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Energy Policy

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Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: Investment trends andpolicy lessons

Anton Eberharda,⁎, Katharine Gratwickb, Elvira Morellac, Pedro Antmannc

a Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town, South Africab Independent Consultant, USAc World Bank, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O

Keywords:Independent power producersSub-Saharan AfricaInvestmentRenewable energyDevelopment finance institutionsPower sector reform

A B S T R A C T

Sub-Saharan Africa is in urgent need of more power. Private sector investment is key to achieving this. Alongwith Chinese-funded projects, Independent Power Projects (IPP) represent the fastest growing sources of powerinvestment in Sub-Saharan Africa. IPP investment flows show little concern for electricity market structures,but are more likely to gravitate to countries with strong planning, procurement and contracting capacity, as wellas good regulatory quality. Data from the continent also shows a variety of ownership and financing structuresfor IPPs, but generally development financing institutions (DFIs) play an important part in mitigating risk andbringing in private financiers. We also see renewable energy breaking through on the continent - both in scaleand price. This breakthrough is in part being facilitated by competitive procurement or auctions, which deliverlower prices and increased transparency when compared with renewable energy feed-in tariffs or directlynegotiated contracts. These developments have important policy implications, highlighting the need for:dynamic, least-cost planning, linked to the timely initiation of the competitive procurement of new generationcapacity; the building of effective regulatory capacity; and appropriate risk mitigation mechanisms. Such effortspromise to promote sustainable economic and social development across the continent.

1. The need for Independent Power Projects in Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a severe shortage of power. In 2014the 49 Sub-Saharan African countries, with a combined population ofmore than 800 million, had less generating capacity (92 GW) installedthan Spain (106 GW), a country with a population of 45 million (Findtet al., 2014; U.S. EIA, 2014). What further sharpens this contrast is thefact that more than half of the region's installed capacity is based in asingle country: South Africa. The remaining 46 GW is therefore sharedamong the remaining 48 countries in the region, with only 14 countrieshaving power systems larger than 1 GW. Put another way: installedcapacity in Sub-Saharan Africa is 44 MW per million people, comparedwith 192 MW per million people in India, 590 MW in Latin America,and 815 MW in China (U.S. EIA, 2014). Electricity demand is set todouble by 2030, and triple by 2040 (International Energy Agency,2015). A recent report by McKinsey estimates that more than $490billion will need to be invested in additional power generation capacityby 2040 to meet projected demand (Castellano et al., 2015).Approximately $45.6 billion was invested in electric power generationin Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2013; excluding South Africa,

this total drops to $31.3 billion (Eberhard et al., 2016). Existinginvestment levels are therefore far below what is required, calling forincreased private sector involvement (Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012).Independent Power Projects, or IPPs, are the main source of privateinvestment in the African power sector (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2013).While these entities are having a signficant impact on the Africanpower sector landscape, relatively little is known about their relatedoutcomes and the factors driving and underpinning these infrastruc-ture investments.

The research questions that we aim to address, are:

– What are the main power sector & IPP investment trends in Sub-Saharan Africa?

– Why are some countries more succesful in attracting private powerinvestments than others?

– What are the different IPP types (ownership structures, technologychoices, procurement methods) in Sub-Saharan Africa, and what arethe related outcomes?

– What are the key lessons for scaling up investment in powergeneration in Africa?

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.023Received 26 August 2016; Received in revised form 4 April 2017; Accepted 9 May 2017

⁎ Corresponding author.E-mail address: anton.eberhard@gsb.uct.ac.za (A. Eberhard).

Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

0301-4215/ © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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2. Methods

We define IPPs as power projects that are, in the main, privatelydeveloped, constructed, operated and owned; have a significantproportion of private finance; and have long-term power purchaseagreements with a utility or another off-taker. IPPs included in thisstudy are all greenfield, grid-connected installations of 5 MW (MW) orgreater that have reached financial close, are under construction, or arein operation. A significant amount of data on power projects has beencollected and analyzed for this study. Sources include a series of WorldBank databases, including the Private Participation in Infrastructure(PPI) database; data from the Energy Information Administration(EIA); and databases prepared by Aid Data and the OECD, amongothers. In addition, the authors have conducted primary and secondarysource research, particularly on individual Independent PowerProjects.

Apart from the above-noted data sources, the analysis of IPP typesand outcomes, as well as the identification of lessons learned, is basedprimarily on original, in-depth case studies carried out in fivecountries, namely Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, andUganda. The five case study countries were selected because theypresent the largest and most diversified experience with IPPs over thelongest time period, accounting for around 80% of IPP investment inSub-Saharan Africa. Each country has developed four or more IPPs, afact that facilitates an assessment of enabling policies and regulatoryframeworks, planning and procurement practices, and lessons learned.All five countries have been host to IPPs with different technologybases, which allows for a relatively in-depth evaluation of cost andreliability. Finally, each country has a mix of directly negotiated andcompetitively bid projects, which has the potential to shed light onwhich procurement methods are more effective.

2.1. Data limitations

Although an unprecedented body of data and case histories havebeen collected and analyzed, data limitations remain. Informationconcerning the composition of investments by funding source; theterms of IPP contracts (which remain mostly confidential); and thesize, composition, and types of investment from emerging financiers(notably China) was gathered from various sources and triangulated.For Chinese data specifically, the authors used Aid Data as a startingpoint. Additional secondary source research was conducted, and thenactual projects were verified with stakeholders in each of the studycountries. However, because nearly every Chinese-funded generationproject is directly negotiated with the government of a given Africancountry, limited public data is available.

Due to a lack of available data, government and utility megawattsand investments have largely been derived by (i) subtracting themegawatt totals of IPPs, Chinese, official development assistance(ODA), and multilateral finance institutions, and development financeinstitutions, and then (ii) using the Energy InformationAdministration's corresponding data on “megawatts installed by tech-nology” per country to determine residual megawatts per technology(U.S. EIA, 2014), and finally (iii) ascribing an investment value, basedon average costs per technology in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whereverpossible, efforts have been made to verify the megawatts and thetechnology with known projects undertaken by the government.

The focus of this paper is on power generation, as opposed to thetransmission and distribution (T &D) of electricity. While inadequateT &D is clearly a constraint on any effort to widen service access,countries must have sufficient generation capacity to be able to servenew customers, improve welfare, and accelerate economic develop-ment. Also, a detailed discussion of the environmental externalitiesattached to specific IPP technologies—which pose growing concern—lies outside the purview of this paper.

Finally, South Africa's size and prominence in the generation of

Sub-Saharan Africa's electric power is noteworthy and hence effortshave been made to present Sub-Saharan African tallies with andwithout South Africa.

3. Trends in power generation investment in Sub-SaharanAfrica

3.1. Investment trends

Power investments in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2013were far below requirements: only 15.63 GW net was added across theregion, excluding South Africa (U.S. EIA, 2014). The 1990s saw a mere1.84 GW of new capacity installed. Investment picked up since 2000,with an additional 13.8 GW installed in the region. Around 94% of thiscapacity has been added in only 15 countries, with the rest addinghardly any capacity at all, and some even losing capacity as a result ofcivil wars or poor maintenance (U.S. EIA, 2014).

While historically public utilities have been the major sources ofnew investment, this trend is changing. Most African governments areunable to fully fund their power needs, and most utilities do not haveinvestment-grade ratings and so cannot raise sufficient debt at afford-able rates (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2013). Official DevelopmentAssistance (ODA) and development finance institutions (DFIs) haveonly partially filled the funding gap. The fastest growing sources offinance for Africa's power sector are now private investments in IPPsand Chinese funding (Eberhard et al., 2016). Nevertheless, around 50%of investment in the African power sector is still coming from the publicsector, but it has remained stagnant over the period analyzed. Inaddition, concessionary DFI funding, ODA and Arab funding representa small portion of the overall funding picture, with no real growth. Thecontinent therefore seems set to increase its dependence on private andforeign (Chinese) investments to fund its power generation needs in thenear and medium term (Fig. 1).

3.2. Chinese funding

While not the explicit focus of this paper, the growing size andprominence of China's involvement in the African power sectorwarrants some discussion. Chinese funded generation assets representan important area of significant capacity additions in Sub-SaharanAfrica, totalling 34 projects in 19 countries between 1990 and 2014(Fig. 2). Taken together, these represent a total of 7.5 GW in installedcapacity, with most capacity added in the years 2009 – 2014 (Eberhardet al., 2016). According to the International Energy Agency, Chinesecapacity additions account for more than 30% of new capacity

Fig. 1. Investments in Power Generation, Five-Year Moving Average: Sub-SaharanAfrica (Excluding South Africa), 1994 – 2013. Note: DFI = Development FinanceInstitutions; IPP = Independent Power Project; ODA = Official Development Assistance;OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

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additions in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2010 and 2015 (InternationalEnergy Agency, 2016). The agency also reports that Chinese contrac-tors have built or are set to build more than 17 GW of new capacity inthe 2010 – 2020 period (International Energy Agency, 2016). It ishowever important to note that there is a considerable and growing gapbetween Chinese funding for African infrastructure and the involve-ment of Chinese contractors: close to 50% of the continent's infra-structure contracts in 2014 are being awarded to Chinese companies,while Chinese funding accounts for less than 5% of the continent'soverall infrastructure financing in the same period (Huang and Chen,2016).

Chinese power sector investments in Sub-Saharan Africa do notappear to follow an expected pattern, with no clear correlation betweenthe resource-wealth of a country and Chinese-backed investments.a

This is in line with findings by Brautigam (2009) as well as Dreher andFuchs (2006), which challenge the notion of Chinese aid and invest-ments in Africa being primarily motivated by resource-based consid-erations. What is however apparent is a preponderance for large ( >50 MW) hydro-power projects (Fig. 3) (Eberhard et al., 2016), compos-

ing 63% of Chinese-funded capacity between 2001 and 2014 and forwhich Chinese engineering, procurement and construction (EPC)contractors have become renowned worldwide. This is in line withfindings from the IEA's investigation into Chinese capacity additions,which finds that 49% of all power projects by Chinese companies forthe 2010 – 2020 period is hydropower focused (International EnergyAgency, 2016).

3.3. IPPs in Africa

Africa's experience with IPPs started in 1994 in Côte d′Ivoire,followed by Kenya in 1996 and Mauritius in 1997 (Eberhard andGratwick, 2011). IPPs have since spread to 18 countries (excludingSouth Africa), with 59 projects having been implemented. Most ofthese projects are concentrated in only a handful of countries(Eberhard et al., 2016) (Fig. 4). From 2011, investments began takingoff, with the years since (2011–2014) constituting the largest and mostsustained investment cycle to date, representing 14 projects (excludingSouth Africa), $4.9 billion in investment and an additional 2.1 GW incapacity. In total, IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa represent more than$11.12 billion in investments and 6.8 GW of installed capacity. AddingSouth Africa's 92 renewable energy IPPs brings this total to 151projects, totalling more than $30 billion in investment and more than12 GW in installed capacity. IPPs however still represent a minority oftotal generation capacity, mainly complimenting state-owned utilities.

IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa range in size from a few megawatts toaround 600 MW – though the majority of projects, about two thirds,are smaller than 100 MW (Eberhard et al., 2016) (Fig. 5). The over-whelming capacity (82%) is thermal –mostly open and combined-cyclegas turtbines. However, there is important growth in renewables –

Fig. 2. Comparison of Chinese-funded power projects and IPPs, by generation capacity:Sub-Saharan Africa, 1994 – 2014. Note: No IPPs recorded for 1995 or 2000, whichexplains the absence of those years in the figure. IPP = Independent Power Project; RSA= Republic of South Africa.Source: compiled by the authors, based on various primary and secondary sources.

Fig. 3. Chinese-supported power project capacity (% of MW), by technology: Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001 – 2014. Note: CCGT = combined-cycle gas turbine; HFO = heavyfuel oil; MSD = medium-speed diesel; MW = megawatt; OCGT = open-cycle gas turbine.Source: Compiled by the authors, based on various primary and secondary sources.

Fig. 4. Countries with the most independent power project capacity in Sub-SaharanAfrica, excluding South Africa, 1994 – 2014 (MW).

Fig. 5. Number of Independent Power Projects in various size categories (megawatt), tohave reached financial close as of 2014.Source: Compiled by authors, based on utility data, primary sources, and the PPIdatabase.

a Chinese-funded power generation projects exist in the following 19 countries:Botswana, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo,the Republic of Congo, Côte d′Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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most notably wind, solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP)(Fig. 6).

There has been a wide variety of African IPP sponsors and debtproviders, though a few have backed multiple projects. Table 1 high-lights specific IPPs from the five country case studies (excluding SouthAfrica, which is treated separately due to its sheer size).

While state institutions have invested in some IPPs—for example,the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Okpai and Afam) andthe government of Uganda (Bujagali), as well as the Kenya Power StaffPension Fund (Iberafrica)—private sponsors are prominent. PrivateAfrican partners are present in numerous projects and recently haveeven taken majority or full equity, as in the case of Aba Integrated(Nigeria), Gulf and Triumph (Kenya), and Tororo and Buseruka(Uganda). Following this, the most conspicuous equity sponsor,Globeleq, hails from Europe, and there are 15 other European entities,such as Aldwych and Wartsila, as well as numerous European bilateralDFIs, such as the Norwegian Investment Fund for DevelopingCountries (Norfund), the Netherlands Development FinanceCompany (FMO), and the Danish Investment Fund for DevelopingCountries (IFU). North America sponsors (primarily from the UnitedStates) are significantly fewer, at only seven, followed by South Asia(one), Southeast Asia (one), and the Middle East (one). Equity is alsoheld by multilateral agencies, namely, the International FinanceCorporation (IFC) and new infrastructure funds: for example, theAfrican Infrastructure Investment Fund (AIIF) managed by a SouthAfrican life insurer.

