INDEX [link.springer.com]978-1-4757-2228-4/1.pdfJones, David M., 37, 69, 74 Judge ... Kemp-Roth Act,...
Transcript of INDEX [link.springer.com]978-1-4757-2228-4/1.pdfJones, David M., 37, 69, 74 Judge ... Kemp-Roth Act,...
ABC News Closeup, 35, 72 Abrams, Richard K., 31, 72,
196-7, 216 Accord, The, 51-2, 82, 104-8,
159 Ackley, Gardner, 159 Aldrich, Nelson, 82 Alesina, Alberto, 322, 332, 356 Almon Lag, 122, 149-154 A1t, James, 322 American Bankers Association,
253 Anderson, Robert, 55, Appointments to Federal Re
serve: as an alternative to signaling, 21-22, 207-212, 286-8, 340
Appointments to Federal Reserve: Burns, 160
Appointments to Federal Reserve: Chairman sponsorship of, 290
Appointments to Federal Reserve: Congressional influence over, 302-3
Appointments to Federal Re-serve: constraints on, 288-
INDEX
-90 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: Martin, 106, 158 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: Miller, 163, 306 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: model of, 288-308 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: objectives of, 287-93
Appointments to Federal Reserve: political vs. nonpolitical, 82-6, 103-5, 289, 294-7, 341, 349-51
Appointments to Federal Reserve: reliable vs. unreliable, 202-204, 207-212, 289,297-300
Appointments to Federal Reserve: screening of candidates, 293-300
Appointments to Federal Reserve: under Bush, 307-8
Appointments to Federal Reserve: under Carter, 305
Appointments to Federal Reserve: under Eisenhower,
362 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
304 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: under Ford, 305 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: under Johnson, 304 Appointments to Federal Re
serve: under Kennedy, 304
Appointments to Federal Reserve: under Reagan, 307-8
Appointments to Federal Reserve: Volcker, 165-6, 306
Association of Reserve City Bankers, 253
Auerbach, Robert D., 31, 35, 72,224,255,322,334,356
Bach, George Leland, 47, 54, 87, 97, 103
Bade, Robin, 332, 356 Baker, Howard, 166 Baker, James, 204, 307 Danian, King, 332, 356 Banking Act of 1933, 58, 91,
101, 340 Banking Act of 1935, 14, 44.,
50, 82, 101, 107 Barth, James, 196, 216 Beck, Nathaniel, 30, 31, 72,
226, 242, 274 Bernanke, Ben, 198, 216, 242 Bibby, John F., 226, 242 Black, Eugene, 49, 94 Blinder, Alan, 198, 216, 242 Blumenthal, Michael, 164, 306 Borins, Sanford, 36, 72 Brady, Nicholas, 37, 69, 167-8 Brunner, Karl, 130, 147
Bryan, William Jennings, 83 Bryce, James, 325 Buchanan, James, 55, 72 Burdekin, Richard, 324, 356 Burns, Arthur, 54, 110-11, 118,
160-3, 193, 322, 333, 356 Burns, Arthur: defender of
Fed prerogatives, 161-2, 169
Burns, Arthur: partisan loyalist vs. sound money devotee, 161-2, 167-9, 180, 262-4
Cagan, Philip, 328, 356 Calmfors, Lars, 329, 356 Cameron, David, 329, 356 Canterbery, E. Ray, 56-57, 72 Central Bank: autonomy in
decline, 341 Central Bank: autonomy pro
duces monetary stability, 330-2, 350-1
Central Bank: indices of autonomy, 331-32, 350
Central Bank: legal autonomy, 332-36, 350-1
Central Bank: reforms to insure autonomy, 351-3
Chandler, Lester, 45, 47, 72, 87, 90, 97-98, 115
Chappell, Henry, 127, 139, 147, 300, 322, 356
Chernow, Ron, 90, 115 Clifford, A. Jerome, 11, 27, 49,
