Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

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IInnddeeppeennddeennttAAsssseessssmmeennttooffTThheeAAiirrFFoorrcceeNNuucclleeaarrEEnntteerrpprriissee

AApprriill22001111

Report of theDefense Science Board

Permanent Task Force on

Nuclear Weapons Surety

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition, Technology and LogisticsWashington, D.C. 20301-3140


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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in

this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of

Defense.

The Task Force completed its information gathering in November 2010. The report was

in security review from 17 Dec 2010 until 4 March 2011.

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.


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SummaryofRecommendations.................................................................................................................. 42

Logistics................................................................................................................................................... 42

OrganizationandGuidance..................................................................................................................... 42

TheInspectionRegime............................................................................................................................ 43

Operations..............................................................................................................................................

43

PersonnelandMorale............................................................................................................................. 44

PersonnelReliabilityProgram................................................................................................................. 44

AppendixA:TermsofReference................................................................................................................ 46

AppendixB:TaskForceMembers.............................................................................................................. 48

AppendixC: FindingsfromPriorReportsontheIncidents........................................................................ 49

U.S.AirForceBlueRibbonReview(BRR)onNuclearWeaponsPoliciesandProcedures(February

2008)....................................................................................................................................................... 49

DSBPermanentTaskForceReportontheUnauthorizedMovementofNuclearWeapons(February

2008).......................................................................................................................................................

49

InvestigationintotheShipmentofSensitiveMissileComponentstoTaiwan(May2008).................... 49

SecretaryofDefenseTaskForceonDoDNuclearWeaponsManagement(September2008).............50

AppendixD:Acronyms................................................................................................................................ 51

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Tasking

SometwoyearsaftermajorchangestothestructureoftheAirForcenuclearenterpriseandthe

levelofattentiontotheAirForcetotheenterprise,theDeputyAssistanttotheSecretaryof

Defensefor

Nuclear

Matters

and

the

Secretary

of

the

Air

Force

tasked

the

Permanent

Task

Forcetoconductanindependentassessmentofprogresstowardsthegoalofreinvigoratingthe

AirForcenuclearenterpriseinsupportofthestrategicnucleardeterrentmission.TheTask

ForcebeganthetaskinAugust2010andcompletedthetaskinNovember2010.

Oneachvisittonuclearmissionrelatedactivities,itwascleartotheTaskForcethatthe

nuclearenterpriseleadershipateverylevelhadencouragedtheirpeopletobeopenandcandid

andtheirpeoplerespondedaccordingly.

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SomeRootCausesandUnintendedConsequences

TheneedforincreasedattentiontotheAirForcenuclearenterprisewashighlightedbythe

August2007unauthorizedtransferfromMinotAFBtoBarksdaleAFBandtheinadvertent

shipmentofnuclearweaponcomponentstoTaiwanin2008.Whiletheseincidentsdemanded

urgentcorrective

action,

anumber

of

earlier

decisions

had

an

important

negative

impact

on

the

overallenterprise. Dealingwiththeseimpactsrequiredandwillcontinuetorequireabroader

enterprisesystemsapproach.

Theearlierdecisionsimpactinglogisticssupportcontinuetohavesignificantnegativeimpacts

onthatsupport.Forexample,priortoexecutionofthe1995BRACrecommendations,expertise

andexperienceforAirForcenuclearlogisticssustainmenthadbeenvestedintheSpecial

WeaponsDirectorate(SWD)attheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenter(SAALC).TheDirectorate

hadservedtheenterprisewithexperienceandexpertiseforseveraldecades.WithBRAC

implementationofthedecisiontoclosetheSAALC,theSWDfunctionswerespreadamongsix

AirForceorganizationsbasedonperceivedcompatibilitywiththeirothermissionassignments.

Verylittle

of

the

special

expertise

in

the

SWD

was

preserved

in

the

system.

ManagementandmaintenanceoftheICBMreentrysystemcomponentsweretransferredand

consolidatedwithothermissilesystemcomponentsattheAirLogisticsCenterinOgden,Utah.

Amongthecasualtieswasspecializedmanagementfornuclearweaponcomponents.

Othernuclearrelatedcomponentsfellundergeneralcommoditymanagementsystemsinthe

AirForceandintheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA).Again,eliminationoftheSWDandits

specialattentionledtoapplyingstandardsupplychainprocessestoNuclearWeaponsRelated

Materiel(NWRM).Thispracticeincludedeliminatingstocklistingsforspecialcomponents

basedonascopeofdemandcriteriabeingusedforothersupplyitems.Asaconsequence,

satisfyingtheneedforthesecomponentscannowrequireatwoyearacquisitionprocess.

Therewerealsosignificantimpactsonoperationsthatrequiredsystemwidecorrectiveaction.

WiththedisestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,theoperatingforceswerefirstassigned

toAirCombatCommandandthentheICBMforcewasreassignedtoAirForceSpaceCommand.

Theendresultwastwomajoraircommandsresponsibleforsegmentsofthestrategicnuclear

operatingforces.

Toregaintheneededfocusonlogisticssupportforthenuclearenterprise,theAirForce

leadershipelectedtofocusactivityattheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB.

TheCenter,createdinMarch2006,hasauthorityoverICBMandnuclearwarheadsupport

activitiesatHillAFBandALCMsustainmentsupportactivitiesatTinkerAFB. Theintended

functions

were

to

encompass

much

of

the

former

function

of

the

SA

ALCs

SWD.

The

Center

alsoinheritedarangeofotherresponsibilitiestoincludeAirForcenuclearweapons

modernizationandlifeextensionprograms.

TheAirForcedecisioninOctober2006toconsolidatecruisemissilesfurtherexacerbateda

strainedstorageandintegratedmaintenancefacility.

Toregainfocusonthestrategicnucleardeterrencemission,theAirForcestoodupGlobalStrike

CommandwithresponsibilityforAirForcestrategicnuclearforces.

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TheAirForceNuclearEnterprise

TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseiscomposedoftheAirForcenuclearforces,supporting

logisticsstructure,commandandcontrolorganizations,weaponssustainmentand

modernizationactivities,andactivitiesofrelevantheadquarters,agencies,andcenters.The

enterpriseand

the

recent

changes

are

illustrated

in

the

following

figures

and

narrative.

Figure1:TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseBefore2008*

Strategic ForcesPEO

A3 Operations

Air ForceInspection Agency

8thAir Force Air Logistics Centers20thAir Force3rdAir Force

Nuclear Bomb WingsICBM WingsWings Air Force NuclearWeapons Center

EngineeringSupport GroupMunitions Group

Munitions SupportSquadrons

WeaponsStorage Sites


WeaponsDepots

Air ForceSafety Center

Air CombatCommand

Air ForceMateriel Command

Air ForceSpace Command

US Air ForcesEurope

Secretary of theAir Force

Chief of Staff

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55thWing, AF Global Logistics Support Center

Figure1aboveshowstheAirForcenuclearenterpriseasitevolvedfromthedisestablishment

ofStrategicAirCommandin1992to2008whentheAirForceleadershipinitiatedsignificant

organizationalchanges.Beforethechanges,nuclearforceswereassignedtothreemajorair

commandsandsupportinglogisticsresponsibilitieswereassignedtoAirForceMateriel

Command. TheprincipalstaffoversightinHeadquartersAirForcewasanelementwithinDCS

Operations(A3).

Inadditiontothenuclearbombermission,AirCombatCommandwasresponsiblefortwo

conventionalbomberwingsandsome20fighter,reconnaissance,commandandcontrol,

electronicwarfare,andotherwings.TheywerealsothegainingcommandforAirForceReserve

andAirNationalGuardunits.InadditiontothethreeICBMwings,AirForceSpaceCommand

wasresponsibleforacquiring,launching,andoperatingmilitaryspacesystems,andproviding

thesupportinggroundsystems.Consequently,intermsofpeopleandresources,nuclear

operationswerenotpredominantineithercommand.Further,inadditiontothethreenuclear

bombwings,8th

AirForcewasresponsibleforconventionalbomberoperationsandcyber

operations.

ThreeCONUSmajoraircommandshadresponsibilitiesforweaponsstorageandmaintenance

onoperatingbases.Withintheoperatingwings,thewingcommanderwasresponsibleand

accountableforallactivityontheoperatingbaserequiredtomeetmissionrequirements.Inthe

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caseofthedualwingbase(Minot),thebombwingcommanderwasresponsibleforstorage

andmaintenanceforboththeICBMandbomberassets.

Twologisticscentersprovidedtheprincipalsupportoftheenterprise.TheOgdenALC

supportedICBMforcesandtheOklahomaCityALCsupportedbomberforces.TheAirForce

NuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandwasestablishedin2006toprovidemorefocusedoversight

ofthe

CONUS

weapons

storage

sites

along

with

other

nuclear

systems

support

responsibilities.

InEurope,themunitionssupportsquadronsprovidedmaintenanceinsupportofNATO.Fighter

WingsalsosupportedtheNATOmission.

ThesupportingairrefuelingforcesweretransferredtoAirMobilityCommandon

disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand.Therewereandareotherelementsofthenuclear

enterprisenotshownonthechartsuchasthe55th

WingatOffuttAFB,butthoselistedwere

principalelementsofthestructurethathaddaytodaynuclearforcesandsupport

responsibilities.

Figure2:TheCurrentAirForceNuclearEnterprise*

Figure2aboveshowsthecurrentAirForcenuclearenterprise.Neworganizationsareshownin

red.Inaddition,A10staffagenciesfocusingonnuclearmattershavebeencreatedatAirForce

MaterielCommand

and

Air

Education

and

Training

Command

headquarters.

The

most

significantchangeincommandofforcesisthecreationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand

(AFGSC)andassigningallAirForcestrategicnuclearforcestothatcommand.

Thetwoprincipallogisticschangesaretheassignmentofweaponsstorageandmaintenance

responsibilitiesattheoperatingbasesforCONUSnuclearforcestotheAirForceNuclear

WeaponsCenter(AFNWC).Otheradditionalresponsibilitieshavealsobeenassignedtothe

AFNWC.Theconventionalbomberforces(B1B)remainassignedtoAirCombatCommand.

