Influencing Terrorists and Their Support Base Through Information Operations and the Media

!

Henley-Putnam University

Santa Clara, California

THESIS

INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA

by

Victor Michael Artiga

Committee Chair: Steve Miceli Committee Member: Harry Nimon, PHD Committee Member: Alexander Corbin

Status of Media Release: Approved for Public Release, distribution is unlimited.

! 2INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA

Abstract

This paper will discuss how the US Army and Muslim terrorists such as al Qaeda

(AQ) have used information operations (IO) and the media against one another. This

includes the strategic and tactical objectives of both, their target audience, and how

effective their operations have been. The US Army has had great tactical successes on

the kinetic battlefield during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). However, despite the

Army’s ability to deliver devastating kinetic attacks it has failed to win the war. The US

Army has not used information operations (IO) to its fullest potential. The Army can do

much better. This paper will discuss how the Army has used IO in the GWOT. Also, it

will make recommendations on how the United States Army should changes its IO

doctrine, plans, and execution to better fight and win the global war on terror (GWOT).

Specifically it will discuss case studies in Iraq and Afghanistan, problems with how Army

officers view IO, difficulties understanding the Muslim culture, and give

recommendations on how to address the media.

Keywords: Information Operations (IO), propaganda, global war on terror (GWOT), media, civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), intelligence


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 5 The US Army and information operations (IO) 7

Lessons from history 8 The Iraq case study 9

The Fallujah case study 9

The US and Information Operations 13 The US Army’s current problems with IO in the GWOT 13

No central guidance 13 Misunderstanding and antiquated thinking 13 Insufficient understanding of semantics and culture 15 The importance of timeliness 15 Integrating intelligence operations with IO 17

Muslim extremists and IO 18 Aspects, history, and current use of IO 18

IO goals 18 IO applications 19 Afghanistan example 21 Iraq example 22 AQ and the media 24

Recommendations 25 Reorganization 25

Re-establish a National Information Agency (NIA) 25 Reorganize Army staffs 27 Understand the role of the IO officer and the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) 27

Use IO offensively 28 Degrade AQ’s online resources through information “Blitzkrieg” 29 Improve dealings with the media 30 Understanding the media 30 Niche media 31 Commanders speaking directly to the media 31 Keeping terrorists in the wrong 32

Exploit weaknesses 32 Use semantics and culture to make a difference 33

! 4INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA The “enemy of my enemy is my friend” mentality 35 A proactive approach to Army public affairs 36 Use the media to exploit weaknesses 37 Replace Jihad with another ideology 38 Commercial style marketing as part of the effort 40 Change IO and intelligence training throughout the Army 41

Improve the way Army intelligence officers train to use IO 41 Improve and change priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) 41

Summary 42

References 44


Introduction

The US Army excels at performing its mission of defending the United States and

its interests anywhere in the world. Army officers receive excellent training in planning

operations and winning the kinetic fight against other standing armies of nation states.

This was all well and good for the last one hundred years. During much of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries the US Army concentrated on defeating conventional armies.

However, the world changed. In the last half of the twentieth century and the US Army

faced more asymmetric threats in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Somalia. (Hancock, 2012). 1

Ever since the end of the Vietnam War in the 1970s the US Army’s doctrine neglected

counterinsurgency operations. (US Army FM 3-24, 2006) Likewise, since the early

1970s the US Army largely ignored teaching asymmetric warfare to most of its officers.

(Hancock, 2012) Instead the Army entrusted the counterinsurgency fight mostly to its

special operations forces. (Hancock, 2012) In fact, the Army had not updated its

counterinsurgency field manual since the mid 1970s. This proved to be a grave mistake

for the Army in the post 9/11 world.

Lieutenant Colonel Hancock is a twenty-five year veteran of the U.S. Army Special Forces. While with 1

Special Forces he participated in combat operations in El Salvador, Panama, Israel, Iraq (during Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom), and Afghanistan.

! 6INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA Asymmetric warfare poses unique challenges for senior Army officers, many of

whom received their initial tactical training during the Cold War—a much different

scenario than they face today. Consequently, Army officers are not as well versed in

asymmetric warfare, the nuances of fighting such a war, and the significant impact of

information operations (IO) in an insurgency (for the insurgent and counterinsurgent).

The average American infantry officer, from platoon leader to battalion commander, has

not received enough training in how to effectively synthesize information operations to

shape his battlefield-operating environment.

In March 2007 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “If I were grading I

would say we probably deserve a “D” or a “D-plus” as a country as to how well we’re

doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world today”. (Metz, Garrett, &

Bush, 2009, p. 263)

Our public diplomacy approaches and applications…are inconsistent

with the realities of the new international environment. Advances in

information technology and the proliferation of electronic media outlets have

leveled the battle space between the United States and the world’s small

powers and non-governmental organizations. (Waller, 2007, p. 19)

Today we live in the information age. Virtually anyone on the planet has access to

several forms of mass media. Today television, radio, the Internet, and all other forms of

media are as viable an operating environment as the sands of the Middle East or the

jungles of the Philippines. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Muslim extremist terrorists

! 7INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAunderstand how to use this fourth dimension, information, to their advantage. These

terrorists effectively use the media to deliver propaganda, recruit new members to their

cause, and discredit the United States and its allies. Significantly, they use kinetics to

support their information operations. (de Caro, 2011) 2

This paper will address the following questions:

• Do the terrorists (al Qaeda, Taliban, et al) have the upper hand in using IO and the

media?

• Has the US Army been able to master operations using the media?

• What does the US Army need to, if anything, to compete with terrorists in this

arena?

• Has the US Army effectively used the media and IO against terrorists?

• Can the US Army use the media and IO as an offensive tool against the terrorists?

The US Army and information operations (IO)

The introduction section of the US Army field manual FM 3-13 Information

Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), dated November 2003 states,

Information operations (IO) encompasses (sic) attacking

Chuck de Caro is a former member of the U.S. Army Special Forces, a former CNN correspondent, 2

futurist with the US National Defense University, and creator of SOFTWAR.


command and control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while protecting

friendly C2 systems from adversary disruption (defensive IO). Effective

IO combines the effects of offensive and defensive IO to produce

information superiority at decisive points… The goal of IO is to gain and

maintain information superiority. Information superiority allows

commanders to seize, maintain and exploit offensive initiative during

combat operations. Likewise, in the best case the effective use of IO

allows commanders and their staffs to make more effective and timely

decisions.

When expeditiously exploited, IO provide a potent

advantage that facilitates rapid military success with minimal casualties…

allows commanders to take advantage of opportunities, while denying

adversary commanders the information needed to make timely and accurate

decisions or leading them to make decisions favorable to friendly forces.

