India New Delhi Report - King's College London · Dr Gupta highlighted the fact that Resolution...

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Identification of Effective Implementation Practices By Examining UNSCR 1540 (2004) after a Decade of its Existence Report Organized by Institute for Defence Studies Analyses, New Delhi, Institute for Strategic Studies, New Delhi and King's College London, in collaboration with United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs February 25-26, 2014 Institute for Strategic Studies India New Delhi

Transcript of India New Delhi Report - King's College London · Dr Gupta highlighted the fact that Resolution...

Identification of Effective Implementation Practices By Examining UNSCR 1540 (2004)

after a Decade of its Existence

Report

Organized byInstitute for Defence Studies Analyses, New Delhi,

Institute for Strategic Studies, New Delhi and King's College London,

in collaboration with United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

February 25-26, 2014

Institute for Strategic Studies India

New Delhi

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INAUGURAL SESSION

Chairperson: Arvind Gupta

Arvind Gupta, Director General, Institute forDefence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

After welcoming all to the IDSA, Dr Guptahighlighted the importance of civil society and 1540experts working together in order to achieve theresolution’s objectives. Dr Gupta highlighted the factthat Resolution 1540 has several important roles,including being an instrument for preventingproliferation and, of particular importance to India,a tool of the international community’s struggleagainst terrorism. He then went on to reflect upon1540’s origins as a response to the Abdul QadeerKhan’s proliferation network. Dr Gupta alsohighlighted the fact that 1540 was an importantinstrument related to nuclear security, noting thatthe third nuclear security summit would take placeshortly after the conference at IDSA. Finally, DrGupta noted that 1540 was adopted under Chapter7 of the UN Charter, which, in his view, gave theResolution a unique flavour.

Wyn Bowen, Director, Centre for Science andSecurity Studies, King’s College London (KCL)

Professor Bowen set out the context of 2004 in whichResolution 1540 was adopted. The direct origins of1540, he said, was the uncovering of the A.Q. KhanProliferation ring and the need to address theemerging risk of transnational proliferation: Khanhad exploited lack of export controls in countrieslike the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Malaysia.Professor Bowen suggested that, in the first decadeof the Resolution’s existence, great strides had beenmade in national legal frameworks. At the same time,he noted that legislation alone is not sufficient ifthe resolution 1540 is to be used to maximum effect.Implementation is thus the key challenge movinginto the resolution’s second decade.

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Reflecting upon the workshop agenda, ProfessorBowen highlighted the importance of identifyingeffective practices for the Resolution’simplementation by governments and the privatesector, of providing insights and analysis forpractitioners, including the 1540 committee, and offorming networks within civil society in order tosupport the Resolution’s implementation. ProfessorBowen concluded by stressing on the need toconsider two points in particular: firstly, what thefuture governance of export controls would look likeand how would this link to 1540; and secondly, howcould the private sector be better engaged inimplementing it.

Francois Coutu, Political Affairs Officer,UNODA

Mr Coutu began by thanking the hosts and thegovernments of Norway and the United States, whichprovided support for the event through contributionsto UNODA. Next, he noted that this event was oneof the first events of the tenth anniversary year ofresolution 1540, which was marked formally on April28, 2014. Mr Coutu then highlighted that, throughresolution 1540, the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) initiated a programme of work to ensure thatnon-State actors cannot acquire or use Weapons ofMass Destruction. This programme of work, hehighlighted, requires a wide range of measures tobe adopted by national governments, including inthe areas of legislation, border controls,enforcement, and domestic outreach. Ultimately, animportant purpose of 1540 is to provide increasedand effective protection for people everywhere fromthe risks of WMD terrorism.

Mr Coutu ended his remarks by setting out whatthe UNSC, through the 1540 Committee, has askedto promote the sharing of experiences. In 2011, hesaid, the UNSC asked the Committee to draw up alist of “effective practices”, templates, and other tools.In this context, he suggested that civil society had a

All member States shouldfeel that they have acommon stake in thesuccessfulimplementation of UNSCResolution 1540

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role to play in sharing experiences and identifyingeffective practices. Mr Coutu also highlighted the1540 Wiesbaden industry engagement programme,the 2013 Vienna civil society forum, and The 1540Compass as tools that had contributed to this goal.

G. Balachandran, Institute for StrategicStudies (ISS), New Delhi

Dr Balachandran began by thanking the otherorganisers and introducing the ISS, which hedescribed as the ‘junior partner’ in the event as it isa relatively new organisation being less than fiveyears old. ISS is an embryonic organisation for thosein India who work on export controls and technologytransfers, he explained. It was started when Indiawas beginning to actively engage itself in exportcontrol governance. Before this, civil society in Indiahad viewed export controls as illegitimate cartels,but this attitude had begun to change in the early2000s. Turning to India’s experience ofimplementation of 1540, Dr Balachandranhighlighted that numerous steps had been taken toensure that the country’s controls were in keepingwith the requirements of 1540 and of theinternational export control regimes. For example,he highlighted that India had harmonised its exportcontrol list with those of the export control regimes;at the same time, India had not duplicated thestructure utilised by other countries, which, he said,should not be necessary.

Dr Balachandran then turned to the work completedby civil society in relation to one aspect of 1540: theNuclear Treat Initiative’s (NTI) nuclear securityindex. He highlighted what he saw as beingmethodological deficits in this work, before goingon to suggest that—while there is a need tounderstand how 1540 is implemented, and that civilsociety can have a role in this—there is a need toensure that any such assessments are robust.Building upon these points, Dr Balachandransuggested that there was a need to guard against

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the view that implementation should bestandardised: the focus, instead, should be onwhether national implementation can be improvedin the appropriate national or regional context. DrBalachandran concluded by suggesting that it is vitalthat resolution 1540 do not impede globalisationphenomenon while exercising its potential to countersecurity risks and threats also.

Michael Aho, US Representative to the 1540committee, United Nations, New York

Mr Aho noted that the mandate of the 1540Committee had been extended for a further 10 yearsin 2011. The extension of the mandate, he said, isreflective of the reality of the time taken to implement1540s measures at the national level. While it isStates that are responsible for the implementationof 1540’s measures, other actors also haveresponsibilities, Mr Aho explained. In particular,non-State actors must not become involved in WMDproliferation. Civil society can also render assistancein implementation of the Resolution, with Statesbeing encouraged to work with their own civilsocieties.

Next, Mr Aho highlighted that the approach ofResolution 1540 in general and of the 1540Committee and group of experts in particular, iscooperative in nature. This is in contrast to thesanctions panels of experts, which are investigativein nature. In the case of 1540, States invite theCommittee to visit and ask it for assistance toimplement the resolution to be made available.Reflecting upon the anniversary year, Mr Aho notedthat reporting was still not universal—only 171 of193 States had so far submitted reports. Hesuggested that often States are doing what isrequired but have not reported it. This lack ofreporting, he concluded, makes identifyingimplementation gaps a difficult challenge.

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY JOINT SECRETARY

SHRI AMANDEEP SING GILL

Joint Secretary, Disarmament & InternationalSecurity Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs

(Statement)

Director General IDSA Dr Arvind Gupta, ProfessorWyn Bowen, Monsieur Francois Cottu of UNODA,Mr Michael Aho of the 1540 Committee, ProfessorBalachandran, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.I would like to begin by complementing the threeorganisers - IDSA, King's College and ISS - forputting together a good programme and for bringingtogether a galaxy of practitioners and thoughtleaders on this important instrument. In a fewweeks, Resolution 1540 would be ten years old. Thisworkshop is therefore an excellent opportunity toidentify the implementation practices that haveproven their effectiveness nationally, and that areworthy of emulation by member States. ProfessorBalachandran, you mentioned the need forengagement between civil society, including industryand policy practitioners in the area of exportcontrols. This Workshop is a good example of that.There are many in the audience today, academics,former practitioners, with whom we in the policyarea have worked together since the 1990s on theevolution of our export control system and I want toacknowledge their valuable contribution.

