to be human and ‘like

us in all things’ has been met with a general theological trend to affirm the contingency and

historicality of Jesus’ life not only insofar as he was human but also insofar as he was divine.

Although this line of thought was initially suggested in a somewhat radical way by Jürgen

Moltmann,1037 nevertheless, perhaps the most brilliant advocate for such a position in recent

years has been Robert Jenson, who proposes a temporal infinity in God.1038 Consequently, in

some quarters, there are aggressive demands for dogmatics to ‘develop a more thoroughly

evangelized metaphysic than that on offer in the tradition.’1039

The Catholic theologian has a unique task in the face of such concerns and demands. We

cannot shirk our commitment to aggiornamento—a task clearly demanded of us in the wake of

the Second Vatican Council. But we cannot afford to fail in our obligation to ressourcement—an

equally constitutive part of our theological task. The epilogue, therefore, proposes an exercise in

the circumcessio or perichoresis of authentic aggiornamento and responsible ressourcement. It

advocates a strategy for bringing forward the theological insights of the Tradition, especially

those regarding certain metaphysical commitments about the Nature of God, in a way that meets

the exigences of contemporary concerns about the contingency and finitude of the life of Jesus,

‘for He is a man who lived in a concrete milieu and who died after having lived his own life

within the unfolding of a historical process.’ But he is also ‘the object referent of the Church’s

Faith,’ and he ‘is neither a myth nor any sort of abstract notion,’1040 nor did he live an ‘abstract’

                                                                                                               1037 This emerges very clearly in his exposition of the Dereliction, see Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and

the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 75-83 and The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 149-53. More recently, others have followed a similar path, see Bernd Oberdorfer, “The Holy Spirit—A Person? Reflection on the Spirit’s Trinitarian Identity,” in The Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2006), 42 and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “How to Speak of the Spirit among Religions: Trinitarian Prolegomena for a Pneumatological Theology of Religions,” in The Work of the Spirit, 61-62. See also, Michael Welker, God the Revealed: Christology, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2013), 185-91.

1038 See Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, The Triune God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 214-18, 221.

1039 See Scott R. Swain and Michael Allen, "The Obedience of the Eternal Son: Catholic Trinitarianism and Reformed Christology," in Christology, Ancient and Modern: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, 75.

1040 International Theological Commission, “Select Questions on Christology,” (1979), 1.1.

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human life.1041 Indeed, Christ is the concretissimum,1042 the concrete analogia entis itself.1043 The

theologian, then, must ‘be able to say what it means for a divine person to live a fully human

life.’1044

To be clear, this is not an analysis or critique of Moltmann, Jenson, Welker, or anyone

else. Their positions are both intelligent and complex; each of their contributions merit the

response of a separate article (or even monograph!) with careful sifting. The project I enter upon,

here, is something quite different. I offer a constructive proposal for an alternate way of

conceiving the way forward in Christology today. The primary tasks of ressourcement are

presupposed, I embark upon an itinerarium of aggiornamento. It should be noted, therefore, that

the epilogue proceeds from within the Tradition, which is to say that it presupposes and receives

as basic Conciliar, Patristic, and much of Medieval and Scholastic Christology. Consequently, it

is not my intention to reconstruct or rebuild, as it were, from the ground up all the theological

positions emergent within the historical development of Trinitarian and Christological dogma

and subsequent systematic reflection.

Consequently, the epilogue is no longer an exercise in the interpretation of Thomas

Aquinas, much less Hans Urs von Balthasar, Bernard Lonergan, or any of the other theological

voices who figure so prominently in the footnotes below. They are the sources upon which I

draw to re-express the basic interpretation of St. Thomas which I have advocated in the seven

chapters above, but with the operative telos of application to contemporary (and legitimate)

concerns about Jesus’ bodiliness and human finitude. Consequently, much of my exposition will

seem highly ‘unoriginal,’ even repetitive, but it is to a distinct (if not new) application that this

exposition is ordered, namely, to effect a rapprochement between the metaphysical and

psychological commitments of the Tradition with contemporary commitments to embodiment

and historical situatedness. While perhaps in tension, I do not believe these commitments are

contradictory. Rather, their complimentary juxtaposition provides us with a far more robust

presentation of the mystery of the incarnation.

The theological and metaphysical commitments of the Tradition are today in question.

There is certainly space for an examination of those commitments. But the task undertaken, here,                                                                                                                

1041 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 75. 1042 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prayer, 165. My sincere thanks to Sylvester Tan, S.J. for drawing my

attention to this text and for many delightful conversations about von Balthasar’s work and theological project. 1043 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3, 222; cf. Prayer, 23-24, 169. 1044 Bernard Lonergan, “Christology Today: Methodical Reflections,” in A Third Collection: Papers by

Bernard F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 91.

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is far more specific: Can we can still appropriate the Tradition’s commitment to divine

simplicity, immutability, and impassibility without compromising on the integrity of Jesus’

human temporality, without making ‘the particular features of the real, historical human being

Jesus of Nazareth and the arbitrary occurrences of his life inessential’?1045

If the question is put systematically, it is possible to ask: If the existential root of Jesus’

life is eternal and uncreated, is there still room for a created and contingent existential

principle? The issue, then, is one of coherence and ‘fittingness’ (convenientia) as it pertains to

the genuine character of Jesus’ contingent, finite, and temporal life and how we can understand

that life as one in an inseparable ontological and psychological union with the divine life. It is

still my (perhaps naïve) conviction that the ‘mystery of the supernatural incarnation reaches its

critical climax in the question concerning the being of Christ.’1046

3 A Christological Hypothesis

The supernatural, substantial, and created participation of Christ’s human nature in his

divine existence is the existential principle or finite horizon under which all of Jesus’ human

operations unfold and take place. If our human lives are historical, is not also Christ’s? Rather

than conceive of God’s eternity as competing or conflicting with human historicality,1047 perhaps

God’s divine being is such that when personally communicated it does not abrogate time, but

rather results in the singularly unique and historical life of this man Jesus.1048

In order to substantiate this, the epilogue proceeds in two parts. The first addresses

primarily metaphysical issues, whereas the second focuses upon cognitive ones. The goals in

each part are distinct but related. In the first, I seek to explicate the meaning of my thesis,

namely, that in Christ the historical, existential principle of his human life is the substantial,

created, but absolutely supernatural participation of his human nature in his personal divine

                                                                                                               1045 See, Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 91. 1046 See Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans.

John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2014), 1.7, 304. 1047 See Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis:

Fortress Press, 2001), 1-33 but especially, 2-5, 11. Instructive, here, too are the words of von Balthasar, ‘It is therefore vain to look for a contradiction between the Son’s temporal and eternal form of existence or to seek within his creatureliness for any opposition between a lower sphere within time in which he receives and acts and a supreme ‘eternal’ sphere in which he enjoys calm, self-sufficient possession of himself’ (see, A Theology of History, 34).

1048 ‘This temporal constitution is so far from contradicting his eternal being as Son that it is what directly, intelligibly and appropriately reveals that eternal being in this world’ (von Balthasar, A Theology of History, 34); cf. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4.49.[11] (ed. Leonina, 15: 156b) and QD de Unione, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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existence. To achieve this explication, certain clarifications are required concerning (1)

contingent predications about God, (2) the notion of a divine mission, and (3) the definition of

human nature. These clarifications will facilitate the discovery of (4) an analogy of created

participation that will serve as a foundation to articulate the supernatural, ontological relation of

Jesus’ human nature to his divine person in such a way that (5) the unique existential character of

the divine person of the Word may still be affirmed.

In the second part, I endeavor to illustrate the implications for transposing this created

existential principle of Christ’s historical life into a psychological register. In his classic work on

New Testament Christology, James Dunn observed, ‘The whole issue of Jesus’ self-

consciousness and its significance is one which has remained at the forefront of NT

Christological study more or less throughout the past two centuries.’1049 Although this

observation was made more than three decades ago, the question of Jesus’ sense of sonship is

one that continues to draw the attention of New Testament scholars and appears, therefore, to be

a perennial question in no sign of decline.

The tasks I propose to accomplish in the second part arise out of a firm conviction that

theology is fittingly distributed across distinct but intrinsically and dynamically related

specialties.1050 Consequently, in addition to the presupposition of the epistemic and historical

horizons of Faith, indicated above, I also presuppose a certain interpretation of the New

Testament textual data, namely, that Jesus knew and claimed that he was the Son of God.1051 I do

                                                                                                               1049 James D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the

Doctrine of the Incarnation (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1980), 22-23. 1050 See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 125-45. 1051 This reality is not only the most plausible explanation of the “high Christology” of some of the earliest

strata of NT writing, although this is certainly true. See Rudolf Schnackenburg, Jesus in the Gospels: A Biblical Christology, trans. O.C. Dean (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995); Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009); and Contours of Christology in the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005). Nor is it only the most plausible explanation of the concomitant and connatural phenomenon of the early Christian practice of worship of Jesus as divine, though again, this is most certainly true. See, Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003). An affirmation about Jesus’ own self-understanding is one that may be responsibly uttered based on the historical evidence we have available to us. See, Sigurd Grindheim, God's Equal: What Can We Know about Jesus' Self-Understanding in the Synoptic Gospels? Library of New Testament Studies 446 (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2011) and N.T. Wright, “Jesus’ Self-Understanding,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 47-61; cf. Jesus and the Victory of God, vol. 2 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 612-53. More reserved in his conclusions but nevertheless well within this stream of scholarship is Joachim Gnilka, Jesus of Nazareth: Message and History, trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1997), 248-65. Older, but also instructive are Ben Witherington, The

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not, therefore, intend to offer new or fresh evidence regarding this interpretive claim despite the

fact that I am well aware of New Testament scholars who contest it.1052 Instead, I propose some

systematic structures for understanding how it was possible for Jesus to utter the human

judgment: ‘I am the Son of God,’ by offering (1) philosophical clarifications regarding human

consciousness and knowing,1053 (2) a systematic extrapolation of what it would mean to say that

Jesus in his human consciousness enjoys beatific vision, and (3) a consideration of some of the

concerns beatific vision raises with respect to Jesus’ humanity, embodiment, and finitude.

 

Part 1: The Contingent Being of Jesus Christ

4 Analogy of Contingent Predication

As Jesus emerges from the waters of the Jordan, the gospels recount ‘a voice from

heaven,’ that said, ‘This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased’ (Mt. 3:17; cf.

Mk. 1:11; Lk. 3:22).1054 There is a similar declaration at the Transfiguration (Mt. 17:1-10; Mk.

9:2-10; Lk. 9:28ff). What kind-of statement is this? There is something (if ever so distant) in the

hic est of the Baptism which recalls the Divine fiat running throughout the Hexameron: ‘“Let

there be light”; and there was light. And God saw that the light was good’ (Gen. 1:3-4). The

factum est caro of the incarnation (Jn. 1:14) should remind us of the facta est lux of creation. The

vox of the Baptism is, in a way, an affirmation of what has gone before: this is the one for whom

I have prepared a body (Heb. 10:5); this is the one, ‘born of a woman, born under the law’ (Gal.

4:4; cf. Mt. 1:21; Lk. 1:32, 34; 2:49). At the beginning of time, God spoke the world into

                                                                                                               Christology of Jesus (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 215-28, 267-77 and Ben Meyer, The Aims of Jesus (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1979), 162-70, 197-202, & 241-53.

1052 Geza Vermes, for example, sees a fundamental rupture between Jesus’ own intentions and understanding of his message and the way in which it was obliterated and replaced by first century Christians. See his, The Changing Faces of Jesus (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2000), 263.

1053 In Biblical scholarship, one often finds phrases such as ‘self-consciousness,’ ‘Divine-consciousness,’ ‘Filial consciousness,’ or ‘God-consciousness’ used interchangeably with expressions such as ‘knowledge of divine identity,’ ‘knowledge that he was God,’ ‘sense of sonship,’ or ‘self-understanding.’ It is, therefore, of the utmost importance for us to provide a clear articulation of what we mean by ‘consciousness’ and what we mean by ‘knowing,’ for though related, they are not the same.

1054 Unless otherwise noted, all direct quotations of Scripture will be taken from The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments. New Revised Standard Version: Catholic Edition (Nashville, TN: Catholic Bible Press, a division of Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1993). Citations and invocations of Scripture in this paper are meant to be suggestive of lines for theological development and are aimed at exploring the surplus of meaning in the text; they are not intended to be exclusively or narrowly exegetical. In the case of the Baptism, it should be noted that the declarations in Mark and Luke are addressed directly to Jesus in the second person, whereas the declaration in Matthew is in the third person. I will be focusing upon the account in the Gospel of Matthew.