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55thWing, AF Global Logistics Support Center

Strategic ForcesPEO

A10-ACS for StrategicDeterrence and Nuclear

Integration

Air Forcection AgencyInspe

8thAir Force Air Logistics Centers20thAir Force3rdAir Force

Nuclear Bomb WingsICBM WingsWings

Air Force NuclearWeapons Center

EngineeringSupport Group

Munitions Group

MunitionsSqua

Supportdrons

Air ForceSafety Center

Air ForceMateriel Command

Air ForceGlobal Strike Command

US Air ForcesEurope

Secretary of theAir Force

Chief of Staff


MunitionsWing/Group/Squadrons

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Requirementsfordualcapableaircraft(DCA)havebeenadjustedinthenuclearenterprise

structureinEurope,buttheU.S.DCAmissionandrelationshiptoNATOhasnotchanged.

Theimpactandconsequencesofthisstructurearediscussedinsubsequentsectionsofthis

report.

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BottomLines

NewLeadershipAttention

TheTaskForcevisitedthethreemajoraircommandheadquarters,theNuclearWeapons

CenterandotheractivitiesatKirtland,activitiesatHillAFBincludingtheOgdenAirLogistics

Center(OO

ALC),

four

of

the

six

strategic

nuclear

mission

wings

and

had

discussions

with

the

commandersoftheothertwowings.TheTaskForcealsovisitedaMunitionsSupportSquadron

(MUNSS)andtheDCAFighterWing.Afterextensivediscussionsandobservingoperationsand

logistics,theTaskForcebelievestheAirForceleadershipcanhavehighconfidencethat,with

fewexceptions,theoperatinganddirectsupportforcesunderstandtheirmissionandthe

demandsoftheirmission,andareaprofessional,disciplined,andcommittedforce.

TheAirForceleadershipinstitutedandhastodatesustainedasetofextraordinarymeasuresto

dealwiththeissueshighlightedbythe2007unauthorizedtransferofnuclearweaponsandthe

2008accidentalshipmentofnuclearweaponsrelatedmaterials.Whiletherearecontinuing

challenges,theextraordinarymeasureshavebeeneffectiveincorrectingmanyofthe

deficienciesin

the

operating

forces

and

in

rebuilding

the

culture

appropriate

to

the

nuclear

weaponsenterprise.

However,someofthesemeasures,appropriatetothesituationoverthepasttwoyears,are

notsustainableforthelongtermandarebecomingcounterproductiveinthattheycreatean

extraordinaryburdenontheoperatingforcesratherthanfocusingsharplyonareasstill

requiringadditionalattention.Thecurrentinspectionregimeisaprimeexample. Thereare

areasstillrequiringspecialattentionandtheinspectionregimeshouldbefocusedonthese

areas.Theseareasincludelogisticssupportandpersonnelsupportappropriatetothepriorityof

thenucleardeterrencemission.

Accounting

for

Nuclear

Weapons

Related

Materiel

(NWRM)

is

greatly

improved,

but

remains

challenging.ConsolidationofNWRM,adaptingtheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)datasystem

forAirForceNWRM,andextraordinaryvigilanceattheoperatinglevelhasgreatlyimproved

thesituation.Thecurrentstateofprogressistheresultofwhathasbeenproperly

characterizedasaheroiceffort.Withtheprogresstodate,theleadershipcanhavehigh

confidenceinaccountingforandcontrollingtheNWRMthatareinthesystem.However,given

thestateofaccountabilityin2008andthemagnitudeofNWRM,theAirForceleadership

shouldnotyetassumethatNWRMaccountingisflawless.

Recommendation: TheAirForceleadershipshouldmaintainrealisticexpectationsregarding

thestateofaccountingforNWRM.

TheAir

Force

leadership

has

stated

clearly

that

sustaining

an

effective

nuclear

deterrent

force

is

firstpriorityandseveraltangibleactionsreinforcethatdeclaration. Giventhiscommitment,

theTaskForcehadextensivediscussionsatmultiplelocationstodiscovertheimpactof

reinvigorationontheoperatingforces. Thefollowingisawidelyheldsetofviewsatthe

operatingforceanddirectsupportlevelsregardingthecurrentstate.

Reinvigorationhasproduced:

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o Increasedattentiontothenuclearenterpriseatseniorlevels.

o Areturntohighstandardsofprofessionalisminthenuclearoperatingforces.

o Morecoherentoperationalfocusunderasinglemajoraircommand.

o Neworganizationsdirectingmoreandmorefocusedattentiontothenuclear

mission.

Thepriority

one

declaration

by

the

senior

leadership

is

yet

to

be

reflected

in:

o Anenvironmentoftrustonthepartoftheleadershipappropriatetothededication

andprofessionalismoftheoperatingforces.

o Budgetandprogrampriorityimpactingthefieldedforces.

o Replacementorupgradeofoldsupportequipmentcentraltothemission.

o Directivesandtechnicalordersprovidingthelevelofdetailappropriatetonuclear

operations.

o Personnelpoliciesandactionsmoretailoredtothespecialdemandsofthenuclear

mission.

Eachoftheitemslistedasyettobereflectedisdiscussedinthisreportwithspecific

recommendations.One

of

the

issues

impacting

perceptions

in

the

operating

forces

is

the

gap

betweenthesenseoftimeurgencyinhigherheadquartersandthatinboththeoperating

forcesandthesupportingworkforceattheairlogisticscenters.Theperceivedbusinessasusual

approachinplanningandacquisitionisinconsistentwiththestateoflongtermneglectof

logisticalsupportforthenuclearweaponsenterpriseasexperiencedintheoperatingforces.

Thisisimportantfortheeffectivenessofthemissionandforthemoraleoftheworkforce.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:

Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices

forcorrective

action

are

oriented

to

long

term

sustainment

rather

than

the

lowest

near

termcostpath.

TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandshouldgive:

Fundingandprogramprioritytologisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrence

missioncommensuratewiththepriorityofthenucleardeterrencemission.

Urgentattentiontoreplacing40+yearoldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportand

testequipmentattheoperatingwingsandtheairlogisticscentersandtoreplacingthe

WeaponsMaintenanceTrucksattheMunitionsSupportSquadron(MUNSS)sites(Europe).

Divided

Authority

and

Accountability

Thecomplexityofthelogisticschaincanimpedethepaceofresolvingemergingorlong

standinglogisticslimitationsonsupportingtheoperatingwingsabilitytoperformtheirmission.

Auniquelogisticsandmaintenanceorganizationwasintroducedatthewinglevelinthe

strategicforcesaspartoftheincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.Thisstructure,

centralizedundertheNuclearWeaponsCenter,wasappropriatewhentheoperatingforces

wereassignedasadditionalmissionstotwomajoraircommands.WiththeformationofGlobal

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StrikeCommand,thisstructureisnowaddingcomplexityandconfusionwithoutcommensurate

addedvalue.

Thebifurcationattheoperatingbaselevelofresponsibilityforthemissionbetweenthe

operationalwingandthemunitionsorganizationiscontrarytoimportantprinciplesofAirForce

organizationwhichassignsmissionresponsibilitieswithinaclearchainofcommand.This

bifurcationis

creating

unintended

complexity

and

negative

perceptions.

Recommendation:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat

actionbeinitiatedtoassignallbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategic

MissileandBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobal

StrikeCommand.

OversightandInspection

Arigorousinspectionprogramremainsessentialtosafe,secure,andeffectiveoperations.

However,excesseshavedevelopedthatarebecomingcounterproductive.Theinspection

programneedstobemoresharplyfocusedonareaswhereissuespersist.Thecontinuing

intenseand

across

the

board

level

of

inspection

and

exercise

activity

is

perceived

by

some

in

higherheadquarterstobeacontinuingneeduntilazerodefectculturecanbereestablished.

Whenoverdone,thelevelofinspectionandexercisesarecounterproductiveandleadtoan

unrealisticzeroriskmindset.

Thecontinuedlevelofoversightandthebroadlyappliedinspectionregimeiscreatinga

perceptionthatthehigherheadquartersleadershipbelievestheycanandmustinspectin

quality.Italsocreatesaclimateofdistrust.Itleadstoaperceptionintheoperatingforcesthat

theleadershipdoesnottrustthemtoperformprofessionally.Thisleadsthemtoquestionthe

motivesofthehigherheadquartersleadership.Furtheritiscreatingaleadershipmindset

wheresatisfyingaNuclearSuretyInspectionteam,forexample,cansupplant,oratleast

competewith,

focus

on

readiness

to

perform

the

assigned

nuclear

mission.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:

Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather

thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.

Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle

NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness

Inspection(NORI)each18months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof

Staff

direction,

conducted

with

NSIs.

TheCommandersofGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommandshoulddirect

thatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlytoaddress

unsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,thewing

commanderorthemunitionssquadron(MUNS)commanderisaccountableforclosingoutthe

discrepancies.

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TheCommanderofUSAFEshoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspections

areconductedonlytoaddressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forall

otherdiscrepanciesthewingcommanderortheMUNSScommanderisaccountablefor

closingoutthediscrepanciesincommunicationwiththeappropriateinspectionagency.

Enlisted

Personnel

Management

Theintersectionofmultipleissuesimpactingmunitions,missilemaintenance,andbomber

maintenancecareerfieldscallsforincreasedattentionandflexibilitytomeettheneedsofthe

operatingforces.

Thecareerfieldswhicharecriticaltomaintainingthestrategicnucleardeterrentseemtobe

largelymanagedinabusinessasusualfashionwithassignmentpoliciesthatdonottakefull

advantageofspecialexperienceidentifiersinmeetingthespecialneedsofthenuclear

enterprise.

OfspecialinterestarethenumbersandassignmentofMasterSergeants(MSgtE7)andSenior

MasterSergeants(SMgtE8)incriticalcareerfields.Onaverage,ittakesabout16yearsto

produceaqualified

MSgt

and

19

years

to

produce

aqualified

SMSgt.

Hence,

there

are

long

termconsequencesrelatedtothemanagementofthisresource.

Recommendation:TheHeadquartersAirForceA1shoulddirectspecialattentiontoproviding

theneededqualifiedpeopletotheoperatingforcesinthecareerfieldsthatarebothfragile

andcriticaltothenuclearmission.

The

Personnel

Reliability

Program

TheDoDguidanceonthePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)hasimprovedsignificantlysince

2004.Incontrast,thepracticeintheAirForcehascontinuedtodeteriorate.