India has been unwavering in its commitment toglobal efforts for preventing the proliferation of WMDand their means of delivery. We recognize theproliferation of WMDs and their means of deliveryas a major international challenge. As a victim ofterrorism for over three decades, we are alsopainfully aware of the catastrophic consequencesthat transfers of WMDs to non-State and terroristscould entail. This is not an academic concern. Weare still living with the consequences of clandestineproliferation networks which have led to insecurity

This workshop istherefore an excellentopportunity to identifythe implementationpractices that haveproven theireffectiveness nationally,and that are worthy ofemulation by memberStates.

India has been unwaveringin its commitment toglobal efforts forpreventing theproliferation of WMD andtheir means of delivery.

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for all and must not be allowed to reappear. Theinternational community must continue to worktogether in eliminating the risks relating to sensitivematerials and technologies falling into hands ofterrorists and non-State actors. The focus on non-State actors should in no way diminish Stateaccountability in combating terrorism, dismantlingits support infrastructure or its linkages with WMD.

This distinguished audience is aware that India hadsupported the general objectives of UNSCR 1540.The resolution is in line with our own GeneralAssembly resolution "Measures to prevent terroristsfrom gaining access to WMD", adopted by consensusevery year since it was first introduced in 2002, andnow co-sponsored by more than 70 member States.India filed its report on UNSCR 1540 in November2004 and has submitted periodic updates, includingadditional and updated information submitted on31 May 2013. An Indian Expert participated in thework of the 1540 Committee between 2007 and2009. As member of the Security Council, Indiasupported resolution 1977 (2011) extending themandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of 10years until 25 April 2021.

Again this audience is aware that the extendedtimeline has been included with a view to help planon long-term and predictable basis assistance andcooperation programmes for States requesting suchassistance from the 1540 Committee. We haveexpressed our readiness to offer assistance to othercountries in capacity building and in fulfilling theirobligations under UNSCR 1540. In fact we haveshared our experience, especially legislative, withcountries in Asia in bilateral and other interactions.Our support for this seminar is in line with thisapproach as part of which we also organised in end-2012 the 1540 Workshop on Building New Synergieson Nuclear Security following a commitmentannounced at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

Nationally, India has enacted a number of effectivelaws and regulations and has put in placeinstitutions and administrative mechanisms to

The internationalcommunity mustcontinue to worktogether in eliminatingthe risks relating tosensitive materials andtechnologies falling intohands of terrorists andnon-State actors.

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prohibit WMD access to terrorists and non Stateactors. After the adoption of UNSCR 1540, Indiatook additional steps to further strengthen itsexisting legislative and regulatory mechanism forexercising controls over WMDs and their means ofdelivery. The WMD Act enacted in June 2005provides for an integrated and over-archinglegislation on prohibiting unlawful activities inrelation to WMDs, their delivery systems and relatedmaterials, equipment and technologies.Amendments to the 1992 Foreign Trade(Development and Regulation) Act passed in 2010further strengthened our national export controlsystem, including with regard to the challenge ofintangible transfers that was mentioned thismorning. India is committed to maintaining effectivenational export controls consistent with the highestinternational standards and is prepared to makeits contribution as a full member of the respectivemultilateral export control regimes.

India has fulfilled its obligations under the CWCincluding destruction of its chemical weaponsstockpiles in advance of the timeline agreed underthe Convention. India is also a State Party to the1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC) and participates actively in the inter-sessional programme under the Convention. Wewelcomed President Obama's initiative in conveninga Summit on Nuclear Security in Washington inApril 2010. India also welcomed the adoption ofthe Summit Communiqué and the Work Plan whichestablishes a common platform for action by allparticipating States. The External Affairs Minister,who will lead our delegation to the next Summit atThe Hague, is looking forward to a productivemeeting. We see the NSS process as buildingpragmatic and purposeful frameworks settingbenchmarks and standards, and as fosteringconfidence for international cooperation tosupplement and not replace existing multilateralinstitutions such as the IAEA. India believes thatthe primary responsibility for ensuring nuclearsecurity rests at the national level, but national

India filed its report onUNSCR 1540 in November2004 and has submittedperiodic updates,including additional andupdated informationsubmitted on 31 May 2013.

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responsibility must be accompanied by responsiblebehavior by States. All States should scrupulouslyabide by their international obligations.

The 1540 resolution has contributed to greaterawareness amongst States on the need for effectivemeasures at the national level to prevent terroristsand non-State actors gaining access to sensitivematerials and technologies. Reporting by States oftheir implementation measures facilitates theoverview of the implementation by the 1540Committee. Measures for the implementation of theresolution should be undertaken by the States basedon their national practices and processes. Assistanceand cooperation for States requesting suchassistance is a key element of the implementationprocess. Such assistance programmes should besuited to the specific national or regionalrequirements. The 1540 Committee has alsoestablished cooperative relations with severalinternational organizations. Consistent with theirrespective mandates, the IAEA and the OPCW cancontribute to the objectives of the 1540 resolution.The full implementation of the Communiqué andwork Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit can alsocontribute to our common goals.

I am grateful to the organizers for inviting me toshare a few thoughts at the outset of this seminar.My message today is that India remains committedto achieving the objectives of the 1540 resolution.India is also prepared to render necessary assistanceto States requesting such assistance in fulfilling theirobligations under the resolution. All member Statesshould feel that they have a common stake in thesuccessful implementation of UNSC Resolution1540. They should also have access to a suite ofgood practices that they can then tailor to theirspecific national frameworks. I am confident thatthis seminar would play a useful role in this regard.I wish you the very best with your deliberations.

Thank you.

The 1540 resolution hascontributed to greaterawareness amongstStates on the need foreffective measures at thenational level to preventterrorists and non-Stateactors gaining access tosensitive materials andtechnologies.

India is also prepared torender necessaryassistance to Statesrequesting such assistancein fulfilling theirobligations under theresolution.

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SESSION 1

An Overview of a Decade of Existence of the UNSCR 1540 fromRegional Perspectives: What Progress Has Been Realized andWhat Still Needs to be Done?

Chairperson: Matthew Harries

Europe and UNSCR1540: Dr CindyVestergaard, Danish Institute for InternationalStudies

Dr Vestergaard started by highlighting that UNSCR1540 fits well within the European Union’s (EU) 2003WMD strategy, and that the EU was supportive ofthe resolution’s adoption. All EU member States hadsubmitted two national reports by October 2010.Additionally, in 2006 the European Council votedto extend support to include helping States outsidethe EU meet the resolution’s obligations. There areareas where efforts to implement the resolution canbe improved, she suggested, in particularhighlighting that very few States provide informationon what international outreach they provide (withFinland and France being two States that do so).

With regard to outreach funding, Dr Vestergaardsuggested that there is a great deal of doublecounting by States: often States would declare thesame funds as supporting of the G-8 GlobalPartnership initiative, of the IAEA, National SupportProgrammes of OPCW support funding, and of 1540outreach funding. She highlighted also that the EUitself has historically provided only modest fundingto the 1540 Committee (€670,000 between 2004and 2012), which is minor in comparison to theamount of funding that the EU provides to its centres

There are areas whereefforts to implement theresolution can beimproved ... in particularhighlighting that very fewStates provide informationon what internationaloutreach they provide (withFinland and France beingtwo States that do so).

All EU member States hadsubmitted two nationalreports by October 2010.

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of excellence initiative. Dr Vestergaard also notedthat there had been an increase in the funding inrecent years. Dr Vestergaard concluded byhighlighting two areas where the EU should do moreto improve the resolution’s implementation. Shestated that the EU should have a clearly-definedcoordinator on WMD issues and that the EU shoulddo more to ensure that overseas territories wereeffectively implementing the resolutionsrequirements.