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existence by his Word (Jn. 1:3). In the fullness of time (Gal. 4:4, Eph. 1:10), he spoke his Word

into the world (Heb. 1:2).

The heavenly declaration at the Jordan, therefore, is nothing less than the paternal

judgment about a fact (‘this is my Son’) and a concomitant judgment of value (‘with whom I am

well pleased’). It is the case that this body, this soul, this life is the body, soul, and life of the

Father’s Son. They belong to Him as his own.1055 The judgment is one of identity. At the

baptism, the Father bears witness to the filiation of his beloved Son.1056 But what makes this

judgment true?

Let us return to creation for a moment and focus upon the existence of a single

individual. If Peter did not exist, then it would not be true to say that Peter exists. This may seem

trivial and tautological but let us endure. God is not a liar. When he speaks, things happen. If

things do not happen, then he has not spoken. None of us would be here unless God had first

loved us into existence.1057 Creation need not entail any change in God.1058 Creation of Peter

entails no change in God. He loves no more nor less than before he created Peter. The knowing

and loving by which God creates Peter is the same knowing and loving by which God knows and

loves himself. God, however, knows and loves himself primarily and necessarily, whereas he

knows and loves Peter secondarily and contingently.1059

Sanctification entails a similar point. Edith needs God’s grace if she is to be brought into

beatific fulfillment. If it is true that God has poured out his love into the heart of Edith, what has

changed fundamentally is not God’s attitude toward Edith (he has called and loved her from the

foundations of the world [Eph. 1:4], and the love with which he loves her is the very same love

                                                                                                               1055 See John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, vol. 2 of Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, ed. P.

Boniface Kotter (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), c. 56 (= Book III, chapter 12), 135. [ET, Saint John of Damascus: Writings, trans. Frederic H. Chase, The Fathers of the Church 37 (DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 293.] Cyril of Alexandria, 2 Ep. ad Nestorium, in vol. 1 of Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. Norman B. Tanner, original text established by G. Alberigo, J.A. Dossetti, P.-P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, and P. Prodi, in consultation with H. Jedin (London: Sheed and Ward and DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 42a, ln. 18-20.

1056 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 39, a. 8, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 396a). 1057 See Joseph Ratzinger [Pope Benedict XVI], God and the World: A Conversation with Peter Seewald,

trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 26-27 [My sincere thanks to Sr. Gill Goulding, C.J. for bringing my attention to this text]; cf. Caritas in Veritate, §§5, 29, 34, 50, & 76.

1058 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 4: 466), a. 3c & ad 1 (4: 467); SCG 2.17 (ed. Leonina, 13: 304).

1059 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 14, a. 5c and q. 19, a. 3c (ed. Leonina, 4: 172, 235); cf. SCG 1. 49 and 1.81 (ed. Leonina, 13: 142, 224-25). It should be noted that there is difference between God’s knowing and God’s willing of created realities, for whereas God does not will any created reality by an absolute necessity, God does know all created realities necessarily (see ST Ia, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6; SCG 1.81.[7]).

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that he is), rather Edith’s attitude has changed toward God. It is now true that Edith loves God,

whereas prior to the enkindling of Charity in her, she did not love God in a salvifically

efficacious way.

So we say things about God in relation to creatures. We say true things about God: ‘God

creates Peter,’ ‘God sanctifies Edith,’ etc. But they are not true on account of some change in

God but on account of some kind of change in the created order of things.1060 This is what we

mean by contingent predication, for we have predicated something of God that takes place

contingently not necessarily. There are certain contingent conditions to be fulfilled if something

is to actually be the case. Judgments are affirmations that such conditions have been fulfilled.

When we make a statement regarding God and creatures a relation is implied. Now a

relation always implies at least two terms; it often involves two real subjects, in those cases

where the relation inheres in both subjects, for example the love shared by a husband and wife.

But there are other cases where the relation inheres in only one of the subjects, strictly speaking,

and hence there is only one real subject, for example when an artist produces a painting. The

relation of being produced (i.e., of being a production) is only in the painting. This does not

make the relation any less real. The relation is real insofar as it really inheres in one of the

subjects.

Hence, when we speak of God creating Peter, there is a real relation in Peter of being

created (creari).1061 There are two terms: (1) an eternal term, namely, God and (2) a temporal

term, namely, Peter. There is one real subject: Peter. Peter is the one receiving, and hence the

real subject of existing. Indeed, every creature is in a posture of receiving toward God, which is

to say that every creature is passive with respect to God and dependent upon Him for its being.

Both the relation of creari and Peter as subject of the relation are creaturely and temporal; they

are not divine and eternal. Yet the relation of creari is formally constitutive of Peter—it is active

with respect to Peter, for it makes Him to be.1062 In turn, however, this relation of Peter existing

is also dependent upon God’s initiative. In this way, both Peter and the relation of creari inhering

in Peter are contingent terms, yet one is material and the other formal.1063

                                                                                                               1060 See Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 12.15-16 (CCSL 48: 369-372); Thomas, SCG 1.29, 2.11-14; ST Ia, q.

13, a. 7c; ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c (ed. Leonina, 11: 40); in 3 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2, n. 26 (ed. Moos, 188); Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1964), thesis 7, pars 4: 252-254.

1061 See Thomas, SCG 2.18 (ed. Leonina, 13: 305); cf. ST Ia, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 4: 467b). 1062 The use of the term “formally” should not be confused with either form or formal cause. 1063 The play, here, between act and potency is what makes it possible to distinguish between ‘formal’ and

‘material’ contingent terms. A material contingent term is a metaphysical subject, for it receives. A formal

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So what would be the appropriate (formal) contingent term for the incarnation? In

creation, someone’s existence, the very fact of being created is the contingent term. In

sanctification, we may say that it is sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens). To say that I am

‘in a state of grace’ is to affirm that I am rightly ordered to God—I am in right relation to Him. It

is to say that I am in his favor, that he loves me, that I am his adopted son (Rom. 8:15-17; cf.

Gal. 4:6-7; Eph. 1:13-14). I have been made a participant in the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4). But

what should we say in regard to the incarnation?

The ‘this’ of the paternal judgment at the Baptism may be explicated in terms of the

animated body emerging from the waters with all its particularity and singularity. The ‘my Son’

is none other than the person of the eternal Word, the image of the invisible God (Col. 1:15), the

very stamp of his nature (Heb. 1:3). But what about the ‘is’? The identifier, if you will, between

‘this’ and ‘my Son.’ We are not simply asking a question about grammar, much less about logic.

We are asking about being, about existence. Can the ‘is’ of the paternal judgment be reduced to

the divine tetragrammaton, to the ‘He Who Is’? This divine ‘is’ never changes, it was, is, and

ever shall be (Rev. 1:8). God is ipsum esse subsistens.1064 Yet Jesus was born at Bethlehem,

grew-up under the guidance of his parents, and at a singular point in history approached John on

the banks of the Jordan seeking to be baptized. What has happened? What is different in the

world to which the Father bears witness at the Jordan and upon the mount of transfiguration?

God has sent forth his Son (Gal. 4:4).

5 Analogy of Divine Missions

What does it mean to say that a divine person has been sent?1065 A divine mission must

have its eternal foundation in the immanent life of the Trinity. If there were no eternal

processions in God, then there would be no temporal divine missions, for a mission implies both

a sender and a sent. But a mission also implies a destination or purpose, someone or something                                                                                                                contingent term is active with respect to the material contingent term but is nevertheless the contingent and created result of God’s action in the world. See Lonergan, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, vol. 12 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), Q. 26, 468, 470; cf. Robert Doran, The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions. Vol. 1: Missions and Processions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), ch. 3: 49.

1064 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 4, a. 2c; cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 11c. 1065 For far more thorough explorations of the constitution and intelligibility of a divine mission see

Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43; Lonergan, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, Assertum 15, Assertum 17, Q. 26, and Q. 29 (CWL 12: 438-42, 454-66, 466-72, 482-90); Jeremy Wilkins, “Why Two Divine Missions? Development in Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan,” Irish Theological Quarterly 77.1 (2012): 37-66; and Doran, Trinity in History, 40-82.

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to whom or to which: this is the term of the mission, as the sender is the principle. A mission also

implies the presence of a divine person existing in a new way in the creature to whom or to

which he is sent.1066 Applying the distinctions we gleaned through our analysis of contingent

predication, we may say that a divine mission entails a special relation between a divine person

and a creature such that a new mode of divine indwelling takes place.1067

So there are two who eternally proceed in God, namely, the Son according to generation

and the Spirit according to Spiration. The Son is sent by the Father into the world for the

redemption of humankind (Jn. 8:12-18; Jn. 12:44-50; Jn. 6:38-40; Gal. 4:4-5; 1 Tim. 1:15). For

the Son to be in the world is to have assumed a human nature into union with himself. The

visible mission of the Son, therefore, entails the hypostatic union, insofar as it is the historical

means by which God reconciles humanity to himself.1068 Consequently, the mission of the Word

is his incarnation,1069 and this new manner of divine tabernacling is absolutely unparalleled.1070

The Father and Son send the Holy Spirit for the sanctification of the human person.1071

This is the theoretical extrapolation of Paul’s declaration that ‘God’s love has been poured into

our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us’ (Rom. 5:5).1072 The invisible

mission of the Holy Spirit, therefore, is properly charity whereby human persons are elevated

unto God by loving,1073 which cannot take place apart from but only according to sanctifying

grace (gratia gratum faciens).1074

                                                                                                               1066 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 4: 445). 1067 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3 (ed. Leonina, 4: 446a). 1068 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b); cf. Pope St. Leo the Great, Tractates de

Natale Domini, tr. 25, n. 4: “Hac missione, qua Deus unitus est homini, Filius inpar est Patri, non in eo quod | est ex Patre, sed in eo quod est factus ex homine. Aequalitatem enim quam inuiolabilem habet Deitas, non corrupit humanitas, et Creatoris ad creaturam descensio, credentium est ad aeterna subuectio” (CCSL 138: 121-122).

1069 See Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. tr. 26, n. 19 (CCSL 36: 269); tr. 36, nn. 7-8 (CCSL 36: 328); tr. 40, n. 6 (CCSL 36: 353); tr. 42, n. 8 (CCSL 36: 368); Prosper of Aquitain, Liber Sententiarum, c. 349 (CCSL 68A: 347); Alcuin of York, Comm. in S. Ioh. Evang., lib. 4, c. 22 (PL 100: 871D) and De Fide Sanctae Trinitatis et De Incarnatione Christi, lib. 3, c. 4 (CCCM 249: 96); Anselm of Laon, Glosae super Iohannem, c. 8, ln. 542-43 (CCCM 267: 165); Peter Lombard, Sententiae, lib. 3, dist. 1, prol. (SB 5: 24).

1070 See Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 1c: “Sed haec est quaedam unio singularis supra omnes modos unionis nobis notos” (ed. Obenauer, 34, 36).

1071 See Augustine, De Trinitate, 15.27.48 (CCSL 50A: 530); cf. Tract. in Ioh. Euang., tr. 99, n. 9 (CCSL 36: 587).

1072 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 3, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 4: 447-448). 1073 See Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1; q. 24, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 8: 165b, 175b); cf. ST IIIa, q. 7, a.

13c (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b). 1074 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 3c (ed. Leonina, 4: 447). For some insight into the early twentieth century

debate over the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and a particularly acute analysis of M. Scheeben’s position, see Malachi J. Donnelly, “The Indwelling of the Holy spirit according to M.J. Scheeben,” Theological Studies 7.2 (June 1946), 244-80; cf. Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, trans. David Smith, vol. 2 (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997), 83-90 and Karl Rahner, “Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated

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Both the mission and the recipient of the mission are created and temporal.1075 The

mission entails what we above called a formal contingent term, and the recipient is the material

contingent term. A divine mission implies a real relation inhering in the creature; it denotes no

change in God, but in the creature.1076 To say that a divine mission implies a real relation in the

creature is to say that the creature has been made a temporal participant in an eternal procession.

