India y Prospects for Conflict and Peace Countr · Prospects for Conflict and Peace 3 1. Executive...

Navnita Chadha Behera

India Prospects for Conflict and Peace Country Risk Profile 2000 2000 Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution and SDC ⋅ Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Swiss Peace Foundation Sonnenbergstrasse 17, Postfach, CH-3000 Bern 7 Telefon ++41 (0)31 330 12 12, Telefax ++41 (0)31 330 12 13 E-mail: [email protected] www.swisspeace.ch

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Prospects for Conflict and Peace


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TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Executive Summary........................................................................................................ 3

2. Policy Recommendations ............................................................................................ 4

2.1. The Domestic Arena ............................................................................................... 4

2.2. The External Realm.................................................................................................. 6

3. Background................................................................................................................... 10

3.1. Political Factors ...................................................................................................... 13

3.1.1. Creation and Demand for New States ..................................................... 13

3.1.2. Towards Multi-level Governance................................................................ 14

3.1.3 Regionalization of the Political Forces ........................................................ 15

3.1.4. The Kashmiri Secessionist Movement ......................................................... 17

3.1.5. North-East India: A Zone of Turmoil............................................................. 20

3.1.6. Caste/ Class/ Agrarian Violence ................................................................ 26

3.1.7 Growing Influence of Hindutva.................................................................... 28

3.1.7.1. Attacks on Christian Minorities.................................................................. 30

3.2 Environmental Factors ........................................................................................... 31

3.3. Foreign Affairs......................................................................................................... 34

3.3.1 Ties with Pakistan ............................................................................................. 34

3.3.2 India-Bangladesh Border Problems............................................................. 37

3.4 Nuclearization of South Asia ................................................................................ 38

4. Internal Risk Assessment .............................................................................................. 44

5. International Risk Assessment..................................................................................... 49

End Notes ........................................................................................................................... 54


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Preface

The present series of case studies on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan

were presented and discussed at the “Second Workshop on Conflict

Dynamics in South Asia: Early Warning in Practice” in September 2000 in Bern,

Switzerland. The workshop was organized by the Swiss Peace Foundation's

early warning unit FAST (Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding) and

brought together scholars, local experts, and representatives of NGOs

dealing with the South Asian region.

FAST's main objective is the early recognition of impending or potential

crisis situations for the purpose of early action towards the prevention of

armed conflict and – if given – seizing opportunities for peace building.

Combined with a collection of statistic evidence and systematic monitoring

of conflictive and cooperative events, the present Country Risk Profile is part

of FAST's early warning methodology linking early warning and early action by

relevant decision makers. FAST is mandated by the Swiss Agency for

Development and Cooperation (SDC).

The case studies on Afghanistan (Rahimullah Yusufzai), India (Navnita

Chadha Behera) and Pakistan (I.A. Rehman) shed light on the various

political, socio-economic and demographic causes of specific ongoing

conflicts in the South Asian region.


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1. Executive Summary

The nature and character of the Indian nation-state has rested on three

key pillars of democracy, secularism and federalism. While Nehru secured

constitutional subordination of sub-national identities, Mrs. Gandhi sought their

submergence into a pan-Indian identity, resulting in several violent regional

movements. The Congress strategy of politicizing religion to electoral ends was

exploited by the BJP to articulate Indian nationalism driven by the ideology of

Hindutva. The recent series of attacks on Christian minorities, against this

backdrop, have been analyzed to show that religion is being used as a

convenient tool to divert attention from deeper political and economic

struggles. The key political features in the current evolution of Indian nation-

state pertain to the growing demand and creation of new states, steps towards

multi-level governance and regionalization of political forces. At the same time,

India continues to be rocked by several secessionist movements along with

caste, class and agrarian violence. The armed conflicts in Jammu & Kashmir

and the North-East region continue to simmer. A peace process is underway

that may not be buried despite various difficult obstacles it faces. Development

induced displacement of millions of people because of big dams and its

implications for leading to new social conflicts have been addressed. In the

external realm, the border tensions between India and Bangladesh resulting in

skirmishes and killing of soldiers as well as civilians have been discussed. More

importantly, the scenario of another “Kargil” or “mini-war”, arising out of

miscalculation, between India and Pakistan cannot be completely ruled out.

This logic extends to the nuclear realm, although there are several factors such

as economic constraints, ambiguity about the current status of nuclear

weaponization and growing international pressure especially from the USA,

militate against such a possibility. The paper maps a vibrant nuclear debate

regarding India’s proposed nuclear posture, doctrine and size and structure of

its proposed nuclear arsenal.


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2. Policy Recommendations

The policy recommendations are addressed to three broad sets of

actors: the Indian government, the civil society players and institutions within

India and, the international community.

2.1. The Domestic Arena

The policy recommendations in the domestic arena are primarily for the

most critical set of players—the Indian government, that is, the central

government in New Delhi as well as the relevant state governments and the

key non-state actors such as militant groups.

With regard to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government must clearly spell out the agenda and the mandate of the K.C. Pant mission in terms of its scope, substance and proposed strategy.

The central government’s initiative to begin the dialogue process with different segments of the Kashmiri society is a welcome step in the right direction. This should be further broad-based to include political leaders and representatives of other communities such as Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, Paharis, Gujjars, Ladakhi Buddhists and Shia Muslims of Kargil region in J&K.

The government should also facilitate a dialogue between the Kashmiri groups across the Line of Control.

New Delhi should allow the Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan to pave the way for their inclusion into the dialogue process.

The All-Party Hurriyat Conference, in return, should drop its pre-condition of being accepted as the sole spokesman of Kashmiris. They have yet to establish their credentials as the true representatives of Kashmiris and considering they are fighting for Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, they cannot in principle usurp the rights of other political groups (e.g Shabir Shah led Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party) and militant outfits’ direct participation in the dialogue process, leave alone the rights of Jammuites and Ladakhis whom they do not even claim to represent.

Farooq Abdullah’s government needs to undertake serious measures to improve the quality of governance in the state. The restoration of a democratically elected government has done little to redress popular grievances and urgent steps are needed to rectify the situation.


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Both the central and state government need to revive the agenda of autonomy. The former needs to clarify and revise its stand on the recommendations of the State Autonomy Commission while the latter should initiate a state-wide debate on the recommendations of the Regional Autonomy Commission.

A similar set of measures needs to be undertaken in the North-East region. These include improving the quality of governance and sanitizing the political processes to break the grid of links between the state governments and militant groups.

The central and state governments need to seriously and squarely address the issue of influx of foreigners and outsiders that has changed the demographic balance of the area and lies at the root of several conflicts in the region.

The government needs to encourage border trade and industrial growth centers along North-East’s international borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan. This will help connect the North-East’s hinterland to markets in South-East Asia and South-Western China apart from the markets of the three neighbouring countries.

Another economic initiative could be to develop the river systems of the North-East. The river ports and tributaries of the Brahmaputra in addition to the main stem of the river can become a busy natural highway, transporting goods and people through the Valley and to and from Bangladesh. The most important aspect of such focused developmental initiatives lies in their sincere implementation. That is because earlier initiatives, for example that of Rs 61 billion economic package by the Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda in 1996 and those by I.K. Gujral and Atal Bihari Vajpayee with an increased quantum of aid, were very poorly implemented with actual devolution of funds falling below the amounts announced and a very limited ‘trickle down’ to the intended beneficiaries.

In the long-term, the Indian State needs to evolve new kind of state structures, which are based on decentralization of power, empowerment of the local people and mass participation in political, economic and social decision making. There has to be effective devolution of development functions and government authority to the local self-governing units. In developing a looser, more confederate character, the Indian State needs to become a ‘federation of federations’. A five-tier, or perhaps six-tier, structure of federal governance may be adopted to create a new federal balance. The basic structure of the center-state relations should be renegotiated. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution may be reworked whereby only matters of national importance such as territorial security, foreign affairs, communications and currency should come under the center’s jurisdiction, vesting the residuary powers in the states. States must themselves become federations and devolve powers to sub-state units and Panchayati Raj


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institutions. There is also a need to imagine and create new sub-state formations such as elected regional councils, autonomous hill councils or autonomous tribal councils depending on the specific features and requirements of each state. Governance needs to be de-bureaucratized and made accountable to the people at every step.

The growing demand for reorganization of states need not be feared. Instead, the center and the federating units should evolve mutually agreed upon criteria for reorganization of states along the lines of “(i) administrative and political manageability involving closer contacts between the people and their elected representatives; (ii) techno-economic viability; (iii) and socio-economic homogeneity (in terms of tribes/jatis, languages/dialect, belief system/religious communities and ethnic identities).”1

With regard to the minority rights, institutional mechanisms such as the Minorities Commission and the Human Rights Commission should be empowered to not only investigate the violation of human rights, but also enjoy judicial powers for directly redressing such grievances.

2.2. The External Realm

The first set of policy recommendations are addressed to the political

leaders and government officials of the ruling NDA government, and General

Musharaf’s regime in Islamabad.

India and Pakistan need to reopen the official channels of communication and resume a bilateral dialogue at the governmental level. They should renew their commitment to resolve all conflicts and outstanding issues particularly that of Jammu and Kashmir through peaceful negotiations and re-affirm their faith in the Shimla Accord and the Lahore peace process.

The SAARC process should be revived that could provide a platform for General Musharaf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to meet.

The two countries should formalize the understanding of a “maximum restraint” or the ceasefire on the Line of Control and undertake a commitment to prevent any acts detrimental to peace and tranquility across Line of Control. This has two dimensions. One pertains to ending the cross-border firing and the second, to check the cross-border infiltration into the Kashmir Valley. For the latter, the onus clearly lies on Islamabad rather than New Delhi.

The two countries should adopt a basket approach to the bilateral negotiating process along the lines of a composite dialogue initiated in Islamabad and New Delhi in October-November 1998. Each round of


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negotiations should address itself to two sets of issues: one to discuss Kashmir and peace and security issues; and second to discuss other bilateral issues.

The governments should undertake a commitment not to undertake military exercises of specified level within mutually identified zones near the Line of Control and International Border (IB), and notification of military exercises of specified level along the international border.

In the nuclear realm too, the two countries need to begin a serious dialogue to reduce the risk of a nuclear war, ensure reliable communication between the two security establishments, and promote greater transparency through exchange of military information and senior defence officials between the two countries.

With the immediate focus on stabilizing the nuclear deterrence, the two countries should avoid putting nuclear weapons on short range nuclear missiles (SRBMs) because the use of these missiles really shorten the time available to respond.

The two sides should also consider the creation of a nuclear safety zone, as suggested by Amitabh Mattoo.2 This would involve three declaratory agreements: a “no-first use,” “a no-use against non-nuclear powers,” and a “no-use-against-national capitals”. The second part of such a zone is a nuclear assistance regime. This would encompass at least three elements: a crisis management center consisting of civilian and military officials who would deal with incidents or accidents that threaten to escalate to crisis levels; a hotline dedicated to communication on nuclear matters; and nuclear scientific exchanges. The third and final part of such a zone is a nuclear collaboration regime whereby the two countries could collaborate on nuclear energy.3

Vajpayee government should unilaterally relax the visa restrictions on Pakistanis traveling to India to promote people-to-people level contacts between the two countries.

As a specific confidence building measure in the socio-cultural realm, the two governments should resolve to stop misusing history for their respective political ends and suitably modify the historical texts and textbooks which have, thus far, served as an important medium for reproducing hatred and conflict. It is important to note that the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto had arrived at an understanding in 1988 to examine freshly the textbooks prescribed in educational institutions particularly relating to history and geography to erase misperceptions of facts on either country promising to break down the barriers of stereotype prejudices which were reinforcing the public indifference to the quality of bilateral relations and poisoning the minds of younger generations. The need of the hour is to implement this agreement sincerely.


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The second set of recommendations seeks to strengthen the civil society

players and institutions and create more spaces for dialogue among the larger

publics in India and Pakistan.

The organizers of the non-official dialogues between India and Pakistan need to broaden the base of such exercises by reaching out to those segments of society whose goodwill has not been harnessed thus far. These include the younger generations, women, grassroots organizations and those who live outside national capitals.

The enormous potential of satellite technology and internet needs to be utilized to consolidate their gains.

The budding peace constituency in the two countries needs to be consolidated both at the grassroots level to mobilize the public and change popular mindsets as well to work as a pressure group to lobby with the highest rungs of the government.

Finally, the international community especially the United States has an

important role to play in averting any armed confrontation in the subcontinent.

The United States and G-8 countries should nudge the two governments to initiate and engage in a sustained bilateral dialogue.

The use of the technology of permissive action links (PALS) that decreases the chances of unauthorized use or accidental detonation should be considered for stabilizing the nuclear deterrence in the region. PALS are electronic circuits wired into a bomb and do not allow activation except under very particular circumstances. They are connected directly with the appropriate authority by radio so that conspiracies could be worked against. PALS are of course, not the perfect answer or absolute assurance of nuclear safety or stability. But these may serve as a first step towards alleviating the fears of possible use of nuclear weapons. The United States and other nuclear weapon powers may be able to share PALS technology with India and Pakistan, as they did with France.