Experience from Asia-Pacific: Hego Sato,Takushoku University

Professor Sato began by suggesting that commitmentto Resolution 1540 is not sophisticated: it variesfrom country to country and region to region. Hewent on to suggest that more could be done byregional fora to raise political awareness of, andcommitment to, 1540. Specifically, Professor Satosuggested that the ASEAN Regional Fora (ARF)statement on 1540 had led to other country’sstatements of commitments. Building upon thetheme of regional engagement, Professor Satohighlighted the work of the Pacific Islands Forumas a practical platform for sharing good practiceson export control and 1540 implementation.

He suggested that there was a need for such regionalfora, in part to overcome country-specific issues,such as Taiwan’s status in the international systemwhich prevents Taiwanese officials engaging inofficial fora and activities through which experiencescan be shared. In this regard, the annual Japanexport control forum provides an excellentopportunity for experience sharing, he said.

Professor Sato then focused on Japan’simplementation of 1540. He highlighted that Japanhad submitted multiple reports to the 1540Committee, but that the latest was effectively thesame as the proceeding one. Professor Satosuggested that this might be the result of a lack of

Commitment toResolution 1540 is notsophisticated: it variesfrom country to countryand region to region.

... that more could be doneby regional fora to raisepolitical awareness of, andcommitment to, 1540

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coordination between the two relevant Japaneseministries— the Ministry of Economics, Trade andIndustry (METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MoFA)—thus highlighting the challenge ofinterdepartmental coordination in the Resolution’simplementation.

Professor Sato’s presentation identified several otherchallenges and lessons. Firstly, he identified anincentive problem regarding the implementation of1540 at the national level. Secondly, the resourcematching efforts (led by the 1540 Committee) wereinsufficient and needed to improve; in his view,efforts to understand 1540’s implementation weredeficient and needed to be improved. He also statedthat the use of regional fora could be expanded toimprove implementation.

During the discussion, Professor Sato suggested thatStates should not be put in the position of askingfor assistance to receive it: the goal should bepartnership, not a one-sided provision of support.He viewed that the Poland/Croatia peer review wasas a good example of an effective practice.

Timur Cherikov, Centre for Non-proliferationand Export Control, Kyrgyz Republic

Mr Cherikov began by highlighting what he sees asthe key implementation challenges of 1540, whichinclude lack of human capital and politicalcommitment in many countries. He highlighted theimportance of Central Asia as a bridge to many partsof the world, especially Asia. He informed theconference that the region had taken some measuresregarding border control and physical protectionmeasures and that that several internationalorganisations such as UNODA and UNSCR 1540committee were active in the region forimplementation of the resolution.

Mr Cherikov said that some individual countries areway ahead in implementing the UNSCR 1540. The

Resource matchingefforts (led by the 1540Committee) wereinsufficient and neededto improve

Goal should bepartnership, not a one-sided provision of support.

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information about non-proliferation instruments areavailable on the governmental websites of someCentral Asian countries. He said that Tajikistan waseven ready to provide assistance to the countriesoutside the region, but because of other politicaland security factors it did not do it. He narrated thegovernmental structure in his country for exportcontrols. Mr Chervikov suggested thatimplementation is very much dependent onresources.

As a practical measure to achieve effectiveimplementation at the national level, Mr Cherikovsuggested that voluntary national action plans werevital. He also highlighted the useful role that regionalcoordinators could play and suggested that allregions should appoint coordinators to strengthenoutreach and coordination measures. Furthermore,he pointed out that civil society was not sufficientlyutilised in the EU to bolster 1540 implementation,and suggested that the EU should do more tofinancially support the civil society in this context.

All regions should appointcoordinators to strengthenoutreach and coordinationmeasures.

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SESSION 2

An Overview of a Decade of Existence of the UNSCR 1540 fromRegional Perspectives: What Progress Has Been Realized andWhat Still Needs to be Done.

Chairperson: Ochieng Adala

The African Experience: Gillane Allam,Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Allam began by highlighting that Africais the second largest continent, the second mostpopulous and includes 54 countries. Because ofthese factors and the continent’s lack of resourcesfor 1540 implementation, Africa has been called a“plethora of non-State actor threats and home tothe most porous and unregulated borders”. Morespecifically, Africa includes many States that havenot reported on the Resolution’s implementation andthere are real implementation challenges which mustbe overcome, including lack of perceived legitimacy;lack of awareness of the requirements of theResolution; lack of capacity among some AfricanStates to implement the Resolution; other prioritiestaking precedence and convincing States thatcompliance with the resolution is worth the costs.These challenges will persist, but capacity buildingand outreach can help mitigate, it was suggested. 

Ambassador Allam also highlighted that the AfricanUnion (AU) had hosted workshops on 1540implementation in December 2013 after the forumhad been encouraged to strengthen its active rolein assisting African States in implementing theResolution. Following the meeting, more States haddesignating national points of contact. At the

Continent’s lack ofresources for 1540implementation, Africa hasbeen called a “plethora ofnon-State actor threatsand home to the mostporous and unregulatedborders”.

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meeting, country visits from the 1540 Committee(and experts) were highlighted as useful. Thecomplexity of developing a national control list wasnoted. Assistance was recognised as key. Inconcluding remarks, Ambassador Allam suggestedthat there was a need to think about how to maintainexport control lists in States with very limitedresources and to think about how 1540 reportingcan be simplified for countries with few resources.Specifically, it was suggested that a (short)questionnaire be created to simplify reporting.

The Latin American Experience, Kai Ilchmann,Institute for International Relations

Dr Ilchmann began by providing an overview of LatinAmerica in a 1540 context, highlighting in particularthat it is both a WMD-free zone and a region thatcontains ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. Heinformed the conference that in Latin America, WMDproliferation could potentially become linked to theorganised criminal network involved in activitiesrelating to small arms proliferation, narcoticstrafficking, youth/criminal gangs and corruption,basically in ungoverned spaces, and pockets offragility.

Dr Ilchmann also stated that the capacity andinstitutional deficit along with porous/inaccessibleborders makes the task further complicated. Theimplementation of the UNSCR 1540 faces challengessuch as lack of/ limited capacity and resources ofStates, and a perceived legitimacy deficit of theResolution. The countries of the region expect moresupport from the international community. Thereis an opportunity to exploit synergies, Dr Ilchmannsuggested, between efforts to encouragedevelopment and efforts to improve security(including the implementation of 1540) in the region.When planning regional and national capacitybuilding efforts, stakeholders should strive as muchas possible to leverage existing initiatives and ensure

In Latin America, WMDproliferation is linked tothe organised criminalnetwork involved inactivities relating to smallarms proliferation,narcotics trafficking,youth/criminal gangs andcorruption, basically inungoverned spaces, andpockets of fragility.

African Union (AU) hadhosted workshops on 1540implementation inDecember 2013 after theforum had beenencouraged to strengthenits active role in assistingAfrican States inimplementing theResolution.

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buy-in by aligning implementation with existingpriorities.

1540 in the Arab Region, Ayman Khalil,Director, Arab Institute for Security Studies

Mr Khalil began by highlighting the securitychallenges in the Middle East, which include somelack of adherence to Chemical Weapons Conventionand security risks. He suggested that in the region,there is variable implementation of 1540 in partbecause of variation in countries’ politicalcommitment. And as a result, there is no uniformor single Arab position on UNSCR 1540. However,he informed the conference that a number of thinktanks are active to work on different aspects of theWMD. The organisations of the region have alsostarted networking among themselves. Mr Khalilpointed out several factors for slow implementationof the UNSCR 1540. He underlined certain historicalrealities in which national priorities, nationalperspectives, conventional threat perception, andthe chronic Arab-Israeli conflict as some of thefactors responsible for the slow implementation ofthe UNSCR 1540.