3.4. ODA and DFI financing

The sustained upward trend in IPP investments on the continent inthe past 5 years is all the more impressive if one considers that of the18 Sub-Saharan African countries with IPPs, only South Africa,Botswana and Mauritius have investment-grade ratings (Mecagniet al., 2014). This limits the possibilities of traditional project financedIPP deals. It is in this context where development finance institutions(DFIs) that invest in the private sector (e.g. International FinanceCorporation (IFC), the Netherlands Development Finance Company(FMO), Proparco, the Norwegian Investment Fund for DevelopingCountries (Norfund)) have played a significant role in funding IPPs

(Fig. 7) – bringing to financial close projects that would otherwise nothave been viable.b

4. Factors that support IPPs and their success

Despite the increase in funding, it is still only a small number ofcountries that are attracting IPPs. Why have some countries been moresuccesful than others in attracting private investment? The followingare some of the emergent determining factors for IPP investment flows.

4.1. Power markets

Sub-Saharan African utilities are often not credit-worthy off-takers,struggling to keep the lights on and unable to increase capacity(Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012). The aim of power sector reform indeveloping countries is primarily to improve utility performance – bothtechnical & commercial - and in the process attract more investment,to provide sustainable, affordable, adequate and reliable services for all,and power economic growth (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008).

The standard model of power sector reform – unbundle, privatise,create regulatory institutions, and create markets (Victor and Heller,2007) - is partly built on the premise that privatization will ultimatelyattract greater sector investment (Jamasb et al., 2005). The unbundlingof generation from Transmission and Distribution (T &D) was initiallyunderstood as a key reform element, and one that arguably should evenprecede the introduction of IPPs to ensure fairness in the contractingand dispatching of IPPs (versus the utility off-taker's own generation).However, nowhere in Africa is full wholesale or retail competition inplace (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). Instead, we find various hybridmodels – where public and private investment co-exist - implementedacross the continent. IPPs are found in very different market structures(Fig. 8), with no clear correlation between the level or sequencing ofreform and IPP investment. The majority of IPPs are in fact found incountries with vertically integrated utilities. This does not negate theimportance of sector reform, especially from sustainability, perfor-mance and governance points of view; it does however pose animportant question regarding what was once assumed to be drivingprivate power sector investment. If power sector restructuring is notessential for attracting investment, then what is?

4.2. Independent regulation

By definition, IPPs are investment transactions regulated by theunderlying contracts. Regulations at the sector level are also importantin defining the rules of the game and ultimately shaping the enablingenvironment for IPPs (Findt et al., 2014). The establishment of energyregulators has been the most widespread power sector reform elementin Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than half of the region's countrieshaving such an agency (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). As a rule, thecountries with the most IPPs all have an independent regulatoryauthority.

An independent regulator brings with it oversight capacity andcould potentially enforce the competitive procurement of IPPs. Thishas unfortunately not been the case in many Sub-Saharan Africancountries, and we are increasingly seeing regulatory risk serve as afurther disincentive to investment. Merely having a regulator is thusnot sufficient; rather, it is the quality of regulation produced andenforced by this regulator that is critical for attracting private invest-ment. Transparent, fair and accountable regulators that produce

Fig. 6. Independent Power Project Capacity (% of MW), by Technology: Sub-SaharanAfrica (Excluding South Africa), 1994 – 2014. Note: CCGT = combined-cycle gas turbine;HFO = heavy fuel oil; MSD = medium-speed diesel; MW = megawatts; OCGT = open-cycle gas turbine.Source: Compiled by the authors, based on utility data, primary sources, and the PrivateParticipation in Infrastructure (PPI) database.

b As stated before, only three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have investment-gradecredit ratings: South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana. Of these three, only Mauritius andSouth Africa have IPPs. Because of South Africa's distorting effect, Fig. 7 excludes datafrom South Africa. Mauritius has six IPPs, but only one has any DFI involvement. This isthe Belle Vue Power Plant, a 71.2MW coal/bagasse plant that reached financial close in1998 and was provided with a US$17 million loan from the EIB.

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Table 1Project sponsors and debt holders in selected case studies.Source: Compiled by authors, based on various primary and secondary source data.

Project Equity partners (country, % of equity held) Procurement Contract changeY=yes/N=no

Equity turnover(#)a

KenyaWestmont Equity: Westmont (Malaysia, 100%); sought to sell plant since 2004; ultimately towed back

to MalaysiaDN Not extended —

Debt: equity financedIberafrica Equity: Union Fenosa (Spain, 80%), KPLC Pension Fund (Kenya, 20%) since 1997 DN Y 0

Debt: Union Fenosa ($12.7 million in direct loans and guaranteed $20 million); KPLCStaff Pension Fund ($9.4 million in direct loans and guaranteed $5 million through localKenyan bank)

OrPower4 Equity: Ormat (USA, 100%) since 1998 ICB Y 0Debt: Equity financed until 2009, European DFIs $105 million loan in 2009, then OPICloan of $310 million drawn down in 2012–13

Tsavo Equity: Cinergy (USA) and IPS (Int’l) jointly owned 49.9%; Cinergy sold to Duke Energy(USA) in 2005, CDC/Globeleq (UK, 30%), Wartsila (Finland, 15%), and IFC (Int’l, 5%) retainremaining shares since 2000

ICB N 1

Debt: IFC own account ($16.5 million), IFC syndicated ($23.5 million), CDC own account($13 million), DEG own account (€11 million), DEG syndicated (€2 million)

Rabai Equity: Aldywch-International (Netherlands, 34.5%), BWSC (Danish, but owned by Mitsuiof Japan, 25.5%), FMO (Netherlands, 20%), IFU (Danish bilateral lender, 20%)

ICB N 0

Debt: FMO ($126 million), Proparco and EAIF (25% each), DEG (15%), EuropeanFinancing Partners (10%)

Mumias Equity: Mumias Sugar Company Limited (100%/Kenya) DN N 0Debt: Not available

Thika Equity: Melec Powergen (part of Maletec grp) (90%/Lebanon) ICB N 0Debt: AfDB (€28 million), IFC (€28 million), ABSA Capital (€28 million)

Triumph Equity: Broad Holding (Kenya), Interpel Investments (Kenya), Taceflex (Kenya), SouthernInter-trade (Kenya)

ICB N 0

Debt: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) ($80 million), and Kenya's CFCStanbic Bank ($28 million) (of which Standard Bank is the parent, in which ICBC has a20% stake)

Gulf Equity: Consortium of local investors, namely Gulf Energy Ltd and Noora Power Ltd ICB N 0Debt: $76 million in long-term debt financing (IFC A Loan, and commercial lendingthrough IFC B Loan and OPEC Fund for International Development)

Kinangop Equity: Aeolus Kenya, AIIF2, majority owner (South Africa/Mauritius), Norfund (Norway) REFiT N 0Debt: Kenyan CFC Stanbic Project stalled.

Turkana Equity: KP & P Africa BV (Netherlands) with Aldwych International (Netherlands) DN N 0Debt: (foreign and local): AfDB, EIB, the Standard Bank of South Africa, Nedbank, FMO,Proparco, East African Development Bank (EADB), PTA Bank, EKF, Triodos, and DEG.The project's debt raising for the generation project was led by the AfDB, as mandated leadarranger, with the Standard Bank of South Africa and Nedbank Limited as coarrangers

NigeriaAES Equity: Enron (USA, 100%) sold to AES (95%) and YFP (Nigeria, 5%) in 2000 DN Y 1Barge Debt: $120 million loan (foreign and local): RMB (South Africa), FMO, African Export

Import Bank, Diamond Bank Nigeria, Fortis Bank, KfW, United Bank for Africa, AfricaMerchant Bank

Okpai Equity: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigeria, 60%), Nigerian Agip OilCompany (Italy, 20%), and Phillips Oil Company (USA, 20%) maintained equity since 2001

DN Y 0

Debt: 100% equity financedAfam VI Equity: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigeria, 55%), Shell (UK/Netherlands,

30%), Elf (Total) (France, 10%), Agip (Italy, 5%)DN N 0

Debt: 100% equity financedAba Integrated Equity: Geometric DN N 0

Debt: Senior debt: Diamond Bank (Nigeria) and Stanbic IBTC Bank (Nigeria);Subordinated debt: EIB and EAIF

TanzaniaIPTL Equity: Mechmar (Malaysia, 70%), VIP (Tanzania, 30% in kind); sold to Pan Africa Power

Tanzania Ltd (PAP) in 2013 (disputed)DN Y 1

Debt: Bank Bumiputra and Sime Bank (Singapore); Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong(SCB-HK) bought debt, valued at $125 million, for $74 million (in 2005)

Songas Equity: TransCanada sold majority shares to AES (USA) in 1999 and AES sold majorityshares to Globeleq (UK) in 2003. All preferred equity shares were converted into “LoanNotes” in June 2009, only common shares remain

ICB Y 2

Debt: IDA ($120 million), EIB ($50 million), assumed loans of $69.2 million from initialTANESCO plant

Mtwara Equity: Artumas Group Inc. (Canada, 100%), sold shares to Wentworth Group, which in turnsold to TANESCO in 2012

ICB Y 2

Debt: 100% financed with balance sheet of shareholdersSymbion Equity: Built by Richmond, sold to Dowans, then to Symbion DN Y 2

Debt: equity financed

Ugandab

(continued on next page)

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credible and predictable regulatory decisions are necessary for creatingcertainty around market access, tariffs, and revenues that encourageinvestment (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011).

4.3. Planning, procurement & contracting

Apart from the quality of regulation, there are further elements thatplay an important role in attracting IPP investment. The first set ofissues relate to generation planning, procurement and contracting.

4.3.1. PlanningIn the course of power sector reform and restructuring, least-cost

power planning is often neglected. Typically, this responsibility shiftsfrom the incumbent national utility to the ministry of energy or theregulator, but these institutions seldom have the experience orresources to produce regular and flexible power plans. Additionally,in hybrid power markets it is often unclear who is responsible forgeneration expansion planning.

The ideal location for this function is the system operator, whichcan be assigned responsibility not only for short-term, but also mediumand long-term supply security. However, this only makes sense if thesystem operator and transmission utility are unbundled from the statepower generation company so that they can plan objectively and fairlyfor the entire national system. An unbundled system operator can alsobe responsible for procurement and contracting of new power genera-tion capacity. In several countries in Africa, this function remainswithin the national utility, in which case the government may exercisepolitical leadership to ensure that the incumbent utility works in thenational interest. Whatever the arrangements are, it is critical that theresponsible agency be resourced with adequate capacity.

The nature of power sector planning is equally important: it needsto be up-to-date and flexible to ensure security of supply, a least-costmix of generation plants, and the right combination of exports andimports. Currently, the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries haveinadequate planning capacity and end up contracting out this function

to consultants (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). All five case studycountries have some form of least cost power development plansdeveloped, although in the cases of South Africa, Nigeria and Ugandathese plans are severely outdated.

4.3.2. Procurement & contractingFor electricity plans to matter, they need to be translated into

timely procurement and well-delineated investment opportunities forthe private and public sector. Unfortunately, few African countries havean explicit connection between planning and procurement (Malgas andEberhard, 2011). In addition, clearly stated criteria for the allocation ofinvestment opportunities between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) andIPPs are lacking.

A key feature of power generation procurement in Africa is the lowrecourse to competitive bidding, despite the fact that this is frequentlyenshrined into legislation. A minority of IPPs in SSA, excluding SouthAfrica, have been competitively procured: only 16 competitive tendersversus 34 directly negotiated projects. This is partly due to the firstIPPs being procured in reaction to power shortages (in all five casestudy countries), in contexts where capacity planning was weak. Incontrast, competitive tenders require good planning, procurement andcontracting frameworks – and often impose higher transaction costs.They have, however, delivered better price outcomes than directlynegotiated power projects, even in situations with too few bidders(Fig. 9). Competitive tenders are also more transparent, providingbetter investment certainty and less chance of corruption.

More than two decades of experience in power procurement in Sub-Saharan Africa have demonstrated that a lack of competition inprocuring new generation capacity has extensive drawbacks, rangingfrom immediate effects on project outcomes (higher prices, unravellingcontracts, and so on) to more general effects on the overall governanceof the electricity sector and its investment climate. Despite this, we seeboth forms of procurement used relatively consistently from 1990 to2014, with no clear move away from or towards either direct negotia-tions or competitive bidding (Fig. 10).