Recommendation:The

Secretary

and

the

Chief

of

Staff

of

the

Air

Force

should

direct

an

immediateadjustmenttoAirForceguidance/practicestoremovePRPbasedrestrictionsand

monitoringdemandsthatexceedthoserequiredbyDoDdirection.

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NewSeniorLeadershipAttention

Focus

TheAirForceleadershipatmultiplelevelshastakendecisiveactiontocorrectdeficiencies,

reinvigorate,andfurtherstrengthentheAirForcenuclearenterprise.Theseactionsinclude

changesin

priorities,

organization,

authorities,

and

processes.

There

is

aclear

message

from

the

SecretaryoftheAirForceandtheChiefofStaffthattheyconsidernucleardeterrencetobethe

AirForcesfirstprioritymission.ThisisreflectedintheAirForcestatementofprioritieswith

ContinuetostrengthentheNuclearEnterpriseasthefirstpriority.Itisalsoreflectedinthe

AirForceCoreFunctionswithNuclearDeterrenceOpsasthefirstlistedfunction.These

actionshavegenerallyproducedtheintendedresultsintheoperatingforces.Theyhavebeen

lesssuccessfulinprovidinglogisticsandpersonnelsupportcommensuratewiththemission

priority.

Changes

in

Organization

Threeorganizational

changes

were

intended

to

bolster

both

the

fact

and

perception

of

restoringthepriorityaccordedthenuclearenterprise:

CreatinganAssistantChiefofStaffforStrategicDeterrenceandNuclearIntegration

(A10)inHeadquartersAirForce(HAF),

TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandasamajoraircommandresponsible

for AirForcestrategicnuclearforces,and

CreatingandstrengtheningtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB,New

Mexico,andasetofsubordinateorganizations,responsiblefornuclearsustainmentto

includeactivitiesinsideCONUSweaponsstorageareas(WSAs)andforabroadrangeof

additionalnuclearenterpriseresponsibilities.

Air

Force

Global

Strike

Command

TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandhasproducedanearlyuniversallypositive

responseinthenuclearoperatingforces.Thepotentialnegativeaspectisthefactthatwhile

themissionresponsibilitiesofthecommandaredeclaredfirstpriority,ithasbeencommanded

byalieutenantgeneralwhileallbutoneoftheotheroperationalandsupportcommandsare

commandedbyfourstarofficers.Thisiswidelynotedinthestrategicoperatingforces.

TheAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandcommanderandstaffhaveaclearunderstandingoftheir

responsibilitiesandaretakingabroadrangeofstepstoinclude:

Clarifyingandexpandingdirectiontomakeitmoreappropriatetothedemandsofthe

nuclearmission,

Dailyoversightofoperationsandmaintenancetoensurethereadinessoftheforce,and

Addressinglongneglectedlogisticsissues.

Thecommandistransmittingaclearsetofvalues:

Individualresponsibilityformissionsuccess,

Criticalselfassessmentofperformance,

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Uncompromisingadherencetodirectives,

Superiortechnicalandweaponssystemexpertise,

Prideinnuclearheritageandmission,

Respectfortheworthanddignityofeveryairman,

Safetyinallthingslarge...andsmall.

TheTaskForceliststhissetofvaluesasacontrasttotheimplicationsofsomeotherapproaches

tostrengtheningthenuclearenterprisediscussedinthisreport.

Incontrasttotheskipechelonorganizationthatbrokechainofcommandresponsibilityfor

operationsandtraininginthebomberforceupto2008,8th

AirForceandAirForceGlobalStrike

CommandareclearlyresponsiblefordailyoperationsandtrainingintheB2andB52forces.

TheAFGSCCommandCenterinterfaceswith8th

AirForceand20th

AirForceandtheirunitsona

24/7basis.Thephilosophyismicroinformed,notmicromanagement. Authoritiesand

accountabilityareclear.

ImpactofOtherChangesinOrganization

Thechanges

in

organization

have

contributed

significantly

to

the

intended

increased

emphasis

onthenuclearenterpriseandthesewerevaluableinaddressingtheurgentissues.Atthesame

time,somehavethepotentialfornegativeimpactswhencontinuedbeyondtheperiodof

urgentneed.Extraordinarymeasuresappropriatetoanurgentsituationmaynotbe

appropriateorsustainableforlongtermmissionaccomplishment.

TheHeadquarters,AirForceA10organizationwasstooduponNovember1,2008toprovidea

singularfocusonnuclearmattersintheAirForceheadquarters.Thisorganizationhasserved

theintendedpurposeandhasbeeneffectiveinincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.The

potentialnegativeimpactisthepossibilitythatkeyDeputyChiefsofStaffwithnuclear

enterpriseresponsibilitiescouldfeellessobligatedtoplacetheneededemphasisonthose

responsibilities.The

Task

Force

met

with

the

Air

Force

A1,

A3/5,

A4/7,

A8,

and

people

from

the

A9anddiscussedthisissue.Anysuchtendencyiscurrentlycounteredbythecontinuing

attentionoftheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaff.Itisnotclearthatthiswillcontinuetobethe

caseorthattheA10shouldbeapermanentfixture. Thecontinuedsuccessofthisoverlapping

arrangementisdependentonpersonalattentionandisnotanormalAirForceinstitutional

arrangement. Inanycase,itcreatesconfusioninsubordinateorganizationsastowhohasthe

responsibilitiesandauthoritiestoaddresstheirissues.

AsecondconsequenceismajoraircommandmirrorimagingofHAFasreflectedintheA10

functionsatAFMCandAirEducationandTrainingCommand(AETC).ThisisnotthecaseatAir

ForceGlobalStrikeCommandwhereallaspectsofthestaffarefocusedonthenuclear

enterprise.There

is

along

standing

arrangement

in

USAFE

that

concentrates

nuclear

expertise

andattentioninadirectorateintheUSAFEA3.Again,supportofthenuclearenterprise

requirestheattentionofthemajorstaffagencies.Thisissueisfurthercomplicatedby

responsibilitiesassignedtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter(AFNWC)withthestatedintent

toclearuppreviouslyambiguouschainsofcommand.TheadvertisedfunctionoftheAFNWCis

sustainment,thatis,logisticssupportoftheoperatingwings.Thatisalsoakeyroleofthe

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AFMC/A4.OurdiscussionswiththeA4andstaffandwiththeAFNWCleadershipmadeitclear

thatbothunderstandtheirresponsibilitiesforsustainingthenuclearenterprise.

InadditiontotheroleandauthoritiesoftheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWCCommander,thereis

theroleoftheAFMCA10.GiventhattheA10isacolonel,theA4isamajorgeneralandthe

Commander,AFNWCisabrigadiergeneral,theroleandauthorityoftheA10mustdepend

heavilyon

the

AFMC

Commander.

Again,

this

is

not

anormal

institutional

arrangement.

At

this

level,theA10positioncouldaddconfusionratherthanvalueinspiteofthequalityand

experienceofthepeopleintheA10.Thisisalsoqualityandexperiencethatisneeded

elsewhereinthenuclearenterprise.

TheAFNWChasbeenstaffedwithqualitypeoplewithimportantandrelevantobjectivesand

hasmadesignificantcontributionstorestoringanappropriatelevelofprofessionalisminthe

operatingforces.TheissuefortheAFNWC,theAFMC/A10,andtheAFMC/A4regardingthe

nuclearenterpriseisclarityinroles.Relatedtothatissueisthescopeofresponsibilitiesthat

AFMCI90204ascribestotheAFNWC.Itcouldbeinterpretedasdevolvingresponsibilitiesto

AFNWCthatwouldlogicallybeassignedtothemajoraircommandheadquarters AirForce

GlobalStrike

Command

and

Air

Force

Materiel

Command.

The

described

scope

of

those

responsibilitiesiswellbeyondareasonableexpectationforthecenter.Beforethe

disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,manyoftheseresponsibilitieswereshared

betweenStrategicAirCommandHeadquartersandAirForceLogisticsCommandHeadquarters

requiringasignificantpartoftheattentionofbothcommandersandkeystaff.

Arelatedissueisthecomplexchainofcommandfromthemaintenanceunitsinthefieldtothe

authorityandcapabilitytoaddresstheirneeds.Thechainofcommandfortheworkforceinthe

munitionssquadron(MUNS)keyplayersinthereadinessofthenuclearforces passes

throughfourlevelsenroutetoaccesstheauthorityandresourcestoprovidesupportneeded

toperformitsmission.Thechainisfromthemunitionssquadrontothegrouptothewingto

theAFNWC

to

the

System

Program

Office

(SPO).

Even

beyond

that

chain,

it

is

likely

that

action

byAFMC/A4willberequiredtoresourcesolutions.Inaddition,theStrategicForcesProgram

ExecutiveOfficehasyetanotherreportingchain.Thislongandcomplexchainofcommand

wouldbelessofaconcernifthemaintenanceoperationshadbeenwellsupportedbeforethe

neworganizationswerecreated.Asubsequentsectionofthereportwillprovideevidencethat

thishasnotbeenthecase.Hence,thereisaneedforrapidresponse.

Theorganizationalchangeshavehadtheintendedeffectofincreasedattentioninmanyofthe

rightplaces.Longstandingneglectinimportantareasisbeingaddressed.However,the

operatingforceshaveseenonlylimitedpositiveimpacttodateandsignificantnegativeimpact.

TheTaskForceheardexpressionsofdisappointmentfrommultiplelevelsmostnotably

amongthe

enlisted

force

maintaining

the

nuclear

weapons.

Part

of

the

problem

is

the

apparent

differenceintimelinessexpectations.Ithasbeentwotofouryearssinceorganizationalchanges

wereputinplace.Thefactsarethathigherheadquartershavebeenworkingtoaddressthe

issuesthatconcerntheworkforcewhosemissionissustainingtheweapons.Further,peopleat

thehigherheadquartersbelievetheyhavemadeimportantstridesinaddressingtheproblems.

Sincethesolutionstomanyoftheproblemsrequiredevelopment,amultiyeartimeframe

seemsreasonabletohigherheadquarters.Itseemslessreasonabletotheworkforcebecause

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theyhavebeendealingwiththeproblemsforalongertime.OneSeniorMasterSergeant

expressedwhattheTaskForceperceivedtobeaviewheldbymanywhenhesaid:Theyhave

beenadmiringproblemsfortwoyearsthatwehavebeenlivingwithfortenyears.