He also discussed a new set of challenges. In thisregard, he talked about the existence of unilateralnuclear deterrence in West Asia/Middle East. MrKhalil concluded by offering thoughts on how exportcontrols could be better balanced to meet thesecurity and prosperity challenges of the region. Hestated that some in the region, not all the countrieshave WMD; so, the responsibility for implementingthe UNSCR 1540 should accept the “proportionalresponsibility” on the basis of possession of WMD.He discussed the new legislative structure in theregion on the basis of many initiatives.

There is variableimplementation of 1540 inpart because of variationin countries’ politicalcommitment. And as aresult, there is no uniformor single Arab position onUNSCR 1540.

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SESSION 3

Effective Practices in the LicensingProcess: Lessons on Implementation

Chairperson: G Balachandran

Indian Experience: S.K. Samal, Joint DirectorGeneral of Foreign Trade, India

Mr Samal began by noting that India hascomprehensive laws based on the foundations oflegal, licensing, regulatory framework, andenforcement. In 2005, India adopted a specific lawon WMD (the WMD Act) which consolidated elementsof 1540’s requirements. Next, Mr Samal providedan overview of the practical considerationsassociated with its export control system:

Documentation: India requires bills of entry ofprevious exports to support a licence application aswell as End User Undertaking, details of thetechnical specification of an item, and the purchaseorder/contract. The End User Certificate (EUC) mustindicate name of the item of export, name of theimporter, specific end use of the product, and detailsof purchase order. Additional clause in EUC is onthe non-transfer from the State to the recipient onthe letter head signed, stamped. EUC from allcompanies in supply chain.

Licence Assessment: Licences are risk assessedbased upon the credentials of the end user, and thecredibility of the stated end use. The Indian systemprohibits the use of PO Box addresses.

Licence Types: India does not offer so-called openor general licences, although thought is being givento introduce these in the future as government wantsto facilitate trade where the risk is minimal.

The Indian systemprohibits the use of POBox addresses.

India does not offer so-called open or generallicences, although thoughtis being given to introducethese in the future asgovernment wants tofacilitate trade where therisk is minimal.

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Mr Samal concluded setting out his thoughts onwhat should be included as elements of a companycompliance system. These included sound internalaudit vital, info sharing, and senior managementcommitment.

Catchalls and End Use Controls: Ian Stewart,Head, Project Alpha, King’s College London

Mr Stewart began providing an overview of thehistory of catchall controls. He linked the catchallcontrol to efforts in the UK to prevent Iraq fromacquiring non-controlled chemicals for its chemicalweapons programme in the 1980s. He then notedthat catchall controls had become institutionalisedthrough both the export control regimes and throughUN sanctions resolutions, which often include acatchall-like clause. Next, he suggested that exportcontrols are in general a proactive tool: they deterand prevent proliferation by giving governmentvisibility of exports so that the risk associated withthem can be assessed. Catchall controls, hesuggested, on the other hand are generally reactive:they are invoked when someone knows something.As such, they generally must be intelligence led asexporters rarely know and only occasionally suspectWMD concerns.

As catchall controls are generally reactive in nature,Mr Stewart suggested that the private sector mustbe proactive in conducting due diligence if they areto prevent their good ending up in programmes ofconcern: it is not possible to rely on governmentinvoking the catchall. This requires informationsharing and training programs such thoseimplemented by “Project Alpha” at King’s CollegeLondon. Finally, Mr Stewart concluded by suggestingthat increased information sharing is vital ifproliferation is to be prevented. Specifically, hesuggested that more should be done to shareinformation with the IAEA, third governments, andUN organisations (such as the UN panels of experts).In particular, he suggested that licensing statistics,

Catchall controls hadbecome institutionalisedthrough both the exportcontrol regimes andthrough UN sanctionsresolutions, which ofteninclude a catchall-likeclause.

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licensing outcomes, suspicious enquiries and, wherepossible, intelligence, should also be shared.

Open Source and the Importance of SharingRefusals: Matjaz Murovec, CustomsAdministration, Republic of Slovenia

Mr Murovec began by highlighting that customsorganisations face significant challenges, whichinclude industry's moves toward just-in-timemanufacturing and delivery; resource constraints(which require more to be done with less staff);customs volume-flows (which typically allow onlyaround 3 per cent of exports to be physicallyinspected in most jurisdictions); high costsassociated with interception and interdiction; thedynamic nature of proliferation and the requirementto bring together information at the right place andtime.

Mr Murovec then outlined the Slovenian exportcontrol system, which includes numerous differentministries with different responsibilities. TheMinistry of Defence leads on military exportswhereas the Ministry of Economy leads on dual-useexports and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads onsanctions. The customs authority (CARS) isresponsible for enforcing the laws and has accessto licences, denials, “catch all” and “soft”information. CARS, Mr Murovec stated, relies uponthe use open source and denial information invarious stages of control. In particular, suchinformation is vital when evaluating an applicationfor a permit (end user, end use, broker, item-technical specifications, country, etc.) and forenforcement purposes such as developing riskprofiles, allowing for faster and easierimplementation of customs control though the usingcompany profiles, technical specifications, routes,etc., and inspections.

During the presentation various sources ofinformation were identified including: Licence denial

The customs authority(CARS) is responsible forenforcing the laws and hasaccess to licences, denials,“catch all” and “soft”information. 

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information, which can be useful but often do notcontain all the information (exporter, tariff number,etc.) and often come too late as well as Open Sourceinformation, which may be found on official export-related websites such as websites for listed entities(EU, US, JP, UK, UNSCR), trade, market andcompany information (Google finance, etc.), generalonline databases and online translation (Googletranslate). During the presentation, the importanceof having companies declare shipments in advanceand of declaring shipments under open licencescame to light. The presentation was concluded bythe presentation of a case study in which opensource information (a news article from aneighbouring State) was used to identify potentiallyproliferation-related exports from a Sloveniancompany.

CARS relies upon the useopen source and denialinformation in variousstages of control.

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SESSION 4

Enforcement: Challenges Ahead

Chairperson: D P Dash

Arvind Madhavan, Ministry of External Affairs,Government of India

Mr Madhavan began by highlighting that India hadbeen able to cover many of the requirements of 1540without a new law, but a new law was nonethelessadopted in 2005 (the WMD act of 2005), whichintroduced a catchall control. Catchall controls, itwas recognised, present particular challenges forgovernments and industry, particularly at theborder. Mr Madhavan noted also that it is difficultto prove knowledge (intent), which is necessary forIndia to prosecute catchall violations as it is not astrict liability offence. Next, Mr Madhavan statedthat he saw almost no cases of non-compliancerelated to controlled goods. Instead, he saw a needto focus on cases where catchall controls couldapply.

Mr Madhavan went on to suggest that some itemsusually stopped by catchall controls could be addedto control lists, but that it was not practical for allitems of possible proliferation concern to be listed.As such, there is need to think through how customsauthorities can effectively implement catchallcontrols at the border, particularly as they currentoften lack information on end use. Catchall in Indiais implemented through the WMD act of 2005 andForeign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act of1992, he explained. It states that “No person shallexport any material, equipment or technologyknowing that such material, equipment ortechnology is intended to be used in the design or

Some items usuallystopped by catchallcontrols could be addedto control lists, but that itwas not practical for allitems of possibleproliferation concern tobe listed.

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manufacture of a biological weapon, chemicalweapon, nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosivedevice, or in their missile delivery system.”

It was suggested that there is a need for a documentof best practices document on catchall controlsimplementation by customs officials. Often there isinsufficient information to determine end useconcerns regarding dual-use technologies.Enforcement difficult as “knowledge” (intent) is oftendifficult to prove. Could there be better guidancefor implementation? How to manage possible futurelegal challenges? 

