Industrial Cyber Security - WordPress.com...2018/02/06  · Over 250 ICS networks (Energy, Pharma,...

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Indegy Industrial Cyber Security ISA New Orleans Section Applying the NIST Framework February 6, 2018

Transcript of Industrial Cyber Security - WordPress.com...2018/02/06  · Over 250 ICS networks (Energy, Pharma,...

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IndegyIndustrial Cyber Security

ISA New Orleans Section

Applying the NIST FrameworkFebruary 6, 2018

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1. Introductions2. Indegy Background3. NIST Background and History with ICS4. What is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?5. How does Indegy Support Implementation of the Framework?6. Wrap-up

Agenda

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Founded2014

CustomersPharma, Energy,

Water, Automotive,Chemicals, F&B…

InvestorsShlomo Kramer

Gen. David Petraeus,Vertex, Magma, Aspect, SBI

Holdings

LocationsHQ – New York

R&D - Israel

Barak PerelmanCo-Founder, CEO

Stratoscale, IDF, Talpiot

Mille GandelsmanCo-Founder, CTO

Stratoscale, IDF, Talpiot

Ido TrivizkiCo-Founder, VP R&DStratoscale, IDF, Talpiot

Dana TamirVP Marketing

Trusteer, Imperva, Symantec

IndegyIndustrial Cyber Security

Gaby KorenVP Americas

Panaya, Radvision, NICE

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Indegy protects againstoperational disruptions

caused by cyber threats, malicious insiders and human error, by

providing visibility and control to industrial networks.

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Stuxnet (2010)Destroyed 20% of Iran's nuclear centrifuges

German Steel Plant Cyber Attack (2014)Second physical damage cyber attack reported in history

Dragonfly / BlackEnergy (2014)Over 250 ICS networks (Energy, Pharma, etc.) compromised

New York Water Dam (2015)Iranian hackers managing to get control of the flood gates

Crashoveride / Industroyer (2016)Ukraine Power Grid blackout as an act of Russian aggression

Dragonfly 2.0 / APT targeting Energy and more (2017)Wide range campaign targeting government entities and organizations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors

Major Incidents

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Threats to Industrial Control Systems

Cyber Attacks (External Threats)•Targeted attacks•Collateral damage

Malicious Insiders (Insider Threat)

•Disgruntled employees•Compromised IT devices

Human Error and Negligence

•Unintentional mistakes• Unsecure contractor

equipment on site

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The risk to ICS Systems

#1Asset Inventory in the priority check list of

gaps in ICS environments (SANS July 2017)

61%of O&G ICS network’s

visibility and security is inadequate

(Security Magazine)

50% of global industrial

companies suffered 1-5 security incidents in

2016(Infosecurity Magazine)

https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/basics-focus-first-cis-critical-security-controls-37537https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/03/cyber-security-risks-to-be-aware-of-in-the-oil-and-gas-industrieshttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/half-of-ics-firms-suffered/

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ICS Infrastructures are Everywhere

SCADA and HMIControl Center

Water

Power & Energy

Oil & Gas Manufacturing

Transportation

Building Management & Automation

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Low Impact ICS

• Product Examples: Non hazardous materials or products, Non-ingested consumer products

• Industry Examples: Plastic Injection Molding, Warehouse Applications

• Security Concerns: Protecting people, Capital investment, Ensuring uptime

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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Moderate Impact ICS

• Product Examples: Some hazardous products and/or steps during production, High amount of proprietary information

• Industry Examples: Automotive Metal Industries, Pulp & Paper, Semiconductors

• Security Concerns: Protecting people, Trade secrets, Capital investment, Ensuring uptime

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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High Impact ICS

• Product Examples: Critical Infrastructure, Hazardous Materials, Ingested Products

• Industry Examples: Utilities, Petrochemical, Food & Beverage, Pharmaceutical

• Security Concerns: Protecting human life, Ensuring basic social services, Protecting environment

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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Major ICS Security Objectives • Deploy security solution based on potential impact

• Not a one size fits all solution • Continuous monitoring

• Security is not a once and done exercise • Continuously monitor risk• Continuously monitor threats• Continuously monitor and mitigate vulnerabilities

• Continuously monitor system boundaries • Continuously monitor ingress and egress traffic • Continuously update security controls

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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NIST Cybersecurity Framework Components

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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Framework Core - Cybersecurity Framework Component

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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Cybersecurity Framework Core

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

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Bridging the Gap – How Indegy Enables NIST Adherence

• Function: Identify• Category: Asset Management

• Subcategory: ID.AM-1

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Identify (ID) – example from Indegy White Paperidentify

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Understand what needs to be protected

• Automated Asset Discovery, Classification and Management

• Configuration Monitoring

identify

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Protect (PR) - exampleProtect

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Continuously monitor access and changes

• Real-time Monitoring

• A comprehensive audit trail

• Periodic integrity checks

• Reconnaissance detection

Protect

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Detect (DE) - exampleDetect

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Assess risk to ICS assets & network segments

• Assess risk to ICS assets and network segments

• Support mitigation efforts

Detect

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Respond (RS) - exampleRespond

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Enforce policies, Get real-time alerts

Granular policies for detecting anomalies and unauthorized activities

Respond

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Recover (RC) - exampleRecover

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Recover - Enabled via Aggregated SnapshotsAggregation of Snapshots into timeline of code versions in controllers

Recover

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Understand What Needs to beProtected

Assess Risk toDevices andNetworks

Enforce Policies,

Indegy

A Continuous Process for Securing ICSCan you effectively manage and respond to events?

2

Without visibility you can’t have security

ContinuouslyMonitor

Access andChanges

Get Real-time Alerts

3

1

4

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IndegyIndustrial Cyber Security

Indegy provides situational awareness and real-time security for industrial control networks to ensure operational continuity andreliability.

Questions/Comments?

Gaby [email protected]

Matt [email protected]

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Appendix

References and works cited:

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing.pdf

Stouffer, K. (2016, November 4) Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, Retrieved from URL https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/05/cybersecurity_for_smart_manufacturing

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