Thedivisionofresponsibilityatthewinglevelisnotattherootoftheshortfallsinlogistics

support.Theseissueshavedevelopedoveraperiodofatleastadecadeandahalf.Further,the

TaskForce

found

no

evidence

that

the

current

division

of

responsibility

between

AFGSC

and

AFMCattheoperatingbaseiscreatingconflictortensionintheoperatingwings.Inpractice,

thewingcommanderandthemunitionssquadroncommanderrelateasthoughtheMUNSis

partofthewing.

Still,thecomplexityoftheorganizationandconfusionaboutrolesandrelationshipscan

complicateanddelayactiontoaddresstheissues.Figure3belowisoneviewofthe

organizationandrelationships.

Figure3:TheLogisticsIssueResolutionChainasSeenbytheWingCommander

Thisisnottheonlyviewsincetheactualflowofinformationandauthoritydependson

individualpersonalitiesandrelationships.Forexample,wingcommanderstreatthemunitions

squadronasanintegralpartofthewing.Theyseektoensurethatthesameinformationmoves

throughboththeoperationalcommandchaintoAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandthe

logisticschaintotheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter.Further,itisnotclearthatthereare

separatechainstotheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWC.Still,theoperationalandlogisticschainsare

separatechainofcommandstructures.Bypassinganypartofthestructurewouldrequirea

subordinatecommandertobypasshisimmediatecommanderwhichisnotanormalmilitary

process.Inanycase,theICBMorbomberSPOisoftenthelocusoftheexpertiseneededto

addressissues.Hence,thesimplest,shortestpathtoinvolvetheSPOwouldseemtobe

desirable.

Amorecentralissueisthatthearrangementiscontrarytoatleasttwoprinciplesthatgovern

AirForceoperationalunitorganizationelsewhereintheAirForce.Thefirstisunityofcommand

atmultiplelevelsmaintenancegroup,missileandbombwing,andmajoraircommand.The

secondisclearaccountability.TheAirForcecultureisthatthewingcommanderhasbuck

stopshereaccountabilityfortheperformanceofallmissionassetsonhisorherbase.Thisis

nottrueofthecurrentorganizationinthestrategicnuclearwings.Thewingcommanderisnot

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accountableforthemaintenanceandstorageoftheweaponsthatarecentraltothemission.

Withoutthataccountability,itisdifficulttoseehowthewingcommanderisaccountablefor

themostbasicdemandofhismission meetingnuclearalertandresponserequirements.

Thearrangementalsocreatesunintendedperceptionissues.AFGSCandthewingcommander

canbeperceivedasinferiorinscopeandresponsibilitytootheroperationalmajorair

commandsand

wings.

For

the

munitions

squadron,

the

chain

of

command

moves

them

from

beinganintegralpartoftheoperationalunittoanappendedsupportorganization.These

perceptionsarenotdesirableinwhatisdeclaredtobethefirstpriorityoperationalmissionof

theAirForce.

Recommendations:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirect:

AnactiontoassignbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategicMissile

andBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobalStrike

Command.

Areexaminationofthecontinuedutilityofthesetofspecialheadquartersorganizations.

ArevisionofthesetofresponsibilitiesascribedtoAFNWCinAFMCI90204tosharplyfocus

onthesustainabilityofthenuclearenterprisewithotherresponsibilitiesassignedto

HeadquartersAirForce,HeadquartersAirForceMaterielCommand,andAirForceGlobal

StrikeCommand.

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OversightandInspection

Regardingthetwoincidentsthathighlightedtheneedforintenseattentiontothenuclear

enterprise,asstatedearlierinthereport,thechangesinpriorityandprocessesarehavingthe

desiredeffect.Theriskofanunauthorizedtransferofanuclearweaponisnownearzeroand

willremain

so

as

long

as

there

is

leadership

attention

and

clear

direction.

The

solution

has

been,forthemostpart,areturntotheprocesses,discipline,andculturethatservedthenation

wellformorethanhalfacentury.

ThereisalsointenseattentiontotheissueofaccountabilityandcontrolofNuclearWeapons

RelatedMateriel.IncreasedattentionhasimprovedtheNWRMsituationgreatly,butthe

conditionofthesystemin2008andthescope,magnitude,anddistributionofNWRMmakethis

acontinuingworkinprogress.Theleadershipcanhaveconfidenceintheorganizationand

attentiontoNWRM.Theleadershipcanalsohaveconfidenceinaccountingandcontrolof

NWRMthathasbeenidentifiedasNWRM.

Thisprogressisevidenceofthevalueofanextraordinarylevelofoversightandinspection

activityappropriate

to

address

the

urgent

need

identified

from

the

2007

and

2008

incidents.

Thetypesofinspectionsinclude:

NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)

DefenseNuclearSuretyInspection(DNSI)

JointNuclearSuretyInspection(JNSI)

LimitedNuclearSuretyInspection(LNSI)

NuclearOperationalReadinessInspection(NORI)

MaintenanceStandardizationEvaluation(MSE)

OperationsStandardizationEvaluation

LogisticsCapabilityAssessmentProgram(LCAP)orTeam(LCAT)evaluation/inspection

NuclearStaffAssistanceVisit(NSAV)

NuclearSuretyStaffAssistanceVisit(NSSAV)

NSAVs/NSSAVswerenotintendedasinspections.Theyarelistedherebecausetheyhave

evolvedintoinspectionsbyanydefinition.Theonlydistinctionisthattheunitisnotgivena

formalgrade.Ingeneral,theSAVteamisnot,asintended,charteredtorespondtotheunit

commandersstatedneed.Instead,itassessesareasidentifiedbytheSAVteamorhigher

headquarters.AnNSAVoccurssixmonthspriortoaunitsscheduledNSI.InbothAirForce

GlobalStrikeCommandandUSAFE,theresultsarereportedtohigherheadquartersandunit

commandersarerequiredtorespondtowriteupsjustastheydowithanNSI.Several

commanders

expressed

the

view

that

NSAVs

have

become

the

higher

headquarters

staff

defenseagainstthepossibleembarrassmentofaunitintheircommandfailinganNSI.

Asnoted,theTaskForcesawandheardconvincingevidencethatthelevelofoversightand

inspectionshasbeensuccessfulandhasservedtheintendedpurposeintheoperatingforces.

Further,thereisnoquestionabouttheimportanceofarigorousinspectionprogram.But,the

currentintenseandpervasiveregimeseemstohavebeeninstitutionalizedastheaccepted

approachtoproducingqualitywork.Anunintendedconsequenceoftheincreasedoversightis

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theworkloadinthewingsboththeoperatingandlogisticswings. Aparticularlycompelling

exampleisMinotwithtwooperationalwings. Table1belowportraystheimpactonthe

leadershipandpeopleperformingthemissionatMinot.

Table1:DaysofSpecialEffortatMinotAFB

Year High Level ofSpecial Effort-Major Inspection,

Congressional Visit

Significant Level ofSpecial Effort -Major Exercise,

HigherHeadquarters Visit

Medium Level ofSpecial Effort White SpaceIncluding Week-ends & Holidays

2008 190* 98 72 69 total

2009 204 192 73 65 total

2010thru

Aug

168 114 75 25 total

*

For

all

categories,

there

are

multiple

activities,

sometimes

three

or

four

on

many

of

the

days.

Thewhitespacesituation(thelastcolumn)atBarksdaleandinUSAFEunitsissimilarinimpact

tothatportrayedinTable1.Therearefewdays,toincludeweekendsandholidays,whenthe

wingcommanderscanfocusonjusttheirmissions.TheTaskForcenotedasimilarlevelof

inspectionandexerciseactivityatthe2nd

BombWingatBarksdaleandinthe748th

Supply

ChainManagementGroup(SCMG)atHillAFB.Therearemultiplecausesofthisexcessive

activity:

Multipleheadquartersandcenterswithoverlappingresponsibilitiesandlackofclarity,

Continuedfocusonpastproblems,and

Wingandgroupcommanderspreoccupationwithdealingwithinspections.

TheTaskForcedidnotattempttorankorderthecauses.Inthecaseofthethirdcause,theTask

Forcenotedthat,atonewing,thecommanderexpressedthegoalofagenerationexercisea

month.Totheextentthereisexcessiveunitgeneratedexercises,theunitcommandersreceive

asteadydrumbeatofexhortationstodomoreselfinspection.Selfinspectionisclearly

importanttoquality.Still,selfinspectionshouldreducetheneedforhigherheadquarters

inspectionratherthanbecominganothersubjectforevaluationandexhortationduring

inspections.

Acommoncomplaintinboththeoperationalandlogisticsunitsisthattheinspectionsareso

frequentthattheunithasneitherenoughtimenorresourcestocorrectdeficiencies.Inthis

case

the

resource

issue

is

people.

The

same

people

who

prepare

for

inspections

are

occupied

bytheinspectionandmustcarryoutthecorrectiveactionaftertheinspection.Theirperception

isthattheyareonanactivitywheeldrivenbyinspections,notbythedemandsoftheirmission.

TheTaskForcesawevidencethatthisperceptionisjustified.

Aperception(andfrustration)amongUSAFEunitsisthatLCAPinspectionsareunnecessarily

duplicativesincenuclearmaintenanceisthoroughlyinspectedduringanNSI.USAFEmunitions

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supportsquadronscannotunderstandtherequirementforaseparatenuclearlogistics

inspectiongiventheextentoftheNSI.

Furthermore,thelevelofinspectionandexerciseintensityishavinganadverseeffectonthe

readinessoftheB52wingsastheyinterferewithaircraftmaintenanceactivityatthesame

timethewingsareexperiencingsignificantshortagesinexperiencedcrewchiefsandrapid

turnoverin

other

experienced

maintenance

people.

Itisusefultonote,onceagain,thattherigorouscorrectiveactiontodealwiththeunauthorized

transferhasbeeneffectiveandthecurrentsituationisnotinneedofanythinglikethelevelof

oversightindicatedinTable1. Also,asnoted,effectiveactiontoprecludearepeatofthe

Taiwanshipmenterrorisunderwayandmakingimpressiveprogressfromwhatiscorrectly

characterizedasasuperhumaneffort.Theyneedbetterdatasystemsandresources,notmore

inspections.