Transit and Transhipment Controls: JanetBaenke, Federal Office of Economics andExport Control (BAFA) , Germany

Ms Baenke began her presentation by highlightingthat resolution 1540 calls for the establishment ofcontrols on transit of sensitive goods: “All States shalltake and enforce effective measures to establishdomestic controls to prevent the proliferation ofnuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and theirmeans of delivery, including by establishingappropriate controls over related materials and tothis end shall...establish, develop, review, andmaintain appropriate effective national export andtranshipment controls over such items, includingappropriate laws and regulations to control export,transit, transhipment, and re-export...”

Implementing these controls, Ms Baenke suggested,is challenging from a number of perspectives. Thefirst one is simply in defining controls. Mrs Baenkeexamined the idea of Transit as an item passesthrough a given country on its way from the countryof consignment to the country of destination. Forthe EU this means something that originates outsidethe EU that is designated for another country outsidethe EU by which passes through the EC, andTranshipment which is similar to transit, but witha change of transport method within the EU.

There were practical issuessuch as whether an itemleaves the ship of stays onboard, or if it is unloadedfor temporary storage orfor a customs procedure,or whether the means oftransportation change.

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Ms Baenke then introduced other challenges to theimplementation of these controls: There werepractical issues such as whether an item leaves theship of stays on board, or if it is unloaded fortemporary storage or for a customs procedure, orwhether the means of transportation change. Shealso identified that if an item is snagged in transitthen it requires a licence for its export. There arealso costs associated with the holding of goods. Thelack of detailed information for transit controls mayalso be a problem.

Ms Baenke concluded by suggesting practicalmeasures that can be taken to manage thechallenges of implementing transit andtranshipment controls In particular, she highlightedthe important role that electronic checks (riskprofiling) can play in implementing the controls. Onerecommendation that emerged from the presentationwas to develop guidance on deploying risk profilingsystems for non-proliferation purposes.

Technological Best Practices: Anshuman Roy,Rhombus Power, USA

Dr Anshuman Roy emphasized that detectiontechnologies for nuclear materials and weapons area key element of the Resolution 1540 framework.Equipping on-ground operators, such as customsofficers, with nuclear detectors is the last mile inimplementing the 1540 framework. In this context,the commodity identification training program andthe cargo container initiative are both serious effortsin the right direction. But if we examine the fieldexperiences of the operators who have been equippedwith nuclear detectors, we find that the last mile inimplementing Resolution 1540 is ineffective.

End user interviews have revealed that these nucleardetectors work well in a laboratory environmentwhere the location and type of nuclear materialssurrounding the detector are known andenvironmental factors & unknowns are well

Lack of reliability and highnoise, weight, size andcosts of the detectorscurrently used in ports,airports and borders,whose technology is often40 years old.

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characterized. But on the field, the nuclear detectorshave too many false alarms, are difficult to use,require frequent calibration and often malfunction.Unfortunately, the core technologies underlyingthese nuclear detectors (especially detectors forweapons grade plutonium and HEU) are decadesold and are ineffective at detecting nuclear materialsthat are shielded. He deplored the lack of reliabilityand high noise, weight, size and costs of the detectorscurrently used in ports, airports and borders, whosetechnology is often 40 years old.

To overcome these challenges, there is need forinnovative detection technologies that are accurate,digital, calibration-free, cost-effectively scalable,customizable to local conditions and massivelynetworkable. One example of such a product iscalled Mercury (made by Rhombus Power Inc. ). TheMercury platform has been built to reliably detectthe presence of Plutonium and Uranium on the field.Mercury is a solid state, easy to use, directionallysensitive, calibration-free, noise-free, scalable, andnetworkable detector for neutrons that exceeds theperformance standards of ANSI. It can becustomized for operation in different countriesthrough collaborations with organizations — bothgovernment and private — of these member Statesinterested in embarking on such projects.

The Mercury platform hasbeen built to reliably detectthe presence of Plutoniumand Uranium on the field.

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SESSION 5

Industry Engagement

Chairperson: Michael Aho

Mukesh Bhargava, Vice President, L&T, India

Commodore Bhargava began by highlighting that,for nations such as India, perceived national securityneeds require the defence industry to “make” ratherthan “buy” advanced capability products so that thecountry can become self-reliant. This has the effectof spreading the high technology base. Nonetheless,he went on to suggest that the very industries thatacquire technology often have their own incentivesto protect this technology—i.e., from an IntellectualProperty perspective.

Next, Cmde Bhargava suggested that there is a needfor industry’s supply chains to provide the requiredlevel of confidence to stakeholders through end useintegrity and robust Internal ComplianceProgrammes. In doing so, he suggested that “trustbut verify” is a useful concept when it comes toexport controls: manufacturing through monitoringand manufacturing under strict supervision are thebest ways to ensure compliance. Nonetheless, codesof conduct do have a role to play too: the Indiandefence industry has adopted one such code. 

The Private Sector as a Non-proliferationAsset: Wyn Bowen, King’s College London

Professor Bowen began by providing an overview ofAlpha, which was established in 2011 on theassumption that the private sector could and shoulddo more to prevent proliferation. Professor Bowenstated that Alpha works to raise awareness andimprove implementation in governments, academiaand business. Alpha has adopted a partnership

“Trust but verify” is auseful concept when itcomes to export controls:manufacturing throughmonitoring andmanufacturing under strictsupervision are the bestways to ensurecompliance. Nonetheless,codes of conduct do have arole to play too: the Indiandefence industry hasadopted one such code.

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approach through its “partners against proliferation”initiative, which is based upon a set of good practiceguidelines that has been recognised by governmentsthat participate in the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG). The Project aims to understand illicit tradeand proliferation and has developed acomprehensive website as a result. They conductoutreach in the UK and international, taking asector-by-sector approach. After providing anoverview of Alpha, Professor Bowen went on to raiseseveral questions that he believes warrantexploration in the approach to the resolution’s 10th

anniversary, including raising a question of whetherthere is a role for 1540 in the future governance ofexport controls.

Anupam Srivastava, Federation of IndianChambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)

Dr Srivastava began by asking what are the actualthreats? He stated that threats include access todual-use, WMD-relevant, items, technologies,materials and knowledge by certain States; accessby non-State actors/terrorist groups (insiderproblem); emerging suppliers; industry (complicitor ignorant); inadequate strategic trade controls intransit or transhipment States and the growingfungibility (of dual-use items and technologies)which requires balancing trade with securityimperatives. Since the forces of globalisation makepreventing proliferation difficult –since a sheervolume of trade in dual use will likely grow andsupply chains become increasingly important.

He also felt that proliferators that increasingly importcomponents (or otherwise) seek to evade controls.Having set out the challenges, as he sees them, DrSrivastava then set out what responses he wouldconsider useful. He suggested that Singapore haddone an excellent job at creating guidance,conducting manufacturing base surveys, and indeveloping a training academy; Malaysia hasdeveloped excellent web-based resources, including

Alpha has adopted apartnership approachthrough its “partnersagainst proliferation”initiative, which is basedupon a set of good practiceguidelines that has beenrecognised bygovernments

Japan’s Center forInformation on SecurityTrade Control (CISTEC)model is an excellent wayto engage industry; andthe Republic of Korea’sStrategic Trade Institute(KOSTI) also provides anexcellent model.

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training; Japan’s Center for Information on SecurityTrade Control (CISTEC) model is an excellent wayto engage industry; and the Republic of Korea’sStrategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) also provides anexcellent model.

He then highlighted the importance while engagingthe industry of maintaining clear procedures,punishing non-compliance, making consistentdecisions, of maintaining transparency with regardsto decision-making, and working through tradeassociations. He suggested that publications suchas “don’t let this happen to you” would be useful.He suggested that intern compliance programmestypically take 1 per cent of turnover to establish,and cost much less each year afterwards to maintain.He also suggested that incentives should be providedto encourage industry to apply and that AEO was apotential model for this. He added that it would beworth exploring having a single agency responsiblefor export control. During the following discussion,it was suggested that thought needs to be given intowho should address industry—efforts by the 1540Committee to engage industry would risk to createconfusion: it is the national authority that maintainsprimacy with regards to industry engagement, andnational authorities should thus develop industryengagement plans.

