Information for the European Citizens

8/4/2019 Information for the European Citizens

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/information-for-the-european-citizens 1/28

Contents

Summary

Recommendations

Chapters:

I Introduction

II Setting the Scene

a. The Governance White Paper

b. The European Parliament

c. The Laeken Declaration and the Convention

III Democratic Legitimacy

a. Turnout at European Parliament Elections

b. Intentions to Vote and actual Turnout

c. Voting behaviour d. Conclusions

IV Under-Information

a. Key Features

b. European Identity

c. Young Peopled. Applicant Countries

V EU Communication Programmes

a. The PRINCE Programme

( Pr iority Information for the C itizens of E urope)b. Innovations

c. Results

VI Conclusions

a. The Right to Information – a New Article in the Treaty of Rome

b. The Role of the Institutionsc. Outline Strategy for informing the Citizen about the EU

Annex - Background



Tables and Charts

Table 1 European Parliament election - 1999

Table 2 European Parliament : intention to vote in June 2004

elections

Table 3 Awareness of citizens’ right

Table 4 feeling informed about citizens’ rights

Table 5 Feeling informed about enlargement

Table 6 Support for the single currency

About the author

Richard Upson worked in the Internal Market Directorate General of the European

Commission between 1995 and 1999 as head of the Citizens First information

programme; earlier, he had been closely involved in planning the management of the EU internal market. He was formerly an assistant director at the UK

Department of Trade and Industry and at the Office of Fair Trading. He wtites in a

personal capacity.



Summary

The Commission's Governance White Paper of July 2001 did not focus sufficiently

on the urgent need for citizens to be informed about the EU.

There is clear evidence to demonstrate that people are not well informed about the

facts concerning the European Union in several important respects:- the European institutions

- the existence and exercise of their rights and obligations in the EU

- the facts behind the challenges facing the EU.

It is also clear that people want to be better informed. The system of European

Governance should be improved by including a right for people to be informed

about the factual aspects of the EU. This right should be included in the Treaty of Rome, thereby ensuring that a permanent communication system is established to

overcome the problem of under-information.

There is a direct link between the degree to which people feel informed about the

EU and their likelihood to vote for the one directly elected EU body, the European

Parliament.

The paper proposes that a major effort to inform people would help to improve the

democratic legitimacy of the EU, particularly as reflected in the voting

participation at the next European Parliament elections (June 2004).

Information for citizens about the EU should be factual and non-propagandist. The

Commission has a major responsibility for communicating this information because, as it alone is the guardian of the Treaty, it has a responsibility to ensure

the complete impartiality of the material and of the way in which it is

communicated.

The provision of such information should be kept separate from other

communication policies which deal with current political issues and proposals.



Recommendations

•

1 The Treaty of Rome should be amended to include the right of citizens to beinformed in a factual and non-propagandist way about the European Union. The

Convention on the Future of Europe should recommend the inclusion of this

right in the Treaty.

•2 The Commission's review of the White Paper provides an ideal opportunity for

the Commission to reconsider and come forward with an effective long term

strategy to meet the needs of people for information about the EU. Details of thisstrategy could be announced in the Commission's next policy statement on

information and communication policy.

•3 The Commission should, in particular, establish a permanent campaign to

communicate factual information about the EU to people which includes use of themass media, particularly television, which is the medium through which most

people expect to receive information about the EU. Greater use should be made of NGOs to relay factual information about the EU.

•4 The campaign should include clear and measurable aims. The top priority isto increase the level of awareness and understanding of the general public about

their individual and collective rights and obligations under the acquis

communautaire.

•5 The Parliament should use this campaign as a basis for encouraging people to

vote in the June 2004 elections in greater numbers, thereby reversing thedownward trend in the participation rate in voting. The Parliament should work todemonstrate that people see it as a major forum for democratic debate.

•6 The Commission should establish a unit to identify people's unmet demands

for factual information about the EU and to evaluate the most effective way of

communicating with citizens. This unit should propose suitable actions under the

PRINCE programme to help support the active exercise by people of their EUcitizenship.



I INTRODUCTION

1.1 This paper has been commissioned by the European Citizen Action Service

(ECAS), with support from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, as a response tothe Commission's White Paper on European Governance, published on 25 July

2001. A first draft was discussed at the ECAS Conference on European

Governance on 26 October 2001.

Since The White Paper appeared, the governance agenda has gathered speed, in

particular through the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, which paved the wayfor the opening of the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe on 28

February 2002. In the field of EU information and communication policy, the

Parliament's Resolution of 13 March 2002 underlines the importance of

information as a means of supporting the process of democratic legitimacy.

However, the White Paper, together with the working papers published on the

Europa website, is the single most comprehensive analysis of the difficulties arisingfrom the way in which the Community operates and is the starting point for this

paper.

1.2 The other introductory remarks concern definitions and sources.

This paper is concerned exclusively with the provision of information in the sense

of factual, non-propagandist material as a means of helping people exercise their democratic rights. Other types of information in the public realm relate to the

expression of political stands over current issues, on which it is natural to expect

sharp divergences of view between political parties, governments and institutions,as well as citizens. These two levels should be kept separate, with the former being

a public service function which provides impartial information to help people

participate in the more political debates.

On terminology, this paper takes "information" to be the content of what is

communicated, while "communication" concerns the way in which that content is put out to people, and the extent to which people may respond.

Reference is made to the regular Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion the EU

which are organised by the Commission. Each survey is carried out byindependent public opinion research organisations and comprises 15,000 face to

face interviews with a random sample of respondents. The sample is selected to be

representative of the population in each country, and each survey contains somequestions which are repeated on a regular basis in order to provide systematic data

about the extent to which attitudes are changing about various aspects of the EU.

The results are published in paper format and are also available on the Europawebsite. Where reference is made to the surveys, the date of the fieldwork is given

together with the number of the survey (eg EB52).