Thiscontinuedintenseandbroadscopesystemofinspectionsandhigherheadquartersvisits

canbeinterpretedasaphilosophyofinspectinginquality.Infact,theTaskForceheard

commentsfrom

some

higher

headquarters

flag

officers

indicating

the

view

that

inspecting

in

qualitywillbenecessaryuntilthecultureofspecialattentiontonuclearoperationsis

reestablishedattheoperatingwings.TheTaskForcesawandheardevidencethatthisculture

hasbeenlargelyreestablishedintheoperatingforces.Incontrast,thesupportingsystemhas

notyetfullyrecoveredthecapabilitiesandculturethatexistedintheSpecialWeapons

DirectorateattheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenternorhasasatisfactoryleveloflogistics

supportbeenreestablished.Further,theTaskForcedidnotdetectasenseofurgency

commensuratewiththeoversightactivityshowninTable1anddescribedforotherunits.

Themostpositiveinterpretationofthecontinuedbroadandpervasivelevelofspecialoversight

andinspectionoftheoperatingforcesisthattheleadershipdoesnotyettrusttheoperating

forcesto

perform

effectively

under

the

authority

of

anormal

Air

Force

chain

of

command.

The

mostnegativeinterpretationwouldbethatsomelevelsoftheleadershiparemoreconcerned

withtherisktotheirprofessionalcareersthanwithsupportingtheoperatingforces.TheTask

ForceheardbothinterpretationsfromNCOsofallranksandfromcompanygradeofficers.

Regardlessoftheinterpretation,theTaskForceconcludesthatcontinuingthebroad,pervasive

levelofinspectionandexerciseshasbecomecounterproductive.Thepervasivenessofthe

inspectionactivitystandsinthewayofthewingsestablishingtheoperatingrhythmessentialto

aneffectiveoperation.Theoperatingforcesunderstandthedemandsofthemission.Theydo

notunderstandthedemandsoftheinspectionandexerciseregimes.Theyalsounderstandthey

mustdoeverythingpossibletoensurethattheydonotfailanNSIregardlessoftheimpactof

suchafocusontheoperationalmissionandsometimesregardlessoftheimpactontheunits

people.

Oneoftheconsequencesofthepervasiveinspectionimpactonunitoperationswas

characterizedattwolocationsasnuclearparanoia,theperceptionbeingthatgoodpeople

(particularlycivilianemployees)areavoidingassignmentsthatsubjectthemtotheinspection

andoversightregimethathasbecomeinstitutionalizedinnuclearoperationsandlogistics

activities.Nuclearparanoiamayalsobeimpactingtheattitudetowardsbeingidentifiedas

havingnuclearexpertisethoughtheevidenceofthiswasanecdotalandlimited.

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TheTaskForcealsohearddiscussionoftheroleoftheAirForceInspectionAgency(AFIA).That

rolehasevolvedtobothacoreaugmentationtomajorcommandinspectionteamsandan

oversightandqualitycontrolroleonvirtuallyeveryNSI/DNSI.TheAFIAroleseemsappropriate

anduseful.Still,thecombinationofmajorcommandinspectors,AFIAinspectorsandobservers,

DTRAinspectorsandobservers,AFSafetyCenterobservers,combatantcommandobservers,

and,in

Europe,

NATO

observers

grows

the

inspection

teams.

It

is

not

unusual

to

have

eight

or

teninspectorsfromthemultipleagenciesobservingatechnicaloperationcarriedoutbytwo

technicians. InthecaseofaNSI/DNSIforaMunitionsSupportSquadroninEurope,itisnot

uncommontohave80to90inspectorsexaminingaunitwithatotalunitmanningoflessthan

150.

Further,thelevelofdetailintheinspection,thejudgmentaboutwhatismajorandwhatis

minor,andanumberofnewandseeminglyillogicalrulesraisecredibilityissues.Fourexamples

illustratethetrendtowardsexcess.

ArecentnewsafetyruledemandsthatnotechnicianinaWMTbecloserthanoneinch

fromawallwhenthefiresetcablesareexposedonanassetlestanunknownsourceof

electricalcurrent

leap

to

the

firing

set.

This

rule

applies

to

aWMT

which,

itself,

is

a

faradaycage,enclosedinalightningprotectedaircraftshelter.Thisisparticularly

difficulttocomplywithinaworkareadesignedforfourpeoplewhentheyarebeing

observedbymultipleinspectors,alldeclaringthattheymustactuallyseethetechnician

performeachstepoftheprocedure.

ThereisanAirForcerequirementfortheSupplyChainManagementGroupattheALC

tomaintaintwoyearsofpaperprintoutsofusagefactors.Sinceallthisinformationis

availableelectronically,theprintoutshavenopracticaluse.Thisrequirementproduces

about400,000pagesofprintouteachquarterdemandingstoragecabinetsforeight

quartersworthofvirtuallyworthlesspaper.StilltheLogisticsComplianceAssessment

Teamreligiously

checks

to

be

certain

that

the

full

eight

quarters

of

printouts

are

properlymaintained.Missingpaperdatacanbeamajorwriteup.Theunitsanswerto

whytheinspectorsdothatisbecausetheycan.

InspectionsoftechnicaloperationsinUSAFEareconductedontrainingassets(notwar

reserveassets).Theseassetshaveseenheavyuseandhavenumerousnicksand

scratches.Theinspectionteamtypicallyrequiresthatthetechniciangothroughthe

processofinspecting,assessingwithreferencetotechdata,andrecordingeachofthe

defects.Thisalonecanconsumemorethananhourattheoutsetofanoperationwhere

thetotaltaskexecutiontimeisnormallyabout30minutes.Itisdifficulttoexplaintothe

technicianwhyhehastorepeatedlydemonstrateduringasingleoperationthathe

knows

how

to

correctly

identify

and

characterize

defects

on

a

worn

training

munition.

ThisisanissueatthenuclearbomberbasesinCONUSaswell.

Thereisalsothematterofthemostbasictrust.Thecomplaintofseveraltechniciansis

thatiftheinspectorsdonotactuallyseethetechnicianperformaparticularstep

becausetheinspectorsareconversingamongthemselvesorotherwisedistracted,

inspectorswillnotacceptthatthetechnicianperformedthestep.Inatleastonecase,it

causedthefailureofanNSI.Thissortofattitudeisinterpretedbytheworking

technicianasevidencethattheofficialdirectiongiventheinspectoristoassumethat

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thosetheyareobservingarenotdoingthetaskproperlyuntilproventotheinspector.

Sincethesearenuclearoperations,therearealwaysatleasttwotechniciansatwork

andthereisnoreasonablebasisforinspectorsautomaticdiscountingofthewordofa

trustedtechnicianteam.

Anadditionalpriceofthenumbersofobservers/inspectorsthatinsistonphysically

observingtechnical

operations

is

alevel

of

interference

and

artificiality

that

calls

into

questionthevalidlyoftheentireinspectionprocess.Asanexample,forUSAFE

operationsitcantakeanhourandahalfwhenusingtheproperproceduretoclearan

inspectionandobserverpartyintoanaircraftsheltertoobserveatechnicalorloading

operation.

Theissueofgroupsofinspectorsalsoappliestonontechnicaloperations.Inthecaseof

arecentNSIataMUNSSinEurope,therewerenineinspectorsexaminingthePRP

recordsofaunitwith142peopleonPRPwithonePRPmonitorintheunit.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:

Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather

thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.

Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle

NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness

Inspection(NORI)each18 months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof

Staffdirection,conductedwithNSIs.ForthelogisticsunitssubjecttoLogisticsCapability

AssessmentTeaminspections,thenormalfrequencyshouldbe18months.

Thenumbersofinspectorsfrommultipleorganizationsistailoredtothesizeand

complexityoftheoperationsoftheunit.

Thenumbersofinspectorsphysicallyobservingtechnicalandloadingoperationsin

controlledfacilitiesistheminimumrequiredtoverifytheproperperformanceofthetask.

TheCommandersofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommand

shoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlyto

addressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,the

wingcommanderorAFMCMUNScommanderisaccountableforclosingdiscrepancies.

TheCommanderofUSAirForcesinEuropeshouldrestrictthetotalsizeandcomplexityofan

inspectionteamtothatwhichisappropriatetothesizeandcomplexityofthenuclear

operationsoftheinspectedunit.

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OperationsandMaintenance

LogisticsandMaintenance

TheTaskForceelectedtovisittheOgdenALCsincemanyofthelogisticsissuesidentifiedon

visitstootherorganizationswerefocusedonthesupportforballisticmissilesandballistic

missilewarheads.

There

are

anumber

of

organizations

relevant

to

the

support

of

ballistic

missilesustainment.SomearelocatedatHillAFBandsomeatKirtlandAFB.Thereisavarietyof

reportingchannels directlytotheOOALC,totheAFNWC,ortoAFMCsAirForceGlobal

LogisticsSupportCenter.Table2listssomeoftherelevantorganizations.

Table2:LogisticsSupportOrganizations

Organization Reports to Location Function

ICBM Systems Division AF Nuclear WeaponsCenter

Hill AFB System Program Office

Engineering Support

498thNuclear SystemsWing (NSW)

AF Nuclear WeaponsCenter

Kirtland AFB KUMMSC Support

Munitions Sqds708

thNuclear Sustainment

Sqd (NSUS)498

thNSW Kirtland AFB Stockpile management of

DOE support to DoD

309thMissile Mx Group

(MMXG)

Ogden Air Logistics Ctr Hill AFB Depot repair for RS/RVMinuteman III Mk12/Mk21

748thSupply Chain

Management GroupAF Global Logistics

Support CenterHill AFB

component

Supply Support

NWRM management

Withtheexceptionofthe708th

NSUS,theissueswiththemaintenanceandlogistics

organizationsimpactingeitherthestrategicforcesorthoseinEuropeweresimilar:

Agingequipment

central

to

their

mission

with

little

or

no

urgency

in

plans

to

replace

the

equipment.

Lowpriorityinspiteofthedeclarationoftheprimacyofthenuclearmission.Plansto

providetheneededsupporttoincludesuchseeminglymundaneneedsasconnecting

cablesrepeatedlyfrustratedbydemandstofindcheapersolutions.Hencetheusual

responseisstretchedordelayedprogramssuchasthereplacementfortheReentry

SystemTestSet(RSTS),a40+yearoldpieceofessentialtestgearwithacurrently

plannedreplacementdateof2017. TheTaskForcenotedthatittookonlyaboutthis

lengthoftimetodevelopandfieldtheF15andF16fighteraircraft.