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SESSION 6

Effective Practices in Coordination: Role of NGOs

Chairperson: C UdayBhaskar

On Effective Practices: Tanya Ogilvie-White,Australia National University

Reflecting on experiences in the Asia-Pacific region,Dr Ogilvie-White identified the following as effectivepractices:

The Council for Security Cooperation for the Asia-Pacific as a forum for regional experience andinformation sharing. Malaysia attended it andpresented its own challenges in implementing itsexport control act. Before the presentation, othersin the region did not even know that Malaysia hadadopted such an act. Outreach by the AustralianGovernment on its radiological sources project,which she views as an unparalleled success, (Note:while this outreach was 1540-related, it did not use1540 language). It was bolstered by Australia’sinvitation to other regional countries to attend a pre-meeting ahead of an IPASS mission.

The maintenance of a sophisticated media strategyby the Fissile Material Working Group. Theorganisation has built greater awareness in civilsociety. It had also identified “nuclear securitychampions” in different areas to conduct mediaoutreach. Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White concluded bystating that there is a need to think about languagewhen discussing 1540: the language used in theresolution is relatively boring—there is a need forreal stories and a “whole of society” approach as

There is a need for realstories and a “whole ofsociety” approach aseveryone must be able torelate to sharedresponsibility.

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everyone must be able to relate to sharedresponsibility. As a basis for this, Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White suggested using the UN report “more secureworld” as a possible basis. She suggested using the10th anniversary to make media outreach about theresolution. It is critical that everyone cares aboutgetting a safer world, she said, adding that this willonly be achieved through a collaborative approach.

The Role of Civil Society: Rajiv Nayan, IDSA

Dr Nayan began by outlining what he believes as ashift in the international system, in whichmultilateral bodies are gradually giving way tointernational organisations. He described a modelof multi-layered coordination for implementation ofthe UNSCR 1540, in which Non-GovernmentalEntities (NGEs) may play a vital role. He suggestedthe need for a harmonious coordination among thegovernment and its different agencies, civil societygroups, and international and regionalorganisations.

Dr Nayan then went on to outline how NGEs canease the implementation burden created by 1540by: providing a bridge between industry andgovernment; articulating genuine grievances withoutbecoming lobbyists; discussing issues in the non-governmental policy-making fora to arrive at adecision on complex issues, assisting industry withcompliance, and becoming a watchdog.

Dr Nayan also indicated that NGEs can providesecond opinion on legislation, build capacity, engagein education, monitor implementation, and facilitateinformation exchange between all stakeholders.Finally, Dr Nayan recommended that governmentsrelease (some) data to the public in order to enablecivil society to contribute: civil society can be a bridgebetween industry and government and act as awatchdog; we should have a forum in each country.

Multi-layeredcoordination forimplementation of theUNSCR 1540, in whichNon-GovernmentalEntities (NGEs) may playa vital role.

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Role of NGOs—A Case Study of Pakistan: MariaSultan, DG South Asia Strategic StabilityInstitute (SASSI) & Chairperson of SASSIUniversity

Dr Sultan began by outlining Pakistan’s laws thatare relevant to 1540, including the export controllegislation. She highlighted the export control act,which was adopted in 2004, largely as a responseto the uncovering of the A Q Khan network. Toimplement the act, Pakistan also established theStrategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. Next, Dr Sultan suggestedthe following roles for civil society in implementing1540: Capacity Building; Completing the SupplyChain; Buy In the Policy Chain; Threat Awareness-Balance with Industry Requirement; developingnational implementation programs and more

Seema Gahlaut – Centre for International andTrade Security (CITS), University of Georgia

Dr Gahlaut began by provided an overview of CITS:the Center was established in 1987 as a non-governmental organisation at the University ofGeorgia to work on Strategic Trade Controls andManagement. It also works on WMD securityculture. CITS conducts research, outreach, andtraining of students and professionals from bothgovernment and industry. 

Dr Gahlaut then outlined several strands of workcurrently underway at CITS that are relevant to 1540implementation. Of particular interest was the 1540Compass, a journal jointly published by CITS andUNODA. The 1540 Compass seeks to chart thesuccesses and challenges of 1540 through sharingexperiences, solutions, and best practices. DrGahlaut concluded by outlining possible futuredevelopments in terms of community tools, such asa 1540 website which featured all books, articlesand papers that have a relevance to 1540.

Export control act, whichwas adopted in 2004,largely as a response to theuncovering of the A Q Khannetwork

The 1540 Compass seeks tochart the successes andchallenges of 1540 throughsharing experiences,solutions, and bestpractices. 

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SESSION 7

Effective Practices and Intangible Controls

Chairperson: B M Gokhale

Intangible Technology Controls in theAcademic World: Peter Clevestig, StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Dr Clevestig began by setting out the definition oftechnology provided by the Wassenaar Arrangement:

‘Technology’ which is ‘required’ for the ‘development’,‘production’, and ‘use’ of items controlled in the dual-use list. Controls do not apply to ‘technology’ in the‘public domain’ or to ‘basic scientific research’.Controls include ‘deemed exports’, where transferswithin country can be controlled. 

Dr Clevestig then suggested that there are lots offields that are potentially relevant to 1540: chemical(chemical weapons precursors, chemicalincapacitants); biological (bio-defence, high-levelcontainment, vaccine production); nuclear (fuelcycle); delivery technologies (propulsion, guidance,payload); advanced computer science (encryption,advanced modelling). 

Next, Dr Clevestig highlighted several challenges tothe effective implementation of controls. Theseincluded: academic research which is increasinglyutilising international collaboration (USA, EU andChina), and that greater exchanges and partnershipsbetween countries occur in the field of scientificresearch. Skilled workforces from third countriesare resulting in a spread of know-how. Finally,funders are increasingly favouring applied (ratherthan basic) research (also that security-relatedresearch being increasingly outsourced toacademia).

Skilled workforces fromthird countries areresulting in a spread ofknow-how.

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Dr Clevestig also outlined specific sectorialchallenges: biological sciences areincreasingly becoming cross-disciplinary;biotechnology increasingly has lower costs,new approaches and availability. He alsooutlined emerging technologies such as 3dprinting (including metal sintering).

Dr Clevestig then highlighted poor awarenessand compliance within the academic sectoras demonstrated by certain specific cases.He also highlighted some difficult issues thathad been overcome through voluntarymeasures, such as the withholding of certaindata from publications, through the use of‘need to know’ communities, and throughvoluntary censorship. 

While concluding, Dr Clevestig made severalproposals on how to better manage theimplementation of controls, including:defining most relevant areas/fields ofconcern and establishing continuousdialogue between practitioners in those fieldsand relevant authorities/experts, integratingdual-use issues early in graduate and post-graduate training and making an advisorybody capable of reviewing scientific work atthe request of scientists, journals or fundersavailable.

Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT): R.Ramachandran, Institute for StrategicStudies

Dr Ramachandran began by noting thatwhile Resolution 1540 (and subsequentresolutions) does not explicitly mention ITT,it is nonetheless included in the 1540 matrix(as well as in UN sanctions). ITT can includetransfer of knowledge (skills etc.) andtechnology—information for the productionof a controlled item.

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He next questioned what the requirements of 1540actually are. Is it necessary for all countries to meetall requirements of matrix, for example? If not, heasked if we can have a subset that is required. Thisled to Dr Ramachandran to ask the question: howdoes one implement ITT controls in practice? DrRamachandran listed company audits, visascreening, awareness-raising with universities,industry etc., and enforcement based uponintelligence collection as possible compliance toolsin this area.