II SETTING THE SCENE

A. The Governance White Paper

2.1 This section examines what the Commission says in its White Paper about

communication with the citizen.

It states that "people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not

interested in them", and that this problem "is particularly acute at the level of the

European Union". It believes that "many people are losing confidence in a poorlyunderstood and complex system", noting that "Member States do not communicate

well about what the Union is doing". It recognises that people need "to see what it

[the EU] does and what it stands for" and, in particular, recommends that EU policy

making - and the delivery of the resulting policies - should be opened up, so as to"help people see how Member States, by acting together within the EU, can tackle

their concerns".

2.2 Certain action points in the White Paper address the need for direct contact

with the citizen.

a. There is a commitment to greater openness to be implemented through the

provision of more up to date, on-line material about the preparation of policy, the

establishment of a more systematic dialogue with regional and local government,

better consultation through effective partnerships with associations which arerepresentative of civil society, and greater connection with European and

international networks of interest groups;

b. There is recognition that complaints from citizens about the unsatisfactory

application of EU rules (infringements) must be taken seriously.

For its part the Commission will try to maximise the impact of its work in

dealing with complaints by introducing a system of prioritisation, with the

first in the list of priorities being transposition. Prioritisation "willmaximise the impact of the Commission's work as guardian of the Treaty".

While the role of the EU Ombudsman and the Petitions' Committee of the

European Parliament is recognised, the aim is less to strengthen them than

to improve the application of EU rules at national level. The suggestion isthat both these bodies should be complemented by means of "creating

networks of similar exisiting bodies in the Member States capable of

dealing with disputes involving citizens and EU issues".

c. The need to communicate is mentioned. The White Paper says that "the

institutions should....together with the Member States....actively communicateabout what the EU does and the decisions it takes". This appears to be confined to

the need to explain day to day top-level action to the media in as clear a manner as



possible. Overall, however, the approach of the White paper to EU information is

to treat it as one of those policies for which responsibility is devolved to others,

with only a modest role for the Commission itself. The White Paper accepts thatthe institutions themselves are intrinsically remote from the general public, and that

the best way to ensure greater awareness of the EU is to persuade more national,

regional and local "actors" to get involved in the policy making andimplementation process. It goes on: "the greater the participation in EU policies of

national and regional actors, the more they will be prepared to inform the public

about these policies".

2.3 Little is said about the need to build a European political identity. This

approach reflects the line of thinking in a background report of the GovernanceTeam (Working Group 1A) which states that "there is little European political

consciousness", and "there is an absence of European political culture". Moreover,

in a Communication on information and communication policy issued by the

Commission on 27 June 2001 (slightly in advance of the Governance White Paper),it is stated that "a European public does not exist today for most purposes".

(Chapter IVb below comments on this assertion.)

2.4 This approach to information policy is "minimalist" in that it leaves the

initiative to devolved actors, and also confines the Commission's role to the

backroom. The consequence of this approach appears to be that the Commission believes that it can rely on a relatively narrow range of core communication tools,

in particular that it can concentrate on internet-based information and feedback.

Both the Communication of 27 June and the report of Working Group 1A speak

warmly in terms of the Europa website as a source of information and for theCommission to initiate contact with interest groups and people through e-mail

networks, as well as using the web as a source of feedback to help the policy

process. The implication is that it is for other actors - in particular the Member States - to use other more wide-ranging communication tools to keep people

informed of EU developments and to keep in touch with their opinions. It is odd

that the Commission seems to be asking one set of (national) bodies which the public distrusts to communicate messages about the EU.

2.5 As the next section makes clear, however, this approach runs counter not onlyto the findings of many studies (including those commissioned for the Governance

White Paper), but also marks a break with the Commission's effort during the

1990s to develop an EU communication policy more closely related to answering

the basic questions of the average citizen about the EU (see Chapter V).

2.6 There is a striking - and controversial - absence from the White Paper of EU

citizenship. The tone of the paper implies a firm acceptance that the focus of people's allegiance is national (and regional), and that the EU needs to act to ensure

that the results can be perceived at those levels. Almost nothing is said about the

possibility that people might understand more about the EU if the rights which theyderive from the EU were consolidated and extended, for example through the pro-

active development of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.



2.7 The Annex sets out the uncertainty of the present Commission's attitude to

information and communication policy since it took office in 1999. Although itinitially pruned the resources available to informing citizens about the EU, an

internal reorganisation took place in early 2001, the first fruit of which was the

Communication of 27 June on A New Framework for Co-operation on Activitiesconcerning the Information and Communication Policy of the European Union.

The aim of this framework, which is to seek support for a new inter-institutional

arrangement to help bridge the gap between the EU and the public, is welcome as it belatedly recognises the importance of involving the Parliament in policies

designed to inform the citizen. On the other hand, the framework says nothing

about the content of an information and communication strategy. Its message is tomake the case that the institutions do in fact have a duty to inform and

communicate, which they should fulfil, while leaving the development of the

strategy as such to emerge from the wider discussions on governance. A second

Communication, which is expected to deal with content, is expected in June 2002.

B. The European Parliament

2.8 Since early in the life of the Prodi Commission, the European Parliament

has been asking the Commission for an information and communication strategy.The Parliament's impatience was embodied in its Resolution of 14 March 2001,

which pointed out the difficulties which had arisen from the Commission's decision

in 1999 (as explained in the annex) to disperse its information and communication

functions among the various Directorates-General. In its contribution to the reportof the Parliament's Culture Committee of 25 February 2002, the Budget Committee

made the point even more clearly: the Commission's attitude to setting up a joint

strategy with the European Parliament in the area of information andcommunication had been marked by "years of reluctance and inefficiency".

2.9 The Resolution adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2002 is its response tothe Commission's Communication of 27 June 2001. In effect, it adopts the report

of the Culture Committee and welcomes the beginnings of a change of heart by the

Commission, in particular its intention to secure better cooperation between theParliament and the Commission.