The international community could also provide the right kinds of economic incentives rather than coercion to persuade India and Pakistan to carry out negotiations to stabilize the strategic environment in South Asia. Both the Indian and Pakistani economies require inputs of foreign investment if they are to carry out successful market reforms and modernize. In fact, India has made the lifting of technology restrictions, particularly in the area of civilian nuclear technology, a precondition for signing the CTBT. Given that there is a need for developmental aid, technology transfers and foreign aid, such incentives may well persuade both sides to carry out meaningful arms control and produce visible results.


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Finally, the international community should work towards strengthening the civil society voices and the peace constituency in the region.


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3. Background

The nature and character of Indian nation-state and its political

boundaries—internal and external—have evolved throughout centuries. It has

shown a varying mix of “high” and “low” degree of “stateness” that varied with

historical experience, institutional legacies and political culture.4 The state-

society relationship in pre-colonial India was primarily instrumental, "the state

upheld and protected society and its values rather than itself constituting the

highest form of community and the means for realizing value".5 The colonial

state structure in India was, however, qualitatively different as the British

constructed a unitary state and centralized political unity based on the notion

of a ‘singular and indivisible sovereignty’ through its practices of ‘bureaucratic

authoritarianism’, rooted in an impersonalized and institutionalized vast

administrative structure that penetrated the lowest rungs of the Indian society.

The nationalist consciousness of the nineteenth century did not question

or attempt to radically transform the colonial state. The dominant argument

was that the British rule was alien and unrepresentative, and hence the

demand for an independent state representing Indian nationalism. The logic of

a modern state representing one nation, or of transferring the responsibility of

managing social relations among individuals and collective identities from

indigenous social regulatory mechanisms to the state, was not questioned. The

political leadership of modern India perceived the state as the prime mover,

the key repository of political power that would act as an agency of

collectively intended social change.

The Constituent Assembly rested the foundations of the Indian State on

three key pillars of democracy, federalism and secularism. The Congress

leadership had upheld the secular, pluralist idea of the Indian nation. Given the

European model of nation building, however, the cultural unification of India

was a prerequisite for building a modern nation state, which did not fit the

pluralities and diversity of Indian society. The result was a paradox. Nehru

insisted that conceptually the imagining of the Indian nation was an


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accomplished and irreversible fact that did not have to be constantly

negotiated, presented and justified.6 Materially, however, it was in infancy, a

nation-in-the-making that needed to be protected against contending

identities. Accordingly, state formation processes were geared towards

constructing a strong state, capable of defending a nascent nation.

India's federal set-up especially the state-state relations were designed

after the 1935 Act. The need for instituting power-sharing devices was

subordinated to the imperatives of state building and forging national

solidarity. Since the federation was founded by the Union vesting powers in

the states, “most institutional devices for inter-governmental consultation and

participation of states in national decision-making processes owed their

origins to central initiatives, their authority to central statutes and their

agendas and terms of reference to central ministries”. Federalism under

Nehru’s regime, the first phase of its evolution, functioned essentially within

the Congress system, to the extent that inner party democracy within the

limits of the consensual model was a reality.

In Nehru’s vision, a person could be an Indian and be a Bengali or

Tamil or Hindu or Muslim. It was the primacy a person accorded to the

regional, religious or ethnic identity and the national identity that was in

question. Nehru hoped that in the process of nation building, an individual

would become first an Indian and then Bengali or Tamil or Hindu or Sikh, and

perhaps ultimately the forces of modernization would sweep away the

ascriptive identities of ethnicity, caste and religion. Secondly, the Congress

leadership had developed a secular nationalism, which could encompass all

Indian cultures and religions. Nehru’s concept of a secular state did not

negate religions; it meant equal protection to all faiths. The core of this value

system was the recognition of multiple diversities, both behavioural and

normative, and legitimacy of group identities and autonomies.7

Nehru’s daughter and political successor, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime

marked the second phase of the evolution of India's federal structures. Nehru

had secured the constitutional subordination of sub-national identities to the


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Indian nation in order to preserve the political and territorial integrity of the

Indian State. But recognizing the plural realities of a diverse society, they were

allowed adequate political space to grow within the Indian polity. The

institutionalized process to deal with state-state conflicts favoured “inclusionary

over exclusionary strategies as long as the demands were non-secessionist,

secular in character and met with the approval of more than one side in

conflict”.8

Mrs Gandhi’s state policies were driven by the much narrower political

objective of keeping herself and the Congress party in power. She

systematically destroyed political institutions by creating a top-down system of

governance in the Congress party and government and adopted a highly

confrontational posture towards demands for political autonomy by sub-

national identities. She sought total submergence of sub-national identities,

because to concede the idea of Bengali or Tamil or Punjabi identity in principle

would bestow political legitimacy on the demands of regional political parties,

which had mobilized such identities into electoral majorities in the states. In her

attempts to homogenize the Indian nation by negating its diversity, repudiating

sub-national identities by forcing them to become only Indian, and in

identifying the Indian nation with the Congress party, Mrs Gandhi’s regime had

arrived at a particularly narrow conception of the Indian identity. The more she

tried to tighten her grip on sub-national identities, the more assertive they

became. Often the result was volatile regional movements demanding outright

secession. The fact that the current political dispensation in India is dotted with

regional, state and locally-based parties is a direct consequence of Mrs.

Gandhi's politics and the centralization drive.

By the early 1980s, the electoral strategy of the Congress of projecting

the image of the Indian nation in danger from the so-called ‘anti-national’

opposition and regional parties had developed communal and rightist

overtones in its reformulation as India’s “Hindu majority in danger” from anti-

national Muslim and Sikh minorities. This shift though prompted by electoral

compulsions, was part of the retreat from the central principles of the


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Nehruvian project and the long-term decline in the secularity of the state. The

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu rightist party, took advantage of this to

rework the balance of power by taking the communal issue beyond the

boundaries set by the Congress and thus, forcing open the ambivalence

between secular and communal politics.9 The following sections will discuss this

issue in detail.

3.1. Political Factors

This section will discuss several positive and negative forces at work in the

Indian polity.

3.1.1. Creation and Demand for New States The Indian State is under growing pressure for redrawing the country’s

political map. Demands for new states and/or administrative units exist in

fourteen states.10 These include Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal, Bundelkhand (with

Madhya Pradesh districts) and Purvanchal (Rohilkhand and Bundelkhand) and

Bhojpur in Uttar Pradesh; Mithila (Bihar); Coorg (Karnataka); Kosal Kajya (Orissa);

Maru Pradesh/Marwar (Rajasthan); Gorkhaland (West Bengal); Bodoland

(Assam); Jharkhand (Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh); Chattisgarh,

Gondwana and Bhilistan (Madhya Pradesh); Telangana (Andhra Pradesh);

Vidarbha and Konkan (Maharashtra); and Jammu (Jammu & Kashmir). Others

seeking separate administration include the Garo tribals and Hmar tribals in

Meghalaya and Assam, and Kukiland and the Zomi tribals in Manipur, while the

people in Karbi Anglong and North Cachar region demand better democratic

treatment and economic development.

Such demands are partly due to increasingly assertive voices of regional

and sub-regional identities within states, and partly because of the unwieldy

and unmanageable size of India’s larger states where certain regions have

flourished and others have stagnated. The calls for reorganization of states

have revived fears of causing disruption and disintegration, but demands for


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new federal units within the Indian State are better than the threats of

secession, and need to be accommodated within the political system.

Alternative political avenues and mechanisms such as the Darjeeling

Autonomous Hill Council in West Bengal, Karbi Anglong Autonomous District

Council in Assam and Autonomous Hill Council in Leh (Ladakh) as well as

Regional Development Boards set up for Vidarbha and Marathwada in

Maharashtra, have also been explored. Some have worked though many

fizzled out. Nevertheless, the state authorities’ willingness to experiment with

different forms of sub-state structures is a positive and desirable change.

The passage of three bills reconstituting the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar

and Madhya Pradesh, creating Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh

respectively, by the Parliament on August 1, 2000 is a momentous step in this

direction. While there are many complications such as division of assets and

liabilities and the distribution of funds devolved from the center to the

predecessor and successor states, the mere fact of the resumption of the state

reorganization process, after a thirty year lull, will impart a new momentum to

regionalist demands in all parts of the country especially in the Hindu

heartland.11

3.1.2. Towards Multi-level Governance

The process of evolving participatory multilevel governance in the Indian

State has been ushered in by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments

according constitutional status to panchayats as institutions of self-government

at the district and sub-district levels. The introduction of a third stratum in

governance has opened new vistas of opportunities of local self-government.

Besides, the Indian Constitution has several precedents of special provisions for

different groups of people and different parts of the country.

The Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Other Backward Classes and minorities

enjoy certain preferences. While Article 370 gave a special status to Jammu &

Kashmir, Articles 371 and 371-A to 371-I list special provisions related to the


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states of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim,

Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Maharashtra and Gujarat. Article 290-A contains special

provisions pertaining to Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Of further significance are the

constitution of eight autonomous district councils in the states of Assam,

Meghalaya and Mizoram under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and six

such councils under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, outside

the Sixth Schedule, which introduced a new level of structural federalism within

the states.

3.1.3 Regionalization of the Political Forces

The steady decline of Congress, the rise of the BJP and rapid growth and

political clout of regional parties has brought about a new phase in the

evolution of Indian politics marked by coalition politics and regionalization of

the Indian polity. The Indian State is undergoing a widening and deepening

historical current of regionalization of all political forces. The regional political

parties having successfully mobilized the linguistic, ethnic, cultural and regional

identities in the states in the 1980s have come to center stage at the national

level. The formation of the United Front government in June 1996 comprising 13

regional and state-based parties was a forceful statement to this effect.

Significantly, not only did government formation depend on the regional and

state parties, but one of the regional leaders, Deve Gowda, also made it to the

prime minister’s post. This was an important milestone in the regionalization of

political processes. Gowda’s selection marked the “emergence of a new

cluster of non-upper caste leadership with local roots and unwilling to be junior

partners of national parties.”12 The process of replacing Gowda by I.K. Gujral as

the leader of the United Front in April 1997 was similarly controlled by regional

leaders, notably by the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Assam,

West Bengal and Bihar. Significantly, as compared to 8 national parties, 181

state parties, recognized by the Election Commission had contested the 1996

elections and they won one of the 4 Lok Sabha seats.13 In the 12th Lok Sabha,


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about 200 seats had gone to parties that have essentially local or regional

support. The state parties have their own social and political agendas shaped

by “specific regional and vernacular discourses”.14

Even the national political parties have been undergoing a renewed

process of regionalization, each with a specific area of influence depending on

the factors associated with particular regions. For example, the principal reason

for the BJP’s growing strength in the national arena has been the regional

concentration of its support in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Maharashtra,

Gujarat and Karnataka.15 The Congress and the Janata Dal, on the other hand,

have undergone several splits.16 Both the Congress and the BJP have been

forced to look for regional political partners. After the 1998 general elections,

the BJP formed the government with 16 political allies. At least six of them—the

Akali Dal (Punjab), the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK,

Tamil Nadu), the Shiv Sena (Maharashtra), Lok Shakti (Karnataka), the Telugu

Desam Party (Andhra Pradesh), and the Haryana Vikas Party (Haryana)—are

avowedly regional outfits and the rest are effectively so being in the main

confined in their support base to one state. Altogether these parties won 73

seats and polled 11.2 per cent of the vote (up from 26 seats and 4 per cent in

1996).17 In the 1999 general elections, the number of BJP’s partners in the

National Democratic Alliance increased to 24. Moreover, as their reward for

helping the BJP to form the government, the allies demanded, and got, a

number of senior portfolios in the government. This, undoubtedly, added to their

political influence at the center.

These developments signify a dramatic shift in the Indian polity from a

dominant party system to minority and multiparty coalitions at the center and

states, reflecting the evolution of regionalizing tendencies over the past two

decades. The days of a national political party single-handedly mobilizing an

electoral majority are over. The political trends clearly point towards the

regional taking precedence over the national, and in future, regional forces

may hold the Indian polity together.


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3.1.4. The Kashmiri Secessionist Movement

The secessionist movement by Kashmiris certainly poses a potential threat

of armed conflict in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The Indian nation’s efforts to

integrate Kashmiris had alienated and politicized the latter to seek

independence. Viewed against the Center’s blemished record of manipulating

the electoral process in J&K and installing Sponsored-sponsored regimes in

Srinagar, the Kashmiris were convinced that they would remain permanently

disenfranchised under the present political set-up and thus, raised the banner

of revolt. By eliminating the political space for the Kashmiri identity to grow

within Indian political framework, successive Central governments had virtually

pushed it on the path of secession. What followed was a decade-long violent

militant movement. But following a brief period of success when it had

paralyzed the state machinery from 1989 to 1991, it had reached a stalemate

by the end-1994.