Dr Ramachandran then highlighted that basicscientific research and information in the publicdomain is exempt from export controls, but thisdefinition is difficult in practice as it can beinterpreted in different ways. Finally, DrRamachandran highlighted that India has a systemfor monitoring phone calls, social media etc. called“central monitoring system”, which is run by theCentre for Development of Telemetrics (C-DOT). Thislead to the question: is maintenance of suchmeasures is necessary for the implementation of1540?

1540: Codes of Conduct and EffectivePractices: Daniel Salisbury, King’s CollegeLondon.

Mr Salisbury began by outlining what types of codethere are that could be relevant to resolution 1540implementation. He defined codes as “set ofprinciples or instructions that are adopted by aspecific group or industry” —like the HippocraticOath adopted by the medical profession. Hesuggested that codes typically lay in the middle of aspectrum which begins with guidelines and endswith treaties or laws. He suggested also that thereare several specific types of code, that generallybecome more specific, such as codes of ethics, codesof conduct, and codes of practice etc.

Basic scientific researchand information in thepublic domain is exemptfrom export controls, butthis definition is difficult inpractice as it can beinterpreted in differentways.

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Mr Salisbury described several codes that weredirectly relevant to 1540s implementation. Theseinclude the good practice guidelines recognised bythe NSG, the export code of conduct for nuclearpower plant exporters (developed by the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace), the code ofconduct for the Safety and Security of RadioactiveSources, the bio-security code, and a nuclearinformation security code of conduct underdevelopment in the UK. The goal is to build a securityculture, but there is also a need to build uponindustry’s interest to make profit.

Mr Salisbury highlighted particular challenges inimplementing 1540 in the academic and researchenvironments, and suggested that codes could beused as an alternative to more restrictive laws. Inthis regard, work done by Alpha on guidance foracademia was helpful. During the discussion, thesubject of ITT and its effects on academia was raised.One participant asked whether an online coursecould require export licences (with it being suggestedthat the answer was “no” as the course would beclassed as public domain). There was generalconsensus on the need to raise awareness ofproliferation issues early in the academic cycle.

Codes as “set of principlesor instructions that areadopted by a specificgroup or industry” —likethe Hippocratic Oathadopted by the medicalprofession.

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SESSION 8

Identification of Effective Practices,Next Steps

Identification of Effective Practices: NextSteps: A B Awati, Scientist, Department ofAtomic Energy, Mumbai, India

Dr Awati began by reflecting on the nature of exportcontrol regimes; unlike formal institutions, such asthe Chemical Weapons Convention, the NPT, andsafeguards agreements, export control regimes areinformal arrangements which are not legally-binding. UNSCR 1540, on the other hand, is basedupon Chapter-VII of the UN charter, and is thusobligatory. It requires States to take a variety ofmeasures, including the “non-support” clause.

In India, 1540 is implemented through a range oflaws, Dr Awati explained, including the WMD Act of2005, the Atomic Energy Act of 1962, the FTDR Act,2010, the Customs Act (1962), the ExplosiveSubstances Act (1908), the Narcotic Drug andPsychotropic Substance Act (1985), theEnvironmental Protection Act (1986), and theUnlawful Activities (prevention) Amendment Act(2008). This range of legislation highlights thatresolution 1540 can often be implemented throughother legal provisions, although it can be easier ornecessary to adopt a custom act.

Next, Dr Awati explained how India ensure internalcompliance, which includes pre-employmentscreening (police verification); confidentialityundertaking at the time of employment (applicationof the official secrets act); security checks at entryand exit points; multi-layered access control system;non-disclosure agreements wherever applicable;restriction on the disclosure of informationpertaining to controlled items; limited access forvisitors (foreign/national) to DAE premises;

Strongly wordedcompliance policies areessential, as are stringentlegislation, appropriatecontrol lists: there is aneed to cultivate anexport compliance culturethat is underpinned bylaw.

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technology transfer control measures—foreign travelrestriction for officials, undertaken only afterpermission with deputation report requirement.

Finally, Dr Awati set out what he viewed as effectivepractices. He stated that strongly worded compliancepolicies are essential, as are stringent legislation,appropriate control lists: there is a need to cultivatean export compliance culture that is underpinnedby law. Industry awareness, engagement andcompliance area prerequisites for success of anyexport control system. A responsible export attitudemust be cultivated and encouraged throughgovernment efforts. This would be done through abetter understanding of the law, training industry,entities, R&D institutions and also relevantacademia through workshops and seminars as wellas guidance on national export control lists andregulations and awareness on internationalcommitments and agreements. Moreover, entitiesmust create an internal compliance plan.

In conclusion, Dr Awati, reiterated that effectiveexport controls requires adequate nationallegislation, education, awareness, outreach, trainingand compliance as well as the ability to detect andprevent illicit shipments.

Changing Perceptions: Focused Capacity-building and Tailored-based Education asPractical Measures for Overcoming Multi-layered Obstacles to Implement UNSCR 1540:Emiliano Buis, University of Buenos Aires

Dr Buis began by reviewing the scope of 1540: hebelieves that the resolution provides key elementsto organize the whole global disarmament and non-proliferation effort, even if it is focused on non-Stateactors. Next, Dr Buis noted that national reportingmay generally take place but that these actualreports are rarely updated. It therefore becomesdifficult to maintain an accurate picture on 1540implementation.

Resolution provides keyelements to organize thewhole global disarmamentand non-proliferationeffort, even if it is focusedon non-State actors.

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Nonetheless, Dr Buis believed that there is a needfor better technical capacity. He mentioned thatthere is a lack of financial capacity to facilitatetechnical capacity-building, and that the institutionsare often corrupt. Overall, political apathy in manycountries remains a key challenge to improvedimplementation. In thinking about how to addressthese challenges, Dr Buis suggested the creation ofan organisation called “ANGUS” to changeperceptions and focus on capacity building andtailored-based education for all stakeholders. DrBuis concluded by presenting summaries of hiscurrent projects, which include working on projectsrelated to the local consequences of nuclear attackand on 1540 e-learning through role-playingexercises. 

Margaret Muturi, Kenyatta University, Kenya

Ms Muturi began by reiterating that UNSCR1540required all States to adopt measures to preventproliferation. She went on to argue that while manyStates in Africa are not technology holders and dueto continuous civil wars, the continent is a soft targetfor terrorists. Indeed, several countries in Africa hadbeen suspected of involvement in proliferation. MsMuturi highlighted that Africa has the highestnumber of States that have not reported to thecommittee (18 have not submitted a report yet). This,she said, highlighted several challenges, whichinclude the absence of legislation in most Africancountries driven by lack of political commitment andlack of resources (usually because of genuineopportunity cost considerations).

As a result there is a lack of national action plans.Overall, she said, lack of awareness persists, despitegains made through awareness-raising. Ms Muturiwent on to suggest that the African Union (AU)meetings on resolution 1540 were a positive sign:they helped to bring many African States on boardwith the purpose of the resolution and helpedidentify priorities for action plans. Ms Muturi

Many States in Africa arenot technology holdersand due to continuouscivil wars, the continent isa soft target forterrorists.

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concluded by identifying the following effectivepractices from the AU’s experience which were;initiate and enhance non-proliferation studies in theeducation system, Civil society could be (but iscurrently not) involved in reporting as well asregional meetings and awareness- raising initiatives.The use of media programmes on 1540 could aid inraising awareness. She stated that it is necessaryto involve regional economic communities (i.e., AU)and to continuously assess implementation in orderto identify gaps. Assistance provision is vital andthe 1540 Committee can help through identifyingbest practices.

