Grace WhiteHIST253Student No. 4265981 What were some of the consequences to society and culture of Japans rapid industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s? After losing the Second World War Japan faced the challenge of rebuilding their country: in respects to not only their society and changing the toxic atmosphere that had been created in the lead up and during WWII but also rebuilding the countries infrastructure and economy. To do this Japan would rapidly industrialise reaching the same level of industry in the West in the space of only two decades. Whilst this massive task was achieved and had the positive effect of eventually increasing the quality of life for most Japanese people, the period in which the growth took place was not without negative repercussions. This essay shall focus on two major aspects that were negative; the high incidence of organised crime within the mining industry and its violent effects on the workers and community, also the environmental effects of rapid industrialization using the Minamata disease as an example of this.

To most people outside of Japan the rapid increase and change of the Japanese economy was referred to as an economic miracle.[footnoteRef:1] After WWII much of Japans infrastructure was destroyed, and the need to rebuild quickly and create a stronger Japan put a huge amount of stress on industry to be able to provide the output required to lift Japan into the realms of success that would make them equal with the West. One of these industries that faced a massive amount of pressure was the mining industry; this pressure to produce quickly and cheaply was passed onto the workers in a violent and systematic manner. [1: Tipton, EK, 'The 'economic miracle'...and its underside', in Modern Japan: A Social and Political History, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2008), pp187-202.]

The area where the prevalence of organized crime was most frequent was in Chihoku. In this area violence was institutionalised and an expected part of working in the mining industry. In his journal article A Culture of Violence Allen looks at the different types of violence performed, the frequency of these acts and how eventually the victims managed to be accepting of the violent community they were a part of. The level of violence was often dependent on how large the mining company was, the smaller the company, the more likely it was that the working conditions were less humane and the overseers were more prone to violence. The larger companies, which had more money to spend, had better working conditions and did not punish workers as much. Allen discusses three main types of mines that the coalminers would work in; the first was known as daikigyo (large companies), the next was chukokigyo (small to medium sized mines) and last was called tanuki bori, which literally translates to badger-holes, named after the size.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.108]

The large companies were known to be the best as they had large-scale operations that needed to be maintained well to ensure the output was high. By keeping the mines fully operational they were also safer. Along with this they had better housing and services for their employees. The next level down, being the chukokigyo, employed between 60 people at the minimum, and up to 500 people. Some of the mines were considered reasonable places to work, whilst others ones, called asseiyama (pressure mines) were violent. To keep these mines within the production rate required they employed people with criminal backgrounds, yakuza, who would ensure employees were kept in order. These overseers were known in the business as komu kakari. The tanuki bori were old mines no longer owned by larger companies that were often leased by husband and wife partnerships. These mines were usually in disrepair and the rate of accidents resulting in injury and death was quite high.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.108]

The management by the komu kabori was a systematised form of violence that used a form of hierarchy to subjugate their workers into conditions that would not have occurred unless the violence itself was eventually accepted by the workers as something they could not escape. The men who carried out the violence were a part of a greater string of commands, so they were only following the orders given to them. What is interesting to note is that the violence was carried out with enthusiasm. Allens interview with a former employee describes the sort of day-to-day violence that was required to run the mines, If a miner was sick they would investigate itthey would come around to the houses where we lived and wait outside and call out that the miner was slacking. Another employee describes and even worse situation if we did something the kacho [section chief] didnt approve of, we were hit by one of the strong-arm men for instance, if we had said that we werent going to work because the water was too high, the romu would have just come around to the tanju to make us go. [footnoteRef:4] [4: Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 109-110]

Apart from the ongoing violence that was extremely prevalent in these mining communities, the consequences of the quick industrialization caused corruption in the area of law enforcement. Any level of law or government inquiry never looked into the violence as they saw the management or the employees as the complete responsibility of the mining companies. As long as there was continual evidence that the mining production was at a level that would support the rapid industrialization they continued to dismiss or turn a blind eye to what was a system of organized crime. The only threat to the authority of the mining companies was the possible emergence of unions that would fight back. To deal with this threat mining companies, particularly smaller ones would be particularly ruthless in stopping any forms of democratic unions.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.112]

From this example of the mines in the Chihoku area, it becomes clear that the effects of the rapid industrialization in Japan had a negative effect on the work culture of Japan, encouraging a culture of crime and violence that is accepted if it provides overall economic benefit to Japan.The next example of the negative social and cultural effects that rapid industrialization had on Japan is the Minamata disease. The manufacturing of acetaldehyde by the Chisso factory, used in making plastics spilt into the bay and combined with organic molecules made the heavy metal compound methyl mercury chloride. The cause of the disease was mercury poisoning that could make its way into the food chain as an organic compound, affecting the fish and shellfish that the people in Minamata relied on as a main source of food caused this disease.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in International Journal of Japanese Sociology, (Tokyo: The Hosei University, 2006)]