Table 1 (continued)

Project Equity partners (country, % of equity held) Procurement Contract changeY=yes/N=no

Equity turnover(#)a

Bujagali Equity: Sithe Global (USA, 58%), IPS-AKFED (32%), Government of Uganda (10%) ICB N 0Debt: IFC, EIB, Proparco, KfW, AfDB, FMO, DEG, AfDB, Standard Chartered, ABSA

Namanve Equity: Jacobsen (Norway, 100%) ICB N 0Debt: Norwegian commercial bank and local Ugandan bank, and supported by theNorwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Bugoye Equity: TrønderEnergi, Norfund (Norway) DN N 0Debt: EAIF/FMO

Mpanga Equity: South Asia Energy Management Systems (SAEMS) (USA, 100%) DN N 0Debt: EAIF, FMO, DEG

Tororo Equity: Electro-Maxx (Uganda, 100%) DN N 0Debt: funded by local Ugandan banks

Ishasha Equity: Eco Power Ltd (Sri Lanka, 100%) DN N 0Debt: Sri Lankan commercial banks

Buseruka Equity: Hydromax Limited (Uganda, 100%) DN N 0Debt: African Preferential Trade Area Bank (PTA), AfDB

ABSA = South African commercial bank; AfDB = African development Bank; AIIF = African Infrastructure Investment Fund; BWSC = Danish engineering company now owned byMitsui; CDC = Commonwealth Development Corporation; DEG = German Investment and Development Corporation; DFIs = development finance institutions; DN = direct negotiation;EAIF = Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund; EIB = European Investment Bank; EKF = Eksport Kredit Fonden—Danish export credit fund; FMO = Netherlands Development FinanceCompany; GETFiT = global energy transfer feed-in-tariff; ICB = international competitive bid; IDA = International Development Association; IFC = International Finance Corporation;IFU = Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries; IPS = Industrial Promotion Services; IPS-AKFED = Industrial Promotion Services Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development;IPTL = Independent Power Tanzania Ltd; KfW = German Development Bank; KP & P = Company registered in the Netherlands to develop the Lake Turkana Wind project; KPLC =Kenya Power and Lighting Company; OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; OPIC = Overseas Private Investment Corporation; REFiT = renewable energy feed-in-tariffs; RMB = Rand Merchant Bank; TANESCO = Tanzania Electric Supply Company; YFP = Yinka Folawiyo Power.

a Shareholders—particularly those with technical expertise—are often prohibited (by lenders) from selling until after commercial operation.b The balance of four Ugandan IPPs (Kilembe Mines aka Mubuku I, Kakira, Kinyara, and Kasese Cobalt aka Mubuku III), not included in the table above, were developed to source

electricity to the mining/sugar industries and have evacuated excess power to the national grid. Also not included are the eight GETFiTs and two solar ICBs for which financial close wasimminent but not yet complete in 2014.

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In most cases, IPP contracts extend over a long period of time; thetypical contract is for 15–30 years. This long time frame is consideredboth a strength and a weakness. Predictable revenue streams allowequity risk capital to be rewarded, and sponsors can also service debtwith long tenors. Conversely, in an environment of power marketreform, both parties can encounter problems with fixed long-term take-or-pay contracts if the various conditions under which the contracts areagreed upon change. Governance frameworks, which shape the degree

of predictability and risk in the sector, ultimately impact on investmentand development outcomes.

4.4. Risk mitigation

At the crux of the investment conundrum is the security of revenueflows and hence the financial viability of the off-taker – usually thenational utility. Many African utilities have poor credit ratings andperform inefficiently (Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012). Average dis-tribution losses in Sub-Saharan Africa are 23%, compared with thecommonly used norm of 10% or less in developed countries. Moreover,average collection rates are only 88.4% compared with the best practiceof 100%. Combining the costs of distribution losses and uncollectedrevenue, expressed as a percentage of utility turnover, provides ameasure of a utility's inefficiency. In Africa, this efficiency is equivalent,on average, to 50% of turnover (Eberhard et al., 2011).

At the sector level, governance reforms targeting ownership andshareholder quality, managerial and board autonomy, accountingstandards, performance monitoring, outsourcing, labour markets andcapital market discipline can critically improve the performance ofstate-owned utilities. Most utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa meet onlyabout half of the criteria for good governance. At the operational level,practices targeting technical and commercial efficiency will amelioratethe financial standing of a utility in a short period of time (Eberhardand Shkaratan, 2012). Such actions become increasingly important as autility approaches an IPP transaction, since these directly affect itsability to honour payment obligations.

Given the performance of most state-owned utilities in SSA, credit

Fig. 7. Total investment by IPPs and by Development Finance Institutions: Sub-SaharanAfrica (Excluding South Africa), 1994 – 2014. Note: DFI = development financeinstitution; IPP = Independent Power project;.

Fig. 8. Electricity sector structures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2014. Note: includes vertical integration or unbundling of generation (G), transmission (T), and distribution (D) andpresence of IPPs. CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo; IPP = independent power project; PSP = Private Sector Participation.

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enhancement and risk mitigation – including payment and terminationrisks - are therefore important for attracting IPP investment in SSA.Robust PPAs – most often denominated in US dollars or euros - havebecome a requirement for new investors seeking to safeguard paymentstreams. Risks can furthermore be reduced through governance reforms;providing investor certainty around planning, procurement and con-tracting; through the involvement of development finance institutions;ring-fenced revenue, escrow accounts, letters of comfort and credit,guarantees, put-call options on termination; and political insurance. Ouranalysis of IPPs shows that significant de-risking is necessary to attractprivate equity and debt-providers (Eberhard et al., 2016).

DFI involvement, in particular, has played a critical role in bringingIPPs to financial close. DFIs appear to “crowd-in” private investments bytheir ability to exercise pressure on the host government to honourcontracts, as well as their offering risk mitigation products such asguarantees and insurance.c As a result, we have seen very few IPPs actuallyunravelling, and a renegotiation of contractsd (after the PPA was signed) inonly eight of the 27 IPPs in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania.

Of the 47 IPPs that have reached financial close between 1990 and2015 in these four case study countries, 29 have some form or anotherof DFI involvement. 18 of these projects have received direct DFIinvestment totalling US$ 2 198 million through equity or loans,representing on average 47% of the total investment for these projects.While five IPPs have some form of “foreign” guarantee or riskinsurance in place, 12 projects have benefitted from some form ofODA grant (Eberhard et al., 2016). It is thus clear that for the majorityof IPPs in the case study countries, DFI's played a significant role,either through the use of risk mitigation products or, primarily,through actually investing in these projects.

4.5. Performance of five case study countries

Fig. 11 provides a visual breakdown of the number of IPPs percountry (excluding South Africa). Of the present pool of 58 IPPs thathave reached financial close, Kenya and Uganda have the highestnumber.e It is noteworthy that three-quarters of the projects in thesetwo countries have closed within the past three years. Thus, more than50% of the total IPP pool, in terms of number of projects, isconcentrated in two countries and is relatively new. The balancedeveloped slowly over the two decades since the first large-scale IPPreached financial close in 1994 in Côte d′Ivoire.

Table 2 below provides a summary of some of the key power sectorfeatures in the five case study countries.

Of the five countries, South Africa clearly has the best investmentclimate, a policy for expanding renewable energy, a power plan linkedto a series of competitive tenders, and a set of standardized contractsbacked by a sovereign guarantee. The country has an independentregulator, although its decisions have not always been consistent. Itcould be argued that utility tariffs do not fully reflect costs; never-theless, the regulator has mandated the full pass-through of IPP costs.The consequence has been a highly successful IPP program where moremegawatts and investment have been contracted in four years than inthe previous two decades across the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.Remarkably, this has been achieved within an electricity sector thatis dominated by a large state-owned vertically integrated utility thatrelies mostly on coal and once was not receptive to IPPs.

Kenya has an investment climate that is better than that ofneighboring Tanzania and Uganda, as well as Nigeria, and has beenable to attract private investment at a lower cost than these countries.

Fig. 9. Comparison of price outcomes for Medium-Speed Diesel and Solar PV in SSA.Note: ICB – International Competitive Bid, DN – Directly Negotiated, REFiT –

Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff, MSD – Medium-Speed Diesel, PV – Photovoltaic.

Fig. 10. Competitive tenders vs. directly negotiated projects, excluding South Africa,1994 – 2014 (MW). DN = direct negotiation; ICB = international competitive bid; MW =megawatts.Source: Based on authors’ calculations.

Fig. 11. Number of Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa by country (excl.South Africa). 1994 – 2014.Source: Compiled by authors, based on utility data, primary sources, and the PPIdatabase.

c While risk mitigation has been critical to attract private investment to IPPs, in noproject have guarantees of any sort been invoked, including projects whose contractsultimately unraveled.

d Such changes vary, from a scaling back of project size, to a reconfiguration of theproject in its entirety. Further changes have included the rolling back or elimination ofcertain security arrangements to reduce the financial liability of the state-owned utility. Itshould be noted that changes occurred in what might be termed the first wave of IPPs inSub-Saharan Africa – which may signal there has been a learning process.

e Projects included in this tally are all grid-connected IPPs with a capacity of 5MW andgreater. A complete list is provided in Appendix 1. While Zimbabwe has three hydro-power IPPs, these projects are all under 5MW and are therefore excluded here.

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

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Its electricity sector has been unbundled, it has an independentregulator, and it once had a clear power-planning process and acompetent procurement capability in the Kenya Power and LightingCompany (KPLC), the T &D company. The regulator has helped movetariffs to cost-reflective levels, and the KPLC has been reasonablycreditworthy. The consequence is a series of competitive procurementswith steadily better price outcomes.

Tanzania on the other hand has a weaker investment climate, someambivalence around private sector investment, a vertically integratedstate-owned utility with technical and financial performance chal-lenges, and poor planning and procurement practice—despite a reg-ulator that seeks to encourage more transparent and competitiveprocurement. Tanzania has relied more on unsolicited bids and directnegotiations than on competitive tenders. As a result, some IPPs herestand out for their high prices and controversial contracts.

Uganda's recent success has relied less on its overall investmentclimate and more on a clear power sector structure and a recentcompetitive tendering program for small renewable energy powerplants. With its power sector unbundled, IPPs contract directly withthe transmission company, free of conflicts with state-owned genera-tion, and the privately concessioned distribution company is increas-ingly more effective in reducing losses and improving its financialviability. The dedicated global energy transfer feed-in-tariff (GETFiT)intervention has provided transaction advice and support for runningcompetitive tenders coupled with standardized contracts. It remains tobe seen whether this initiative can be sustained in the future.

Nigeria's investment climate is challenging; its previous successwith IPPs had less to do with a clear policy framework and more withstrong political will at the highest levels. A protracted and torturouspower sector reform process—including full unbundling, privatization,and, eventually, competition—has, in the short term, probably made itharder to secure investments in new IPPs. It is hoped that, eventually,the reform process will improve the financial viability of the sector, andthe Nigerian Bulk Energy Trader (NBET) will become a dependableand attractive off-taker for IPPs.

This analysis of the case study countries reveals no single orconsistent element that guarantees IPP investment. Planning andcompetitive procurement practices are important; creditworthiness ofoff-taker utilities is also critical, but policy makers should not lose sightof the broader investment, policy, and regulatory climate.

5. Renewable energy technologies are breaking through

The majority of IPPs in Africa have historically been thermal, mainly

gas or diesel plants. However, we are seeing rapid growth in grid-connected renewable energy capacity, especially wind and solar. TheSouth African Renewable Energy Independent Power ProducerProcurement Programme (REIPPPP) is an important illustration of this,with more than 6327 MW of renewable energy contracted in 4 years,across 92 projects, with an investment of more then US$19 billion(Eberhard et al., 2016, 2014). South Africa has added more renewableenergy capacity and IPP projects in this short period of time, than the restof Sub-Saharan Africa has in more than 20 years. Over four bid rounds,prices fell 46% for wind energy and 71% for solar PV to levels lower thanthe utility's average cost of supply (Eberhard and Kåberger, 2016).

While South Africa clearly leads the region in terms of renewableenergy IPPs, it is important to note that this trend is not limited to asingle country. Fig. 12 below provides an overview of renewable energycapacity (excluding hydro) from 2006 to 2015 for Sub-Saharan Africa,clearly showing a significant increase in capacity beyond South Africa.

Most of the new RE capacity in the region has been contracted inSouth Africa, through the competitive procurement program(REIPPPP). Looking beyond South Africa, it is clear that theREIPPPP is having a signficant regional impact, with eight Sub-Saharan African countries officially having developed renewable energyauction policies by 2015 (REN21, 2016). This is a significant develop-ment given that, apart from South Africa, there were no competitiveprocurement programmes for renewable energy in the SSA region in

Fig. 12. Renewable Energy Installed Capacity (megawatt) in Africa, 2006 – 2015. Note:Excludes hydropower; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; SA = South Africa;.Source: Compiled by authors based on IRENA Annual Renewable Energy Statistics.

Table 2Summary of power sector features in case study countries.Source: Compiled by authors, based on various primary and secondary source data.

Country Unbundledutility

Privatizedutility

Wholesalecompetition

Independentregulator

Least-cost power developmentplan (LCPDP)

Predominant procurementpractices

South Africa No No No Yes Integrated Resource Plan for 2010–2030 out of date

Competitive

Kenya Yes No No Yes LCPDP based on stakeholderconsultations

Competitive

Tanzania No No No Yes Electricity Supply Mostly direct negotiationsReform Strategy and Roadmap,2014–2025; LCPDP, 2013

(some previous tenders with limitedcompetition)

Uganda Yes Partiala No Yes 2011 Power Sector Investment Plannot updated

Direct negotiations until advent ofGETFiT (hybrid feed-in tariff withcompetitive tenders)

Nigeria Yes Yes Transitional market Yes System operator is mandated toprepare a power master plan but hasnot been updating it

Direct negotiations

Note.a Uganda’s main distribution utility is concessioned to a private company, as is the previous state generation utility. Transmission remains public. There are also some small private

regional concessions not connected to the main transmission grid. GETFiT = global energy transfer feed-in-tariff.