Through the divine missions, human persons are brought not simply into any kind of relation, but

into the very relations of the Trinity.1077 This is what it means for a divine person to be sent.1078

Now in the life of Jesus, the missions are juxtaposed in a unique way (a way which we

see manifested at the Baptism). The historical life of the incarnate Son is his mission. Having

assumed humanity, however, he places himself in that humanity at the disposal of the Holy Spirit

and therefore in his humanity participates in the mission of the Holy Spirit.1079 There is,

however, no question of a temporal priority, for at the very moment of conception Christ is both

fully man and fully endowed with the plenitude of grace.1080 What should be noted is that Jesus’

humanity needs the elevation of grace. Not because of any sinful defect which must be

purged,1081 but because it has been elevated to a task of manifestation and revelation which

exceeds its natural endowments.1082

6 The Human Reality of Jesus

What are the metaphysical constituents of a human and historical life? Here, we must

discern and relate the biological, formal, and existential features of human life. There can be no

doubt that there are biological and vital processes developing and coalescing in such a way as to

constitute a body—we are bodily, and we act in and through our bodies. To be embodied is an

                                                                                                               Grace,” trans. Cornelius Ernst, in vol. 1 of Theological Investigations (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), 319-46, esp. 319, fn. 1.

1075 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2 (ed Leonina, 4: 446). 1076 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 43, a. 2, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 4: 446b). 1077 See Longergan, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, Q. 26, CWL 12: 470, 472 and De Gratia

Sanctificante, theorema 2, in Early Latin Theology, CWL 19: 632; cf. Doran, Trinity in History, 135-75. 1078 See Augustine, De Trinitate, 4.20.28: ‘Ab illo ergo mittitur dei uerbum cuius est uerbum; ab illo

mittitur de quo natum est. Mittit qui genuit; mittitur quod genitum est. Et tunc unicuique mittitur cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque percipitur quantum cognosci et percipi potest pro captu uel proficientis in deum uel perfectae in deo animae rationalis. Non ergo eo ipso quo de patre natus est missus dicitur filius, se due eo quod apparuit huic mundo uerbum caro factum unde dicit: A patre exii et ueni in hunc mundum, uel eo quod ex tempore cuiusquam mente percipitur sicut dictum est: Mitte illam ut mecum sit et mecum laboret’ (CCSL 50: 198).

1079 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 1c (ed. Leonina, 11: 106). 1080 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 12c (ed. Leonina, 11: 51b); q. 7, a. 13c (ed. Leonina, 11: 124). 1081 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 9, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 117b). 1082 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3 (ed. Leonina, 11: 107b).

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essential feature of what it means to be human. Yet, the bodies we have are not just any bodies.

We do not have rocks for bodies; we do not have plants for bodies; we do not have a squirrel,

dolphin, or dog body. We have human bodies; bodies uniquely suited, at it were, to express those

features of human life which are unique and distinctive to the human species.

Consequently, there is a higher formal unity that is essential for the numerical and

physical unity of our body or matter. The physical and numerical unity of the body will dissipate

upon the loss of this higher formal unity, namely, the soul. A lifeless body decomposes, as other

biological unities parcel out the hollow shell that is no longer an organic, living unity.

The essential unity achieved through the composition of soul and body, however, is still

but mere potency in comparison with existence. No creature contains within the stores of its own

essential constitution the wherewithal for its own existence. Every member of the human species

is in just as much need of the gift of existence as the lowest microorganism. We are dependent

beings, and though our ‘special’ identity (i.e., the identity we have insofar as we are members of

a species) is attained through the mere composition of matter and form, this is insufficient for

personal identity. Persons are wholes; natures are parts.1083

A person is a distinct subsistent of an intellectual nature.1084 A supposit is a distinct

subsistent of any specified nature (this rose, this cat, this dolphin, etc.). What primarily exists are

supposits. All other things exist only insofar as they participate in or contribute to the existence

of supposits.1085 Personal identity is attained when a distinct subsistent of an intellectual nature

exists, for existence pertains primarily to persons or supposits not to natures. Natures are that by

which supposits exist, and human nature is that by which a human person exists.1086 Nature is the

most basic and fundamental, interior principle of all operation, be the operation passive or

active.1087

                                                                                                               1083 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 2c: ‘Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem

formalem et perfectivam sui’ (ed. Leonina, 11: 25a); cf. Compendium Theologiae, 1.211 (ed. Leonina, 42: 163b). 1084 See Thomas, Aquinas, in Sent. 1, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4c: ‘persona dicit aliquid distinctum subsistens in natura

intellectuali’ (ed. Mandonnet, 566). 1085 See Lonergan, De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 16. 1086 See Aristotle, Physics, 2.1 (192b8-12) and Metaphysics, 7.17 (1041b1-33, but especially 27-32).

Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 17, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 11: 222a). 1087 See Aristotle, Physics, 2.1 (192b21-23) and Metaphysics, 9.8 (1049b5-10). Boethius, Contra Eutychen

et Nestorium, c. 1, ln. 96-97 (ed. Moreshini, 211). John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, 59; III.15 (Kotter, 144; FOTC 37: 304). Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, 1.212 (ed. Leonina, 42: 165b.49-50). Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 4, scholion 2: 206 and “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” in A Third Collection (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 174-5.

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A human person, then, is not the same as human nature, even an individual human nature.

Persons are that which exist, natures are that by which persons exist. A whole is distinct from its

parts, and who is distinct from what. A human person includes in their metaphysical constitution

elements which are beyond the immediate determination of the species (i.e. accidents).1088 All

humans have hair, but not all humans need have red hair. All humans have skin, but there is no

need for it to be one color rather than another, such attributes are related per accidens to the

essence of the species.

Consequently, a person is a composite of essence and existence. A composition which is

unique both on the side of the essence and on the side of existence. Peter’s body is not Thomas’

body. We know this because each body has its own unique set of characteristics or accidental

qualities in addition to the qualities that all human bodies have. Their bodies are different sizes,

shapes; one is older, the other younger; their bodies occupy different spaces; one is walking, the

other is still crawling, one wears pants, the other wears shorts; one mostly talks, the other mostly

listens. Peter’s soul is not Thomas’ soul. Peter’s seeing, imagining, considering, understanding,

judging, loving are not the seeing, imagining, considering, understanding, judging, and loving of

Thomas.

While each individual human nature is unique to each person, nevertheless, we also share

human nature. Human nature is really common to all human beings. Which is why human nature

may be predicated univocally of Peter, Edith, and Thomas. But existence is different. We can say

truly that Peter, Edith, and Thomas all exist. We could even say that they participate in existence,

that they have a share in existence. But we are only able to say this analogically not univocally.

Just as we say that Peter, Edith, and Thomas are persons, yet each is their own person, so too the

existence of Peter, Edith, and Thomas is unique to each of them. They have their being directly

from God. Existence, therefore, is real but unique in every instance.

So what can we say about the human reality of Jesus? The Councils furnish us with an

initial heuristic framework for what is one in Christ and what is two: one person, two natures.

This is not to say that the Councils are somehow metaphysical as opposed to narrative, as though

to set up an opposition between the Councils and Scripture. This is not only historically

anachronistic and irresponsible but is also a false dichotomy that is to be avoided at all costs. To

be sure, the Councils presuppose certain metaphysical commitments, but they do not impose a

                                                                                                               1088 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 2c (ed. Leonina, 11: 25a).

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metaphysical system. I have, clearly, followed a certain metaphysical ‘school of thought’ in my

exposition of human nature above (i.e. Thomist), but there are others. The real question for a

metaphysics appropriated by Christian theology is this: Can it explicate the mysteries of the

Faith in a way that is faithful to Scripture and Tradition and in a way that increases the

understanding of the faithful in a fruitful way?

The Gospels depict Jesus as acting in a human way. He lives a human life. He is born,

grows, learns, matures, teaches, and dies. They also, however, depict Jesus doing things that are

outside the proportion of human capacities: raising the dead and rising from the dead himself.

Consequently, the Gospels leave us with an account of someone who does things that are

proportionate to human nature and does things that are disproportionate to human nature. Why is

this the case? Why can Jesus perform human operations and divine operations? The analysis of

nature above provides us with an explanatory framework for articulating an answer.

Nature is an interior principle of operation. Hence, certain kinds of operations point to a

metaphysical foundation, namely, nature. But natures, strictly speaking, do not act, persons do.

Nature is the interior principle of operation; it is not the operator. This raises the question about

who performs the actions in Jesus’ life. The combined witness of the Gospels and the Epistles is

that Jesus is the Son of God. This claim of divine identity is the basis of all Christian theology. It

is meaningless and false if Jesus himself did not know it, proclaim it, and teach it.1089 Scripture

and Tradition are agreed about the one who acts: it is the eternal and only-begotten Son of the

Father, who ‘for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven.’

There is a further question, however, as to how to relate the natures and the person. The

Fathers, through their defense, explanation, and promulgation of the Conciliar synthesis offer us

a dogmatic term whereby we may talk about the union of the two natures in the person of Jesus:

‘hypostatic union.’ This dogmatic term, ultimately, comes to mean that the union takes place at a

personal level, not at the level of nature. A union at the level of nature always results in a third

                                                                                                               1089 See n. 26, above. My operative distinction is this: It is one thing to claim on scholarly grounds what the

texts of the gospels and the NT epistles were intended to convey. Scholars disagree about the purpose, meaning, and intention of NT texts. Yet one could be an atheist and still come to the scholarly conclusion that the gospel of John is intended to show that ‘Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God’ (Jn. 20:30-31). Understanding the purpose of the text is different from the affirmation of the truth claim presented by the text. Consequently, the recognition of the intent of NT texts is not the same as a personal assent to the claim: ‘Jesus is the Son of God.’ The former may be affirmed or denied by scholars operating on the basis of textual and historical evidence. To accept the latter, however, is an act of faith, and to reflect on its meaning and implications is to begin the process of Christian theology.

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nature which is neither of the natures that were conjoined. A union at the level of person,

however, preserves the ontological integrity of both natures.

So there is a divine person with two natures: divine and human. What can we say about

Jesus’ existence? Clearly, he existed. But was his existence divine or human? Was it uncreated

or created? Above, we indicated that existence is properly and primarily of the person. If Jesus’

person was divine and uncreated, then it seems to follow that his existence is divine and

uncreated. Yet, Jesus is really human. The hypostatic union does not abolish the reality of Jesus’

human nature. It too, surely, exists in some way. But if a human nature is a by which of existence

(as we indicated above), can we say that the Eternal Word has his eternal existence by the human

nature? Such a position would quickly collapse into incoherence as soon as we affirmed that the

Word becomes flesh, or that he assumes a human nature. The one assuming precedes in existence

that which is assumed. That which is assumed is brought into the personal existence of the

Eternal Word.1090

7 Toward an Analogy of Created Participation

Let us try to frame the question a different way: What is the ontological relation of Jesus’

human nature to his divine person? As noted above, the Tradition furnishes us with the heuristic

term hypostatic union. But what is this union? From our discussion of the divine mission above,

we may say that it is the temporal result of the visible mission of the Son. From our discussion of

contingent predication, we may say that it is the formal contingent term, that is, the contingent

result of the Word becoming flesh.

Several things follow: (1) The hypostatic union is the relation of the human nature to the

person of the Word. (2) It is created and therefore, finite and temporal.1091 (3) It is not a relation

in a merely accidental or conjugate order,1092 it is substantial because it pertains to the human

nature as united to the Word and inheres in the human nature as in a metaphysical subject.1093 Let

us add that (4) being joined to a divine person is outside the proportion of any creature; no

creature possesses the internal resources for actualizing such a union; consequently, this union is

also absolutely supernatural, which means that it is a grace, the grace of union.1094 Lastly, the

                                                                                                               1090 See Thomas, SCG 4.49 (ed. Leonina, 15: 156-157). 1091 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, s.c. (ed. Leonina, 11: 40a). 1092 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 6c; q. 6, a. 6, s.c. (ed. Leonina, 11: 104a). 1093 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 48-49). 1094 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13c (ed. Leonina, 11: 124b); cf. q. 2, aa. 10-12; q. 6, a. 6c.

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union has as its real ontological subject the human nature. A thing’s existence depends upon the

subject in which it inheres; hence, (6) the existence of the union is a created existence.1095

In the case of the Spirit’s mission of sanctifying grace or charity, we speak of charity as a

created participation in the Holy Spirit.1096 We may say something similar concerning the

mission of the Son: the human nature of Jesus participates in the personal existence of the Word,

for the grace of union is the communication of the personal existence of the Word to the human

nature.1097 The contingent result of this communication is the joining of the human nature to the

Word, which expressed existentially is the created existence consequent upon the human nature’s

union with the divine person of the Son.