51-2, 54-5, 72, 84-5, 89-90, 104-8, 115, 290
Commision on Money and Cre-dit, 351
Congressional concern for mo-
Index
netary policy management, 87-8, 107-9, 155-7
Congressional Oversight Hearings, 112, 222-3, 225-30
Congressional signaling, 232-41 Congressional signaling: Fed
responses to, 221-2, 232-41
Congressional threat to Fed powers, 108-9, 169, 178-82
Congressional threat to Fed powers: measurement of, 170-3
Consumer Advisory Council, 10-20
Coolidge, Calvin, 46, 92 Corporatism and inflation, 329-
31 Cost push inflation, 63, 329 Craft, Vanessa, 118, 124, 127,
147 Crissinger, Daniel, 46, 92 Crihfield, John, 305, 324 Cukierman, Alex, 329, 331,
352-3, 356 Cullity, John P., 36, 61, 72,
160, 162, 193 Currie, Lauchlin, I 02 Darby, Michael, 37, 68 Darman, Richard, 37, 68 Dawes, R.M. , 329, 357 Delano, Frederick A., 84 Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 340
Dewald, William G., 196, 216 Dillon, Douglas, 56-59 Distributed lags, 121, 149-53
363
Douglas, Paul, 52, I 06 Eccles, Marinner, 51, 101-5,
108-9,290 Economists as reliable partisan
FOMC members, 298-300 Eichengreen, Barry, 97, 115 Employment Act of 1946,
340-41 Epstein, Gerald, 115, 332, 357 Expansionist School, 94-100 F AC index: influence on
FOMC voting, 265-8 FAC index: construction of,
257-8 Farm Relief Bill of 1933, 49,
100 Fed-watching, 222-5, 337-40 Federal Advisory Council,
10-20, 46, 84, 87, Ill, 251-73
Federal Advisory Council: conventional view, 254-6
Federal Advisory Council: symbiotic view, 255-6
Federal Advisory Council: Treasury influence over, Ill, 255
Federal Reserve: as sound money oracle, 32, 255
Federal Reserve: as whipping boy, 32, 255
Federal Reserve: confrontation with Administrations, 57-62
Federal Reserve: disclosure, 223, 335
Federal Reserve: political vs. non political appointees,
364 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
82-8,103-5,256,289, 294-7, 341, 349-51
Federal Reserve: secrecy, 223, 335
Federal Reserve: self -censorship, 335
Federal Reserve: structure of, 10-20
Federal Reserve Act (1913), 17, 82-4, 254, 288
Federal Reserve Bank, 10-20 Federal Reserve Bank: direct
orates, 10-20 Federal Reserve Bank of New
York: resentment of, 92-9 Federal Reserve Chairman:
function of, 10-20 Federal Reserve Reform Act
(1978), 288, 341 Federal Reserve System: func
tions, 10-20 Federal Reserve System: pri
vate sector representation within, 89-100, 252, 272-273, 348-354
Federal Reserve System: struggle for authority within, 39-47, 82-6, 100-3, 105
Feldstein, Martin, 68, 166 Ferguson, Thomas, 11 S FOMC voters: ease and tight-
ness groups, 295-300 FOMC voters: reliable and un
reliable groups, 207-212, 297-300
FOMC voting, 295-300 FOMC: composition, 102-3 FOMC: index, 266
FOMC: structure and functions, 10-20
Forgan, James, 46 Formalism: pitfalls of, 157,
342-43 Frey, Bruno, 72 Friedlaender, Ann F., 31, 72,
196, 216 Friedman, Milton, 30, 45, 73,
94-8, 108, 115, 132, 147, 193
Froyen, Richard, 31, 72, 73 196-7, 216
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, 341
Gamber, Edward N., 216 Garrad, Winston, 85 Giannini group, 1 OS Gildea, John, 132, 202-4, 217,
242, 285, 295, 322, 323, 357
Glass Steagall Act of 1932, 50, 95
Glass, Carter, 10, 83, 91, 102-3 Gold reserve backing, 49 Gold standard, 47, SO, 88. 90,