2.10 In a long list of proposals, the Resolution stresses the need for impartial

information, and for a joint Commission/Parliament awareness raising campaign inthe run-up to the elections in June 2004. It also proposes that a distinction should

be made between information on issues close to the everyday lives of citizens ("top

priority") and major issues facing the EU ("additional but important"). It is alsoseeking synergy with the Commission to avoid duplication of effort (as, for

example, through the co-location of Commission and Parliament offices as "Europe

Houses" in the Member States).



C. The Laeken Declaration and the Convention

2.11 The Declaration on The Future of the European Union issued by the

European Council on 15 December 2001 (the "Laeken Declaration") sets out theissues to be considered by the Convention on the Future of Europe, whose first

meeting was held on 28 February 2002. The document records that "twenty years

ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community'sdemocratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was

considerably strengthened". It proceeds, under the heading of "More democracy,

transparency and efficiency in the EU" to state that "the European Union derives itslegitimacy from the democratic values it projects....[and] also from democratic,

transparent and efficient institutions".

2.12 A large number of questions are listed for the Convention to consider,including whether the President of the Commission should be directly elected, how

members of the European Parliament should be elected, the possibility that the

powers of the Parliament and/or the Council could be strengthened, and whether there should be greater transparency in terms of access to Council meetings and

documents. It should also be noted that the Declaration remarks that "national

parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project", and arange of possibilities is listed in relation their future role.

2.13 The Declaration conveys a persistent concern about the need for greater

democratic scrutiny of the European project. Nonetheless, there is no reference tothe need to secure an improvement in legitimacy by reversing the downward trend

in people's participation in the elections for the only European institution that is

directly elected, namely the Parliament. In the midst of a very institutionalapproach to the issues, the need to inform citizens about the EU is remarkable by

its absence from the Declaration. It is to be hoped that the Convention will correct

this omission.



III DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

A. Turnout at European Elections

3.1 One of the most striking features of the European Union is that in June 1999only 49% of those eligible to vote did in fact vote in the European Parliament

elections, despite the fact that in certain countries voting is compulsory. The

voting rate has fallen continuously since direct elections were introduced in 1979(66% 1979, 61% 1984, 59% 1989, 57% 1994).

Table I shows that the proportion of people who voted in 1999 varied widely between the fifteen countries, for example voting figures were high in those few

countries where voting is compulsory – Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg. The

important point, however, is that turnout for EP elections is much lower than for

any national election, and a good deal lower than many local/regional elections.For example, comparison can, be made between the turnout for the European

Parliament elections in France - 46.8%, Germany - 45.2%, Netherlands - 29.9%,

and UK - 24.0%, with the turnout in 2001 for the municipal elections in France(70%), national elections in Italy in (80%), and regional elections in the Basque

provinces (80%), and even the rather low rate in the UK June 2001 national

elections (59%).

B. Intentions to vote and actual turnout

3.2 The intentions to vote recorded by the Eurobarometer survey for March/April1999 (EB51) a couple of months before the elections show that the overall actual

turnout (49%) was considerably less than predicted by Eurobarometer (67%). If

this level of intention to vote could be achieved, it would confer more legitimacyon the European Parliament and the EU in general. Moreover, the relatively high

level of voting intention in itself suggests that it is mistaken to interpret the

European Parliament elections as a sort of verdict on each county's nationalgovernment which is of secondary importance compared to national elections.

3.3 The reasons for such a divergence between the intentions to vote and theactual turnout are worth examining. In the period before the 1999 elections

successive Eurobarometer surveys reported relatively high voting intentions with

little change between surveys. In other words, it is not the case that there was a

downward trend in voting intentions before the elections. In October/November 1999, Eurobarometer (EB52) asked about voting intentions for the next European

Parliament - 2004 - elections, only to find that, as before the 1999 elections, a

similarly high proportion said they would vote. (Details in Table II). There istherefore no reassurance to be taken from the apparently high intentions to vote

when looking ahead to the 2004 elections.



C. Voting Behaviour

3.4 The degree of variation between countries in respect of people's intention to

vote was similar to the variations which actually occurred (see Table I) suggesting

that there was a common factor(s) which restricted the level of turnout. The lower than expected turnout calls for an examination of the Eurobarometer analyses of

voters' and non-voters' behaviour and intentions.

3.5 Looking first at objective characteristics, successive surveys in recent years

find similar levels of voting intentions between men and women. They also find

broadly similar results across the age groups, although the EB52 analysis of respondents' recall of their actual behaviour at the 1999 elections shows that the

older age groups are more likely to have voted. There is however some doubt

concerning this conclusion because the data for the 15-24 age group is difficult to

interpret on grounds that a sizeable proportion of that age group are not eligible or not registered to vote. Significant differences are however found in respect to

socio-economic groups, with managers and the self-employed being more likely to

vote than those in manual jobs and the unemployed, and there is also a distinctionin respect of educational qualifications where those with qualifications acquired

from age 20 onwards being more likely to vote than those with qualifications

obtained up to age 20.

3.6 Looking at the more subjective factors, i.e. those based on people's own

perceptions or attitudes, it is clear that support for or opposition to the EU appears

to affect voting intentions. In November-December 2000 (EB54) an assessmentwas made of those who have never voted in an EP election: 38% of abstainers

regard their country's membership of the EU as a bad thing, while 21% of

abstainers support their country's membership of the EU. In the EB52 analysis of actual election behaviour, those who place high trust in EU institutions, or would

like to see a more important role for the EU and/or EP, or think EU membership a

good thing for their country, were more likely to have voted than those who do notsupport the EU.