The Son, therefore, does not exist eternally by his human nature; rather, the human nature

of Jesus is brought into the eternal divine existence.1098 The human nature cannot have the divine

existence as its own; it cannot limit it or possess it.1099 But as participating in it, there redounds to

the human nature a created and temporal existence by which the Word is this man. This created

and temporal existence is substantial and supernatural, but secondary insofar as it is not that by

which the Word is the Word simply or eternally but only insofar as the Word temporally became

man.1100

The sole sufficient reason for why the Son of God became man is completely and

mysteriously contained in the divine existence itself. Everything about Jesus’ historical life is the

contingent result of the divine initiative. His human nature, therefore, does not exist because it

has its own existence, nor does it exist because it provides the essential or formal conduit

through which eternal existence may be communicated. It exists solely because it has been made

to participate in the divine act of existence. Nevertheless, this very participation is created and as

such serves as the existential principle for Jesus’ temporal life insofar as he is this man. As

                                                                                                               1095 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: ‘ratio relationis, sicut et motus , dependet ex fine vel termino: sed

esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum’ (ed. Leonina, 11: 40b).

1096 See Thomas, ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 8: 165b); q. 24, a. 2c (8: 175b). 1097 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 6, a. 6c: ‘Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus

datur humanae naturae in persona Verbi: quod quidem est terminus assuinptionis’ (ed. Leonina, 11: 104a). 1098 See Thomas, SCG 4.49.[15] (ed. Leonina, 15: 157b). 1099 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 7, pars 3, n. 3: ‘Ubi componuntur essentia et esse

proportionatum, esse recipitur in essentia et per essentiam limitatur. Sed esse divinum non recipitur in assumpta essentia neque per eam limitatur. Quod communiter conceditur.’

1100 See Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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human, therefore, Jesus lives his historical life under this finite horizon, according to this

secondary act of existence (esse secundarium).1101

8 The Divine Person of Jesus

The fundamental and constitutive unity of Jesus’ person is not determined by any of the

created metaphysical constituents of his human nature. Jesus is one because as the eternally

begotten Son he partakes of the one act of divine existence that is common to all three of the

persons. The secondary act of existence that is the contingent result of the assumption of human

nature does not compromise this personal unity because it is brought into an already (and

eternally) constituted existential unity. It adds nothing to the divine existence because insofar as

it is an act, it is itself the contingent result of the Son’s divine communication.

Jesus’ personal identity, therefore, is not constituted by his human nature or the

secondary act of existence but is rather revealed through and in them. Jesus’ life is not primarily

one of personal self-discovery but one of self-revelation. What Jesus discovers is ever more

appropriate ways to manifest his divine Sonship, to teach humankind about the Father. This

naturally brings us to the question of the ‘I’ of Jesus Christ, but in order to avoid an

unnecessarily impoverished discussion of Jesus’ ‘I,’ we must amplify and enrich all that we have

established metaphysically with properly psychological structures and content. This will be the

task of part two.

Part 2: The Human Consciousness of Jesus Christ

9 Jesus is Always at Prayer

Standing outside of Lazarus’ tomb, truly grieved at the loss of his friend’s life. Jesus says,

‘Father, I thank you for having heard me. I knew that you always hear me, but I have said this for

the sake of the crowd standing here, so that they may believe that you sent me’ (Jn. 11:41-42).

This prayer uttered by Jesus is suggestive of an ongoing interior life of prayer that is only

occasionally (if also frequently) expressed in spoken words. Jesus is always at prayer.

But what is prayer? This is an often asked question, and it is not the kind of question

which admits of a glib answer concocted out of ready-made formulas or tropes. So let us focus

                                                                                                               1101 See Thomas, QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4c (ed. Obenauer, 86).

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on just two aspects of prayer: (1) ascent and (2) expression. Prayer has a telos—to bring us into

union with God. In expressing our own wants and desires in the context of dialogical

communion with him our thoughts and desires become his. In us, there is a gap (or gaps even)

between our lived life, our prayer life, and God’s life. Perhaps it is for this reason that we are

exhorted to pray continually (1 Thess. 5:17).

Yet, in Christ we can imagine no such gap. There is no time at which he is not in prayer

with the Father. How can this be? At the ontological level, as we have shown above, the human

nature of Jesus is related to his divine person as hypostatically united—there can be no more

intimate metaphysical union. At the level of being, Christ is perfectly one with God because he is

the Son of God. But how does Jesus in his human cognition relate to the Father? If the goal of

prayer is unitive, what would it mean to say that Christ has always achieved this psychological

union in prayer? This union of prayer is precisely what is at the heart of affirming the presence of

beatific vision in the human mind of Jesus. To say that Jesus enjoys the beatific vision is to

affirm that from the moment of conception he has attained and maintains the perfect union

toward which all prayer is ordered as to a final end. In what follows, let us try to unpack this

claim, especially as it relates to Jesus’ mission and as it pertains to the question of his human

knowledge of his divine identity.

10 Transposing Person, Nature, and Existence

In part one, we re-appropriated the Conciliar and Patristic consensus of Christ as one

person with two natures by affirming the presence of a secondary act of existence as the

contingent term of God’s speaking his Son into history so that we could have a metaphysical

foundation for affirming the authentic finitude and genuine historicality of Jesus’ human life.

Let us now try to transpose this ontological framework of (1) person, (2) nature, and (3)

existence into a psychological key.

Because the meaning of consciousness is perhaps the most elusive, it will be helpful if we

focus our attention on illuminating this obscure phenomenon first. It is very easy to conceive of

consciousness as a kind-of perception. We often say things like: ‘Oh, I wasn’t even conscious

that I was doing that.’ Implying that consciousness has an object or focal point in the way that

our sensitive and intellectual operations do, such as seeing, hearing, imagining, understanding,

conceiving, or loving.

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It is possible, however, to pursue an alternate way of conceiving consciousness, namely,

not as perception but as experience.1102 Consciousness is the entire field or panorama of our

awareness and while dependent upon our acts and operations, nevertheless, it cannot be

identified with any one of them. When there are no intellectual or sensitive operations, as when

we are in a deep and dreamless sleep, then we are not conscious. When dreaming, we are

partially conscious. When awake, we are fully conscious.1103

Our operations and actions take place within a unified and dynamic manifold.1104 Our

operations do not tumble out of us as though dumped out of a bag, nor do we experience

ourselves as acting in the world as though thrown from a spinning merry-go-round. Our

operations are naturally ordered and they proceed from a dynamic unity.1105

Consciousness is immanent to and constitutive of all our sensitive and intellectual

operations,1106 and yet it is not limited to them, for in any given operation where we perceive or

attain the object of the operation, we are also and simultaneously conscious that we ourselves are

the very ones acting, and we are also conscious that the operation is happening.1107 This presence

of ourselves as operators or actors is not reflexive. Reflection has an object, but consciousness

attains the subject as subject not as object.

We may deepen this observation by distinguishing three kinds of presence: (1) physical,

(2) objective or intentional, and (3) subjective.1108 Physical presence is the presence of an object

in a room, for example, a table or a chair. They are physically present in the room whether they

are perceived by a viewer or not. Intentional presence is the presence of an object to a perceiver,

having attained it either sensitively (something seen by seeing, something heard by hearing, etc.)

or intellectually (something understood by understanding, something conceived by conceiving,

etc). This second kind of presence is what we might call the object-pole of a cognitional

operation, for acts have objects. But an operation also has a subject-pole, and this is what I mean

                                                                                                               1102 See Lonergan, De Constitutione Christi Ontologica et Psychologica, vol. 7 of the Collected Works of

Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 156: ‘Conscientia est sui suorumque actuum experientia stricte dicta atque interna.’ Cf. “Christ as Subject: A Reply,” in Collection, CWL 4: 163-6.

1103 See Lonergan, “The Subject,” in A Second Collection, ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), 80.

1104 See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3: 345. 1105 See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3: 349-50. 1106 See Lonergan, Insight, CWL 3: 344; De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 172-3; De Conscientia Christi,

CWL 19: 538. 1107 See Lonergan, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, CWL 12: 380. 1108 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 10: 267; cf. Christology Today, 91-2.

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by subjective or self-presence: the presence of the acting subject in any operation performed by

the subject. Self-presence is the presence of the subject as the one performing the operation. It is

not the presence of the subject as an object considered, reflected upon, or grasped.

In this explication of consciousness as experience, three elements have emerged: (1) the

subject who is conscious, (2) consciousness as a given unity within which operations unfold and

take place, and (3) the self-presence of the conscious subject to any intentional operation. If we

designate the second element of consciousness with the term ‘subjectivity,’1109 then we may

integrate and distinguish all three elements of consciousness in the following definition:

subjectivity is that ‘by which the subject is present to himself or herself and the acts of the

subject are present to the subject.’1110

We are now in a position to assign the transposition of terms, first as it applies to us and

second as it applies in the case of Christ. As there is one metaphysical person who acts, so is

there one psychological subject; as nature is that by which a person exists, so is subjectivity that

by which a subject is self-present; and just as existence is something really distinct from nature

and person, so self-presence is really distinct from the subject and subjectivity.

In Christ, then, there is one subject and two subjectivities just as there is one person and

two natures.1111 And just as there is one primary, principal, uncreated, and eternal existence in

the person of the Word insofar as he eternally is, yet there is also a secondary, created, and

contingent existence insofar as he temporally became man, so too Christ is present to himself

primarily and eternally insofar as he is the divine Word and also present to himself secondarily

and temporally in a human way.

11 Jesus’ Knowledge of His Divine Identity

The basic constitution of Christ’s intellectual consciousness is unique. Christ enjoys

beatific vision from the first moment of his conception.1112 The continual illumination of beatific

                                                                                                               1109 See Lonergan, “Christology Today,” 92. 1110 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 10: 267. It should be noted that I have subbed in

‘subjectivity’ where Lonergan has ‘consciousness’. I think this move is suggested by the way he defines ‘subjectivity’ in Christology Today, but to my knowledge at no place in his corpus does he relate or juxtapose subjectivity and self-presence in quite the way that I am arguing here. He uses subjectivity interchangeably with consciousness and self-presence interchangeably with consciousness. But on phenomenological grounds, I believe that subjectivity and self-presence can and ought to be distinguished. Hence, ‘consciousness’ emerges as something composite.

1111 See Lonergan, “Christology Today,” 93-94. 1112 The presence of beatific vision in Christ was much disputed in the twentieth century. Yves Congar

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vision in the conscious life of Jesus means that Jesus is never only a potential psychological

subject. For someone is an actual psychological subject whenever he or she is operating. Beatific

vision is an intellectual operation; therefore, Jesus is intellectually operating when enjoying

beatific vision. Now, insofar as self-presence is the concomitant subject-pole of any intentional

operation, if Christ always enjoys beatific vision, then he is always present to himself.

God gives to every being its first act.1113 Hence, in addition to the natural endowment of

the light of agent intellect, God also gives to the intellect its first act by which, presumably, being

(ens) first enters the human mind. If one affirms acquired knowing in Christ,1114 then it would

seem that this too occurs in the mind of Christ. Without destroying this phenomenon, however,

there is an additional and concomitant structure and event: Christ enjoys the beatific vision as

first act of his intellect and as a result his intellect is disposed not only by the lumen agentis but

also by the lumen gloriae. Because beatific vision is the first act of Christ’s human intellect, his

human self-presence is constituted uniquely, that is, supernaturally.

Christ’s human self-presence is supernatural because Christ is present to himself

according to his humanity in the act of beatific vision. Not simply ens but ipsum esse subsistens

is the first object which falls within Christ’s human intellect. Christ not only has an intending

intention of being (lumen agentis) but also the understanding of the divine essence itself

according to which the human intellect of Christ is shaped by the lumen gloriae. As first act of

Christ’s human intellect, the beatific vision elevates Christ’s self-presence such that he is truly

present to himself in a supernatural but still human way. As noted above, every act has a subject

                                                                                                               provides a non-exhaustive but still helpful distillation of some of the literature up until his time, see his Jesus Christ, 52. Von Balthasar expresses an extreme reticence regarding the issue, see Theo-Drama 3: 191-202. But it may be that he is rejecting a particular (and problematic) meaning of visio beatifica rather than dismissing the phenomenon entirely. Karl Rahner seems far more open to it but with some qualifications, see “Current Problems in Christology,” Theological Investigations, vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), 149-200, but especially, 158-73. More recently, Jean Galot has altogether rejected the presence of beatific vision in the human consciousness of Christ, see his Who is Christ? A Theology of the Incarnation, trans. M. Angeline Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 353-59. A similar rejection may be found in Thomas Weinandy, “Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father,” Pro Ecclesia 13.2 (2004): 189-201; cf. Jesus the Christ (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 2003): 88-95 and In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 52-53. Thomas Joseph White has engaged both Galot and Weinandy on this topic and presents his own arguments affirming the presence of beatific vision in the human consciousness of Christ. See his, The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology (DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 236-74. Also helpful is the discussion of Jeremy Wilkins, “Love and Knowledge of God in the Human Life of Christ,” Pro Ecclesia 21.1 (2012), 77-99.

