Indian economic environment 3. pricing output decisions
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Transcript of Indian economic environment 3. pricing output decisions
3Pricing and Output
Decisions: Imperfectly Competitive Markets
Alternative Market Structures
• Classifying markets (by degree of competition)
– number of firms
– freedom of entry to industry
• free, restricted or blocked?
– nature of product
• homogeneous or differentiated?
– nature of demand curve
• degree of control the firm has over price
Alternative Market Structures
• The four market structures
– perfect competition
–monopoly
–monopolistic competition
– oligopoly
Features of the four market structures
Features of the four market structures
Features of the four market structures
Features of the four market structures
Features of the four market structures
Features of the four market structures
Alternative Market Structures
• The four market structures
– perfect competition
–monopoly
–monopolistic competition
– oligopoly
• Structure → conduct → performance
Monopoly
• Defining monopoly– importance of market power
• Barriers to entry– economies of scale
– economies of scope
– product differentiation and brand loyalty
– lower costs for an established firm
– ownership/control of key factors or outlets
– legal protection
–mergers and takeovers
Monopoly
• The monopolist's demand curve– downward sloping• the greater the market power, the less elastic the
demand curve
–MR below AR
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AR and MR curves for a monopolyQ
(units)
1234567
P =AR(£)8765432
ARAR
, MR
(£)
Quantity
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Q(units)
1234567
P =AR(£)8765432
TR(£)
8141820201814
MR(£)
6420-2-4
MR
AR
, MR
(£)
Quantity
AR
AR and MR curves for a monopoly
Monopoly
• The monopolist's demand curve– downward sloping• the greater the market power, the less elastic the
demand curve
–MR below AR
• Equilibrium price and output– Equilibrium output, where MC = MR
Profit maximising under monopoly
MR
£
Q O
MC
Qm
Monopoly
• The monopolist's demand curve– downward sloping• the greater the market power, the less elastic the
demand curve
–MR below AR
• Equilibrium price and output– Equilibrium output, where MC = MR
– Equilibrium price, found from D curve
Profit maximising under monopoly
MR
£
Q O
MC
Qm
£
Q O
MC
AC
Qm
MR
AR
AC
AR
Profit maximising under monopoly
Monopoly
• The monopolist's demand curve– downward sloping
• the greater the market power, the less elastic the demand curve
– MR below AR
• Equilibrium price and output– Equilibrium output, where MC = MR
– Equilibrium price, found from D curve
• Profit– Measuring profit
£
Q O
MC
AC
Qm
MR
AR
AC
AR
Total profit
Profit maximising under monopoly
Monopoly
• The monopolist's demand curve– downward sloping
• the greater the market power, the less elastic the demand curve
– MR below AR
• Equilibrium price and output– Equilibrium output, where MC = MR
– Equilibrium price, found from D curve
• Profit– Measuring profit
– Supernormal profit can persist in long run
Monopoly
• Monopoly versus perfect competition– lower short-run output at a higher price
– supernormal profit not competed away
– costs under monopoly• lack of competition to drive down costs
• BUT possibility of substantial economies of scale
– innovation and new products• less incentive to innovate
• BUT greater possibility of innovation through investing ploughed-back profit
– competition for corporate control
AR = D
MC
MR
£
Q O Q1
P1
Monopoly
Equilibrium of industry under perfect competition and monopoly: with the same MC curve
£
Q O
MC ( = supply under perfect competition)
Q1
MR
P1
P2
Q2
AR = D
Comparison withPerfect competition
Equilibrium of industry under perfect competition and monopoly: with the same MC curve
Monopoly
• Monopoly versus perfect competition– lower short-run output at a higher price
– supernormal profit not competed away
Monopoly
• Monopoly versus perfect competition– lower short-run output at a higher price
– supernormal profit not competed away
– costs under monopoly• lack of competition to drive down costs
• BUT possibility of substantial economies of scale
Monopoly
• Monopoly versus perfect competition– lower short-run output at a higher price
– supernormal profit not competed away
– costs under monopoly• lack of competition to drive down costs
• BUT possibility of substantial economies of scale
– innovation and new products• less incentive to innovate
• BUT greater possibility of innovation through investing ploughed-back profit
Monopoly
• Monopoly versus perfect competition– lower short-run output at a higher price
– supernormal profit not competed away
– costs under monopoly• lack of competition to drive down costs
• BUT possibility of substantial economies of scale
– innovation and new products• less incentive to innovate
• BUT greater possibility of innovation through investing ploughed-back profit
– competition for corporate control
Oligopoly
• Key features of oligopoly
– barriers to entry
– interdependence of firms
• Competition versus collusion
• Collusive oligopoly
– cartels
• equilibrium of the industry
£
Q O
Industry D = AR
Profit-maximising cartel
£
Q O
Industry D = AR
Industry MC
Industry MR
Q1
P1
Profit-maximising cartel
Oligopoly
• Key features of oligopoly
– barriers to entry
– interdependence of firms
• Competition versus collusion
• Collusive oligopoly
– cartels
• equilibrium of the industry
• allocating and enforcing quotas
Oligopoly
• Collusive oligopoly (cont.)– tacit collusion
• price leadership
• rules of thumb
– factors favouring collusion• few firms which are open with each other
• similar cost structures
• similar products
• there is a dominant firm
• significant barriers to entry
• stable market conditions
• no government measures to curb collusion
Oligopoly
• The breakdown of collusion
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies
• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games
Profits for firms A and B at different prices
£2.00 £1.80
£2.00
£1.80
X’s price
Y’s price
A B
C D
£10m each
£8m each£12m for Y£5m for X
£5m for Y£12m for X
Oligopoly
• The breakdown of collusion
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies
• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
Profits for firms A and B at different prices
£2.00 £1.80
£2.00
£1.80
X’s price
Y’s price
A B
C D
£10m each
£8m each£12m for Y£5m for X
£5m for Y£12m for X
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
– more complex non-dominant strategy games
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
– more complex non-dominant strategy games
– the importance of threats and promises
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
– more complex non-dominant strategy games
– the importance of threats and promises• are threats seen by rivals as credible?