3.7 Another attitudinal factor is the degree to which people feel well informedabout the EU. It is striking that successive Eurobarometer surveys show that those

who fell well informed have high intentions to vote, while those who do not feel

well informed are much less likely to express an interest in voting. In EB54, the

analysis of voting intentions for 2004 show that those with a low self-perceivedknowledge of the EU have a likelihood to vote score of 5.9 out of a possible 10,

while those with a high knowledge have a likelihood to vote score of 8.3. The

EB54 analysis of abstention shows that of those who have never voted in EPelections, 39% have a low self-perceived knowledge of the EU while 14% have a

high knowledge of the EU.



D. Conclusions

3.8 Many of these socio-economic and attitudinal factors overlap, showing that

those with more education, who are also more likely to be in better jobs, and to

favour the EU, will tend to vote in EP elections compared to other people who donot share these characteristics. The important point, however, is that the perception

of being poorly informed about the EU affects all socio-economic groups and

varieties of attitudes, and is a major influence which holds people back fromvoting.

3.9 This conclusion is underlined in the report on EB51, where reference is madeto a special survey of reasons why people decide not to vote. It states: "The most

widely affirmed reason is not feeling well enough informed to go and vote (61%),

followed by not having sufficient knowledge about the role, the importance and the

power of the European Parliament (59%)". The result is that one of the building

blocks of democracy is largely absent at the EU level. It is as if people are

saying "as I am not sufficiently informed, I do not feel able to vote in European

elections".



IV UNDER-INFORMATION

A. Key Features

4.1 The Eurobarometer surveys contain several indicators of the extent to which

people are not well informed about the EU.

(i) The Eurobarometer report for November/December 2000 (EB54) stated that

"the lack of knowledge and misperception about how the EU budget is spentcontinues to be widespread". It found that 31% of respondents did not know what

most of the budget is spent on, and 30% thought that most is spent on the cost of

officials, meetings and buildings. In fact 44% goes on agriculture, and 40% goeson the structural funds. It is of concern "that people who feel they know a lot about

the EU are not much less likely to think that most of the Union's budget is spent on

administrative costs than people who feel they know very little about the EU".

(ii) Like several preceding surveys, the Eurobarometer survey for April/May 2001

(EB55) reported on the extent to which people have heard of the EU institutions.

The highest level of awareness is recorded for the European Parliament (89%),followed by the Commission and the Central Bank; the average level of awareness

for the nine institutions was 55%. In this case, however, as the Eurobarometer

commentary states, "the more people feel they know about the EU, the more likelyit is that they have heard of the EU institutions". It is worth noting that while those

with a low self-perceived knowledge level have a low recognition of the

institutions, this is not the case in respect of the EP: 82% of this group have heard

of it.

(iii) Another area in which under-information can be gauged through the EB

surveys is citizens' rights. The Eurobarometer survey for April/June 1997 (EB47)asked if people had heard of eleven specific rights from which they benefited as EU

citizens, and also if they felt that they knew enough about each of them. For all the

eleven rights taken together, the average awareness was only 34% (see Table/chartIII), with living and studying at about 50% and voting rights in local and European

Parliament elections down at 23-25%. Those who had heard of these rights were

asked if they knew enough about them or not. EB47 reported "On average two inthree of those having heard about the various rights say they would like to know

more" (see Table/chart IV). This is clear evidence that there is widespread lack of

awareness, and that even the minority who are aware of the rights in question feel

they do not know enough.

(iv) The feeling of being under informed spills over into impending EU events

such as enlargement, where "the results show that only 18% of EU citizens feelvery well or well informed about enlargement, with 78% feeling not very well or

not at all well informed" (EB55) (see Chart V).



(v) Another indicator of the way in which being under informed holds people

back from involving themselves in the EU is shown by people's interest in

participating in a "dialogue" on Europe. The report for EB55 found "that 26% of EU citizens would be interested in taking part in discussions about Europe, while

62% say they are not interested". The report continues: "Respondents who did not

wish to take part in discussions were shown a ... list of six possible explanations for their lack of interest. This reveals that the most important reason why people do

not wish to take part is that they feel do not know enough about the EU (41%)".

4.2 A most revealing study, published in the context of the Governance White

Paper , concerned a qualitative study (based on discussion groups) of the public's

attitude to and expectations of the EU (June 2001). The importance of the study isthat it reinforces the conclusions which can be derived from the more traditional

sample survey approach long used by Eurobarometer. Some of the key points

include:

· a deterioration of the image of the EU in recent years

· knowledge of the EU , and in particular of its institutions, is quite weak,

most notably in the larger Member States· such information as people do acquire about the EU tends to come from the

media,

· there is low awareness of information put out by the EU or nationalauthorities

· the more "northern" member States are broadly resistant to enlargement

· there is a strong desire for more information about the EU, concentrating on

how Community activities concern each country and individuals in their daily lives,and on acquiring a better general knowledge of EU affairs.

4.3 The conclusions to be drawn from both these sources (Eurobarometer, para4.1, and the discussion groups, para 4.2) are that there is a profound degree of

under-information:

• most people do not have a practical understanding of what the EU

actually provides for them, nor how it works;

• in addition, however, it is clear that people would like to be informed

about the EU: there is an unmet demand for more information.

B. European Identity

5.1 The Governance White Paper, and the Laeken Declaration, appear tounderestimate the extent to which people see themselves as having a European

identity and, by implication, to have a reduced expectation of the extent to which

people wish to be able to express themselves at a European level. The findings of the Eurobarometer surveys support the idea that territorial and cultural identity in

modern Europe involves a multi-layered perception for most (though not all)

people. In the Eurobarometer survey for October/November 2001 (EB56), 53% of respondents see themselves as having a European identity and, not unexpectedly,

for nearly all of them it lies alongside their national identity. Those who perceive



only a national identity account for 44% of respondents. For young people, the

balance towards European identity is more marked, the proportions being 59% and

38% respectively.

5.2 Another indicator of European identity can be obtained by asking people

about whether they prefer various issues to be handled by their nationalgovernment or jointly in the EU. In EB56 people were asked about 26 issues and

for 18 of them they expressed a preference for joint dealing at EU level.