Reductionsinmanpoweratthesametimeasincreasesinworkload.Figure4offersone

illustrationoftheincreaseinworkload.

26


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Figure4:Re-EntrySystem/Re-EntryVehicle(RS/RV)EngineeringRequests

Therearemultiplereasonsfortheescalatinggrowthindemandforengineeringsupportfrom

theICBMSystemsDivision:

Continuedagingofsystemsbeingsupportedandsupportequipment.

Reducedexperienceintheunitsmaintainingtheequipment.

Inadequateandoutdatedtechnicaldatawithmanpowerasaprimereasonfortechnical

databacklog.

Anenvironmentofriskavoidanceleadingtoreferralsforengineeringjudgments

formerlymade

by

maintenance

supervisors.

Virtuallyallofthesecausesofincreasedworkloadandreducedefficiencyareevidentacrossthe

maintenanceandlogisticsactivitiesintheoperatingwingsandthelogisticswingsandgroups.

Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddirectazerobaseassessmentofthelogistics

centerandoperatingunitengineeringandmaintenancemanpowerrequirementsconsidering

theagingoftheequipment.

Additionalrecommendationsrelevanttothisdiscussionarefoundinthefollowingsectionson

operatingwings.

Operations

Missile

Wings

Missileoperationscrewsarecommittedtotheirmission,butmostwerenotvolunteersfor

missileduty.Theyperceivealackofknowledgeofandrespectfortheirmissionfromwithinthe

largerAirForce.Thisperceptionisreinforcedbybothlargeandsmallsignals.Manyofthe

currentcrewsexperiencedthetraumaofhavingtheirStrategicMissileWingrenamedSpace

Wingandreplacingthedistinctivemissilebadgewithaspacebadge.Further,astheyattend

professionalmilitaryeducationatalllevels,theynotethatthereislittleinthecurriculumabout

27


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theirmissionandtheyperceivethattheirclassmatesattachlittlevaluetothatmission.Asa

seeminglysmallbutstillirritatingmatter,asamissilecrewwatchesthecomputerdisplayfor

theirmissionbriefingbeforestartingeachperiodofduty,theyseetheofficialclassifiedAir

ForcescreensaverwhichfeaturesasingleweaponssystemanF22.TheyalsonotethatAir

Forcerecruitingadsandposters,defenseindustryadvertising,andotherformsofAirForce

publicrelations

activity

seem

to

ignore

the

ballistic

missile

mission.

This

combination

makes

it

difficultfortheleadershipintheoperationalforcestoconvincethecrewsthattheirserviceis

valuedcommensuratewiththedeclaredpriorityoftheirmission.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthatAirForcepublic

relationsandpromotionalmessagesincludethenuclearforcesinportrayingtheAirForce

missionandfocus.

TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshould

frequentlyreinforcetheprimacyofthenucleardeterrencemissionwithcommunicationsto

HeadquartersAir

Force,

the

Major

Air

Commands,

and

the

nuclear

operational

forces

and

logisticssupportorganizations.

OperationsBombWings

TheattitudeintheBombWingsisgenerallypositive.Theirmissiondemandsahighopstempo,

buttheyseemtodealwithiteffectively.Still,theefforttorefocusthewingsonthenuclear

missionischallenging itremainsdifficultforaircrewstobetrulyimmersedinthenuclear

mission.Nosinglewingcanmeettherapidreactionnuclearrequirement.Consequently,the

commitmentissharedonanadhocandpiecemealbasisbetweenBombWings.Thismaybe

thebestapproachgiventhecurrentforcedistribution,butitmakesitdifficultinaselectedpart

oftheunittomaintainahighdegreeoffocusonoperationalreadinesstoperformthestrategic

nuclearmission.

Inordertobereadytoassumethenuclearcommitment,crewsmustretainsomeleveloffocus

onthenuclearmissionwhiledeployedelsewhereforcommitmenttocontinuouspresence.In

spiteofseniorleadershipfocus,manycrewsvaluethesedeploymentsandtheconventional

missionabovethenuclearmission.Again,partofthisattitudestemsfromwhattheyperceive

asthewiderAirForceattitudetowardsthenuclearbombermission.Thisisexacerbatedbythe

widelyreportedinternaldebatesinthePentagonaboutthefutureofthebomberlegofthe

nucleartriad.TheinternalPentagondebateiswellknownintheoperationalbomberunits.As

inthecaseoftheMissileWings,B52crewsaresubjectedonadailybasistotheF22AirForce

classifiedscreensaverwhichreinforcestheirperceptionthatthefighteraircraftmission

dominatesAir

Force

attention

and

priorities.

And,

there

is

ageneral

perception

that

the

nuclear

missionisancillarytothecrewsotherdemandingmissions.Thiscombinationoffactorsisa

continuingobstacletoconvincingtheB52forcethatthenuclearmissionisfirstpriority.

Recommendation:TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshoulddirectmoving

fromtheadhocapproachtomeetingthenuclearbombercommitmenttoaformalprogram

thatisinsulatedfromotherdemands.

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Maintenance

and

Sustainment

Missile

Wings

and

Munitions

Support

Squadrons

(Europe)

Theworkloadformissileandweaponsmaintenancehasincreasedsignificantlywiththe

reductionsinmanpower,reductionsinexperiencedNCOsupervisors,failuresofsupport

equipment,andinadequatetechnicaldata.Theseconditionsarenottheresultof

reorganizationnor

will

further

reorganization

be

the

solution

to

the

need.

Withtheformationofnewhigherheadquartersorganizations,nearly48%oftheMSgtsand

SMSgtsintheNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)careerfield(nuclearmunitions

maintenance)areathigherheadquarterscreatingpoliciesfororinspectingthe52%that

provideNCOleadershipintheoperatingwings.Thisnumberiswellknownamongthe52%.

Table3showsthestaffpositionsmannedfromfieldresourcesasofAugust2010.Dueto

reducedoverallnumbers,thisisafragilecareerfieldandrequiresspecialattentiontoensure

theneededlevelofexpertiseandquantityofqualifiedpeopleintheoperatingforce.

Table3:MigrationofSeniorNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)NCOs

Organization

Current

Authorization

HAF/A10 1SMSgt

AFIA 2MSgt

AFGSC 1SMSgt;4MSgt

AFSC 2MSgt

DTRA 2MSgt

EUCOM 1MSgt

STRATCOM 2MSgt

USAFE/A3NM

1

MSgt

USAFE/IG 1MSgt

AFMC/IG 3MSgt

AFMC/A10 1SMSgt;1MSgt

AFMC/A4 3MSgt

AFNWC/LG 1MSgt

ICBMSYSTEMSDIVISION(HILL) 2MSgt

49THT&ESqd 2MSgt

708NSUS 1SMSgt;6MSgt

709NSS

1MSgt

710NSS 1MSgt

Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shouldinitiateaprogramtoensureaprioritybalance

suchthattheoperatingforceshavetheneededseniorNCOleadershipfromthe2W2career

fieldtoincludeimmediateactiontoaddressthemismatchbetweenseniorNCOssupervising

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workintheunitsandseniorNCOsoverseeingandinspectingtheperformanceofoperational

andlogisticsunits.

ICBM

Warhead

Sustainment

TheslowresponsetoinadequatetechnicaldataincreasedtheICBMnuclearmunitions

maintenanceworkload.

Munitions

components

are

received

at

the

missile

wings

from

the

weaponsdepotandfromothersites.Beforeassemblingcomponentsforloadingona

Minutemanmissile,thetechnicianmustinspecttheconditionofthecomponent. The

inspectionfrequentlyrevealssmalldefects(nicksandscratches,mostlycosmeticinnature)that

arenotaddressedinthetechnicaldata.Ondiscoveringthesedefects,themunitions

maintenanceorganizationhasnochoicebuttodocumentthedefects,returntheassetto

storage,andsendthepaperworktotheICBMSystemsDivisionforanengineeringjudgment.

Sinceittakesaboutahalfdaytoprepareanitemforinspectionandanotherhalfdayto

documentthedefectsandreturntheitemtostorage,eachsuchincidentcostsadays

productivityforacrew.Thishadoccurred55timesMay2010throughAugust2010atthe15th

MUNS.

In52

of

those

cases,

the

engineering

judgment

ultimately

rendered

was

that

the

item

wasserviceable.Thismeans52daysofneedlesslostproductivityinasinglemissilewinginthe

periodnoted.

TheAFNWChasbeenworkingthissituationfortwoyears.Whiletheoptionsforcorrectingthis

deficiencyarewellunderstoodpreinspectionanddocumentationbeforeshipment,rapidly

changingthetechorders,and/oronsitejudgmentthereseemedtobetimeconsuming

obstaclestoanyofthesolutions.Withthisconditionasacontributor,munitionsmaintenance

peopleworkexcessiveshiftsandweekendstomeettheneedforwarheadsfordeployed

missiles.

Recently,theAFNWCidentifiedfourtechnicalorders(techorders)thatcovertheareasmaking

upover

two

thirds

of

the

cases

where

inadequate

tech

data

necessitated

engineering

assessment.Twoofthesetechordershavebeenexpandedandreissued.Atthetimeofthis

report,theothertwowerestillinwork.Thisactionshouldsignificantlyreducethisparticular

obstacletoefficientmunitionsmaintenanceinthemissilewings.

Analltoocommonresponsefromjuniorairmentoseniormastersergeantstoquestionsabout

theirfutureplanswasthattheyhadenoughoftheworkingconditionsandstateoflogistics

supportandtheywereleavingeitherthecareerfieldortheAirForce.Severaldeclaredthatit

wasntthelonghoursofworkthatbotheredthem;itwasthelonghourswhentheycouldnot

dotheirworkbecauseoftechorders,supportequipmentissues,andinspections.

Thereisamorefundamentalcauseofthissituation.Inthepast,thejudgmentsregardingthe

cosmeticdefectscausingsomeofthisproblemwererenderedbyexperiencedmunitions

maintenancepeopleintheWSA.Withthedriveforzerodefects,thisbecameunacceptableto

somelevelsofnuclearenterpriseleadership.Thefallacyisthegoalofzerocosmeticdefectsin

30yearoldweapons.Thisisneitherachievablenornecessary.Ifthestandardispeerreviewed

engineeringassessmentforcosmeticdefects,thenthesystemhascrossedthethresholdtozero

risk.Intheworstcase,therecouldbesomeslightriskthatafaultyjudgmentregardingasmall

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nickorscratchcouldcauseawarheadtofailonreentry.Again,thisissuecontributestothe

perceptionofdistrustoftheprofessionalqualificationoftheworkforce.