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

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2011 (REN21, 2012).The Ugandan GETFiT program further illustrates the growth in

competitively procured renewable power. In 2013, KfW assisted theUgandan Regulatory Authority to develop the GETFiT to incentivisenew investments, aiming to add 170 MW to the country's 840 MWinstalled capacity (in 2013) (Meyer et al., 2015). The primary GETFiTmechanism is a grant-based premium payment at the REFiT level toclose the gap with the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) for eligibletechnologies, namely small hydropower, biomass, bagasse, and solarPV. A competitive tender run in 2014 for four 5 MW solar PV plantsdelivered an average levelised tariff of US$c 16.37/kWh – lower thanthe average retail tariff of US$c 16.6/kWh in 2013 (Meyer et al., 2015).

Furthermore, Zambia's very recent experience with solar PV IPPscould be a technological game-changer for the continent: through theIFC's Scaling Solar program, two 50 MW solar PV projects were put outto tender. The lowest winning bid came in at US$c 6.02/kWh – a newrecord for Africa. The tariffs are fixed (non-indexed) for the 25-yearcontract period (International Finance Corporation, 2016).

These are but two examples outside of South Africa in the region.Scaling Solar is set to soon being rolled out in Madagascar, Senegal andEthiopia (Eckhouse, 2016; Sibanda and MacInnis, 2016). Ghana andBurkina Faso concluded RE auction rounds in 2016, and Botswana,Namibia, Ethiopia and Senegal launched pre-qualification or proposalsubmission stages for their respective auction programmes in the sameyear. Kenya and Nigeria are additionally in the process of developingauction programmes and more countries are soon to follow. While themajority of renewable energy projects on the continent contracted inthe past 3 years remain based on feed-in tariffs or directly negotiateddeals, this surge in competitive procurement programmes seems toindicate a noteworthy shift.

Given these trends, the renewable energy sector is set to grow anddiversify on the continent, with major additions in especially wind,solar PV and geothermal generation projected to come online in thenext few years (Marks et al., 2016; Quitzow et al., 2016).

6. Conclusion and policy implications

As demonstrated by the data on investment trends reported in thispaper, IPPs make an important and growing contribution to meetingSub-Saharan Africa's power needs. These projects are concentrated in afew countries, but there is scope to widen private investment across thecontinent. Current experience with IPPs on the continent offersimportant lessons for how this can be done (Eberhard et al., 2016).

Previously published research on critical success factor for IPPsincludes a range of country specific factors (investment climate, powersector policies and regulation, effective planning and competitiveprocurement) and project specific factors (well structured, bankableprojects with experienced sponsors and debt providers, robust PPAs,risk mitigation and security measures, and strategic project manage-ment) (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011).

An analysis of the case study countries that have had the mostsuccess in attracting IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa, suggests that while allof the above success factors are important, more emphasis needs to beplaced on dynamic power planning, competitive procurement practicesand adequate contracting capacity. Power planning cannot be neglectedand is an essential first step towards greater private sector powerinvestment. Sound planning means that countries are able to projectfuture electricity demand correctly, decide on least-cost supply options,and anticipate how long it would take to procure, finance, and build therequired generation capacity. Planning tools must be updated fre-quently and new build opportunities should be allocated betweenpublic and private generators on the basis of clear criteria. Finally,there must be an explicit link between planning and the timely

initiation of international competitive bids or auctions for long-termcontracts for new power. Without these policy tools, capacity andreforms, a country is unlikely to see new privately financed powergeneration capacity.

IPP investments in Africa will rely on long-term contracts with off-takers. Competitive tenders for these long-term contracts – also calledcompetition for the market - more often than not result in betterinvestment and price outcomes than feed-in-tariffs or directly nego-tiated projects. This is especially true for standardised technologiessuch as renewable energy, diesel-generation and heavy-fuel oil gen-erators. Competitive tenders are also more transparent, leading to lesscorruption. The use of standard contracts in competitive tendersfurthermore result in a fair allocation of risk. And projects are morelikely to move to financial close, construction and commercial opera-tion. Competitive procurement has also been shown to lead to thedevelopment of a pipeline of bankable projects, especially for renew-able energy.

More competitive tenders should be run in a greater number ofcountries, both for standard thermal technologies as well as for othertechnologies and contexts where competition is possible. While thecosts of running a competitive procurement program might be higherthan those involved in directly negotiated projects, these are justifiedby the lower prices achieved. If directly negotiated projects are to beused, governments need to build capacity to ensure that they offervalue for money, and that the project developers have the requiredtechnical and financial capabilities.

IPP contracts should be undertaken with financially viable off-takers, whether these be utilities or large customers. Secure revenueflows are essential for ensuring the bankability of IPPs, most of whichare project-financed. While credit-enhancement and security measurescan mitigate some of this risk, the ultimate goal for host governmentsand development partners should be the improved performance of off-takers (in most cases utilities) as sustainable solution.

The case studies demonstrate that Development FinanceInstitutions are playing an important role in IPP financing and riskmitigation. The mere presence of these institutions seems to attractprivate sector interest, particularly due to their ability to exercisepressure on host governments to honour commitments. However, careshould still be taken to ensure that where adequate commercialfinancing appetite exists, DFIs are not taking on more than theirappropriate share of financing volume.

A further notable conclusion of the paper is that IPPs have beendeveloped in countries with very different power sector structures andlevels of reform. This conclusion does not imply that power sectorreform is unimportant but it does underline the relevance of additionalfactors, noted above, in accelerating investment in IPPs. In developingcountries in Sub-Saharan Africa, some reforms may be more importantthan others. Clearly full wholesale or retail competition is not a pre-condition for private investment in power. But clear policy and effectiveregulatory frameworks are important for securing market entry,revenue flows and contract prices. And the separation of state-ownedgeneration companies from the main transmission system (as inKenya) provides a level-playing for IPPs and more investment certaintyand confidence.

Finally, we have noted the extent to which renewable energy IPPsare breaking through and can be competitively procured. The signifi-cant renewable energy price reductions evidenced by the latest auctionsclearly show that renewable energy can compete with fossil-fuel basedsources and in many countries solar and wind energy are now thecheapest sources of power. This has significant implications for how thecontinent's relatively undeveloped power systems are designed. MostAfrican countries have excellent solar resources, and many have goodwind resources as well. But solar and wind energy are also variable and

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

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need to be complemented with flexible resources. This calls for a re-evaluation of the role of utilities and power markets in balancing thesystem and contracting appropriate back-up and auxiliary services.

In conclusion, investment in African IPPs is growing, but not fastenough. Africa does not have sufficient power. All sources of invest-ment need to be encouraged. For IPPs to flourish, Africa needsdynamic, least-cost planning, linked to the timely initiation of thecompetitive procurement of new generation capacity. This must beaccompanied by the building of effective regulatory capacity thatencourages the distribution utilities that purchase power to improvetheir performance and prospects for financial sustainability – and to

widen access to electricity. IPP investment require appropriate riskmitigation, often helped by the participation of development financeinstitutions. Renewable energy are breaking through and competitiveprices are being achieved in auctions for new power. Such effortspromise to promote sustainable economic and social developmentacross the continent.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based, in part, on research supported by the WorldBank (UPI00217304).

Appendix A. Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa

See:Tables A1–A18.

Table A1IPP investments in Angola by project.

Project Information Project Name Project Name2Chicapa Hydroelectric Plant Biocom (Malange)

Capacity (MW) 16 30Technology Hydro, Small ( < 20 MW) Waste/bagasseTotal Investment (US$ Million) 45.0 89.8Year of financial closure 2003 2014COD 2008Project status Operational OperationalProcurement method Direct Negotiation (DN) DNNumber of bidsContract period 40Contract type Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)Sponsors/Developer ALROSA Co. Ltd. (The Almazy Rossii-Sakha Company) (55%/Russian Federation)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing methodTotal DFI financing (US$ Million)ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements & security arrangementsForeign credit enhancements & security arrangements

Table A2IPP investments in Cameroon by project.

Project Information Project Name Project Name2Dibamba Power Plant Kribi Power Plant

Capacity (MW) 88 216Technology HFO/MSD CCGTTotal Investment (US$ Million) 126.0 342.0Year of financial closure 2009 2010COD 2009 2013Project status Operational OperationalProcurement method DN DNNumber of bidsContract period 20 20Contract type BOT BOTSponsors/Developer AES Corporation (56%/United States), Republic of

Cameroon (44%)KPDC was 56% owned by AES, with the remaining 44% in the hands of theCameroon government, built by Finland's Wartsila, running on natural gas from theoff-shore Sanaga-South field operated by Cameroon's state oil company, SNH, andindependent producer Perenco - the first major commercial development ofCameroon's substantial gas reserves. In Nov 2013, AES announced it would sell itsstake in Cameroon to Actis (Globeleq parent company), a global pan-emergingmarket investor, for $220 million of net equity proceeds. Sale was completed in2014.

(continued on next page)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

400

Table A3IPP Investments in Cape Verde by Project.

Project Information Project NameElectra Cabeolica Wind Project

Capacity (MW) 25.5Technology Wind, OnshoreTotal Investment (US$ Million) 80.0Year of financial closure 2010COD 2010Project status OperationalProcurement methodNumber of bidsContract period 20Contract type Build-Own-Operate (BOO)Sponsors/Developer Electra (Cape Verde), Africa Finance

Corporation (Nigeria)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US

$ Million)DFI Agency and financing method EIB (Loan/$39 Million/2010), AFDB

(Loan/$19 Million/2010)Total DFI financing (US$ Million) 58.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements & security

arrangementsVariable government payments

Foreign credit enhancements &security arrangements

Table A2 (continued)

Project Information Project Name Project Name2Dibamba Power Plant Kribi Power Plant

EPC WartsilaFuel arrangement HFO/Tolling agreement with AES Sonel as Toller A gas supply agreement has been signed with a state-owned gas supplier.Debt-equity Ratio 75/25Local shareholder equity (Entity, US

$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity,

US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing method IFC (Loan/$31 Million/2010), AFDB (Loan/$31

Million/2010), (FMO Loan/$31 Million/2010)AFDB (Loan/$57 Million/2011), EIB (Loan/$41 Million/2012), Other (Loan/$23Million/2012), IDA (Guarantee/$82 Million/2012), IFC (Loan/$77 Million/2012)

Total DFI financing (US$ Million) 93.0 198.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements &

security arrangementsSovereign guarantee

Foreign credit enhancements &security arrangements

Typical project finance security agreementsimplemented but details not made public

WB PRG (enabled local bank participation)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

401

Table

A4

IPPinvestmen

tsin

Côted′Ivo

ireby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

Pro

ject

Nam

e6

Com

pagnie

Ivoiriennede

Pro

duction

d′E

lectricite

(CIP

REL)

Com

pagnie

Ivoiriennede

Pro

duction

d′E

lectricite

(CIP

REL)

Azito

PowerPro

ject

Com

pagnie

Ivoiriennede

Pro

duction

d′E

lectricite

(CIP

REL)

Azito

Power

Pro

ject

Com

pagnie

Ivoiriennede

Pro

duction

d′E

lectricite

(CIP

REL)

Cap

acity(M

W)

9911

128

811

114

611

1Technolog

yOCGT

OCGT

OCGT

OCGT

OCGT+CCGT

OCGT+CCGT

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)10

8.0

134.0

223.0

134.0

207.0

134.0

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1994

1997

1999

2009

2013

2013

COD

1995

2000

Project

status

Operational,Planning/reached

finan

cial

closure

Operational,Planning/reached

finan

cial

closure

Operational

Operational

Under

Con

struction

Reach

edfinan

cial

close

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

DN

Intern

ational

Com

petitiveBid

(ICB)

DN

ICB

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

3Con

tractperiod

1924

Con

tracttype

Build-O

wn-O

perateTransfer

(BOOT)

BOOT

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erSA

UR

Intern

ational,with88

%(Joint

Ven

ture

(JV)be

tweenFrench

SAUR

Groupow

ned

byBou

ygues,65

%an

dEDF,35

%)BOAD,PROPARCO,and

IFCholdingtheremaining12

%;in

2005

allsh

ares

sold

toBou

ygues

(France,98

%),exceptBOAD

(2%)

SAUR

Intern

ational,with88

%(JV

betw

eenFrench

SAUR

Groupow

ned

byBou

ygues,65

%an

dEDF,35

%)

BOAD,PROPARCO,andIFCholding

theremaining12

%;in

2005

allshares

sold

toBou

ygues

(France,98

%),

exceptBOAD

(2%)

Globe

leq(77%

/United

Kingd

om),Aga

Khan

Fund

(Switzerlan

d)

SAUR

Intern

ational,with88

%(JV

betw

eenFrench

SAUR

Groupow

ned

byBou

ygues,65

%an

dEDF,35

%)

BOAD,PROPARCO,andIFCholding

theremaining12

%;in20

05allshares

sold

toBou

ygues

(France,98

%),

exceptBOAD

(2%)

SAUR

Intern

ational,with88

%(JV

betw

eenFrench

SAUR

Groupow

ned

byBou

ygues,65

%an

dEDF,35

%)

BOAD,PROPARCO,andIFCholding

theremaining12

%;in

2005

allshares

sold

toBou

ygues

(France,98

%),

exceptBOAD

(2%)

EPC

Fuel

arrangemen

tGov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Gov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Gov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Gov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Gov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Gov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

70/3

0Local

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)Foreign

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)DFIAgency

and

finan

cingmethod

BOAD

(Loa

n/$

9Million

/199

4),IFC

(Loa

n/$

18Million

/199

5),IFC

(Equ

ity/$1Million

/199

5),IB

RD

(Loa

n/$

80Million

/199

5)

AFDB(Loa

n/$

14Million

/19

98),ID

A(G

uaran

tee/$30

Million

/199

9),IFC(Loa

n/$

41Million

/199

9),IFC

(Syn

dication/$

31Million

/19

99)

IFC,AfD

Ban

dPROPARCO

Total

DFIfinan

cing

(US$

Million

)10

8.0

–11

6.0

––

–

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

Sovereigngu

aran

tee,

Escrow

accounteq

uivalen

tto

1mon

thcapacitych

arge

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

World

Ban

kPRG

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

402

Table A5IPP investments in Gambia by project.