The overwhelming support of the Kashmiri Muslims was the key to its early

successes but vehement opposition to their goals by the people of Jammu,

Ladakh and the Kashmiri Pandits, comprising nearly half of the state’s

population, checkmated it. Within the Valley too, more than the underground

militants, the mass processions in early 1990 had caused the total collapse of

the state authority in the Valley. When the militants failed to channelize the

mass support to their cause, half the secessionist battle was lost. Subsequent

criminalization and degeneration of the militant ranks led to growing popular

disillusionment. Without popular support and vital social sanction of violence,

the movement fizzled out. The Kashmiris, however, remain deeply alienated

from the Indian State and their longing for azadi is intact.

The second important factor was the indigenous character of the

insurgency. But before long, Pakistan had marginalized the Jammu & Kashmir

Liberation Front (JKLF) with the help of the Hizbul Mujahideen and later

replaced the Kashmiri cadre with foreign mercenaries whose agenda and

ideology had no room for the Kashmiris’ political aspirations and goals.


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Denuded of its local character and support, the foreign militants can at best

wage guerrilla warfare, as they did, and are doing, and bleed the Indian State.

Third, the ideological divide among the militants, between those seeking

independence and others supporting accession to Pakistan, depleted their

limited but vital resources. The JKLF enjoyed popular support but lacked the

manpower and weapons; the Hizbul Mujahideen had a well-trained and

armed cadre but little public sympathy. Without mutual support, both failed.

Finally, the constant supply of armed men and weapons from across the

border has kept the pot boiling. The mountainous terrain in the state rules out

fencing of the border as was undertaken in large tracts of the border in Punjab

in the 1980s during the height of the Khalistan movement there. Besides, over

the years, Pakistan has diversified its routes and used the coastline of Gujarat,

the plains of Punjab, India’s open border with Nepal, and Assam’s border with

Bangladesh as a conduit to infiltrate men and arms. Sealing India’s border with

all the neighbouring countries is setting an impossible task. The only effective

strategy would be to address, and remove, the need to resort to the gun

option by the local population for redress of their grievances.

The most serious problem with the successive governments’ handling of

the Kashmiri secessionist movement has been that there is no coherent,

consensual and clearly defined strategy. Ad hoc decision-making continues to

be the norm. The civil, political and military wings of the central and state

governments remained divided and often worked at cross-purposes. Militarily,

the tactical strategy of “wearing down the militants” worked, but had limited

value. There was no vision or political strategy and the leadership in Srinagar

and New Delhi flinched away from grappling with the socio-economic and

political issues driving the insurgency.

Caught in the quagmire of corrupt state machinery, an indifferent

bureaucracy and fearful and self-serving politicians, four years after the

restoration of a democratically elected government of Farooq Abdullah-led

National Conference, the people are still grappling with ‘bread and butter’

issues. The militancy has spread from the Valley to large areas of the Jammu


19

region—Rajouri, Poonch and Doda—and some parts of Ladakh as well. The

Kashmiri youth are, once again, beginning to join the ranks of the militants.

Without clear and committed support from the ruling party, the state police

especially the officers of the Special Operations Group are feeling demoralized.

The security forces are once again on the defensive. The National Conference

government has, on the one hand, refused to engage the militants and their

political representatives in a dialogue and, on the other, sought to undercut the

support base of moderate, secular and pro-India political voices such as that of

the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Their attempt to monopolize the political

space in the state has led to growing public disenchantment with democratic

politics.

Despite the continuing bloodshed and growing disillusionment, however,

the political battle of winning the hearts and minds of the Kashmiris is not

completely lost. Indeed on a wide variety of parameters, the situation is better

than it was in the 1990s. The despair and dejection among the populace has

not turned into popular sympathy for the militants. People are generally averse

to violence. The foreign militants enjoy little popular support. International

support for the Kashmiri cause has also waned. The honeymoon with Pakistan is

over and it is no longer viewed as the ‘patron’ of their cause. The Kargil crisis in

a nuclearized South Asian environment only drove home the point that the

‘Kashmir issue’ cannot be resolved militarily.

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's decision to

release the All Party Hurriyat leadership—a conglomeration of several militant

and political outfits in Kashmir—in July 2000 in order to initiate a dialogue,

followed by the Hizbul Mujahideen's offer of a unilateral ceasefire announced

in July and the central government's acceptance to hold unconditional talks

within the framework of insaniyat (humanity) marked the beginning of a peace

process. This was a significant departure as by doing so, the central

government had overcome the first important hurdle in holding the talks by

bridging the gap between its traditional position that talks with militants could

only be held within the framework of the Indian Constitution and Hurriyat and


20

Hizbul Mujahideen’s stand that no solution to Kashmiri within that framework

was negotiable.

The Hizbul’s withdrawal of the ceasefire offer because the Indian

government refused to accept its time-bound demand to hold tripartite talks

by involving Pakistan in the negotiations temporarily stalled the peace process.

This was revived by the Indian government’s announcement of a unilateral

ceasefire in December 2000 that has been extended till the end of May 2001.

The internal risk assessment of this situation and the future of peace process

shall be discussed in a following section.

3.1.5. North-East India: A Zone of Turmoil

The North-East India comprises seven states: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh,

Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya. After fifty years of

independence, the entire North-East continues to face some form of violence,

insurgency, and terrorism. There is the Meitei insurgency in Imphal Valley, Naga-

Kuki fratricidal feuds in the hills of Manipur, the Naga insurgency in Nagaland,

the tribal insurgency in Tripura, the Bodos in Lower Assam, and the United

Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in the whole of Assam and the radical Achik

Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) in Meghalaya.18

In an effort to reach an agreement with the North-East insurgents, the

government has signed a number of accords in the past: the Shillong Accord

with the Nagas in 1975, the Assam Accord with the All Assam Students Union

(AASU) in 1985, the Memorandum of Settlement with the Mizo National Front

(MNF) in 1986, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Tripura

National Volunteers(TNV) in 1988 and the Bodo Accord with the All Bodo

Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo People’s Action Committee in 1993 and a

ceasefire agreement between the center and the Nationalist Socialist Council

of Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN [IM]). Despite these accords, peace has

remained elusive, except in the case of Mizoram, where the settlement arrived


21

with the MNF has seen the return of peace and started the democratic

processes.

There are two broad sets of issues that have spurred various militant

movements in the region. The genesis of ethnic violence in Tripura and Assam

lies in the massive influx of settlers from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh as

well as other parts of India, thus, upsetting the socio-economic pattern in the

state and increasing pressure on land. Due to the demographic transition

arising out of the partition of the subcontinent, millions of Bengali Hindus

migrated from East Pakistan to Tripura reducing the indigenous tribes to a

minority19 with large areas of cultivable land being transferred to the refugees.

The disturbance in the demographic equilibrium, land alienation supplemented

by economic exploitation, a strong tribal identity led to militancy in Tripura.20

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Tripura National Volunteers

(TNV) leaders that led to the creation of the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous

District Council (TTAADC), failed to usher in peace.21 The severe eruption of

violence unleashed by the All-Tripura Tribal Front (ATTF) and the National

Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in 1980 that continues unabated, has primarily

targeted the Bengali settlers with an aim to trigger an exodus of non-tribals.

Such attacks, particularly in South and West Tripura have become more

frequent after the victory of the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (the

political wing of NLFT) in the Tripura TTAADC elections held in May 2000. The

level of violence is also heightened by the emergence of militant Bengali

organizations such as the United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF) and Amra

Bangali.

Assamese too faced a similar set of grievances though secessionist

demands took much longer to emerge. The persisting underdevelopment of

the area was attributed to the intrusion of outsiders and unresponsiveness of

the central governments. The migrants had “monopolized or dominated

virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or jobs in the modern

sectors of economy and in the government service” and threatened to reduce

the indigenous Assamese Hindu population to a minority. The demographics of


22

the border districts of Assam has changed in that Hindu-majority districts have

become Muslim-majority in a span of 20 years. At least three other districts

(Barpeta, Morigaon, Nowgaon) are on the verge of turning Muslim-majority.

These grievances were initially mobilized by the All Assam Student Union (AASU)

and the Asom Gono Parishad (AGP) which signed the Assam Accord for

deportation of refugees.

It was the failure of the AGP and the central government to implement

the Accord and revise the electoral rolls that resulted in the emergence of a

group called United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in 1979 that launched a

violent secessionist movement. By 1990, the ULFA was at the peak of its power

and had “a highly effective system of levying taxes and also organizing

community work, often through coercion”.22 The Indian armed forces had

succeeded in immobilizing ULFA by early 1992 when a section of its leadership

agreed to hold talks with the central government triggering a split in the

organization. The hardcore section of ULFA, continued to wage struggle by

acquiring new military hardware and establishing a chain of training camps

across the border in Myanmar, and later in Bhutan.

Currently, ULFA’s campaign in Assam is at an ebb, politically and

militarily. The continuous military and para-military operations since 1997 have

considerably weakened the ULFA, driving the entire senior leadership into exile.

While ULFA’s top leadership shows no sign of giving up, the second rung

leadership is becoming increasingly disillusioned and a number of them have

surrendered to local authorities. Its cadres have become divided and

corrupted. They are seen as extortionists, not liberators. When ULFA joined other

militant groups such as NSCN (Khaplang faction) and the United National

Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur in calling for a campaign against Indian

troops at Kargil, it was met with a furious public outcry. While ULFA is not

eliminated, its credibility and image has taken quite a battering. AGP was also

wiped out in the Lok Sabha elections and now in the recent assembly elections

of May 2001.


23

The Bodo insurgency in Assam is rooted in their grievances of

dispossession of their tribal land by Assamese and Bengali settlers, as well as

neglect of the Bodo culture and language. The Bodo Accord which created

the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) soon ran into problems of

demarcating the jurisdiction of the BAC since Bodo villages are not contiguous.

The Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and the National Democratic Front of

Bodos (NDFB) have repudiated the accord and carried a sustained campaign

of violence against the Santhals and Muslim immigrants in the Bodo areas.23 The

BLT is currently engaged in a peace process with the government since 1999. A

ceasefire agreement is currently in place, and six meetings between the BLT

representatives and the government were held in 1999, with another five held

in year 2000. The NDFB has, however, spurned all such initiatives.

The roots of Naga separatism precede Indian independence and lie in

the ethnic assertion of their identity. The Naga National Council (NNC) led by

Angomi Zapu Phizo resolved to establish a sovereign Naga state soon after

independence. The Shillong Accord in 1975 had failed to bring peace to

Nagaland, mainly because it was seen as an agreement signed by only a

section of the Naga rebels in their personal capacities and not as

representatives of Naga Nationalist Council. The agreement was repudiated by

Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah who formed the Nationalist Socialist

Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. The NSCN spilt vertically eight years later

after a bloody clash between the Muivah and Khaplang factions and the

internecine feud has continued throughout 1990s. The Naga-Kuki clashes since

the beginning of 1992 has added another dimension to the Naga problem.

The nature of insurgency has gradually changed over years. The classical

guerilla tactics of hit and run and mass mobilization have given place to the

tactics of terror, extortion, intimidation and indiscriminate violence. Most

importantly the Nagas, cutting across tribal barriers, are tired of four decades of

violence and it is this popular yearning of peace that prompted the NSCN (I-M)

to agree to a ceasefire and return to the negotiating table in August 1997. The

BJP government led by A.B. Vajpayee initiated talks with the NSCN (I-M) group


24

in September 1998 and ceasefire thus agreed upon has since been extended

until the end of July 2001.