1113 Thomas, ST IaIIae, q. 109, a. 1c. 1114 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 9, a. 4c; q. 12.

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pole and an object pole. Christ’s supernatural self-presence is the subject pole of the beatific

vision, whereas God as quidditatively understood is the object pole.

Without beatific knowing, Christ would be incapable of affirming, ‘I am the Son of God.’

Jesus must know that he is God, but to do so he must first have a quidditative knowledge of what

God is, otherwise the crucial part of the judgment would remain an unknown, namely, God. But

a quidditative knowledge of God is only possible through the beatific vision, whereby God

informs the human intellect with his very own essence so that by his essence the human intellect

may understand him but not comprehend him.1115

But without lumen gloriae, Christ would be incapable of expressing sufficiently this

perfect understanding of God in an inner word. He would have been just as Paul, unable to tell

and unable to utter (2 Cor. 12:4). It should be noted, however, that according to his human

intellect, Christ cannot utter a simple, comprehensive inner word, for while understanding God

perfectly and quidditatively according to his human intellect, nevertheless, Christ does not

comprehend God according to his finite human intellect. This would not abrogate the possibility

of a great host of inner words that each express (in a limited way) some aspect of his beatific

vision that under the influence of lumen gloriae could serve as sufficient (but not proportionate)

ground for the reflection requisite for a proceeding judgment.

Now the ‘I’ of the judgment regarding his divine identity according to the act of meaning

is a compound inner word.1116 It conforms according to what is meant with the content of

Christ’s beatific vision: He understands the person of the Word under the ratio of object. Due to

the influence of lumen gloriae, such content may be sufficiently but not comprehensively

expressed and considered.

As an act of meaning, what is the judgment’s source or origin?1117 From whence does it

proceed?1118 We have indicated already that this judgment is impossible without the act of

beatific vision and the disposition of lumen gloriae, but the beatific vision only yields, as it were,

the divine side of things under the ratio of object. Is there a further interior source upon which

the judgment must draw for its meaning?1119

                                                                                                               1115 See Thomas, ST Ia, q. 12, a. 7c (ed. Leonina, 4: 127); cf. Compendium Theologiae, 1.106 (ed. Leonina,

42: 121b). 1116 See Lonergan, De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 168. 1117 See Loenrgan, De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 172. 1118 See Lonergan, De Conscientia Christi, CWL 19: 538. 1119 See Lonergan, De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 173.

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It would seem that such a source is to be found in the interior experience of Christ as

constituted and shaped by the beatific vision, which is to say, that Christ’s consciousness as

intellectually patterned by the beatific vision is that from which proceeds the ‘I’ of the judgment:

‘I am the Son of God.’ As an act of meaning, therefore, this judgment derives the source of its

meaning from the human self-presence of Jesus as constituted uniquely by the beatific vision and

habituated by the lumen gloriae. Although Christ’s self-presence is not the only source of

meaning, nevertheless, it is the definitive source insofar as the content of Christ’s inner

conscious life is uniquely patterned and shaped by beatific vision and lumen gloriae.

The most excellent manifestation of lumen gloriae in the human life of Jesus is

exemplified in his ability to identify himself as the ‘I’ of the Son of the Father, for this

affirmation is the most adequate, incarnate expression of Christ’s beatific vision. There can be no

more excellent inner expression of the meaning of Christ’s beatific vision than the verbum iudicii

by which he affirms: ‘I am the Son of God.’

Such a position on Christ’s beatific knowing entails that Jesus cannot fulfill his mission

of divine revelation without beatific knowing, only one ‘who has seen God’ can proclaim Him as

he truly is. To know himself as God and to live his life in such a way that all aspects of it are

manifestations of who God is requires beatific knowing. To complete his mission, Jesus must

know who he is and who his Father is (cf. Mt. 11:27), to do this he must understand that which

both of them share, that by which he and the Father are one; it is not sufficient for Him simply to

believe it. Only someone with perfect intellectual vision of the divine essence, filled as it were to

overflowing due to the ardent burning of his perfect charity,1120 possesses the interior resources

requisite for the marshalling of all that a culture can provide in order that he may express the

definitive revelation of God.

12 Human Finitude and Beatific Knowing

Does the affirmation of beatific knowing in Christ compromise an authentic experience

of his human finitude? Let us approach this question by asking and answering two ancillary

questions: (1) Does Jesus learn? (2) Does Jesus experience things, people, and events in a human

way? Both of these questions may be answered in a definite and affirmative way. But what is it                                                                                                                

1120 Thomas, ST Ia, q. 12, a. 6c: ‘PIus autem participabit de lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate: quia ubi est maior caritas, ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior erit’ (ed. Leonina, 4: 126b).

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that Jesus learns? The life of the believer ought to be the accumulation (‘on the way up’) of

experiences, images, insights, and concepts that in an ever clearer (but never definitive) way

orients us to the God of our salvation. This is what it means for faith to seek understanding. We

are in via toward a perfect vision. The human life of Christ, however, while also in via is ‘on the

way down,’ as it were, insofar as all his acquired experiences, images, insights, and concepts are

ordered primarily not to understanding the ineffable divine essence but to expressing the divine

essence in an effable way.1121 Christ’s life is ordered to teaching. Thus, every new human

experience, every cultural trope, every text of Scripture is an opportunity for appropriation and

expression of the fundamental mission which he himself Is: He is the Word, the perfect and total

expression of the Father. His humanity in every one of its aspects must manifest this identity.

It is exceedingly difficult for even the most disciplined philosopher to attend to the basic

and natural dynamism of his or her human consciousness: the sense of wonder, the intending

intention of being, the light of agent intellect. If this, the most fundamental and transcendental

drive of our intellectual intentionality is so difficult to detect, why should we suppose that the

light of glory redounding in Jesus’ intellect would be so conspicuous as to override the natural

human exigence to know and wonder?1122 Beatific knowledge does not snuff out experientially

derived knowledge; it simply orients it in a new way.

Let us distinguish between two lines of development, two ways of becoming (fieri), or we

might say two trajectories of existenz: (1) vertical and (2) horizontal.1123 The horizontal way of

becoming stretches out across the course of our life: we grow, change, acquire new skills, learn

new things, develop, mature. There is a narrative-like unfolding to our lives. Yet in any given

moment, especially in times of decision, there is a vertical line of measure manifest in our

actions. In an instant, we will know if we did the ‘right thing,’ or at the least, ‘all that could have

been done.’ We will also know if we have ‘fallen short.’ The vertical line of fieri is determined

by our very metaphysical constitution; it is the teleological benchmark for our human potencies

and capacities. It is the foundation for the horizontal line. Without natural and cognitive

potencies to be fulfilled, we would not progress over the course of time.

In us, there are gaps in both lines: we not only fail to reach our historical potential, but

also (and often) fail to do the right thing at the right time. In Christ, however, there is really only

                                                                                                               1121 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 12: 332-5. 1122 See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis 12: 338. 1123 For Lonergan’s account of existenz, see De Constitutione Christi, CWL 7: 19-31.

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the development proper to the horizontal becoming. For although Christ most certainly never

actualizes all of his human potencies in any given moment, nevertheless, he always does and

says what needs to be said and done. Hence, the vertical becoming in the life of Christ is always

actualized.

In addition to the encounter we have with existence through the mediation of the light of

agent intellect, that may be identified with the universal and natural desire to know on the one

hand and the objectified, analogical concept of being attained through judgment on the other, we

can detect another manner of Being’s ‘unveiling’ in our consciousness. We have an experience

of our own act of existence, when we experience our own contingency or finitude in the face of

either its potential loss or its potential fulfillment. Hence, we experience contingency when we

brush closely with death but also when we find ourselves committed to a beloved.

We often thematize this experience of our contingency and finitude through aesthetic,

dramatic, or narrative patterns. If we were to speculate about the way in which Christ thematized

his experience of finitude, the New Testament suggests several themes: ‘my hour,’ ‘my cup,’ ‘I

was sent,’ ‘I have come,’ etc. All of which ultimately take the form of obedience and mission.

The Pauline ‘obedient unto death,’ could help us to understand how Christ may have thematized

his radical and unique experience of human contingency in his human consciousness: Christ

embraces his human finitude and creatureliness through the concrete and daily exercise of filial

obedience.1124 Christ’s historical and human life is not an inauthentic being unto death, but the

absolute exemplar and criterion for an authentic and virtuous human life because Christ in every

moment of his life maxes out the vertical finality of all his human operations. In always doing

what he sees the Father doing he at every moment presents his human life as the perfect

sacramentum of the divine life. Transformed by grace, being unto death takes on the new shape

of obedience unto death.

Jesus’ beatific vision in no way compromises the human obedience that normally

accompanies the virtue of faith as merit.1125 Jesus is the perfectly obedient one, in all things, even

unto death. Indeed, all the things which he learns are summed up and completed most excellently

                                                                                                               1124 As noted in the introduction, this is a recently recovered theme in contemporary Catholic Christology.

It is central to von Balthasar’s notion of Christ’s mission-consciousness and obviously animated much of Guardini and Congar’s reflections on the life of Christ. It is a recurring theme in the Christology of Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI). Also instructive is Thomas Joseph White’s reflections in The Incarnate Lord, 277-307.

1125 See Thomas, ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 3, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11: 109b).

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in his obedience upon the Cross, for here he exemplifies the lengths to which the Divine Love is

prepared to go to rescue the lost.

Peroratio 7: ‘In these last days He has spoken to us in His Son’

The basic thrust of what we have been trying to say somewhat laboriously and certainly

cumbersomely is this: God the Father has eternally spoken his Son, but ‘in these last days’ he has

spoken his Son in(to) history. Now, the eternal speaking does not change, but an absolutely

wonderful, marvelous, and unimaginable change has occurred in the world: the Word has

become flesh and dwelt among us. This means that distinct from the eternal existence which the

Word has had from all eternity,1126 there is a created and temporal secondary act of existence

which is the created, supernatural, substantial participation of Jesus’ human nature in his eternal,

uncreated, and personal existence. This supernatural, created, existential principle is the

contingent result of God’s speaking in history. It is the finite horizon under which all Jesus’

human experiences, operations, acts, and actions unfold and take place.

Psychologically speaking, Jesus is a divine subject present to himself in a divine and

eternal way by the divine subjectivity and present to himself in a human and temporal way by his

human subjectivity. Jesus’ human self-presence is the created participation of his human

subjectivity in his divine self-presence. According to his human subjectivity and self-presence,

then, Christ’s conscious life unfolds, grows, and develops horizontally according to an aesthetic

and dramatic pattern of experience. Yet within this historical unfolding, there is never a vertical

gap. For at every moment, Jesus always fulfills what the Father has sent Him to do. There is

never a hiatus or aporia between what Jesus should have done, could have done, or did. So far

from the contradiction of finitude, this is in fact its authentic embrace: Jesus lives a life of perfect

obedience because he has fully accepted his dependence upon God for all that he has and all that

he is.

We have, therefore, illustrated both ontologically and psychological what it means for

Jesus to ‘live his own life within the unfolding of a historical process.’1127 Like creation,

incarnation is not something accomplished and finished in a single moment or event.1128

                                                                                                               1126 See Thomas, QD de Unione, a. 4, ad 1 (ed. Obenauer, 86). 1127 ITC, “Select Questions on Christology,” 1.1. 1128 See Yves Congar, Jesus Christ, 63: ‘The incarnation is not limited to the fact, somehow ontological or

(meta)physical, of the hypostatic union, but is realized in a human history whose full human truth is necessary to its own.’