This lengthy explanation may have some significant flaws. It focuses primarily on

fighting conventional, standing armies and not upon terrorists. Likewise, it does not

clearly address the attitudes or motivations of civilians on the battlefield. In addition, it

does not address the importance of synchronizing IO with other battlefield operating

systems such civil affairs (CA), military information source operations (MISO) , public 3

affairs (PA), and intelligence. IO “needs to be more strictly defined…(to include)

MISO is the new term for what the Army used to call psychological operations (PSYOPS).3

! 9INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAmethodologies that are recognized and understood by all practitioners…(and) be limited

to a more realistic view, in which goals and capabilities are attainable”. (Armistead, 2010,

p. 105) Perhaps commanders could better think of IO as a combination of four functions:

influence, inform, attack, and protect. When coordinated together these factors can

produce “…an effect on the battlefield greater than merely adding the results of

individual functions together”. (Cox, 2006 p. 3) IO can be an extremely effective tool to

complement the Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. David Galula, a French army

officer, prominent COIN theorist, and author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and

Practice, emphasized the importance of separating the insurgents from the populace and

described IO as the decisive operation in COIN. (Galula, 1977)

Lessons from history

Strategic communications and IO have always been a part of warfare. They are

important combat multipliers. (Murphy, 2009) IO can be about “anything you can do to

achieve the desired information effects in support of military operations, to include

physical attack”. (Murphy, 2009, p. 2) In order to be an effective combat multiplier the

war fighter “needs to ‘own’ the information capabilities…and in order to own it [the

battle], he must understand it”. (Ibid)

Unfortunately, throughout US military history military and political leaders had to

relearn how to effectively use IO. Often times the United States faced adversaries who

were more skilled at using IO than the United States. Aside from brief periods of great

patriotic feelings in the United States during the Spanish-American war and WWI the

! 10INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAUnited States has only reluctantly embraced government supported media twice in

history during WWII and the Cold War. Even then the efforts of the United States lagged

behind their enemies. (Doorey, 2009, p. 151)

The Iraq case study. Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, the deputy commander

of CJTF 7 in 2004, said, “Our enemy was better than we were in operating in the

information domain”. (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p. 265) The Iraqi insurgents

effectively used the media against the United States’ primary ground combat components

in Iraq—the Army and Marine Corps. The insurgents adroitly created the perception US

combat operations were indiscriminate, disproportionate, and in violation of the rules of

war—even thought this was not the case.

The Fallujah case study. The two battles of Fallujah in April and November

2004 provide an excellent example of how the US and the insurgents approached

information operations. The two battles illustrate how the US military mistakenly

neglected IO, how they later learned from this mistake, and demonstrates how the

insurgents used IO. (This paper will later discuss these in the recommendations section.)

During the first Battle of Fallujah US military leaders took few steps to prepare the IO

battlefield. Consequently, US military leaders had to halt combat operations after only

two days. Worse yet, the commanders failed to attain their tactical objective of securing

the city. Ironically Marines and Soldiers won every kinetic battle while abiding by their

rules of engagement. Their IO preparation of the battlefield should have been conducted

while their battle staffs conducted their military decision making processes (MDMP).

! 11INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIALikewise, their IO plans should have included coordination with the various Iraqi leaders,

removing enemy information centers, and rapidly disseminating information from the

battlefield via the worldwide media. Because the aforementioned did not occur, the

Intern Iraqi Government did not support the US military’s combat actions in Fallujah.

Also, international pressures amongst the open source media focused on unsubstantiated

enemy reports of collateral damage and uncorroborated stories of US forces using

excessive force. Thus, the US military had to withdraw from Fallujah after only two

days. Fallujah fell into the hands of the insurgents.

In short, during the first battle of Fallujah the US forces failed to integrate IO

components into their combat plans. Also, the US military failed to gain support of

important influencers in the battle space. The US military failed to prepare the Iraqi

public for the realities of combat in their city. Consequently, without such advanced

support, the effectiveness of the United States’ combat plans was very limited. However,

the insurgents did establish links to regional and global media who followed their own,

often anti-US military, agenda.

For example, during this first battle of Fallujah, US Marines used hellfire missiles

and later 500 bound bombs to attack an enemy sniper who was hiding inside of a local

mosque. An Associated Press corresponded name Abdul-Qader Saadi reported this story.

He wrote, “The (US) strike came as worshippers gathered for afternoon prayers…they

said the dead were taken to private homes.” The reporter added US forces killed forty

people in the attack. However, the Marines did not find any wounded or dead bodies in

! 12INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAthe area. (Bragg, 2009 p. 342) This report caused Marine commanders to scramble to

publish a more accurate synopsis of the events. This included a UAV video recording

from a UAV patrolling overhead during the battle. The video documented the fact there

were no civilians injured in the attacks upon the sniper in the mosque. The UAV video

was important in vindicating the US military. However, it took the Marines more than

eight hours to prepare and declassify the UAV’s video. “By that time the story had taken

on a life of its own.” (Bragg, 2009, p. 333) Many other news outlets to include the BBC

posted their own inaccurate version of this story. These other versions included false

stories of Marines massacring worshippers. Thus, it became a massacre that did not

happen. The multitude of reports of civilian deaths at the hands of Marines (though false)

became a “…central factor in the media disaster that led to the (US military’s) withdrawal

from Fallujah.” Consequently, Fallujah became a safe haven for “…criminals, terrorists,

and murderers of every stripe”. (Bragg, 2009, p. 348) Thus, the United States’ failure

(emphasis added) to mass effects in the global information sphere proved decisive on the

battleground. (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p. 263)

Several months later, during the second battle of Fallujah, US commanders

learned from their previous mistakes regarding the importance of IO. Prior to retaking

Fallujah, US military commanders made the following changes to their operations:

o Developed courses of action (COA) to mass effects in the IO domain prior

to the battle.


o Deliberately countered enemy IO campaigning.

o Planned and executed IO shaping operations.

o Executed carefully planned senior engagements, military diplomacy, and

public diplomacy activities.

Consequently, the US forces had a great deal more success than in the first battle. The

Marines adroitly prepared news stories concurrent with their tactical mission planning.

As US bombs hit targets press releases hit the news wires. The Marines clearly explained

what the insurgents were actually doing—illegally using schools, mosques, hospitals,

etc., as weapons storage facilities and bases of operations. The Marines’ new, proactive

approach “…prevented a great deal of misinformation from making the news and out

cycled the enemy’s IO”. (Mayne, 2009, p. 368) Consequently, negative news stories

amongst the Arab media regarding the Fallujah operation decreased significantly. (Ibid)

The Marines learned from their mistakes. They vowed, “It will never again take eight

hours to release critical information to the media in the heat of battle.” (Bragg, 2009, p.

349) Because the US military learned from its mistakes and eventually incorporated IO

into their pre-battle plans they were able to mass information effects during the second

Battle of Fallujah. Likewise, they built a strong support base for combat operations

before the battle. This culminated in a successful combat operation for the United States.

(Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p. 268) Fallujah residents returned to their homes. The

Fallujah residents referred to the second battle of Fallujah as the liberation of Fallujah.