The passage of a unanimous resolution in the Nagaland Assembly

demanding the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas into one administrative

unit, Greater Nagaland, has however, stoked fears of the Manipuris that their

state would again be divided. All Meiteis irrespective of their political affiliations

are against the bifurcation of the state. The rise of Meitei sub-nationalism which

took a virulent form in the late 1970s and early 1980s was also mainly an

expression of their sense of neglect by the central government. There was that

deep sense of hurt that despite its long distinctive history, it was denied full

statehood for more than two decades after independence till 1972 and they,

being the targets of rebel Nagas for being Vaishnavite Hindus, were given step

motherly treatment vis-à-vis the Nagas of Manipur. A new dimension was given

to insurgency in Manipur in 1992 with the outbreak of fratricidal Naga-Kuki

clashes. The clashes were triggered by Kuki resistance to NSCN (I-M) control of

the border town of Moreh, which would have allowed them full control of the

narcotics and illegal trade. The insurgent groups in Manipur have been trying to

re-group since the 1990s. While the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) has

again started its armed struggle, the PLA is reported to have set up camps in

Bangladesh. Together, the UNLF and the PLA have formed a political front

called the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF).24

The real obstacle to the peace in the state lies in the deep vested

interests with growing indications that militancy in the state-with its

disproportionate emphasis on criminal activities such as abduction and

extortion-is substantially supported and sustained by political patronage. There

is a deepening nexus between political parties and the militant groups. The

NLFT is said to have close links with the Congress (I) while the ATTF is aligned

with the Left Front. In Manipur the various militant groups have been

substantially criminalized, and there is overwhelming evidence of a complex

web of collusion between militants and various political parties. A Ministry of

Home Affairs Report mentions at least five ministers of the Manipur state


25

government as having direct links with terrorists of NSCN-K, PLA, UNLF, Kanglei

Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL-O) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA).25 In a raid by

security force personnel on November 28, 2000, at the official residence of the

Transport Minister, Haokholet Kipgen, two Kuki National Front militants were

arrested. Thereafter, the Central government announced an investigation into

the clandestine alliance between the politicians and the militants. Official

reports also indicate the subversion of civil administration in the state. For

example, senior state officials and politicians openly negotiate the levels at

which the extortion amounts to be paid to militants by various government

departments have to be fixed. Militants of the PLA and the UNLF reportedly

have unhindered access to government files and offices, and commercial

contracts are allotted to nominees of these groups. Such a complex and

collusive arrangement between various legitimate power elites and militant

groups facilitates a continuous transfer of resources into the “underground

economy of terrorism.”26

Another common feature of the militant groups in the North East has

been their widening network of extortion, criminal and quasi-legal operations in

the entire region. This is largely due to growing ‘lumpenisation’ of the rank and

file of militant groups such as ULFA and NDFB in Assam, and NSCN(I-M) in

Nagaland. For example, abduction by terrorists in Tripura has evolved into a

well organized criminal operation. A total of 55 incidents of abductions,

including 481 by the NLFT and 41 by the ATTF, were reported in the state during

the year 2000. 27

An increasing number of militant groups have established contacts with

each other. The ULFA and the NSCN(I-M) are the two largest militant groups

which provide training, arms and economic support to a number of other

militant outfits in the region. By 1986, ULFA had established contacts with the

NSCN(I-M), in Nagaland and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in

Myanmar. Amongst the Bodo groups, the NDFB established a ‘working

arrangement’ with the NSCN(I-M) and, so did the Dima Halim Daoga (DHD) for

training and supply of arms. Insurgent outfits in Tripura such as ATTF maintains


26

contacts with ULFA in Assam and PREPAK and PLA of Manipur. ULFA and

certain Islamic fundamentalist militant groups in the North East have reportedly

also developed strong contacts with Pakistan’s ISI. The various militant groups

like PREPAK and the PLA in Manipur operate from bases in Bangladesh, Bhutan

and Myanmar. In fact, the PLA reorganized itself and formed a political wing

called the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) in 1989 and established a

government-in-exile in Sylhet district of Bangladesh. The PLA also set up two

camps in Myanmar and five in. Bangladesh. The NSCN-K in Nagaland runs a

government-in-exile from Myanmar. ULFA also established a chain of training

camps across the border in Myanmar, and later in Bhutan in the 1990s. The ATTF

headquarters at Tarabon in Bangladesh currently also serves as the

headquarters of the ULFA chairman Arobindo Rajkhowa.

The influx of weapons in the region bought from the arms bazaar in South

East Asia is cause for yet more concern. Weapons still in possession of the Khmer

Rouge in Cambodia are brought and smuggled into the North Eastern states

via small ports in Bangladesh.28 The security forces have recently captured arms

and ammunitions from gunrunners in Indian waters off the Andaman and

Nicobar islands. It is believed that weapons were shipped fro the North-East

militants through Bangladesh’s ports.

3.1.6. Caste/ Class/ Agrarian Violence

Parts of Central India where the borders of the four states of Bihar, Orissa,

Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra meet are rocked by this form of violence. The

writ of the state does not run in these areas. The rural oligarchy in this region is

engaged in a feudal mode of appropriation of surplus value and perpetuates

an exploitative production relations.29 The state machinery in some of these

areas, particularly Bihar, comprises of a non-official apparatus of landlords and

their private armies who form the ruling classes. To maintain existing pattern of

agrarian relations, the rural oligarchy is opposed to rural class struggle and is

willing to use force towards this end. Resentment by the poor peasants, let


27

alone revolt, invites severe retribution not only against individuals but also

against members of an entire caste, at times, even against entire villages by

the private militia called ‘senas’. The Ranvir Sena, for instance, is a powerful

private militia of upper caste landlords mainly Bhumihars and Rajputs, which

came into existence in August 1994 in Belaur. It has the support of the major

political parties of the state – the BJP, the Congress(I) and the covert support of

even the ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)30.

The violence unleashed by the landlords has led to the mobilization of

the peasants, low castes and the landless harijans by the Naxalites. The

Naxalites are the descendents of the parent Communist party of India (Marxist-

Leninist) founded in 1969 with the aim of organizing the peasantry and seizing

power through armed struggle. Their main demands and mobilization centers

around tribal autonomy and land reforms. Over a dozen naxalite groups exist in

Bihar and Jharkhand including the CPI(ML) (Liberation), the Maoist Communist

Center (MCC) and CPI(ML) (Party Unity). One of their key objectives is to grab

land from the landlords and distribute it to those who tilled it. The MCC till 2000

had grabbed 17,980 acres of land in Aurangabad district, 2,044 acres in Gaya

district from 60 landlords in Aurangabad and six from Gaya.

In Bihar and Jharkhand, there is a sharp polarization based on caste. The

lower class and lower caste people, especially the dalits, support either of the

two major Naxalite groups – the MCC or the CPI(ML) Party Unity. The main

reason for this support stems from the failure of the state government to provide

basic social and economic amenities for the local population. The Naxals

provide education; have abolished bonded labour in those areas where they

are powerful; have secured minimum wages fixed by the State government for

the labourers; and have stopped the exploitation of tribal women.31 On the

other hand, the upper castes and upper classes find the Naxalites hostile to

their social and economic interests and as pointed out earlier have organized

senas.

The prospects of getting rid of Naxalite violence in Bihar and Jharkhand

appear remote and gloomy. The land reforms, one of the main reasons for the


28

class conflicts in Bihar, have not been carried out effectively. The RJD faced

with challenges both within and outside the party has been unable to govern

competently. To combat the caste violence and the growth of caste based

militia, efforts need to be made at both the macro and micro levels. Land

reforms should be effectively implemented; the State Police needs to be

modernized; developmental programmes need to be implemented; and

political parties should function autonomously of caste influence.

3.1.7 Growing Influence of Hindutva

Secularism, as argued earlier, has been the guiding principle of Indian

nationalism. Since 1980s, however, it faced a challenge from the Bharatiya

Janata Party (BJP) which presented an alternative in Hindu nationalism. The

Hindu nationalists reject the idea that Indian culture is composite or synthetic

culture and argue that India has only “one national culture... known as Hindu

culture”, and all others such as Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh cultures are really Hindu

sub-cultures since all of them originated in India. They are part of Bharatiya

culture.32 Broadly stated, the premise of Hindu nationalists is that India's

national identity is rooted in Hindu culture for the obvious reason that Hindus are

the dominant majority in the country and nations are built on the basis of

common culture and ideology. Thus, in order to forge a strong sense of Indian

national identity, it must be culturally rooted in Hinduism and Hindu civilization.

In this context, they tend to view Hinduism, not as a religion but as the

foundation of Indian civilization and culture, which should be given a central

place in the ideology of Indian nationalism. However in reality, as Malik argues,

“Hindutva acts as an exclusionary force in the Indian society rather than

universalistic and open to the values of other cultures”.33

BJP has made impressive electoral gains in past few years and it makes

no bones about using the plank of Hindutva for fighting its domestic political

battles. BJP’s active role in the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1993 and its

increasingly assertive and uncompromising position on the Mathura and Kashi


29

temples indicate its political strategy to use the Hindu card. BJP’s stand towards

the minorities that they must reconcile to the political dominance of Hindus and

the centrality of Hinduism in the national identity; its efforts to re-write the Indian

history from a Hindu perspective; its demand for a uniform civil code for all

religious communities and most significantly, its attempts to forge a ‘single

homogeneous national identity’ for the whole country has profound

implications for a multi-national, multi-religious and multi-ethnic state like India.

An alternative argument is that BJP-in-power intends to downplay anti-

Muslim actions and mass mobilization in order to present itself as a moderate

party, which no reasonable person should fear. It will, in this avatar (role) stress

the more conventional themes of Indian politics and those that have an easy

popular appeal: opposing corruption, condemning Pakistan and achieving

great power status and respect in the world for India through inducting nuclear

weapons in its armory, having crossed the barrier of conducting tests in May

1998.34 In order to establish its universal presence and the new centralist party in

the Indian political order, however, BJP must succeed in “(a) undermining and

capturing the social bases of left parties among the backward castes, who

comprise the majority of the country; (b) making deals with regional parties that

would amount to reducing the powers of the center in relation to the states,

which goes against its fundamental goals; (c) establishing itself as a genuinely

national, rather than merely, a Hindu, anti-Muslim party, which would require

giving up some of its goals, such as the elimination of Article 370, the

establishment of Uniform Civil Code and the building of temple at Ayodhya, if

not the destruction of some more mosques”.35 If, however, BJP gives up on

latter goals, it risks losing the support of its cadres and its ability to mobilize large

masses of voters around emotional appeals of Hindu sentiment, faith and

solidarity. One may argue, therefore, that BJP's drive for national power through

Hindu consolidation continues to be source of concern.


30

3.1.7.1. Attacks on Christian Minorities

Since 1997, there has been a series of attacks on Christian minorities

throughout the country. There were108 attacks on Christian institutions in 1998

alone, the most prominent example being that of Dangs in Gujarat where

within a week following Christmas in 1998, 36 churches and prayer halls were

burnt.36 The chief instigators behind such attacks seem to be from the bodies

associated with the Hindu Right, namely, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh

(RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal (BD), and the Hindu

Jagaran Manch (HJM). Together with the BJP these are often described as the

Sangh Parivar. The VHP leader, Ashok Singhal, went so far as to justify the

aggression on the grounds that Hinduism was in danger from “Christian

conspiracies.”37

There is a pattern in these attacks and in the use of religion in political

and socio-economic power struggles. However, a careful analysis shows that in

each case the situation was different and often religious conversion functioned

merely as a convenient tool to divert attention. Let me illustrate with two

examples. For example, in Gujarat it is attack on the tribal efforts to protect their

identity or free themselves from poverty, while in Orissa it is division amongst the

subalterns exploited by the vested interests.

There are two dimensions to the violence perpetrated against the

Christians in Gujarat. Firstly, they take place in rural areas, and secondly, they

are concentrated primarily in the districts of South Gujarat. An in-depth analysis

of this phenomenon reveals that violence against the Christian adivasi tribals is

a strategy by the political and business elites of Gujarat, in liaison with the

Hindutva forces in the state and central governments. The elites in Gujarat had

followed a capitalist development model, throughout the 1960s and 1970s,

which destroyed the forests and natural habitations of the tribals, especially in

North Gujarat and, forced them to migrate to South Gujarat, where the

Narmada river became a source of sustenance. When the rulers tried to

construct the Sardar Sarovar Dam over the Narmada -- an issue which we will


31

address shortly -- the adivasis started a popular resistance movement to protect

their threatened livelihood. This anti-Narmada movement allowed the adivasi

tribals to rediscover their rich heritage and strengthened their collective identity

and community power. The emergence of such unprecedented unity among

the adivasis threatened the vested interests of the ruling economic elites. They

tried various strategies for breaking this growing unity – threats, bribes,

depoliticisation – but none worked. Finally, the ruling elites combined with the

Hindutva forces and used religion as a divisive force to attack and destroy the

adivasi unity. Hence, the rationale for the recent spate of attacks on Christian

adivasis lies in socio-economic causes than religious persecution as such.

Likewise, in R Udaigiri in Orissa, it is division amongst the subalterns. For

many decades moneylenders had used the dalits (Pano) as their agents to

exploit the tribals in the villages resulting in a traditional rivalry between the two.

A majority of Christians in the Phulbani and Gajapati districts are panos. The

vested interests and political parties have communalized and exploited this

division. Several churches were destroyed in Phulbani in 1992 in what was

actually a land struggle. In 1998, the Sangh Parivar allegedly used this rivalry to

get the tribals to attack the panos.38

3.2 Environmental Factors

Environmental pressures are being generated on India by population

growth and economic development. During the last fifty years, the population

has gone up by 600 million and per capita economic activity by 117 per cent.

The next 25 years could see the population go up by 350 million and per capita

economic activity by 150 per cent. The biotic pressures generated by

population growth will continue to be substantial, but that posed by economic

development is likely to be even greater.39 Also, the equally pressing needs of

economic development and environmental protection are set to clash.

There is a growing body of literature that establishes the linkage, that

environmental destruction itself may become the cause of a conflict.40 Let me

illustrate this point with reference to the debate around big dams and


32

development-induced displacement in India. India is the third largest dam

building country with over 3600 large dams and more than 700 under

construction. The path to national development in India had begun with the

construction of projects like Bhakra Nangal, Hirakud and the Damodar Valley

Corporation, then revered as modern temples of development. They have

brought water, irrigation facilities and power to large parts of the country, but

they also have a dark side. They have displaced, according to some estimates,

up to 56 million people, submerged millions of acres of prime forest land; led to

the water logging and salinisation of vast areas; and destroyed estuarine

ecosystems.