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Medieval exegetes understood quite well that the exinanivit of Philippians, applied not only to

the entrance of the Son into human history, but also to events in that history such as his passion

and death.1129 Which is to say, that incarnation is not simply the beginning of the Son’s life on

this earth, it encompasses everything that follows. The incarnate Son returns to the Father. Our

human form is embraced by the Trinity.1130

   

                                                                                                               1129 See Gilbert of Poitiers, in Ep. ad Phil., c. 2, f. 82va: ‘Vnde non conversione diuinitatis in carnem sed

secundum hanc claritatem assumptione humanitatis in deum. Verus deus et uerus homo est unus Christus et hanc utriusque substantie ueritatem habere inuentus est et cognitus ex his que fecit que nemo alius nisi deus facere potuit ex his que secundum humanam substantiam suscepit et pertulit secundum quam humiliauit et semetipsum factus obediens. Non solum usque ad eam, quoniam dicta est, incarnationis et humane mortalitatis exinanitionem nec tantum usque ad diaboli temptationem uel iudaeorum irrisionem sputa uincula alapas et flagella, uerum enim usque ad mortem est mortis genus quoque attendas mortem autem crucis quam in generibus mortuum nichil peius quoniam in cruce mors ipsa protenditur ne dolor cuius finiatur’ (Lisbon, Biblioteca Nacional Fundo Alcobaça, XCVII/178).

1130 See Dante, Paradiso, canto XXXIII.124-132, trans. R Hollander and J. Hollander (New York: Random House, Inc., 2007), 917.

 

264

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Appendices

Appendix A: Excerpt from Gilbert’s Glossa in Ep. ad Heb. [11, 1]

(Mss consulted: Lisboa Alcobac 178, f. 113rb and Bruges 78, f. 101va) “Est autem fides, etc. Hic dicendum quod fides est ueritatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione perceptio. Plurima tamen sunt que siquis aliter quam sint cum assensione percipiat non dicitur tamen fidelis. Non enim Iacob dicendus est infidelis eo quod uiuentem filium a bestia credebat occisum neque petrus qui cum uere educebatur de carcere existimabat se uisum uidere. In eodem quoque rerum1131 genere siquis prout est etiam cum assensione rei ueritatem percipiat non ideo fidelis uocatur ut fide ui et numero elementorum1132 de motu et ordine et de effectibus siderum de generibus et naturis creaturarum de spaciis locorum et temporum de signis euenturorum et postremo siquis rerum potuit cognoscere causas. Vnde tremor terris qua ui maria alta tumescunt obicibus ruptis rursumque inseipsa resident et multa huiusmodi sicut se habent percipiat non ideo a nobis fidelis esse dicitur. Ex quidem1133 manifestum est rerum inuisibilium et ad religionem pertinentium per quandam ex |B 101vb| cellentiam fidem uocari. Hec ergo quanta sit materia primum demonstrat apostolus dicens, fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, id est, per quam ea que nondum uidentur |LA 113va| promissa fidelibus premia iam quodammodo in eis subsistere dicuntur. Sicut enim per solam gratiam electis inuisibilia post hanc uitam ita per solam gratiam eisdem in hac uita inuisibilium cum assensione perceptionem se daturum promisit. Cum igitur alterum promissorum dando inuisibilium fidem impleuit de alterius, id est, inuisibilium in futuro premiorum impletione indubios reddidit. Vnde addit argumentum non apparentium hac fide non tantum hoc tempore gratie set etiam ante iusti appellati sunt multi. Senes enim, id est, antiqui patres consecuti conscripti sunt, id est habuerunt a deo et hominibus testimonium iusticie. Quod autem fides sit inuisibilium assensio plurimis apparet exemplis fide namque intelligimus secula esse aptata uerbo dei secula uocat que esse ceperunt ex nichilo ut mundum et ea que nascuntur in mundo que omnia deus primo fecisse legitur.”  

                                                                                                               1131 rerum ] om. B 1132 elementorum ] electorum B 1133 quidem ] qui B

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Appendix B: A Divisio Textus for Lombard, Sententiae, Book Three Part One: Incarnation [Christ’s coming in Time, see lib. 1, d. 15, cc. 7-8]

A. Assumption (cc. 1-53) [First Descent1134] {53 chapters | 32%} 1. Assumption Proper (cc. 1-37)

a. Agent (cc. 1-3) b. Human Nature (cc. 4-13)

i. Human Nature (cc. 4-6) ii. Conditions of the Flesh Assumed (cc. 7-10) iii. New Questions of Attribution and Predication (cc. 11-13) [NB: subject of predication is mostly Christus] c. Divine Nature (cc. 14-16, 26-27) [c. 14, incipit: praeterea] [NB: terms “person” and “nature,” take center stage; predication shifts

to divine nature] i. Is the Divine Nature Incarnate? (c. 14) ii. Should it be said that the divine nature became flesh? (c. 15)

• Clarification about the term homo (c. 16) Excursus: Opinions on the Incarnation (cc. 17-25) iii. Should it be said that the divine nature is born

of the Virgin? (c. 26) • Twofold birth of Christ (c. 27) [NB: pred. shifts]

Coda: Adoration of the Humanity (c. 28, incipit: praeterea) d. Problems Regarding Adoption and Sonship (cc. 29-34)

[NB: subject of predication shifts back to Christus and the multi-fold meaning of secundum is introduced]

e. Other Possibilities for the Assumption (cc. 35-37) 2. Properties and Accidents [c. 38, incipit: praeterea]

a. Wisdom, Grace, and Knowledge (cc. 38-40) b. Defects (cc. 41-46) c. Acts: Prayer and Will (cc. 47-49) d. Merit (cc. 50-53)

B. Passion and Death (cc. 54-73) {19 chapters} [Second Descent] Part Two: Virtues (cc. 74-164) [Christ’s daily coming in the hearts of the faithful]

Virtues and Gifts (cc. 74-137 = 90 | 55%) Theological Faith Hope Charity (cc. 96-119 = 23) Cardinal Gifts of the HS

• Integration of the Above Law (cc. 138-64 = 26) [NB: one of the chapters is about why the law is said to command the hand not the soul; virtues in contrast may be largely construed as commanding the soul]

                                                                                                               1134 Alexander of Hales presents a division based on the twofold descent of Christ, see Glossa, in lib 3,

prol.)

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Appendix C: Non est Communem Speciem Accipere

Cerbanus (1134-38) Lombard (1154/59) Burgundio (1148-50) Quoniam autem unam hominum naturam esse dicimus, sciendum est quod non consideranter ad animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim est unius naturae dicere corpusque Domini et animam ad invicem comparata. Quoniam autem plures personae hominum sunt et omnes eandem recipiunt rationem substantiae, — omnes ex anima et corpore compositae sunt et omnes naturam animae amplectuntur et substantiam corporis possident, — communem speciem plurimarum differentium personarum unam naturam dicimus esse, uniuscuiusque videlicet personae duas naturas habentis, et quae duabus perficitur naturis, animae dico et corporis. Sed in Domino nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim fuit, neque est, neque aliquando erit alius Christus ex deitate et humanitate, et in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus idem et homo perfectus. Ex quo non est dicere unam naturam esse in Domino nostro Iesu Christo.”

“Cum unam hominum naturam dicimus, sciendum est quod non considerantes ad animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim est unius naturae dicere” Domini “corpus et animam ad invicem comparata. Sed quia plurimae personae hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem naturae — omnes enim ex anima et corpore compositi sunt, et omnes naturam animae participant et substantiam corporis possident — communem speciem plurimarum et differentium personarum unam naturam dicimus, uniuscuiusque scilicet personae duas naturas habentis et in duabus perfectae naturis, animae scilicet et corporis. In Domino autem lesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim factus est, nec est, nec aliquando fiet alius. Sed Christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus est, idem et homo perfectus.”

Quia autem unam hominum naturam inquimus, sciendum quod non inspicientes in eam quae animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim unius naturae dicere animam et corpus ad invicem comparata. Sed, quia plurimae hypostases (id est personae) hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem naturae; — omnes enim ex anima sunt compositi et corpore, et omnes naturam animae participant et substantiam corporis possident; — communem speciem plurimarurn et diversamm hypostaseon (id est personarum) unam naturam inquimus, unaquaque scilicet hypostaseos (id est persona) duas naturas habente et in duabus perfecta naturis, animae dico et corporis. In Domino autem nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem suscipere. Neque enim generatus est neque est, neque unquam generabitur alius Christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus idem et homo perfectus. Hinc non est dicere unam naturam in Domino nostro Iesu Christo.

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Appendix D: Excerpt from Ps-Peter of Poitiers Gloss on the Sentences  Ps.-Peter of Poitiers, Glossae in 3 Sent. [d. 2, c. 4]: “Nota diuersitatem nominum: Christus assumpsit hominem, humanitatem, humanam naturam. Caue ergo ne nomine hominis personam intelligas uel nomine humanitatis proprietatem set quodlibet horum trium intellige animam et carnem. Quod autem humanae, hic eliditur quorundam opinio dicentium quod hoc nomine humanitatis non corpus et anima Christi significetur set propertas quedam communis a qua dicitur homo. Non negabant tamen quin corpus et anima haberet, set aliud designari illo nomine quam illa dictio, scilicet naturalem statum constandi ex corpore et anima rationali quod factum est. Non enim de Christo predicari speciem aliquam dicimus, alioquin definitio hominis de illo predicaretur et in cetera aliter, quod non concedimus. Si uero aliter: substantia animam sensibus et illa substantia corporis, quod non est uerum, quia tantum diuina natura enim in Christo non sic accipitur ut cum dicitur una natura esse omnis hominis, scilicet hec species homo. Inpossibile est enim unius nature dicere Domini corpus <et> animam uel sub aliqua specie contineri uel unam utriusque esse naturam in domino accipere etc. Queret quis quomodo cum quilibet homo <per> coniunctionem corporis et anime efficiatur aliquam quare pro Christo eorundem coniunctionem non sit factus aliquid. Ad quod dicimus: malus | hec sumitur ad non existens ut scilicet existat quod non erat in Christo uero non ad existens set a diuina existens hec assumpta sunt non ut ex eis esset uel aliquid esset set ut alicuius nature esset enim factus est. Probat quod communis species de eo non predicatur: quia non factus est alius, nec erat alius, scilicet alia substantia quam modo est et fuit, scilicet diuina set esset corporis substantia et species de eo predicaretur et horum proprietates licet non omnes non carnem <sine> anima sicut quidam putabant omnia que in nostra natura, . . assumpsit, etc. que non derogabant eius maiestati et animam intellectualem, id est intellectum habentem, totum enim scilicet animam et carnem quod enim inassumptibile etc., et istud est adprobandum quod utraque assumpserit quasi diceret si animam non assumpsit non curauit et sic de carne quasi diceret ut utraque curaret” (Naples, VII.C.14, f. 40vb – 41ra). * I am exceedingly grateful to Dr. Chris Evans of the University of St. Thomas in Houston, TX for making this MS available to me and to Dr. Alexander Andree of the Center for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto for evaluating my transcription. The generosity with which they have each shared their twelfth century expertise has been indispensible to me. I have, however, kept my own counsel about certain transcription decisions, so any errors are due to me alone.  

274

Appendix E: Divisio of Institutiones in Sacram Paginam, Distinction 7 I. Why the incarnation? q. 1: Queritur ergo cum ante aduentum Christi fieret peccatorum remissio (quod probabat uirtutum collatio in Abel et in Abraham et similibus), cur Christus incarnatus est? II. Who was Incarnate? (2-6) q. 2: Queritur ergo cur solus Christus potuit mereri celum homini aperiri, quod homo sibi meruit claudi? q. 3: Queritur autem cum Pater sit Deus, cur factus homo non meruit? q. 4: de Spiritu sancto cur non sit incarnatus? q. 5: Queritur autem si Pater uel Spiritu sanctus potuit uel potest incarnari? q. 6: Queritur autem "cum 'indiuisa sint opera Trinitatis,' nonne ergo si Filius carnem assumpsit, et Pater et Spiritus sanctus?" III. What was Assumed? (7-48) A. In General

1. Definition (q. 7: Queritur cum dicatur humanam naturam assumpsisse, quid sit humana natura?)

2. Order (8-9) q. 8: An Christus simul assumpserit carnem et animam, an alterum altero prius? q. 9: Queritur quoque an prius concepta fuit caro quam assumpta?

3. Condition (10-14) q. 10: Queritur cuius conditionis carnem assumpsit Christus? q. 11: Queritur autem cum tota massa generis humani obnoxia fuerit in parentibus primis pene et culpe, quomodo solus Christus exceptus est a culpa? q. 12: Queritur cum sine peccato conceptus sit, an de peccatrice conceptus sit? q. 13: Queritur de qua carne solida uel fluida, que uulgo dicitur 'sperma,' propagatus sit Christus? q. 14: Queritur cum Christus sit exceptus a culpa, cur non est exceptus a pena?