The United States and Information Operations (IO)

The US Army’s current problems with IO in the GWOT

No central guidance. Lacking a central US Information Agency (USIA) for

guidance, being tied to antiquated doctrine, not understanding IO, misunderstanding

semantics, having apathy towards IO, and facing a superior opponent on the IO

battlefield are all problems for US Army leaders. “The full capabilities, constraints, and

requirements of IO are not well understood.” (Allen, 2007, 21) “It still appears that the

executive branch and the Department of State (DOS) are still very slow to understand the

power inherent in information…there is still a need for a basic understanding at a more

strategic level.” (Armistead, 2010, p. 97) Furthermore, since the demise of the USIA

there has been an “incredible gap in the strategic capability of the American government

to adequately project its message to influence people around the world”. (Ibid, p. 97)

Consequently, there are over seventy IO courses amongst the various US Government

organizations--none of which have a significant amount of coordination or interaction

with one another. (Ibid, p. 99). Thus, it appears the members of the DOD do not have a

central, controlling, or overarching authority for their use of IO.

Misunderstanding and antiquated thinking. “Information has always been an

element of power, but it is often seen as an enabler or supporting

component.” (Armistead, 2010, p. 97) The average Army officer simply does not have

enough experience to identify key elements of an IO plan. (Bragg, 2009) Likewise, the

! 15INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAUS Army is tied to its legacy doctrine from a bygone era—the Cold War. Consequently,

the Army is less than fully resolved to cope with the benefits and challenges of

information globalization. “We are too wedded to procedures that are anchored to the

Cold-War—industrial age.” (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p. 266) So, the US Army is

losing the propaganda war “…a war we must win”. (Waller, 2007, p. 13) The collective

belief is US leaders lack the required skills, resources, and guidance to synchronize IO in

order to achieve tangible effects on the battlefield. (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009)

Likewise, the US Army lacks a thorough understanding of the Jihadist ideology and their

strategy. (King, 2007)

Many Army commanders still have misconceptions about how or what IO is, how

to use it, and IO’s combat potential. Many war fighters incorrectly view IO as simply

MISO operations or computer network operations. Many commanders do not fully

understand how to use IO, have not read IO doctrine, only receive a three-hour class on

IO at a senior service college, or “…is left to his own devices”. (Murphy, 2009, pg. 2)

Consequently, IO becomes an afterthought and pushed out of a commander’s battle

planning process. LTC Shawn Straud, Director of Strategic Communications at the US

Army Combined Arms Center said, “It’s almost like we’ve surrendered the information

battlefield”. (Bruno, 2009)

Air Marshall Guilio Douhet said, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the

changes in the character of war…not upon those who wait until after those changes have

occurred.” (de Caro, 2011). This “…failure to recognize the pivotal role information

! 16INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAplays in this ideological struggle will condemn our military…to an unsustainable and

unwinnable defensive strategy…There is little evidence to indicate that the United States

is winning the ideological struggle against radical militant Islam.” (Doorey, 2009, p. 145)

Insufficient understanding of semantics and culture. For the last ten years the

US media, US Government, and The US Army have mistakenly used terms such as

jihadist, insurgent, or mujahedeen to describe Muslim terrorists in their press

conferences, web pages, news stories, and official reports. This has been a grave mistake.

Calling terrorists jihadists or mujahedeen gives the terrorists religious legitimacy for their

use of violence, intimidation, and evil. Many Americans believe jihad means to fight a

holy war against anything opposing Islam. However, many Muslims interpret jihad as a

religious obligation. By calling terrorists jihadis the US validates violence and adds

legitimacy for what the terrorists are doing. “In essence, we are saying that they are

striving to be in the path of God” and this is exactly what al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) claimed

to be doing. (Hamstra, 2008, p. 13) Likewise, when US officials say we are fighting

jihadists they are saying our fight is against Islam. The US also misuses the term

mujahedeen. A mujahedeen is one who participates in a jihad or holy war. However,

when US Army IO messages use this term they are

…communicating that the terrorists’ actions are just because they

(the terrorists) are committing jihad...every time a terrorist is called a

mujahedeen or jihadist it aids the terrorists’ branding campaign and casts

! 17INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA them in a light as being good Muslims and defenders of Islam.

(Hamstra, 2008, p. 13)

The importance of timeliness. The US military faces a grave challenge of

getting out the truth in an appealing package before the enemy does. (Metz, Garrett, &

Bush, 2009) As in so many other facets of life first impressions are important. It is very

difficult to change people’s initial perception of events after the fact. Many Department

of Defense (DOD) personnel say we are losing the information war in the GWOT. As

evidence they cite inaccurate news stories published by the open source media. These

new stories report on the problem between actual conditions and successes on the

battleground in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Galbraith, 2009)

Another common problem for US commanders is the slow approval process for

using MISO products, combat camera footage, and press releases. Currently the process

to approve such products is sloth like, lengthy, and too centralized. This gives the enemy

a decisive advantage over US forces. (McNeive, 2009) Likewise, US personnel in Iraq

had challenges getting media correspondents out of Baghdad and onto the battlefield in a

timely manner. “Getting them (the reporters) into the provinces is the single largest

factor in getting US military visibility in their reports”. (Galbraith, 2009, pg. 134) In

cases where correspondents could not be placed quickly and decisively on the battlefield

the military had to rely on effective public affairs (PA) operations. These PA operations

were the next best thing. However, many PA reports did not get published until it was too

! 18INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAlate to be effective against the insurgents’ operations. For example, in 2005 a military

press release was published in US print news, network news, and cable news within 24

hours of a combat operation. However, the photos and combat correspondent reports

from the operation sat on a senior military officer’s desk for two weeks waiting to be

cleared by military authorities. Consequently, the military’s report lost all of its value and

was never published. (Galbraith, 2009)

Integrating intelligence operations with IO. “Intelligence doctrine only

provides details on analysis in threat dimension and land combat operations of the

operation environment.” (Cox, 2006) This tends to keep tactical commanders focused on

the kinetic fight. Consequently, their intelligence staffs collect, analyze, and disseminate

processed intelligence based upon priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which

support the commander’s tactical, kinetic objectives. In 2005 the Rand Corporation

produced a study of military intelligence support to IO during Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF). The report concluded intelligence failed to provide commanders with the level of

support they needed in order to conduct their operations. Further, the report cited a

failure of intelligence doctrine to adequately address IO operations. The report further

suggested intelligence officers should have conducted a more thorough intelligence

preparation of the battlefield (IPB). In the future this IPB should include information

about enemy capabilities, enemy decision-making style, and their information systems.

Likewise, the report stated intelligence officers should have considered the impact of

media and the attitudes, culture, economy, demographics, politics and personalities of the

! 19INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIApeople living and working in the tactical commanders area of operations (AO). (Strykula,

2005, slide 10)

In summary, as discussed in the first section, the US Government and US military

may not be using IO to its full potential as a battlefield operating system. Using

antiquated doctrine, misunderstanding IO, and fighting a more able adversary in the IO

arena all contribute to the United States falling behind AQ. In 2005 the Army’s Center

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) determined four problematic trends regarding the

Army’s use of IO. First, the Army did not adequately provide guidance to Soldiers for

shaping the IO environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, intelligence support to IO

was inadequate. Third, Army units were unable to integrate IO into their plans. Fourth,

Army staffs did not know how to integrate IO with civil affairs, public affairs, and

maneuver elements. (Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005)

Muslim Extremists and IO

Aspects, history, and current use of IO

AQ and many other Muslim terrorists have embraced IO, modern technology, and

the Internet.