The oft-repeated argument that ‘some people’ who live in the

submersion area will have to ‘sacrifice’ for the ‘larger interest’ of the country

has increasingly been questioned by a socially aware, vocal and articulate

lobby that highlighted the aspects neglected by the state-guided path to

national well-being and the adverse impact of development on both nature

and people. Despite the fact that the number of displaced persons since

independence is more than thrice the number of population displaced by

India’s partition, they are yet to enter into our national consciousness. The main

reason for this callous attitude, according to W. Fernandes, is that most

displaced persons are asset-less rural poor like landless labourers and small and

marginal farmers. The tribals who comprise 8.08% of India’s population are

estimated to be more than 40% of the displaced population. Dalits constitute

20% of displaced persons. Most of the remaining are other rural poor. 41It

becomes abundantly clear that mostly powerless and voiceless people are

displaced and made to pay the price of national progress, while the benefits

accrue to largely largely middle class in urban sector and rich farmers on rural

side. The development process is thus leading to a widening gap between the

rich and the poor and deep down it is dividing the society horizontally with no

meeting ground in the social sphere. In the recent past, the proportion of tribal

population among those displaced has been growing. For example, the Karjan

and Sukhi reservoirs in Gujrat displaced only tribals; and tribals constitute 98 per


33

cent and 96 per cent of those families displaced by the Balimala hydro project

and Upper Kolar dam in Orissa respectively. In the case of Sardar Sarovar

project, tribals constitute 55 per cent of those ousted.42 A large proportion of

those displaced are also from hilly areas and when force to leave their natural

habitat, the families are not only physically uprooted but their entire existence is

disturbed: living patterns, social space, economic status, kinship patterns and

health. However, the government does not envisage a plan for compensating

the loss of employment or disruption of livelihood of the displaced. The landless

labourer, marginal farmer, share cropper, tenant cultivators, artisans, cattle

grazers, fisher-folk and the like who depend on the region’s natural resources

are not even compensated for their loss.43 In fact a humanitarian definition of

displaced persons is yet to be accepted by the Central and State governments

in India. For instance, it is estimated that when the 3,200 dams on the Narmada

river, as part of the Sardar Sarovar Project are completed, more than one

million people will have been displaced. The inadequacies of the resettlement

and rehabilitation programmes of the Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya

Pradesh governments show that in all likelihood, more of these displaced

people will not be rehabilitated by the state.44 The people of Narmada Valley

through a grassroots mobilization of the Narmada Bacho Andolan (Save

Narmada Campaign) led by Medha Patkar and supported by Baba Amte,

have opposed the construction of dams.

However, in a recent judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India in

October 2000, the construction of the dam was allowed to proceed. The NBA

has sought to mobilize the people around the rallying cry of the displaced

persons – “Whatever your law says, Narmada Valley is ours”. Clearly there is a

social and political conflict brewing in this situation. As Arundhati Roy cautions:

“A 15 years-old non-violent peoples movement … if it is dismissed in this

contemptuous fashion, if violence is the only thing that forces the government

to the negotiating table, then anarchy lurks around the corner.”45 The

economics of large dams must, therefore, incorporate values that respect

ecology and human rights.


34

3.3. Foreign Affairs

3.3.1 Ties with Pakistan

The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be embedded in the history and

politics of the two countries. While many Pakistanis believe that India has not

reconciled to their independent existence or at best, many Indians view

Pakistan only as a recalcitrant neighbour against which India must be on its

guard. It is important to understand some of the structural variables

underpinning this conflict. First pertains to an ideological dimension. The Islamic

lobby in Pakistan perceives India as an embodiment of Hindu values, being

intrinsically antithetical to the Islamic faith. The paradox is that while there is little

electoral support for the Islamic lobby within Pakistan, it has an enormous

nuisance value for thwarting the rapprochement between the two countries. In

India too, the rise of the political fortune of the BJP with an increasing support

for its ideology of Hindu nationalism and its stand towards the Muslim minority, in

particular, impacts upon their bilateral relations. While Pakistanis had always

labeled India as a `Hindu state' and attacked its secularism as `bogus' and

`superficial', it is interesting to note that they are much more worried about the

rise of Hindu nationalism in India.

Secondly, India and Pakistan's self-images of their power status vis-à-vis

each other in the regional context have, ever since independence been at

variance. India believes that its predominant place in the natural power

hierarchy of the subcontinent must be asserted by it and acknowledged by

others, while Pakistan has always sought to achieve and enjoy an equal

standing in politico-military terms with India. Pakistan's fears of Indian hegemony

emanate partly from latter's military might and are partly rooted in the history of

three wars between the two countries. Such fears of hegemony extend to the

realm of economic relations and bilateral trade where India is viewed as an

"economic Leviathan". Indian threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan, on the other

hand, derive their origin from the latter being an anti-status quo power in the


35

subcontinent. From an Indian point of view, Pakistan has time and again

attempted to change the status quo by annexing Kashmir forcibly in 1947-48

and then in 1965. Pakistan's attempts to capture the Kargil heights in summer

1999 reinforces this viewpoint.

On Kashmir too, the official stand taken by both India and Pakistan is

untenable. The Indian position that Pakistan has no locus standi and that

Kashmir is an integral part of India does not stand scrutiny. The Shimla

Agreement is, per se, evidence that there is a dispute, so also the ground reality

of a Line of Control and Article 48 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution which

makes provision for 24 seats to be filled from areas of the state currently under

Pakistan’s control. Pakistan’s demand for the implementation of the UN

resolutions also remains a non-starter, partly because Pakistan has always

demanded Part III, a plebiscite, without complying with the specific

preconditions set out in Parts I and II which include complete withdrawal of its

armed forces from the areas under its occupation.46 The plebiscite option also

overlooks the current ground realities where several prominent militant groups

including the All-Party Hurriyat Conference demand inclusion of a third option—

independence.

The leadership as well as the larger concerned public in India and

Pakistan need to change their way of thinking about the Kashmir issue. The

bilateral negotiating process on Kashmir needs to be disentangled from its

historical and ideological baggage. It needs to be de-ideologized and

delinked from the respective countries’ nationalist discourse that ‘Pakistan is

incomplete without Kashmir’ or that ‘Kashmir is the crown-symbol of Indian

secularism’. The Pakistani logic that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of

Partition’ because Pakistan was meant to be the ‘homeland of Indian Muslims

on the subcontinent’ has not stood the test of time. After the creation of

Bangladesh in 1971, India has more Muslims than Pakistan. Five decades after

an independent existence, the Pakistanis must evolve an identity that no longer

hinges on the inclusion of Kashmir in Pakistan. Likewise, the secular tenets and


36

beliefs of the Indian polity must not be held hostage to the political choices of

the Kashmiris.

Given these structural impediments and in wake of the Kargil crisis, the

negotiating process between India and Pakistan has suffered a grave setback.

Following closely on the heels of Vajpayee’s bold and historic Lahore visit in

February 1999, the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil resulted in loss of trust and

hardening of the national mood that will stymie the early resumption of

dialogue. The BJP government had invested a lot in the bus diplomacy. It was

relying on the four B’s—the Bus, the Budget, the Bomb and Bihar—to win the

forthcoming elections. Of these, the Bus was clearly closest to Vajpayee’s

heart. A BJP Prime Minister could not hope for any greater tribute to his

statesmanship than a breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations.47 But after Kargil,

the BJP adopted a tough posture evident in Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s

three conditions, including a renewed commitment to respect the sanctity of

the Line of Control and cessation of support to the Kashmiri militants, before the

resumption of bilateral talks. In Pakistan, its diplomatic isolation, the Washington

agreement and Pakistan’s sudden and unilateral withdrawal produced a

furious political backlash in the country, imperiling the Muslim League

government, ultimately resulting into its ouster. Opposition political parties,

specially the right wing Jamaat-i-Islami, accused the government of treason

and betrayal of the ‘Kashmiri freedom struggle’. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif also attributed the overthrow of his democratic government last year to

his differences with army chief General Pervez Musharaf on the Kargil crisis.48 In

India too, there is a growing body of public opinion, that argues in favour of

lobbying for getting Pakistan declared as a terrorist state and isolating it

diplomatically or ignoring it at best. There are very few voices in favour of the

resumption of a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. The SAARC summit process has

also been stalled by India since November 1999.

It is important to take into account the people-to-people level contacts

between the two countries, the growing civil society voices and more

specifically, the non-official dialogues between different segments of their


37

intelligentsia. These include the Neemrana dialogue, the Royal Military College

(RIMC) Boys Network, the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative, Pakistan-India

Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, Summer and Winter Schools, Joint

Chambers of Commerce of India and Pakistan and so on. These are well

documented elsewhere.49 Suffice to say that they have, in a modest way,

begun to mobilize public opinion, influence government policies and change

public mindsets towards improving the bilateral relations between the two

countries.

3.3.2 India-Bangladesh Border Problems India and Bangladesh are friendly neighbours, though there are several

outstanding issues between them, most of which relate to the 4,000 km long

common border. The border, with its long history of movements between

people, cultures, beliefs and ideas and customs was unreal right from the

beginning. Even more problematic was that each country had its enclaves

within the boundary of the other. Land on both sides was mostly cultivable and

was locked, and there were farms within 40 yards of zero point on either side.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the border was that in many cases

it was not contiguous but separated by 53 rivers which make its functioning

more complicated.

The border problem has two key aspects. One of border demarcation

and the other of return of the enclaves. Out of the 4095 km long border, only

6.5 km remains to be demarcated, which includes areas of Duikhata, Muhurir

Char and Lathitila. As for the enclaves, there are 97 Indian ones inside

Bangladesh and 114 Bangladeshi ones inside India. 50 In addition, 47 “adverse

possessions” belonging to Bangladesh are under Indian control while 43 such

positions belonging to India are under Bangladesh’s possession.51

These problems were attempted to be tackled by the Indira Gandhi-

Mujibur Rehman Accord of 1974. Bangladesh immediately ratified the Accord

and brought into effect all the necessary constitutional amendments for


38

implementing it. The Indian government has not ratified the Accord till date on

the grounds that it requires parliamentary approval, which cannot be done

until the entire border has been demarcated and the areas to be exchanged

identified on the ground. The border dispute, therefore, remains a major irritant

between the two countries, often sparking skirmishes in which many lives have

been lost. In the last two years alone there had been 53 clashes in which 45

Bangladeshis, including 2 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) men, were killed. The most

recent conflict escalated on April 15, 2001 when BDR forces attacked the

Border Security Force (BSF) outpost in Pyrdiwah village on the Indian side and

held them captive. In retaliation the BSF sent a team to Boraibari village in

Bangladesh, which was attacked by BDR and Bangladeshi villagers and 16

soldiers were killed. This incident was downplayed by both India and

Bangladesh. Most senior Indian leaders, especially Prime Minister Atal Bihari

Vajpayee, home minister L.K. Advani and foreign minister Jaswant Singh were

all extremely circumspect.52 Jaswant Singh in a statement in Parliament termed

the incident as unfortunate, but refrained from castigating the Bangladeshi

Prime Minister. Sheikh Hasina, on her part, expressed anguish and regret. Her

most conciliatory gesture was withdrawing the BDR forces from Padua within a

day after capturing it from BSF. It was a bold gesture risking considerable

domestic backlash in view of the upcoming elections in October, 2001, but she

did it to assuage India’s feelings. Thus, the two countries formed joint groups to

resolve bilateral issues relating to border demarcation. Bangladeshi Prime

Minister Sheikh Hasina was expected to visit New Delhi and address the border

problem at the highest political level.

3.4 Nuclearization of South Asia

The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in the summer 1998 had raised

fears of turning South Asia into a nuclear flashpoint. The specter of a nuclear

arms race and at worst, a nuclear war breaking out between the two hostile

neighbours has been much talked about. At home, it triggered a vibrant and

unprecedented debate on the nature of nuclear policy and posture,


39

especially on questions such as: “ How far is India from establishing a viable

program for deploying and delivering weapons? What kind of doctrine will

govern the role of nuclear weapons in India’s security policy? What will be the

size and structure of its proposed arsenal?”

Kanti Bajpai identifies three schools of thought amongst those who

belong to the “pro-bomb” lobby.53 These are rejectionists, pragmatists and

maximalists.54 Rejectionists hold that nuclear weapons are regrettably

necessary in a world where there are others who refuse to give them up and

who may threaten India’s security.55 Nuclear disarmament is both desirable

and feasible, but in the emerging fundamentally unequal and hegemonisticl

world order, India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or

join a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Pragmatists also believe that nuclear

weapons are vital for India’s security but they argue in favour of New Delhi

cutting a deal with the international community whereby India joins the (CTBT)

and a possible (FMCT) in return for a de facto if not de jure recognition of its

new nuclear status and a lifting of ban on nuclear-related technologies. In this

viewpoint, India should set aside its traditional posture on nuclear disarmament

and instead focus on arms control.56 The maximalists want India to arm itself as

quickly as possible with the whole range of nuclear weapons, for security

reasons. They argue in favour of a classical deterrence posture defined by a

triad of air, land and sea launched nuclear weapons with sophisticated

command and control.57 India, according to this school of thought, must

refuse to join the non-proliferation regime primarily so that a CTBT and a future

FMCT do not constrain the achievements of a credible nuclear force. Nuclear

abolition is, accordingly, regarded as both undesirable and unfeasible on

strategic and technical grounds.