5.3 The implication is that people expect that the EU should be active on many

essential issues. Under-information is prevalent and the voting rate is low. Thus

people tend not to be aware of how the EU can (and when it should) help to dealwith problems which national governments alone cannot resolve, which in turn

means that they are less likely to perceive the issues on which they could bring

pressure to bear to ensure that fuller consideration is given to the range of

possibilities available at EU-level.

5.4 The following topics are among those which have been the subject of

considerable treatment in the media over the past year or so:

· climate change, Kyoto

· energy use, petrol prices· immigration and asylum

· animal and food safety (BSE, Foot and Mouth)

· bio-engineering (GMOs)

· maritime safety· globalisation/world trade

· reorganisation of multinationals/redundancies

· e-commerce

5.5 All of them have a substantial component where the EU has competence, often

where the European Parliament has the final say in the adoption of legislation. Itwould, however, take another study to demonstrate that most national media give

relatively little coverage to the possibility of EU-level action in areas such as these,

their emphasis being on individual countries pursuing their own policies. Evenwithout that degree of proof, the point for this paper is that unless people have

better access to the purely factual background to what the EU has done and the

scope for EU action, little improvement can expected in the democratic legitimacy

of the EU, particularly of the European Parliament.

5.6 Against this backgound, it is little surprise to find that people are often

doubtful about the benefits of the EU, and sceptical about the impact on them of the challenges ahead for the EU. The high degree of abstention in the Irish

referendum (June 2001) underlines the point; if referendums were held in the other

EU countries, what would the results be?

5.7 Perhaps the most curious aspect of this situation is that a large proportion of



people want to know more about their EU rights, and would like to be able to

have some say in the process of deciding what action should take place at which

level (whether at EU level, an/or at national, regional, or local level).

C. Young People

6.1 In discussions on the issue of citizens information, it is often remaked that

young people have different attitudes and need to be communicated with in a

special way compared to people in older age groups.

6.2 The evidence for the 15-24 year age group from various Eurobarometer

surveys does no more than lend mild support to this view.

6.3 The survey data show that interest in political matters is less marked among

younger people, and this would appear to be related to the apparently lower voting

turnout noted in paragraph 3.4. This is also the case in respect of levels of awareness of EU institutions. Nonetheless the young have more positive attitudes

about support for EU membership and the degree to which their country benefits

from its membership than their elders and this translates into a mildly greater preference for EU-level action (rather than national governments acting alone) in

several policy areas. According to the Eurobarometer for Autumn 1991 (EB36),

this generational distinction was also identifiable then. It is not however clear howfar this more positive attitude persists as young people get older.

6.4 Perhaps the most revealing finding in EB55 (April/May 2001) is that when

people are asked about which sources they use when looking for information aboutthe EU, 65% give TV as their main source; for young people it is very little

different - 60%. The use of daily newspapers as a source of EU information (33%

for the young as compared to 41%) and of radio (21% as compared to 28%) issomewhat less than for the older age groups, while their preparedness to use the

internet as a source is higher than in the rest of the population (23% as compared to

an average of 11%). This suggests that while a more varied media mix and stylemay well be appropriate for young people, the underlying effectiveness of TV as a

medium remains a keystone for them as for the rest of the population.

D. Applicant Countries

7.1 As noted in para 4.1 (iv) above, most people in the EU do not feel informed

about enlargement, and not surprisingly there is certainly widespread concernabout its impact. Only 44% of people asked in the Eurobarometer survey at the end

of 2000 (EB54, November/December 2000) were in favour of enlargement, while

35% were against: in several countries the proportion against was quite pronounced- Germany, France, Austria, UK. In considering the degree of priority to be

attached to a range of EU actions, the Eurobarometer for April/May 2002 (EB55)

reported that only 29% of people thought that welcoming new member countrieswas a priority, while 58% thought it was not.



7.2 In the applicant countries themselves, the picture is not so much brighter.

According to the first Eurobarometer survey dedicated to the applicant countries,

which reported in December 2001, while there is a broad measure of support ineach country for entry into the EU, most people do not feel informed about

enlargement (only 28% of people in applicant countries claim to feel well

informed) nor about the process of enlargement (only 29% well informed).

7.3 It would appear that there is not a great risk of negative votes in the applicant

country referendums. Of greater concern in the longer term is the impact of theobjective set by the European Council at Göteborg (June 2000), for the applicant

countries that are ready, "that they should participate in the European Parliament

elections of 2004 as members". The level of under-information in the applicantcountries runs the risk of producing a rather low turnout.



V EU COMMUNICATION PROGRAMMES

A. The PRINCE Programme

8.1 It is worth considering the range of communication tools which theCommission has at its disposal, many of which were developed - and their

effectiveness proved - in the later 1990s.

8.2 The PRINCE (PRiority INformation for the Citizens of Europe) programme

was instigated by the Parliament in the face of Council opposition in 1995, and

comprised three elements aimed at the general public:

· Citizens First/Citoyens d'Europe, designed to increase the knowledge of

personal rights and opportunities in the Internal Market, thereby putting in place a

building block for the other two campaigns:

· Building Europe Together , which aimed at a wider understanding of the

Amsterdam Treaty and current EU issues;

· Euro - the Single Currency, which established the groundwork for the later

phases of the campaign which concluded early in 2002.

8.3 All these campaigns involved the use of national mass media to communicate

their message, including public service advertising slots, paid advertising spots

(where public service access was not available or to supplement it), and through programme content. They also used dedicated websites, supported by a widespread

distribution of paper-based material to reach out to the large proportion of people

who have no access to the internet or who do not use it for accessing EUinformation.

8.4 All of this apparently top-down activity was discussed with the Member States, to ensure that the material reflected national characteristics. The impact was

enhanced by the parallel efforts of the Commission's Representative Offices in

Member States, together with the Parliament's Offices, to ensure a fullydecentralised support activity in each of the fifteen countries. Most Member States

provided complementary action, either directly or through agreements

("conventions") with the Commission. There was also widespread involvement of

NGOs throughout the EU, mostly through 50% financed projects which aimed atdeepening the personal interest of people in the factual material associated with

each campaign.