Excursus 1: Conception and Birth: Trinitarian Implications (15-16 q. 15: Queritur cum totius Trinitatis auctoritate caro Christi separata sit a Uirgine, cur potius dicitur conceptus de Spiritu quam de Patre? q. 16: Queritur quoque quomodo Christus dicitur natus de Spiritu sancto, cum non sit filius Spiritus sancti? B. In Particular, with respect to the Whole (17-33) 1. Questions of Unity, Composition, and Identity (17-22)

q. 17: Queritur quoque cum Filius Dei simul assumpserit corpus et animam, utrum assumpserit personam uel naturam?)

275

q. 18: Queritur opponendo, cum Christus simul et ea uniendo assumpserit corpus et animam, persona uero hominis constet ex anima et corpore simul iunctis, cur ergo non dicitur assumpsisse personam hominis? q. 19: Queritur cum natura non persona sit assumpta, an persona assumpserit naturam? q. 20: Queritur quoque an natura assumpserit naturam? q. 21: Queritur cum natura naturam non acceperit, an unite sint nature? q. 22: Queritur quoque cum persona corpus et animam simul assumpserit et coniunxerit, an sit ex eis composita uel ex tribus?

2. Implications: Aliquid (23-27) q. 23: Queritur autem cum secundum quod homo compositus sit, an sit aliquid secundum quod homo? q. 24: Queritur autem cum Christus secundum quod Deus sit aliquid et secundum quod homo sit aliquid, an secundum hoc, idest homo Deus, sit idem, uel unum et aliud? q. 25: Queritur quoque cum Christus secundum quod homo sit aliquid, an ceperit esse aliquid? q. 26: Queritur quoque an Christus cum sit homo sit creatura, ut quomodo dicitur 'homo et Deus' dici possit "Creator et creatura"? q. 27: Queritur autem cum Christus factus est homo uel Creator creatura, an homo factus sit christus et creatura Creator?

3. Clarifications: Hypothetical Scenarios (28-31) q. 28: Queritur quoque an Christus hominem assumendo ut Petrum uel aliam creaturam ut Michaelem de Petro uel Michael possit facere Deum? q. 29: Queritur autem cum Petro assumpto assumpta esset persona et assumptum esse de assumente, an persona esset de persona? q. 30: Queritur quoque an Christus assumendo Petrum fieret Petrus uel homo? q. 31: Queritur an muliebrem sexum assumere potuit, et cur non assumpsit?

Excursus 2: Christ’s Nativity (32-33) q. 32: Queritur autem cum Christus natus sit de Patre et natus de matre, an dicatur bis natus? q. 33: Queritur quoque cum humana natura Uerbo sit unita, utrum adoranda sit latria uel dulia? C. Assumption in Particular, with respect to the “parts” (34-48)

1. Christ’s Soul (34-44) a. Condition (q. 34: Queritur quoque cum Christus assumpserit animam et

corpus, an cum naturalibus et infirmitatibus utriusque assumpserit?) b. Naturalia (35-42) 1. Liberum Arbitrium (35-36)

q. 35: Queritur ergo an Christus assumpserit naturalem potentiam anime, que dicitur liberum arbitrium? q. 36: Queritur quoque an statim Christus anima assumpta habuerit usum liberi arbitrii, uel quomodo infantes natura tantum habuerit arbitrium non usu et per temporis incremementum in discretione profecerit?

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2. Scientia (37-38) q. 37: Queritur ergo an Christus eque sciens sit humana scientia et divina? q. 38: Queritur cum anime Christi data sit omnium scientia, cur non est data omnium potentia?

3. Auctoritas (39-41) q. 39: Queritur uero an ministerio possit omnia anima Christi, cum nulla possit auctoritate? q. 40: Queritur quoque an Christus acceperit potentiam auctoritatis non solum ministerii ex tempore? q. 41: Queritur etiam an Christus habuit secundum quod homo potentiam omnis ministerii, suendi calceos uel quodcumque aliud ministerium exequendi?

4. Virtues (q. 42: Queritur quoque an Christus habuit uirtutes?) c. Infirmities (43-44)

q. 43: Queritur ergo an infirma fuerit anima Christi uel non? q. 44: Queritur cum infirmitas fuerit in Christo, an omnis generis infirmitas?

2. Christ’s Body (45-48) q. 45: Queritur ergo an in Christo secundum corpus fuit quartum genus qualitatis quod dicitur forma uel figura? q. 46: Queritur quoque an omnia membra habuit communi lege aliorum hominum? q. 47: Queritur quoque an Christi corpus ex elementis quatuor et quatuor humoribus fuerit? q. 48: Queritur quoque an Christi corpus fuerit equalis complexionis?

IV. Christ’s Passion and Death (49-66)

A. Necessity (49-50) q. 49: Queritur etiam an necessitatem habuit Christus patiendi et moriendi? q. 50: Queritur quoque cum necessitas uoluntati opposita in nullo artauerit Christum, an factum sit quicquid Christus uoluit fieri?

B. Merit (51-53) q. 51: Queritur quoque cum Christus meruerit, an sibi tantum uel nobis tantum uel simul sibi et nobis? q. 52: Queritur cum ex predictis constet Christum non sibi meruisse sed nobis, ut cautum est auctoritatibus, quomodo meruit nobis, idest quomodo merito eius a pena sumus liberati et beatitudinem adepti? q. 53: Queritur quoque an diabolus minorem habeat nunc potestatem in homine quam prius?

C. Liberation (54-58) q. 54: Queritur cum constet nos morte Christi liberari a morte, a qua temporali uel eterna? q. 55: Queritur quoque cum Christus nos morte sua liberauerit, an alio modo liberare potuerit? q. 56: Queritur quoque nunquid sua sola auctoritate conuenientius nos liberaret, quam probrosa morte?

277

q. 57: Queritur autem qua iusticia Christus uicit diabolum? q. 58: Queritur autem si sola potentia liberaret, quomodo equissime?

D. Mediator (59-62) q. 59: Queritur autem cum Christus morte sua, ut predictum est, nos liberauit, an ipse solus sit noster mediator uel Pater et Spiritus sanctus? q. 60: Queritur cum ab eterno dilexerit nos Deus, quomodo ei reconciliati sumus? Non enim dicimur reconciliari nisi ei qui nobis inimicabatur? q. 61: Queritur quoque cum solus Christus dicatur mediator, secundum quam naturam sit mediator? q. 62: Queritur ergo cum Pilatus et Iudas et Iudei operati sint mortem Christi, an mediatores sint nostre redemptionis?

E. Death (63-66) q. 63: Queritur autem cum morte Christus nos redemerit, an ea morte separata sit anima carne, et utrumque a diuinitate? q. 64: Queritur an Christus fuerit homo triduo post mortem et ante resurrectionem? q. 65: Queritur cum de Christo quedam sint secundum humanam naturam uera, quedam secundum diuinam, an uicissim possint dici de Deo et de homine, ut cum homo sit et dicatur mortuus et Deus, et cum Deus sit et dicatur esse ubique et homo? q. 66: Queritur quoque cum homo ille sit ubique, an totus sit ubique?

V. The Law (qq. 67-102) q. 67: Queritur quoque an Christus se offerendo legem soluerit? qq. 68-102: Various Questions on the Law

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Appendix F: A Thematic Divisio of Prepositinus’ Summa, Book 3

DE VERBO INCARNATO1135 I. Assumption of Human Nature (qq. 1-23) A. Implications for the homo assumptus (qq. 1-9)

<q. 1> Utrum aliquis homo assumptus a Verbo et ille sit Verbum? <q. 2> Utrum hoc nomen Deus equivoce teneatur vel dicatur de homine assumpto et Patre? <q. 3> Utrum hanc connumerationem debeat recipere: Homo assumptus et Verbum sunt? <q. 4> Utrum sit eandem speciem communem in Domino nostro accipere et communiter? <q. 5> Utrum Filius Dei assumpsit personam? <q. 6> Utrum hominis assumpti possit esse proprium nomen secundum humanitatem? <q. 7> Utrum concedant hanc: Homo assumptus est unitus sibi? <q. 8> Cum concedatur quod illa persona sit concepta, nata, passa, resurrexerit, ascendit, et hoc totum quod ille homo hec omnia habuit, cur non concedatur esse assumpta? <q. 9> Utrum homo assumptus sit filius dei?

B. Implications with respect to Chirst, the Son of God (qq. 10-19) <q. 10> Quid predicetur cum dicitur: Christus est duo? <q. 11> Utrum aliquid possit esse proprium nomen filii dei? <q. 12> Utrum filius dei sit simplex? <q. 13> Quare non dicas quia ex anima illa et corpore unum quid efficiatur? <q. 14> Utrum Christus sit minor se ipso? <q. 15> An Christus sit Deus et homo a secunda et tercia sententia? <q. 16> Utrum Christus sit adoptivus filius secundum quod homo? <q. 17> Quare negetur hec: Persona assumpsit personam? <q. 18> Utrum hec sit concedenda: Christus incepit esse hoc? <q. 19> An concedendum sit quod Christus sit creatura?

C. Imlications with respect to the Divine Nature (qq. 20-23) <q. 20> An divina essentia sit homo? <q. 21> An divina natura sit nata? <q. 22> An divina [natura] conceperit humanam? <q. 23> An dicendum sit quod divina natura assumpsit humanam naturam?

Transition: Christ’s Person (qq. 24-25)

<q. 24> An quidquid dicatur de Dei Filio dicatur de eo secundum divinam naturam vel

                                                                                                               1135 I have, here, followed Lacombe’s division of individual questions (it seems primarily based on BnF

14526) to establish the question numbers only for the sake of ease of reference. I think that there is good reason to doubt that such divisions will hold once all extant manuscripts are collated and a critical edition is produced. Sometimes Lacombe divides one question off from another in a way that obscures how Prepositinus nests them together (This seems to be the case with questions 1-3). See Lacombe, Prepositini Cancellarii Pariesiensis (1206-1210), vol. 1 La Vie et Les Oeuvres de Prévostin, Bibliothèque Thomiste 11 (Kain, 1927), 175-76. Naturally, the overarching divisions and subdivisions are my own interpretation of implicit structures within the text.

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secundum humanam? <q. 25> Utrum Christus sit composita persona ex Deitate et humanitate?

II. Mysterium Salutis A. Christ’s Death (qq. 26-30)

<q. 26> Utrum [in illo triduo] divina natura deposuerit humanam? <q. 27> Utrum Christus in illo triduo fuerit homo? <q. 28> Utrum Christus in illo triduo fuerit rationalis? <q. 29> Utrum fuerit vivens vita humana? <q. 30> Utrum Christus mortem nostram destruxit?

B. Christ’s Merit (qq. 31-33) <q. 31> Utrum Christus habuit fidem et spem et utrum meruit? <q. 32> Utrum magis meruit una vice quam alia, scilicet in passione quam in conceptione, et quando loquebatur Samaritane ad puteum? <q. 33> Utrum meretur omni suo motu?

Transition: How we ought to relate to Christ (qq. 34-36)

<q. 34> Utrum humanitas Christi sit adoranda latria? <q. 35> Utrum Christus tantum diligendus sit quia homo est quantum quia Deus est, vel magis? <q. 36> Utrum Christus magis diligendus est quia est homo quam quia Deus?

III. Assumption of Properties and Operations (qq. 37-43)

A. Christ’s Knowledge (qq. 37-39). <q. 37> Utrum anima Christi habeat omnem scienciam? <q. 38> Si deus potuit dare omnium scienciam? <q. 39> Cur Deus potuit dare omnium scienciam et non omnium potentiam?

B. Christ’s assumption of infirmities and passions (qq. 40-41) <q. 40> Utrum illa auctoritas Leonis pape similiter sit vera : Deus in se suscepit omnia infirmitatis nostre preter peccatum? <q. 41> Utrum timorem accepit et dolorem?

C. Christ’s Love (qq. 42-43) <q. 42> Posito quod Christus sit in via, utrum impleat hoc mandatum: Diliges proximum tuum etc. < q. 43> Utrum Dominus magis dilexit minus diligentem se?