For bin Laden…and no less for other terrorists around the globe—the weapons

of terrorism are no longer simply the guns and bombs they always have used.

Now those weapons include the Minicam and videotape; editing suite and attendant

production facilities; professionally produced mass-marketed CD- ROMS and DVDs;

! 20INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAand, most critically, the laptop and desktop computers, CD burners and e- mail accounts,

and Internet and World Wide Web access that have defined the information revolution

today. (Hoffman, 2006, pg. 197)

Disseminating propaganda, delivering their message to current and would be supporters,

instilling fear amongst their target audience, and using kinetics to support their IO

operations are all examples of how terrorists successfully use IO.

IO goals

The Taliban, AQ, and other militant Muslims want to promote themselves as the

providers of hope, discredit the actions of the United States, raise awareness for their

cause, recruit new members, and terrorize their victims into submission. Specifically, AQ

uses the media as a means to:

• Intimidate wavering communities.

• Discredit the US Army’s use of excessive force and indiscriminate and poorly

targeted cordon and search operations in the hopes the affected communities will

embrace the terrorists.

• Unite extremist, competing factions to direct their violence against the United

States instead of against each other. (Waller, 2007, p. 34)

IO applications

! 21INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA Al Qaeda has long embraced IO and understands its key role in preparing the

battlefield. In 2003 Osama bin Laden said, “It is obvious that the media war in this

century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total

preparation for the battles”. (de Caro, 2011) Likewise, AQ adroitly exploited the United

States’ underutilization of IO.

Since the US attack on the Taliban in October 2001 and, more

importantly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Arab street has been fed a steady

diet of the most gruesome images of collateral damage, brutality, and

humiliation. This provocative media is the oxygen for radical militant

Islamist terrorist and insurgent movements. Its messages serve as effective

recruitment tools for young, angry Muslims unwilling to accept the status

quo. (Doorey, 2009, p. 149)

Today AQ effectively uses IO on the strategic and tactical levels. In fact, AQ is

better than the United States at integrating information operations via mass media. (Metz,

Garrett, & Bush, 2009) AQ recognizes they can secure victory in the IO arena.

Therefore, AQ has seized the opportunity to be the best at operating in the IO domain.

(Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009) AQ is an adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy

foe. They recognize the global information network is their most effective tool for

attacking what they perceive to be the United States’ center of gravity or weak link—

! 22INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIApublic opinion. (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009)

Another advantage AQ has is it operates without any legal or regulatory restraints.

AQ members conduct their information and influence operations as they see fit. “The US

armed forces compete for their acceptance against an enemy that uses brutality,

intimidation, cultural bias, and disinformation as extremely effective tools of persuasion.”

(McNeive, 2009, p. 358) AQ takes the United States’ mistakes, twists around the facts of

the incident, and develops their own version of the story. AQ seeks to create a rift

between the United States and potential US supporters. Likewise, AQ publishes their

own version of US combat operations and any collateral damage much faster than the

United States. For example, AQ skillfully exploited “indigenous paranoia” by

distributing UBL’s statements using professionally produced CDs and DVDs. They used

these media as part of a sustained campaign conducted via the Internet. Documentaries

in some Muslim countries stated the CIA and Mossad planned the 9/11 attacks. (Taylor,

2009) AQ even exploited natural disasters to vilify the West. “AQ quickly exploited the

chaos of Hurricane Katrina (in New Orleans) to demonstrate God’s revenge against the

city of homosexuals.” (Taylor, 2009, p. 15)

On the tactical level AQ uses information operations very effectively. AQ

elevated IO’s importance as an asymmetric weapon of choice. (Murphy, 2009) “Militant

Islamist movements have skillfully leveraged many of the tools of the information

revolution to outmaneuver both authoritarian governments and the Western media

alike.” (Doorey, 2006) For example, an improvised explosive device (IED) is normally

! 23INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAthought of as a tactical, kinetic weapon. However, an IED becomes a tactical and

strategic weapon when paired with a videographer (Murphy, 2009). The IED weapon

becomes a “slave to the camera” (de Caro, 2011) whereas US doctrine uses the camera as

a slave to the weapon—the exact opposite of one another. (de Caro, 2011)

Afghanistan example

The Taliban successfully weaved the media (which includes TV, radio, Internet,

etc.) into part of their operational fabric. Since the 1990s the Taliban planned and

conducted attacks to deliver a significant public relations punch. The Taliban’s

knowledge of the area, people, culture, and language gives them a very distinct advantage

over any outsider (e.g. the US military) coming to Afghanistan. For example, Afghan

warlords revamped printing presses, launched new publications in Dari, Pashtu, Arabic

and English, and maintained a radio station called “The Voice of Sharia”. After the US

invasion of Afghanistan Mullah Omar, a Taliban chief, told the Voice of America the

United States was trying to take Islam hostage. (Bruno, 2009) “If someone follows the

path to Islam, the government arrests him, tortures him, or kills him. This is the doing of

America.” (Bruno, 2009)

By 2009 the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban factions operated hundreds of radio

stations, distributed propaganda on audiocassettes, and delivered night letters to the local

populace to instill fear and obedience amongst their target audience. (Bruno, 2009)

Likewise, the Taliban used all available intellectual approaches to include political,

! 24INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAsocial, economic, and military issues. Also, to influence their audience, the Taliban’s

supporters maintained a website for the posting of press releases, videos, and an assorted

collection of other reports. Their goal was to convince their enemy’s (United States)

decision makers that they will not accomplish their strategic goals or that pursuing their

goals was too costly to pursue. (Bruno, 2009)

On the tactical level AQ and the Taliban have adopted several IO tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP), which revolve around using mass media. Specifically,

a key means is using video. (Bruno, 2009) For example, when a Taliban member plans

an ambush he will also arrange for the photographing or videoing of the attack. Then he

distributes the footage via the Internet, cell phone video, or press release. Their video

productions are professionally produced by trained, professional camera operators,

processed by professional video and sound engineers, and receive slick graphics. Their

video equipment, production techniques, and final products are akin to what the major

Western news networks use.

Iraq example

After the battle of Fallujah US Marines found evidence insurgents created torture

rooms. These torture rooms were covered in blood and filled with television recording

equipment. Insurgents recorded torture sessions and sold them as DVDs on street corners

throughout the region. (Mayne, J, 2009) Insurgents continued to use the video camera

later in the war. Chuck de Caro provides insight into this phenomenon. The camera

! 25INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAbecame a key component to the insurgents’ combat operations. The insurgents

videotaped improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against Coalition forces. Later the

insurgents used the videos to spread propaganda and to receive payment from their

handlers as proof they actually killed Americans. Another common TTP for using a

camera involved insurgents ambushing Coalition convoys along roadways. However, US

analysts were unable to properly exploit the video images. Neither the CIA nor the Army

intelligence communities were able to determine several key facts regarding how the

insurgents used video and how it related to conducting IED ambushes. (de Caro, 2011)

First, the insurgents always set up their video cameras with the sun behind them. Setting

up a camera in front of the sun’s intense light would have washed out the image and

made the video image appear completely white. Also, the subject of the video (US

forces) had to be illuminated by natural sunlight in order to be visible by the viewer.