94-100, 119, 348 Golden, David , 31 Goodfriend Marvin, 336 Governors' Conference, 85 Granato, James, 331, 358 Granger causality, 126, 266 Greenspan, Alan, 18, 37, 118,
167-8 Greider, William, 36-7,73,
115, 117' 193, 256, 274, 286,306,335-36,357
Grier, Kevin T., 213, 221, 242,
Index
303, 322, 357 Griffiths, W, 148, 150 Hakes, David, 132, 147 Hamlin, Charles S., 85 Harding, Warren, 45-6, 49 Harding, W.P.G., 84, 89, 92 Harrison, William, 93-8,
327-30 Harrison, William B., 342, 357 Hastings, Delbert, 274 Heller, Walter, 56-60 Herren, Robert Stanley, 166,
193 Hetzel, Robert L., 27, 226, 242,
323, 358 Hibbs, Douglas, 323 Hill, R., 148, 150 Hoover, Herbert, 47, 97 Hoover, J. Edgar, 158 Humphrey, George, 53 Inflation: as an addiction, 327-
-30 Inflation: costs of, 328 Inflation: costs of monetary
policy, 108, 326-32 Inflation: unanticipated, 327-8 Janis, Irving, 323, 358 Johnson, Harry G., 196 Joint Commision on Agricul-
tural Inquiry, 87 Jones, David M., 37, 69, 74 Judge, George, 148, 150 Kalman filter, 127 Kane, Edward, 31, 74, 222,
243,291,305,323,358 Katz, Bernard, 72, 193 Karamouzis, Nicholas, 217,
256, 275
Kemp, Jack, 166 Kemp-Roth Act, 13, 66 Kennedy, David, 60 Kennedy, Edward, 166
365
Ketti, Donald F., 12, 27, 47-8, 53-4, 56, 59, 61, 63-4, 74, 83, 89, 93, 97, 102-3, 105-6, 109-10, 115, 161-2, 165, 193, 226, 243, 251, 253, 274, 289
Khoury, Salwa S., 196-97,217 Kudlow, Lawrence, 37 Lags: in response to Adminis-
tration signaling, 121 Lags: reporting, 121 Laney, Leroy, 74, 332, 356 Laxalt, Paul, 166 Lee, T., 147, 150 Lindley, James Thomas, 254,
274 Linkages, 13-5 Liquidationist School, 48, 94--
100 Lombra, Raymond, 30, 217,
256,275,285,300,324, 358
Luckett, Dudley, 31, 130, 148, 196,217
MacRae, Duncan, 30, 74 Maisel, Sherman, 36, 58-9, 74,
115, 158, 162, 193, 221, 226,243
Margin Interview, 37, 74, 117 Martin, Preston, 166, 285 Martin, William McChesney,
18, 35-37, 106, 118, 158-9, 302
Mayer, Thomas, 27, 217, 222,
366 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
243, 322, 323, 333, 334, 358
McAdoo, William, 85 McCabe, Thomas, 52, 105,
108-9, 158 McCracken, Paul, 60, 266 McCubbins, Matthew, 226, 243 McGregor, Rob, 127, 139, 147,
300, 322, 356 McKinney, Marie, 64, 74,
163-4, 193 Mellon, Andrew, 45-6, 85, 87,
89, 255, 272-3 Meltzer, Allan H., 130 Meyer, Eugene, 49, 93, 95 Miller, Aldoph, 47, 84, 88, 90,
94 Miller, G. William, 18, 61-5,
118, 163-5, 302 Miller, Paul, 302 MISERY index, 206-15 Monetary excesses: institution-
al defenses against, 340-44 Monetary history: importance
0~ 157,170,342-3 Monetary institutions: impor
tance of, 157, 170, 342-3 Monetary policy: activism, 54-
6, 346-7 Monetary policy: and material
ism, 354-5 Monetary policy: and redistri
butive policy, 12-14, 58-61, 63,67-8, 336-7
Monetary policy: as a morality play, 339
Monetary policy: costs of, 326-39
Monetary policy: costs of inflation, 108,326-32
Monetary policy: costs of lobbying, 338
Monetary policy: costs of monitoring, 338
Monetary policy: costs of signaling,338
Monetary policy: costs of threats, 224-5, 338
Monetary policy: credibility, 33
Monetary policy: denial as defense mechanism, 333
Monetary policy: during great depression, 93-108
Monetary policy: erosion of safeguards over monetary excess, 340-4
