Giants in Small Worlds? Innovation and nanotechnology development in China and Russia

Evgeny Klochikhin, PhD Candidate,Manchester Business School, UK

The IM2012 Conference, Beijing, China, 21-24 May 2012

Research questions

• How Russia and China can exploit their science and technology (S&T) history to promote indigenous innovation development and resolve the weaknesses of the former state planning system?

• Are there any particular complementarities between the Russian and Chinese innovation that can contribute to their socioeconomic development?

• What are the current and emerging opportunities for mutual leaning between the two countries?

• What is the role of technology-based growth strategies in this process?

Literature

• Soviet S&T: Zalesski et al. (1969), Berliner (1976), Amman and Cooper (1977), Amman et al. (1977), Balzer (1989), Fortescue (1990)

• Russia: Graham (1998), Radosevic (1999), Radosevic (2003), Gokhberg et al. (2003), Kosals (2004), Gianella and Thompson (2007), Graham and Dezhina (2008), OECD (2011), Westerlund (2011), Klochikhin (2012a,b)

• China: Cao (2004), Sigurdson (2005), Li (2006), Huang (2008), Sigurdson and Tompson (2008), OECD (2008), Breznitz and Murphree (2011)

• BRICS: Cassiolato and Vitorino et al. (2009)

RUSSIA and CHINA

Social and political status of science and technology

Quality of STI and technology transfer

STI policy system

System of IPR protection

Soviet S&T systemStrengths• High profile and continuity of

science• Support of highly-qualified S&T

personnel• Good level of theoretical research• Massive resource allocation to

S&T• Block system of science funding• Prioritization of most important

S&T projects• Knowledge as a public good that

can be freely used by all agents

Weaknesses• Lack of S&T equipment in research institutes• Inhibited information flows• Separation of research and teaching• Technological ‘backwardness’• Low productivity and rates of ROI• Weak technology diffusion• Risk averse culture• Weak computing capability• Poor training of researchers• Rampant departmentalism and political

involvement• Emphasis on the military• Corruption and nepotism• Lack of enterprise autonomy• Reluctance to dissolve unsuccessful SOEs• Imbalance between risk and reward for

innovating• Lack of mission-oriented approach• Low patenting activity

(Klochikhin, 2012)

Historical perspective

USSR/Russia China

1917

1930-1950sLysenkoism

1960-1970sSTI frontier

1980-1990sDecline

2003-presentReform

1911

1949

1950sS&T expansion

1966-1976Cult revolution

1978-1992Open Door Policy

1990s Post-Tian’anmen Decline

1997-present Back on track

Opportunities for mutual learning

• Turning universities into research institutions• Rethinking the state planning legacies• Finding effective ways to employ state-owned

enterprises as major innovation actors• FDI and knowledge spillovers – not an only

solution of innovation growth• Development zones and SEZs• Regional spread• Mega-science projects• Turning ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain gain’

Nanotechnology Russia China

Launch of the national nano program

2007 2001

Significance of nano component in STI policy

Highly important One of the areas to support

Policy design Highly centralized Dispersed among diverse programs and institutions, center and regions

Scale Several fields (mostly nanomaterials)

‘Across the board’ (but mostly nanomaterials)

Regional spread Across the country Concentrated in several key regions

Commercialization mechanism

Rusnano Tianjin Nanotech Industrialization Base; Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Center; Nanopolis Suzhou, and others

Regular evaluations Annual, carried out by the Ministry of Education and Science

Varied (basically part of larger S&T policy evaluations)

Conclusions

• History matters• Many opportunities for mutual learning

between Russia and China but not from the United States

• Nanotechnology is a fuzzy field with no clear leader – every nation is exploring its own ways

Policy recommendations• More democratization and transparency of the science,

technology and innovation policy making process with broader involvement of the academic community and wider public:a) involvement of a bigger circle of university researchers and think-

tanks into policy consultation and evaluation; b) establishment of an independent agency that would openly

present the interests of the academic community at the top political level

• Better legislation and regulation for the innovation process• Development of private sector and reducing the role of the

state in the national economy