Second, due to the type of commercially available video cameras the insurgents had, the

insurgents had to set up the camera within fifty meters of their target. Third, a great

majority of the attacks took place during daylight hours. Fourth, the insurgents most

likely would have had to set up as a four-person team. Two team members would have to

be on either side of the roadway to act as lookout and inform his other team members

when a Coalition vehicle approached. Another team member had to operate the camera.

The fourth member would have to operate the IED’s detonator. Not understanding such

TTPs or how to counter them put the US military at a distinct disadvantage. (de Caro,

2011)

AQ and the media

! 26INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA Anti-US forces in Iraq were very good at using the Western media to focus

attention on their efforts. The Western media tended to focus “… on death and

destruction as the top news items (which) plays very well into their efforts”. (Allen,

2007, p.11). Likewise, the Western media aided the Iraqi insurgents’ political strengths

because the insurgents understood what motivated the “…Western media’s need for

attention from their consumers”. (Allen, 2007, p. 11)

In 2004 insurgents in Iraq used Al Jazeera media stringers to portray the United

States and Coalition forces in a negative light. These journalists on the insurgents’

payroll often staged photographs and fabricated stories. (Mayne, J, 2009) Also, AQ

embraced modern technology. They quickly and effectively adapted to technological

changes. For example, they established a host of web pages designed to distribute

training, doctrine, and operational orders to their members, target audience, and potential

recruits. Currently AQ’s methods range from grass roots Internet forums to professional

quality published magazines such as their Inspire magazine. This extensive use of the

media and the Internet allowed AQ members to rapidly and constantly undermine the

United States’ messages, “…attacking in swarms and refuting, distributing and drowning

out US messages, and agitating increasingly shrill and influential opposition”. (Waller,

2007, pg. 19) Also in 2004 al Qaeda in Iraq targeted media members in the hopes of keep

these journalists within protected areas. As of 2008 terrorists in Iraq killed 300

journalists in Iraq. (Hamstra, 2008)

Recommendations

! 27INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA AQ and many other Muslim terrorists have the upper hand in using information as

a weapon against the West (de Caro, 2011). “The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

and the Joint Command Staff should ensure that all military plans and operations have

appropriate strategic communications components.” (Defense Science Board Task Force

on the Report on Strategic Communications, 2004, p. 10) Likewise, the Army needs to

change how it views and uses IO if it ever hopes to deliver a coup de grace to AQ and

other similar extremist groups. The US government and the US Army need to change the

way they are organized, operate, train, and use intelligence with regards to information

operations. First, the federal government needs to re-establish the National Information

Agency (NIA) to develop a national communications strategy. This strategy will provide

the overall doctrine for the Army to follow. The US Army’s Training and Doctrine

Command and Intelligence and Security Command must take note on the importance of

integrating IO operations into all Army operations. Also, the Army needs to change how

it trains its leaders in using IO and how its intelligence officers view and interact with IO

professionals.

Reorganization

Re-establish a National Information Agency (NIA). The US Government

needs to re-establish a National Information Agency and publish a national

communications strategy. This communications strategy would be a key step in

providing guidance to all government agencies including the US Army. Such a strategy

would guide, plan, coordinate, and oversee IO efforts. Unfortunately, the US

Government abandoned government sponsored information programs and overseas

! 28INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAbroadcasting at the end of the Cold War-- just when an information revolution occurred in

the Middle East with the advent of cell phones, the Internet, and Arabic language TV

stations. The United States needs a national communications strategy coequal with the

political strategies overseen by the Department of State, the economic strategy led by the

National Security Council Office of International Economic Affairs, and the national

military strategy implemented by the Secretary of Defense. Such a national

communications strategy would provide for better coordination of information efforts

amongst the different government agencies to include the Department of Defense. (Jones,

2009)

Another benefit of having a national communications strategy is improved

strategic communication. Strategic communication is the synchronized coordination of

statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other

activities reinforced by political, economic, military, and other actions to advance US

foreign policy objectives. (Jones, 2009) The US Government needs a new information

agency and policy to provide guidance for and direction of information and

communications for several reasons. First, “to get America’s message across, we need

assurance, positive actions and examples, persuasion, moral suasion, and other

inducements as much as we need deterrence, dissuasion, and coercion”. (Nye, 2004)

The challenge of achieving consistency makes some decentralized IO planning and

execution necessary and requires higher skills at lower echelons. (Doty & Trent, 2009)

This is something the Army can do by giving battalion commanders more discretion and

! 29INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAauthorization to use IO offensively in their areas of operations (AO). Second, such an

agency will better enable the United States to understand global attitudes and cultures by

engaging in a dialog of ideas between people and institutions. Third, the agency will

advise policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders regarding public opinion and policy

choices. Fourth, the agency will have subject matter experts to influence attitudes and

behavior through improved communications strategies. (Schneider, 2004)

Reorganize Army staffs. The Army needs to make the position of information

operations officer part of every maneuver battalion’s staff section. Currently only

selected maneuver battalions have such a position. In some cases information operations

are a secondary function of the unit’s fire support officer—a career field artillery officer

(Mifsud, 2012). Also, commanders should ensure these IO staff officer attend the 4

Army’s IO course and not simply learn about IO by reading the Army’s IO field manual.

Understand the roles of the IO officer and the PAO. The roles of the staff IO

officer should not be confused with the roles of the staff public affairs officer. The IO

officer “…is only concerned with what his enemy believes is the truth and how that

perception can be modified and used to his advantage.” (McNevie, 2009, p. 360) In other

words, it is acceptable for the IO officer to use deception against a target. Deception is an

age-old tactic in warfare. Consequently, commanders should consider deception as part

of their operations. Deception is the purview of the IO officer, whereas publishing

Lieutenant Colonel Mifsud is a career Army infantry officer and the information operations chief (G7) for 4

the California National Guard’s 40th Infantry Division.

! 30INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAaccurate press releases is the responsibility of the PAO. Deception can be effective

against terrorists who operate in an area full of rumors and paranoia.

Sometimes the truth is the best weapon; other times something less than

the truth will be effective. It is up to the IO officer to coordinate the

approach. However, the staff IO officer can only do that if the

commander accepts lying as a viable option. Too often commanders

forget this and prefer to conduct their kinetic operations only via press releases

written by the PAO. (McNevie, J, 2009, p. 360)

Use IO Offensively

I am absolutely convinced that we must approach IO in a different

way and turn it from a passive war fighting discipline to an active one.