Monetary policy: measurement of private influences upon, 257-270
Monetary policy: misdirection, 337-40
Monetary policy: neoclassical criticism of, 19-20, 346-8
Monetary policy: obfuscation, 333
Monetary policy: politicization of, 12-15, 340-3
Monetary policy: power of appointment, 239-40, 286-88, 340
Monetary policy: pressures on 1914-1939,44-49,81-104
Monetary policy: private nonbanking influences upon, 252,270-3
Index
Monetary policy: projection as defense mechanism, 333
Monetary policy: psychopathology of, 332-6
Monetary policy: public choice approach, , 336-7
Monetary policy: rational expectations criticism of, 348
Monetary policy: responsiveness during transitions to new Administration, 118-120, 157-8
Monetary policy: responsiveness to banking industry signaling by Chairmen, 261-5
Monetary policy: responsiveness to ease and tightness signaling, 127-29, 131-39, 174-80, 257-70
Monetary policy: responsiveness to F AC index, 257-70
Monetary policy: responsiveness to signaling in general, 30, 119-20, 155-58, 251-56
Monetary policy: responsiveness to signaling under different Administrations, 129-39, 174-80
Monetary policy: responsiveness to signaling under different Chairman, 132-39, 158-69
Monetary policy: responsiveness to threat-augmented signaling, 173-80
Monetary policy: rules vs. dis-
367
cretion, 104, 346-8 Monetary policy: selective re
sponsiveness to signaling, 134-9, 169-181
Monetary policy: signaling by source and by Administration, 130-2, 174-80
Monetary policy: symbioses, 60,63
Monetary policy: targeting procedures, 197-201
Monetary policy: telegraphed by Chairman, 228-32
Monetary policy: time lags in response to signaling, 121
Monetary policy: uncertainity, 337-40
Monetary policy: under Bush Administration, 68-9, 175-77
Monetary policy: under Carter Administration, 61-5, 160-3, 175-77
Monetary policy: under Eisenhower Administration, 55-6
Monetary policy: under Ford Administration, 61-5, 130, 160-63, 175, 178
Monetary policy: under Johnson Administration, 57-60, 175
Monetary policy: under Kennedy Administration, 56-59, 158
Monetary policy: under Nixon Administration, 60-2, 15-9-60, 175-7
368 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
Monetary policy: under Reagan Administration, 65-9, 175-177
Monetary policy reforms: bases for, 344-7
Monetary policy reforms: central bank autonomy, 351-2
Monetary policy reforms: incentives, 224, 351-4
Monetary policy reforms: lengthening Chairman's term, 352-4
Monetary policy reforms: practicable vs. radical, 224, 348-9
Monetary policy reforms: private sector influences, 272-3
Montagu, Norman, 46 Moran, Mark, 226, 238, 243 Moran, Michael, 30, 300 Morgenthau, Henry, 51, 103-4 Multicollinearity, 123 Murray, Alan, 16, 27, 289, 323,
358 National Association of Busi
ness Economists, 273 National Monetary Commision,
82 Neal, Walter, 349 Neoclassical criticisms of mon
etary policy activism, 239-40,286-88,348
Net threats: as a dependent variable, 110, 213-S
Net threats: measurement of, 170-3
Net threats: to Fed powers,
110, 38-39, 155-7, 169, 182
New Deal, SO-l, 100-4 New Frontier, 13, SS-1 Newton, Maxwell, 36, 39, 74,
129, 148 Nonstationarity, 122 Nordhaus, William, 30, 74, 148 Office of Management and the
Budget, 37, 39, 68 Open Market Investment Com