The basic disagreement of these three viewpoints, however, concerns

the logic of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence depends upon the survival of a

retaliatory force. The threat of retaliation is what deters the other side from

attacking in the first place. The rejectionists/pragmatists argue that deterrence

is achieved by uncertainty.58 Given that both sides have nuclear weapons,


40

what deters both of them from launching an attack is not the certainty that

that the other side may retaliate but that it may do so. Since no-one can be

absolutely sure that the other side’s nuclear force can be absolutely destroyed

in the first-strike, it is deterred from striking. The uncertainty regarding residual

capabilities and the will of the adversary to use that capability to deliver an

unacceptably punitive return blow is enough to deter.59 The implication of

accepting this line of argument is that India can afford to take a much more

relaxed view of force size and structure, doctrine, deployment patterns and

command and control.60 The maximalists, as pointed out earlier, take a more

classical view of deterrence. They argue that for the purposes of deterrence,

certainty, or near-certainty, rather than uncertainty of retaliation is vital. Any

“potential aggressor must have no doubt that India could and would use

nuclear weapons against population and industrial centers if a nuclear strike is

initiated against it”61 Some have argued in favour of India developing a sea-

based deterrence to ensure second strike capability.62

Divergent opinions also exist on what are nuclear weapons needed

against. While some argue that Pakistan and China are the extent of the

nuclear threat to India, others believe that India must reckon with nuclear

threats in terms of a global theatre. The possible implication is that India must

ultimately develop a nuclear capability to target the United States as well.63

Accordingly, in terms of size of force structure, the moderates argue that India

needs only a small nuclear force of 60-100 Hiroshima-size nuclear devices. They

also reject the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons

which are associated with war-fighting doctrines rather than doctrines of

minimum deterrence. General K. Sundarji, for instance, has proposed that 90-

135 fission devices would suffice in the sense that India could absorb a first strike

and have enough to retaliate. To deter Pakistan and China, he suggests that

India needs to be able to punish five counter value targets in Pakistan and ten

in China. Each target (e.g. a city) would be targeted by at least a 20-kiloton

fission devices. In making these calculations, he explicitly rejects the idea that

India needs to arm itself with either fusion bombs or boosted fission devices.64


41

The maximalists, on the other hand, want India’s nuclear arsenal to be as big as

that of the secondary nuclear powers like France, U.K. and China.

With regard to the proposed nuclear doctrine, rejectionists and

pragmatists, by and large, support a No-First-Use posture. While those who are

more cautious acknowledge that No-First-Use is simply an undertaking, with no

guarantee that it will be observed at the limit; the more radical ones believe

that it is a vital CBM. For them, the No-First-Use signals India’s desire to deploy

nuclear weapons in a strictly defensive role. For example, K. Subrahmanyam

argues that No-First-Use is more than a paper commitment: India will be

committed to a specific operational and deployment posture as the result of

the No-First- Use policy.65 Under the No-First-Use, India would place nuclear

weapons in a de-alerted/de-mated posture. If India is in a position to bring

together the warheads and the delivery vehicles in a short order, say, within 24

hours or so, deterrence, it is argued, will be stable.66 This would also reduce the

dangers of unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and of rapid

escalation in a crisis with the attendant risk of unintentional nuclear war. The de-

mated posture may be verifiable and in such a case, the No-First-Use would be

the basis for a safe, credible and restrained deterrent.67

Maximalists are, by contrast, very dubious about a No-First-Use policy.

They believe that the operational posture of de-alerting and de-mating is not a

credible nuclear posture. The armed forces will not and cannot adopt a

strategic posture in which nuclear weapons are not “ready to go”. Maximalists

want a more classical deployment of nuclear weapons, which means a mated

deployment pattern. In this, the warheads and delivery systems are

permanently on alert and permanently mated. These ready-to-go weapons

would be appropriately dispersed and mobile. An invulnerable national

command authority would coordinate military responses in the event of an

attack or a threat of attack. Maximalists feel that a de-mated /de-alerted

posture may be the only option in the short run, but is not viable in the long-

run.68 Besides, de-alerting and de-mating is difficult if not impossible to verify.


42

Judging by official pronouncements in the wake of the tests, India

appears to be set for a pragmatic course of action. The Indian government’s

policies’ on seven issues—minimum deterrence; No-First-Use; and, non-use

against non-nuclear states; continued missile testing; a moratorium against

testing and possible accession to the CTBT; an active negotiating stance on the

FMCT; tightening export controls on dual-use technologies; and, global nuclear

disarmament—indicate that official policy reflects this approach substantially.69

The Draft Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Council Advisory Board

(NSAB) in August 1999, thus, declared: “India’s strategic interests require

effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability

should deterrence fail.”70 It provided a broad framework for the development,

deployment and use of India’s nuclear forces and proposed that India should

establish a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent capability comprising

sufficient, survivable and operationally ready nuclear forces based on the

principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear

states. It will also develop a robust command and control system under civilian

control. The force itself will be “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based

missile and sea-based assets.” Survivability will be enhanced by a combination

of “multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception”. Space-

based and other assets will be created to “provide early warning,

communications, damage/detonation assessment.” Finally, the Indian

government will take steps to ensure the security and safety of nuclear

weapons and will ensure that “unauthorized and inadvertent activation/use

does not take place and risks of accidents are avoided.” The proposed

doctrine also rejects the concept of nuclear war-fighting and does not, hence,

consider it necessary for India to match its nuclear warheads and delivery

systems with those of its potential nuclear adversaries. The government asserted

that India had no interest in engaging other states in an arms race and its

arsenal will be pegged at the lowest possible level required for credible

deterrence. It also repeats India’s desire for universal disarmament and global


43

arms control and states that the country will continue working to achieve these

goals.71

While the pragmatists seem to be on the ascendancy, they may not

necessarily prevail. The other schools remain strong and more importantly, the

government has not signaled a closure on the issue of India’s nuclear posture.72

The NSAB’s proposed nuclear doctrine is suggestive of a nuclear posture that is

much more ambitious than minimum deterrence and is closer to the posture of

the maximalists. Also, contrary to the hopes of the pragmatists, the prospects of

India signing the CTBT appear to have receded, especially after the US

Senate’s failure to ratify the Treaty.

In the final analysis, India is likely to have a modest nuclear force that will

be relatively smaller in size and is likely to be “recessed” rather than deployed.73

There is a near consensus on the need for a triad as well as the realization that

India will not be in possession of the three legs of the deterrent for at least a

decade, unless the rocket programme can be readily adapted to the missile

development programme i.e. the PSLV/GSLV programme must be grafted onto

the DRDO programme.74 India has already taken the decision to induct the

Agni-2 IRBM into service, and reports suggest that the country may test an ICBM

named Surya in 2001.


44

4. Internal Risk Assessment

In the preceding sections, we have analyzed the structural factors that

could lead to a conflict in different domestic situations ranging from internal

armed conflicts to social and political conflicts over land rights or resource

sharing. Here, an attempt will be made to identify the proximate causes of

conflict, discuss various scenarios and make a prognosis for the future.

The potential for an armed conflict in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-

East, and the future of the peace process are the most critical variables in this

regard. Let me address Kashmir first. Hizbul Mujahideen's short-lived cease-fire

followed by the unilateral ceasefire announced by the central government has

opened a window of opportunity. There are both positive and negative

indicators for peace.

The most important positive development has been that it has proved

the existence of a genuine constituency for peace in J&K. Hizbul's ceasefire

had received widespread public support and the initial criticism of APHC had

earned the public fury. The core constituency of the Islamic Right, lower level

government servants, shopkeepers and elements of the Bar Association were

also disappointed by the collapse of the Hizbul-led ceasefire. The Vajpayee

government’s announcement of the Ramzan ceasefire was in response to

this popular yearning for peace. A wide spectrum of political leaders

advocating Kashmir’s secession welcomed the government’s peace

initiative. The APHC, for instance, dropped its earlier condition that it would

only enter into a dialogue if it was trilateral in nature, involving the

governments of India, Pakistan and 'Kashmiri representatives', and accepted

a bilateral dialogue between India and Hurriyat leaders, on the one hand,

and separately between the APHC and Pakistan, on the other. Unofficial

parleys for formulating the modalities of the proposed dialogue, ‘talks about

talks’ were held with the Hurriyat leaders. Subsequently, Shabir Shah-led

Jammu & Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party also accepted the

government’s offer of dialogue. The JKLF leaders such as Hasim Qureshi on


45

one hand, and Ammanullah Khan, on the other, welcomed the talks.

General Musharaf also pitched in by announcing its decision to observe

maximum restraint along the Line of Control, on December 2, 2000.

According to official sources, the level of infiltration by the militants from

across the border has resultantly, come down drastically.

On the negative side, the central government has failed to unveil a

clear and coherent strategy on political and military fronts. For example,

during the earlier phases of Ramzan month, the security forces had

suspended all offensive operations. Their operations were largely restricted to

engagements of chance or those based on information about the presence

of militants in specific built-up areas. However, in a more recent communiqué

announced on 4 April, 2001, the security forces have been instructed to

launch wide-area operations. Although a ceasefire is still in force, significantly

this communiqué makes no demand that the security forces refrain from

initiating combat operations in J&K.75 Much of the renewed fighting is taking

place in the border districts of Jammu, where troops and police personnel

have renewed aggressive search operations in forest areas. The Valley has

also seen an increasing number of encounters. This is mainly due to the sharp

increase in the ratio of security forces losses to those of militant groups in the

post-ceasefire period. Some comparative statistics on casualties for two

months preceding and succeeding the November 27/28 cease-fire indicate

that militants enjoyed a greater degree of impunity particularly when it came

to incidents of attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that left a

large number of civilians and security force personnel injured. By the second

and third week of March 2001 the ratio of security force losses to those of the

terrorist groups had become unacceptably high (1:1.25). Compared to this,

in 1998 this ratio stood at 1:4.1 and in 1999 stood at 1:3.05.76 Also, the militant

attacks against the security forces and civilians have considerably increased.

This keeps the security forces on a constant trigger alert, resulting in

unprovoked attacks on civilians and, ultimately, in sustaining a vicious cycle

of violence. Most militant groups especially the better armed and trained


46

cadres of Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Jaish-e-

Muhammadi have rejected the ceasefire. One must not underestimate their

ability and determination to leave no stone unturned in derailing the peace

process. The massacre of hundred civilians in different parts of the Valley soon

after the Hizbul-announced ceasefire was an indication to that effect. More

importantly, General Musharaf is unlikely to rein in major militant groups,

operating from Pakistan, to terminate violent activities in J&K.

On the political front too, the central government appears to be

fumbling. Although it announced Mr K.C. Pant to be the chief interlocutor for

initiating the dialogue process with the “Kashmiri organizations which are

currently engaged in militancy in the state, but are desirous of peace”, along

with the J&K government as well as the larger spectrum of all political parties,

NGOs, trade unions, social and religious bodies from all the regions of the

state”, a clear action plan is yet to emerge. The Hurriyat Conference rejected

the invitation on two grounds. First, the central government had failed to

permit a proposed APHC delegation visit to Pakistan to confer with militant

groups based in that country and, second that the invitation was open to all

Kashmiri bodies, which meant that the government was not willing to endorse

the amalgam's self-assumed mandate of being the 'sole genuine

representative' of the State's people. APHC Chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat said

that the alliance “is not ready to join the crowded train which goes

nowhere”.77 New Delhi should have allowed the Hurriyat leaders to visit

Pakistan ostensibly to persuade the Pakistan-based militant groups to join the

ceasefire. If they succeeded in their mission, it would be a valuable

contribution to the peace process and if they failed, it would only expose

Hurriyat’s lack of influence over the militants. The official argument that

allowing the APHC representatives to travel to Pakistan would legitimize its

untested claims to represent the people of J&K does not stand scrutiny. The

Pant initiative rightly seeks to involve a wide cross-section of groups in the

dialogue process. As it is, the APHC leaders need to prove their credentials as

representatives of J&K by securing some form of electoral mandate. The


47

fissures between the pro-peace and pro-jehad elements in the APHC have

also come into a sharp focus. At a December 10, 2000 seminar in Srinagar,

violence broke out between members of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic

Student’s League on the one hand, and backers of the more centrist

People’s Conference and the JKLF. Also, while Hizbul Mujahideen did not split

as speculated by sections of government officials at the center and state

governments, differences between the Kashmir-based leadership led by

Abdul Majid Dar and the Pakistan-based supreme leader, Syed Salauddin

have also come to the fore.