We must learn to employ aggressive IO. We cannot leave this domain

for the enemy; we must fight him on this battlefield and defeat him there

just as we’ve proven we can on conventional battlefields…We are not

consistently achieving synergy and mass in our strategic communications

from the strategic to the tactical levels.(Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p. 265-266)

The Army can aggressively use IO against the enemy’s information resources, or against

any of the other five political, military, economic, social infrastructure, and information

systems (PMESII) aspects of a nation or transnational terrorist group and to directly

influence a population segment. (Allen, 2007) Army leaders need to begin to study how

to use IO offensively and learn how kinetics supports IO. (de Caro, 2011)

! 31INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA IO can effectively manipulate the scattered jihadist movement by “…dangling

expertise, resources, and connections that are sought with greater uncertainty and even

desperation, without recourse to a reliable central base”. (Jones, 2009, p. 12) “A clear

need exists for strategic and operational commanders to become as aggressive and as

offensive minded with information operations as they have always been with other

elements of combat power and war fighting functions.” (Metz, Garrett, & Bush, 2009, p.

266)

Degrade AQ’s online resources through information “Blitzkrieg”. One way to

use IO offensively is via information Blitzkriegs. These can overwhelm al Qaeda’s cyber

and analytical capabilities. In the war on terror the Internet can be thought of as a

modern, model line of communication (LOC) just as railroads, rivers, and highways have

been in past wars. As with tradition LOC’s, which move physical commodities and

personnel, the Internet moves intellectual, ideological, and informational commodities. A

lack of trust in online resources may seriously reduce AQ’s room for maneuverability.

Consequently, the United States needs to degrade the terrorists’ ability to use the Internet

as a means of communication. The United States Army can accomplish this by:

▪ Shutting down the terrorists’ web sites and posting alternative sites

to undermine jihadist propaganda.

▪ Degrading and undermining AQ’s online communications.

▪ Polluting the terrorists’ online environment of learning,

information sharing, social bonding, and coordinating operations.


▪ Discrediting AQ’s use of the Internet permanently and by

rendering it unreliable, risky, cumbersome and useless. (Jones,

2009)

▪ Creating chaos and distrust amongst terrorists and their supporters

by bombarding terrorist-oriented message boards and chat rooms

with false, misleading, or annoying information.

▪ Using phishing scams against specific users of web pages to

generate further uncertainty and erode the terrorists’ trust of the

Internet as a reliable means of communication.

▪ Launching “information Tsunamis” to overwhelm AQ’s limited

cyber collection and analysis capabilities. (de Caro, 2011)

In the past simply shutting down specific web pages has not been completely effective.

Shutting down a web page only encourages the terrorists to appear elsewhere on line.

(Jones, 2009) It is easier for AQ to adapt to a web page being shut down than it can to

Blitzkrieg techniques.

Improve dealings with the media

Including niche media, commanders speaking directly to the media, and quickly

disseminating battlefield news are ways the US Army can contribute to a more effective

information campaign.

! 33INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAUnderstanding the media. De Caro emphasizes military commanders on the battlefield

need to understand the media as well as they understand the terrain in which they fight.

This necessitates commanders understanding how to work with the media and the

media’s instantaneous impact upon global audiences. Unlike past wars, television and

twenty-four hour news networks force the United States to operate in a transparent

environment. Any event (good or bad) can receive instant media coverage.

Consequently, every military operation automatically becomes a military-political (mil-

pol) operation. (de Caro, 2011) Military commanders at all levels must understand

errors in judgment (whether intentional or not) easily end up receiving global media

attention. Likewise, such errors of judgment become subject to interpretation and

misinterpretation by journalists and those watching the news stories. This

misinterpretation can have devastating results for military forces. This negative publicity

over a US military action can lead to extreme violence against US forces, rioting, and

causing great setbacks to the Army’s mission. Such was the case after news networks

posted incendiary images from abu Gahrib, Marines urinating upon dead bodies in

Afghanistan, or Soldiers burning copies of the Koran.

Niche media. The Army should continue to emphasize mass media and include

niche media as part of their IO offensive. With technology messages can be tailored and

made interactive. Interactive Internet sites and free DVDs can carry messages to

identifiable targets and allow two-way communication between the organization and the

target audience. (Doty, & Trent, 2009) This, of course, would require the producers to

! 34INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAmore completely understand the regional cultures, norms, and beliefs. A generic message

will not work in all combat theatres nor will it work towards influencing all cultures in a

region.

Commanders speaking directly to the media. The Army needs to empower its

commanders to be able to quickly combat AQ’s counterproductive messages. The Army

can accomplish this by allowing commanders to speak directly to the media and by

improving the role of the Army’s combat photographers. Battalion or brigade

commanders should be allowed to speak directly to the media and not through a brigade

level PAO. This, of course, requires the commanders to have a better understanding of

how to work with the civilian media to deliver the military’s message. Another way to

accomplish this is by the US Army’s combat photographers. Army photographers should

be allowed to film operations and post their own combat footage online before our

adversaries are able to do so (emphasis added). (Bruno, 2009) Unfortunately, such

timely posting is the exception rather than the rule.

Keeping terrorists in the wrong

Exploit weaknesses. The Army needs to exploit structural weaknesses in the

terrorists’ information campaign. For example, in Afghanistan the US Army must

continue to work with Pakistani, Afghan, and Coalition officials to draw the link between

Taliban doctrine and the oppressive and poor living conditions people experience in the

region. (Bruno, 2009) Likewise, Coalition forces should adopt the recommendations

! 35INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIABritish Defense analyst Tim Foxley. Foxley recommends a media campaign to challenge

the Taliban to explain their actions and intents, promote a broader discussion of the

Taliban’s legitimacy, explain their interpretation of Islam, define what constitutes a jihad,

and justify the morality of killing civilians. (Bruno, 2009)

The terrorists’ reliance on global information and societal infrastructures versus

geographically isolated safe havens is another weakness. It increases their vulnerability

to infiltration. (Jones, 2009) AQ’s porous nature may be especially susceptible to

culturally and linguistically informed information operations. Such IO operations raise

the cost of legitimate peripheral participation in terrorism. (Jones, 2009) The Army may

be able to exploit these weaknesses. Many AQ operators are amateurs and/or lack the

type of thorough training they received in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. This porous

structure creates opportunities for security forces to use information operations to exploit

jihadist amateurism. The US Army can even set traps for AQ by appearing to provide

resources, connections, and linkages the aspiring terrorists seek. (Jones, 2009)

Use semantics and culture to make a difference. Instead of calling terrorists

jihadists or mujahedeen the US Army should adopt other Arabic words to describe them.

Such messages could use stronger language and call the terrorists mufsidoon committing

hirabah. (de Caro, 2011) A mufsidoon is an evildoer who fights for selfish reasons. (de

Caro, 2010). By calling the terrorists mufsidoon, the US Army and its Coalition partners

have the ability to more easily justify combat actions against them. Hirabah is how

Muslims would describe the actions that the terrorists are using and is the most severely

! 36INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIApunished of all crimes in Islam. (Hamstra, 2008, p. 19) Likewise, the US Army should

develop IO messages, which emphasize the fact terrorists are misinterpreting and

corrupting the Koran, which is tajdeef (blasphemy). (Hamstra, 2008) Tajdeef has

traditionally been considered a capital offense in Islam. (ibid) The Army needs to develop

messages calling them these things to vilify and demonize the terrorists’ violent, illegal,

and immoral actions.