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
– more complex non-dominant strategy games
– the importance of threats and promises• are threats seen by rivals as credible?
– the importance of timing
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: game theory– alternative strategies• optimistic or cautious approach?
– simple dominant strategy games• Nash equilibrium
• the prisoners’ dilemma
– more complex non-dominant strategy games
– the importance of threats and promises• are threats seen by rivals as credible?
– the importance of timing• decision trees
Boeingdecides
500
seat
er
500 seater
500 seater
400 seater
400 seater
400 seater
A decision tree
Boeing –£10mAirbus –£10m
(1)
Boeing +£30mAirbus +£50m
(2)
Boeing +£50mAirbus +£30m
(3)
Boeing –£10mAirbus –£10m (4)
Airbusdecides
B2
Airbusdecides
B1
A
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
£
QO
P1
Q1
Current priceand quantity
give one pointon demand curve
Kinked demand for a firm under oligopoly
£
QO
P1
Q1
D
D
Kinked demand for a firm under oligopoly
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
£
QO
P1
Q1
MC2
MC1
MR
a
bD = AR
Stable price under conditions of a kinked demand curve
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
– limitations of the model
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
– limitations of the model
• Oligopoly and the consumer
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
– limitations of the model
• Oligopoly and the consumer
– advantages
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
– limitations of the model
• Oligopoly and the consumer
– advantages
– disadvantages
Oligopoly
• Non-collusive oligopoly: the kinked demand curve theory
– assumptions of the model
– stable prices
– limitations of the model
• Oligopoly and the consumer
– advantages
– disadvantages
– difficulties in drawing general conclusions
Alternative Aims to Profit Maximisation
• Alternative aims– separation of ownership and control
– the principal–agent problem
– managerial utility maximisation
– profit satisficing
• Sales revenue maximisation (short run)– equilibrium output and price
• comparisons with short-run profit maximising
• implications for advertising
£
Q O
AR
MC
MRQ1
P1
Sales revenue maximising price and output
Profit-maximisingprice and output
£
O
AR
P1
MC
Q1
MRQ2
P2
Sales revenuemaximising
price and output
Q
Sales revenue maximising price and output
Alternative Aims to Profit Maximisation
• Alternative aims– separation of ownership and control
– the principal–agent problem
– managerial utility maximisation
– profit satisficing
• Sales revenue maximisation (short run)– equilibrium output and price
• comparisons with short-run profit maximising
• implications for advertising
– implications for the consumer
Alternative Aims to Profit Maximisation
• Growth maximisation– measuring ‘growth’
– equilibrium for growth maximising firm?
• Multiple aims– satisficing and the setting of targets
• different stakeholders with different aims
• various possible targets
• potential conflicts between targets
– organisational slack• a way of reconciling conflicting aims?
• cutting slack with 'just-in-time' methods
Pricing in Practice
• Do firms know their costs and revenues?
– difficulties in identifying the profit-maximising price and output
– difficulties in predicting rivals’ behaviour
• Cost-based pricing
– the use of a profit mark-up on AC• choosing the level of output
• choosing the mark-up
Choosing the output and profit mark-up
O
AC
£
Q
D
P1
Q1
f
gP2
Q2
j
h
Pricing in Practice
• Do firms know their costs and revenues?
– difficulties in identifying the profit-maximising price and output
– difficulties in predicting rivals’ behaviour
• Cost-based pricing
– the use of a profit mark-up on AC• choosing the level of output
• choosing the mark-up
• equilibrium price and output?
Pricing in Practice
• Do firms know their costs and revenues?
– difficulties in identifying the profit-maximising price and output
– difficulties in predicting rivals’ behaviour
• Cost-based pricing
– the use of a profit mark-up on AC• choosing the level of output
• choosing the mark-up
• equilibrium price and output?
– variations in the mark-up
Pricing in Practice
• Price discrimination
– meaning of price discrimination
• charging different prices to different consumers for reasons unrelated to costs
• the prices depend on price elasticity of demand
Price discrimination
P
QO
P1
D
200
O
P1
D
P2
150 200
P
Q
Price discrimination
Pricing in Practice
• Price discrimination (cont.)
– conditions for price discrimination
• firm must be able to set its price
• markets must be separate
• demand elasticity must differ between markets
– advantages to the firm
• higher profits
• possibility of cross-subsidisation
• Pricing and the product life cycle
– the four stages
• launch
• growth
• maturity
• decline
– competition and pricing in each stage
Pricing in Practice
O
Sa
les
per
per
iod
Time
The stages in a product’s life cycle
The stages in a product’s life cycle
O (1)Launch
(2)Growth
(3)Maturity
(4)Decline
Sa
les
per
per
iod
Time
Product notbecomingobsolete
Productbecomingobsolete