Project Information Project NameBrikama

Capacity (MW) 25Technology HFO+MSD/HFOTotal Investment (US$ Million) 36.2Year of financial closure 2005COD 2006Project status OperationalProcurement methodNumber of bidsContract periodContract typeSponsors/Developer Global Electric Company

(GEG)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)DFI Agency and financing methodTotal DFI financing (US$ Million) –

ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements & security

arrangementsForeign credit enhancements & security

arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

403

Table

A6

IPPinvestmen

tsin

Ghan

aby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

Takora

di2

Sunon-A

sogliPowerPlant

CENIT

Energ

yTakora

di2

KponeIP

P

Cap

acity(M

W)

220

200

126

110

350

Technolog

yOCGT/C

CGT

OCGT+CCGT

OCGT+CCGT

OCGT+CCGT

CCGT

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)11

0.0

200.0

140.0

330.0

900.0

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1999

2007

2009

2013

2014

COD

2000

2011

2012

2014

x20

17Project

status

Operational

Operational

Operational

Under

construction

Finan

cial

close

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

DN

DN

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

Con

tractperiod

25Con

tracttype

BOOT

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erCMS(U

SA,90

%),VRA

(Ghan

a,10

%),CMSsold

shares

toTAQA(U

AE,9

0%)in

2007

Shen

zenElectric(60%

/China),ChinaAfrica

Develop

men

tFund

(CADfund)(40%

/China)

Gecad

(100

%/U

nited

States)

CMS(U

SA,90

%),VRA

(Ghan

a,10

%),CMSsold

shares

toTAQA

(UAE,90

%)in

2007

AfricaFinan

ceCorporation(A

FC)(31,85

%),

Cen

Pow

erHoldings

Lim

ited

(21%

),a

consortium

ofGhan

aian

investors,

Sumitom

oCorporation(28%

),Mercu

ryPow

er(15%

),an

dFMO

(4,15%

)EPC

Mitsu

i&

Co(Jap

an)an

dKEPCO

E&C(K

orea),

Mitsu

i&

Co(Jap

an)an

dKEPCO

E&C(K

orea),

Fuel

arrangemen

tGov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Interim

fuel

agreem

entfor

access

toWAGPga

sGov

ernmen

tprocu

resfuel

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

72/2

8Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Local

strategicinvestor,

Tog

beAfedeXIV

Foreign

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

IFC(Loa

n/$

60Million

/200

4)Other

(Loa

n/$

67Million

/20

08),Other

(Quasi-eq

uity/

$10

Million

/200

8),AFDB

(Loa

n/$

32Million

/201

1)

IFC,an

daconsortium

ofintern

ational

develop

men

tfinan

ceinstitution

sledby

FMO.Thelendersparticipatingin

the

consortium

includetheAfrican

Develop

men

tBan

k,Deu

tsch

eInvestitions-undEntw

icklungsgesellschafte,

EmergingAfricaInfrastructure

Fund,IC

F-D

ebtPoo

lan

dProparco.TheOpec

FundforIntern

ational

Develop

men

tan

dtheCan

adaClimateChan

geProgram

areparticipating

alon

gsideIFC

FMO(equ

ity,

$10

,3million

),DBSA

(loa

n,$

53million

),OFID

(loa

n,$7million

),EAIF

($25

million

),FMO

(loa

n,$24

million

),an

dothers

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)60

.0–

109.0

347.5

207.0

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

Sovereigngu

aran

tee(phase1),

US$

3million

Letterof

Credit

provided

bygo

vern

men

t(phase1)

Variablego

vern

men

tpaymen

ts

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

404

Table

A7

A:IPPinvestmen

tsin

Ken

yaby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

Pro

ject

Nam

e6

Mom

basa

Barg

e-M

ounted

PowerPro

ject/W

estm

ont

Ibera

fricaPowerLtd

.Kip

evu

II/T

savo

Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Ibera

fricaPowerLtd

.M

um

iasPower

Plant

Cap

acity(M

W)

4644

7513

1226

Technolog

yOCGT

MSD

/HFO

MSD

/HFO

Geo

thermal

MSD

/HFO

Waste

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)65

.050

.386

.010

5.0

13.7

50.0

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1996

1996

1999

1999

1999

2008

COD

1997

1997

2001

2000

,20

0920

0020

09Project

status

Con

cluded

Operational

Operational

Operational

operational

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

DN

ICB

ICB

DN

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

32

Con

tractperiod

77

2020

15Con

tracttype

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erWestm

ontLtd.(M

alaysia)

UnionFen

osa(Spain,80

%),

KPLCPen

sion

Fund(K

enya,

20%)since

1997

Cinergy

&IP

Sjointlyow

ned

49.9%

,Cinergy

sold

toDuke

Energy

in20

05,

CDC/G

lobe

leq(U

K,30

%),Wartsila

(Finland,15

%),IFC(5%)retain

remainingsh

ares

since

2000

Orm

atTurbines

Ltd

(100

%/Israel)

UnionFen

osa(Spain,80

%),

KPLCPen

sion

Fund(K

enya,

20%)since

1997

MumiasSu

gar

Com

pan

yLim

ited

(100

%/K

enya)

EPC

Fuel

arrangemen

tOriginally

Westm

ontto

procu

refuel

andthen

passthrough

toutility,

how

ever,follow

ingdispute

withfuel

supplier

abou

ttaxesafterthefirst

year

ofop

eration,utility

took

over

procu

remen

t

Iberafrica

buys

fuel

andpasses

cost

through

toKPLCba

sedon

theunitsgenerated

andsp

ecific

consu

mption

param

etersag

reed

onin

thePPA

Tsavo

buys

fuel

andpassescost

through

toKPLCba

sedon

theunits

generated

andsp

ecific

consu

mption

param

etersag

reed

onin

thePPA

Theon

lyfuel

arrangemen

tper

seis

that

OrP

ower4was

gran

teda

Geo

thermal

Resou

rceLicen

sefrom

the

govern

men

t,to

whichitpaysaroyalty

ofsorts(ofUS$

.004

/kWhor

USc

.4/

kWh)

Iberafrica

buys

fuel

andpasses

cost

through

toKPLCba

sedon

theunitsgenerated

andsp

ecific

consu

mption

param

etersag

reed

onin

thePPA

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

72/2

878

/22

Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)KPLCStaffPen

sion

Fund(U

S$9.4in

directloan

san

dgu

aran

teed

US$

5million

through

alocalKen

yanba

nk).

9.45

Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)UnionFen

osa(Spain)(U

S$12

.7million

indirectloan

san

dgu

aran

teed

US$

20million

);

9.48

Orm

at(100

%)since

1998

-UNTIL

2008

DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

IFC(Loa

n/$

18Million

/200

0),IFC

(Equ

ity/$2Million

/200

0),IFC

(Quasi-eq

uity/$3Million

/200

0),IFC

(Syn

dication/$

24Million

/200

0),IFC

(Riskman

agem

ent/$2Million

/200

1),

CDCow

naccount(U

S$13

million

);DEG

ownaccount(€

11million

),DEG

syndicated

(€2million

)

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$49

Million

/200

0),

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$70

Million

/200

2),

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$89

Million

/200

9),

(Guaran

tee/$11

0Million

/201

1)

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)–

–82

.0–

––

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)–

––

––

–

Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsAnad

vance

paymen

tcash

dep

ositinitially,

butIberafrica

presentlyhas

nopaymen

tsecu

rity

Letterof

Com

fort

provided

bygo

vern

men

t,escrow

account,

equivalen

tto

1mon

thcapacitych

arge,

andastan

d-byLetterof

Credit,

equivalen

tto

3mon

thsbilling

Astan

d-byLetterof

Credit,covering

severalmon

thsbilling(althou

ghon

lyfinalized

aten

d–20

06)

Anad

vance

paymen

tcash

dep

ositinitially,

butIberafrica

presentlyhas

nopaymen

tsecu

rity

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsMIG

Agu

aran

tee

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

405

Table

A7

B:IPPinvestmen

tsin

Ken

yaby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

e7

Pro

ject

Nam

e8

Pro

ject

Nam

e9

Pro

ject

Nam

e10

Pro

ject

Nam

e11

Pro

ject

Nam

e12

RabaiPowerPlant

Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Ibera

fricaPowerLtd

.Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Trium

ph

HFO

Power

Plant

ThikaTherm

alPower

Pro

ject

Cap

acity(M

W)

9035

52.5

3683

87Technolog

yMSD

/HFO

&steam

cycle

Geo

thermal

MSD

/HFO

Geo

thermal

MSD

/HFO

MSD

/HFO

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)15

5.0

128.7

59.9

126.2

140.0

144.0

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

2008

2009

2009

2011

2012

2012

COD

2010

2009

2009

2013

2015

2013

Project

status

Operational

Operational

operational

Operational

Con

struction

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

ICB

DN

DN

DN

ICB

ICB

Numbe

rof

bids

45

9Con

tractperiod

2025

2020

Con

tracttype

BOOT

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erAldyw

ch:34

.%,BWSC

(Dan

ish,bu

tow

ned

byMitsu

iof

Japan

):25

.5%,

FMO:20

%,IFU

(Dan

ishbilateral

lender):

20%

Orm

atTurbines

Ltd

(100

%/Israel)

UnionFen

osa(Spain,80

%),

KPLCPen

sion

Fund(K

enya,

20%)since

1997

Orm

atTurbines

Ltd

(100

%/Israel)

Broad

Holding(K

enya),

Interpel

Investmen

ts(K

enya),Taceflex(K

enya),

SouthernInter-trad

e(K

enya)

Melec

Pow

ergen(partof

Maletec

grp)(90%

/Leb

anon

)

EPC

BWSC

Co-develop

er,sp

onsor,

shareh

older,EPCcontractoran

dO

&M

contractor

XJIntern

ational

EngineeringCom

pan

y(w

holly

owned

subsidiary

ofStateGridCorporation

ofChina)

MAN

Diesel(G

erman

y)an

dMatelec

Grp

Fuel

arrangemen

tFuel

Supply

Agreemen

twithKen

olof

Ken

yaIberafrica

buys

fuel

andpasses

cost

through

toKPLCba

sedon

theunitsgenerated

andsp

ecific

consu

mption

param

eters

agreed

onin

thePPA

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

75/2

574

/26

75/2

5Local

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)Foreign

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)

Orm

at(100

%)since

1998

-UNTIL

2008

Orm

at(100

%)since

1998

-UNTIL

2008

DFIAgency

and

finan

cingmethod

Other

(Loa

n/$

126Million

/200

8),

DEG:15

%,FMO:25

%,EAIF:25

%,

Proparco:25

%,EFP(E

uropean

Finan

cingPartners):10

%

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$49

Million

/20

00),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$70

Million

/200

2),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/

$89

Million

/200

9),EIB

(Loa

n/$

155

Million

/201

0),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$49

Million

/20

00),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$70

Million

/200

2),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/

$89

Million

/200

9),EIB

(Loa

n/$

155

Million

/201

0),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$12

Million

/201

2),ID

A(G

uaran

tee/$45

Million

/20

12)

AFDB(Loa

n/E

uro

28Million

/20

12),IFC(Loa

n/E

uro28

Million

/201

2),ID

A(G

uaran

tee/$45

Million

/20

12),MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$62

(con

tinued

onnextpage)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

406

Table

A7(con

tinued

)