The US State Department and the Army’s tactical commanders need to encourage

Muslim leaders to do their part to isolate the extremists in their midst and act as

responsible guests and citizens instead of a special class of victims. (Waller, 2007)

Likewise, the US Army needs to be more effective in delivering an ideological rift

between the United States, the terrorists, and the terrorists’ audience. In other words the

Army should develop messages to “…present uplifting goals and beliefs to take the moral

high ground, and attack the enemy mercilessly”. In the words of Samuel Adams the US

Government and military must, “…keep the enemy in the wrong”. (Waller, 2007, p. 31)

J. Michael Waller, a professor of international communications at the Institute of

World Politics in Washington D.C., recommends a comprehensive strategy to accomplish

this. He recommends a soft policy to tell the world our intentions in hopeful tones using

appropriate linguistic and cultural settings with, “…the punch of a simultaneous strategic

influence offensive to discredit and ultimately destroy the enemy as a political, moral and

psychological force”. (Waller, 2007, p. 31) Likewise, Waller emphasizes the human

! 37INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAmind should become a priority target. However our traditional military approach has

been to destroy the brain instead of trying to influence it. (Ibid.)

Part of Waller’s strategy is what he calls the Onion analogy. He compares

terrorists and their supporters to the layers of an onion. This analogy involves a three

dimensional sphere of concentric layers. On the outermost layer are the terrorist group

members who are not wholeheartedly committed to the terrorists’ agenda. At the center

are the hard-core members of the terrorist group. At the outermost layers the opposition

to the United States is the weakest. So, the United States needs to peel away the

organization’s outer layers of opposition. This will allow the Army to get as close to the

core as possible with a minimum use of lethal force. Each layer the US Army peels away

is a layer that no longer identifies with the terrorists. They will realize they have a vested

future in the US’s and their own success. The closer security forces get to the core, the

more difficult it may to peel away most dedicated layers of hard-core activists and

terrorists. It is at this point governments must choose kinetic action against the terrorists.

(Waller, 2007)

Based upon Waller’s analogy the United States could use information operations

and the media to:

• Break up personal networks.

• Provoke resentments, suspicions, fear, and paranoia amongst the terrorist group

members.

• Generate betrayals and defections of terrorist group members.

• Allow US to identify and destroy most intransigent targets.

! 38INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA The “enemy of my enemy is my friend” mentality. Using the “an enemy of my

enemy is my friend” theme is an attempt to win over anti-democratic/hostile elements

away from the hard-core terrorist. It can create a rift between supporters and hard-core

AQ members alike. It is an attempt to appeal to their best interests. It is not an attempt to

persuade them of the virtues of democracy, liberation of women, alternate lifestyles, or

trying to make friends with the terrorists. Once the US Army establishes the “enemy of

our enemy” relationship it can succeed in reducing hostility against the United States. It

will also allow the United States to form some sort of temporary alliance or working

relationship with indigenous groups. This will be sufficient to help the United States

isolate most insurgents. The Army in the long term will have to keep splitting, isolating,

and destroying the most extreme, remaining elements. In short, the United States must

reorient it approach to meet our current wartime needs. (Waller, 2007)

Tactical Army commanders should continue to work with local religious leaders.

The Army in conjunction with religious leaders needs to develop themes to portray

radical Islam as the politicized mutation of a religion--not a legitimate religion in its own

right. These religious leaders could give messages to their congregations such as, “Do

not wage hirabah, do not become mufsidoon, do not commit tajdeef, do nothing that

would cause Allah to cast you in Jahannam (hell)”. (Hamstra, 2008, p. 20) So, when

security forces target AQ and its affiliated groups, the forces are NOT seen targeting a

religion. (After all, radical Islam is an extremist political ideology.) Instead, witnesses

will more accurately see terrorists as political extremists who seek to change/destroy an

established political order via intimidation and violence. Intimidation and terrorism are,

! 39INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA“…classical means of ideological warfare that the US …successfully fought and defeated

in the past”. (Waller, 2007, p. 22) Terrorists emphasize the shaping of public opinion in

the course of changing the political and constitution orders of other countries. Terrorists

have turned the Koran into a political manifesto. Therefore “…approaching radical Islam

as a political force can liberate American policymakers from the self-imposed, paralyzing

angst that many suffer about the religious aspects of the conflict”. (Waller, 2007, p. 23)

A proactive approach to Army public affairs. Army public affairs officers

(PAOs)

…must be proactive with the media instead of reactive

to media news stories. The Army public affairs (PA) community must

work towards providing near real time (within news cycle) video imagery

to support TV media—just as the terrorists do. (Galbraith, 2009, p. 134)

After all, the Internet and 24-hour worldwide cable news have expanded the media’s

space available for information on combat operations. So, how can combat forces use

this information explosion to their advantage?

The Army and the DOS need to create interesting web pages with information of

interest to the consumer. Likewise, these organizations should promote the existence of

those websites on the media. This includes posting roadside billboards, increased

communications, and interviews in mainstream media. Winning the GWOT requires the

American people knowing its military is winning the war on the battlefield. If the Army

does not get coverage from the media then the military must document their successful

stories in newsworthy formats for the civilian media to use. In short “…we need to

! 40INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIArecognize that the information battlefield exists and be engaged in that

dimension.” (Galbraith, 2009, pg. 136)

Use the media to exploit weaknesses. The US military needs to portray the war

on terror as a war for our national survival. However, the US media rarely portrays this

ideal. The GWOT became more of an afterthought on the psyche of many Americans.

Many Americans are more interested in the tabloid exploits of celebrities. “The people of

America, Madison Avenue, Hollywood, YouTube, MySpace, media and the multitude of

other information producers can make a difference…Instead, these information producers

and communicators focus on scandals, gossip, and mindless entertainment.” (King, 2007,

p. 52)

Likewise, the Army’s PAOs need to help the media barons draw attention to the

atrocities the terrorists commit. The Army PAOs can facilitate this by publishing reports

on exactly these atrocities.

The killing of fellow Muslims, suicide bombings and beheadings are

examples of unpopular acts of terror that can condemn the movement. These

mistakes should be highlighted in our information operations and be made to

represent the entire movement…the weakness to exploit is to interrupt the propaganda

flow and stop the cycle. (King, 2007, p. 46)

Furthermore, the US Government can contact Muslim artists to create similar works that

propagate the ideologies of modernization, peace, and tolerance to appear in print,

! 41INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAInternet, radio, TV etc. (King, 2007)

The US Army needs to ensure indigenous and Western journalists are at the scene

of a terrorist attack as soon as possible. It would be very advantageous for indigenous

soldiers, instead of Americans, to give initial statements to the media. These initial

statements should give an accurate synopsis of the events and emphasize the atrocious

actions of the mufsidoon. (Hamstra, 2008) Indigenous soldiers making statements to the

press should emphasize how the mufsidoon targeted and killed innocent civilians.

Likewise, as soon as practical after the attack the Army’s MISO Soldiers should print

flyers with graphic photos of the carnage. These flyers can place blame for the violence

upon the mufsidoon and ask the local population for help in bring the guilty to justice.