The lack of care for the environment and the health consequences that followed was similar to the organized crime in the mining communities in that it was more important to authorities to focus on the economic benefits reaped from the industrialization, than to make inquiries about any negative consequences. In the journal article Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance by Harutoshi Funabashi, the issue of bad policy relating to Environmental law in Japan is discussed in detail. An area that is important is where Funabashi outlines main failures by the Japanese authorities on the case of the Minamata disease. The first of these failures is in regards to the failure to initial stage. To understand their failure in the initial stage the sequence of events that occurred will be discussed. The background behind the events beginning in 1956 was that the Chisso factory, operational since 1908 had been polluting the waters in the area since its opening. In May 1956 the first victims of the disease were discovered, the symptoms that showed were, numbness in their hands and feet. Then they became unable to grasp things or fasten buttons. If they try to walk, they stumble. They cannot run, and they speak in a childish tone. They often complain of difficulties seeing, hearing, or swallowing food ... Those symptoms gradually develop Death appears to come to patients between two and six weeks after the onset of the disease ... 11 out of 30 patients have died, i.e., the mortality rate is 36.7%.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Harada, Masazumi, Minamata Disease, (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun Culture and Information Center, 2004), p.23 24]

The disease was first suspected to be a contagious bacterial disease, this was soon dismissed as research took place and the Kumamoto University research group found that a toxic substance caused the disease.[footnoteRef:8] At the time, some people already suspected that the cause of the disease was from the Chisso factory, since they had been the polluting the area already for half a century. In January 1957 the Minamata Fishery Cooperative petitioned Chisso to stop the discharge of polluted effluents in January 1957.[footnoteRef:9] [8: Harada, Masazumi, Minamata Disease, (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun Culture and Information Center, 2004), p.27] [9: Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in International Journal of Japanese Sociology, (Tokyo: The Hosei University, 2006), p.10]

In the spring 1957, feeding cats fish from the area tested the theory that the fish in the area were causing the disease due to the pollution. They showed the same symptoms as the victims of the disease and died. Despite this evidence no ban on Chisso polluting the area happened as the prefectural and central governments failed to make any effective measures. In meetings the Director of the Public Health Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare stated that the disease might be caused by heavy chemical pollution caused by a factory in Minamata. Though not directly stating that Chisso was the cause of the disease, it was clear this was what was implied. Further reports over the next three years said the same thing. The government cabinet discussed these, but any attempt to create environmental policy was stopped by the Minister of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).[footnoteRef:10] The Chisso factory itself strongly argued that they were the cause of the outbreak. Eventually though, they organized a contract for victims of the disease to give them a small amount of compensation, but still did not claim they were responsible for the disease. [10: Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in International Journal of Japanese Sociology, (Tokyo: The Hosei University, 2006), p.11]

Another area of failure was the lack of measures made to decrease the spreading of the disease and the damage to the environment. Funabashi states that it took until 1968 for the diseases source to be officially recognized as the fault of the Chisso Company for their pollution cause heavy metals to go into the water source. This meant that any effective measures were not able to take place. One thing that could have been dealt with though, is that after it was clear the cats had died from eating the local fish, a complete fishing ban could have easily been made. Another measure that could have been taken was that after the discovery that it was heavy metals causing the disease, the stopping of Chisso factory polluting could have occurred on the instruction of the authorities. As even though it had not been directly stated as being the Chisso factorys fault, as a manufacturer of heavy metals that would be the most reasonable thing to do to ensure no more heavy metals could effect the aquatic life in the area and then as a consequence, the community.The need for increasing the economic power in Japan was rational, as they had faced a significant set back to their progress in WWII, but the methods used to achieve this rapid industrialization were questionable. The results of these methods clearly show the lack of care in regards to the safety of those who worked in the industries and those who lived in the areas around the industries. Whilst Japans standard of living dramatically increased in the space of a few decades the repercussions of the low ethical standards required to ensure quick progress have been evident. The Chikuto factory workers and the violence they faced was an issue that should not have been occurring, let alone being condoned by the local authorities. Similarly the death and disease in Minamata should not have occurred, and when it did occur, should have been taken more seriously. The lessons learned from this period of time has shown a need for more concern about the impacts of industrialization on society, and not just its impact on economic growth. Bibliography:Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in International Journal of Japanese Sociology, (Tokyo: The Hosei University, 2006)Harada, Masazumi, Minamata Disease, (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun Culture and Information Center, 2004),Tipton, EK, 'The 'economic miracle'...and its underside', in Modern Japan: A Social and Political History, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2008),