8.5 Behind the use of advertising in the mass media lay the recognition that it is

very difficult to ensure that EU messages are carried in the normal editorial content

of national press and TV channels, which inevitably have a national focus thatoften obscures the EU-wide nature of the issues involved. It is also important to

bear in mind that there is no TV channel devoted to EU affairs apart from



Euronews, which is only available in certain countries and languages by satellite,

and thus has only a limited viewership, and that the download of EU news is

available through Europe by Satellite (EbS) is primarily for use by broadcasters.

8.6 The Euro campaign succeeded because:

•the product was clear, a deadline for its launch as coinage was definite, and all

those involved (particularly the 12 Member States concerned) wanted the

product to succeed;

•the Commission played a major role, both in terms of spending its own PRINCE

budget and in terms of triggering more than equivalent sums from each of thetwelve governments. The Commission therefore maintained an overall control

of the consistency of the national campaigns.

8.7 During the Euro campaign, the Commission and the Member States worked

on the basis of a separation of tasks whereby the Member States purchasedadvertising space from national media, while the Commission dealt with

transnational media such as certain TV channels (TV5, MTV, Euronews, BBCWorld, CNN, etc), and international NGOs and associations. Support was given by

the European Central Bank, which invested 80m euro in its own campaign, of

which more than half involved television time.

8.8 In terms of expenditure, however, the PRINCE programme was crucial:

between 1995 and 2001, the Commission devoted 500 million euros to thecampaign, of which one-third went on television spots (directly, and under

conventions with the Member States).

8.9 The visibility of the PRINCE programme is nowadays less than in previousyears. As the Euro campaign is almost complete, expenditure is expected to

decline from the 2002 level of 40 million euros. The campaigns which are

currently under way concern the enlargement of the EU, the dialogue on Europe – adebate on the EU, and work in the field of justice and home affairs. All of these

campaigns are likely to be low key and decentralised; none of them are expected to

use the mass media to attract a wide audience. It is possible that the Commission isconcerned at the risk of running into criticism as a result of producing factual

material which some people may nonetheless find controversial (see the comment

at para 8.12).

B. Innovations

8.10 Several innovations from the early PRINCE programme have since been puton a permanent footing. They include:

• the use of an 11 language call centre, pioneeded during the Citizens Firstcampaign, whose function included the mailing of factual brochures and the



provision of substantive replies to queries from individuals about how to exercise

their rights and take advantage of their opportunities in the EU (eg recognition of

diplomas, obtaining social security, etc).• the retention of the name "Europe Direct" , which is a brand name for the

service to help citizens find out information about the EU. On the Europe Direct

website it offers itself to the public in the following terms: "If you're looking for information about the EU, it can sometimes be difficult to know exactly where to

find what you need. Europe Direct cuts the run-around by acting as your first point

of contact....". It offers free telephone helplines in each member State, a directresponse service via e-mail, and links to information and advice facilities at

national, regional and local level.

. the collection of feedback in the sense that the questions asked by citizens can be

assessed to identify problems which suggest that EU legislation needs improvement

or that its application at national level is unsatisfactory.

C. Results

8.11 No comprehensive results of this major communication effort have been published. In Single Market News, published by the Internal

Market Directorate General of the Commission, certain details are,

however, available. For example, during an active period for theCitizens First campaign (between October 1997 and May 1998), the

proportion of people across the EU who said they felt well informed

about their rights to work, live and study in another EU country rose

from 17.6% to 22.2%. Perhaps more interestingly, in the same period, the proportion who thought (rightly) that a work permit was

not needed to work in another EU country rose from 36% to 54%,

while those who knew of their right to vote in local elections inanother EU country rose from 42% to 50%. Such evidence as there

is from subsequent Eurobarometer surveys suggests that these

proportions have fallen, partly because the Commission has ceasedto invest in campaigns designed to reach the ordinary person.

8.12 As regards the Euro campaign, the chart at annex (see Table/Chart VI) ,which gives the results of successive Eurobarometer surveys, shows that

knowledge of the euro improved very gradually over time. In one sense this is to be

expected because the inevitability of the 1.1.2002 deadline implied that the effort at

creating awareness would have its maximum effect shortly before that date. Inanother sense, it reinforces the results of the Citizens First programme (see para 8.6

above) which suggest that an improvement in the levels of knowledge of people

about the EU is a gradual process. One conclusion to be drawn is that any programme designed to create awareness of EU matters needs to carried out on a

permanent basis.

8.13 A good deal of what is covered in this paper concerns the wide range of

material concerning the EU. Another result of the PRINCE campaigns is that the



Commission demonstrated that three different levels of information could be

treated in a factual and non-propagandist way:

- material about the European institutions themselves- the existence and exercise of the collective and individual rights and obligations

which flow from the acquis

- the facts behind the adopted policies of the Union.

While this sort of information may not always be uncontroversial, in the sense that

some part of a national audience may not wish others to be informed about EU policies or opportunities which they do not support, this is no reason not to make it

available. The crucial criterion is that the information is correct and impartial, not

that it is uncontroversial.



X CONCLUSIONS

A. The Right to Information – a New Article in the Treaty of Rome

9.1 Most people need and want factual information about the EU, its activities,

and their part in it and that, without prejudice to the activities of national authoritiesin this field, they are content to have that information provided by the Commission.

9.2 A new Treaty article should therefore be promoted to provide a legal basis for the citizen to be informed about their individual and collective rights and

responsibilities in the EU and about the facts behind the challenges facing the EU.

The article would need to make clear that the information should be limited to

material which is non-political, factual and non-propagandist, and that the citizenwould have the right to obtain rapid answers to factual questions.