On balance, the Kashmir conflict is likely to simmer in the near future,

albeit the stakes for peace are very high on both sides. Overall, the hardcore

sections of militants are likely to keep up their attacks on military as well as soft

targets of unarmed innocent civilians in order to strike terror. Yet, the

government's steadfast determination to carry forward the peace process and

the people's longing for peace may yet win the day.

The prospects for peace in the North-East also remain mixed. There has

been steady erosion in the popularity base of all insurgency movements in the

region and there is a growing public pressure for peaceful resolution of

conflicts. A number of ceasefire agreements are already in place and others

are being negotiated. Where a multiplicity of militant groups are operating,

negotiations with some groups have led to escalation of violence by others.

Negotiations have also not resulted in a decline of extortion and other criminal

activities by such groups, though there is a significant diminution in killings. The

most significant obstacle to peace in the region is the crisis of governance.

Levels of corruption in the North-Eastern governments are very high and the

political patronage of militants has now become entrenched in the region.

There have been several announcements by the Union Home ministry that

some sort of official ceasefire and peace package preceding talks with various

militant groups, would be initiated in the whole North East region in the near

future. However a policy of drift and overwhelming reliance on the army has

tended to define the Center’s attitudes towards these insurgency movements.


48

The most important positive development increasing the prospects of

peace has been the growing voices and institutions of the civil society in the

region and a gradual yet definite coalescing of the peace constituency in the

region. The traditional institutions of civil society have played a significant role in

the containment of tensions and that of the larger conflict. The Church of

Nagaland, for instance, has been involved in the peace process since the

beginning of the conflict. In July 1997, the Baptists church had organized the

Atlanta Peace Meet where the NSCN leadership accepted initiatives to start

an unconditional dialogue process. Naga Hoho, the apex council of Naga

tribals has also sought to engage the militant factions and is particularly

engaged in efforts to bring about unity among the NSCN factions. Women’s

groups have also been involved in peace initiatives. The Naga Mothers

Association boasts of nearly 35000 active members. The Bof Meira Paibis

(Women activist group) is active in Manipur. In every village, locality and

community, the womenfolk have organized themselves into associations and

have been very active in protesting human rights violations and unjustifiable

arrests by the security forces and taking actions against social evils of drugs and

alcoholism in the youth. The Nupi (women’s) movement has also organized

many demonstrations for peace in Manipur. In Tripura, the Jamatiya Hoda, the

Supreme Council of the Jamatiya tribe, has initiated a peace movement. At

the four hundred and tenth conference of the Hoda, in December 2000, the

tribal leaders resolved not to pay any kind of “tax” to the militant groups

operating in the state. In addition to the Jamatiyas, the Reangs and Uchais are

the other communities that have joined the larger peace campaign.

There will of course be many more political battles waged in the country

for resource sharing, for land rights and for socio-economic rights by the weaker

sections of the society, as well as for more political and financial powers by the

states. These have very important and far-reaching implications for the political

future and evolving character of the Indian State but are unlikely to trigger an

armed conflict which is more of a danger in the external realm, especially in

context of India-Pakistan relations.


49

5. International Risk Assessment

With the traditional reservations of the successive Indian governments to

negotiate with the military rulers of Pakistan especially with General Pervez

Musharaf—the military mind behind Kargil—at the helm of affairs, an early

resumption of dialogue appears unlikely. More importantly, the possibility of

another "Kargil" or an overt military engagement, perhaps a "mini-war" cannot

be totally ruled out between India and Pakistan. It could simply result from a

miscalculation by either side or spiral out of an increasingly tenuous situation on

the borders. Pakistan's Kargil operation, for instance, was politically and

strategically, an ill-conceived and fundamentally flawed strategy and its

political objectives were not clearly thought through.78 Its military as well as

political assumptions proved to be grave miscalculations. What makes the

situation even more complicated is the presence of nuclear weapons on both

sides.

Nuclearization of South Asia had led many observers to believe that the

Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir would perforce get frozen, as neither country

would risk a confrontation that could escalate to the nuclear level. The Kargil

crisis proved this assumption to be erroneous because that threshold was not

reached. In focusing on Kashmir’s likelihood of a full-blown conventional

conflict, the argument overlooks an essential aspect that unconventional and

limited war between them is not deterred by the so-called nuclear balance of

terror. Indeed, a corollary of the inability to wage an all-out conflict has been

the pursuit of ‘war by other means’. Pokhran and Chagai, in this sense, have

opened the space for more low-intensity, localized wars, which in themselves

are as debilitating as a regular war.79 There is also a small albeit influential

section of opinion among the Indian intelligentsia that advocates hot pursuit of

militants into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or smashing of the militants training

camps across the border so that our security forces are not forced to fight

Pakistan's proxy war on latter's terms. While it is not the avowed policy of the

ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and it is also not clear if


50

the Indian army supports this strategy but should it happen, the possibility of its

spiraling out of control could not be ruled out.

It is equally important to take account of the factors that militate against

the possibility of an armed confrontation between India and Pakistan in the

region. First and foremost, neither can afford it. The Pakistani economy is in

shambles. While Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir is financed by a mix of the

jehadi groups and drug money, it cannot afford to fight a full-fledged

conventional war with India. Pakistan's dependency on the World Bank and

IMF "bail-out" packages is also a critical factor in this regard. While Indian

economy is relatively in a much better condition, it too cannot risk a war. Kargil

exposed the chinks in its armour forcing the NDA government to increase the

defence budget this year and initiate a drive for defence modernization.80

More importantly, its preoccupations are different and focused on economic

development and the war clouds would no doubt, seriously undermine the

investor confidence, painstakingly built over last decade or so.

On the nuclear front, two questions need to be addressed: how stable is

the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan? And what are the risks of

a nuclear conflict taking place in South Asia? The grave dangers posed by

nuclear weapons in a bilateral situation marked by tension, animosity and

distrust were underscored by Kargil. There were no fewer than 13 occasions

when the leaders of the two countries delivered direct and indirect nuclear

threats to each other from vowing to use ‘any weapon’ to defending ‘national

integrity’ and spelling out the consequences of India going ‘all out’, if

threatened.81 On the other hand, India and Pakistan, in the wake of nuclear

tests in May 1998, have sought to stabilize their nuclear rivalry. India had first

proposed a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons by both states that

was rejected by Pakistan because in a purely conventional conflict, the

asymmetry of forces favoured India. Pakistan made three different proposals

that: Kashmir be made the core issue in resolving the broader India-Pakistan

relationship; they work towards conventional force reductions; and, both

countries neither weaponize nor deploy their nuclear arsenal.. The first round of


51

negotiations made little headway. After almost a year of efforts combined with

US pressure, domestic political and economic concerns and the need to

stabilize the situation brought them again to the negotiating table when they

took the first steps towards formalizing a nuclear restraint in South Asia.

At the Lahore summit in February 1999, the two countries signed a

memorandum of understanding to develop a set of confidence building

measures. They agreed to exchange strategic information about their nuclear

arsenal and to give each other advance notice about ballistic missiles tests.82

When India tested Agni-II in April 1999 and Pakistan followed by testing the

Shaheen and Ghauri missiles, both countries notified the other about the missile

launch.83 The two sides also agreed to engage in bilateral consultations “on

security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures

for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at the

avoidance of conflict.” In other words, both sides would exchange information

on any C3I measures they planned to implement to safeguard their nuclear

arsenals. Further, both countries agreed to provide notice of “any accidental,

unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a [nuclear]

fallout.”84 Without a secure C3I system, however, long-term stabilization will not

occur. In the near future, keeping nuclear forces recessed or at least not on

alert is the cheapest and easiest option for maintaining command and control

over them.

A nuclear exchange in South Asia is likely to occur not because of

rational calculations, but through miscalculations or through accidental or

unauthorized detonation. There is a history of miscalculations between India

and Pakistan, the most prominent examples being that of the 1965 war and

when miscalculation almost triggered a war at the time of Indian military

exercises-Brasstacks in the mid-1980s and as earlier pointed out, the recent

Kargil crisis. The possibility of an inadvertent nuclear exchange also stems from

the difficulty of setting up a command and control system in the subcontinent

that is reliable and safe. This is further complicated because unlike the US-Soviet

equation where missile flight times-25 minutes-through the use of satellite


52

monitoring allowed enough time for making a rational response. Between India

and Pakistan, there is approximately 2-5 minutes warning once a missile is

launched, which allows almost no time for making a thoughtful decision.

Another key factor affecting the possibility of miscalculation or

accidental detonation of nuclear weapons is the number of those weapons.

Simply put, the more weapons there are, the more difficult it will be to control

them. Therefore, the actual number of weapons in each country must be

controlled. Both countries might be willing to adhere to such controls given their

stated commitments against engaging in a nuclear weapons race. What is not

clear is if either India or Pakistan will accept as a minimum level of deterrence in

terms of numbers of nuclear weapons. Alternatively, the numbers could be

limited by controlling the amount of fissile material available to both countries

through their participation in the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

It is important to take into account the China factor as well. If China is

India’s main nuclear threat, it would mandate different kinds of deployment

and targeting. A lot of emphasis has been on the need for transparency,

command and control and deterrent stability in the South Asian context. But to

an Indian strategic planner, “it would seem best that deterrence vis-à-vis China

be pursued along the lines of China’s deterrence policy vis-à-vis the former

Soviet Union which involved a lot of calculated ambiguity, deception and

dispersal.”85 If India very explicitly identifies China as a threat, it might provoke a

major reallocation of Chinese strategic resources towards nuclear weapons.

However, for the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to accept any linkage

between its nuclear strategy and India’s declared nuclear motivations.

Another critical factor pertains to the growing international pressure especially

from United States for both countries to refrain from deploying nuclear

weapons, to revert to the negotiating table and resume a dialogue on all

outstanding conflictual issues including Kashmir. There is a growing appreciation

in the world capitals of Indian viewpoint that Pakistan is supporting Kashmiri

militant groups with arms and training. This was particularly reinforced at the

time of Kargil crisis. The Vajpayee government’s restrained approach, at a time


53

when military and political logic dictated that it should cross the Line of Control,

won overwhelming international approval. The G-8 held Pakistan, without

naming it, responsible for ‘the military confrontation in Kashmir’, describing ‘the

military action to change the status quo as irresponsible’ and asked Pakistan to

withdraw its forces north of the Line of Control. It called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff

by refusing either to intervene in the Kashmir—as distinct from Kargil—dispute

and refusing to put any pressure on India to stop the fighting.86 The European

Union publicly called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of infiltrators’.87 President

Clinton underlined the point that ‘no progress was possible until Pakistan pulled

out its forces from the Indian zone of Kashmir.’88 China’s response suggested

guarded neutrality, urging both Islamabad and New Delhi to defuse the

situation. The US effectively intervened when in an emergency meeting sought

with President Clinton on 4 July 1999, Sharif promised to take ‘concrete steps’ to

restore the sanctity of the Line of Control in accordance with the Shimla

Agreement, and agreed that the bilateral Shimla-Lahore process was the ‘best

forum’ to resolve all disputes including Kashmir—in that sequence. The new

Republican administration led by George Bush also concerned about the

India-Pakistan conflict and is likely to weigh in on both sides to avert risking

another armed confrontation.