Recommendations:TheCommander,AirForceNuclearWeaponsCentershould:

Directimmediateactiontoreestablishriskmanagementandtrustinthetechnicians

judgmentversus

risk

avoidance

on

cosmetic

defects

with

the

needed

technical

data

and

trainingprogramtosupportthatjudgment.

Provideonsiteengineeringsupportuntilprocessesareinplacetoseparatethecosmetic

defectsinRVcomponentsrequiringengineeringanalysis.

SupportequipmentforICBMmunitionsandmissilemaintenanceisoldandattheendofits

usefullife.TheReentrySystemTestSet(RSTS)wasdeliveredinthe1960sandincludes1950s

technology.ThereareplanstoreplaceitwithaFullOperationalCapabilitybutnotuntil2017.

GivenalltheotherneedsacrosstheAirForce,thedecisionhasbeenthatthisistheright

priority.However,thisisthetestsetthatverifiesMMIIIreentrysystems(Mk12,Mk12A,and

Mk21)andreentryvehicleintegrity.Maintenancetechniciansperceivethis2017replacement

dateas

amismatch

between

stated

mission

priorities

and

logistics

support

priorities.

Failuretoreplaceseeminglysimplepiecesofsupportequipmentsuchasconnectingcablesisa

majorirritantandobstacletoproductivity.Thesameistrueofsupportequipmentformissile

maintenance. Again,overthepasttwoyearsthishasreceivedattentionwithacontractthat

wastodelivernewcablesinlate2010.WhiletheTaskForceheardcomplaintsaboutthis

problemfromeachofthemissilewings,therewasnoindicationthattheworkforceknewthat

helpisontheway.Thisillustratestheneedforamoreproactiveapproachtoinformingthe

troops.

Vehiclesessential

to

transporting

and

removing/installing

missiles

and

post

boost

vehicles

in

thesilosprovideanexampleofacquisitiondecisionsthatseemtolackmeaningfulconsultation

withthepeoplewhoperformthemission.Atleastthisisaperceptionamongpeoplewhouse

thisvitalequipment.Thetractorsaremodern2003and2009models.Sincecabovertractors

arenolongerproducedintheU.S.forcommercialtruckinguse,thedecisionwastochangenew

procurementtotheindustrystandardtractors.Theproblemisthattheadditionallengthofthe

industrystandardtractorreducesmaneuverabilitymakingthemdifficulttoimpossibleto

maneuveronsomeofthelaunchsites.Thenewtractorswereprocuredasacommodityitem

withnoconsiderationofspecialdemandsofthenuclearsupportmission.

Further,whilethetransportererectortrailershavebeenupgraded,themostessentialpieceof

equipment,acomplex

hoist,

is

40

years

old

with

no

known

plans

for

replacement.

When

the

transportererectorswererefurbishedsome20yearsago,theenvisionedrefurbishment

includedanewhoist.Theaddedexpenseofthenewhoistledtodirectionthatacheaper

programbedeveloped.Thisisanotherexampleofalowestcost,stopgapapproachtosupport

equipmentessentialtotheAirForcesfirstprioritymission.Thereisstillnoprogramtoreplace

thehoists.

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Munitions

Support

Squadron

(MUNSS)

AttheMUNSSsites,weaponsmaintenancemustbeperformedinsidetheprotectiveaircraft

shelter.Thecentralpieceofsupportequipmenttoprovidethismaintenancecapabilityisthe

WeaponsMaintenanceTruck(WMT).Thesetrucksweredesignedfora20yearlifemorethan

20yearsago.Whileitiscommonforsystemstobeusedbeyondtheirdesignlife,thewearand

tearon

these

trucks

has

far

exceeded

the

design

operating

environment.

For

example,

they

weredesignedtodelivertheneededcapabilityintheaircraftshelter,notforextensiveroad

travel.Inpractice,thesetrucksmusttravelsomedistancetoamainoperatingbaseforroutine

maintenance.Further,theWMTswereprocuredanddeliveredwithnoplannedsustainment

package.TheMUNSSsitesoftendependontemporaryWMTloansfromothersites.

TheTaskForceheardmostlypositivecommentsabouttheperformanceoftheengineering

detachment,Det1,responsibleformaintenance/sustainmentoftheweaponsvaultsand

portionsoftheWMT(hoist,electricalsystems).However,theoperatingunitsalsodescribed

howDet1wasundermannedforthesustainmentdemandsplaceduponit.Det1,underthe

498th

MunitionsMaintenanceGroupatRamstein,comprises21personnel,mostlyengineers,to

serviceall

of

these

aging

systems.

Themaintenanceissueisfurtherexacerbatedbythefailuretoplanforandprocurea

sustainmentpackageforthesesystems.Hence,partsandsupportcantakeanextendedperiod

forroutineneeds.Asanexample,aWMTfromoneofthesiteshasbeenunderrepairat

Ramsteinformorethanayear.Atthetimeofourvisit,itwasawaitingtirestocompletethe

work.Thesearestandardheavytrucktires.

ThecurrentplanistoreplacetheWMTswiththeSecureTransportableMaintenanceSystemin

2014.Aprototypehasbeeninexistenceforsometwoyears.WhenMUNSSpeopletaketheir

20yearoldessentialequipmenttoamainoperatingbaseforrepair,theynoticethefleetof

relatively

new

fuel

trucks

populating

the

flight

line

supporting

the

conventional

tactical

fighter

mission.

Anissuecommontoothernuclearoperationsisthelackofsupplypriority.Partoftheissueis

infrequentdemandforsomepartsandthefailuretoplanforasustainmentpackage.Butpart

oftheissueispriority.Itisnotdifficulttounderstandthatwhenthereiscompetitionforassets

betweentheforcesincombatandeveryoneelse,theprioritywillproperlygotoforcesin

combat.Stillthereshouldbeatleastsensitivitytotheneedsofthenuclearenterprisewhich

areoftensmallcomparedtoothers.Forexample,aninquiryaboutthestatusofanorderfora

smallnumberofnightvisiongogglesforthesecurityforcesassignedtothenuclearmissionwas

answeredbytheitemmanagerwiththeinformationthattheunitsneedwaspriority2with

more

than

200

priority

2

orders

ahead

of

these

security

forces.

Some

Common

Bottom

Lines

for

ICBMs

and

MUNSS

Thereareotherexamples,buttheexamplesabovedemonstratethreekeypoints:

Slowresponsetotechorderandequipmentissuessendsanegativemessageandaddsto

theworkloadofmunitionsmaintenancepersonnel,requiringextraordinaryeffortsto

sustainthemission.

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Thelackofanailsyndromeisreal.Payingattentiontoallthebitsandpiecesofsupport

equipmentneededtosustainthemissionisasimportantasmajorpiecesofequipment.

Theprocessofdesigningandprocuringnewsupportequipmentwhetheritbelarge

tractorsortheneedforconnectingcablesshouldbemadeonthebasisoflongterm

effectivenessratherthantheimmediatecost.Decisionsshouldalsoincludeconsultingthe

peoplewho

use

the

equipment

to

support

the

mission

at

the

operating

units.

Consulting

peopleintheheadquartersisnotasubstitute.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:

Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices

forcorrectiveactionareorientedtolongtermsustainmentratherthanthelowestnear

termcostpath.

TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgivefundingandprogrampriorityto

logisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrencemissioncommensuratewiththe

priorityof

the

nuclear

deterrence

mission.

TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgiveurgentattentiontoreplacing40+ year

oldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportandtestequipmentattheoperatingwings

andtheairlogisticscenterandtoreplacingtheWeaponsMaintenanceTrucksatthe

MUNSSsites.

TheCommander,AFGSCandCommander,AFNWCshoulddirectagreatlyincreased

communicationsefforttokeeptheoperatingforcesinformedaboutactionsunderwayto

addresstheirsupportissues.

TheCommander,AFGSCshouldensurethatequipmentpeculiartosupportofnuclear

operationsis

treated

as

specialized

equipment

before

reverting

to

acommodity

approach.

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U.S.AirForcesinEurope

USAFEnuclearforceshaveasetofspecialchallengestoinclude:

Theoperationsareunique.

o TheMunitionsSupportSquadronseachsupportandaresupportedbyadifferent

alliedair

force.

o ThereisakeyUSNATODualCapableAircraft(DCA)tasking.

TheunitsaresubjecttobothUSAFandNATOdirectives.Thesedirectivesaresometimes

inconflictduetovariedupdatecyclesorduetounresolvedconflicts.

TheunitsaresubjecttoUSAF,DTRA,andNATOinspectionsandinspectioncriteria.

Thereishighturnoverinessentialpersonnel,sometimeswithmostofthesenior

leadershipchangingoverashortperiod.

TheuniquenatureoftheNATODCAtaskingraisessomeissueswithreadinesscriteriaandwith

inspectionteams.TherequirementistobecapableofbringingarequiredDCAsquadrontothe

requiredreadinesswithinaspecifiedtime.Tomeetthisrequirement,itisclearthatthewing

mustsustain

certain

capabilities

at

constant

readiness,

e.g.,

security

forces,

systems

maintenanceandcontrol,andcommandandcontrolsystemsandcapabilities.Atthesametime

thereistimetobringothercapabilitiesfromalowerstateofreadinesstotherequiredlevel.

Theissueistheneedforcleardefinitionofwhatisrequiredonadailybasis.Thisleadsto

concernsaboutthedifferencebetweenwhatthewingcommanderbelievesisrequiredtomeet

theNATODCAcapabilityandtimingrequirement,andthedesireofanNSIteamtoassess

capabilitiesthatthewingdoesnotneedtokeepataconstantstateofreadiness.Additionally,

thewingmustcontinuouslymeetitsongoingcombatoperationsrequirementsleadingto

constantchangeinforcesassignedtomeettheNATOrequirement.

ThemismatchbetweenUSAFandNATOdirectivesandinspectionrequirementscanhavean

adverseimpact

on

NATO

strike

evaluation

(STRIKEVAL)

operations.