9.3 The following text would extend the provisions of the Treaty which deal withcitizenship to give people the assurance that they can rely on being provided with

the essential information to enable them to participate actively in the Union, in

particular to exercise their rights and fulfil their duties as citizens of the Union,including the use of their right to vote for a member of the European Parliament.

New Treaty Article

An addition to the Citizenship Part of the Treaty establishing the European

Community

1. All citizens of the Union, and all natural persons residing in a Member

State, shall be informed about their individual and collective rights and

obligations resulting from the policies adopted in the acquis

communautaire, and about the facts behind changes to these policies.

Community policy on informing citizens shall therefore contribute to the

advancement of citizens' practical understanding and participation in the

Union and its institutions.

2. Action by the Community, which shall complement national policies,

shall be directed at

· producing factual and non-propagandist information, expressed in

clear and understandable language, about the acquis communautaire and

its development, the measures which implement it, and the Charter of

Fundamental Rights;

· providing and disseminating this information by all available means

in a socially balanced and non-discriminatory way, taking account of

available impartial data about the extent to which citizens are accurately



informed about the acquis.

9.4 In addition to the main arguments of this paper, there are several more

technical points to be made in favour of such a Treaty change.

•(i) The absence of a specific legal basis for providing information about the EU

is a barrier to progress. While the Commission has a wide-ranging power under

Article 211 of the Treaty "to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market" by "[ensuring] that the provisions of the Treaty and the

measures taken by the institutions are applied...", this is not strong enough by

itself to give a budgetary justification for the provision of information which

cannot also be justified by other provisions of the Treaty. In practice, low keyinformation work carried out by the Commission is not contested, but larger

more adventurous programmes usually run up against Council rejection which

only the Parliament can over-ride. The notable example of successful

parliamentary pressure is the PRINCE programme, which began in 1996 andwhose main component in recent years has been the Euro campaign.

•(ii) Subsidiarity can also be a stumbling block to the information work carried

out by the Commission in Member States, because it is too often assumed that

only national authorities have the right to inform their own citizens about theEU. This ignores the fact that the Commission is best placed to

· produce accurate information about EU rights and obligations as a resultof its role as guardian of the Treaty,

· identify the needs for information across the Union on the basis of socio-

economic data about the extent to which people are informed about the EU,· coordinate EU-wide campaigns which are more cost-effective than a setof 15 separately organised promotions.

•(iii) Lack of continuity. The lesson from the major information campaignsundertaken in recent years is that, apart from the Euro campaign, they have

primarily been organised as knee-jerk reactions rather than as a part of a

measured approach to communication. For example, the difficulties

encountered in the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in several Member Statesled to the rushed inception of the original PRINCE programme in 1996. A

Treaty article which laid a direct obligation on the Community to meet the

needs of people for information about the acquis would overcome the need for the institutions to re-invent the wheel each time there is a crisis of confidence.

B. The role of the institutions

10.1 The experience of the PRINCE programme confirms that the Commission

has a unique role in the field of EU information and communication which flowsfrom its responsibility as guarantor of citizens' EU rights.



10.2 The Commission's role of guarantor arises both because it is responsible for

initiating legislative proposals from which citizens stand to benefit and for checking that EU law is implemented and respected, in particular through the

infringement procedure. No other institution has these responsibilities; indeed the

others depend on the Commission to carry them out. While the Member States areresponsible for transposing Union legislation, and for informing their populations

accordingly, the Commission is the arbiter, subject to the Court, of the rights

conferred and the obligations created across the Union by EU legislation.

10.3 The position of the Commission in relation to the acquis communautaire will

not change in the future, even though it is possible that the Convention on theFuture of Europe and the subsequent IGC might limit the powers of the

Commission in other fields. The Commission is therefore in a unique situation as

regards to communication with the citizen about the factual basis of the EU, and

will remain so. It should therefore play a significant and visible part in the processof ensuring that people are aware of the availability of factual information about the

EU.

10.4 The Parliament's role lies more in validating the long term objectives of the

Commission's programmes for communicating with citizens (the machinery for this

already exists in the form of the inter-institutional group on information andcommunication which is co-chaired by the Parliament and the Commission).

The Parliament is dependent on the success of campaigns which aim at informing

people about the institutions, the rights and duties they have as a result of theacquis, and about the challenges ahead for the EU, because they are so closely

linked to the health of representative democracy at the EU level. The Parliament

can ensure that the Commission delivers citizen-friendly information policies bysetting conditions for the release of the annual budget for information and

communication. For example, it has for several years granted the first part of the

annual PRINCE budget, making the release of the reserve subject to approval of theCommission's detailed plans.

The Parliament can also build on such campaigns by ensuring that funding isavailable for local action to be taken, for example by municipalities and NGOs,

which encourage a wide debate on European issues.

10.5 The Council, through the Member States, has a duty to inform each country'scitizens about the EU and the challenges ahead; indeed the conclusions of the

European Council at Nice (December 2000) call upon the Member States to

actively stimulate the debate on the future of the EU. The recently created futurumwebsite (part of europa) gives details of the activity being undertaken by member

states, which varies a great deal from one country to another. While the

Governance White Paper is right to emphasise the role of national activity increating a better informed populace, it seems to overlook the fact that, in practice,

the performance of Member States in informing their citizens is very uneven, and



the experience of the PRINCE programme suggests that they will perform much

better when the Commission is seen to be running campaigns across the EU as a

whole.

C. Outline Strategy for Informing the Citizen about the EU

11.1 In its review of the White Paper on Governance the Commission should

accept that information and communication is a key element in the EU system of

governance, and that the responsibility for well-informed debate based on impartialand reliable factual material is therefore very much a core function of the

Commission.

11.2. The Commission should also confirm that it continues to accept the

distinction between the press handling of key day to day events and the

presentation of factual material about the EU to the general public. Its second

statement on information and communication policy (due in June 2002) should alsocontain the following elements of communication strategy.