mittee, SO, 89, 91 Open Market Policy Confer
ence, 91 Operation Twist, 56-57, 120,
158 Parkin, Michael, 332, 356 Patman, Wright, 54, 109-11,
157. 256, 351 Peg, The, Sl-53, 104-7 Persson, Torsten, 343, 358 Pierce, James, 74, 226, 242 Poterba, James, 31, 73 Political Business Cycle, 30,
124, 209 Political versus nonpolitical
appointees to the Federal Reserve, 82-6, 103-S, 289, 294-7,341, 349-Sl
Poole, William, 30, 74, 346, 358 Potts, Glenn, 31, 130, 148, 196,
217 Power of appointment to the
Federal Reserve (See Appointments to Federal Reserve)
Power of appointment to the Federal Reserve: as an
Index
alternative to signaling, 21-22,207-212,286-8, 340
Price level stability goal for monetary policy, 88, 348--50
Progressivism, 83, 104 Proxmire, William, 110, 163,
166 Psychopathology of monetary
policy, 332-6 Psychopathology of monetary
policy: denial, , 333 Psychopathology of monetary
policy: obfuscation, , 333 Psychopathology of monetary
policy: projection, , 333 Puckett, Richard, 130, 148 Quadriad, 56, 104 Rational expectations criticism
of monetary policy, 327, 347
Reaction functions: difficult to fit for the eighties, 212-5
Reaction functions: estimation of, 124-6, 195-200
Reaction functions: interpretation of, 196-200
Reaction functions: shifts in, 119-20, 157-9, 197
Reaction functions: stability of, 34, 228
Real Bills Doctrine, 48-9, 88, 119
REAL RATE index, 206-15 Reconstruction Finance Corpo
ration, 99 Regan, Donald, 68, 204
369
Regime changes, 119-20, 157-8 Reserve Banks, 1-5, 46-7, 89-
104 Reuber, G.L., 196, 217 Reuss, Henry, 110, 166 Riefler, Winfield, 52, 106 Rist, Charles, 90 Robertson, Ross M., 274 Rose, R., 358 Rose, Sanford, 75 Roos, Lawrence, 286 Roosa, Robert V., 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 48-9,
97, 100-4 Sachs, Jeffery, 322 SAFER index (See also Signal
ing/ Administration) SAFER index: absolute value
of, 206-15 SAFER index: construction of,
117-18 SAFER index: influence on
FOMC voting, 301 Sapp, Robert, 193, 217 Sargent, Thomas, 328, 358 Schacht, Hjalmar, 90 Schirm, David, 254, 274 Schmitter, P., 329, 359 Schneider, Friedrich, 72 Schorr, Juliet, 332, 357 Schultz, Charles, 64 Schwartz, Anna, 30, 45, 94-8,
108, 132 Schwartz, Thomas, 226, 242 Schweitzer, Robert, 15, 27, 73,
193,217,242,252,274, 287. 295, 323, 341
Seger, Martha, 37, 166, 307
370 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
Separation of powers and mon-etary policy, 88-9, 350
Sickles, Robin, 196, 216 Signaling (See also SAFER) Signaling/ Administration, by
Administration, 129-39, 174-180
Signaling/ Administration: altenatives, 286-87
Signaling/ Administration: by source, 130-32
Signaling/ Administration: costs of, 202-205, 286, 338
Signaling/ Administration: model of, 204-6,
Signaling/ Administration: non-responsiveness during transition to new Administration, 119-20, 157-8
Signaling/ Administration: response to ease and tightness, 127-29, 131-9, 174-80
Signaling/ Administration: selective responsiveness to, 134-9, 169-81
Signaling/ Administration: shifts in, 200
Signaling/ Administration: threat-augmented, 173-82
Signaling/ Administration: time lags in monetary policy response to, 121
Signaling/ Administration: time trends in, 200-1
Signaling/ Administration: under Bush Administration, 68-9, 175, 203-4