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Appendix G: Excerpt from Langton’s Exposition of Lombard’s Gloss on Romans (B = BnF 14443, f. 256va; S = Salzburg, a.X.19, 4b)

Peter Lombard, Coll. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1: “Queri etiam solet utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit persona. Ad quod dicimus : Si secundum causam vel conditionem naturae notat, secundum quod homo non est persona, qui ex eo quod homo vel in quantum homo est, persona non est, quia, si ex eo quod homo est, persona est, ergo vel tertia in Trinitate, vel alia ; sed alia non est. Ergo tertia in Trinitate; ergo Deus, item. Ideo in quantum homo non dicitur persona, quia non est in quantum homo personali proprietate discretus a Patre et Spiritu sancto, quia in quantum homo non est genitus a Patre, vel Filius Patris” (PL 191: 1312A) Stephen Langton, Exp. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 1:

“Hic habere nota quod hoc nomen persona uel per nomen demonstratiuum substantiuatum in masculino genere in nullo sensu modo dicitur de Christo in quo non diceretur ante incarnationem de ipso,1136 non enim dicitur de Christo inquantum est homo unde in nullo sensu huius nominis persona est hec uera: filius dei incepit esse persona uel incepit esse iste.1137

Set contra: nonne hoc nomen persona ad minus habet duas significationes: in quarum una dicitur tantum de personis increatis et in alia consignificat naturam creatam et dicitur de personis creatis set in hac falsa expositione supponit omnes personas creatas, set Christus est persona creata,1138 ergo in secunda significatione supponit Christum quod prenegatum erat.

Solutio: Reuera hoc nomen persona significat personas creatas et dicitur de personis creatis set hec falsa: in illa significatione supponit omnes personas creatas, non tamen in illa supponit Christum qui est persona creata set non est creatus inquantum persona. Quomodo hoc querit magister qualiter intelligendum sit quod super dixit augustinus quia non est quantum homo in personali proprietate, etc. Inualida est hoc ratio quia siquis diceret contrarium diceret quod licet personali proprietate increata non sit distinctus a patre secundum quod homo, tamen haberet personalem proprietatem creatam qua esset persona secundum quod homo, qui suscepit, etc. et postea soluit.

Set nota quod sensum catholicam inde elicit, set causam dicti non exprimit sicut plerique in sententiis ubi unicus est sensus, tamen ne locus errori detur et falsitati exponit tamquam duo sensus fuit ibi ad intelligendum itaque quod hic dicit augustinus sciendum quod hec dictio ‘cum’ ponitur quandoque pro copulatiua coniunctione ut in poeta “Iphitus et Pelias mecum diuellimur inde,” et in topica Boetii, “Socrates cum discipulis suis de phisice ratione pertractauit. . . Cum ergo hec dictio cum ponatur pro et non est uitium set quandoque fiat e conuerso et ita sit hic.

Vnde est sensus qui suscepit quod suscepit, etc. id est qui suscepit cum eo quod suscepit una est in trinitate persona uel sic qui suscepit et quid sucepit, id est, qui suscepit et suceptum, id est, qui suscepit et homo assumptus una est, etc. hanc aut homo assumptus una est in trinitate persona expone eo modo quo exposuisti unam1139 lectionem: ‘ille homo ut a uerbo patri coeterno in unitatem persone assumptus unigenitus filius dei esset.’ Vnde hoc iniuit monet nos quoque aliam facit questionem et eam bene soluit hominem Ihesum Christum a filio dei assumptum non fuisse anathama sit si dicas hominem, id est, humanam naturam falso sit appositio |B 256vb| quia est sensus secundum hoc humanam naturam existentem ihesum christum, etc. Set constat quod

                                                                                                               1136 ante incarnationem de ipso ] quantum ad incarnationem quando de ipso B 1137 iste ] ille B 1138 creata ] increata S 1139 unam ] illam B

281

humana natura non est Ihesus Christus |S 5a| dicendus quod talis est locutio qualis et illa hic situs est pheton uel expone sic “hominem Ihesum Christum,” humanam naturam Ihesu Christi.  

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Appendix H: Thomas’ Divisio of Book Three of the Sentences  Skopos: de rebus quae dicuntur divnae, secundum reditum in finem, scilicet Deum I. de reducente effective, scilicet de Deo incarnato (dd. 1-23) A. de divina Incarnatione (dd. 1-5)

1. de Incarnatione ex parte assumentis carnem, quis sit (d. 1) a. quae sit person assumens (prol.) b. quare potius Filius quam alia persona (c. 1) c. excludit objectionem (c. 3)

2. de Incarnatione ex parte assumpti, quid sit (dd. 2-4) a. quid sit assumptum (d. 2, c. 4) b. quale fuerit illud assumptum (d. 3, c. 7) c. quo agente id quod assumptum est, formatum sit (d. 4, c. 11)

3. ex parte utriusque, cujusmodi sit, quantum ad intentiones eorum, utrum scilicet assumens et assumptum habeant rationem naturae vel personae (d. 5)

a. movet questionem (c. 14, n. 1) b. determinat eam, ibi: “Haec inquisitio,” etc. i. quantum ad id quod manifestam habet veritatem ii. quantum ad illud quod est magis dubium in quaestione c. movet quasdam dubitationes circa determinationem (cc. 15-16) i. quantum ad hoc quod dixit naturam assumpsisse ii. quantum ad hoc quod dixit personam non esse assumptam

B. conditiones ipsius Dei incarnati (dd. 6-23) 1. de his quae conveniunt Deo incarnato ratione unionis (dd. 6-12)

a. determinat de his quae dicuntur de Deo incarnato exprimentia ipsam unionem, sicut quod dicitur : Deus est homo, vel factus est homo, etc. (dd. 6-7)

i. movet quaestionem de locutionibus expreimentibus unionem ii. ponit diversas opiniones de modo unionis

(1) prima opinio (2) secunda opinio (3) tertia opinio

iii. ostendit quomodo intelliguntur diversimode praedictae locutiones secundum diversas opiniones (d. 7)

b. determinat de his quae conveniunt ei consequenter ad unionem (d. 8) 2. de his quae pertinent ad naturam assumptam absolute (dd. 13-22) II. de reducentibus formaliter, ut sunt virtutes et dona (dd. 23-50).  

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Appendix I: Divisio Textus of Book Four of the Summa Contra Gentiles  I. Part One: Is it possible that God became man? (SCG 4.27-49)

A. On the Incarnation of the Word according to the tradition of Scripture [an sit] B. Distortions and Perversions of the Meaning of Sacred Scripture [quid sit]

1. Errors regarding the Incarnation (SCG 4.28-30) a. On the error of Photinus about the Incarnation (SCG 4.28) b. On the error of the Manicheans about the Incarnation (SCG 4.29) c. On the error of Valentine about the Incarnation (SCG 4.30)

2. Errors regarding Christ’s ontological Constitution—metaphysical elements a. On the error of Apollinaris about the body of Christ (SCG 4.31) b. On the error of Arius and Apollinaris about the soul of Christ (SCG

4.32) c. On the error of Apollinaris, who says there was no rational soul in

Christ; and the error of Origen, who says the soul of Christ was created before the world (SCG 4.33)

3. Errors regarding the Hypostatic Union (SCG 4.34-35). a. On the error of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius on the union of

the Word to man (SCG 4.34) b. Against the error of Eutyches (SCG 4.35)

4. Errors regarding Christ’s operations: On the error of Macarius of Antioch, who holds there is but one will in Christ (SCG 4.36) 5. Errors regarding Christ’s ontological constitution—metaphysical unity

a. Against those who said that the soul and body do not constitute a unity in Christ (SCG 4.37)

b. Against those who put two supposits or hypostases in the one Person of Christ (SCG 4.38)

C. The Tradition of the Catholic Faith regarding the Incarnation of Christ (SCG 4.39) 1. Incarnation

a. Objections against faith in the Incarnation (SCG 4.40) b. How one should understand the Incarnation of the Son of God (SCG

4.41) 2. Assumption (SCG 4.42-44)

a. That the assumption of human nature was most suited to the Word of God (SCG 4.42)

b. That the human nature assumed by the Word did not pre-exist its assumption, but was assumed in the conception itself (SCG 4.43)

c. That the human nature assumed by the Word in the conception itself was perfect in soul and body (SCG 4.44)

3. Nativity (SCG 4.45-48) a. That it became Christ to be born of a virgin (SCG 4.45) b. That Christ was born of the Holy Spirit (SGG 4.46) c. That Christ was not the son of the Holy Spirit in the flesh (SCG 4.47) d. That Christ must not be called a creature (SCG 4.48)

4. Solution of the arguments against the Incarnation given above (SCG 4.49) II. Part Two: Why would it be fitting for God to become man? (SCG 4.50-55)

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A. Reason given by the Apostle: Original Sin (Rom. 5) 1. That original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his descendants (SCG 4.50) 2. Objections against original sin (SCG 4.51) 3. Solution of the objections proposed (SCG 4.52)

B. Additional Arguments 1. Arguments which seem to prove that God’s Incarnation was not suitable (SCG

4.53) 2. That it was suitable for God to be made flesh (SCG 4.54) 3. Answer to the arguments previously set down against the suitability of the

Incarnation (SCG 4.55)  

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Appendix J: Divisio Textus of the Compendium Theologiae, cc. 185-246  I. Why God became Man (185-208) A. The Fall, Sin, and its Effects (185-197) B. Reparation and Restoration (198-201) C. Errors about the Incarnation (202-208) II. What the Catholic Faith teaches about the Incarnation (209-246) • Unity (209-212) • Perfection(s) (213-216) B. Conception and Birth (217-225) • Defects (226) C. Death (227-230) D. Passion (231-233) E. Burial (234) F. Descent (235) G. Resurrection (236-238) • Effects (239-240) H. Judgment (241-245)  

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Appendix K: Divisio Textus of Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars  

“Quia salvator noster dominus Iesus Christus, teste Angelo, populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem totius theologici negotii, post considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae et virtutum ac vitiorum, de ipso omnium Salvatore ac beneficiis eius humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur” (IIIa, pr.) I. de ipso salvatore A. de ipso incarnationis mysterio, secundum quod Deus pro nostra salute factus est homo 1. de convenientia incarnationis ipsius (q. 1)     2. de modo unionis verbi incarnati (qq. 2-15) a. quantum ad ipsam unionem (q. 2) b. quantum ad personam assumentem (q. 3) c. quantum ad naturam assumptam (qq. 4-15) i. de his quae sunt a verbo Dei assumpta (qq. 4-6) (1) quantum ad ipsam naturam humanam (2) quantum ad partes ipsius (3) quantum ad ordinem assumptionis ii. de coassumptis (qq. 7-15) (1) de his quae pertinent ad perfectionem (7-13) de Gratia Christi (qq. 7-8) de scientia eius (qq. 9-12) de potentia ipsius (q. 13) (2) de his quae pertinent ad defectum (qq. 14-15) de defectibus corporis de defectibus animae 3. de his quae consequuntur ad hanc unionem (qq. 16-26) a. quantum ad ea quae conveniunt Christo secundum se (qq. 16-19) i. de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum esse et fieri (q. 16) ii. de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum rationem unitatis (1) de unitate Christ quantum ad esse (q. 17) (2) de unitate Christi quantum ad velle (q. 18) (3) de unitate Christi quantum ad operari (q. 19) b. de his quae conveniunt Christo per comparationem ad Deum Patrem i. de ipso secundum habitudinem ipsius ad patrem (qq. 20-22) (1) ei subiectus (q. 20) (2) ipsum oravit (q. 21) (3) ei in sacerdotio ministravit (q. 22) ii. secundum habitudinem patris ad ipsum (qq. 23-24) c. de his quae conveniunt Christo quantum ad nos (qq. 25-26) i. de adoratione Christi (q. 25) ii. de hoc quod est mediator noster ad Deum (q. 26) B. de his quae per ipsum salvatorem nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum, sunt acta et passa 1. de his quae pertinent ad ingressum eius in mundum a. de conceptione Christi (qq. 27-34)

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b. de eius nativitate (qq. 35-36) c. de eius circumcisione (q. 37) d. de eius baptismo (qq. 38-39) 2. de his quae pertinent ad processum vitae ipsius in hoc mundo a. de modo conversationis ipsius (q. 40) b. de tentatione eius (q. 41) c. de doctrina (q. 42) d. de miraculis (qq. 43-45) 3. de exitu ipsius ab hoc mundo a. de passione eius (qq. 46-49) b. de morte (q. 50) c. de sepultura (q. 51) d. de decensu ad inferos (q. 52) 4. de his quae pertinent ad exaltationem ipsius post hanc vitam a. de eius resurrectione b. de eius ascensione c. de sessione ad dexteram Patris d. de iudiciaria potestate II. de sacramentis eius (qq. 60 seq.) III. de fine immortalis vitae