Recognise the role of the Commission to deliver information directly to the public across the EU, both because of its intrinsic quality of impartiality

and accuracy (reflecting the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaty),

and because of the effect it has in spurring other authorities, such asMember States, into action.

Identify the core factual material. The material is that which relates to

helping people see how they are affected by the EU, and how they canexercise their rights as well as how they can express their views. It would

include details of EU citizenship, rights and opportunities flowing from the

completion of the Single Market, the Charter of Fundamental Rights , theimpact of the acquis, and also the facts behind key EU policies along the

lines of the list in para 5.4.

Set targets which are to be achieved by strategy of informing the general

public. These should include a quantitative objective to raise the awareness

of EU rights and issues among the general population, as one of the meansof generating greater interest in the elections for the European Parliament in

June 2004, and thus an improvement in the voting participation rate

compared to 1999.

A related, and very significant target, should be to ensure that as many

citizens who live in another EU country actually exercise their right to vote

in the next European Parliament elections. In 1999, only 9% of suchcitizens were registered to vote.

Identify the target population, which should be as large as possible. All thesurvey data shows that there are unacceptable levels of under-information in

all Member States and across all age groups and social/educational classes.



Select the communication tools to be used, according to their coverage of

and impact on the target population. The lessons of the early PRINCE programme should be applied:

- get best value for money by using the most effective medium, usually

television - through public service advertising and paid spots- reinforce activity on television through advertising in the print media

- avoid detailed and time-consuming campaigns targeted at relatively small

groups- provide a firm support through websites

- handle questions and feedback from citizens: the existing mechanism of

the Europe Direct call centre and website should be developed.

Ensure that the campaign is permanent so that it enables the Commission to

ensure that the citizen has a clear and positive recall of the effort being

made to provide reliable facts and figures about the way that the EU affects people’s lives. It takes time to build up such a "brand image" in a media

saturated world.

Seek the support of as many NGOs as possible. A first step would be to

review the evidence from the PRINCE programme of the results achieved

from granting financial help to hundreds of NGO-led projects. Such areview should identify the the types of project which are cost-effective, and

they could be encouraged in the future as a means of providing a non-

propagandist means of relaying useful material about the EU. The

Commission should establish a consultative panel whereby NGOs could putforward suggestions about how best to ensure a wide partnership with civil

society across the EU before invitations to tender are issued.

*****************



ANNEX

Background

A1 The Commission which took office in September 1999 has not yet identified

a communication strategy which is designed to overcome the apathy about the EUwhich is apparent in many parts of the Union.

A2 From its early days, the Prodi Commission identified the main informationand communication issue as the handling of news in order to secure better press

coverage of EU affairs. This is an essential aim, particularly in the light of the very

negative image which the Commission had acquired from the events surroundingthe collective resignation of the Santer college in March 1999.

A3 Press handling should not, however, be confused with the different aim of

communicating with the general public about the EU. Even if the objective of securing better press coverage is achieved, it is unlikely to have much impact on

the general public. This is partly because only a small proportion of the population

take a close interest in EU policy matters, for example only 19% of people in theEU "pay a lot of attention to news about the European Union in comparison to

other news topics" according to the Eurobarometer survey for April/May 2001

(EB55). It also arises because most of the reporting of EU matters is in the handsof the national media whose stance is rarely to view things through EU eyes.

A3 Although the Commission recognises in the White Paper the importance of

communication with the general public, and its link to the democratic deficit, itsactions have until recently been characterised by too much uncertainty and

hesitation.

A4 The main problem has been a lack of continuity. An initial decision, taken in

1999, was to decentralise the responsibility for information and communication,

breaking up the former Directorate General X (responsible for information), withonly press handling remaining under central control. It also seemed that part of the

role of the Commission's Representative Offices in Member States had been put in

doubt, as they were for a time instructed not to deal with the general public anylonger.

A5 This period of uncertainty has been characterised by a retreat from the more

pro-active approach to communicating with EU citizens which had been developedduring the 1990s (see Chapter V above). Nonetheless, several important

information and communication activities have been continued or initiated.

•There has, in particular, been a continuation of the long-running campaign to

prepare for the changeover to the Euro, which was driven by an unavoidable

deadline and which concentrated on the mechanics of the changeover rather

than on enabling people to understand more about the EU.



•In addition, the pressure of events has led to two communication initiatives.

Firstly, the run-up to the Nice Council saw the creation of the Commission'sweb-based Dialogue 2000. This has been developed into the "Future of

Europe" initiative, centred on the futurum website, as a response to the Nice

conclusion to have a "great debate" about the future of Europe. This websitewill make an important contribution to the work of the Convention.

In addition, a strategy for communication to provide information aboutenlargement was adopted in May 2000, and not before time to judge from the

significant proportion of people who are apathetic about enlargement, and

even hostile to it. It forms part of the current PRINCE programme, the

emphasis being to carry it out on a decentralised basis in each country (see also para 8.9).

A6 In response to the Parliament's criticisms of its absence of an information and

communication strategy, noted in para 2.9, the Commission announced areorganisation which put some elements of communication policy back together

with press relations under a combined Press and Communication DirectorateGeneral. The functions of this expanded DG are less wide-ranging than the former

DGX but do provide for some coordination of the Commission's information and

communication activities. In particular, the new DG is responsible for the Europa

website and publications as well as the Europe Direct service (see papa 8.7), andsupports the Commissioner who participates in the discussions of the Inter-

Institutional Group (i.e. with the Parliament) on information and communication

matters.

Tables and Charts

Table 1 European Parliament election - 1999

Table 2 European Parliament: intention to vote in June 2004

elections

Table 3 Awareness of citizens’ rights

Table 4 feeling informed about citizens’ rights

Table 5 Feeling informed about enlargement

Table 6 Support for the single currency

Information for the European Citizens

Documents

Transcript of Information for the European Citizens