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

e7

Pro

ject

Nam

e8

Pro

ject

Nam

e9

Pro

ject

Nam

e10

Pro

ject

Nam

e11

Pro

ject

Nam

e12

RabaiPowerPlant

Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Ibera

fricaPowerLtd

.Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Trium

ph

HFO

Power

Plant

ThikaTherm

alPower

Pro

ject

$11

0Million

/201

1)$11

0Million

/201

1)Million

/201

2)Total

DFIfinan

cing

(US$

Million

)12

6.0

155.0

––

–64

.0

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)–

––

––

–

Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

SupportLetterfrom

GoK

(cov

ers

political

risk

butfallssh

ortof

being

anou

trightgu

aran

tee),KPLC

issu

edaletter

ofcred

iteq

uivalen

tto

5mon

thsof

capacity(deb

tservice,

fixedcostsan

deq

uity

return

s)paymen

tsan

d2mon

thsof

fuel

paymen

ts

Letterof

Com

fort

provided

bygo

vern

men

t,escrow

account,

equivalen

tto

1mon

thcapacity

charge,an

dastan

d-byLetterof

Credit,e

quivalen

tto

3mon

thsbilling

Anad

vance

paymen

tcash

dep

ositinitially,

butIberafrica

presentlyhas

nopaymen

tsecu

rity

Letterof

Com

fort

provided

bygo

vern

men

t,escrow

account,

equivalen

tto

1mon

thcapacity

charge,an

dastan

d-byLetterof

Credit,e

quivalen

tto

3mon

thsbilling

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

PRG

PRG

Table

A7

C:IPPinvestmen

tsin

Ken

yaby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

e13

Pro

ject

Nam

e14

Pro

ject

Nam

e15

Pro

ject

Nam

e16

Kin

angopgre

enfield

win

dpro

ject

Gulf

Power

LakeTurk

anaW

indPower

Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

Cap

acity(M

W)

6080

300

26Technolog

yWind,Onsh

ore

MSD

/HFO

Wind,Onsh

ore

Geo

thermal

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)15

0.0

108.0

861.1

91.1

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

2013

2013

2014

2014

COD

Delayed

2014

2017

Project

status

Con

struction/stalled

Operational

Finan

cial

close

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

REFiT

ICB

DN

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

5Con

tractperiod

2020

Con

tracttype

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erAeo

lusKen

ya,AIIF2,

whichbe

cameinvo

lved

inthe

project

in20

12to

assist

thedevelop

erAeo

lusKen

yato

Con

sortium

oflocalinvestors,nam

elyGulfEnergy

Ltd

andNoo

raPow

erLtd

KP&PAfricaBV,a

grou

pof

Dutchen

trep

reneu

rs,w

ith

AldwychIntern

ational

asco-develop

ers

(con

tinued

onnextpage)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

407

Table

A7(con

tinued

)

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

e13

Pro

ject

Nam

e14

Pro

ject

Nam

e15

Pro

ject

Nam

e16

Kin

angopgre

enfield

win

dpro

ject

Gulf

Power

LakeTurk

anaW

indPower

Orm

atOlkariaIIIGeoth

erm

al

PowerPlant,

OrP

ower4

(phase

1and2and3)

concludeallmaterialcontracts

anddeliver

aba

nka

ble

project,is

themajorityow

ner

oftheproject

compan

yKinan

gopWindPark(K

WP),whileNorfundheldthe

remaininginterest.

EPC

Fuel

arrangemen

tDeb

t-eq

uityRatio

Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Finnfund,IFU,Norfund

DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

Abo

utthree-qu

arters

ofthe80

million

-euro

project

willbe

deb

t-finan

ced.IFC,theOPECFundfor

Intern

ational

Develop

men

tan

dStan

dardBan

kGroup

Ltd.areeach

lending20

million

euros($26

million

).$32

million

ofeq

uityinvestmen

tsan

d$76

million

inlong-term

deb

tfinan

cing.

Thedeb

tportion

consistsof

IFCA

Loa

n,an

dcommercial

lendingthrough

IFCB

Loa

nan

dOPECFundforIntern

ational

Develop

men

t(O

FID

)

SENIO

RDEBT:A

fDB€11

5m,T

ranch

e‘B′ECAFacility

Cov

ered

€20

m,Tranch

e‘B′ECAFacilityUncovered

€10

0m,EIB

SeniorLoa

n‘A′€50

m,EIB

SeniorLoa

n‘B′€50

m,FMO

€35

,Proparco

€20

,IC

CF€30

mMEZZANIN

E:DEG

€20

,EADB€5m,PTA

€10

m&

AfD

B2m

EQUIT

Y:IFU

€7.5m

Norfund€16

mFinnfund€16

m

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)–

52.0

595.8

–

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)–

––

–

Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsGOK

letter

ofsu

pport

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

IDA

guaran

tee,

MIG

AEKF(D

anishexportcred

itag

ency)to

guaran

teeap

prox

billionDan

ishkron

erin

totalto:EIB

andAfD

B

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

408

Table A8IPP investments in Madagascar by project.

Project Information Project Name

Hydelec Madagascar S.A.

Capacity (MW) 15Technology Hydro, Small ( < 50 MW)Total Investment (US$ Million) 17.8Year of financial closure 2007COD 2008Project status OperationalProcurement methodNumber of bidsContract period 15Contract type BOTSponsors/Developer Hydelec Madagascar (100%/

Madagascar)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity, US

$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity,

US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing method AFDB (Loan/$9 Million/2007), MIGA

(Guarantee/$20 Million/2008)Total DFI financing (US$ Million) 9.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements &

security arrangementsForeign credit enhancements &

security arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

409

Table

A9

IPPinvestmen

tsin

Mau

ritiusby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

Pro

ject

Nam

e6

DeepRiverBeauCham

paka

Conso

lidatedenerg

ylim

ited

FUEL

powerplant

BelleVuePowerPlant

St.

Aubin

PowerPro

ject

akaCom

pagnie

therm

ique

du

Sud

Com

pagnie

therm

iquede

Savannah

Medin

e

Cap

acity(M

W)

28.4

36.7

71.2

32.5

9013

Technolog

yWaste/b

agasse

Waste/b

agasse

Coa

l/ba

gasse

Waste/b

agasse

OCGT/C

CGT

Waste/b

agasse

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)85

.010

9.7

109.3

95.2

81.5

38.9

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1997

1998

1998

2004

2005

1994

–20

11COD

Project

status

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

ICB

Numbe

rof

bids

Con

tractperiod

2020

20Con

tracttype

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erSu

garInvestmen

tTrust

(10%

/Mau

ritius)

Suga

rInvestmen

tTrust

(20%

/Mau

ritius)

Harel

Freres(51%

/Mau

ritius),

Suga

rInvestmen

tTrust

(14%

/Mau

ritius),SIDEC(27%

/France)

Suga

rInvestmen

tTrust

(15%

/Mau

ritius),Mon

TresorMon

Desert(19%

/Mau

ritius),Sa

vannah

Suga

rEstates

(15%

/Mau

ritius),So

cieteUnionSt

Aubin(15%

/Mau

ritius),

Sech

ilienne-SIDEC(25%

/France)

EPC

Fuel

arrangemen

tDeb

t-eq

uityRatio

Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

EIB

(Loa

n/$

17Million

/199

8)

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)–

–17

.0–

––

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsForeign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

410

Table

A10

IPPInvestmen

tsin

Nigeria

byProject.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

AESNigeriaBarg

eLim

ited

OkpaiIn

dependentPowerPro

ject

Afam

PowerPro

ject

Azu

raAbaIn

tegra

ted

(em

bedded)

Cap

acity(M

W)

270

480

630

450

141

Technolog

yOCGT/C

CGT

OCGT/C

CGT

OCGT/C

CGT

OCGT

OCGT

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)24

0.0

462.0

540.0

895.0

460.0

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

2001

2002

2008

2015

2013

COD

2001

2005

2008

2016

x20

13Project

status

Operational

Operational

Operational

Finan

cial

closeexpected

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

Unsolicitedproposals

DN

DN

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

18

Con

tractperiod

1320

2020

Con

tracttype

BOO

BOO

BOO

BOO

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erEnron(U

SA,10

0%)sold

toAES(95%

)an

dYFP

(Nigeria,5%

)in

2000

NigerianNational

Petroleum

Corporation

(Nigeria,6

0%),NigerianAgipOilCom

pan

y(Italy,20

%,withAgipow

ned

byENIsince

2003

),an

dPhillipsOilCom

pan

y(U

SA,

20%)maintained

equitysince

2001

NNPC(N

igeria,55

%),Sh

ell

(UK/N

etherlands,

30%),Elf

(Total)(France,10

%),Agip

(Italy,5%

)

AldwychIntern

ational,Africa

Infrastructure

Investmen

tFund(A

IIM),

andAsset

andResou

rceMan

agem

ent

(ARM)in

conjunctionwiththego

vern

men

tof

Edostatewhichhas

abou

tfive

per

cent

equitystak

ein

theproject

Geo

metric

EPC

Siem

ensan

dJu

liusBergerNigeria

Gen

eral

Electric

Fuel

arrangemen

tUtility

arrangesfuel

Project

compan

yprovides

fuel

Project

compan

yprovides

fuel

15-yearfuel

supply

agreem

entwithSe

plat

withaga

ssu

pply

LC

Fuel

supply

agreem

entwith

Shell

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

0/10

00/

100

80/2

0Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)5%

Maineq

uitysp

onsors:Azu

ra-E

doLtd

97.5%

compromisingAPHL50

%(A

maya

Cap

ital

80%,American

Cap

ital

20%);

AIM

30%;ARM

6%;Aldwych14

%;an

dEdo

State2.5%

Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)20

%.45

Maineq

uitysp

onsors:Azu

ra-E

doLtd

97.5%

compromisingAPHL50

%(A

maya

Cap

ital

80%,American

Cap

ital

20%);

AIM

30%;ARM

6%;Aldwych14

%;an

dEdo

State2.5%

DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

The$12

0million

finan

cingwas

funded

from

aconsortium

offourcommercial

banks

andthree

develop

men

tfinan

ceinstitution

s.Thedevelop

men

tfinan

cial

institution

sareFMO

(Ned

erlandse

Finan

cierings-M

aatsch

appijvo

orOntw

ikke

lingslanden

N.V.),African

Exp

ort-Im

port

Ban

k,an

dDEG

(Deu

tsch

eInvestitionsund

Entw

icklungsgesellschaftmbH

).Thecommercial

banks

areAfricaMerch

antBan

k(France),adivisionof

Belgo

laiseBan

k,United

Ban

kforAfrica(N

igeria),

Ran

dMerch

antBan

k(Sou

thAfrica),an

dDiamon

dBan

k(N

igeria)

KfW

Ban

kengruppeof

German

y,the

NetherlandsDevelop

men

tFinan

ceCom

pan

y(FMO),Intern

ational

Finan

ceCorporation(IFC),German

Investmen

tCorporation(D

EG),French

Investmen

tCorporation,EmergingAfrica

Infrastructure

Fund,theWorld

Ban

kGroup

andSw

edfund,OPIC

Subo

rdinated

deb

t:IFC,EiB,

andEmergingAfrica

Infrastructure

Fundan

d4m

nIFCeq

uity

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)60

.0–

–33

2.5

4.0

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsSo

vereigngu

aran

tee,

US$

60million

Letterof

Credit

from

Ministryof

Finan

cePPA

backed

byNigerianPetroleum

Develop

men

tCom

pan

y'soilrevenues

PPA

backed

byNigerian

Petroleum

Develop

men

tCom

pan

y'soilrevenues

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsOPIC

political

risk

insu

rance

CreditEnhan

cemen

tPRG

(IBRD)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

411

Table A11IPP investments in Rwanda by project.

Project Information Project Name

KivuWatt

Capacity (MW) 100Technology Methane GasTotal Investment (US$

Million)200.0

Year of financial closure 2011COD 2015Project status ConstructionProcurement method DNNumber of bidsContract period 25Contract type BOOSponsors/Developer ContourGlobal (100%/United States)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity

(Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity

(Entity, US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing

methodMIGA (Guarantee/$26 Million/2011), AFDB(Loan/$25 Million/2011) UK, Dutch, Swedishand Swiss governments loaned $91mn

Total DFI financing (US$Million)

116.0

ODA Grants (US$ Million) –

Local credit enhancements &security arrangements

Foreign credit enhancements& security arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

412

Table

A12

IPPinvestmen

tsin

Senegal

byproject.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

GTiDakarLtd

.KounouneIIP

PSain

t-Louis

-Dagana-

PodorRura

lElectrifica

tion

Sendou

Tobene

Cap

acity(M

W)

5267

.519

125

87.5

Technolog

yOCGT+CCGT

MSD

/HFO

Solar,

PV

Coa

lMSD

/HFO

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)65

.011

0.0

22.0

254.3

163.5

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1997

2005

2010

2013

2014

COD

2000

2008

2017

2015

Project

status

Operational

Operational

Operational

Con

struction

Con

struction

Procu

remen

tmethod

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB,then

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

21

Con

tractperiod

1515

25Con

tracttype

BOOT

BOO

BOT

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erIFC,So

ndel

(Green

wichAir

Service,

Inc).