For

example,

USAF

directivespermittowinganuclearloadedaircraftonlyasalastresortinanemergencywhile

NATOrulespermitsuchtowingasneededtomeetthegenerationrequirements.Giventhe

distributionofaircraftandmunitionsatsomelocations,thiscanresultinNATOSTRIKEVAL

scenariosthataredifficultifnotimpossibletomeetwithUSAFdirectedlimitation.Insuch

cases,thewingcommandermustcomplyfirstwithUSAFdirectives.

TheimpactoftherapidturnoverinEuropeisexacerbatedbyatleasttwopersonnelpoliciesor

practices.Theneedistomaintainahighlevelofnuclearoperationsandmaintenance

experienceandcompetence.However,itatleastappearsthatassignmentstothekeyDCA

FighterWingaremadewithattentiontofactorsthancanoverrideattentiontonuclear

experience.There

is

areluctance

to

allow

people

to

extend

in

Europe

when

they

volunteer

and

theirexperienceisimportanttoDCAoperations.Partofthereasonforthereluctanceisthat

manyassignedtoanunaccompaniedtourataspecificbaseoverseasarepromisedthatatthe

endofthisunaccompaniedtourtheywillbeassignedtofighterunitsinUSAFE.Theendresultis

aflowofpeoplewhohavenonuclearexperienceintothekeyDCAwinginEurope.Thissame

setofpoliciesimpactstheMUNSSsites.Thisisparticularlyimportantatthesesitessincethey

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aresmall(typicallylessthan150totalassigned)andsometimesareonedeepincritical

experience.

Recommendations:

TheCommander,USAirForcesinEuropeshould:

Directthe

USAFE

A3

to

provide

clarity

on

the

elements

of

the

DCA

mission

that

require

continuousreadinessandthosethatcanbebroughttotheneededlevelwithinthe

prescribedtime.

IdentifythedisconnectsbetweenNATOandUSAFdirectivesthatimpactnuclearoperations

andestablishaworkingbodywithNATOtoresolvethedifferences.

TheAirForceA1shoulddirectareexaminationorclarificationofthepolicyorpractice

opposingvoluntaryextensionsfornuclearexperiencedpeopleinEuropeandthecriteriafor

assignmentsfromnonnuclearmissionstotheDCAmissionunits.

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GuidanceversusDirection

Acontinuingissueinthenuclearforcesistheadequacyofdirection.TheAirForcemovetothe

philosophyoftheAirForceInstructionversustheAirForceRegulationprobablyachievesits

intendedpurposeinotheractivities.Thephilosophyseemstobetodescribewhatistobe

done,to

give

guidance,

and

to

leverage

the

experience

and

talents

of

Air

Force

people

to

do

the

jobmoreeffectivelyandefficiently.Itwouldbedifficulttofaultthatpropositionwereitnot

contrarytothedemandsofthenuclearmissionwherethepremiumisondoingthingsexactly

rightandasprescribedeverytime.Thereislittleroomforadhocinnovationinthenuclear

operationsandmaintenancebusiness.

AcommonanswerbyseniorNCOsinthenuclearenterprisetoaquestionaboutthedifference

betweenaninstructionandaregulationisthatthefirstprovidesguidance(somesay

suggestionsorphilosophy),thesecondprovidesdirection.Oneofthedifficultieswithguidance

versusdirectionisdifferentinterpretationsbyunitsupervisors,staffassistanceteams,and

inspectors.Inthenuclearbusiness,roomforinterpretation,innovation,andincreased

efficiencyis

more

likely

to

be

an

obstacle

than

an

enabler.

One

such

innovation,

simultaneously

inventoryingthestoragefacilitywhilepreparingtheloadfortransporttotheflightline,wasa

factorintheunauthorizedtransferincidentin2007.Anotherfactorwasadifferent

interpretationofwhatconstitutedverificationofthepayloadinthecruisemissilesbeing

transported.Intheseareastheconceptofguidancehasnowbeenreplacedwithcleardirection

toincludeprocessesthatneitherrequirenorallowinterpretation.Inotherareas,clearer

directionisstillneeded.

GlobalStrikeCommandisintheprocessofprovidingthatdirection.Thecommandisnearing

completionofworktobringsome190documentsthatprovideguidanceanddirectionupto

thestandardneededinthenuclearenterprise.

Recommendations:

TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectreviewoftheapproachto

guidingnuclearoperationstoensureitisdirectionwithadequatedetailviceguidancethat

leavesthedetailsopentointerpretation.

TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshouldcompletetheongoingAFGSCwork

tosupplementAFIsasneededtoprovidecleardirectionfornuclearweaponsoperations.

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EnlistedPersonnelManagement

ThereareanumberofintersectingissuesthatcouldleadtoaperfectstormincriticalNCO

leadershipandsupervisioninthemaintenancefields.Specifically,therearefourissues:

ThedrawonexperiencedMSgtsandSMSgtstomanoversightorganizations,

Highyear

tenure

(HYT),

InflexibleenlistedassignmentpoliciesandpracticesforallranksbelowE9,and

SomeMSgtsandSMSgtsdepartingforgreenerpastures.

ThedrawonexperiencedseniorNCOsisaddressedelsewhereinthisreport.Theissueinthe

operationalunitswithhighyeartenureisinflexibility.ThepurposeofHYTtopreventstagnation

intheseniorNCOpopulationisunderstoodandisnot,initself,anissue.Theissueisthatthe

operatingforcesassumetherewillbenowaiversandarereluctanttoaskforthem.Inasmall

careerfieldlikethe2W2field,asingle,experiencedMSgtorSMSgtmaybeunusuallyimportant

tothemissionforsomeperiodoftimeuntilareplacementisonboardanduptospeed.The

issueonenlistedassignmentpoliciesistheperceptionandperhapsthefactthatthesystem

doesnot

pay

adequate

attention

to

special

experience

identifiers.

Hence,

base

of

preference

or

someotherassignmentpolicyfactormaysendaC17crewchieftoaB52wingwithout

appreciationfortheverydifferentdemandsfortheB52crewchief. Thegreenerpastureinthe

fourthbulletaboveisalmostanywhereexceptthecurrentworkingconditionsanddemands.

TheendresultoftheseniorNCOassignmentissuesisthatinoneofthebomberwings,the

turnoverrateforMSgtsinthenuclearmaintenancecareerfieldinasingleyearwas70%. For

SMSgts,itwas100%.

Atthesamewing,turnoverrateinweaponsloaderswas30%.Crewchiefmanningwasat75%.

TheNuclearIssueResolutionandIntegration(NIRI)Boardisawareoftheconsequencesof

theseintersecting

issues

and

provides

the

following

assessment

of

critical

skills:

NuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)atacriticalpoint

MissileandSpaceMaintenance(2M0)atalevelofconcern

AerospaceMaintenance/HeavyCrewChiefs(2A5)atalevelofconcern

Munitions,MissileMaintenance(21M)(amunitionsofficerAFSC)atalevelofconcern

ThemostoptimisticassumptionexpressedtotheTaskForcewasthat,overtime,thesecareer

fieldswillbemannedintheoperatingforcestothesamelevelastherestoftheAirForce

(85%).

Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddevelopandimplementaprocessforspecial

managementof

nuclear

career

fields

those

in

which

small

numbers

create

special

challenges.

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ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)

Thefollowingdiscussion,findings,andrecommendationsaresimilartothoseincludedinthe

2004PermanentTaskForce(thencalledtheJointAdvisoryCommittee)reportonAirForce

NuclearSuretyInspections(NSI).TheDoDguidanceonPRPhasimprovedsignificantlysince

2004.In

contrast,

the

practice

in

the

Air

Force

has

not

improved.

The

importance

of

this

programdictatesthatitbecoherent,wellmanaged,andreasonablyattainable. Theprogram

continuestosuffer,insomecasesincreasinglyso,fromfundamentaldeficienciesthatwork

againsttheprogramspurposeandimportance.

AccordingtotheDoD5210.42RegulationandAirForceManual103902,thepurposeofthe

PRPistoensurethateachpersonselectedandretainedforperformingdutiesassociatedwith

nuclearweaponsornuclearcommandandcontrolsystemsandequipmentisemotionallystable

andphysicallycapable,andhasdemonstratedreliabilityandprofessionalcapability.1In

identifyingpotentiallydisqualifyingordecertifyinginformationtheguidancestatesthatin

evaluatingcertaintraitsorconduct(suchasalcoholuse,druguse,medicalcondition,poor

attitude,lack

of

motivation),

certifying

and

reviewing

officials

shall

ensure

there

is

no

reasonabledoubtofanindividualsreliability...2Thisisahighbutattainablestandard.Earlier

languagecalledforreliabilitybeyondanydoubt anunattainablestandard.

DiscussionswithcommandersandPRPmonitorsmakeitclearthattherehasbeencontinuing

escalationinpursuitofabsolutegoals.Infact,whencommanderswereaskedspecificallyabout

theDoDdescribedstandardforPRPreliability,nonequotedtheDoDguidance.Thiscontinued

focusonabsoluteassuranceofreliabilityhasproducedimportantdysfunctionalaspectsinthe

programtoincludetheuseofsuspensionanddecertificationactionsasriskavoidance

measures. Riskavoidancepermeatesthestructureandpracticeoftheprogram.

Currentpracticesproduceanenvironmentofdistrust,implyingthatthepeopleselectedand

qualifiedfor

demanding

nuclear

duties

and

who

are

critically

important

to

the

mission

are

not

sufficientlytrustworthytoliveanacceptabledailylife.Itthenfollowsthattheymustconstantly

reestablishreliability. EventhepossibilityofPotentiallyDisqualifyingInformation(PDI)leadsto

temporarydecertificationuntilitisestablishedthattherehasbeennocompromiseof

reliability. Basedonthisfundamentallyflawedassumption,thePRPrepeatedlyreexaminesthe

historyofeachindividual.

Asoneexampleoftheconsequencesofthisattitude,personnelareautomaticallysuspended

fromPRPdutieswhenreferredbyAirForcemedicalauthoritiestooffbasemedicaltreatment

regardlessofthenatureofthereferral. Theindividualmustthenreporttobasemedical

authoritiestobereinstated. TheDoDguidancedoesnotrequireautomaticsuspensionbut

insteadrequires

follow

up

after

treatment.

Individuals

should

be

suspended

only

Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

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