54

End Notes

1 Khan, Rasheedudin, ed., (1997), Rethinking Indian Federalism, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, pp. 261-262. 2 For a detailed account of this set of proposals, see, Mattoo, Amitabh, (1999), “Post-Pokaran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Issues”, in Post-Pokaran II: The National Way Ahead, New Delhi: India Habitat Center, pp. 104-106. 3 Mattoo, (1999), p. 106. 4 Nettle, J.P., (1968) “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics, vol. 20, July, p. 566. 5 Rudolph, L.I., & Rudolph, S.H., (1987) In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 67. 6 Kaviraj, Sudipto, (1994), “On the Structure of Nationalist Discourse,” in State and Nation in the Context of Social Change, Vol. I, Sathyamurthy, T.V., ed., New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 330. 7 Kothari writes that this was based on the “pan-Indian cultural identity and common civilizational values” which over the centuries had achieved a remarkable degree of cohesion and held together different sub-systems in a continental-size society. See, Kothari, Rajni, (1988), “Integration and Exclusion in Indian Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly, 22 October, p. 2223. Also see, Heimsath, Charles H., (1964), Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reforms, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 139-141. 8 Kohli, Atul ,ed., (1988) India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, New Delhi: Orient Longman, p. 311. 9 Hasan, Zoya, (1999) “Region and Nation in India’s Political Transition,” in Copland, Ian, and Rickard, John, eds., Federalism: Comparative Perspectives from India and Australia, New Delhi: Manohar, p. 178. 10 For details, see Khan, (1997), p. 264. 11 “The Birth of Three New States”, Frontline, 1 September 2000, pp. 34-35; and “Splitting Headache”, Outlook, 21 August 2000, pp. 33-36. 12 Ibid. 13 Ahuja, M.L., (1990), Electoral Politics and General Elections in India (1952-1998), New Delhi: Mittal Publications, pp. 9-10. 14 Hasan, (1999), p. 172 15 Hasan, (1999), p. 177. 16 In 1996, for example, a prominent section of the Congress in Tamil Nadu broke away to form the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC). In 1998, the Congress witnessed Mamata Banerjee breaking away the West Bengal unit to launch the Trinamool Congress; S. Bangarappa cut loose in Karnataka to form the Karnataka Vikas Party; Jagannath Mishra in Bihar created the Bihar Jan Congress and V. Ramamurthy in Tamil Nadu floated his own outfit. Sharad Pawar formed the Nationalist Congress Party in 1999. In the Janata Dal, an influential section of the party in Orissa broke away to launch the Biju Janata Dal; the entire Bihar unit broke away with Laloo Yadav to form the Rashtriya Janata Dal; and Ramakrishna Hegde floated Lok Shakti in Karnataka. Even the BJP did not escape this phenomenon when S.S. Vaghela split the Gujarat unit to launch the Rashtriya Janata Party. 17 Copland and Rickard, (1999), p. 15. 18 For major militant groups that have been active in the North-East, see, Sinha, S.P., (2000), “Insurgencies in North-East India: An Appraisal,” AAKROSH, vol. 3, no. 7, April, pp. 40-61. For a detailed analysis, see, Hazarika, Sanjoy, (1995), Strangers of the Mist, New Delhi: Penguin. Also see, Gen. Rao, K.V. Krishan, (1998),“Insurgency in the North-East,” Part I and II, USI Journal, vol. CXXVIII, No. 531 & 532, January-March and April-June; Lt Gen. Nayar, V.K., (1992) “Management of Insurgency in the North-East,” Indian Defence Review, October, pp. 11-28. 19 In 1947, the population of tribals in Tripura was 93 per cent of the total population of 600,000, but by 1981, they had been reduced to a minority of 28.5 per cent of a population of 2.06 million. Hazarika, (1995), pp. 123-124. 20 Behera, Ajay Darshan, (1999), “Politics of Violence and Development in South Asia”, RCSS Policy Studies 6, Colombo: RCSS, May, p. 45.


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21 Under the agreement, the state government would take the initiative to redraw the boundaries of the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) and to facilitate restoration of alienated tribal lands. The central government also agreed to reserve three additional seats for Scheduled Tribes in the Tripura Assembly. 22 Behera, (1999), p. 46. 23 Large scale attacks were carried out against Santhal tribals in May 1996, displacing tens of thousands of people. A second wave of attacks in May 1998 resulted in further distress migration. 24 Sinha, (2000), p.47 25 Sahni, Ajai, (2001), “Survey of Conflicts and Resolutions in India’s Northeast”, a paper presented at a conference on Conflict Prevention and Management Activities in South Asia, 15-17 May. 26 Sahni, Ajai, (2001), “The Terrorist Economy in India’s Northeast: Preliminary Explorations,” Faultlines, vol. 8, April, pp. 127-148. 27 Sahni, (2001). 28 Sinha, (2000), p. 56; also see “North East Rebels getting weapons from Khmer Rouge: GOC”, The Times of India, 24 July 1997. 29 Prasad, Pradhan H., (1989), “Agrarian Violence in Bihar”, in Prasad, Pradhan H., Lopsided Growth: Political Economy of Indian Development, Bombay: Oxford University Press, p. 75. 30 Sinha, Arvind, and Sinha, Indu, (1996), “State, Class and Sena Nexus”, Economic and Political Weekly, 2 November, p. 2908. 31 Bhelari, Kanhaiya, (2000), “Love for the Outlaws”, The Week, 30 April. 32 For an excellent exposition of Hindu nationalism and its belief systems, see, Malik, Yogendra K., and V.B. Singh, (1994), Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party, New Delhi: Vistaar, pp. 3-5, 9-15. For an analysis of the RSS, the BJP’s precursor, views on Hindu revivalism and Hindu ideology, see Anderson, Walter K., and Damle, Shridhar D., (1987), The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swaymsevak Singh and Hindu Revivalism, New Delhi: Vistaar, pp. 71-82. 33 Malik and Singh, (1994), p. 15. 34 Brass, Paul R., “Regionalism, Hindu Nationalism and Party Politics in India's Federal System”, in Copland and Rickard, (1999), p. 156. 35 Brass, (1999) 36Das, J.S., (1999), “Lessons for the Christians”, The Pioneer, 8 January. 37 India Today, (1999), 11 January. 38 Sethi, Lokpal, (1998), “Sangh Parivar Plays Tribal-Christian Card to Arouse Communal Passion”, The Hindustan Times, December 22. Also see Fernandes, Walter, (1996), “Conversion to Christianity, Caste Tension and Search for a New Identity in Tamil Nadu”, in Fernandes, Walter, ed., (1996), The Emerging Dalit Identity : The Reassertion of the Subalterns, New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, pp. 140-165 39 Koithara, Verghese, (1999), Society, State and Security, New Delhi: Sage, p. 245. 40 The two prominent research projects investigating this question are the Swiss Based Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) and the project led by Prof. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto concerning environmental scarcity and acute conflict. The ENCOP work seeks to develop a typology of environmentally induced conflicts, while Prof. Dixon’s work is directed towards theory building. See, Libiszewski, Stephan, (1992), “What is an Environmental Conflict?” ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 1, Bern: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Homer-Dixon Thomas F., et al, (1993), “Environmental Change and Violent Conflict,” Scientific American, February, pp. 38-45; Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., (1994), “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer, pp. 5-40. Also see, Wallensteen, Peter, (1992), “Environmental Destruction and Serious Social Conflict: Developing a Research Design,” PRIO Report No. 3, May, pp. 47-54. 41 Ray, Parshuram, (2000), “Development Induced Displacement in India”, South Asian Refugee Watch; Vol. 2, No. 1, July, p. 35. 42 Judge, Paramjit S., (1997) “Response to Dams and Displacement in Two Indian States,” Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 9, September, p. 841. 43 Roy, Arundhati, (1999), “The Greater Common Good”, Frontline, 4 June; Kothari, Smitu, (1996), “Whose Nation? The Displaced as Victims of Development”, Economic and Political Weekly, 15 June.


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44 Bavadam, Lyla, (2001), “The Dam and the Displaced”, Frontline, 5 January, pp. 119-120 45 Arundhati Roy’s interview with N. Ram, (2001), “Scimitars in the Sun,” Frontline, 19 January, p. 8. 46 Verghese, B.G., (1997), “Who’s Afraid of Kashmir Talks?”, Outlook, 11 June. 47 Kang, Bhavdeep, (1999), “Lull before the Fall”, Outlook, 26 July, p. 28. 48 The News, 9 March 2000. 49 See, Behera, Navnita Chadha, Paul M. Evans and Gowher Rizvi, (1997), Beyond Boundaries: A State of Non-official Dialogues on Security, Peace and Cooperation in South Asia, Toronto: University of Toronto-York University; Behera, Navnita Chadha, (2000), “Popular Interactions in South Asia: A Post-Modernist Agenda,” in Behera, Navnita Chadha, et al, (2000), People-to-People Contacts in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar. 50 Banerjee, Paula, et al, (1999), “Indo-Bangladesh Cross Border Migration and Trade”, Economic and Political Weekly, 4 September. 51 Times of India, 30 April 2001 52 The Indian response to the Pyrdiwah incident indicated a certain internal power struggle. While the Home Minister Advani took a hardline stance and wanted to carry out countermeasures, the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh was more conciliatory towards Bangladesh and was more sensitive to the domestic political compulsions of Sheikh Hasina. In fact, a brigade strength reinforcement of the Assam Rifles (headquarters in Shillong) was put on standby a day after the Pyrdiwah incident at the instruction of the Home Ministry. But the decision to move them was ultimately shot down by Jaswant Singh, who, apparently is against annoying the friendly neighbor. It was Jaswant Singh who was given the job to make a statement in parliament although it was Advani’s task as the BSF comes under his ministry. This was because the Home Ministry was supposed to have created the embarrassing situation by sending troops into Boraibari, indicating a hardline stance against Bangladesh. 53 Examples of anti-bomb writings include Vanaik, Achin and Praful Bidwai, (1999), South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Ram, N., (1999), Riding the Nuclear Tiger, new Delhi: Leftword; Chatterjee, Partha, (1998), “How We Loved the Bomb and Later Rued It,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 33, no. 24, 13 June. 54 Bajpai, Kanti, (2000), “The Great Indian Nuclear Debate,” in Majumdar, Anindyo J., ed., Nuclear India Into The New Millennium, New Delhi: Lancer, p. 49. 55 Ghose, Arundhati, (1999), “Post-Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Aspects,” in Post-Pokaran II , (1999), p. 94; Vardarajan, Siddarth, (1998), “Testing the World Order,” Seminar, No. 468, August, p. 29. 56 The pragmatist viewpoint is best articulated by Rajamohan. See Rajamohan, C., “Post-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and Reconciliation,” in Post-Pokaran II, (1999), pp. 21-22. Also, K. Subrahmanyam, (1998), “Nuclear India in Global Politics,” Strategic Digest, vol. 28, no. 12, December, p. 2007; and “Nature of CTBT in Pragmatist’s View,” Economic Times, 20 July 1998. 57 The best known maximalist is Bharat Karnad, (1998), “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Mattoo, Amitabh, ed., (1998), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokaran II and Beyond, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, pp. 108-149. He refers to his preferred nuclear option as “maximally strategic”. The need for a classical nuclear deterrent is also advocated by Menon, Raja, (1998), “Parallel Stories: Stories, Scientists and Nuclear Logic,” IIC Quarterly, Summer-Monsoon, pp. 76-78; and Nair, Vijai, (1998), “The Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent,” in Mattoo, (1998), pp. 93-98 and 101. 58 Bajpai, (2000), p. 66. 59 ibid., (2000), pp. 66-67. 60 Ibid., (2000), p. 67. 61 Nair, (1998), p. 81 62 The proposed deterrent includes a sea-based version of the Prithvi (renamed Dhanush) SRBM aboard Indian surface vessels; the building of a nuclear powered submarine and the induction of an SSBN force ; and the deployment of an indigenously produced submarine-launched cruise missile named Sagarika. Thomas, Raju G.C., and Amit Gupta, eds., (2000), India’s Nuclear Security, New Delhi: Sage, pp. 278. 63 See, South Asia After the Tests: Where Do We Go From Here? (1999), A Report on 1st July 1998 Roundtable Workshop, New York: Asia Society, p. 21; and Karnad, (1998), p. 111. 64 Sundarji, K., (1996), “Imperatives of Indian Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,” Agni, vol. 2, no. 1, May, p. 18.


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65 K. Subrahmanyam as cited by Bajpai, (2000). 66 Bajpai, (2000), p. 63. 67 Subrahmanyam, (1998), p. 2015. 68 Bajpai, (2000), pp. 65-69. 69 Ibid., (2000), p. 71. 70 The Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine is available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html 71 Thomas and Gupta, (2000), p. 277. 72 Ibid., (2000), pp. 272-273. 73 The Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes characterized the “recessed forces” as peacetime deployment. It means that India would develop and flight-test its ballistic missiles and produce nuclear weapons but would not mate the warheads to the delivery systems. The warhead and the delivery systems could be stored separately and only assembled in the event of a crisis. See, “Fernandes: US Nuclear Policy is Hypocritical,” Hindustan Times, 19 June 1998. 74 Bajpai, (2000), p. 61. 75 Swami, Praveen, (2001), “The Pant Mission”, Frontline, 11 May. 76 Ibid., (2001). Also see http://www.satp.org/India/J&K/Assessment_J&K.htm for original figures 77 Initially displaying confusion, the Hurriyat failed to issue an official reaction to the government's invitation for talks. The alliance’s top-most decision making body, the Executive Committee, on April 15, referred the issue to the Working Committee and the larger General Council which includes the seven members of the Executive Committee and representatives of all constituent parties. After a session of the Working Committee on April 21 and that of the General Council on April 23, the issue was tossed back to the Executive Committee which, on April 28, rejected the government’s offer. 78 Amir, Ayaz, (1999), “A Fiasco in the Making”, The Dawn, 26 June; Maleeha Lodhi, (1999), “Anatomy of a Debacle”, Newsline, July, pp. 31-36. 79 Editorial, (1999), “Pokhran-Kargil Connection’, Frontline, 2 July, pp. 8-9. 80 See, Kanwal, Gurmeet, (2001), Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, New Delhi: Knowledge World and IDSA, pp. 192-197. 81 Bidwai, Praful, (1999), “War and Peace,” Newsline, July, p. 40. 82 The entire memorandum is available on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs website, The Lahore Declaration, http://www/meadev.gov.in/govt/lahore.htm 83 Cherian, John, (1999), “The Arms Race,” Frontline, 24 April-7 May. 84 Ibid., (1999). 85 Asia Society, (1999), pp. 21-22. 86 Outlook, 12 July 1999, p. 13. 87 Lodhi, (1999), p. 32. 88 Ibid., (1999), p. 32.

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