Melec

Pow

ergen(partof

Matelec

grpof

compan

ies)

(Leb

anon

),Mitsu

bish

i(Jap

an)

OfficeNational

del′Electricite

(73%

/Morocco),Intern

ational

Finan

ceCorporation(17%

)EPC

MEGS(M

editerraneanElectricGen

erating

Services)-ajointventure

betw

eenSo

ndel

and

Gen

eral

Electric

MHIEqu

ipmen

tEurope,

France,

(Mem

berof

Mitsu

bish

iHeavy

Industries

Group)

Fuel

arrangemen

tDuringtheproject

negotiation

s,the

structure

oftheFSA

andPPA

were

chan

gedto

turn

thePPA

into

atolling

agreem

ent

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

70/3

0Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Foreign

shareh

older

equity(E

ntity,US$

Million

)DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

IFC(Loa

n/$

13Million

/199

7),IFC(E

quity/$2

Million

/199

7),IFC(Syn

dication/$

3Million

/19

97),IFC(E

quity/$1Million

/199

8),IFC

(Syn

dication/$

12Million

/199

8),IFC(Q

uasi-

equity/$7Million

/199

8),IFC(R

isk

man

agem

ent/$1Million

/200

2)

IDA

(Guaran

tee/$7Million

/200

5),ID

A(Loa

n/$

10Million

/200

5),IFC(Loa

n/

$21

Million

/200

5);MIR

also

listed

Proparco,AfD

B,BOAD

andCBAO

IFC(E

quity/$1Million

/201

0)African

Develop

men

tBan

k(A

fDB)-

Netherlands

Develop

men

tFinan

ceCom

pan

y(FMO)

IFClead

arranger,

Euro

tran

che=

€78

.5M–

€28

.5M

Aloan

byIFC,an

d€50

MBloan

(€25

Mby

FMO

and€25

Mby

EmergingAfrica

Infrastructure

Fund/E

AIF),an

dalocaltran

che

fortheCFAeq

uivalen

tof

€13

.5M

byBOAD

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)39

.053

.71.0

108.0

135.1

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

Gov

ernmen

tgu

aran

tee,

escrow

account

Gov

ernmen

tgu

aran

tee,

aletter

ofcred

itfrom

Senelec

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

Creditinsu

rance

through

agu

aran

teeprogram

ofSA

CE,theItalianexportcred

itag

ency,an

da

partial

interest

subsidythrough

theMed

iocred

ito

Cen

tral

SubsidyDep

artm

ent(M

CSD

)

APRG,b

utnever

sign

edby

govern

men

tID

APRG

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

413

Table A13IPP investments in Sierra Leone by project.

Project Information Project Name

Addax Biomass Plant

Capacity (MW) 15Technology BiomassTotal Investment (US$ Million) 30.0Year of financial closure 2011COD 2013Project status OperationalProcurement method DNNumber of bidsContract periodContract type BOOSponsors/Developer Addax & Oryx Group (100%/

United Kingdom)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity Ratio 61/39Local shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)DFI Agency and financing method AFDB (Loan/$30 Million/2011)Total DFI financing (US$ Million) 30.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements & security

arrangementsForeign credit enhancements & security

arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

414

Table

A14

IPPinvestmen

tsin

Tan

zania

byproject.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

IndependentPowerTanza

nia

Ltd

Songas-SongoSongoGasto

PowerPro

ject

Mtw

ara

Region

Gas-to

-PowerPro

ject

Sym

bion

Cap

acity(M

W)

100

189

1812

0Technolog

yMSD

/HFO

CCGT

OCGT/C

CGT

OCGT/C

CGT

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)12

7.2

316.0

32.0

123.2

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1997

2001

2005

2006

COD

2002

2004

2007

2006

,20

07Project

status

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

ICB

ICB

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

2Con

tractperiod

2020

25Exp

iryOct

2014

Con

tracttype

BOO

BOO

BOO

Emergency/short-term

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erVIP

Engineeringan

dMarke

tingLtd

(Tan

zania),MechMar

Energy

SdnBhd

TransC

anad

asold

majoritysh

ares

toAES(U

SA)in

1999

and

AESsold

majoritysh

ares

toGlobe

leq(U

K)in

2003

[1].All

preferred

equitysh

ares

wereconverted

into

“Loa

nNotes”in

June20

09.Only

common

shares

remain

Artumas

GroupInc.

(87%

/Can

ada)

FMO

13%

Builtby

Richmon

d,sold

toDow

ans,

then

toSy

mbion

EPC

Larsen

&Tou

bro(L

&T)

Fuel

arrangemen

tIPTLim

ports

fuel,w

hichis

apassthrough

totheutility

Songo

Songo

gasprovided

toproject

compan

yat

arate

ofUS

$.55/

MMBtu

forturbines

I-Van

dat

US$

2.17

MMBtu

for

turbineVI

Fuel

provided

byaconsortium

that

includes

theproject

spon

sor(has

a25

.4%

stak

ein

thega

sconcession),at

ach

arge

ofUS$

5.00

per

MMBTu,whichis

passedthrough

toutility

TANESC

Opurchases

natural

gasan

dfuel

isapassthrough

Deb

t-eq

uityRatio

0/10

070

/30

0/10

00/

100

Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)VIP

(Tan

zania,30

%in

kind),(disputed),

hav

esough

tto

sellsh

ares

4.83

100%

finan

cedwithba

lance

sheetof

shareh

olders

Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Mechmar

(Malaysia,

70%)hav

esough

tto

sellsh

ares

5.67

100%

finan

cedwithba

lance

sheetof

shareh

olders

Equ

ityfinan

ced

DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

IBRD

(Loa

n/$

183Million

/200

1),EIB

(Loa

n/$

55Million

/20

01)

FMO,13

%eq

uitysh

areh

older

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)–

249.0

4.2

–

ODAGrants

(US$

Million

)–

100.3

––

Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsSo

vereigngu

aran

tee,

liqu

idityfacility

equivalen

tto

4mon

thscapacitych

arge

(butnot

yetestablished

)

Escrow

account:forfirst11

5MW,withthego

vern

men

tmatch

ingeveryUS$

1sp

entby

theproject

compan

y;liqu

idity

facility

equivalen

tto

4mon

thscapacitych

arge

forthefirst3

years,

decliningto

2mon

thsstartingin

year

4through

the

remainingyearsof

thecontract

TariffEqu

alizationFundprovided

,afixed-valueaccount

designed

tomak

eupthedifference

betw

eenthenational

tariff

andthecost-based

tariff(w

hichwou

ldotherwisebe

charged

tothefinal

consu

mer)under

theproject

Nogo

vern

men

tgu

aran

tees

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

415

Table A15IPP investments in Togo by project.

Project Information Project Name

Centrale thermique de Lome

Capacity (MW) 100Technology Triple fuelTotal Investment (US$ Million) 196.0Year of financial closure 2008COD 2010Project status OperationalProcurement method DNNumber of bidsContract period 25Contract type BOTSponsors/Developer ContourGlobal (80%/United States),

International Finance Corporation (20%)EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity,

US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity,

US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing method IFC (Equity/Loan) and OPICTotal DFI financing (US$ Million) 161.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements &

security arrangementsPayment Guarantee

Foreign credit enhancements &security arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

416

Table

A16

A:IPPinvestmen

tsin

Uga

ndaby

project.

Pro

ject

Info

rmation

Pro

ject

Nam

ePro

ject

Nam

e2

Pro

ject

Nam

e3

Pro

ject

Nam

e4

Pro

ject

Nam

e5

Pro

ject

Nam

e6

Kase

seCobalt,

Mubuku

III

Kilem

beM

ines

(Mubuku

I)Kakiraco

genera

tion

plant

Bujagali

Hyd

roPro

ject

ECO

Ishash

aM

ini

Hyd

ropowerPlant

Tro

nder/Bugoye

Hyd

roElectricPowerPro

ject

(Mubuku

II)

Cap

acity(M

W)

9.9

5.4

3225

06.5

13Technolog

yHyd

ro,Sm

all(<

20MW)

Hyd

ro,Sm

all(<

20MW)

Waste/B

agasse

Hyd

roHyd

ro,Sm

all(<20

MW)

Hyd

ro,Sm

all(<20

MW)

Total

Investmen

t(U

S$Million

)22

.516

.256

.086

0.0

14.0

65.7

Yearof

finan

cial

closure

1999

1975

2003

2007

2008

2008

COD

2013

2012

2011

2009

Project

status

Operational

not

operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Procu

remen

tmethod

DN

DN/R

EFiT(PPA3)

ICB

DN

DN

Numbe

rof

bids

3Con

tractperiod

2020

3030

20Con

tracttype

BOO

BOT

BOT

BOT

Spon

sors/D

evelop

erBlueEarth

Refineries

Inc(10

0%Uga

nda)

Gov

ernmen

tof

Uga

nda(51%

)Mad

hva

niGroup(100

%/

Uga

nda)

BELLtd

(SitheGloba

lPow

er(58%

/United

States),Aga

Khan

Fund(31%

/Switzerlan

d))

Eco

Pow

er(100

%/S

riLan

ka)

Tronder

Pow

erLim

ited

(100

%/

Norway)

EPC

In-hou

se/con

sultan

tFuel

arrangemen

tDeb

t-eq

uityRatio

78/2

270

/30

53/3

2(14%

gran

tby

Gov

ernmen

tof

Norway)

Local

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Non

-recou

rse

Tronder

Foreign

shareh

older

equity

(Entity,US$

Million

)Balan

cesh

eet

Norfund

DFIAgency

andfinan

cing

method

EADB

MIG

A(G

uaran

tee/$11

5Million

/200

7),IFC(Loa

n/

$13

0Million

/200

7),ID

A(G

uaran

tee/$11

5Million

/200

7),

ADB(Loa

n/$

110Million

/200

7),EIB

(Loa

n/$

130Million

/20

07)

EAIF/F

MO/N

orway

govt/

Norfund

Total

DFIfinan

cing(U

S$Million

)–

–15

.037

0.0

–48

.2

ODA

Grants

(US$

Million

)GETFiT

14%

gran

tby

Gov

ernmen

tof

Norway

Local

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

tsGov

ernmen

tpaymen

tgu

aran

tee

Gov

ernmen

tpaymen

tgu

aran

tee

Foreign

cred

iten

han

cemen

ts&

secu

rity

arrangemen

ts

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

417

Table A16B: IPP investments in Uganda by project.

Project Information Project Name7 Project Name8 Project Name9 Project Name10 Project Name11 ProjectName12

Mpanga Hydro PowerProject

NamanvePower Plant

KinyaraCogeneration Plant

Buseruka/HydromaxHydropower Plant

Tororo PowerStation

Tororo PowerStation

Capacity (MW) 18 50 7.5 9 16 34Technology Hydro, Small ( < 20 MW) MSD/HFO Waste/Bagasse Hydro, Small ( < 20 MW) MSD/HFO MSD/HFOTotal Investment (US$

Million)27.0 74.0 29.0 27.0 41.5 41.5

Year of financial closure 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2012COD 2011 2011 2012 2010Project status Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational OperationalProcurement method DN ICB DN DN DNNumber of bids 3Contract period 20 6 20 30 9Contract type BOT BOT BOO BOT BOOSponsors/Developer South Asia Energy

Management Systems(SAEMS) (100%/UnitedStates)

Jacobsen Elektro(100%/Norway)

Kinyara Sugar Group(100%/Uganda)

Hydromax Limited(100%/Uganda)

Electro-Maxx(100%/Uganda)

EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity Ratio 70/30 60/40Local shareholder equity

(Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity

(Entity, US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing

methodEAIF ($14 million)/FMO AFDB (Loan/$9 Million/

2009)Total DFI financing (US$

Million)20.0 – – 9.0 – –

ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements

& securityarrangements

Payment Guarantee PaymentGuarantee

Variable governmentpayments

Governmentpayment guarantee

Foreign creditenhancements &security arrangements

Table A16C: IPP investments in Uganda by project.

Project Information Project Name13 Project Name14 Project Name15 Project Name16 Project Name17 Project Name18

KakakaHydropowerProject

RwimiHydropwoerProject

Lubilia HydropowerProject

MuvumbeHydropowerProject

Nengo BridgeHydropower Project

SAIL Cogen

Capacity (MW) 5 5.4 5.4 6.5 6.9 6.9Technology Hydro, Small ( <

20 MW)Hydro, Small ( <20 MW)

Hydro, Small ( <20 MW)

Hydro, Small ( <20 MW)

Hydro, Small ( <20 MW)

Waste/Bagasse

Total Investment (US$Million)

18.0 18.0 18.0 14.0 27.0 22.0

Year of financial closure 2015 2015 2015 2015COD 2016 2017 2017 2017Project status Financing in process Under Construction Under Construction Under Construction Cancelled CancelledProcurement method REFiT REFiT REFiT REFiT REFiT REFiTNumber of bidsContract period 20 20 20 20 20 20Contract type BOT BOT BOT BOT BOT BOOSponsors/Developer Frontier (Danish

Private Equity Fund)Eco Power (100%/SriLanka)

Frontier (DanishPrivate Equity Fund)

Vidullanka (100%/SriLanka)

Jacobsen Elektro(100%/Norway)

Sugar AlliedIndustries(Ugandan)

EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity Ratio 70/30 65/35Local shareholder equity

(continued on next page)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

418

Table A16 (continued)

Project Information Project Name13 Project Name14 Project Name15 Project Name16 Project Name17 Project Name18

KakakaHydropowerProject

RwimiHydropwoerProject

Lubilia HydropowerProject

MuvumbeHydropowerProject

Nengo BridgeHydropower Project

SAIL Cogen

(Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity

(Entity, US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing

methodEAIF/FMO EAIF/FMO EADB

Total DFI financing (US$Million)

– – – – – –

ODA Grants (US$ Million) GET FiT GET FiT GET FiT GET FiT GET FiTLocal credit enhancements

& securityarrangements

Foreign creditenhancements &security arrangements

Table A16D: IPP investments in Uganda by project.