Signaling/ Administration: under Carter Administration, '61-5, 175-5,202-4
Signaling/ Administration: under different Chairmen, 132-9
Signaling/ Administration: under Eisenhower Administration, 55-6, 204
Signaling/ Administration: under Ford Administration, 61-5, 175-7
Signaling/ Administration: under Johnson Administration, 57-60, 175, 202, 204
Signaling/ Administration: under Kennedy Administration, 56-59
Signaling/ Administration: under Nixon Administration, 60-2, 175-7' 203
Signaling/ Administration: under Reagan Administration, 65-9, 175, 177
Signaling/ Administration: sources within, 130-32,
Signaling/banking industry, 258-65
Signaling/banking indus try: Fed Responsiveness to ease and tightness signaling by, 260-1
Signaling/banking industry: selective responsiveness to, 262-4
Signaling/banking industry: under different Chairmen, 261-5
Index
Signaling/Congressional, 232-41
Signaling/Congressional: measurement of, 222, 228-40
Signaling/Congressional: re-sponses to, 232-40
Snyder, John, 52 SOMC index, 268-70 Sprinkel, Beryl, 65, 68 Sproul, Allan, 52, 105 Steagall, Henry, 102-3 Stockman, David, 165 Strong, Benjamin, 29, 45-7, 85,
87. 88-99, 97 Strong, James G., 81 Sullivan, Mark, 97 Supply-Side Coup, 64, 119,
166, 200-4, 306 Supply-Side: opposition to
Volcker, 166-7 Supply-Side: Republican ease
oriented Tabellini, Guido, 343, 358 Taft, William Howard, 83 Targets of monetary policy,
197-201 Taylor, John, 33, 75, 330, 359 Temin, Peter, 95, 98, 115 Thaler, R.H., 329, 357 Thomas, Senator, 49 THREAT index: construction
of, 170-3 THREAT index: influence on
FOMC voting, 30 I THREAT index: influence on
monetary policy, 17 3-182 Threats to Fed powers, 38-39 Timberlake, Richard, 15, 27,
51, 75, 104-5, 115, 358 Time lags, see Lags
371
Tootell, Geoffrey, 297, 394 Treasury: debt refunding, 46,
51-3, 104-7 Treasury: interaction with
Federal Reserve, 39, 46, 51-3, 104-7
Truman, Harry, I 05-6 Tufte, Edward, 75 Type II error, 233 Unreliable appointees, 202-
203, 207-12, 297-300 Vencil, Daniel, 36, 68, 158-9,
193 Volcker, Paul, 18, 35-36, 83,
111, 118, 166-8, 285 Volcker, Paul: appointment to
Federal Reserve, 306 Volcker, Paul: defender of Fed
prerogatives, 38-39, 165, 181-2
Volcker, Paul: partisan loyalist vs. sound money devotee, 166-9, 181-2, 262-4
Wagner, Richard, 55 Wahar, Mark, 356 Wallace, Neil, 328, 358 Waller, Christopher, 304, 324 Wallich, Henry, 285, 290, 324 Warburg, Paul, 46, 84, 89 Waud, Roger N., 31, 72, 196-7 Weidenbaum, Murray, 65, 165 Weingast , Barry, 226, 238,
243, 303 Weintraub, Robert E., 31, 35,
75, 161-2, 226, 243 Weist, Philip, 196, 216
372 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
Wells, Wyatt, 36, 61-3, 66, 75, 111, 116, 194,203,217
Wheeler, Burton, 49, 100 Wheelock, David C., 90, 94, 96,
98-9, 116 Whittlesey, C.R., 275 Wicker, Elmus, 75, 91, 96, 99,
116 Willett, T., 74, 324, 332, 356 Williams, John S., 87 Wilmerding, Lucius, 81 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 29, 83-5,
254 Winston, Garrad, 46 Witte, William, 285, 323, 324,
358 Wood, John H., 196,217, 305,
324 Woolley, John T., 12, 27, 30,
31,36,75,116,225-6, 243, 251, 253, 255, 275, 286, 289, 324, 359
Wright, James, 166 Yeager, Leland, 330, 358 Yohe, William, 254, 274 Young,Roy,46,94,96