(Hamstra, 2008)

Replace Jihad with another ideology. Destroying the Jihadist ideology

necessitates it being replaced by another ideology. This ties in with creating a rift

between AQ and their intended audience. Army leaders at every level in a combat zone

need to reach out to the religious leaders in the communities. The religious leaders’

primary focus and goal should be to address the factors of religion that contribute to

violence and warfare. (Otis, P., 2009) Also, military leaders need to develop a religious

impact strategy as part of their mission planning. (Otis, P, 2009) Such a strategy cannot

be a “one size fits all” approach. Such a strategy needs to be country/region specific as

Islam is practiced differently in different parts of the world. Such an information strategy

should emphasize the following points:


▪ The real authority and responsibility are between God and man.

▪ Engage at the tactical and operational level with the positive in

mind.

▪ Emphasize the religious community’s desire for survival and

security.

▪ Show respect.

▪ Research the religious-warfare connection more. The sensitive and

potentially explosive nature of the subject necessitates that it be

researched by experts and not by the “flavor of the month” or

“instant” experts.

▪ Task a group to find or conduct research that would give the

community a solid base of information, frameworks for analysis, a

lexicon for discussing religion politely and usefully, and an outlet

for additional research that would contribute to any strategic

information operations. (Otis, P., 2009)

Commercial style marketing as part of the effort. The US Army needs to take

some lessons from the civilian marketing community. If the US Army is going to fight

via ideas, then the Army should turn to experts in selling ideas—the civilian marketing

community. First, the Army needs to “leverage the brand”. The United States has an

identifiable brand (good, bad, or indifferent). When possible the US Army should partner

with civilian or government organizations that have already established their own

! 43INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAcredibility in the region. This includes non-local governments that have a better

reputation than the United States. Second, the Army needs to understand the customer or

the target market. Commanders at all levels need to view IO as selling their military

mission to the local population. This has been a problem for the US Army. In fact, a

significant shortfall in military operations continues to be insufficient knowledge about

the local populace and how to influence it. (Doty & Trent, 2009) Third, the military

needs to know how to identify market segments in their areas of responsibility (AOR).

This includes identifying and knowing local leaders as well as the leaders’ goals,

motivations, expectations, and daily rituals. This will require better communication

between the Army maneuver commanders, civil affairs units, and the CIA. Fourth, the

Army needs to craft IO messages directed at different target audiences. For example, in

two communications, one targeting potential insurgent recruits and one targeting active

guerrillas, both should discourage resistance. Potential terrorist recruits might be shown

a message of hope and prosperity. The active guerrilla should receive a message about

the futility of their resistance. Both messages should still have a similar personality,

positioning, and identification. (Doty and Trent, 2009) An even stronger message would

be to goad the insurgents into fighting US forces (a message the U.S. Marines used

during the second battle of Fallujah) at a place and time of the tactical commander’s

choosing. Sixth, the Army needs to recruit and train skilled marketing professionals by

contracting US marketing companies, co-opting the best local national counterparts, or by

providing marketing training for military IO practitioners. (Doty &Trent, 2009)

Change IO and intelligence training throughout the Army


Improve the way Army intelligence officers train to use IO. “If there is one

word to describe those officers and people who are working information operations (IO)

in the war on terror, that word would be ‘frustration’.” (McNevie, 2009, p. 357) Most

Army intelligence officers receive little IO training. The Army field manual FM 34-130

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) does not provide any guidance or

instruction on how to modify the IPB process to support IO. (Bragg, 2009) An Army

infantry brigade or battalion staff IO officer should begin early to confer with the unit’s

staff intelligence officer to determine which IPB products they will need to develop in

support of IO. (Bragg, 2009, p. 332) If this does not happen the staff IO officer will be

separated or even isolated from a unit’s primary staff planning military decision making

process (MDMP). This separation causes a lack of synergy and results, poor coordination

amongst all of the staff members, and diminishes a unit’s combat effectiveness.

Likewise, it removes information as a major weapon when dealing with these types of

enemies on the battlefield. (McNevie, 2009, p. 360) After all, terrorists fight using a

combination of information and bullets.

Improve and change priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The

aforementioned will require Army staff intelligence officers to update the maneuver

commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR). This means the PIRs must move

away from just focusing upon finding kinetic indicators on the battlefield (weapons

caches, IED factories, terrorist group organization, etc.). The staff intelligence officer

should recommend additional PIRs, which address IO. These different PIRs should seek

! 45INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAto address video and media production—something many intelligence officers currently

do not due nor are they trained to do. (de Caro, 2011) Clearly, AQ uses kinetics to support

their video camera operations. (de Caro, 2011) So, in addition to looking for indicators

of building IEDs, storing weapons, or conducting para-military training, our intelligence

collection platforms need to be looking for indicators of media production. This includes

looking for video production facilities, video cameras, web browsers, professional digital

single lens reflex (DSLR) cameras, and professional editing software. These are the new

tools of the insurgents. Without a means to record ambushes and other attacks upon

Coalition and security forces, the insurgents will be less effective. US intelligence

Soldiers do not understand the significance of AQ’s use of the media and the tools AQ

uses. Consequently, the Army’s intelligence analysts and collectors are not looking for

such indicators of terrorist activity. So, the analysts miss key indicators of terrorist

activity. Likewise, looking for such indicators is not often discussed in intelligence

journals or at the Army intelligence school at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. The ironic thing is

much of the technical jargon used by AQ’s media professionals such as web browsers,

video editors, Internet, camera aperture setting, etc. are spoken in English. Thus, the key

words are even easier to locate if our intelligence collection platforms are looking for

them. (de Caro, 2011)

Summary

Since 2001 the United States has been involved in an ancient yet unique type of

warfare—terrorism. Unlike past US wars the contemporary enemy does not wear a

uniform or represent a particular nation state. However, the terrorists do use time tested

! 46INFLUENCING TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE THROUGH INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIAmeans to deliver ideas to their intended audience—the media and information. In

addition, unlike past adversaries, AQ, the Taliban, and other Muslim extremists use

kinetics to support their information operations. This is the exact opposite of how the

United States views using IO. The United States uses IO to support kinetics, which is a

mistake. If the United States is going to deliver a coup de grace to AQ the United States

needs to change how it is fighting and using information. IO is an attempt to bring many

of the Army’s facets of power to bear against any adversary. (Armistead, 2010) The

United States Army will rarely lose a tactical kinetic engagement. Soldiers are able to

bring more firepower than their adversaries to such a fight. However, the United States

will never win completely or defeat the terrorists because the Army is not aggressively or

whole heartedly fighting on the additional battle space—the media (de Caro, 2011). The

Army needs to move away from fighting and relying mostly on kinetic action. The Army

needs to target the human mind. The Army can do this through a combination of civil

affair, kinetics, and information operations. Heeding the aforementioned

recommendations is a way to have greater success at defeating terrorists and influencing

the local populace from supporting terrorists.


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Influencing Terrorists and Their Support Base Through Information Operations and the Media

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