Project Information Project Name19 Project Name20 Project Name21 Project Name22

SAEMS Nyamwamba SHPP Siti I/II Hydropower Project Tororo North/South

Soroti Solar

Capacity (MW) 9.2 21.5 10 10Technology Hydro, Small ( < 20 MW) Hydro Large Solar PV Solar PVTotal Investment (US$ Million) 34.0 48.0 18.0 18.0Year of financial closure 2015 2015 2015x 2015xCOD 2017 2017–18 2017 2016Project status Construction started in 2014 Under Construction Under Construction OperationalProcurement method REFiT REFiT ICB ICBNumber of bidsContract period 20 20Contract type BOT BOTSponsors/Developer South Asia Energy Management Systems

(SAEMS) (100%/United States)Frontier (Danish Private EquityFund)

Simba/BuildingEnergy

Access/TSK

EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity Ratio 73/27 70/30 75/25 75/25Local shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US$

Million)DFI Agency and financing method Other (Loan/$24 Million/2012) Out of which

EAIF is 6 millionEAIF/FMO (5.3) FMO FMO

Total DFI financing (US$ Million) 6.0 5.3 – –

ODA Grants (US$ Million) GET FiT GET FiTLocal credit enhancements & security

arrangementsForeign credit enhancements & security

arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

419

Table A17IPP investments in Zambia by project.

Project Information Project Name Project Name2

Ndola Energy TATA Itezhi-Tezhi HPP

Capacity (MW) 50 120Technology MSD/HFO HydroTotal Investment (US$ Million) 72.0 230.0Year of financial closure 2012 2014COD 2013 2016Project status Operational ConstructionProcurement method DN DNNumber of bidsContract period 25Contract type BOTSponsors/Developer Subsidiary of Concordia Energy (Group of

Mauritius)Tata Enterprises (50%/India), Zambia Electric Supply Corporation(ZESCO) (50%/Zambia)

EPC Chinese EPC/ICB for EPCFuel arrangementDebt-equity RatioLocal shareholder equity (Entity, US$ Million)Foreign shareholder equity (Entity, US$ Million)DFI Agency and financing method EIB (Equity/$18 Million/2011), 2014: a $142 million loan by DBSA,

Proparco, ADB, and FMOTotal DFI financing (US$ Million) – 162.0ODA Grants (US$ Million)Local credit enhancements & security

arrangementsForeign credit enhancements & security

arrangements

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

420

Table

A18

IPPinvestmen

tsin

South

Africaby

project.

Pro

ject

Capacity

(MW

)Tech

nology

Total

Investm

ent

(US$M

illion)

Fin

ancial

closu

reCOD

Pro

ject

statu

sPro

cure

ment

meth

od

Sponso

rs/

Developer

DFIAgency

andfinancing

meth

od

TotalDFI

financing

(US$

Million)

Loca

lcr

edit

enhance

ments

&se

curity

arr

angem

ents

Bethlehem

Hyd

ro7

Hyd

ro,Sm

all(<

20MW)

13.7

2005

2009

,20

12Operational

DN

NuPlanet

(26%

/Netherlands)

Other

(Loa

n/$

5Million

/200

5)5.0

DarlingWindFarm

5Wind,Onsh

ore

9.9

2006

2008

Operational

DN

Darling

Indep

enden

tPow

erProducer

Pty

Ltd

(26%

/So

uth

Africa)

–

Sasol

373

OCGT/C

CGT

399.0

2010

2010

Operational

DN

Sasol

–

Slim

SunSw

artlan

dSo

larPark

5So

lar,

PV

26.1

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

8.9

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

RustMo1

Solar

Farm

6.9

Solar,

PV

28.0

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

9.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Kon

koon

sies

Solar

Energy

Facility

9.7

Solar,

PV

43.9

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

15.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Aries

SolarEnergy

Facility

9.7

Solar,

PV

44.5

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

15.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Greefsp

anPVPow

erPlant

9.9

Solar,

PV

53.5

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

10.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Mulilo

SolarPVDe

Aar

10So

lar,

PV

39.3

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

13.6

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Herbe

rtPVPow

erPlant

20.0

Solar,

PV

105.3

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

12.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Mulilo

SolarPV

Prieska

20So

lar,

PV

79.1

2012

2015

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

26.9

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Dassiek

lipWind

Energy

Facility

27Wind,Onsh

ore

83.1

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

18.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

MetroWindVan

Stad

ensWind

Farm

27Wind,Onsh

ore

74.8

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Soutpan

SolarPark

28So

lar,

PV

155.7

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Witko

pSo

larPark

30So

lar,

PV

174.3

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Tou

wsrivierSo

lar

Park

36So

lar,

PV

197.5

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

DeAar

SolarPV

45.6

Solar,

PV

178.0

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

Globe

leq

DBSA

in20

12ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

43.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

South

Africa

Mainstream

Ren

ewab

lePow

erDroog

fontein

45.6

Solar,

PV

173.6

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

Globe

leq

DBSA

in20

12ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

41.9

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

KhiSo

larOne

50So

larCS

509.8

2012

2016

Operational

ICB

IFC,EIB

,DBSA

andID

Call

hav

edeb

twhileID

Chas

29%

equityalso

298.7

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

LetsatsiSo

lar

Photov

oltaic

Park

64So

lar,

PV

320.9

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Lesed

iSo

lar

Photov

oltaic

Park

64So

lar,

PV

322.7

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Hop

efieldWind

Farm

65.4

Wind,Onsh

ore

195.6

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

(con

tinued

onnextpage)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

421

Table

A18(con

tinued

)

Pro

ject

Capacity

(MW

)Tech

nology

Total

Investm

ent

(US$M

illion)

Fin

ancial

closu

reCOD

Pro

ject

statu

sPro

cure

ment

meth

od

Sponso

rs/

Developer

DFIAgency

andfinancing

meth

od

TotalDFI

financing

(US$

Million)

Loca

lcr

edit

enhance

ments

&se

curity

arr

angem

ents

Kalkb

ult

72.5

Solar,

PV

274.9

2012

2013

Operational

ICB

DBSA

in20

12ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

29.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

KathuSo

larPlant

75So

lar,

PV

430.4

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

DBSA

in20

12ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

45.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

SolarCap

ital

DeAar

75So

lar,

PV

296.6

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Nob

elsfon

tein

Phase

175

Wind,Onsh

ore

196.8

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Kou

gaWindFarm

80Wind,Onsh

ore

235.6

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

12ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

53.9

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Dorper

WindFarm

97.5

Wind,Onsh

ore

286.1

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

KaX

uSo

larOne

100

SolarCS

976.3

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

DBSA

1,17

1,29

0,60

0,ID

C82

9,65

6,56

6,IFC

600,00

0,00

0,IFC(as

Implemen

tation

Entity

ofthe

Clean

Technolog

yFund)

232,40

5,00

0.MEZZDeb

t:DBSA

195,31

2,70

7,ID

C19

5,31

2,70

7Equ

ity:

IDC29

%

454.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Jeffreys

Bay

138

Wind,Onsh

ore

366.5

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

Globe

leq

DBSA

848,70

0,00

010

1.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Coo

khou

seWind

Farm

138.6

Wind,Onsh

ore

295.6

2012

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Vreden

dal

Solar

Park

8.82

Solar,

PV

29.1

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

StortemelkHyd

ro(Pty)Ltd

4.4

Hyd

roSm

all(<

20MW)

17.4

2013

Operational

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Upington

SolarPV

8.9

Solar,

PV

26.5

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Aurora-R

ietvlei

SolarPow

er9

Solar,

PV

30.3

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Neu

sbergHyd

roElectricProject

A10

Hyd

ro,Sm

all(<

20MW)

73.5

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC(in20

13ZAR)(E

xchan

gerate

.12)

senioran

dmezzdeb

t19

.7Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Chab

aWindFarm

Project

21Wind,Onsh

ore

54.4

2013

Operational

ICB

IDCin

2013

ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

15.5

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Waa

inek

Wind

Pow

er23

.3Wind,Onsh

ore

69.7

2013

2016

Operational

ICB

IDCin

2013

ZAR

(Exchan

gerate

.12)

19.9

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Linde

36.8

Solar,

PV

147.2

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Bok

poo

rtCSP

Project

50So

larCS

642.2

2013

Con

struction

ICB

IDC25

%eq

uity

45.1

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Grassridge

Wind

Energy

Project

59.8

Wind,Onsh

ore

161.3

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC20

1346

.1Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Boshof

SolarPark

60So

lar,

PV

312.0

2013

Operational

ICB

OPIC

222.7

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Dreunbe

rg69

.6So

lar,

PV

286.6

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Sish

enSo

larFacility

74So

lar,

PV

294.8

2013

2014

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

SolarCap

ital

DeAar

375

Solar,

PV

326.9

2013

Operational

ICB

IDC

111.1

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Jasp

erPow

erCom

pan

y75

Solar,

PV

290.7

2013

Operational

ICB

DBSA

60.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

WestCoa

stOne

WindFarm

90.8

Wind,Onsh

ore

252.1

2013

Operational

ICB

DBSA

44.1

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Tsitsikam

ma

Com

munity

WindFarm

94.8

Wind,Onsh

ore

365.9

2013

2016

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Amak

halaEmoy

eni

133.7

Wind,Onsh

ore

497.0

2013

2016

Operational

ICB

IFC

76.1

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

(con

tinued

onnextpage)

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

422

Table

A18(con

tinued

)

Pro

ject

Capacity

(MW

)Tech

nology

Total

Investm

ent

(US$M

illion)

Fin

ancial

closu

reCOD

Pro

ject

statu

sPro

cure

ment

meth

od

Sponso

rs/

Developer

DFIAgency

andfinancing

meth

od

TotalDFI

financing

(US$

Million)

Loca

lcr

edit

enhance

ments

&se

curity

arr

angem

ents

WindFarm

Gou

daWindProject

135.5

Wind,Onsh

ore

336.3

2013

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Mku

ze16

.5Biomass

95.6

2015

Finan

cingan

dApprova

lsunderway

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Johan

nesbu

rgLan

dfillGas

toElectricity

18Lan

dfillGas

24.8

2014

Partially

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Tom

BurkeSo

lar

Park

60Photov

oltaic

Thin

Film

Fixed

2014

2016

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Adam

sSo

larPV

275

Photov

oltaic

CrystallineFixed

2014

Con

struction

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Electra

Cap

ital

(Pty)

Ltd

75Photov

oltaic

CrystallineFixed

2014

2016

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Mulilo

Sonned

ixPrieska

PV

75Photov

oltaic

CrystallineFixed

108.0

2014

2016

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Mulilo

Prieska

PV

75Photov

oltaic

Crystalline-

Single

Axis

200.0

2014

Operational

ICB

IDCin

2014

20.2

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

PulidaSo

larPark

75Photov

oltaic

Thin

Film

Fixed

2014

Finan

cingDon

eIC

B–

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Nou

poo

rtMainstream

Wind

80Wind,Onsh

ore

180.0

2014

2016

Operational

ICB

EKFan

dDBSA

108.5

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

NojoliWindFarm

86.6

Wind,Onsh

ore

2014

2017

Operational

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Lon

gyuan

Mulilo

De

Aar

Maa

nhaa

rberg

WindEnergy

Facility

96.5

Wind,Onsh

ore

180.0

2014

Con

struction

ICB

IDC

63.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Ilan

gaCSP

1/Karoshoe

kSo

lar

One

100

Con

centrated

Solar

Pow

er,parab

olic

trou

gh,w

ithstorag

e(4.5

hper

day)

735.4

2014

Con

struction

ICB

IDCan

dDBSA

180.0

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

XinaSo

larOne

100

Con

centrated

Solar

Pow

er,parab

olic

trou

gh,w

ithstorag

e(5

hper

day)

880.0

2014

Con

struction

ICB

DBSA

800,00

0,00

0,ID

C75

0,00

0,00

0,AfD

B1,50

0,00

0,00

0an

dID

C20

%eq

uity

316.8

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Red

Cap

-Gibson

Bay

110

Wind,Onsh

ore

202.5

2014

Con

struction

ICB

–Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Khob

abWindFarm

137.7

Wind,Onsh

ore

315.0

2014

Con

struction

ICB

DBSA

,EKF

214.2

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Loe

riesfontein

2WindFarm

138.2

Wind,Onsh

ore

315.0

2014

Con

struction

ICB

DBSA

,EKF

208.5

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Lon

gyuan

Mulilo

De

Aar

2North

WindEnergy

Facility

139.0

Wind,Onsh

ore

264.6

2014

Con

struction

ICB

IDC

85.5

Paymen

tGuaran

tee

Notes:

a)REIPPPPinvestmen

tdatais

derived

from

public

sources

andhas

anerrorrange

ofarou

nd10

%an

dthat

final

finan

cial

closedatais

differentfrom

biddataan

dis

not

yetpublicly

available

b)Cells

withnoinputrepresentinform

ationwedonot

hav

e.Investmen

tnumbe

rcellswitha"-"sign

mean0investmen

t.

A. Eberhard et al. Energy Policy 108 (2017) 390–424

423

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