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CLOSING SESSION

Closing Remarks by Michael Aho, UNSC 1540Committee Member, United States

Thank you to IDSA, King’s College London, theInstitute for Strategic Studies, and the UN Office forDisarmament Affairs for their work in organisingthis important conference in New Delhi. I will makea few clarifying remarks based on discussions, andalso highlight a few key messages I heard yesterdayand today that I will take back to the 1540Committee. As we are in the 10th anniversary yearof resolution 1540 (2004), it is evident that muchhas been achieved with regard to the resolution,particularly with regard to national legislation, butas many speakers and participants noted, there ismuch that needs to be done with regard toimplementation.

It is worth reflecting on IDSA Director General, DrArvind Gupta’s comment from the opening sessionthat resolution 1540 needs to be appreciated beyonda narrow group of experts, as all of us are affectedby terrorism—which is why the role of civil societyis so important. As India’s Ministry of ExternalAffairs Joint Secretary Amandeep Gill said,harmonization between governments and privateindustry has been key to India’s implementationexperience. One effective practice raised in hisinaugural address was that bilateral assistance isworthwhile, particularly as India has shared its 2005WMD act with ASEAN, allowing for a discussion oflegislative needs. All Member States would benefitfrom reviewing India’s practices and lessons.

Allow me to address the issue of sovereignty whichwas raised during this conference. The 1540Committee in no way seeks or discusses ways tointerfere in a State’s affairs. This reality relates toanother question raised by many of you: why isresolution 1540 so State-centric? It is because the

One effective practiceraised in his inauguraladdress was that bilateralassistance is worthwhile,particularly as India hasshared its 2005 WMD actwith ASEAN, allowing fora discussion of legislativeneeds. All Member Stateswould benefit fromreviewing India’s practicesand lessons.

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basic principle of resolution 1540, as I noted in myopening remarks, is cooperation. It is not designedto be a punitive resolution like others in the field ofnon-proliferation. The Security Council is permittedunder the UN Charter to create obligations for States,and that is what resolution 1540 does. Theimplementation and reporting related to it are thesole prerogative of the State involved. For example,if a State requests that its national implementationreport not be published on our Committee’ website,then it will not be.

Overall, we can catalogue effective practices in awide range of areas, including as noted earlier,industry engagement, catchall controls, andenforcement. One clear effective practice, whichadmittedly is complicated and multi-layered toimplement, is having a high-level politicalcommitment to ensure that working-level efforts leadto actual implementation.

We also heard suggestions for more detailedguidance on issues from catchall implementationat the border, to guidance to business and for moreusable resolution 1540 reporting templates andmaterials. We also talked some about codes ofconduct, and we must think more about how tosystematically engage universities and researchersbroadly, including through codes of conduct.

One effective practice that the 1540 Committee isalready working on is how to engage the publicthrough a media strategy. In this 10th anniversaryyear, we can use that occasion to highlight theresolution to members of the media, but allow meto make a request of you: please send ideas to mein my capacity as Coordinator of the 1540 CommitteeWorking Group on Transparency and MediaOutreach. This is also a good opportunity to suggestmembers of civil society, industry, and academiashare insights with the editors of the 1540 Compass.Please also visit the Committee’s website atwww.un.org/sc/1540, which has outreach events,

The 1540 Committee isalready working on ishow to engage the publicthrough a media strategy.In this 10th anniversaryyear, we can use thatoccasion to highlight theresolution to members ofthe media

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assistance requests, national reports, and theCommittee’s annual review of implementation whichwe heard about after lunch—all of which I hope canhelp you. While not directly related to this per se, Ialso welcome the information we had about the roleof technology. I think the Committee needs toconsider this topic and I look forward to raising itwith my colleagues.

While recognising that resources of the resolution1540 Committee are finite and the work to be doneis significant, there is a role for regional coordinatorsand for national and international outreachprogrammes. However, civil society has a role to playin bridging the gap. In particular, civil society cansupport countries that have resource constraints.This is a good idea and one that the Committee haswelcomed, when the relevant State seeks suchcollaboration, and we all should work together inthe remaining seven years of the resolution’s currentmandate.

One area where the Committee has decided to focusthis year is on working with academia. I welcomeacademic efforts on the future of resolution 1540and on issues related to control lists, as an example.But there is much that needs to be thought through.As I mentioned yesterday, resolution 1540 is aunique resolution and it is the obligation of theCommittee to consider changes and whether we havethe right toolkit to meet the challenges ofinternational security.

The Security Council in early May, under thepresidency of the Republic of Korea which also chairsthe 1540 Committee, will hold a meeting dedicatedto reflecting on the 10th anniversary of resolution1540. We will also seek to adopt a presidentialstatement at that meeting. I would encourage all ofyou to ensure your governments, fellow civil societymembers, academia, industry, and publics areaware, since this can be a good opportunity to shareeffective practices and other views, as appropriate.

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As Rajiv Nayan suggested, civil society could in factease the government’s burden for public education.

As Professor Wyn Bowen noted, partnership is keyto compliance, and we heard a few examples of howKing’s College London/Project Alpha partner withstakeholders. As we move forward, we should allkeep partnership in mind, as it really is key to anysuccess. I will end by noting that the success ofresolution 1540 is not about submitting nationalreports, although this is still key to do, but rather,inter alia, ensuring that States are taking nationalmeasures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,chemical, and biological weapons and their meansof delivery. If they do so, then we will achieve thegoals of the resolution, which is only one measureof many in this field. On behalf of the 1540Committee, we look forward to considering thisconference’s report, which will capture the effectivepractices identified. I thank you very much for yourparticipation, and please keep the dialogue going.

G. Balachandran, Institute for Strategic Studies(ISS), Delhi

Non-State actors motivated by various social,cultural, political and economic factors may beinterested in acquiring WMD. The interest of suchas a person or a group may be reduced by makingthe task of acquisition of WMD more difficult difficult.UNSCR 1540 could act as an instrument that maybe useful in making the task of proliferation of WMDmaterials difficult. Harmonization of the entire 1540efforts may not be an ideal instrument, but somestandardization like a common list is required.National sovereignty and economic development

Harmonization of theentire 1540 efforts maynot be an idealinstrument, but somestandardization like acommon list is required.

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should not be adversely affected by implementationof the resolution. NGOs can play an important rolein balancing all the challenging tasks.

Rajiv Nayan, IDSA

The idea behind holding this workshop was to builda community of experts who will interact on thecomplex and challenging issues of export controlsin general and resolution 1540 in particular. TheCommunity may work closely with the 1540committee and UNODA. The workshop succeededin making a number of breakthroughs. The mostsignificant are the discussion of technological bestpractices. How new effective and cheap technologymay make the task of implementation moreacceptable among Nation-States.

Balancing security and economic interests continuesto be an important imperative for the internationalcommunity even after a decade of the existence ofthe UNSCR 1540. Discussions on intangibletechnology controls were another highlight of thisevent. Two perspectives emerged on this issue andwe are hoping the international community willsynthesize the two perspectives to develop aneffective practice. The process of organization of theevent underlined the lack of understanding aboutUNSCR 1540 among several stakeholders, especiallythe media and industry.  IDSA along with otherpartners and supporters is going to undertakeoutreach activities targeting media, universities andthe industry. 

Ian J. Stewart, King’s College London

Mr Stewart focused his comments on what wouldhappen after the conference. There would be tworeports that would be produced. The first wouldinclude the conference proceedings, and the secondthe best practices identified throughout theconference.

The process oforganization of the eventunderlined the lack ofunderstanding aboutUNSCR 1540 amongseveral stakeholders,especially the media andindustry.

Further gatherings of civilsociety would be vital in thefuture if the resolution’sobjectives are to be met.

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He then turned his attention to how these reportswould be used. He said that he hoped that theeffective practices would be recognised by the 1540Committee and adopted by States.

While concluding, Mr Stewart said that he felt thatthe collection of expertise that had gathered for theconference was valuable and had resulted in uniqueinsights into 1540’s implementation. He suggestedthat further gatherings of civil society would be vitalin the future if the resolution’s objectives are to bemet.

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